

This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).  
[<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>]



# Communication Strategy of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland in the Context of Russian Aggression Against Ukraine: An Analysis of the Content Shared on its Facebook Profile Between 24 February and 23 March 2022

Adriana Kanarek | University of Gdańsk  
ORCID: 0000-0003-4093-0504

## Abstract

**Keywords:**  
political communication, war in Ukraine, communication strategies, Facebook, Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland

The article contains an analysis of the communication strategy used by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland on its official Facebook profile during the first month of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The shared content, which was analysed in this paper, had a distinctive character given the immediate proximity of the ongoing conflict, which required the government to face current challenges, such as the growing number of refugees or numerous appeals to foreign leaders for support for the attacked state. Furthermore, in addition to the abovementioned challenges, these communications were conducted in the context of a declining sense of security among Polish citizens. The article aims to illustrate the communication strategy that, according to its goal criterion, was implemented by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland. In addition, the article identifies the forms of posts that were most often used by the Chancellery.

## Strategia komunikowania Kancelarii Prezesa Rady Ministrów w Polsce w sytuacji rosyjskiej agresji na Ukrainę – analiza treści publikowanych na oficjalnym profilu KPRM na Facebooku w okresie 24.02-23.03.2022 (Streszczenie)

**Słowa kluczowe:**  
komunikowanie polityczne, wojna w Ukrainie, strategia komunikacyjna, Facebook, Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów

W artykule przeprowadzono analizę strategii komunikacyjnej stosowanej przez Kancelarię Prezesa Rady Ministrów na jej oficjalnym profilu w serwisie społecznościowym Facebook w pierwszym miesiącu pełnoskalowej rosyjskiej agresji na Ukrainę w 2022 r. Udostępniane treści, będące przedmiotem badania, miały szczególny charakter ze względu na bezpośrednią bliskość trwającego konfliktu, co prowadziło do konieczności mierzenia się z bieżącymi wyzwaniami, takimi jak napływająca liczba uchodźców czy liczne apele do zagranicznych przywódców o wsparcie dla zaatakowanego państwa. Co więcej, oprócz powyższych

zidentyfikowanych wyzwań, komunikacja prowadzona była w kontekście spadającego poczucia bezpieczeństwa wśród polskich obywateli. Artykuł ma zobrażać, jaką strategię komunikacyjną, zgodnie z kryterium celu, wdrożyła polska Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów. Ponadto w pracy zostaną wskazane formy postów, które były najczęściej wykorzystywane przez tę jednostkę rządową.

## Introduction

On 24 February 2022 Russia invaded the territory of Ukraine. Following an address by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, to the Russian people, a “special military operation” was initiated. The key objective was to defend the population of Donbas against the alleged “genocide” perpetrated by Ukrainians and “to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine”, which posed a threat to Russia’s security (Wilk, Domańska 2022). On Thursday, 24 February 2022, news spread worldwide of numerous airstrikes on targets across Ukraine, while Russian forces crossed the Ukrainian border and began offensive operations in the country.

The reaction of Western countries to the invasion launched by Russia was immediate, ranging from condemning the aggression against an independent state, through gradual suspension of Russia’s membership in various international organizations, to the imposition of sanctions, including economic, diplomatic, and individual sanctions targeting specific entities. Political leaders and international authorities from various fields called on Russia to halt its military operations. On the day the invasion began, demonstrations took place in many cities around the world in support of and in unity with the Ukrainians affected by the conflict. On social media, blue-and-yellow logos and profile picture overlays with the Ukrainian flag appeared as a sign of solidarity with the attacked country. At the same time, humanitarian aid and material support played a crucial role, as it helped to meet the basic needs of refugees. The Russian aggression against Ukraine undoubtedly continues to constitute a crisis situation, affecting international security. The events described particularly impact Ukraine’s immediate neighbours in terms of their military security and the social impact related to the influx of war refugees.

In the circumstances outlined above, Poland as a neighbour and partner clearly expressed its support and solidarity with the attacked Ukraine and took actions aimed at providing comprehensive assistance.<sup>1</sup> Many Poles felt the need to support Ukrainians fleeing the war and, therefore, spontaneous collections of products, financial resources, shelter, and transport for them were organized. Alongside empathy and compassion, these actions were also accompanied by concern and fears about

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda, visited Kyiv the day before the Russian invasion began, i.e., on 23 February 2022, as a sign of solidarity with Ukraine (Prezydent.pl 2022).

whether the conflict initiated by the Russian Federation would escalate and spread further onto the Polish territory.<sup>2</sup>

Assistance on such a large scale required coordination mechanisms to be put in place by the Polish government, providing support from the Government Agency for Strategic Reserves and other state and local government institutions. In Poland, the Council of Ministers is the main government body which is in charge of coordinating crisis management actions and enhancing the sense of security among citizens. The Chancellery of the Prime Minister (hereinafter in this article I will also be using its Polish abbreviation "KPRM") is a special unit serving as an auxiliary body for the actions taken.

In this article, we will describe the informational activities that the Prime Minister's Chancellery undertook on its Facebook profile during the first month of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. Assuming that the communication activities carried out by KPRM were primarily aimed at promoting the actions of the Prime Minister, the conducted content analysis is intended to examine the forms of communication on Facebook used, the dominant topics of posts, and the communication strategies employed according to the criterion of purpose.

## 1. Basic Tasks of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister

In accordance with Article 146 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the Council of Ministers, consisting primarily of the Prime Minister and ministers, is responsible for conducting the internal and foreign policy of the Republic of Poland (official journal "Dz.U." of 1997, No. 78, item 483). Alongside the President, it constitutes the second executive authority. In connection with the ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine and, consequently, the decreasing sense of security among Polish citizens and growing fears of war-related threats, the key tasks carried out by the Council of Ministers include ensuring external and internal security of the state and public order, as well as exercising general leadership in the field of national defence and determining the annual number of citizens called up for active military service (official journal "Dz.U." of 1997, No. 78, item 483). However, it should be noted that the scope of activities specified in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland is an open catalogue which is detailed in lower-ranking acts, such as laws and regulations.

Referring to the subject under study, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister is an institution responsible for providing services to the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, the Collegium for Special Services Affairs, and the Head of the Civil Service (official journal "Dz.U." of 1996, No. 106, item 492). Acting on behalf

<sup>2</sup> According to a survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Centre in March 2022, 85% of Poles believed that the war in Ukraine posed a threat to Poland's security (Feliksiak, Roguska 2022).

of the Prime Minister, it carries out tasks such as preparing assessments of the internal situation of the state and international conditions, coordinating the personnel policy of government administration and cooperation with legislative and executive authorities in Poland, and providing informational and press services to the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister, and internal auxiliary and advisory bodies of the Council of Ministers, as well as performing tasks related to national defence (official journal "Dz.U." of 1996, No. 106, item 492).

With regard to the circumstances that arose as a result of the Russian aggression in Ukraine and the conducted research, it should be added that the KPRM implemented the abovementioned tasks also in relation to actions undertaken in connection with the current information policy addressed to the general public. Therefore, fulfilling one of its statutory tasks, which is public communication, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister implemented a communication strategy, effectively reaching citizens and informing them of the activities undertaken by the government.

## 2. Types and Strategies of Communication

The functioning of modern states and societies depends on information exchange processes. Every person participates, more or less consciously, in various processes of social communication every day – from interpersonal communication, in which the sender and recipient are directly designated, which is interactive in nature, and focused on feedback (Castells 2013), to much broader mass communication in which messages are disseminated largely through mass media. Additionally, recipients also receive content related to public and political communication processes.

Observing contemporary realities, these types of communication are often mistakenly equated with each other. Although public and political communications intersect, it is necessary to clearly define both these concepts. Public communication is a formal communication occurring in a specific communicative (informational) space, and is aimed at transmitting and exchanging information of public interest and maintaining social ties through responsible public institutions, such as state and local government authorities or government administration units (Dobek-Ostrowska, Wiszniowski 2007: 18). Political communication, in its simplest definition, is a purpose-oriented communication about politics (Dobek-Ostrowska 2006: 130), and the primary goal of the entities that use this type of communication is to gain or maintain power. As Stanisław Michalczyk points out, referring to Richard Perloff, it constitutes a "process of exchanging information between political leaders, media, and citizens about events and issues occurring in the sphere of public policy" (Michalczyk 2005: 17). It should be emphasized that the communication entities specified in the above definition, i.e., politicians, the media, and citizens, form the so-called "golden triangle of communication" within which political discussion takes place (Adamik-Szysiak 2018).

Hence, it should be emphasized that every message, whether it is an element of public or political communication, is distributed for a purpose. Therefore, communication can be divided into two types: informational and persuasive.

The basic assumption of informational communication is the exchange of information between participants in a process intended to help achieve mutual understanding, assuming that the informational message is neutral and the sender does not intend to influence the behaviour and attitudes of the recipients. As Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska emphasizes: "Recipients engage in the communication process, expecting the sender to provide them with the knowledge they do not possess" (Dobek-Ostrowska 2004). Persuasive communication, on the other hand, is a process in which the sender, using tools such as influence techniques, persuasion, or encouragement, attempts to influence the other party to change their reactions and behaviours, shape new opinions and attitudes, or change existing ones and provoke desired actions (Dobek-Ostrowska 2004: 33).

An analysis of messages distributed by public and political entities reveals that they largely employ a communication strategy prepared in advance. This can be defined as "a set of actions aimed at achieving desired future states (ultimate goals) that are determined by the information-disseminating entities (...)" (Kolczyński 2024: 382). In the case of politicians, it should be recognized that the main objective of the formulated strategies is to capture the interest of the potential electorate in the proposed concepts, ideas, and activities and to motivate them to provide support, especially electoral support (Adamik-Szysiak 2018). Furthermore, as Mariusz Kolczyński has noted, "the emergence and improvement of [political] communication strategies should be linked to the historical process of the evolutionary shaping of state functions (...), and the specific functions performed by specialized state bodies and agencies, the implementation of which conditions the development and survival of the entire state system" (Kolczyński 2008: 47). Referring to the above division of communication types, one can identify the type of communication strategy determined by the criterion of purpose, i.e., informational and persuasive strategies (Dobek-Ostrowska 2004: 33).

The subject of the research presented in this article is the official profile of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister on the Facebook social media platform. At this point, it should be noted that the messages disseminated by this body should be regarded as public communication. The KPRM is a public administration body operating in Poland, and its audience consists of the country's citizens to whom the information of public interest is directed. Thus, when conducting research related to the analysis of the content published in one of the KPRM's social media channels, the authors decided to adopt the division of strategies presented in the paragraphs above, according to the criterion of the purpose conditioning the communicative actions.

### 3. The Facebook Profile of the Prime Minister's Chancellery: the Results of Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses

Social media has become an integral part of our world. Serving both as a source of entertainment and a platform for facilitating communication, social media has also emerged as one of the primary sources of information about current events (Statista 2022). What is more, they play a role in politics. As Katarzyna Kamińska-Korolczuk notes, they have introduced a specific form of influence in this sphere as “they influence people’s opinions about the world, lock users into a specific circle of information, and can also lead to a situation where actions taken online will set new standards not only for communication but also for governance” (Kamińska-Korolczuk 2021: 61). At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that social media structures provide political entities with excellent opportunities to reach their audience directly, mobilize voters, bypass information filters, and influence public opinion (Engesser et al. 2017; Magin et al. 2024).

Founded in 2004 as a closed network for Harvard University students to facilitate mutual connections (Trzeciak 2015: 110–111), Facebook has quickly gained popularity and became “more than just a social networking site” (Gemius Poland 2017). Currently, it stands out amongst other social media platforms due to the wide range of activities it offers users for private, professional, and public purposes. Functions such as publishing posts containing photos, videos, or links, conducting live broadcasts, creating groups and fan clubs, and the ability to post reactions<sup>3</sup> to shared content, form the basis of Facebook’s popularity among various age groups. Furthermore, by adopting the role of a news and e-commerce platform, the portal “allows testing the business potential of various projects and sets trends in this direction” (Gemius Poland 2017).

Due to the ever-growing popularity of social media amongst the general public, particularly younger generations (Feliksiak 2019), Facebook has become one of the communication channels used by politicians and public bodies. As Małgorzata Adamik-Szysiak observes: “in the context of political communication, Facebook can be compared to a megaphone that amplifies content disseminated by users within a given community of ‘friends’” (Adamik-Szysiak 2018: 177). This statement also applies to public communication processes.

Currently, an increasing number of public administration units use Facebook as their communication channel. By fulfilling their informational function, they publish announcements, thereby gaining an additional opportunity for quicker reach to a wider audience. An active and engaged community surrounding a given profile plays a crucial role in this case, acting as a “relay” for the published content to reach

<sup>3</sup> Facebook allows the following reactions under shared content: “Like”, “Love”, “Care”, “Haha”, “Wow”, “Sad”, and “Angry”.

a wider audience.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, maintaining their social media channels constitutes a vital element of their communication strategies in crisis situations.

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland has implemented a communication strategy on Facebook aimed at keeping the public informed about ongoing actions. During the period from 24 February to 23 March 2022, within a month of the start of the Russian aggression, the Chancellery published a total of 181 posts on its official profile, of which 179 were directly or indirectly related to the crisis situation in Ukraine. The highest number of posts (58) was published in the first week of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the remaining period, the number of posts remained at a similar level (3–9 March: 39 posts, 10–16 March: 45 posts, 17–23 March: 36 posts). The conducted research shows that the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland shared an average of about 6 posts per day. Compared to the content published by other units, this is a relatively high result.<sup>5</sup> The abovementioned quantity of posted content may result, among other things, from the fact that the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland is a leading unit of the Council of Ministers, and a significant majority of the shared content referred to the activities of individual ministries responsible for specific issues. In addition, it should be noted that the Chancellery's profile is followed by the largest number of users as compared to other government units' profiles.<sup>6</sup> Hence, it can be concluded that, in order to reach a wide audience, they published numerous pieces of content related to the government's overall activities during the crisis situation.

As observed, the frequency of publications was influenced by the following factors:

- 1) day of the week: generally, the number of publications decreased to approximately 2 posts per day on weekends unless there was an important diplomatic visit on that day;
- 2) diplomatic visits, including visits of foreign politicians to Poland, meetings of the Prime Minister abroad in various countries, and those at forums of international organizations such as the European Union.

As regards the format of the published posts, these were primarily messages describing the actions taken by the Prime Minister, accompanied by photo reports of events

<sup>4</sup> In this case, Facebook's algorithm, EdgeRank, plays a particularly important role.

<sup>5</sup> For comparison, during a similar period, the following units published the following quantity of posts related to a greater or lesser extent to the situation in Ukraine: the Ministry of Interior and Administration – 95 posts (out of a total of 98 posts shared), while the Ministry of the National Defence – 25 posts (out of a total of 84 posts shared). Source: profiles of the units on the Facebook social networking site, accessed: 23 October 2022.

<sup>6</sup> Currently, the profile of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister is followed by 443 thousand Facebook users. For comparison, the number of followers of the other selected government unit profiles is as follows: Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland: 202 thousand followers, Ministry of National Defence: 108 thousand followers, Ministry of Interior and Administration: 47 thousand followers. Source: profiles of the units on the Facebook social networking site, accessed: 13 November 2022.

or infographics containing key information on particular issues. Frequently, graphics containing key quotes from speeches, statements, or interviews by Mateusz Morawiecki were shared. Some of these posts included hashtags, with the most commonly used being: *#SolidarityWithUkraine*, *#HelpUkraine*, *#PolandFirstToHelp*, and *#StandWithUkraine*. The particular role of content aimed at combating disinformation is worth mentioning. In response to false information, which occurred frequently during the analysed period and raised public concerns, corrections containing hashtags *#StopFakeNews* and *#EnableVerification* were published, along with instructions how to recognize and combat fake news that may appear.

In addition to posting, live streaming was frequently used, especially during press conferences or briefings. Links to government websites, interviews with the Prime Minister, and video materials posted on the official KPRM YouTube channel were also shared. Occasionally, posts by Piotr Muller, the government's spokesperson at the time, were shared, with their primary function being to provide information.

An essential element of the communication strategy adopted by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland was to share posts directly from Mateusz Morawiecki's official profile. These posts contained statements, reflections, and summaries of the politician's views on issues related to the ongoing war in Ukraine. To a large extent, this content was not strictly informative; rather, it was framed in a persuasive tone, aiming to influence public opinion. The Prime Minister often employed strong language to evoke negative emotions in recipients related to the previous policies of Western countries towards Russia. These relationships were characterized by close cooperation, particularly in the field of energy.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the Prime Minister emphasized the necessity of providing assistance to the attacked Ukraine, introducing an element of fear associated with the possibility of military operations extending to other countries.<sup>8</sup> Additionally, the Prime Minister pointed out internal actions taken to contribute to the "derussification" of the Polish economy by introducing the "Anti-Putin Shield".<sup>9</sup> In the Prime Minister's narrative, one can observe the use of a top-down party storyline, reflected in appeals to Polish citizens to demonstrate

<sup>7</sup> Quote from Mateusz Morawiecki's post on 26 February 2022: "The construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline connecting Russia and Germany showed how many politicians in the EU are ready to sell Western values for the opportunity to make a good deal."; quote from a statement to the media in Paris on 10 March 2022: "Today, the Council of Europe has a chance to change its compromised policy towards Russia"; quote from a post on 17 March 2022: "The comfort of Western Europe is not more important than the blood of Ukrainian children!".

<sup>8</sup> Quote from Mateusz Morawiecki's press conference after a visit to the Government Agency for Strategic Reserves warehouse in Germany: "Ukrainians are fighting against Russians today for their sovereignty, and they are also fighting for the security of Europe. There, in the trenches in Ukraine, on those fortifications, the fate of not only Ukraine but of the entire Europe is being decided today"; quote from a statement to the media in Paris on 10 March 2022: "Today, Ukraine is also fighting for you; if Putin conquers Ukraine – he will murder tens of thousands of people and will not stop there. Next, other countries will face the same fate. We must stop him!".

<sup>9</sup> Quote from Mateusz Morawiecki's press conference on 18 March 2022: "The Anti-Putin Shield lies in the de-russification of Polish and European economies and the diversification of energy sources".

solidarity in difficult times,<sup>10</sup> an approach employed earlier during the COVID-19<sup>11</sup> pandemic, and in reference to earlier warnings by Lech Kaczyński regarding Russia's aggressive policy during his diplomatic visit to Georgia.<sup>12</sup>

Given its persuasive tone, this element cannot be classified as part of the public communication process. The statements and quotes by Mateusz Morawiecki were not neutral; instead, they conveyed a specific perspective, portraying the leading politicians of the ruling party as those who were the most proactive in helping Ukraine. They were depicted as conducting the so-called "Diplomatic Offensive",<sup>13</sup> repeatedly warning about Russia's policy, raising awareness among other countries about the security threat to all of Europe, and being the first to risk their lives by visiting war-torn Kyiv on 15 March 2022. The adopted narrative fits significantly into the process of political communication and the promotion of the Prime Minister as an active and effective politician who, in the event of a crisis situation, faces the challenges that have arisen.

### 3.1. Topics of Shared Posts

Taking into account the number of posts and the main topics identified in the previous paragraphs, a categorization key was applied to divide the content into five categories:

1. Assistance to Ukrainians: this category includes posts related to accepting refugees at border crossings and in major Polish cities, as well as those referring to aid delivered across the border to Ukraine. Additionally, information about ongoing collections, volunteering, and the Act on Assistance to Ukrainian Citizens in Connection with the Armed Conflict in Ukraine (promulgated in the official journal "Dz.U." of 2022, item 583), which was introduced during the analysed period, were also examined;
2. Diplomatic Activities: this category encompasses foreign visits and meetings held by Mateusz Morawiecki abroad, visits and meetings of foreign politicians to Poland, and participation in extraordinary summits of international organizations, referred

<sup>10</sup> Quote from Mateusz Morawiecki's post on 5 March 2022: "We have opened our hearts and borders, and in their wake, help is flowing from all over the world. This is the strength and example of Polish solidarity!".


<sup>11</sup> Data taken from the author's research for a master's thesis on the communication strategy of the Ministry of Health in the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic in Poland.

<sup>12</sup> Fragment of a post by Mateusz Morawiecki shared after his visit to Batumi in Georgia on 17 March 2022: "When Putin attacked Georgia 14 years ago, the late President Lech Kaczyński spoke prophetically in Tbilisi: 'Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the Baltic countries, and then it will be turn of my country, Poland.' We remember them well, and today the whole world is reliving their warnings. They were ridiculed and ignored – heard, yes, but what use is hearing if no one truly listened?".

<sup>13</sup> Example of a series of posts shared in the form of infographics called "Diplomatic Offensive" presenting actions taken by politicians of the ruling party on the international stage with the aim to assist Ukraine and impose sanctions on Russia.

- to by the KPRM as the “Diplomatic Offensive”. This category also includes information about sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation;
3. Security of Poland: this category includes actions taken for the defence of Poland, such as the adoption of the Homeland Defence Act (official journal “Dz.U.” of 2022, item 655), the idea of introducing the so-called “Anti-Putin Shield”, the purchase of Abrams tanks, and the celebration of the 23rd anniversary of Poland’s accession to NATO. Actions aimed at preventing fake news and the spread of disinformation are also included;
  4. Other: this category includes posts containing statements by Mateusz Morawiecki that could not be classified under other categories due to elements of political communication. These statements most often referred to the previous policy of the West towards Russia and Vladimir Putin and included criticism of past actions as well as calls for change, formulated in a rather persuasive manner;
  5. Press Conferences at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister: this category has emerged due to the high volume of publications falling under this type. It should be emphasized that all topics listed in the categories above were discussed during these events, which were attended by representatives of various departments (most often the Ministry of Interior and Administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This category does not include press conferences of the Prime Minister after diplomatic meetings with foreign politicians or press conferences concerning the introduction of the Act on Assistance to Ukrainian Citizens and the Anti-Putin Shield.

Figure 1 presents the number of posts published each week.




**Figure 1. Number of published posts according to the adopted categories**

Source: Profile of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland on the Facebook social media platform (Facebook.com 2022).

The majority of the published posts – as much as half of these posts – concerned diplomatic issues, including meetings with foreign political leaders in Poland and abroad, as well as the imposition of stricter sanctions against Russia. The second most frequently published content category is “other”, which includes statements and posts by Mateusz Morawiecki containing persuasive elements as part of political communication processes. The conducted research indicated that 14% of the messages (24 posts) concerned Poland’s security, while only 11% were related to aid for Ukraine (19 posts). As for the press conferences at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, where both refugee assistance, diplomatic matters, and Polish security issues were discussed, 6 such meetings were organized during the analysed period, accounting for 3% of the published content.

The number of posts on the abovementioned topics per week is presented in Figure 2.



**Figure 2. Number of posts according to the adopted categories in the respective weeks of the analysed period**

Source: Profile of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland on the Facebook social media platform (Facebook.com 2022).

The data presented in Figure 2 reveal that diplomatic activities dominated each week. Posts related to providing assistance to Ukraine, which was fighting the Russian aggression, were particularly visible in the first week of the invasion, while later on their volume decreased week by week. In contrast, the exposure of persuasively-oriented statements gradually increased, in line with the intensification of actions undertaken by Mateusz Morawiecki. These actions should be considered an element of political communication and activities promoting the Prime Minister. The variable in focus is the security of Poland. The highest number of posts appeared particularly in the first week and the last week of the analysed period, whereas a decrease in related content was noted in the second and third weeks.

## Conclusions

The presented analyses indicate that the Chancellery of the Prime Minister has adopted an active communication strategy on the Facebook social media platform, aligning with current trends of the steadily growing popularity of social media platforms. Given the adopted criterion of purpose, the analysed communications can be categorised as both informational and persuasive, as they involve sharing posts by Mateusz Morawiecki formulated in an opinion-forming tone, thus fitting within the Prime Minister's political communication process. The content of these posts largely consisted of the Prime Minister's personal opinions, which could influence the way the ongoing situation was perceived by recipients. This approach is consistent with the concept of political communication presented earlier in this article, which assumes that its main goal is to gain or maintain power. In the case under analysis, the intention to maintain power is clearly evident.

Considering the subject matter of the posts shared directly from Mateusz Morawiecki's profile, the following characteristic elements can be identified:

- 1) instilling a sense of fear among the audience by pointing to the possibility of the military operations being extended to other countries. By their very nature, such posts are effective in arousing negative emotions. With regard to posts concerning Poland's security, it can be concluded that they were intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of the government and its control over the situation, as well as to encourage a sense of "solidarity in difficult times", which is often invoked by Polish politicians in times of crisis;
- 2) criticism of the actions of Western countries, particularly their past relations with the Russian Federation, while emphasizing their predictions and warnings regarding that country. Such messages, aimed at substantiating and emphasizing their point, could foster hostility towards the leaders of other countries among the audience and, at the same time, shape the perception of the Polish Prime Minister as a politician of international significance, firmly supporting the Ukrainian side, unlike others.

The two elements described above are part of another clear goal of every politician who, in order to gain or maintain power, must cultivate their public image among citizens. All communication activities aim to portray Mateusz Morawiecki as an effective politician who actively confronts emerging challenges, bearing in mind not only the security of his country's citizens, but also support for an attacked neighbour.

During the analysed period, reflections and persuasive statements by the Prime Minister on the Facebook page of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister accounted for 22% of the published content. Half of the posts referred to the Prime Minister's diplomatic actions, while the remaining part concerned Poland's security (14%) and aid to Ukraine (11%). Only 3% of the messages were press conferences, during which topics from all the abovementioned categories were discussed. However, it should be noted that each of the published pieces of information, to a lesser or greater

extent, referred to the ongoing war in Ukraine, which is why this theme dominated the communication from the Chancellery of the Prime Minister.

In the overall summary, the opinion-forming statements of Mateusz Morawiecki constitute more than one-fifth of the published posts, which is a concerning practice for an institution whose primary task is to inform citizens about the actions taken by the government. Despite the negative emotions associated with the situation in Ukraine, the Chancellery of the Prime Minister should be publishing messages in a more neutral tone, even in channels such as the social media, which are less formal than, for example, an official website. The research showed that M. Morawiecki, as Prime Minister, is characterized by a persuasive tone, and the Chancellery, by publishing fragments of his statements, on the one hand fulfilled the function of informing citizens about his activities, and on the other hand, excessively highlighted posts from the politician's profile.

The efforts of the Polish Prime Minister initiated to support Ukraine and its citizens cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, the research results show that the Chancellery's channel has become an additional forum for conveying information and, additionally, for the image-building activities of the Prime Minister. Moreover, due to the small number of posts related to the theme of citizens' security, the communication gave the impression that this important issue was being neglected in favour of promoting the politician.

When considering the effects of the communication measures in terms of their immediate and delayed impact (Jensen et al. 2011), one might be tempted to conclude that they were not entirely effective. An immediate effect can be seen in the reactions of recipients to the published content, but their analysis was not the subject of this article. However, in terms of the delayed effect intensifying over time, and with reference to the concept of a permanent election campaign which involves activities promoting politicians throughout their term of office, these efforts proved ineffective, as evidenced by the change of government in 2023.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that the dominance of the theme related to the war in Ukraine during the initial stages is not surprising. Due to its proximity, this situation affects Poland more than other countries, which explains why the issue of war is likely to remain present in government communications for a long time.

## References

- Adamik-Szysiak M., 2018, *Strategie komunikowania podmiotów politycznych w Polsce w mediach społecznościowych*, Lublin.
- Castells M., 2013, *Communication Power*, Oxford.
- Dobek-Ostrowska B., 2004, *Podstawy komunikowania społecznego*, Wrocław.
- Dobek-Ostrowska B., 2006, *Komunikowanie polityczne i publiczne*, Warszawa.

- Dobek-Ostrowska B., Wiszniowski R., 2007, *Teoria komunikowania publicznego i politycznego. Wprowadzenie*, Wrocław.
- Engesser S., Ernst N., Esser F., Büchel F., 2017, *Populism and social media: How politicians spread a fragmented ideology*, *Information, Communication & Society*, Vol. 20, No. 8.
- Facebook.com, 2022, *Kancelaria Premiera*, <https://www.facebook.com/kancelaria.premiera>.
- Facebook.com, 2022, *Kancelaria Prezydenta RP*, <https://www.facebook.com/prezydentpl>.
- Facebook.com, 2022, *Mateusz Morawiecki*, <https://www.facebook.com/MorawieckiPL>.
- Facebook.com, 2022, *Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej*, <https://www.facebook.com/MinisterstwoObrony>.
- Facebook.com, 2022, *Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji*, <https://www.facebook.com/MSWiARP>.
- Feliński M., 2019, *Korzystanie z Internetu. Komunikat z badań*, Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, nr 95/2019, [https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2019/K\\_095\\_19.PDF](https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2019/K_095_19.PDF) [accessed: 5.11.2022].
- Feliński M., Roguska B., 2022, *Polacy wobec rosyjskiej inwazji na Ukrainę. Komunikat z badań*, Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, nr 38/2022, [https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2022/K\\_038\\_22.PDF](https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2022/K_038_22.PDF) [accessed: 20.10.2022].
- Gemius Poland, 2017, *Facebook 13 lat po uruchomieniu – opinie ekspertów*, 21.02.2017, <https://www.gemius.pl/wszystkie-artykuly-aktualnosci/facebook-13-lat-po-uruchomieniu.html> [accessed: 5.11.2022].
- Jensen J.D., Bernat J.K., Wilson K.M., Goonewardene J., 2011, *The Delay Hypothesis: The Manifestation of Media Effects Over Time*, "Human Communication Research", Vol. 37, No. 4.
- Kamińska-Korolczuk K., 2021, *Polityka i media a kryzys zaufania. Polityka informacyjna mocarstw w czasie zagrożenia*, Gdańsk.
- Kolczyński M., 2024, *Strategia komunikacyjna*, in: K. Wolny-Zmorzyński, K. Doktorowicz, P. Płaneta, R. Filas (eds.), *Leksykon Terminów Medialnych M-Z*, Toruń.
- Kolczyński M., 2008, *Strategie komunikowania politycznego*, Katowice.
- Magin M., Larsson A.O., Skogerbø E., Tønnesen H., 2024, *What makes the difference? Social media platforms and party characteristics as contextual factors for political parties' use of populist political communication*, "Nordicom Review", Vol. 45, No. 1.
- Michalczyk S., 2005, *Komunikowanie polityczne. Teoretyczne aspekty procesu*, Katowice.
- Prezydent.pl, 2022, *Polska i Litwa solidarne z Ukrainą*, 23.02.2022, <https://www.prezydent.pl/en/newsroom/foreign-visits/visit-kijow,49254> [accessed: 2.11.2022].
- Statista, 2022, *Most popular social networks worldwide as of January 2022, ranked by number of monthly active users*, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/> [accessed: 5.11.2022].
- Trzeciak S., 2015, *Wizerunek publiczny w internecie. Kim jesteś w sieci?*, Gliwice.
- Wilk A., Domańska M., 2022, *Rosyjski atak na Ukrainę (24 lutego, godz. 9.00)*, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 24.02.2022, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2022-02-24/rosyjski-atak-na-ukraine-24-lutego-godz-900> [accessed: 1.11.2022].

### Legal acts:

Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. (Dz. U. Nr 78, poz. 483).

Ustawa z dnia 12 marca 2022 r. o pomocy obywatelom Ukrainy w związku z konfliktem zbrojnym na terytorium tego państwa (t.j. Dz. U. z 2025 r., poz. 337).

Ustawa z dnia 8 sierpnia 1996 r. o Radzie Ministrów (t.j. Dz. U. z 2025 r., poz. 780).

Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2022 r. o obronie Ojczyzny (t.j. Dz. U. z 2025 r., poz. 825).

### Biogram

**Adriana Kanarek** – doktorantka III roku Szkoły Doktorskiej przy Wydziale Nauk Społecznych Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego w dyscyplinie Nauk o Polityce i Administracji. Absolwentka studiów magisterskich na kierunkach: Politologia oraz Bezpieczeństwo Wewnętrzne Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Członkini Polskiego Towarzystwa Komunikacji Społecznej (PTKS) oraz European Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA). Redaktor naczelna Newslettera Forum Młodych Medioznawców i Komunikologów PTKS „FMMiK News”. Zainteresowania badawcze: badanie zjawiska mediatyzacji, w szczególności w kontekście konfliktów zbrojnych, komunikacja instytucji Unii Europejskiej, komunikowanie polityczne i publiczne oraz marketing polityczny.

**Adriana Kanarek** – 3rd-year PhD student at the Doctoral School of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Gdańsk in the discipline of Political Science and Administration. Graduate of the Master's programme in Political Science and Internal Security at the University of Warsaw. Member of the Polish Society of Social Communication (PTKS) and the European Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA). Editor-in-chief of the newsletter of the Forum of Young Media and Communication Scientists of PTKS "FMMiK News". The researcher's interests include the study of mediatization, especially in the context of armed conflicts, communication of the European Union institutions, political and public communication, and political marketing.