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TOWARDS A NEW “SOVIET PERSON”: THE BIOPOLITICS OF PUTINISM THROUGH THE LENS OF ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY²

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Abstract

This article examines the biopolitics of Putinism through the theoretical lens of ontological security, arguing that contemporary Russia is pursuing a renewed attempt to construct a new form of the ‘Soviet person’. Central to this process is the increasing

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securitisation of domains traditionally considered private, including sexuality, family life, reproduction, and cultural expression. By invoking ontological security, the study shows how the state legitimises invasive control over the biological lives of its citizens by framing such measures as essential to the preservation of Russia's unique civilisation and moral superiority.

Keywords: Russia, biopolitics, national security, ontological security, state ideology, axiology.

Abstrakt

Ku nowemu „sowieckiemu człowiekowi”:

Biopolityka putinizmu w perspektywie bezpieczeństwa ontologicznego

W tym artykule przeanalizowano biopolitykę putinizmu przez pryzmat teorii bezpieczeństwa ontologicznego, argumentując, że współczesna Rosja podejmuje ponowną próbę stworzenia nowej formy „człowieka sowieckiego”. Kluczowym elementem tego procesu jest rosnąca sekurytyzacja dziedzin tradycyjnie uważanych za prywatne, w tym seksualności, życia rodzinnego, reprodukcji i ekspresji kulturowej. Odwołując się do koncepcji bezpieczeństwa ontologicznego, artykuł pokazuje, w jaki sposób państwo legitymizuje inwazyjną kontrolę nad życiem biologicznym swoich obywateli, przedstawiając takie środki jako niezbędne do zachowania wyjątkowej cywilizacji i moralnej wyższości Rosji.

Słowa kluczowe: Rosja, biopolityka, bezpieczeństwo narodowe, bezpieczeństwo ontologiczne, ideologia państwowa, aksjologia.

Introduction

One prominent feature of Putinism in contemporary Russia is the increasing authoritarianism of the state, reflected in the growing control over both the social and individual lives of citizens and the elimination of all institutions that might serve as sources of values, attitudes, and lifestyles alternative to those promoted by the state. This development marks, to a large extent, a return to Soviet-era biopolitics, which aimed to construct the ‘Soviet person’ from the Soviet Union’s multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious population – someone living a state-approved lifestyle, expressing views acceptable to the authorities, and displaying full devotion to the state. This also entailed comprehensive control over the biological life of citizens.

In Putin’s Russia, biopolitics is shaped by the growing totalisation of political life. Under these conditions, the state claims the authority to control virtually all aspects of human existence. Such control and deep intrusion into the private lives of citizens are frequently justified by references to national security concerns – allegedly under threat from external enemies, primarily the West, and internal enemies, defined as individuals or organisations that oppose Putin’s policies or promote lifestyles divergent from those sanctioned by the state. As the political system becomes increasingly totalitarian,

an expanding range of social domains is subject to securitisation. The discourse on national security has thus moved beyond military, political, and economic issues to encompass cultural and religious life, and even citizens' lifestyle choices, particularly decisions concerning family formation and childbearing. The biopolitics of Putin's Russia – especially following the so-called ‘conservative turn’ initiated at the beginning of Putin's third presidential term and intensified with the escalation of the conflict with Ukraine into war in 2022 – cannot be adequately interpreted without reference to the security paradigm.

Ontological security as a theoretical framework

This paper adopts ontological security as its principal theoretical lens. Ontological security, as a framework, integrates critical approaches in contemporary security studies with reflection on the ideological underpinnings and legitimisations of domestic and foreign policy in modern states. The study examines the core elements of Putinism's biopolitics through this lens, based on the premise that maintaining the status desired and promoted by state authorities is essential for state security, and that any attempt to question this status constitutes a security threat.

In the case of Putin's Russia, this status – articulated in Russian strategic documents and propagated through state-controlled public discourse – comprises, among other things: the conceptualisation of Russia as a global power with its own sphere of influence; the belief in a distinct civilisational path of historical development; the assertion of the uniquely ‘spiritual’ nature of traditional values held by Russian society; and the conviction of Russia's moral superiority over the decadent West. In this context, the biopolitics of Putinism is not merely a continuation of Soviet biopolitics. Rather, it is intimately connected to the full-scale securitisation of all spheres of social life, including values, attitudes, and lifestyles – now regarded as integral components of national security.

The concept of ontological security provides a valuable analytical tool for examining state security policies, particularly in uncovering their ideological foundations. Since the onset of the ‘conservative turn’, Russian political discourse has increasingly emphasised a conservative, neo-imperialist, anti-individualist, anti-liberal, and broadly anti-Western ideology. This ideological orientation forms the basis of Russia's conception of ontological security.

Ontological security is typically defined in relation to the fundamental psychological and existential needs of individuals, before being extended to the societal and state levels. According to Mitzen (2006: 342), “[o]ntological security refers to the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time – as being rather than constantly changing – in order to realise a sense of agency.” Contemporary constructivist approaches in International Security Studies apply this concept to states, positing that states construct historical and ideological narratives to justify their origins, territorial claims, international relations, and adherence to global norms. Such identity constructions are materialised in state symbols, official rituals, and the public statements of political elites (Krickel-Choi 2024: 14). This is particularly evident in today's Russia, where the consolidation of authoritarian rule has suppressed civil society initiatives and enabled the state's near-total monopolisation of the public sphere (Ingvarsson and

Kalinina 2024; Ivanova 2021). In this context, the crafting of a specific image of Russia becomes central to legitimising both the intensifying totalisation of society and the deliberate estrangement from the West. Constructing a distinct state identity – radically differentiated from states perceived as threats, particularly liberal Western democracies – is thus essential. This differentiation is not confined to political or economic realms but extends to values, culture, and fundamental attitudes to life.

Within this framework, biopolitics – understood as state control over the biological existence of its citizens – serves to affirm Russia's 'status' as a global power, a unique civilisation, a polity and society fundamentally different from and morally superior to the West. It becomes, in effect, an essential component of Russia's self-definition. Conversely, attitudes and beliefs that contradict the officially sanctioned norms of biological life are construed as threats to national security. For this reason, despite the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and the prohibition of a state-imposed ideology, such views are not only stigmatized – especially through state propaganda – but also criminalised.

The principal sources for this paper are the Russian National Security Strategies of 2015 and 2021. These have been analysed to identify references to various aspects of the biological life of citizens and their relevance to state security, in the light of contemporary academic literature on Russian biopolitics and security policy.

The paper is structured into four sections. The first outlines the defining features of biopolitics in an authoritarian or quasi-totalitarian state such as Russia. The second examines specific manifestations of biopolitical discourse in contemporary Russia. The third section analyses the two National Security Strategies mentioned above with reference to the biopolitical characteristics previously identified. The final section presents the overarching conclusions.

1. Biopolitics in a quasi-totalitarian state

Biopolitics constitutes 'a relatively soft (but rather pervasive) technology of power and governance targeted at such areas as health, sanitation, birth rate, and sexuality' (Makarychev and Medvedev 2015: 45). From a Foucauldian perspective, it is understood as 'the entrance of biological or species life into the calculations carried out by political rationality' (Vatter 2014: 2). In this context, politics intervenes to regulate biological life and to define the parameters of population well-being. Within liberal political systems, the state may exercise control over the biological lives of its citizens in more or less intrusive ways, depending on ideological assumptions regarding the constituents of individual happiness and societal welfare. Whether or not an individual adopts the vision of happiness endorsed by the state – and aligns with the prescribed practices and lifestyles – often determines their recognition as a legitimate member of the community. Biopolitics thus operates as a set of mechanisms that define inclusion in, or exclusion from, the political community on the basis of conformity with accepted norms of biological life, simultaneously stigmatising those who challenge these norms. Consequently, biopolitical regulation frequently assumes the form of prohibitions and restrictions aimed at shaping the individual and collective lives of citizens

in accordance with the state's political objectives – ostensibly for the common good. These regulations may also serve as markers of distinction from other communities and societies, becoming integral to the construction of collective identity (Makarychev and Yatsyk 2017: 4).

In contemporary Western societies – where numerous aspects of personal life, lifestyle choices, and worldviews carry a pronounced political dimension (Makarychev and Medvedev 2018: 168) – biopolitics, as the state's involvement in the biological domain of life, becomes both pervasive and difficult to contain. This results in the inevitable instrumentalisation of human life, which becomes 'the object of political calculations and of the mechanisms for executing power and providing security' (Makarychev and Medvedev 2015: 45).

However, whereas in Western contexts biopolitics is enacted through a plurality of actors – governments, local authorities, medical professionals, educators – often via soft power techniques ranging from birth control policies to public hygiene initiatives, in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes lacking political pluralism and a vibrant civil society, biopolitics typically assumes the form of repressive regulatory frameworks. These regulations are designed, on the one hand, to preserve the 'purity' and biological vitality of the nation, and, on the other, to suppress behaviours deemed biologically detrimental, particularly sexual practices rejected by the authorities (Makarychev and Medvedev 2015: 46).

In Putin's Russia, the increasing totalisation of public life is paralleled by a growing repressiveness in the domain of state biopolitics. This trend has been observable since the onset of the so-called conservative turn, which began in 2012 with the commencement of Vladimir Putin's third presidential term. Both public discourse and state propaganda – now under near-total state control – as well as legislative measures, increasingly contain provisions aimed at shaping the biological life of individuals in line with the political objectives of the regime. Citizens are left with progressively less autonomy in determining their own lifestyles. To understand the specific character of Russian biopolitics, it is essential to situate it within a security context. Its primary function is the reinforcement of state security; all measures regulating or constraining the biological life of citizens are subordinated to this end. The principal value invoked to justify such interference is patriotism, understood in a distinctively Russian manner as the readiness of individuals to subordinate their own interests entirely to those of the state. Moreover, this conception of patriotism – centred on the capacity for self-sacrifice – is regarded as a core element of Russian national identity and a criterion for community membership. As Shamakhov and Kovalev, contemporary scholars of Russian security, observe, 'a characteristic feature of the Rus people [*russskij narod*] is the sacrifice of their present in the hope of a better future' (2020: 139–140). If the primacy of state interests legitimises deep political intrusion into the private sphere, and if public acceptance of such intrusion is framed as a defining feature of Russian identity, then it is unsurprising that the state mobilises existing, formally independent institutions of social life – such as the Russian Orthodox Church – to further its biopolitical objectives. As Makarychev and Medvedev (2015: 46) aptly put it, these institutions perform 'biopolitical cleansing functions on behalf of the state'.

2. The specificity of biopolitical discourse in Putin's Russia

The principal themes of state-led biopolitics in Putin's Russia are centred – unsurprisingly for an authoritarian regime – on sexuality and the definition of the family. However, two distinctive features characterise Russian biopolitics.

First, its primary justification – and the rhetorical foundation for the restrictions imposed on individual lives – is the need to defend so-called traditional values, which, from the perspective of ontological security, are considered constitutive of Russian national identity. Contemporary Russian 'patriotic' public discourse is largely axiological in nature (Prina 2016: 97). These traditional values are constructed as distinguishing Russia from other nations and – especially in contrast to the liberal West – as demonstrating its moral superiority (Davidenko and Utkina 2024: 136).

Second, Russian biopolitics is increasingly embedded within the framework of national security – so much so that opposition to or questioning of state-imposed norms is treated as tantamount to treason or a direct threat to the state. This logic is exemplified in a particularly illustrative statement by Shamakhov and Kovalev. Writing about the necessity of defending traditional values, they contend: 'Just as a critical mass of bacteria can lead to serious illness and death in a living organism, a critical mass of traitors can lead any society to stagnation and disaster' (2020: 145). In Russian security discourse, the West is depicted as a source of subversive influence, primarily through 'information pressure' exerted on the younger generation with the intent of eroding their historical, spiritual, and patriotic traditions (Shamakhov and Kovalev 2020: 140). The resulting tendency among Russian youth to question tradition and to prioritise personal success – even at the expense of moral norms – is interpreted as a symptom of Western influence and moral decline (Shamakhov and Kovalev 2020: 147).

This axiological discourse, intimately linked with ontological security concerns, is particularly focused on sexuality and pro-natalist rhetoric. In this context, both Russian public debate and academic security discourse frequently accuse the West of moral decay, most notably expressed in the legal and social acceptance of LGBTQ+ rights, which are portrayed as a contributing factor to the demographic decline of Western societies (Makarychev and Medvedev 2015: 45; Shamakhov and Kovalev 2020: 150). Even issues of health security – such as the growing HIV epidemic in Russia – are framed within this moralistic lens. In the fight against the virus, state policy prioritises spiritual and moral education over strictly medical or preventative strategies (Dorogov 2025: 5).

In Russia's increasingly authoritarian system, the state exerts a monopoly over the production of biopolitical discourse. As a result, this discourse is marked by pronounced state-centrism, portraying the state as the sole guarantor of citizens' development and well-being, including the improvement of their quality of life. This serves to legitimise intrusions into individual autonomy under the guise of 'state paternalism' (Dobrenkov and Agapov 2011: 179–182). The state-centric nature of Russian biopolitics contributes to the homogenisation of society, a process that accompanies the continued centralisation of the still formally federal Russian state. This homogenisation is ideologically underpinned by patriotism, which is promoted as a core value organising social life and shaping the attitudes and worldviews of individuals (Prina 2016: 96–97).

This emphasis on the centrality of the state and the creation of biopolitics aimed at strengthening state power has given rise to a distinct pro-natalist discourse in Russia. This discourse is driven by a deepening demographic crisis: Russia's population is in decline, with no immediate prospects for reversal. The causes are long-standing and rooted in the final years of the Soviet Union, exacerbated by the social and economic upheavals of the 1990s (Vishnevskiy 2015: 164–169). Russian scholars have also observed that, as in many other countries, fertility in Russia is affected by the pluralism of available life choices and the existence of alternative models of individual and family life (Vishnevskiy 2015, pp. 268–269). Consequently, contemporary Russian biopolitics includes attempts to curtail the pluralism that emerged in the post-Soviet era. Russian public discourse increasingly presents heterosexuality not only as normative but as imperative for the survival of Russian society and the state. This heteronormative discourse is accompanied by the promotion of a patriarchal vision of society, characterised by rigidly defined gender roles and a cult of masculinity, including the symbolic elevation of President Putin himself as a model of masculine virtue (Scheller-Boltz 2017: 79–81). State propaganda promoting large families draws upon traditional values but is not supported by significant material assistance for mothers. Instead, an essential component of this discourse is the condemnation of alternative forms of sexuality. Anti-LGBTQ+ legislation enacted in recent years is justified by state officials as a response to the country's demographic challenges (Scheller-Boltz 2017: 82–83).

Given the scale of Russia's demographic problems and the ideological responses they have provoked, it is important to highlight a further dimension of Russian biopolitics. While state authorities seek to increase the birth rate, they also aim to maintain the cohesion and stability of Russian society. On the one hand, this is expressed through the marginalisation of ethnic differences and the erosion of non-Russian local cultures in the multi-ethnic Russian Federation (Prina 2016: 98). On the other hand, immigration – particularly economic migration – is increasingly securitised. Migrants, mainly from Central Asian countries that emerged following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, are portrayed as threats to the Russian social order (Galas, Sillaste, and Shevchenko 2020: 207) and potential sources of social unrest (Galas, Sillaste, and Shevchenko 2020: 215). In this context, contemporary Russian biopolitics is increasingly concerned with maintaining the ‘purity’ of Russian society and asserting its cultural and linguistic unity.

3. Application of the principles of state biopolitics in the 2015 and 2021 National Security Strategies

Basic principles

In the National Security Strategies (NSS) of 2015 and 2021, national security is defined as the condition of safeguarding individuals, society, and the state from internal and external threats. It encompasses not only conventional state-centric concerns such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and socio-economic development, but also the quality and standard of living of Russian citizens (NSS 2015, sect. 6; NSS 2021, sect. 5).

Among the declared national interests are the improvement of health outcomes, enhancement of quality of life, and the promotion of stable demographic development (NSS 2015, sect. 30; NSS 2021, sect. 29). Strategic objectives in the sphere of citizens' well-being include the development of human potential, the fulfilment of material, social, and spiritual needs, and the reduction of social and material inequality, primarily through raising income levels (NSS 2015, sect. 50; NSS 2021, sect. 25).

The 2015 Strategy identifies the protection of public health as a state priority, with aims such as increasing life expectancy, reducing disability and mortality rates, expanding the population, improving the accessibility and quality of healthcare, and enhancing the safety and effectiveness of pharmaceuticals (NSS 2015, sect. 71). It further identifies the spread of epidemics and specific diseases – including HIV, drug addiction, and alcoholism – as threats to national security within the public health domain (sect. 72). The Strategy also acknowledges weaknesses in the state's health policy and declares a commitment to its reform and improvement (NSS 2015, sects. 73–75). Demographic challenges are addressed within the framework of securing citizens' quality of life. The Strategy mandates the creation of conditions to stimulate fertility, reduce mortality, promote healthy lifestyles, and expand participation in sport, particularly among children and youth (NSS 2015, sect. 53).

The 2021 Strategy reiterates many of the earlier document's general declarations concerning the state's responsibility for the quality of life of its citizens, while introducing new emphases – especially in the realm of demographic policy. It assigns significantly greater priority to demographic concerns. The Strategy asserts the state's particular responsibility for supporting families, motherhood, fatherhood, children, persons with disabilities, and the elderly. It also places special emphasis on the upbringing of children and their comprehensive spiritual, moral, intellectual, and physical development. It explicitly states that increasing the birth rate is a necessary condition for reversing population decline, thereby implicitly rejecting immigration as a viable demographic solution (NSS 2021, sect. 30). The document identifies sustainable natural population growth as a goal of state policy aimed at preserving the Russian people and enhancing national human capital (NSS 2021, sect. 32). In pursuit of this goal, the state aims to raise fertility levels and cultivate among citizens a 'motivation for large families' (NSS 2021, sect. 33).

Values as a justification for biopolitics

Specific values underpin state biopolitics as a mechanism for ensuring national security. The 2015 Strategy refers to the revival of 'traditional Russian spiritual and moral values', particularly among the youth. These shared values are intended both to consolidate Russian society and to form the foundation of Russian statehood (NSS 2015, sect. 11). They are explicitly identified as the basis of the 'all-Russian identity' of the peoples of the Russian Federation (NSS 2015, sect. 77). Both strategies list similar core values: the primacy of the spiritual over the material; the defence of life, human rights, and freedoms; humanism; mercy; justice; mutual assistance; collectivism; the historical unity of Russia's peoples; and the continuity of Russian history (NSS 2015, sect. 78; NSS 2021, sect. 91).

Any questioning of these values – especially under the influence of foreign cultural and informational expansion, or the promotion of total permissiveness (*vsedozvolennost'*) – is explicitly described as a threat to national security (NSS 2015, sect. 79). The Russian state is thus portrayed as a defender of values considered uniquely Russian. In this capacity, it seeks to shield society from 'external ideological and value expansion', primarily through mechanisms of information control. Among the strategic measures outlined are the development of a 'system of spiritual, moral, and patriotic education of citizens' and the alignment of the education system, youth policy, and nationalities policy with officially endorsed values (NSS 2015, sect. 82).

The 2021 Strategy substantially expands upon this axiological dimension and anchors its security policy more explicitly in the defence of traditional values. It asserts that there is a growing unity in Russian society and a heightened awareness of the necessity to defend these values (NSS 2021, sect. 11). The axiological framing of Russian security also acquires a global dimension. The Strategy references the 'crisis of the Western liberal model', asserting that many countries are now challenging traditional values. It contends that the question of moral leadership is becoming increasingly salient (NSS 2021, sect. 19) and implies that Russia – by virtue of its traditional values – is well positioned to assume such a leadership role.

The West is accused of conducting information warfare against Russia with the aim of undermining traditional values and demoralising Russian society. The primary vehicle for this alleged attack is the internet, through which illegal and destructive content is said to be disseminated – ranging from the promotion of suicide, drug use, and criminal behaviour to the propagation of morally corrosive values. Youth are identified as the principal targets of these attacks (NSS 2021, sect. 52).

The increasing prominence of axiological concerns as justification for both security policy and restrictions on individual freedoms is further evidenced by the fact that the 2021 Strategy devotes a separate section to the defence of traditional spiritual and moral values. It asserts that these values are under mounting threat in the contemporary world as a consequence of scientific and technological progress (NSS 2021, sect. 84). Particular vulnerabilities are identified in the domains of religion, marriage, and the family. The Strategy accuses adversaries of absolutising personal freedom, promoting a radical ideology of total permissiveness (*vsedozvolennost'*), and encouraging immorality, egoism, violence, consumption, and self-indulgence. Such tendencies are said to lead to the rejection of life's natural course and to the degradation of societies (NSS 2021, sect. 86).

The Strategy identifies multiple sources of these corrosive influences, including the United States and its allies, transnational corporations, foreign NGOs, and religious, extremist, and terrorist organisations. These actors are said to engage in psychological and informational manipulation to undermine Russian moral norms and societal cohesion (NSS 2021, sect. 87).

These claims serve to justify the expansion of state control across multiple domains of social life. The linkage between values and national security is made explicit: traditional moral values are described as the foundation of Russian society and as essential for safeguarding Russian sovereignty (NSS 2021, sect. 90). Their defence is equated with the defence of the Russian state and people (NSS 2021, sect. 92). The securiti-

sation of the axiological sphere, and the construction of external cultural influences as existential threats, legitimise a range of policies that restrict individual freedoms. Among the specific measures outlined in the 2021 Strategy are: the state defence of the institution of the family and the preservation of traditional family values; information control intended to promote traditional values and reject externally imposed ideas, behavioural models, and stereotypes; and a heightened emphasis on moral education through the school system (NSS 2021, sect. 93).

A key element of this axiological discourse is its overt state-centrism. The state is presented as the ultimate guarantor of social stability and individual well-being. The 2015 Strategy identifies the strengthening of internal unity and the preservation of social stability as principal state responsibilities (NSS 2015, sect. 26). Language policy also assumes a biopolitical dimension: the promotion of the Russian language is framed not only as a matter of communication but as a vector of traditional values and a unifying force within the Russian Federation (NSS 2015, sect. 81). The 2021 Strategy further radicalises this position, claiming that questioning the universal status of the Russian language constitutes an act of external aggression and a threat to national security (NSS 2021, sect. 89).

4. Conclusions

Can contemporary Russian biopolitics, interpreted through the lens of security, be understood as an attempt to construct a new 'Soviet person'? The 'Soviet person' is generally conceptualised as an individual deprived of agency over personal and social life beyond that which is sanctioned by state-approved structures, such as the family, local community, ethnic group, or religious organisation. The influence of these social structures is limited to the extent that they act as transmitters of values and behavioural norms accepted by the state. In this model, the 'Soviet person', although embedded in various communal and institutional frameworks, ultimately remains an atomised individual – subordinated to the state's objectives and internalising the values and lifestyle imposed by it. This extends to all aspects of human life, including biological existence.

The biopolitics of Putinism rests on several foundational elements:

1. The dismantling of autonomous civil society institutions, including non-governmental organisations and independent media outlets, to prevent individuals from accessing alternative sources of information beyond those controlled or sanctioned by the state.
2. The regulation of citizens' everyday behaviour, achieved through the promotion or stigmatisation of specific patterns of consumption, daily routines, and leisure activities.
3. The control of sexual behaviour, most notably through public information campaigns and legislative measures that discriminate against non-heterosexual individuals, restrict access to abortion, and promote state-sanctioned gender roles.

4. The criminalisation of dissent, encompassing undesirable sexual behaviour, publicly expressed non-conforming views, and membership in organisations classified as undesirable.

The interpretative framework for this repressive biopolitics is provided by the concept of ontological security. The increasingly invasive control over the biological lives of citizens, and the imposition of behavioural restrictions, are justified by an asserted need to preserve the integrity of Russian society. The rejection of alternative values, identities, and lifestyles is framed as a defence of Russia's unique identity and moral superiority over the perceived decadence of liberal Western societies. Such a model of biopolitics presupposes that the state alone possesses the legitimacy to regulate the biological existence of its citizens and to define the acceptable repertoire of values and attitudes. Social institutions that have not yet been dismantled – such as religious, cultural, and community organisations – are expected to serve merely as vehicles for reproducing and reinforcing the state's rhetoric on desirable and undesirable forms of life. In this process, they lose their autonomy as alternative sources of normativity and meaning.

In this context, it may be argued that contemporary Russian biopolitics – against the backdrop of the pervasive securitisation of all domains of social life – represents a renewed attempt to construct the 'Soviet person.' This involves not merely the subordination of individual interests to those of the state or the organisation of private life in accordance with official norms, but also the internalisation of the state's worldview. In such a scenario, the values and lifestyle promoted by the state are no longer imposed solely through coercion; they are also adopted as the individual's own.

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