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Tomasz Nowicki
University of Gdansk

The zoo as a socialisation project

The topic of this paper is a deconstruction of the zoo. Therefore, I shall attempt to identify the two layers of the zoo as a text, and present conclusions resulting from analyses. The working questions I have posed are: "in what way does the zoo construct the notions of nature, species, and animal?",and "in what way does the zoo inscribe itself into the model of knowledge developed in the Western culture?".

The modern form of zoological gardens – of an educational and entertaining nature – emerged in the 18th century. From the definitional point of view, it is assumed that zoological gardens are „public parks which display animals, primarily for the purposes of recreation or education" (Jamieson 2006: 132). The oldest zoological garden still in existence is the Vienna zoo founded in 1752. Along with the development of the natural sciences and the formulation of evolutionary theories, the interest in animals increased; a zoological garden with entertainment and education included in its charter was established in Paris in 1793. Despite a high mortality of animals transferred from their natural environment to Europe, the project of establishing zoological gardens by the biggest cities was very enthusiastically welcomed by their authorities. Before yet another zoo was opened, in London in 1828, people supplied from European colonies – mostly Africans – joined animals kept in the gardens, although displays of people with disabilities or suffering from genetic diseases were also very popular. Such exhibitions were called human zoos, ethnological expositions or Negro Villages. Subsequent zoological gardens were founded in Amsterdam (1838), Berlin (1843), Melbourne (1857), Moscow (1864), Philadelphia (1874), Buenos Aires (1888) and Cairo (1890). Later on, the above-mentioned functions of zoos were extended to include tasks in the area of the protection of endangered animal species and research.

Zoo as entertainment

The first function of the zoo, entertainment, is marked by the voyeurism of gazing at the animals. The factor standing behind the provision of pleasant impressions in the zoo is the sensory need of having contact with nature. On the viewer/gazing/object trajectory, sensations and emotions related to the exhibition of animals are embodied and grounded in space. Distance, assimilation, and objectification, being elements of the voyeuristic gaze, highlight the power victimising the animals, which are reduced to objects.

Assumptions as to the domination of the pleasure principle were confirmed in research carried out in the zoological garden in Buffalo, New York, which determined a very low educational effectiveness of the establishment. The research showed that visitors to the zoo were not interested in the educational factor, but their main motive behind their visit waste delivery of experience in the form of entertainment (Jamieson 2006: 135). Research into the turnout and population of visitors to zoos shows that in terms of the number of visitors, neither museums nor galleries can compete with them.

John Urry and Phil Macnaghten point out that for nature to become attractive to people, they need to take it into their possession, which in turn leads to turning attention tithe possessiveness of the gaze (Macnaghten, Urry 1998). This appropriation is tantamount to the subordination of the sensory experience to the hegemony of visuality, which transforms nature into a sort of spectacle. Camille Paglia expressed the above as follows: "There is, I must insist, nothing beautiful in nature. Nature is a primal power, coarse and turbulent. Beauty is our weapon against nature… Beauty halts and freezes the melting flux of nature" (Macnaghten, Urry 1998, after: Paglia 1990). Animals subjugated in the way outlined above become embodiments of the victory of the male gaze, and their representation becomes a confirmation of the optic truth. The identification of the viewer with the image of the animal artefact becomes therefore possible through the framing of the experience in the pleasure drawn from one's identification with vision (the power of the gaze) and the observation of subjugation. Jacques Derrida, referring to Jacques Lacan, calls this experience narcissism: human subjectification occurs in their gazing into the mirror of nature at their own construction. Animals in enclosed conditions exemplify captivity as devotion, and stereotypy[1] – as infantalisation. Animals return in

[1] "Motor stereotypies (zool.) – repetitive identical or almost identical sets of motions in animals; they can be a natural element of their behavioral ceremonies, in particular dances, but they predominantly express temporary mental disorders or permanent mental aberrations, and – in people – even a mental disease; the dysfunctions appear as reactions in conditions of deprivation, e.g. due to keeping social seasonally migrating animals in isolation, limited space in cages or pens, poor conditions or due to their immobilisation; the most frequent motor

the consumption of nature as an opposite of the wilderness and chaos we associate with untouched nature. The plates placed by cages and runs provide animals with language, which shows them in their individuality and complexity as a species. The aestheticization of the scene in which we see animals in zoos allows us to notice their tarnished nature as beauty. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer expressed the process of cultural distortion in the following way: "Yet behind man's admiration for beauty lurks always the ringing laughter, the boundless scorn, the barbaric obscenity vented by potency on impotence, with which it numbs the secret fear that it is itself enslaved to impotence, to death, to nature" (Horkheimer, Adorno 2002: 207). This makes one recall the obscenity of the indignation in the mass media in relation to the murders in Copenhagen zoo, which disturb the cultivation of beauty, making the truth about what we do to animals in the food and entertainment industries visible. And after all, it was only an instance of making visible what Paul McCartney expressed as follows „If slaughterhouses had glass walls, everyone would be vegetarian"(McCartney 2010).The authorities of the Copenhagen zoological garden explained that actually the murder of a giraffe and lions was no different than natural selection; it was to exemplify the wild and merciless side of nature, other than the tamed nature at the zoo. The Copenhagen mistake lay in forgetting that all deviations from the idyllic vision of nature are punished as crimes against the ideology of speciesism.

The organisation of what can be seen in the zoo can be divided into the aestheticization of animals and the cognitive layer of the prepared scene. The aestheticization and the cognitive value make the sum of the principle of the pleasure and the disciplining of the gaze. The disciplining takes place through the introduction of rules of the spatial order of one's visit, a map of the zoo – i.e. a spatial symbolic visualization from a bird's eye view (abstraction of the gaze), cameras, staff supervision, and rules and regulations. Maps of the zoo discipline the journey of the gaze and order the spatial division into the locations of the gaze – as the visitors' route, i.e. the place of culture, and the locations of animals – as nature. Vision becomes an ever-present gaze following oneself. Just like in the panopticon, the gaze has a double organisation – as the gaze of the visitor and as a pervasive power of the gaze ordering the divisions: culture/nature, and human/non-human.

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stereotypies include: head shaking or nodding, whole body turning or rapidly changing direction, running up and down the same route, usually along the fence, body rocking (e.g. rocking the body side to side on front legs by horses kept in small stalls – the so-called weaving) or swaying and cowering with the head hidden in the hands by macaques bred in isolation. Motor stereotypies caused by staying in a barren environment occur as a result of an absence of changes of controlling stimuli, resulting in the "freezing" of the movement orientation component; some stereotypies may vanish after the release of the animal, while others, e.g. ones resulting from separation anxiety disorder, normally leave permanent mental and behavioural damage"; https://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/stereotypie-ruchowe;3979622.html [accessed on 07.11.2017].

The power of the gaze is additionally strengthened by the role of technology in the visual culture and industrialisation of the sense of vision. Cameras allow a single, neutral, isolated, disembodied vision. The distance created in this way allows for the freezing of the observed animals and a confirmation of the separateness of the observer from the observed. Urry and Macnaghten point out that the experience of nature becomes increasingly hyperreal and hypersensory, thus resembling simulation (Macnaghten, Urry 1998: 167). Cameras and online visualisation techniques make it possible to visit a zoo without leaving one's home. Gardens increasingly resemble amusement parks. The architecture available to tourists is inscribed with a possibility of relaxation through the inclusion of benches, shops with drinks and food, bars, and shops with gifts and souvenirs. Donna Haraway describes the emergence of new technologies strengthening the visual experience as "[…] [a] technological feast (which) becomes unregulated gluttony; all seems not just mythically about the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into ordinary practice" (Haraway 1988: 581).

This eye-centric surplus shallows the animal corporeality to the surface. Possessed with animality, the relation to the body in the Western culture takes the form of a feminised nature. Feminist critiques of the concept of nature underline the significance of the colonial era, when the explosion of the conquests of Africa, Asia and America led to the development of slavery, racism, militarism, capitalism and the keeping of exotic animals in captivity. Anne McClintock describes such subordination as the erotics of ravishment, in which the white man conquered nature and constructed the conquered bodies in the categories of radical otherness (McClintock 1995).

The zoo as cognition

The second function of zoological gardens is cognition. This role in zoo discourses is mostly referred to as education – nevertheless, in my opinion what is significant in this perspective is the reproduction of the experience of the sensory observation marking the enlightenment project. In this sense, I maintain that a trip to the zoo is a historical journey to the source of the paradigm of cognition and a question concerning the manner and the importance given to the representation of animals. Just like the panopticon, the tradition of the existence of zoological gardens and the discourse shaped around them teaches that the generation of objectivity, i.e. normativity, is a process of the construction of the conditions of the human gaze as a knowledge/power relation. In *The Order of Things*, Michel Foucault reconstructs the history of the development of natural history as a process designed for the production of plates introducing order to the representation of the objects of research (Foucault 2005). This process is embodied in the zoo in the form of the placement of information plates classifying the particular species of animals.

Libraries and archives in which knowledge is coded in the form of print cease being the only sources of research material, as these begin to include spaces in which things are grouped together, such as herbaria, collections, and gardens. A trace of this method has survived to our own times in the discourse of the zoo, in which animals are referred to as a collection[2]. Such an organisation of things displayed for view appears in the space of signs ready to absorb the animal through discourse. This is what Foucault has to say about it:

> It is often said that the establishment of botanical gardens and zoological collections expressed a new curiosity about exotic plants and animals. In fact, these had already claimed men's interest for a long while. What had changed was the space in which it was possible to see them and from which it was possible to describe them. To the Renaissance, the strangeness of animals was a spectacle: it was featured in fairs, in tournaments, in fictitious or real combats, in reconstitutions of legends in which the bestiary displayed its ageless fables. The natural history room and the garden, as created in the Classical period, replace the circular procession of the 'show' with the arrangement of things in a 'table'. What came surreptitiously into being between the age of the theatre and that of the catalogue was not the desire for knowledge, but a new way of connecting things both to the eye and to discourse. A new way of making history (Foucault 2005: 143).

Observation concentrates on the recording of the obvious and the spatial. What thus takes place is an exclusion of uncertainty through the shortening of the distance between the word and the thing. This attitude is strengthened through the privileging of the human body as an instrument of objectifying visibility through the possession of vision and linguistic tongue. The thus generated epistemological base allows a methodical and systemic classification of nature. The animal is classified as a species in the game of differentiating features, and its existence is confirmed on the surface of that from which it differs. However, in order for natural history to emerge and develop in the Enlightenment, we need to extend the view outside of the European continent. The subsequent step is to take possession of what the coloniser saw, and importing it to Europe to give things their names and some order. The creator of taxonomy, Carl Linnaeus, expressed his surprise at the fact that nature does not reflect the order of reason and locates organisms that are not connected by common features in the same places. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce to the observation conditions allowing for the transfiguration of the unordered nature and indication of its place in the order of the laboratory, the botanical garden, and the zoological garden. The division into nature and society in this organisation of the order of cognition becomes increasingly artificial and spatial. Linnaeus expressed the above as follows:

[2] For example here: https://www.zoo.gda.pl/history [accessed on 07.11.2017].

> The method, the soul of science, designates at first sight any body in nature in such a way that the body in question expresses the name that is proper to it, and that this name recalls all the knowledge that may, in the course of time, have been acquired about the body thus named: so that in the midst of extreme confusion there is revealed the sovereign order of nature. (Linnaeus 1776: 13, after Foucault 2005: 173-174)

The assignment of names to the particular living creatures is created on a uniform, two-dimensional surface of the taxometric table. The individual's features located on the surface indicate the appropriate columns of taxonomy: genus and species. Nevertheless, along with the development of Georges Cuvier's comparative anatomy, the main notion of the categorization of nature becomes the internal structure. The notion of life is extracted from the previously abstract idea of nature. Nature is subject to being cut up in the laboratory with the help of a scalpel and microscope, which makes the internal order of the organism visible. Although the surface of the body still counts, its importance for the order of indexing is combined with the internal functioning of the organs. The thus created classification tension between the external and the internal parts of the body leads to the emergence of the vegetative order of plants and the animal order of animals. A high mortality of animals in zoological gardens at the turn of the 18th and 19th century becomes a backup source of material for autopsy and the development of knowledge. At that time, public autopsies of such animals as camels, rhinoceroses, reindeers, etc. enjoyed considerable popularity. The examinations resulted in the creation of the first atlas of anatomy (Gucwiński, Strojny 1977: 41). The contribution of zoological gardens to the development of the "base for science" has been documented since 1866. In laboratories, a reference of living creatures into things and words occurs. When the work has been done, nature becomes visible and understandable – therefore, taxonomic plates can be displayed to the gaze, and animals and plants can be arranged in gardens according to the order of their indexing. Zoological and botanical gardens therefore become a scene manifesting the visible law and order of nature. The power of the gaze is no longer to raise fear and fascination through a bloody spectacle of torment, but to draw admiration and amazement.

Zoos have their own infrastructure and organisation, which introduces a specific order of the gaze. Clean cages, bars, and later also cameras and geometrically arranged spaces down which the vision travels, become specific material-formal requirements of cognition. At the same time, walls and fences separate and determine space at the zoo, creating an operating closed circuit. The preparation of objects for examination in the laboratory takes place in a similar manner, and has the following sequence: reduction of complexity – cutting into pieces – isolation of objects – understanding – indexing and cataloguing their activity – manipulation. In the case of the zoo, the process of laboratization takes place in turn through the

taking of the animal from its natural complex environment and locating it in the controlled space of the cage or pen and separating it from other species, followed by the process of the isolation of the object and identification of its features that may exist in the prepared conditions, enabling its breeding and reproduction; the subsequent step is the preparation of a plate presenting the distinctive features of the isolated object, and at the end there are examinations aimed at the manipulation of the species and their understanding. However, in order for the zoo system to be operating effectively, it must solve the problem of the high mortality of animals and understand how to reproduce them in semi-natural conditions. However, at the beginning of the development of knowledge on animals, the activity of the gardens was limited to the reproduction of the idea of the zoo as such. For the zoo to become a well-operating closed circuit, it had to face the high mortality of animals, which initially provides a pretext for the supply of a large number of previous exhibits to zoological museums and laboratories. The materials obtained in this way are used for anatomical-morphological examinations. The first attempts at the extrapolation of knowledge acquired in the gardens in the animals' original environments were usually unsuccessful (Gucwiński, Strojny 1977: 41). For this reason, the understanding of the biology of animal reproduction was a task of the utmost importance for the newly established gardens. The continuation of the zoo system and reproduction of animals in captivity was dependent on familiarization with the breeding conditions, breeding season, and the manner of feeding of many species. People were also aware that the results of examinations acquired in the gardens are the only ones that are technically possible and that it is impossible to compare them with the results of field research. The problem of the impossibility to compare examinations in enclosed conditions with field research remains unsolved. A review carried out in 1995 by Ben Beck, Associate Director of the National Zoological Park in Washington, revealed that out of 145 registered reintroductions of 115 species, only just 16 were successful, with only half of these involving endangered species. The reason behind this failure in the application of the existing knowledge was that the natural environment of animals which were born in the zoo had already vanished or underwent degradation; also, the very process of biological changes taking place in the bodies of the animals bred in captivity was ignored (Jamieson 2006: 139). In other words, the fact that knowledge acquired in enclosed conditions can be successfully applied only in similar conditions was omitted.

The shift of the issue of animal reproduction and breeding to the forefront makes us again return to the problem of the status of the gaze at animals – this time from the linguistic perspective. The categories "species" and "animal" enforce the treatment of individuals as pluralities, as expressed in the use of the third person plural (they), the failure to perceive them as subjects (I), i.e. first person singular, or as partners to the dialogue (you), i.e. the second person singular. Derrida paid attention to the use of this inflective form in relation to animals and species, reflecting as follows:

> I would like to have the plural *animals* heard in the singular.There is no Animal in the general singular, separated from man by a single, indivisible limit. We have to envisage the existence of "living creatures", whose plurality cannot be assembled within the single figure of an animality that is simply opposed to humanity. (Derrida 2008)

The mixing of every non-human individual into the general category of "animal" or "species", as Derrida noticed, was not a mistake against the rigour of thinking, but a discursive strategy of speciesism, a sin against empiricism. It is this procedure of the inflective multiplication of the individual which guaranteed longevity to speciesism. Richard D. Ryder uses the notion of speciesism in reference to an error in our moral understanding. In a similar spirit we read about it in works by Richard Dawkins, who explains speciesism as an erroneous habit of discontinuity of our minds, which strive to understand the notion of "species" within precise, impassable boundaries of morality. Using the term "discontinuous mind", Dawkins refers to the efforts aimed at the delineation of boundaries wherever they do not exist, and a search for semantic preciseness for the categories defined on the basis of the relations between them. This problem has a long tradition reaching back to antiquity, which from the Middle Ages until our own times has been called a dispute between the status of universities and nominalia. In other words, all forms of exclusion are created as a tension between the recognition of the primacy in defining a category of beings as a general set at the cost of the recognition of their individual existence as a manifestation of a set of features of a general notion. With reference to the zoo, we can notice that the understanding of the role and function of the zoo as rearing, collecting and reproducing is a consequence of the understanding of animals in the category of species. For this reason in the zoo discourse, primacy is acquired by the scientific-technical issue of the replace ability, reproduction, and biodiversity of species through inbreeding aimed at the selection of the genetic material of the animals. In messages justifying racing (speciesing),even the reproduction of animals who currently live freely is considered ecological practice, since the thus-acquired knowledge and experience are to protect such freely living animals from extinction (Gucwiński, Strojny 1977: 45–52). The treatment of animals from the species perspective is also based on the mechanical philosophy approach to the animal body – a concept commenced by Descartes, who believed that the animal is a mechanism, which can be produced and replaced by another one. This justifies a belief that some animals, including the aurochs, Père David's deer, black wildebeest, okapi and Przewalski's horse, live only because there are zoological gardens. It is said that if it was not for the existence of the zoo, these species would have been extinct by now. Hence, the reason behind the breeding and killing of animals is the achievement of a species

advantage that will be experienced by animals appearing in place of their killed predecessors, as well as the advantage to be gained by our successors from the possibility to satisfy their aesthetic needs – hunger of the gaze. The concept of the "advantage" or "interest" in being kept in captivity permeated to the zoo discourse in the form of Darwinism adopting species as a unit of natural selection. It is for this reason that as a part of zoological gardens' successes, inbreeding and the selection of the animals' genetic material are practiced as a justification for the protection of the biodiversity of species, subjecting individuals with excessively related gene pools to recycling. As a part of such practices, surplus animals are sold to various institutions or are used as shooting targets in private hunting grounds. Surplus animals are also killed in the zoos to be provided as food to other animals (Jamieson 2006: 139). Experiments with interspecies crossbreeding of animals are also carried out in zoological gardens. Many of the currently living animal crossbreeds originate from zoological gardens – this number is estimated at about 70% of new genetic modifications (Gucwiński, Strojny 1977: 44). The concept of the replaceability of life attaches value to the existence of species rather than the particular representatives of such species. However, species as a form of the continued existence of animals does not have an inbred value of life, which is only the right of individuals. This is because animals do not and cannot have any interests related to the continued existence of their species as they do not possess the appropriate mental structure allowing such abstract thinking. The attribution of advantages resulting from being kept in captivity is speciesism, an attribution error, and anthropomorphism. Animals understood as species do not have any interest in being kept, killed or bred by people.

Going back to the problem of the perception of the category of "animal" as a plurality, i.e. the primacy of the species/population before the individual, it will turn out that the order of existence of populations of animals results primarily from our biopolitics. Foucault claims that sovereign knowledge is transformed into biopower together with the birth of the police sciences. The formula of such power boils down to two imperatives: to order to live and to allow to die (Foucault 1991). In this sense, is not the remaining alive until obtaining a permission to die a condition behind the constitution of a boundary of subjectivity between a ban and a permission, the space of which is marked by the area of species/population/the animal? This would mean that the animal at the zoo takes the space of naked life, i.e. that it delineates its biopolitical substance, life, which in its nudity is no longer discernible from its biological mass. Following Giorgio Agamben further, it is life which can be killed, but which cannot be offered as a sacrifice (1998). Population as a form of care for species as a result of the development of the panopticon of the knowledge/power gaze became a function of survival. Replaceability, breeding and the order to live are therefore something more than ecology and science – they express a paradigm of the power of the gaze, changing the question "why do we have the right to kill animals?" into "why don't we have the

right to let them die?". Perhaps animals are to experience their own death to give testimony to their suffering in future? However, when becoming a all-embodying witness, will life that has been degraded and impoverished to the stereotypy of enslavement be able to make an accusation against its tormentors? Perhaps the demolishing of yesterday's concept of lay theodicy would make us pose the question of whether existence boiling down to care for the population would be better than non-existence? The sustaining of the existence of animal species in captivity is not a choice of the interest of these species, but our own fancy and whim. For this reason, the question concerning the cultural construction of animal does not refer us to something external, but is inscribed into contemporary debates concerning the discursive construction of the subject. Looking at the culturally-generated "artefacts" of animals kept in captivity, we see with satisfaction our own construction of the human/non-human order. The gaze at the zoo should be located in the Western tradition of the interpellation of subjects, having its beginning in modern science.

Returning to reflecting on the zoo as a laboratization of the world and expansion of instruments of knowledge/power, successful rearing, crossbreeding and reproduction became a source of cognitive and technological success of the animal production science, i.e. knowledge on the rational breeding and use of animals. Such an extension of enclosed conditions allowed a transformation of natural environments in which living creatures live into supervised parks and nature reserves. Successful reintroduction, i.e. transferring animals from the zoo to the spaces prepared for their arrival, happened in the case of aurochs, Père David's deer, and the black wildebeest. Such practices allow an extrapolation of conclusions drawn from the anthropology of science and a look at the zoo from the perspective of research practice blurring the boundary between animal science and its expectations on the one hand, and the technology of the organization and reproduction of life of animals kept in the zoo on the other. Hence, the success of reproduction and reintroduction becomes possible as changes are introduced to populations of endangered species, followed by their transfers to the prepared environments with limited biological instability and a low incidence of predators and other natural selection factors. In this way, the zoo becomes a self-justifying practice creating a closed circuit, in which, owing to isolation, new natures are created which are able to survive and exist through the blurring of the border between nature and culture, interior and exterior, freedom and enslavement. What also becomes blurred is the border between the technological generation of natures and life on the one hand, and knowledge acquired during the practice on the other. This knowledge provides support to biopolitics, and the extension of breeding conditions to populations of living species.

Conclusions

The performed analyses reveal a picture of the category "animal" as a cultural construction in which the biological mingles with the social. The cognitive-technical effectiveness of nature and the animal is formed by the disciplining of the gaze at and processing of the examined objects. Scientific cognition as an immobilisation and closing of systems takes place through the application of violence to the web of the culture-nature reality (Afeltowicz, Pietrowicz 2009: 35). In this perspective, one should consider the advantages resulting from the separation of the notion "species" and "animal" into their biological and cultural parts. After all, the notion of nature and animal in all the analyses of exclusion always appeared as the primary matrix of the placement of a group of beings outside the boundary of the social, political, and moral. The system of exclusions nature/animal/species/race/gender clothed the social into biological determinism, depriving the thus-cutout social actors of the possibility of rebellion and language, and transforming them into biological monads. The possibility to blow up the monolith nature/species/animal through a reference to its historical and linguistic context and its extraction would allow a continuation of the ethical project of liberating animals and its socio-political positioning. An infringement of the biological authoritarianism of the categories in question opens up a field of the possible political interventions on the axis human/non-human, subject/animal.

Returning to the diagnosis of the contemporary situation of the animal, we can say that the animal body constitutes only raw material for the fulfilment of our expectations concerning what we want to see in nature reduced to the transparent category of naked life. As a part of the Western discourse, the "animal" becomes a product of the knowing eye. The zoo as a laboratory becomes a protection and a collection of objects confirming the power of our appetite, law, order, and domination. It becomes a space of a species socialisation of our concept of Western androcentrism. In such a system, there is no place for partnership or untying social actors and actants from things.

The stake in the animal emancipation project is the recovery of biological animals, which can become allies in the strategy of returning and rewriting the teleological plate of the taxonomy of the species placed before the cage or run. It is about a recovery of the animals' nature for them, even if it makes us adopt the problematic external position human/animal. We must remember that today's division into human/non-human is not unquestioned, and in the light of the existing research into science we can show in what way it has been entangled and woven into our civilizational entertainment-industrial particularisms. The abandoning of animals and leaving them to the play of the gaze of science would be tantamount to Dr Frankenstein's escape from the laboratory.

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Summary

Zoo as a socialisation project

The epistemological status of the zoo can be seen as a process of knowledge-power which supports something more than the Cartesian model of science. A visit to the zoo is a historical journey to the source of the cognition paradigm. Seeing animals in cages is the first lesson of what human perception should be like. It leads to adopting the attitude of gaining experience by homogenizing its contents from the natural environment.

Animals were turned into the object of cognition by depriving them of subjectivity. As a content of knowledge, it is formulated in a closed system cage – pen – aquarium, which is a representation of laboratization of nature. Just like panopticon the tradition of zoological

gardens and the discourse shaped around them teaches that the production of objectivity = normativity is a process of constructing the conditions of human perception in the form of a knowledge-power relation.

Keywords

zoo, posthumanism, animal studies, laboratization, knowledge, power, gaze

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