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CRITICAL PEDAGOGY TODAY
BASICS, DILEMMAS,
AND SELECTED PROBLEMS

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Piotr Stańczyk
University of Gdansk

Critical Pedagogy Today – a Word of Introduction

On 28–29 May 2012, the Institute of Pedagogy of the University of Gdansk held a conference which bore fruit in the form of volume IX of the Academic Journal *Ars Educandi*. The issue around which our efforts were organised concerned the status of the theory and practices of critical pedagogy, as well as – as stressed by Lech Witkowski – radical pedagogy. It is as early as at this point that we are faced with the problem of critical pedagogy as an “absent discourse” – a problem, which in the categories of Žižek’s psychoanalysis could be expressed as one of an unbridgeable gap. What I mean is that radical and critical pedagogy is still at the stage of “textualisation”, although it is in an entirely different place than when Zbigniew Kwieciński undertook the effort of introducing to Polish pedagogy the thinking approaches that might provide it with new strategies of interpreting the reality after the formative turn¹. The comment made by L. Witkowski does hit the essence of the problem, which Lucyna Kopciwicz very clearly captured in her text-manifest. Both these texts open volume IX of *Ars Educandi* and fit Z. Kwieciński’s formula of the “textualisation of absence”. Speaking in a more straightforward manner, although critical pedagogy is no longer the “absent discourse” in the space of academic discourse, this is because it still remains in the academic ghetto and continues to be helpless in the face of the blockade preventing it from progressing from criticality to radical pedagogy, or – better still – to radical pedagogics. Putting it in a nutshell, the great effort of researchers identifying themselves with the radical and critical paradigm of pedagogy is from the pragmatic point of view of social involvement entirely free from practical consequences. What is more important, this is not so much due to the shallowness of research and theories, as – paradoxically – due to their theoretical refinement.

The following quotation from Slavoj Žižek seems to fit radical and critical pedagogy: “[...] the answer to the question ‘Who, where, how is the (fantasizing) subject inscribed into the phantasmic narrative?’ is far from obvious; even when the subject himself appears within his narrative, this is not automatically his point of identifi-

¹ See Z. Kwieciński, *Tekstualizacja nieobecności. Wprowadzenie* [The Textualisation of Absence. Introduction], [in:] *Nieobecne dyskursy* [Absent Discourses], Z. Kwieciński (ed.), Wydawnictwo UMK, Toruń 1991, pp. 5–12.

cation – that is, he by no means necessarily ‘identifies with himself’. At a different level, the same goes for the subject’s symbolic identity; the best way to render its paradox palpable is to paraphrase the standard disclaimer from the movie credits: ‘Any resemblance to actual events or persons is purely accidental’; the gap between [...] the void of the subject and the signifying feature which represents him, means that ‘any resemblance of the subject to *himself* is purely accidental’².

In other words, all resemblance of radical and critical pedagogy to itself is purely accidental – radical and critical pedagogy is not what it is not because it does not want to be so, but the other way round. The problem I am writing about culminates in L. Witkowski’s finding that when applied to critical pedagogy, the label of “criticality” can be irrelevant, just like the label of “socialism” can be irrelevant when applied to the so-called socialist pedagogy; it also culminates in L. Kopciewicz’s claim that we are dealing with a “safe interpretation” of what results from postulates of critical pedagogy, which satisfies itself with the creation of knowledge on “our excluded ones”. Simply put, critical pedagogy does not resemble itself due to the fact that it fetishizes critique and due to the related consequences: the overwhelming power of theory.

Nevertheless, critical pedagogy must not resign from critique – S. Aronowitz and H. A. Giroux argue that anti-racism, anti-sexism, and anti-capitalism are principles that are responsible for a broader mobilisation of intellectuals taking the side of radical democratisation³ – and such “taking the side of” or rather “taking one’s own side” is a statement constituting a “countertext”⁴, it is a critique and it takes the voice from the dominating discourse. Here we arrive at the starting point: is critical pedagogy only a “safe” instance of taking a voice or is it only such a “safe” nonchalance of academicians, to which we could apply an anarchistic slogan concerning elections – here in the following version: “if critical pedagogy could change something, it would be banned”.

Critical pedagogy is not yet lost whilst we still live, whilst there are exclusions, social asymmetries, and alienations. Until we are haunted by the “spectre of Marx”. Jacques Derrida writes: “I reread *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*. I confess it to my shame: I had not done so for decades – and that must tell one something. I knew very well that there was a ghost waiting there [...]. Now, of course, I have just discovered, in truth I have just remembered what must have been haunting my memory: the *first* noun of the *Manifesto*, and this time in the singular, is “spectre”: “A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of communism”⁵. The spectre of Marx haunts J. Derrida, and it also haunts Tomasz Szkudlarek, despite – to cite his own words – his “particular allergy to Marxism”⁶. The allergy T. Szkudlarek mentions

² S. Žižek, *The Plaque of Fantasies*, Verso, London New York 1997, p. 40.

³ S. Aronowitz, H.A. Giroux, *Postmodern Education. Politics, Culture & Social Criticism*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis–London 1991, p. 123.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 118–121.

⁵ J. Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, Routledge, New York – London 1994, p. 2.

⁶ T. Szkudlarek, *Wiedza i wolność w pedagogice amerykańskiego postmodernizmu* [Knowledge and Freedom in the Pedagogy of American Postmodernism], Impuls, Kraków 2009, p. 226.

is also suffered by the figure of key significance for critical pedagogy: Z. Kwieciński, who believes that critical pedagogy must not be associated with Marxism⁷. With all these problems, L. Kopciwicz reflects that critical pedagogy texts were the most valuable readings of her university times, and I can add that this was also the case when one was a student of philosophy (my example), and not pedagogy. Retroactively, an entirely new sense emerges from the texts of representatives of the Frankfurt School, Antonio Gramsci, Gyorgy Lukacs, Stanisław Brzozowski, and finally Marx himself, whose debtors, willy-nilly, we theoretically are.

The problem under discussion lies in the fact that critique is an indispensable, albeit not a sufficient condition for possible social change, as insightfully noticed by Bogusław Śliwowski in his paper included among the ones opening up this volume; in his reminiscences of the period of the transformation turning point, the author recalls the moment of the publication of *Wyzwania pedagogiki krytycznej i antypedagogiki* [Challenges of Critical Pedagogy and Antipedagogy] – one of the most important books from the point of view of students reading about the radical and critical theory of education. Simply put, since theory may be an impulse for social change, we still lack something, while the radical and critical theory of education tries to contextualize this shortage.

Volume IX of *Ars Educandi* is a collection of texts that express various types of criticality and constitute different varieties of critical actions. Katarzyna Szumlewicz discusses the absence of the history of ideas and the history of education from the point of view of the radical and critical theory of education. The author reconstructs the roots of the idea of emancipation by education – the roots from which we keep detaching ourselves due to the poststructural critique of the mind, forgetting that emancipation is an entirely Renaissance undertaking. In his article, Szymon Dąbrowski tries to reconstruct the critical paradigm in the area of a sub-discipline – the pedagogy of religion; what is more important, religion can also be emancipatory.

The subsequent two papers: one authored by Michał Zawadzki and the other one by Monika Noworolnik-Mastalska, deal with the contact point between education, economics and politics, focusing on the most cynical asymmetries present on the surface of today's social practice – asymmetries resulting from the division of labour. Michał Zawadzki presents the concept of managerial education that will be critically-oriented through the denaturalization and instrumentalisation in labour processes. The other side of the problem of the instrumentalisation of labour subjects is the issue posed by Monika Noworolnik-Mastalska who analyses conditions for the possibility of the democratisation of relations in the workplace. Przemysław Szczygieł's text being a result of his association of the feminist thought with the radical and critical pedagogy can be summed up by a travesty of The Manifesto of the Communist Party: A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of equality.

⁷ Cf. Z. Kwieciński, *Tropy – ślady – próby* [Clues – Traces – Attempts], Edytor, Poznań–Olsztyn 2000, p. 173.

An interesting variety of critical pedagogy is presented by Anna Walczak, who analyses the issue of forms of knowledge, language, and the hidden program in the perspective of Jungian psychoanalysis.

The block of texts which concentrate to a higher degree on the presentation of results of empirical procedures starts with Agnieszka Imbierowicz's paper opening critical and radical pedagogy to the issues of ageism, and, to be more precise, the tabooization of the sexuality of third age persons. The mosaic of the sensitisations of critical and radical pedagogy is supplemented by Jolanta Rzeźnicka-Krupa who focused her analyses on disability, fitting it into the notion network determined by the categories of the body and engaged art.

The subsequent three papers are successful examples of the use of discourse analysis. Justyna Dobrowolowicz presents the results of her research concerning the image of school created by opinion-forming weeklies – the picture emerging from media narration might be called one of moral panic. In turn, Karolina Stary's text is a methodological lecture on the theoretical bases of studying textbooks by means of Critical Discourse Analysis, involving the presentation of results and interpretations of studies on social studies textbooks. At the same time, Łukasz Stankiewicz focuses on the analysis of documents generated as a part of the debate on the higher education reform in Poland, meticulously reconstructing a vision of the role of students.

The last block of texts, too modest for the pragmatic ambitions of radical and critical pedagogy, is devoted to practical applications of theory. Agnieszka Janik presents the functioning of the *Bajkobus* project carried out under the auspices of Wrocławski Teatr Lalek [Wrocław Puppet Theatre]. Agata Rzeplińska and Jarosław Jendza's paper is an attempt at building a transition from the concept of critical pedagogy to its practical application, while Beata Karpińska-Musiał presents the variety of critique consisting in the reflective practicability of an academic teacher.

Encouraging you to read on, and summing up my word of introduction, I shall reach for the question formed by P. Freire: "In favour of what do I study? In favour of whom? Against what do I study? Against whom do I study?"⁸. We must not avoid the thus-formed issue in the area of the social sciences, and in particular in pedagogy.

⁸ P. Freire, *Pedagogía da indignação. Cartas pedagógicas i outros escritos*, Editora UNSEP, São Paulo 2000, p. 37.

OPENINGS

Lech Witkowski

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On Critical Pedagogy (Retrospection and Projection against Problems and Experiences in Polish Pedagogy)

Introduction¹

I would like to offer some methodological and meta-narrative reflections concerning strategies when it comes to the treatment of the so-called critical or “radical” pedagogy, not only as an object of research, but also a perspective on Polish pedagogical understandings of our existence in the social and academic world, as well as in the public sphere and the educational domain. I undertake this review through the prism of changes from the last twenty five years, its current status, and from the angle of the direction of changes desirable for the future. I am guided by my experience in dealing with this thread of thought, or type of reflection since the beginning of the 1980s, as well as my recent attempt at grasping the comprehensive reception of critical pedagogy in the version related to my translations of Henry A. Giroux’s works, as well as works he co-authored, which were published in Poland, and my own analyses thereof². I am pleased to be able to underline that the attempt at a balanced overview of the reception of critical pedagogy in the book, grouped by way of the foreword, the afterword and the annex, as the main protagonists of the reception, i.e. Professors Zbigniew Kwiecieński, Tomasz Szkudlarek, Zbyszko Melosik, and Bogusław Śliwerski. All their voices are, without any doubt, worthy of being taken into account as the ones providing testimony to what the phenomenon of critical or radical pedagogy has become in Poland. I also wish to point out that the book contains an extensive chapter authored by myself entitled: *O stanie recepcji amerykańskiej pedagogiki radykalnej w Polsce. Próba świadectwa osobistego i refleksji o „doświadczeniu pokoleniowym”* [On the status of the reception of American radical pedagogy in Poland. An attempt at a personal testimony and reflection on “generational experience”], to which I wish to kindly refer you for details, development and documentation of the theses that I can only signal here.

¹ This essay is based on the text of my plenary speech marking the opening of the conference “Critical pedagogy today. Questions about theory and practice”, Gdansk, 28 May 2012, at the Institute of Pedagogy, University of Gdansk. Here, the core of the speech remains unchanged.

² H.A. Giroux, L. Witkowski, *Edukacja i sfera publiczna. Idee i doświadczenia pedagogiki radykalnej* [Education and the public sphere. Ideas and experiences of radical pedagogy], Oficyna Wydawnicza “Impuls”, Kraków, 2010.

I shall divide my paper into three main parts. First, I shall make several reservations and some almost anecdotal remarks, wishing to refer to the symptomatic circumstances grounding the issues of the critical pedagogy itself regarding real references to the attitudes and histories of its foundations. The above will be followed by a retrospective concerning all the things that happened to us when, being a generation of still young PhDs belonging to the seminar circle of Zbigniew Kwieciński at the IRWiR, PAN (Institute of Rural and Agricultural Development, Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences) in Torun, we began to realise and understand the consequences, for us, of the existence of someone like Giroux and the phenomena of current critical pedagogy. In a triangle of environments with their leaders: T. Szkudlarek/Gdańsk, Z. Melosik/Poznań and Z. Kwieciński/Toruń, and with my humble participation, impulses were generated in subsequent years, about which Zygmunt Bauman himself wrote directly as being important ones for himself, and for the history of the pedagogical sciences, noticing manifestations of the “Poznan/Torun/Gdansk school” in them³. These were manifestations of a critical attitude in pedagogy, stemming from our re-evaluation of, simultaneously, Marxism, post-modernism, the Frankfurt school and French post-structuralism.

Finally, in the third part, the key question must be asked: what does it mean today to practice critical pedagogy in Poland, and why can, or even must it mean something different than it does in the USA? Finally, we shall not avoid the question of what should the best possible criticism in pedagogy be based on, if it can be designed or, be postulated with some concrete elements? American critical pedagogy showed us that it had gone through a whole range of inspirations, which for us still remained to be a task to be undertaken. We did not have to back us an awareness of the achievements of our local tradition and its criticality, or how it fit the evolution of critical pedagogy in the West. Let us, for that matter, consider that Polish pedagogy, reaching as far back as the interwar period, contains many accents sensitizing us to the significance of the phenomena of resistance in educational (child-rearing) interactions, while the transfer in the critical analysis to the resistance paradigm – following the strategy of the identification of the mechanisms of reproduction of various aspects of inequality by education – is generally considered as belonging to the late stage of the evolution of attitudes in Western pedagogy associated with the 1970s.

Reservations, motivations and programme-related orientation of criticism

I have to state that I am conscious of the fact that I am not unbiased here, being a participant of a certain process which began, and which, I think has not been finished yet, and neither am I certain that it intensively will last, although it still seems important and necessary to me. Critical meta-pedagogical reflection seems all the more indispensable here as I am convinced of the growing intellectual crisis in

³ *Postmodernity and its discontents*, New York University Press, New York, 1997.

our academic environment, which could be discussed for a long time; let it suffice that I have written about it quite extensively, as can easily be checked. Additionally, what is a considerable additional difficulty for me in undertaking the perspective of a distanced overview is the fact that I am not so much attracted by analysing critical pedagogy as by practicing it, and here in my narration I have to change my attitude a little. Generally, this critical pedagogy requires that its important sources of critical traditions be indicated, and, subsequently, it is indispensable to follow their traces from a research perspective, as I have done with Bakhtin, Bourdieu and, partially, with Lacan following Giroux and McLaren, as well as with Erikson and Kohlberg following Habermas. In turn, what needs to be indicated from the point of view of functionality, is new areas, tasks, and the specificity of critical pedagogy's attitude, fitting in particular its ability to identify previously invisible phenomena such as symbolic violence, or, broader, manifestations of a hidden programme and the ritualisation of appearances, and to point out the ability to problematize strategies which, elsewhere, are considered obvious or sufficiently better than others. This includes, for instance – despite various advantages of (neo)liberalism over the baggage of experiences which is being overcome, and is related to all varieties of totalitarianism, including the one generating *homo sovieticus* attitudes – that one needs to identify phenomena that need to be criticised in the increasingly post-totalitarian world, which however is simultaneously entangled in the contradictions and traps of neoliberalism and globalisation, in ways that are not easily identified or untangled from their knots and inertia, nor from the camouflage that is alluring for the naive.

To build critical discourse in relation to the world is very difficult. It starts to have symptoms of resistance of being overthrown, and it includes the mechanism of hiding itself behind procedurality on the one hand, where democracy itself becomes a hostage of procedures, and globality on the other, where differences start to lose their importance and value. And all this is happening with the consent of individuals who are increasingly less reflective, and who increasingly abandon their citizen-subjectivity; or their ability to take responsibility for their own fate and social life in the longer perspective of engaging in the processes of democracy building and developing a culture other than the one temporarily promoted in the media. It is not accidental that Giroux sensitizes us to the “new authoritarianism of neoliberalism”, criticized as far as being included in the categories of terror. And, this last word must also be seen critically, since – as Tomasz Szkudlarek insightfully observed – “neoliberalism is poorly invasive”, and even seductive. It uses soft means, providing an ultimately illusionary sense of comfort and absence of addiction. One needs to be able to recognize the means this new way of impact uses us, in order to find the ways in which its hidden influences can be countered. Along with the strategy of political correctness, it is worth differentiating the pressure of the culture of organisation and interaction dominated by the model of procedurality: the order guaranteed no longer by hierarchy or decision-making as the starting point, but by procedures, which are replacing responsibility, the ability to care, and ethical sensitivity. Therefore, we are witnessing the emergence of a world dominated by the violence of political correctness (ostentatious courtesy falsifies

hidden meanness), entanglements addicted to perverse and perfidious socialisation, and the care for the domination of conventionality in the Habermasian sense, in the form of procedures and procedurality of actions. All this has become a new space for the ritualisation of appearances, as manifested in what I heard from a city authority: "competitions are for those who are to win them". Also in education: efforts are increasingly focused on the generation of the world of paper compliances dreamt-of by every bureaucrat, instead of real concerns for authentic life-giving qualities, so that the latter is measurable, chopped into modules, and definable by declarative competence-related benefits after just a short sequence of impulses.

It is more and more often that we become victims of mechanisms, which are not only concealed, but which also deceitfully use stolen identities, hijacked tradition, and language affirming the right (while in fact usurping claims) to being above criticism as a naturalized object, or one continuing luminous ethos. Social interactions and organisations as a space of hidden, transparent, silent claims – are a perspective which needs to be included in pedagogical analyses, although this takes place slowly; here, Habermas should long have been the primer – but he is not. What is more, it turns out that an act of usurpation in the convention of Orwell's newspeak reverses meanings, and, to be more precise, places labels on situations and new constructs, or even neoplasms resembling neo-constructs that deny associations linked with these labels.

As a part of my own approach to criticality, there is a growing significance of pedagogical alertness, still disregarded in Poland, although already present in its tradition during the interwar period to the two-edgedness of educational measures as well as the bipolar complexity of basic phenomena, which, when reduced to unambiguity, typically become single-sided reductions, losing the necessity to see processes and practices from the other side. We must be able to cope with the necessity to take into account criticality in the form of paradoxical power to protect one from exaggeration, overgrowth or extremes on the one hand, and the absence, deficit and inadequacy on the other. Criticism can no longer be simply related to the postulate of change, since it must be able to also target the changes themselves, their strategies and ways of introduction, and further demand the noticing of their manifestations, which are harmful, diseased, sometimes mad and blind or naïve, or fit the characteristics typical for the so-called Orwellian world involving the description of the world exactly in the spirit of newspeak, denying its sense and enforcing its perspective that imposes blindness and participates in upholding of world that does not deserve it. In its cognitive attitude, criticism includes reflectiveness, which also recognizes the perverseness of effects and burdening intentions, where reflex – as a return reflection of consequences in the form of a distorted echo – tends to be unidentified in the absence of tools for adequate cognition, i.e. for understanding the transformation of the initial attitude. Criticism must be able to feed on impulses also from the sphere of the phenomena, which it can urge us to rebel against by alarming us rather than by only diagnosing and reporting concerns. What is particularly important for the construction or identification of criticism, is the question of what such criticism is motivated by and in which direction (not necessarily by

a project, or less still, utopia) it moves, for what benefit it wants to act, at what price, and with what degree of allowance for giving a voice to the difference within disputes concerning its constitution.

In the Polish reality, it is particularly important and difficult to fit criticism into discourses dealing with the presence of religion in schools, attitudes related to the body and disability, as well as ways of countering the effects of programmes of reform, which cannot be stopped, hampered or reversed. As I have shown elsewhere, we have at least four possible pedagogical strategies hidden behind the differing attitudes to tradition, different visions of freedom and liberation of human spirituality, differing needs for change, and, finally, different ideals of place, which, jointly, call for entirely new visions of possibility for dialogue, for engaging with culture, and for communication mechanisms and their rationality. An entirely different scale of criticism takes on a voice when we are able to notice the need for “transverse rationality” (the importance of which for pedagogy was discovered and is implemented by Ewa Marynowicz-Hetka); or, when – recalling Habermas-Kohlberg’s developmental triad, or its anticipation as found in Sergei Hessen in the form of the well-known sequence: anomie-heteronomy-autonomy – we can critically analyse the double-edgedness of procedurality (of the conventional level in Habermas’s terminology), which was probably most spectacularly presented by Leszek Kołakowski in his analysis of the code-based regulation of occupational liability in the essay, constituting a model for such critical alertness, entitled *Etyka bez kodeksu* [*Ethics without a Code*] from the famous volume *Kultura i fetysze* [*Culture and Fetishes*].

It seems to me that what is most important for pedagogy is the constant infringement of its ideas on socialisation (in view of its stereotyping and reductions of its complexity to local requirements), as well as the highlighting of the violence present in its impact, the results of which range from “voluntary submissiveness” to the allegedly useful and desirable “inviolability” of authority, and the affirmation of seduction or fascination. Critical pedagogy teaches us to understand that dangers and realistically dangerous phenomena are not based mainly on aggression, ostentation or eager offensiveness. Such phenomena can be poorly invasive, and even seductive, and they draw the power of their impact from their apparent lack of interest in addiction. We also know that it is indispensable to trace phenomenon of reverse effectiveness (an effect contrary to the intended one, not despite, but owing to efforts that are directed towards its opposite), or even the perverseness and perfidy of erasing all traces so that peak symptoms of domination and victimisation become reflectively unattainable to individuals who are subjected to them; let alone the generation of gestures of resistance, which is difficult, if not entirely impossible in the entanglement within a “victim syndrome”, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the narcissistic focus on the satisfaction of the needs and follies of the consumer on the commodities market: one of the attitudes being the reverse of the pilgrim’s involvement in culture, as described so well by Bauman, sensitizing us *inter alia*, as we are aware of the demands of tourists or vagabonds for whom educational offers or developmental efforts have no value in themselves. I have already on a separate occasion revealed, following Bauman, the diagnosis of the

“end of the culture of learning” as an additional challenge to education, obstructed by the fiction of the slogan “society of knowledge”⁴.

On the trap of labelling in science: the example of criticism

In my opinion, it is only possible to talk and write sensibly about critical pedagogy when one simultaneously practices and cultivates it, applies it in his/her own attitude for the benefit of the entire pedagogy and not uses it as just another drawer from which, very conveniently, professors or trainees can take papers with a view to promotion, or tolerated texts about some exotic construct, when, at the same time, one is vigilant in relation to traps and dangers. I am against the development of a ghetto from the circle dealing with the critical pedagogy being ALREADY a thought tradition in Western pedagogy – with its own canon, variants, world-class personalities and evolution. It is not about seeing a uniform phenomenon here, still less one deserving an uncritical attitude and single-sided affirmations. Like few other labels, the very formula of “criticality” covers a meta-narrative task, and references to its own claims. It was not for nothing that Marek Siemek sensitised us to the dual, non-reducible tension in the history of philosophy between the extremes of critique and the extremes of the system, where it is easy to encounter an uncritically treated system, or a critique devoid of systemic support as justification for its claims.

The label affirming “criticism” does not give one a patent for infallibility, and cannot relieve one from alertness or responsibility, although we often put traps for ourselves here, and voice usurping aspirations, or at least tempting promises. For instance, the “tasty” soup advertised on TV cannot be tasty just by the power of the word on the pack, and, similarly, the psychology referred to as “humanistic” does not have arguments on the superiority, or, still less, the singularity of the standard of its representation as being such only on the basis of its name, while simultaneously being naive, shallow or discarded outside the boundaries of the complexity of phenomena, requiring as much as the knowledge of psychoanalysis in its version far from reductionist orthodoxy.

There is a huge number of such examples with usurpations or the misfortune with labels and their promises. There is a symptomatic example connected with the so-called socialist pedagogy, which unfortunately was applauded by the majority of the great personalities of our pedagogical tradition after WWII. Wherever pedagogy is right and up-to-date, it has nothing to do with socialism, since it has value outside this label and its reference, which in many respects is deficient. Therefore, we are not the hostages of a label when we recognise some of its elements as being positive. In turn, wherever the pedagogical tradition has become covered over with various endeavours, it is false, and even a label of socialism not only fails to help here, but, what is more, it hinders the effort of differentiating positives from

⁴ L. Witkowski, *Ku integralności edukacji i humanistyki II* [Towards the Integrity of Education and Humanities II], Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń.

misunderstandings. Similarly, Marxism, referred to as a “progressive” philosophy, was unable to hide its lack of progressiveness in its many divergent incarnations, just like the Church, proud of the term *katholikos*, meaning *universal*, is not as such simply by the power of the word – and faces the challenge of ecumenism. Let me remind you that Luther’s criticism on the eve of Reformation did not postulate the establishment of some new Church, as it was fighting for the Church of the time to not only nominally remain faithful to its Christian mission, but also not to cause an association of the word “Pope” with the term “anti-Christ”. Hence, we know that labels often hide huge claims, and even usurpations masking interests connected with attempts at ruling in a given constellation of powers. In the history of philosophy, a critical label was initially mainly associated with the Kantian tradition, and subsequently with the critical theory originating from Frankfurt am Mein in a dispute with Karl Popper’s “critical rationalism”; therefore, criticism has many names, and it would be good to care for it, and reflect on it.

Similarly, although critical pedagogy has its own natural branches and references to the tradition of Marxism, it would do it a lot of harm to fit its entirety solely into this tradition. At the same time, it would be an absolute misunderstanding to consider one’s aversion to, say, Engels or Lenin, as an alibi for the indiscriminate condemnation of Antonio Gramsci’s attitude, or the reading of this tradition in, for example, the Frankfortian version, not to mention a return to the ethical reflection of the “young Marx”.

A discussion on critical pedagogy must be critical itself – in a broader way than in relation to a closed whole. I would not like us here to multiply errors, or undertake a habitual attitude to other labels, including alternative pedagogy, post-modernist pedagogy, or emancipatory pedagogy. Critical pedagogy wants to be pedagogy *tout court*, as such, and not a marginal or exotic variety proud of its exclusiveness, magnanimously recognising the right of the equal functioning of other pedagogical currents whilst unaware of their deficits, or even their harmfulness to democracy, citizenship and the quality of the subjective functioning of the human being in the world of culture. It is, in particular, an opportunity to reflect on the condition of the entire Polish pedagogy, as well as its parts, such as general pedagogy, social pedagogy, or comparative pedagogy, as well as on the development of tasks for each of them, and on the identification of their shallow and backward areas – especially when they are entirely unnoticed as a part of a typical complacent attitude.

I want to close this part of my reflections with a provocative thesis. If pedagogy is serious – it is critical. Of course, the above only begins the dramatic task we are facing – because it is not easy to measure the necessary amount of criticism, just like there is no single direction here, or a closed list of topics to be undertaken – despite various starting models and despite the simultaneous suggestion that there is not a single valid version of critical pedagogy or its single direction. For the purposes of greater precision, let me also add (although I am conscious of an additional complication I am introducing already at the beginning) a certain reservation concerning the signalled traps and terminological disputes, which do not have to be treated as trivial. I must reveal that, myself, I definitely prefer the term *radical*

pedagogy – firstly, because it is easier to be afraid of the term, since radicalism has poor connotations, although its etymology is connected with roots, with reaching to the roots of phenomena as a precondition for the “uprooting” on the one hand, and the taking care of roots, for instance in a culture as symbolic memory, on the other. Naturally, this gives birth to intellectual and ethical alertness as the first condition for in-depth criticism. Secondly, one needs to thoroughly consider what and how should be radicalised (it was some time ago that I postulated the semantic radicalisation of pedagogy). Thirdly, in connection with the above, radical pedagogy is a term which requires a more theoretical foundation than a critical one, because everyone wants to be critical, while not giving much thought to how to be critical in relation to... the critique itself. The willingness or the determination to be radical calls for a much more strategically serious justification, insightfulness and alertness. What is more, I only have to refer to my own already discussed thesis on the need of “semantic radicalisation” of various categories in pedagogical discourse whenever it is marked by academic ambitions, be it only to deepen the association of various categories, as ones including different traps or even semantic differentiation, where a meaningful use of a term calls for the breaking off with colloquial associations with it. For me, the key example here is the indication of the tension between the function of socialisation as a whirl of the cultural reduction of a given space, and education as a way of pulling oneself out from this whirl in a mode that steps beyond both local and tentative expectations and dominations.

A contribution to a description of critical pedagogy in Poland

If I am not mistaken, the first trace of critical pedagogy in Poland dates back to the beginning of the 1980s, when, on a tide of Solidary awakening, I wrote a letter to Giroux, asking him for a book symptomatically and promisingly entitled *Theory and resistance in education*, a trace of which I had found somewhere in literature. The book quickly became our starting source of intellectual opening, encouraging us to follow footsteps which have not yet been discovered here so far. It was not accidental that parts of the book were translated and published, as a part of a series developed by the Nicolaus Copernicus University, in the subsequent volumes of *Nieobecne dyskursy [Absent Discourses]* edited by Z. Kwieciński. That was the key book for further development of our methodological awareness, and it made us conscious of the fact that somewhere out there, there was a different pedagogy – one, which had long ago (the 1980s) assimilated critically the Frankfurtian tradition, and one which was correcting its own criticism in relation to the realities of capitalism by going from the paradigm of reproduction to the paradigm of resistance, which, to boot, was affirmed critically rather than sentimentally.

It turned out not only that somewhere out there, is there a DIFFERENT pedagogy in relation to the one dominating here, but also that pedagogy can, is, and even should be DIFFERENT. The entire pedagogy should be different. It turned out that its inspirations can, and even have to be, different – more deeply integrated

with the state of philosophy, sociology, and even literary science and psychoanalysis. It was the main lesson for me – one which formed the basis for the direction of my further research and my readings – also of our own tradition. I had learnt that a contact with Marxism does not have to copy the domination of creeds of even our leading coryphaeuses, but can provide one with tools of criticism. The different practice of pedagogy by T. Szkudlarek and by me, considering all the differences between us, probably resulted from such a discovery: my own being a consequence of reading, and the excellent Gdansk pedagogue's, also a result of his stay at Giroux's place in the USA, when we were still "young and beautiful" in the 1980s.

Together with my new readings, I also discovered for myself a trace of Bakhtin's Russian semiotics in the American critical pedagogy, which gave fruit in the form of a book (which won me professorship)⁵, and the recognition of the significance of Jacques Lacan's French psychoanalysis for pedagogy, which resulted from as many as three doctoral dissertations I had supervised, which focused on psychoanalysis in pedagogy and philosophy. I have also discovered for myself that Pierre Bourdieu was a great humanist, excellently rooted in the history of philosophy (see *Pascalian Meditations*), and not "just" a sociologist who is interesting only to sociologists themselves, and to scholars doing narrow research. It turned out that they all were providing pedagogy with a new, critical and semantically radicalised language, which we did not even dream of in the past, and which all of a sudden began to be considered as obvious, as something necessary and already adopted by pedagogy in the world.

It soon turned out how much the vision of emancipation was rooted in the Latino-American example of Paolo Freire, whom, however, we tend to associate with some other vision of pedagogy labelled as emancipatory pedagogy. We discovered that one needs to be able to ask oneself a serious, difficult and critical question: what psychology does pedagogy need and why? And why is the one routinely lectured by academic psychology often too weak? And why has it also to be psychoanalysis in Lacan's version? American pedagogues showed twenty years ago that Lacan was necessary in pedagogy, while we still rarely understand that it can be, as much as possible and worthy of observation, with a view to changing the ways of observing and understanding. The unveiling of the significance of the category of absence as one not necessarily related to deficit, while fitting the order of desire on the one hand, and at the same time the appreciation of the ability to recognise absence as a basis for action on the other, is just one of the traces, which require in-depth studying and inclusion into pedagogical thinking.

But, at the same time, I want to stress that it would be a mistake to associate the beginning of critical pedagogy in Poland with our discovery of Giroux, and the critical sociology of education with Apple. So, as not to begin as late as the 1980s, it is worth going back a bit. Let us quote Mysłakowski's symptomatic sentence from 1967 as a *motto* for some of our current dilemmas concerning the normative ministerial

⁵ L. Witkowski, *Uniwersalizm pogranicza* [Universalism of the Borderland], Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 1991, sec. ed.

usurpations present in the visions and solutions included in the programme of higher education reform. It requires sensitisation to the necessity of seeing the duality of the scope of education under the pain of a suicidal attitude in relation to culture.

“Possibly, we shall not build a motorcycle with the help of the truths from, for instance, the *Book of Job*, but neither will we become more mature to life by the knowledge of mechanics and the ability to weld”⁶.

Mysłakowski’s modest book of almost magazine column writings entitled, *Zatracone ścieżki, zagubione ślady* [*Vanished Paths, Lost Places*] (1967), contains a large dose of dramaturgy, and simultaneously sensitises us to the fact that critical pedagogy must be... dramatic, that it must not be blind to drama, or even tragedy, and, all the more, the ritualisation of appearances. I also wish to add that what is surprising when one reads Mysłakowski is how much he affirms the presence of the dimension of resistance in educational relations, while we were reading that the paradigm of resistance emerged only after three critical uncoverings of the paradigm of reproduction in the sphere of education. The title of the collection of essays is also meaningful from the point of view of critical pedagogy: vanished paths, lost traces; here, I want to refer to the 1980s idea of the promotion of “absent discourses” in Polish pedagogy. Critical pedagogy was one of them. Isn’t it so that we are to blame for the fact that it still is an absent discourse – and at what price?

Therefore, one needs to ask critically whether we can approach our own tradition in such a way as to unveil in it “accents”, which somewhere else were given a voice, perhaps even later, but managed to do so much more prominently? Are we picking it up critically? And “critically” is tantamount here not only to the opposite of non-criticality, but also of superficiality, of an absence of strong inspirations, of an inability to unveil traces it is worth to follow, which oblige one, which not only become tools of revealing, but as much as an alarmist call for the activation of a change of attitudes. Criticism must be included in the formula of involvement in significant social issues recognised as historical breakthroughs, as was excellently sensed by the generation of Polish pedagogues born in the 1880s, who subsequently were dedicated to developing pedagogical reflection, guided by their desire to support the development of the sector of education in the Polish state, which was regaining its independence in 1918, after years of nonexistence.

Let us also note by the way, that in terms of its sensitisation and openness to psychoanalysis, pre-war pedagogy in Poland, dealing initially and mainly with Adler and inferiority complex-related problems (also in teachers as an obstacle in educational activity), was more critical and advanced in the taking over of impulses from the then-new humanities than our current pedagogy. In the meantime, it experienced a regression of competence and a decline of discursive styles, only painfully regained in the subsequent monographic studies (such as doctorates on Lacan for pedagogy). What I have discovered here was the significance of the Frankfurt school, while independent reading of Habermas revealed the im-

⁶ Z. Mysłakowski, *Zatracone ścieżki, zagubione ślady* [*Vanished Paths, Lost Places*], Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa, 1967.

portance of the trace of Erikson's theory on the life cycle and Kohlberg's triad as a foundation of the vision of developmental processes, which still fail to be entirely used in pedagogy. In this current, in contrast to Giroux and McLaren, I followed Habermas's theory of communicative action and its references. All this allows one to see the limitations of various traces dominating our common associations, such as those connected with the affirmation of humanistic psychology or hermeneutics treated in opposition to critical thinking. However, it is enough to notice that in the light of Habermas's approach, it is clear that developmentally and educationally important emancipation cannot be reduced to the hermeneutic perspective, and requires supplementations taking into account its scopes included in other types of action than those oriented at agreement. It is enough to associate types of rationality and cognitive interests. The poor reception of critical pedagogy in Poland has a lot to do with the poor reception of the critical tradition in the scope of the Frankfurtian tradition, which fails to provide censorship as an alibi after more than 25 years of attempts at showing off the tradition and its translations.

After the first conversations with professor Kwieciński, who at that time was invited to take the chair of the dean of a newly established faculty at UAM, we discussed the formula of taking over the experience from the Miami University in Florida, so that the new unit could be called the Faculty of Education (and possibly also Cultural) Studies. I am surprised that it is still an entirely single case of calling a faculty in isolation from the discipline, the name of which is not especially known or recognized elsewhere. We cannot even use the critical experience of others.

An important benefit resulting from the discovery of critical pedagogy was a study visit that Prof. Tomasz Szkudlarek took (as a still young assistant professor) to the USA, his excellent preparation, works, including those published in America, and Giroux and McLaren's joint earlier visit to Poland (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Educational Research Institute in Warsaw and Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan). All this opened up the road to the formation-related turn in Poland, bringing along new generational impulses. Therefore, the generational leap, which simultaneously generated and promoted the generational leaders – personas active in the critical current, including: T. Szkudlarek, Z. Melosik, B. Śliwerski, R. Kwaśnica and my own humble self – has possibly never been repeated. It is still unclear whether it is only a biographical episode which concerns us, or something which will significantly change the worsening intellectual environmental climate of the academic pedagogy in Poland into one preventing deeper concern with the postulate of critical care for education.

Two or three anecdotes as a testimony

In my opinion, it is worth turning attention to Giroux's choice of the cover for our joint book *Edukacja i sfera publiczna* [Education and the Public Sphere] with a motif of Alfred Jarry's King Ubu, utterly fantastically fitting the topic of education and

the public sphere, made by Stasys Eidgrigevicius – a graphic designer of Lithuanian origin who lives in Poland and enjoys international recognition. The figure of the masked, smiling sorehead who laid various claims (to power, to superiority, to seriousness, to kindness), was to symbolise difficulties in the unmasking of the hidden dimensions of communication in the space of education. One of my most acclaimed lectures was the one during which, while presenting the *King Ubu* cover of the book I wrote with Giroux to my students, I explained why it so greatly illustrates the pathology of the public space and education. Similar masks are worn by some students and lecturers dominated by pretending, feigned involvement and kindness, rather than open aggression. Their smiles and lofty attitudes and costumes mask emptiness, and can be a symptom of a persistent ritualisation of appearances and the bareness of participation in the process, but only in a distant sense convergent with the care for the development and deepening of symbolic capital. Let us remark on the sidelines that there are three manners in which masks are worn and the resulting three strategies of unmasking. One needs to act differently when (a) the mask is hidden and its wearer claims that there is no mask, (b) the mask is treated as inherent, making its change or taking off unnegotiable, (c) the mask is shamelessly worn as such with ostentatious related usurpations (e.g. you cannot do anything to me, because I have the power).

Let me also mention, in a slightly anecdotic tone, Giroux's reluctance to accept my proposal of including in the book some texts he wrote jointly with McLaren, although in the 1990s they published joint books promoting, among other things, the idea of a border and borderland for pedagogy, as well as the significance of the politicality of cultural studies. Giroux believed that they were suddenly two separate worlds, since McLaren became more revolutionary in the sense of the Marxist classics, popular in particular in Latin America in the leftish spirit, with the identification with Lenin and "Che" Guevara. After lecturing in Miami and Penn State University (taking its name from Pennsylvania), Giroux now lectures at the McMaster University in Hamilton, Canada, while McLaren, after lecturing at UCLA, immigrated to Auckland, New Zealand (remaining professor at both universities). At the same time, in Mexico, he opened McLaren's Institute of Critical Pedagogy with its flagship call "Teach for a better world". Giroux dominated his texts with critical analyses of the condition of capitalism and mechanisms dominating in the USA, introducing in recent years some dramatic terminology, such as university in chains, America on the edge, and terror of neoliberalism. Together with twelve other intellectuals, he has recently been nominated for a Pulitzer Award in Canada. While Giroux travels less these days, McLaren conquers the world in places reporting the need for leftish political and civic involvement. He activated and publicized institutional anti-capitalist actions as a part of an ideological offence in the spirit of the radical Latino-American left. When I asked him for a preface to the Polish edition of *Schooling as ritual performance*, McLaren sent in a text in which the key thesis was that it was the CIA who had effected Karol Wojtyła's election to become Pope JP II. Although the author entitled me to retouch his writing, I re-

frained from this right. The text was published as it was in a volume dedicated to me⁷. This can be combined with the fact that on the opening page of his website McLaren placed the image of Lenin, and many of his texts follow the spirit of “Che” Guevara, owing to which, together with his openly revolutionary rhetoric, the American radical is known especially in Latino-American countries.

I am discussing this slightly anecdotic information for one rather important reason and a very serious one at that. It turns out that there is not a single model when it comes to a political attitude in critical pedagogy, which is tantamount to its immense potential requiring some intellectual wrestling with the neoliberalist world-view, and to face the end of the pipe dream of state socialism after the drama of national socialism. Marxism can also be double-edged in its critical attitude: as much facilitating, as it is disturbing. And the already mentioned double-edgedness of labels, not excluding critical pedagogy, is an important thesis for me here. I generally believe that labels (even those marking disciplines) are too reductive, too strongly imposing the stereotype of associations, too closing, too relieving one from the sense of obligation to reach out, because our little label is different, because it is not about the very pedagogy or its interest. Maybe it is an all the more indispensable and current direction of fitting into the requirements of the ‘market’. I remember McLaren’s informative remark that it is not enough to be “right in the head”, but one also needs to be reliable in relation to one’s interlocutor: short hair and a tie can destroy all chances for successful communication with college students in the USA before one even opens one’s mouth. In our contexts, it is worth stressing that the interest of pedagogy, or pedagogical environments, is not everywhere tantamount to the interest of education and pedagogical culture. We have environments which represent the academic anti-world looking after its own interests (systems, averageness, stability). It is not accidental that it is so difficult to fight for the interests of education when what dominates is the interests of teachers represented for example by the teachers’ trade union.

The majority of our faculties are faculties of pedagogy – if not hidden among historians at the Faculty of History, as is the case in Wrocław, then among sociologists and philosophers, as at the Faculty of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University. To boot, our names, wherever the term *pedagogy* is featured, hide or lose the fact that professional pedagogical training studies are not at all conducted there. This is a fact even Minister Kudrycka is not aware of, who recently tried to convince us that the poor condition of Polish schools results from the poor preparation of teachers at pedagogical faculties in universities. And, we all know how narrowly school pedagogues are associated with pedagogical bodies or our teachers’ councils, which are also fictitiously labelled as pedagogical.

⁷ Cf. *Ku integralności edukacji i humanistyki. Księga jubileuszowa dla Lecha Witkowskiego* [Towards Education and Humanities. A Jubilee Book for Lech Witkowski], eds. Z. Kwieciński, M. Jaworska-Witkowska, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2009.

The problem of looking for an alternative or changing the mainstream?

The perspective for the treatment of critical or radical pedagogy must be clarified, since it is not so much about it being “only” an alternative, or it being named and treated in this way, but as a certain deviation from the standard or a rebelling margin. The excellent publishing house Oficyna Wydawnicza “Impuls” advertises the book authored by Giroux and myself *Edukacja i sfera publiczna* [Education and the Public Sphere] as a representative of alternative pedagogy, and I am not sure whether it is not doing harm to itself in this way, placing us in some ghetto or pigeonholing us, while what it is all about is the reconstruction of the mainstream education, which is deficient and a delusion. Neither an alternative pedagogy nor, much less, critical pedagogy, can be tantamount to just one more label in the work division, which is comfortable to us, or the making of clubs. Critical pedagogy is a paradigm for the whole of pedagogy, reversing the relationship with what already Kotarbiński called the “foozling of disciplines” as a part of the apparent divisions of specialisations. When radical pedagogues reach for *gender studies*, it is not because they want to cultivate a plot – rather, they want to ask what their essence is for the entirety of pedagogy if it does not want to remain backward in this scope. This is because it is not the question of yet another type of pedagogy referred to as ‘gender’ in this case, but the pedagogy of gender as an object of reflection that subsequently leads to important prompts to various pedagogical disciplines, and, to be more precise, to the entirety of pedagogy. When references to postmodernism emerge in critical pedagogy, and there are many references to Bauman in Giroux’s latest books, it is not aimed at the creation of just one more pigeonhole. It has never been the question of the development of a specific vision, for example postmodern pedagogy, but an indication as to what pedagogy, temporarily referred to the condition which the already mentioned Zygmunt Bauman has for some time been calling liquid modernity instead of postmodernity, must be able to find the courage to do.

In Polish pedagogy, we are past the period when various eminent scholars announced that they practiced “socialist” pedagogy (Suchodolski, Mysłakowski or Muszyński), thus entangling themselves in many ways within this label, from which, as we realise, nothing has remained. Wherever such pedagogy was wise and valuable, by no means did it need to be squeezed into the label of “socialism”, and whenever it was pressed into such a label, it did not always have to be dogmatic or stupid. The socialist label was simply totally irrelevant or senseless.

I believe that it is, or even MUST BE the same with terms such as alternative pedagogy, emancipatory pedagogy, critical pedagogy, etc... With just one clarification: criticism is a METATHEORETIC postulate: one entangled in the duality with the care for a systemic approach related to the question concerning the justification of critical strategy. It appeals to the level of organisation of the power of discourse, and to an indispensable distance from it. Critique may be uncritical to itself. We are not talking about such criticism. Critique does not have to be only

unmasking – in none of the three senses which I indicated earlier in relation to the types of the status of the mask. What is more desirable is an alarmist pedagogy, where the alarm is tantamount to a fundamental threat, with the ability of a prior diagnosis. An exposing critique rips off the mask. A critique, which is alarmist, warns that it is impossible to take off the mask as it defends its claims. However, the worst evil does not appear solely in a mask, but also wears an ostentatiously cynical face manifesting that no one can do anything to him, anyway. Demands that reduce universities to the market do not require unmasking as harmful, since they openly announce that it all boils down to the reduction of the university to training, to employees' expectations, rather than to cultural heights, or to the spiritual development of people. Such a critique does not have to, and even cannot be, "systemic", as it invalidates the concern for the critique of the system itself (assumptions, intentions, hopes, sensitivities).

A critique of education can be sentimental and wrong in its claims of the purity of its intentions and their nobleness; this actually being a form of naivety. How can we avoid naive critique sentimentalising, say, resistance or ideologically manifesting its blind superiority? It is an important question for critical pedagogy. One of the directions that can be followed to answer this, which finds its way into our consciousness with great difficulty, as I show when reconstructing the history of pedagogy against the conditions of the social sciences (including sociology as in Simmel, Elias or Bauman) is that it must be aware of the requirements of the paradigm of duality sensitizing us to, inter alia, the already mentioned threat that there can be a kitsch critique of kitsch or, on the other hand, an unreasonable praise of reason. A critique of school requires critical alertness itself, as criticism is not immune to the requirements of alertness concerning the position it takes to speak and see the world or just its educational part. Democracy has already liberated itself from absolutism and calculation-based automatism founded on the rightness of the majority, while the bothersome celebration of difference has become a mark of a culture's democratic co-being as coexistence, at least whenever we are dealing with the maturity of the public sphere or political responsibility instead of the announcement that the winner takes it all, and the opposition is, in exchange, vested with a "bandit's law" with no holds barred.

It is also worth remembering that critique is not to be tantamount solely to some alternative or alternativeness in relation to an equally, somehow, valid pedagogy devoid of criticism. When Bogusław Śliwerski was discovering anti-pedagogy for us, and when it was jointly presented in a volume devoted to critical pedagogy together with the then-young Tomasz Szkudlarek (which, until now, has been reissued at least a dozen or so times), we however already knew that we should seek something totally different: it is not sufficient to declare: *I will not discipline you, and I do not want to exercise authority*, for subordination to disappear. The meeting point of critical pedagogy and anti-pedagogy turned out to be extremely illusory, although both of them are about criticism. Radical pedagogues were searching for critical psychology. Phil Wexler wrote his texts about "critical psychology", while at the same time, we were sometimes told that anti-pedagogy does not require any

psychology since it does not need any psychology of... impact or influence, as it does not want to have any impact or establish a relation of domination – as if the suspension of the intention to exercise authority automatically abolished the relation of power. Unfortunately, it turned out that apart from “absent discourses”, the first associations concerning critical pedagogy were, to its harm, directly linked with anti-pedagogy. I am sorry that we cannot discuss this issue in-depth, and more seriously due to the absence of Bogusław Śliwerski. It would be fair to note here that the 18 “contemporary theories and currents of education” importantly and laudably discussed by Bogusław Śliwerski⁸ include refined differentiations between the divisions of non-authoritarian or anti-authoritarian pedagogy, such as Fromm’s radical humanism, and Freire’s emancipatory pedagogy, while the critical science of education is associated with Habermas, Giroux is absent, and Freire is classified into an approach with which I would not necessarily agree. This is a matter for another occasion. However, these issues are of key significance for our pedagogical culture.

It was since the 1980s that I preferred the Italian version of critical pedagogy in the form of Riccardo Massa’s *clinica della formazione*, where the ‘clinical’ approach was a clarification of his understanding of criticism influenced by his direct opening to Michel Foucault’s trace with his power-knowledge and to the “Frankfurt school”, while at that time we were already independently reading Habermas, when the guys from Greifswald, GDR, told us that they were rid of Habermas long ago. However, let us note that our failure to undertake a deeper analyses as to what a “clinical discourse” brings to pedagogy (as a model and as a backup of specific knowledge) is additional testimony of our environment’s inability to profit from our own tradition, as both Stefan Wołoszyn and Wincenty Okoń long postulated the establishment of a closer relationship between pedagogy and the medicine-related approach, in particular as it concerns studies in pathology. A fuller contact with the clinical approach would also make it easier to inform pedagogy of psychoanalytic currents, so far deafened in pedagogy by its limitations in the discourse of academic psychology.

The problem of an approach to critique in the context of comparative pedagogy

It is worth dealing with the question whether there is a place for critical pedagogy in the descriptions and typologies of pedagogical standpoints we encounter in our literature. In my opinion, there is no such place – not only because critical pedagogy has been excluded to join the class of “absent discourses”. Also, various typologies are developed, classifying Freire and Habermas on the one hand to a separate category, and contrasting the apparently existing emancipatory pedagogy and pedagogy of liberation, or postmodernist pedagogy on the other. I consider

⁸ Cf. *Współczesne teorie i nurty wychowania* [Contemporary theories and currents of education], Oficyna Wydawnicza „Impuls”, Kraków 1998.

all these attempts as unjustified and theoretically uninteresting. We know from Habermas of an interpretative trap consisting in the existence of an “emancipatory interest” he distinguished on the one hand, and on the other we have residues of emancipation owing to each of the other cognitive interests. These residues are present in every type of rationality. Also the “instrumental” rationality (one which objectifies and is based on the mechanism of ruling and subordination) obviously has its residues of emancipation (from the limitations of natural nature), just as contextual rationality has its residues of emancipation from social limitations in the area of a failure to arrive at an agreement.

Just like the words *freedom* or *development* belong not only to the liberal discourse, the words *tradition*, *authority* and *canon* do not belong solely to the conservative discourse. There is a liberal affirmation of tradition, as well as a conservative vision of freedom. We need a vocabulary of critical pedagogy, with its own specificity of categories, such as: empowerment or the attitude of a “transformative intellectual”, or the task of canon deconstruction, and, on the other hand, the specific meaning of traditional categories in pedagogy, be it authority, as I demonstrated in volume 1 on the challenges of authority in *Impuls*.

What is of key importance is the question of what normative project is related to the same term. Critical pedagogy does not have to discard authority or canon to the bin: as for the latter, Giroux talks about the need of its deconstruction, and as for the former, about the emancipatory authority related to the attitude of a transformative intellectual; he postulates borderland or hybrid identity, and turns attention to the category of the voice, which reaches further into the practice of education and society than the very affirmation of subjectivity. This is because it allows one to ask concrete questions and use a strict criterion in the scope of who has the right to speak, who is allowed to speak, whose voice can be heard, and whose voice can be listened to.

Criticism of pedagogy in Polish conditions

Let us at last take my third intended block of issues. If there is not a single critical pedagogy (and pedagogy as such, if it exists, must be critical), how can we understand it in the Polish context – the current one to boot? In America, owing to the titles of Giroux’s latest books, we have an indication of the ‘terror of liberalism’, a fight for the recovery of the University tied with the chains of a military complex, or a mass culture pathology exemplified even by Mickey Mouse, with its soft imprinting of attitudes via an apparently innocent convention of play.

On our end, it is insufficient to associate criticism with the unmasking function – what is indispensable is the discourse Z. Kwieciński calls alarmist, or the effort to reveal pedagogical inspirations from discreet discourse. The fight for the university must be related to both the reclaiming of higher education’s cultural function against the recurring peak pathologies demanding only the kind of education which will be useful for the labour market. This collective madness returns every so often – it

was ridiculed already by Hegel during his university days – he accused a part of the professorial of succumbing to such madness. Hence the thesis – pedagogy, if it at all exists, is critical also in the sense of its identification of the collective madness we are all prone to succumb for comfort, due to the domination of stupidity.

We do not often participate in public debate, which Giroux considers to be a significant aspect and indispensable function of a critical intellectual. On our end, individual interviews in newspapers or weeklies have become exceptions and extraordinary events (just like the recent excellent interview with Tomasz Szkudlarek or an interview with Aleksander Nalaskowski – made in a different convention and from the point of view of an axiological perspective). I am not particularly good at giving interviews, and I do not really like it myself, despite my several attempts at “Gazeta Wyborcza” daily and its local supplement, and my previous attempts as a critical columnist in three subsequent newspaper issues. However, what is worse, we do not read each other’s books, we do not reproduce the most precious traces from the history of pedagogical thought, starting with Trentowski’s *Chowanna*, which we left without much sense, and is of benefit only to the historians of education. *Chowanna* is a treasure-trove of pedagogical ideas, including, naturally, erroneous ones, but it is worth reading more than many contemporary works authored by disciplinary coryphaeuses, including textbooks: some of them premature or even ill-timed, missed as failing to comply with the heritage of the tradition.

We are in danger of an intellectual catastrophe in our environment if Polish pedagogy fails to really become pedagogy, i.e. a critical discourse, which simultaneously displays mature self-criticism. At the same time, we must treat this criticism as a task rather than something given, as something rolling and developing, moving, rather than something prone to final codifications. Critique is always local, both historically and in terms of space, being a hostage of its time and its limitations, which can be seen only from a distance. One of the tasks, which, when recognised consciously and then undertaken, would change the condition of the discipline, is the task of a critical reference to the achievements of pedagogy from the times of the Polish People’s Republic, in its most colloquially affirmed variants, not excluding the works of Bogdan Suchodolski. I am trying to take my first steps in this direction in my latest book⁹.

The indication of the directions of care for civil empowerment must go hand in hand with our care for the cultural function, against eradication from the symbolic heritage, which does not have to be understood conservatively, but as the soil of historicity that develops us, as Heidegger had put it in his flagship book, *Being and Time*.

We often cannot read the critical tradition, or use it in our writing. In one of the recent general pedagogy textbooks, there are only many references to Bourdieu – and only references. Having the power of affirmation, we allegedly have the right to automatically feel like “depositories” of our disciplines. Then I prefer to read

⁹ Cf. L. Witkowski, *Przełom dwoistości w pedagogice polskiej między historią i teorią* [The breakthrough of duality in Polish pedagogy between history and theory], Oficyna Wydawnicza „Impuls”, Kraków 2012.

Bourdieu, as his works are basically indispensable for the more serious treatment of general pedagogy, with references to such categories as the ritualisation of appearances, the economics of fraud, symbolic profit, the attitude of complicit adversaries (*adversaires complices*), epistemological pairs, etc. We need critical notions to be able to comprehend, i.e. to critically grasp. Such an understanding becomes categorically more offensive, both politically and culturally; as Adorno¹⁰ warned, the practice of philosophy and science can also be barbarian if the insight into the state of things does not result in postulates for change, but preserves the *status quo* or blocks the very approach to change.

Instead of an ending: On the naturalisation of the world as a source of threats

On the sidelines, these must have been as much as the threats described by Norbert Elias¹¹ which the Frankfurtians in the persons of Adorno and Horkheimer had in mind when they warned in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*¹² that the attitude of quarter-intellectuals and semi-intellectuals is more dangerous to culture than the attitudes of the illiterate, since the latter do not aspire to faking behaviours of, say, intellectual elites, while the former strive to “eliminate” differences and equalize standards at the price of their downward movement. The category of elimination recurs many times in Elias’s work, and it is worth to associate here its links with the elimination of differences at the price of degradation in the ways in which models are manifested in the mode of ritualisation regarding their appearances. It seems that we are not sufficiently aware of the threats to our culture brought about by the admission of degraded forms that promote an illusion to the “educated” layers through the mass-production of the fictitious quality of education, in particular at the nominally higher level. As a part of this digression, which I find important, let me stress that it would be worthwhile to identify and reveal the same (or corresponding) phenomena in the sphere of the mechanisms that compose participation in life and enable expressions within academic environments through participation of persons who have never made a sufficient effort to meet the requirements of top standards, but who, nevertheless, do not find it an obstacle to prevent status-related discriminations by those who are ambitious, including the exercising of academic authority and apparently being the “depositories” of tradition of particular disciplines, having dominated them with their position of institutional hegemony.

One of the tasks we still are not able to problematize in the practice of differential cultural relations is the very translation of difference into value and potential. Toleration is very often associated with a disregard, on the one hand, and a claim

¹⁰ Cf. T.W. Adorno, *Minima moralia. Reflections from Damaged Life*, transl. by E. F. N. Jephcott, Verso 2005.

¹¹ Cf. N. Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, Wiley-Blackwell 1994.

¹² M. Horkheimer, T. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Stanford University Press 2002.

for inviolability on the other. We are witnessing various manifestations of ghetto and ghettoisation, which kill the possibility of interaction and treatment of difference as a treasure, with the help of which one can enliven relations, and keep on enlivening them. Let us note that Mirosława Dziemianowicz rightfully and excellently showed that single-sex education (separation of the sexes) *de facto* destroys the value of the sexes for each other in their function as generating an important experience (also cultural one) and occasions for the acquisition of competence in an area of ability, which require the need to fight for each other, rather than to be separated from such the interactional space. And such education – in an Orwellian way – destroys the value of difference by keeping it rigidly inside ghettos, activating processes of socialised stereotyping not only in the area of the sexes, professions, and attitudes in the public sphere, but also the recruitment when taking a voice. On the side of interest in the phenomenon of interdisciplinarity, one can see how much specialisations, which are closed off from the inside, lose as they become entangled in illusory qualities designed to spoil whole disciplines for years, if not generations. We have evidence to show that pedagogy is just in this situation if we compare its interwar potential with the trends dominating in times of the Polish People's Republic. In my opinion, the only possible remedy is to engage impulses in the mode of a multiplied and transversal criticism.

Summing up: critical pedagogy in its various manifestations shows the minimum use of radicalised discourses and efforts, both academic and civil. It is time to use them more intensely. It is this challenge that needs to be faced – otherwise, complacency and comfortableness in our disciplinary ghettos will occur. We will not even notice the moment when the dream of an unmasking function will no longer be achievable, not because someone will make it difficult to reach it, but because we ourselves, due to our blindness, dumbness and deafness, or – to use one word: stupidity – will be unable to meet the task of awakening, followed by rubbing our eyes and undertaking the daily activities thinking about the future. We will be left with a bleating about our fate – the one we prepared with our own hands. It is possibly already almost done, with little chance for reversal. And, it is always possible to make a soup in such a way that it is inedible, although it comes from a package announcing that it is “Tasty”. Only now can we wish everyone *bon appetite!*

There is one key thesis resulting from the above exposé: there is no longer any alibi for the absence of impulses that are critical to pedagogy in self-education, didactics, and research in Poland – not necessarily the impulses originating from intentional critical pedagogy itself in our daily academic functioning. Critical impulses emerge in various types of discourse, as presented by Zbigniew Kwiecieński; their action was illustrated using cultural contexts by Monika Jaworska-Witkowska in their recent extraordinary book written jointly¹³. In particular, their book is about the various discursive practices and the various forms of pedagogical intentionality, which bring about effects that need to be uncovered to reveal critical inspira-

¹³ Z. Kwiecieński, M. Jaworska-Witkowska, *Nurty pedagogii: naukowe, dyskretne, odlotowe* [Currents in pedagogy: scientific, discreet, awesome ones], Oficyna Wydawnicza „Impuls”, Kraków 2011.

tions for pedagogy from literature and other areas of culture, and from various disciplines in the integrally understood humanities. We have a multitude of undervalued (and, consequently, unused in pedagogy) new cultural and humanistic traces, which have managed to get through, also owing to examples from Poland, to areas adjacent to pedagogy, leaving no alibi to close our discourse in a canon or convention known to our older colleagues, or their younger victims who are doomed, but also dooming themselves by their poor familiarity with a broad literature to the overlimited context of works written to get good grades. Researchers in the social sciences can function closed in by their algorithms, schemes, parameters, and statistics. Pedagogues must not repeat such an attitude if they are to be able to function more profoundly and deeply, since it is the humanistic awareness and alertness that are of key importance here, in contrast to the intentions themselves, and the rigidity of procedures.

In contrast to Suchodolski's thesis dating to the end of the 1980s, maintaining that pedagogy no longer has anything to refer to nor to support it, there are many traces on which we may further develop the strength and critical insightfulness of pedagogical discourse, i.e., using traces boldly referring to accents loudly labelled as postmodernist, although these are most often misunderstood in a way which is harmful to the task of the renewal of modernity. There is no one canonical surname, circle, or a single valid interpretation. One must be able to compose the critical potential by stringing, comparable to a string of beads, of ideas like thought pearls, giving oneself a possibility to start "the glass bead game", as written by the excellent 1946 Nobel Prize winner, Hermann Hesse, in his book under the same title.

We will then discover the category of Peter Sloterdijk's "enlightened cynicism", the Orwellisation of speech, the terror of mediocrity contaminated with the syndrome of mass appeal, etc. I think it is beyond any doubt that the cynicism of those participating in public life and representatives of its official institutions, not excluding educational and political institutions, as well as the Orwellisation of speech, are significant challenges for democracy from the point of view of the care for civil society. This area is particularly important not only for social pedagogy in Poland, which calls for an attitude fitting the critical tradition. When applying a critical attitude, one needs to know what one is against, and what the value of an alternative is, and also – whether the critique itself is able to bear criticism, and what criticism it is unable to withstand. Pondering on what can be the subject matter of criticism is indirectly a manner of analysing where communication barriers and authority pressures are found, or excluded from reflection, or protected against degeneration. Additionally, not only behaviours that are extremely offensive, ostentatious or aggressive are dangerous and critique-worthy, but also ones which are masked, courteous, giving one the sense of an affirmation of subjectivity, naturalising certain states as illusively unchangeable, and even invisible in their transparency.

What remains to be asked is a basic question of whether our cognitive and ethical approach is sufficiently radical in the sense of the reaching to the roots of phenomena; whether we are sufficiently alert to various interpretations of sense and values, and, all the more, ready for the effort of a source-based confrontation

with whatever reaches us if only in a package of authoritative reductions. Changes appear to the characteristics of potential objects, calling for an alertness and attentiveness, radicalizing our potential of fighting for ourselves. Domestication and naturalisation (the claim of an unreflective obviousness of the arrangement of the social world) is the main source of threats. The object requiring criticism has not so much camouflaged itself, or cased itself in inaccessible external ramparts, as built-in the rampart that is within ourselves by naturalising itself under our very eyes with the help of the absence of alternatives, political correctness, inertia of proceduralism, courtesy, the ability to overuse democratic mechanisms and practices such as elections, and an absence of an authentic academic community of people who talk to each other and enter into debates concerning important research attempts and publications. Most of us have closed ourselves off into our ghettos, and diligently collect points and publications to be promoted to one or another degree.

It is not difficult to criticise totalitarianism or authoritarianism. What is difficult is to see the camouflaged attempts at soft hidden violence, and in particular those camouflages that act at the level of socialisation, requiring dissocialising; an alertness necessary to pull individuals and social groups from this vortex of cultural reduction. I have yet to see a pedagogical textbook discussing socialisation, also the desirable socialisation, in the categories of perversion and the perfidy of even commendable impacts. This is indispensable, since socialisation sanctions whatever IS done, at the same time pretending that these are personal models, and, besides, such socialisation covers up its tracks, because one no longer knows what such socialisation has deprived them of, while introducing them to a world of pretended obviousness, which does not hide its arbitrary demands elsewhere. It is indispensable to see the function of education, despite its continuous entanglement in socialisation, as one posing the task of desocialisation, breaking set structures that release one from thinking, and from giving a voice to difference which is as a life-giving impulse. An important aspect of the criticality of pedagogy, as an entire discourse and practice, is to finally recognise everywhere the DOUBLE-EDGEDNESS of the means we must use, the DUALITY of the situation of action, sentencing us to tensions and non-reducible dilemmas, continually threatening us with the one-sidedness of choices. This is tantamount to fitting our actions into the perspective of bipolarity, from which none of our pedagogical efforts, as I am showing in my latest book¹⁴, are free.

I shall conclude, although not just to be courteous, but out of my own desire, that the University of Gdansk and its pedagogical environment is by all means the most appropriate place for a debate on the condition and tasks of critical pedagogy in Poland. Owing to the early contact with Giroux's analyses, it became, largely owing to Tomasz Szukdlarek's development and his creative impact, the leading Polish centre radiating with its new optics of research and pedagogical narration

¹⁴ Cf. L. Witkowski, *Przełom dwoistości w pedagogice polskiej, między historią i teorią* [The breakthrough of duality in Polish pedagogy between history and theory], Oficyna Wydawnicza "Impuls", Kraków 2012.

in the area of critical analyses and new threads in research and theories, covering for example the critique of neoliberalism (Joanna Rutkowiak), the openness to *gender studies* (Lucyna Kopciwicz), and the introduction of the tradition of critical sociology, e.g. that of Bourdieu and Foucault to pedagogical analyses (Astrid Męczkowska). Young researchers are also growing. It was *inter alia* owing to the pedagogical environment of Gdańsk after the impulses of critical theory that Poland experienced – although with reluctance and on a limited scale – a generational breakthrough, and it is also in the Gdansk centre that we are witnessing the development of a new school of pedagogical research, the presence of which can be excellently highlighted on the occasion of the organisation of next year's Pedagogical Assembly, which will again be hosted by Gdansk. We might also follow the temptation to honour Giroux himself one way or another, to mark the significance of the research evolution around critical strategy in pedagogy which has been taking place during the last 25 years. The scale of the impact of Henry Giroux's works on changes, not only in Gdansk pedagogy and its didactic strategy, but its research directions and individual achievements, including the scientific development of a new generation of researchers (headed by Tomasz Szkudlarek), cannot be disregarded and deserves broader recognition. It feels good that the new dynamic pedagogical journal entitled *Ars Educandi*, owing to its young, dynamic and creative editing team, facilitates reflection on the thread of thought, and over time will perhaps provide a significant reflection on the subsequent generation of young pedagogues, and their research sensitivities coupled with civic and cultural involvement, which is so close to the radical understanding of the mission of education in the modern world. This is what we should wish for.

Summary

On critical pedagogy (retrospection and projection at the background of problems and experiences in Polish pedagogy)

The article discusses the status of radical and critical theory of education in Poland. The author presents the educational theorists' generational experience that included both the initial contact with radical and critical pedagogy, as well as following attempts to find strategies explaining the reality of the transformation period. The text is therefore an attempt to answer the question about the ways of practicing critical pedagogy in Poland, but also about the foundations of criticism and criticality in general.

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Critical Pedagogy Today?

My answer to the question what critical pedagogy is in today's Poland, after twenty years of political transformation, does not fit into statements like: "it doesn't exist", or "its condition is poor". This diagnosis is certainly accurate, but it refers (rather) to "pedagogy today" as a whole and not only critical pedagogy. What I mean when thinking about this "absence of pedagogy", is its marginal position in the university and its weak, mute condition in the public space.

The question about today's critical pedagogy in Poland is connected with another question – what it used to be for me, for other students of pedagogy at the University of Gdansk. Studying critical pedagogy in the early 1990s was fascinating because of its distinctness from the compromised socialist pedagogy and its clear distancing from the "obligatory" pedagogy, inspired by the catalogue of conservative values. Critical pedagogy was expressive and different. It offered access to a different set of tools (theories, ideas, analysing methodology) and showed new possibilities of research: the relations of power, the political nature of culture, the strength of the position of subjects in the existing social order, the processes of creating and imposing some versions of cultural order at the expense of other versions, or the inequality of power among social groups, established by the school.

Critical pedagogy was decisively exciting and strong to us all – the pedagogy students at that time. We talked about it during classes and at parties. No other subject was worthy of more interest. Personalistic pedagogy seemed suspicious and false, while numerous liberal currents; although acceptable, were not as stirring as critical pedagogy. A few people who belonged to the Catholic Light-Life Movement had a less trustworthy attitude to it (because it was "corrupted by the left"). However, upon leaving the university, we were convinced that among the many inspiring currents, this one was the "most important".

Looking at it from today's perspective, we realise that critical pedagogy in Poland was interpreted very safely. Until today, many problems have not been seriously worked on. What I mean is a variety of topics which radically problematise

a group of issues connected with standardisation, hierarchisation and the policy of the voice of the minority. The environment of pedagogues, also those dealing with critical pedagogy, is rather reserved when it comes to supporting this voice. I do not think that minorities can count on us.

Another crucial matter which we assumed to be certain was that critical pedagogy refers to “cultural others”, weaker social groups, marginalised and destined to be silent in the socialising school training. Nevertheless, Polish critical pedagogy satisfies itself with the creation of knowledge about those “others” (their inequality, the social conditions in which they live) and to a lesser extent – the engaged knowledge created in their interest. The effects of this work include many brilliant empirical studies, which undoubtedly facilitate academic advancement but do not necessarily serve the emancipation of the people whose biographical experience became valuable “empirical material”.

Another important problem connected with the modern critical pedagogy is a “significant omission” of one of the key research threads, i.e. the analysis of the power relationship in pedagogy itself. It is most unfortunate that we do not study what power relationships are and what they are like in academic pedagogics; how we “have power” (how we use it) or how the power “has” us, limiting our research imagination, sometimes forcing us to be silent, and taking away our moral courage.

Studying the power relationship could, in my opinion, bring knowledge about the amount of condescension and various forms (situations) in which condescension appears: where science disciplines the humanities, independent workers take dependent ones down a peg, scholars dealing with school do the same with teachers, academic workers with students, and the hermetic university circle with “practitioners” – and in many other divisions between “us” and “them”.

Studying the power relationship would give us knowledge about various forms of censorship and self-censorship taking place in academic life – fear, guardedness, “biting one’s tongue”, the certainty that “it will change nothing anyway” – in the name of some “greater good” or one’s peace of mind. That censorship *de facto* limits the freedom of scientific research guaranteed by the Constitution (for fear that “such” a topic will never be accepted for ideological reasons), kills moral courage, and induces false suaveness and courtesy in the hierarchical academic relations.

Studying the power relationships, as pointed out by, for example, Pierre Bourdieu, could give us knowledge about the opportunities and restrictions of realising scientific *libido dominandi* in the pedagogical field of knowledge and power. I am thinking here about the everyday situations when seemingly minor but actually poignant narcissistic wounds are inflicted: undervaluation, omission, rejection, overlooking. In other words, the creation of someone’s unimportance – or their lack of significance. Such actions of dispersed, discriminating power have been described in many studies devoted to the barriers impeding professional advancement of individuals originating from weaker or repressed social groups.

Thus, instead of the strategy of a refusal of access, another strategy appears – that of “overlooking”, and instead of bans and exclusions – disdain.

Confrontation with the mechanisms of making one insignificant generates frustration, aggression, or powerlessness (“inadequacy”). While analysing numerous situations of feeling frustration, aggression, jealousy or powerlessness (quick academic advancement of a younger colleague, someone’s higher salary, more numerous publications, a stronger position or clout, a different, especially philosophical, theoretical base) it is possible to learn about the modes of action of today’s authorities. It is also worthwhile to have a close look at the phenomenon of “gaining an advantage”, the strategies of the growing in strength of individuals and groups in the pedagogical field of knowledge and power. What routes and strategies lead to this aim? My intention is not a cynical instruction of how to efficiently move about in the local pedagogical field (identifying the paths of fast advancement, proper subjects of research or gaining power), but the willingness to make oneself familiar with the particular mechanisms in order to control them – wherever possible. Taking a closer look at oneself in the situation of powerlessness or frustration as well as perpetration makes it easier to answer questions about who we are and what we want. This knowledge could also order our relations with subjects situated outside the world of academic pedagogy. What language do we need in order to announce our presence, to regain our voice? What language are we going to use to communicate with teachers, unions, NGOs, the media? Must the effects of our research achieve the heights of theoretical sophistication (and sometimes the limits of communicativeness) so that we are considered good scholars by reviewers when we want to climb the career ladder? Or should we try to achieve such effects of work that they make us conversation partners (partners who have something sensible to say and can talk about it in non-academic situations)?

Today, the academic *libido dominandi* is additionally being severely tested by precarisation in universities (lack of employment security and its continuity), which unquestionably reinforces pedagogues’ focus on advancement and disinterest in what is going on “next door”. It induces new “narcissistic pretensions” (among doctoral students for instance) that the university is “as blind as a bat” and “does not see” that they (doctoral students) are real depositaries of the critical spirit of pedagogy, which they have moved outside the university walls and raised to such great heights as are not even sensed by academicians¹. Disregarding the fact that the university in this very statement has gained the attribute of the observer who should see and appreciate, it is worth noting a number of “ambivalent sensations”, well described in studies about postcolonialism – the contempt toward the conservative, fossilised institution which does not enable one to find a job within its walls (at least with a fixed-term contract) mixed with the dreams of being included – becoming a part of the community existing within its walls (and having a contract of employment, be it a fixed term one).

¹ Facebook posts after the conference *Pedagogika krytyczna dziś* [Critical Pedagogy Today].

Critical pedagogy today is the pedagogy of the time of a crisis. And such a time is doubtlessly favourable to the social movement to the left, towards the ethics of care, restoration of the sense of being a community and of solidarity. Let us hope this time will not be wasted.

Bogusław Śliwerski

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Pedagogy Trapped Between the Humanities and the Social Sciences

Pedagogy, having been for over a century seeking its autonomy, exclusivity, and the ability to differentiate itself from other sciences, has effected a situation in which it exists today in two forms: the first one is a self-determined sovereign scientific discipline, and the other one is defined by other disciplines of knowledge incorporated by it; as a result, either they have to live together in dialogue or marginalise each other. Therefore, pedagogy has a continuous problem with its own identity which is not experienced by sociology or psychology, although they also belong to the same field of the social sciences – or, until recently, the humanities.

The lack of satisfying results of the described procedures of transferring fixed theories to pedagogy and, above all, its ambiguous scientific condition, have had to result in pedagogues' shifting away from the concept of pedagogy as a complex of derived knowledge, and turning to facts, to studying them with reserve and mistrust for all general opinions "obtained" as ready for use from other scientific fields. The pedagogues' unease connected with the perception of pedagogy as a "complex of derived knowledge" could have been compensated by scientism, which has been reached for willingly since the beginning of our [the 20th – B.Ś.] century¹.

Does not the scientific level achieved by OTHER sciences, which is higher in comparison with pedagogy, lead to a threat that the latter will lose its chance for further development, for joining the race for primacy or a high position? The confrontation of the scientific level of pedagogy is partially enforced by the authorities of the ministry of science and higher education, which has classified it among the problematic scientific panels of the National Centre of Science, together with psychology and sociology². When applying for means to finance their

¹ W.P. Zaczyński, *O potrzebie teorii w badaniach pedagogicznych dydaktycznych* [About the Necessity of Theory in Didactic Pedagogical Research], "Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny" 1991, No. 3, p. 100.

² B. Śliwerski, *Anomia akademickiej pedagogiki z jej własnym udziałem* [The Anomie of Academic Pedagogy with Its own Involvement], [in:] *Przeszkody dla rozwoju humanistyki w szkołach wyższych (z pedagogiką w tle). W perspektywie troski o uniwersytet, kulturę humanistyczną i podręczniki* [Obstacles for the

research projects, pedagogues have a worse position from the very beginning, because they are not able to compete with psychologists or sociologists either in terms of a better research methodology (since pedagogues themselves use the same methodology as well) or a high citation index. In this methodological “arms race”, pedagogy constitutes a “slow” or still “immature” world, making scientists realise their “disability”.

Pedagogy primarily belongs to the humanities but also to the social sciences. It is sufficient to consult the history of child-rearing in order to see that from its beginning it has been treated as a source of reflective and normative knowledge about child-rearing and education. The fact that pedagogy is a normative science does not mean it is not a science, as the methodology of pedagogical research has to be accordant with the non-normative methodology of the sciences and the theory of scientific cognition or general methodology, which means it has to use the logical and epistemological theory of the empirical sciences, which deal for instance with the analysis of language, methods, structures and the dynamics of the studied processes or phenomena. When studying phenomena of a social nature, pedagogues consequently use formal methods and techniques, which are justifiable in the methodology of social research. Even in the research which is normative when it analyses notions, hypotheses, theories or the evolution of thought etc., it is obligatory to use proper methodology, which, after all, is ruled by the criteria of formal correctness. However, both approaches to research in science, descriptive as well as normative, are fully justifiable in the modern methodology of science. It is therefore incomprehensible why pedagogy, as one of the humanities, is denied having a right to be a science in a situation when competent scholars correctly use a methodology of research identical to: philosophy (in the case of the philosophy of child-rearing, general pedagogy, the theory of child-rearing), history (in the case of the history of education and of ideas), psychology (in the case of studying didactics, resocialisation, special education, pedagogy of creativity, pedeutology, etc.), sociology (in the case of the sociology of education, social pedagogy, childcare education, etc.) or the health sciences (e.g. the pedagogy of health, gerontology, sport pedagogy, etc.).

In the humanities and the social sciences, the treatment of scientific disciplines as progressing should not be based merely on the cumulative development of knowledge and the general consent as to the basic research problems and methods. This is because there are anomalies in science which cannot be explained by the existing theories, which leads to scientific revolutions. It is precisely as a result of a rejection of the heretofore existing paradigm and the constitution of a new research tradition and style that changes which undermine tradition and generate new research approaches appear. Thus, a new paradigm of doing science

emerges, referred to as “*post-academic science*” (J. Ziman), “*triple helix*” (H. Etzkowitz and L. Leydesdorff), “*technoscience*” (B. Latour), “*post-normal science*” (P. Weingart), “*grassroots science*” (T. Hansen), and “*academic capitalism*” (S. Slaughter and L. Leslie). Differences among the concepts mentioned above do not refer only to terminology, but are also of a substantive nature³.

Scientific research is no longer an “objective” study of the natural or social world by an isolated cognitive subject, for the borders between the sciences have been opened and the hierarchically functioning research communities are declining for the benefit of teams, created on ad hoc basis, which carry out short-term scientific projects sometimes involving a new type of organisation – a think-tank – in solving their research problems.

New forms of controlling the quality of research are being developed and the theoretical criteria of the quality of knowledge are merging with the practical ones. Traditionally, the quality of research and its results were evaluated by colleagues representing the same discipline with such mechanisms as peer review; [...] there is no stable taxonomy of disciplines from which the evaluating “experts” would originate, while the known forms of quality control cannot be easily applied to problems solved by various “producers” of knowledge as well as “conductors”, “knowledge sellers” or “knowledge distributors”. There are no clear criteria which could be used for the assessment of the quality of research and the knowledge acquired, as there are many dimensions of quality⁴.

Krzysztof Rubacha does not get involved in a divagation about what pedagogy is, whether or not it is a field of science, only because pedagogues have to study education as “a form of social practice focused on the formation of human life skills, and thus covering child-rearing, care, education, teaching, learning and socialisation”, similarly to psychology and sociology, which are also interested in them⁵. A pedagogue should therefore focus on the methodology of education studies understood as the norms of research accepted by the scientific community, for his/her conceptualisation and research execution to be considered scientific. The author clearly indicates that he refers here to the methodology of the social sciences, and that therefore, there is no reason to singularise a distinct methodology of pedagogical studies. Thus, the approach proposed by him points to – not without reason – the theoretical and practical methodology of education studies which can be used by representatives of all the disciplines found within social studies, not only pedagogues.

It turns out, however, that the situation is not as simple, for, in J. Górniewicz’s opinion:

³ A. Lekka-Kowalik, *Nauka jako zawód i powołanie – sto lat po analizach Maxa Webera* [Science as a Profession and Vocation – a Hundred Years After Max Weber’s Analyses], [in:] *Metodologia: Tradycja i perspektywy* [Methodology: Tradition and Perspectives], ed. M. Walczak, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, p. 79.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁵ K. Rubacha, *Metodologia badań nad edukacją* [Methodology of Education Studies], WaiP, Warszawa 2008, p. 9.

[...] empirical research based on principles accepted in other disciplines within the social sciences encounters some difficulties. They are, it seems, the basic methodological problems of pedagogy. These barriers derive from academic tradition, the personalities of the researchers themselves, the level of their self-confidence, the evoked status of the scientific discipline as well as the criticism of pedagogues' scientific achievements by representatives of other humanistic and social disciplines⁶.

It is therefore pointless to discuss the methodology of pedagogical research from the positivist perspective if this discipline does not have a subject of research distinct in relation to other sciences (other social sciences also deal with child-rearing, care, education, socialisation, etc.) and, moreover, the conditions of the studied processes and theoretical interpretations which justify them change ceaselessly.

However, according to Teresa Bauman:

[...] the adoption of the thesis about excluding the subject of research in the social sciences results in methodological purity, a sense that one functions in a discipline with diligently defined border areas and studies whatever belongs to the subject of a given field. The adoption of such an attitude results in inaccessibility, closing oneself within a single discipline of knowledge, and a lack of interest in research done as a part of other sciences. [...] The undertaking of research problems in areas belonging to other disciplines of knowledge and the acceptance of researchers from other disciplines entering the field traditionally belonging to the area of our science are considered legitimate practices. Although this results in the loss of legibility of our own subject of research, we benefit in that the perspective of the insight into a given phenomenon is broadened⁷.

We are right when criticising the low level of research in pedagogy, as it does not comply with the standards either in the quantitative or the qualitative paradigm, although in the latter case, they are strongly disputable. How are things to be standardised if at every stage of the research procedure it is necessary to follow the principle of openness? The difference between qualitative and quantitative research lies in the fact that in the case of the former, the researcher resigns from any standardisation of the collection of the research material. However, for fear of being rejected by reviewers favouring the quantitative type of research, pedagogues began to prove that they are also ruled by definite procedures – only that a different procedure is applied to every method. However, D. Kubinowski comes to their aid, emphasising that

⁶ J. Górniewicz, *Metodologiczne problemy empirycznej pedagogiki – spór o status naukowy* [Methodological Issues of Empirical Pedagogy – Dispute about Scientific Status], "Wychowanie na co dzień" 2011, no. 3, p. 3.

⁷ T. Bauman, *Komplikacje i dylematy przy określaniu przedmiotu badań pedagogicznych* [Complications and Dilemmas in Defining the Subject of Pedagogical Research], [in:] *Konceptualizacje przedmiotu badań pedagogiki* [Conceptualisations of the Subject of Pedagogical Research], ed. K. Rubacha, Oficyna Wydawnicza "Impuls", Kraków 2008, p. 61.

[...] in the humanities-oriented pedagogy there are no [...] ready-made methodological solutions, but only a set of descriptions of the use of various research procedures and a focus on the construction/creation of the course of cognitive procedure⁸.

If we agree with Karl R. Popper that the methodology of the sciences is a theory of the rules of scientific method, then adopting them in reference to qualitative research and defining this as a methodology of constructing and performing such research should contribute to confirming its scientific status. However, Dariusz Kubinowski makes the following reservation:

Qualitative research is a difficult art of improvisation and as such cannot be subjected to strict methodological formalisation. On the one hand, its methodology is based on concrete principles determining the admissible ways of thinking about the rules of the cognitive process, which form the general basis for constructing adequate methodological solutions each time resulting from the specific nature of a given research project, while on the other hand, it involves a vast and continuously growing set of specific research traditions, concepts and approaches successfully applied by the particular researchers in their search for answers to the emerging problems or the problems which they formulated⁹.

We have grown to believe and have accepted as a certainty – following the thesis supported by scientifically-oriented psychologists – that pedagogy, failing to meet the methodological rigours of the empirical sciences, is not and has never been a science. As Jerzy Brzeziński put it:

The maturity of an empirical discipline is indicated by the extent to which its statements are verified experimentally. In this respect, it is physics which is the most advanced discipline and some of the social sciences, for example pedagogy, which are the least advanced ones¹⁰.

The humanities, focusing on the human being as their research subject, cannot be included among or compared to exact sciences or life sciences as they explore a different matter. "The indispensable condition of a scientific character of a humanistic discipline is its complete ineffectuality". It is not surprising, then, that the outstanding mathematician considers as suspicious the scientific status of all scientific disciplines such as psychology, sociology, or economics, "[...] which openly or implicitly purport to exercise individual or collective control over the human being [...]"¹¹.

⁸ D. Kubinowski, *Jakościowe badania pedagogiczne. Filozofia. Metodyka. Ewaluacja* [Qualitative Pedagogical Research. Philosophy. Methodology. Evaluation], Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2010, p. 120.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

¹⁰ J. Brzeziński, *Elementy metodologii badań psychologicznych* [Elements of the Methodology of Psychological Research], PWN, Warszawa 1978, p. 60.

¹¹ R. Thom, *O naukowości nauk humanistycznych* [About the Scientific Character of Humanities], [in:] *Rozmowy w Castel Gandolfo* [Discourse in Castel Gandolfo], introduction by K. Michalski, Centrum Myśli Jana Pawła II – Wydawnictwo Znak, Warszawa 2010, p. 38.

The efforts undertaken by the subsequent generations of pedagogues to make their discipline more scientific or even exact, and therefore more useful in the technological sense, owing to the acquisition of the repetitive, the universal and the general, may partially work in didactics, but in other fields of pedagogical research they have come to naught – and it cannot be otherwise. This is because we deal with the entirely unmeasurable, the unquantifiable, with what leaves us one-to-one with the unrecognizability of people and events, determined not only by the quantifiable but also by what in the humanities is described as the humanistic coefficient: transcendence and fate. According to R. Thom:

[...] in the humanities, the truth is achieved only when influence is given up. This is because any influence on the human material has unpredictable consequences. [...] In the humanities, just like in other sciences, it is naturally not impossible to discover a technological innovation which could give an unprecedented advantage to the group which would possess it. However, then the accompanying inequality would become deeper to such a degree that it would result in a division of the social body, making any consensus impossible. In this respect, the effectiveness of technology in the humanities is inevitably limited by ethics, as only ethics is able to preserve the consensus indispensable for the existence of science¹².

Possibly, the backwardness or reluctance to develop comparative research in pedagogical thought is an effect of the fact that some pedagogues are not aware of the high level of the metatheoretical development in the social sciences, including child-rearing studies, as a result of dissipation and concentration of their own research on narrowly understood social, pedagogical, educational or historical problems, but also due to excusing its non-theoreticalness with the existing theoretical chaos. And from the theory of chaos, as Otto Speck rightly points out – “one must not and should not draw any pedagogical conclusions”¹³. This is because today we have such methods of comparative studies in pedagogical thought that we can situate theories, trends or the currents of ideas both of a deterministic and indeterministic nature, those which locate themselves in the perspective of stronger or weaker naturalism or subjectivism (indeterminacy, presuppositionlessness), as well as those which may be located on the axis of positivism or objectivism (necessity, teleologicalness).

The contemporary pedagogical thought is of social significance, since it is a specific form of interpersonal (intergenerational, intercultural, etc.) communication. It provokes some people to reflect on their child-rearing, teaching, learning or self-improvement style, while sensitising others to clichés, stereotypes, ideological conventions or prejudices: all this to make us aware of our narrow-mindedness, to enable us to understand other people’s attitude towards educational processes and to notice their different sources, but also to make us capable of forbidding our

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹³ O. Speck, *Być nauczycielem. Trudności wychowawcze w czasie zmian społeczno-kulturowych* [To Be a Teacher. Child-Rearing Difficulties in the Time of Social and Cultural Changes], transl. E. Cieślak, GWP, Gdansk 2005, p. 22.

own standpoint and seeing the possible consequences of putting it into practice. Pedagogy, thanks to its analyses and comparisons, should make what seems simple, easy or trivial – difficult and requiring effort. It should also make us aware that not all – and all the more that not only – our opinions are right.

However, problems with the methodology of scientific research are also experienced by philosophers, and their interest in this discipline of knowledge is diminishing, which results in the lowering of

[...] the scientific level and the level of teaching in higher education institutions, including universities. They are increasingly oriented at increasingly ad-hoc didactics and practicality, as well as higher professionalisation. Such a tendency does not foster the development of philosophy or philosophising, even if it is a “practical” kind of philosophy. In particular, the omission of methodological didactics in the curricula of the philosophy as well as the introduction of two levels of studies in this field fail to guarantee thorough education in this scope, and sound and practical methodological formation¹⁴.

As a result, as Andrzej Bronk and Stanisław Majdański write:

The pro-methodological approach is not obvious to all “wisdom lovers”, in particular when we think about the so-called pure methodology. It is possible that it is an effect of a postmodernist attitude towards philosophy, as well as towards the humanities and social sciences among which philosophy is “administratively” counted, although the Polish tradition has been the reverse in this regard. It is also about the modern anti-fundamentalism, anti-demarcationism and “post-disciplinarity”, which neglect the allegedly redundant methodological rigours, which does not make methodological issues cool¹⁵.

Pedagogy experiences problems, exactly like other social sciences, with its own notional apparatus, which is created on the basis of both scientific language, and derives from various philosophical, psychological, sociological and even economic theories, and the colloquial language (similarly as in sociology or psychology). Subjecting the subject of pedagogical research to the procedure of explication, Janusz Gnitecki demonstrated its multifacetedness and the ambiguity of both scientific understanding and the meaning of its basic notions. The meanings of the basic notions

[...] are not homogeneous and result from various premises of pedagogy. A very significant role is played by diverse premises, paradigms, ways of synthesising and making generalisations of the accuracy of child-rearing processes in the stable and changeable cultural context¹⁶.

How are pedagogues supposed to measure and improve the quality of didactic, child-rearing or care-related impacts if psychologists themselves are continu-

¹⁴ A. Bronk, S. Majdański, *Metodologia nauk: Jej zadania i potrzeby wczoraj i dziś* [Methodology of Sciences: its Tasks and Needs Yesterday and Today], [in:] *Metodologia: Tradycja i perspektywy* [Methodology: Tradition and Perspectives], ed. M. Walczak, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, p. 11.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁶ J. Gnitecki, *Eksplikacja pojęcia „przedmiot badań pedagogiki”* [Explication of the Notion of the “Subject of Pedagogical Research”], [in:] *Konceptualizacje przedmiotu badań pedagogiki* [Conceptualisations of the Subject of Pedagogical Research], ed. K. Rubacha, Oficyna Wydawnicza “Impuls”, Kraków 2008, p. 35.

ally struggling to define personality as the subject of their research? We are not worse than psychologists if they have a dilemma how to deal with an abundance of theories, in this case such as theories of personality, the prospect of the accumulation of knowledge and its interpretation. Piotr Oleś writes:

Although almost 70 years have passed since the emergence of personality psychology, it is still debated how it should be practiced and how personality should be understood. Should the structure of personality be determined in terms of features, or should personality be understood as a system of information, habits or personal meanings, or perhaps should the fundamental and unconscious conflict determining human behaviour be sought, as psychodynamic theories proposed? Should we make references to the rules governing the world of nature, as sociobiology suggests, or are the specifically human predispositions for development and intentional activity to be searched for, as humanistic, phenomenological and existential theories propose? Should we study the potential for creative changes and development throughout one's lifetime or focus on achieving competences, the regulatory force of beliefs concerning the "ego", or perhaps on conscious and unconscious conflicts?¹⁷

The philosopher Włodzimierz Prokopiuk reproaches pedagogues for the multitude of languages and knowledge about child-rearing, believing that their frequent mixing of "[...] scientific, philosophical, colloquial, religious, mythical, journalistic, and art-inspired statements [...] results in borderline or eclectic forms, as well as pseudo- and para-languages"¹⁸. Stanisław Kawula, too, points to the fact that representatives of other sciences depreciate pedagogy for the language it uses and the way pedagogues formulate their statements. "It is believed that its language is still pre-scientific: rather literary or even mythical, and that pedagogy merely 'speaks beautifully', but does not have much influence on educational and child-rearing practice and its effects"¹⁹.

Although the knowledge about child-rearing and education collected and broadened by the subsequent generations of scholars, has many variants, a question emerges whether thanks to it we know much more about the principles governing those processes than our predecessors did a hundred or two hundred years ago? Is it not so that, continuously returning to past descriptions, categories and explanations, we only use their modern terminological substitutes, but otherwise

¹⁷ P. Oleś, *Perspektywa integracji nauki o osobowości czy metateoria?* [The Perspective of the Integration of Personality Studies or Metatheory?], [in:] *Psychologia w perspektywie XXI wieku* [Psychology in the Perspective of the 21st Century], eds. Z. Chlewiński, A. E. Sękowski, TN KUL, Lublin 2004, p. 143.

¹⁸ W. Prokopiuk, *Wprowadzenie do rozważań nad humanizacją pedagogiki (edukacji) w kontekście filozoficznych aspektów przestrzeni pedagogicznej przelomu wieków* [An Introduction to Reflections on Humanisation of Pedagogy (Education) in the Context of Philosophical Aspects of Pedagogical Space at the Turn of the Century], [in:] *Metodologia pedagogiki zorientowanej humanistycznie* [Methodology of Humanistically-Oriented Pedagogy], eds. D. Kubinowski, M. Nowak, Oficyna Wydawnicza "Impuls", Kraków 2006, p. 130.

¹⁹ S. Kawula, *Pedagogika jako swoista nauka o człowieku* [Pedagogy as a Specific Human Science], [in:] *Prace promocyjne z pedagogiki. Skrypt dla uczestników seminariów: licencjackiego, magisterskiego i doktoranckiego* [Dissertations in Pedagogy. Academic Book for Participants of BA, MA and PhD Seminars], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, Olsztyn 2000, p. 15.

we have not moved forward much? It is far easier to accept a statement about progress in technology, medicine or natural science than in the humanities. If the history of pedagogical knowledge had a significant impact on the social, cultural and political life of the societies in which it is developed, we might be witnessing progress expressed by better manners or higher education of the subsequent generations. However, the increase in pedagogical knowledge has not prevented and is not countering the subsequent failures of humankind, and individual or collective tragedies. Unfortunately, despite such a dynamic development of human and social sciences, our general knowledge about human functioning, conditions and ways of behaviour, to some extent is still questionable, and probabilistic. I wonder if pedagogy has not been trapped by ideonomy, i.e. discovering knowledge which already exists hidden in words used by previous generations, and thus does not bring anything new to our knowledge about the studied phenomena, despite it perhaps being interesting and tentatively fruitful in practice²⁰.

Child-rearing studies do not have their own pedagogical theories and representatives of this discipline reluctantly use theories formed by the sciences which cooperate with it. Moreover, pedagogues are not interested in building their own theories, which should be their main task.

However, the building of theoretical pedagogy could be considered a specific "to be or not to be" of this discipline as one equivalent of significance to other social sciences. [...] Regretfully, when one is looking at the newest history and today's condition of Polish (but not only Polish) pedagogy, one can easily have the impression that it is not progressing towards a more mature form, whose significant feature would be its "theorisation"²¹.

However, it is impossible to agree with the author's thesis that the highest level of development of pedagogy as a distinct scientific discipline is its achievement of a state defined as the formation of a homogeneous, integrated, consolidated and systematised theoretical scientific discipline²².

Such an expectation was perhaps valuable and important at the time when only one pedagogy was to be in effect. However, the systematisation of pedagogy should not consist in this kind of its finalisation, but in the pedagogues' identification and self-determination of the current or theoretical paradigm of humanistic and/or social sciences in which they locate their research. The search for and the call for the creation of a single synthesis of knowledge about child-rearing and education is a return to the state of development of sciences in the merely positivist paradigm.

²⁰ Ch. Van Doren, *A History of Knowledge: Past, Present and Future*, Ballantine Books, New York, 1992, p. 386.

²¹ H. Muszyński, *Teoria w pedagogice* [Theory in Pedagogy], [in:] *Uniwersytet. Społeczeństwo. Edukacja, Materiały konferencji naukowej z okazji X-lecia Wydziału Studiów Edukacyjnych Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, Poznań 13–14 października 2003* [University. Society. Education. Materials from the Scientific Conference Marking the 10th Anniversary of the Faculty of Educational Studies, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, 13th–14th Oct. 2003], eds. W. Ambroziak and K. Przyszczykowski, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Poznań 2004, p. 89.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 91.

It is not true that knowledge about child-rearing and education, which is based on a current, orientation, theory or paradigm clearly selected by the researcher, will be useless for practice. On the contrary. It is precisely thanks to this that the particular processes and facts are not only explained better but also better interpreted.

Pedagogy does not possess any particular research methods, and even in methodological textbooks presented by their authors-pedagogues, there are great differences which concern the understanding of science itself, locating pedagogy within it, and the classification of paradigms, methods and research techniques. Pedagogical research should therefore be interdisciplinary, liberating itself – as Marian Nowak put it:

[...] from being monopolised by a single dominating aspect of the knowledge about child-rearing, either philosophical or another [...]. The pedagogue should strive to achieve scientific understanding of child-rearing practice and at the same time be open to the world of ideas (child-rearing philosophy) and to standpoints originating from the perspectives of other sciences interested in the knowledge of child-rearing such as psychology of child-rearing, sociology of child-rearing, politics of child-rearing, etc.²³

Let us see how pedagogues – authors of textbooks devoted to the methodology of research in this discipline – reinforce our sense of self-confidence (distinctiveness of competence) or the sense of inferiority or the necessity of submission they consider deserved. In his textbook discussing the basics of research methodology in pedagogy, Marian Nowak describes this discipline as a “philosophical-empirical-practical science covering the entire content of these individual words and their tradition in the history of scientific research methodology”²⁴. Following Wilhelm Flitner, I assume that pedagogy

[...] is tantamount to engaged thinking originating from a responsible pedagogue. Essentially, it is a humanistic science and this forces it to adopt a particular scientific approach²⁵. Although – he adds – its problems fit the general methodology of scientific research, it is primarily related to the tradition of the humanistic and social sciences, with the latter also using the methods of cognition applied by the natural sciences. However, since pedagogues deal with open situations, then, when studying processes which occur as a part of them, they are not always able to indicate their real causes, the relationships between them or their consequences”.

Therefore, M. Nowak suggests that, following Thomas Cook, the term quasi-experimentation be used in the case of the empirical research done in pedagogy,

²³ M. Nowak, *Przedmiot pedagogiki w kontekście jej wyzwań i założeń* [The Subject of Pedagogy in the Context of its Challenges and Assumptions], [in:] *Konceptualizacje przedmiotu badań pedagogiki* [Conceptualisations of the Subject of Pedagogical Research], ed. K. Rubacha, Oficyna Wydawnicza “Impuls”, Kraków 2008, pp. 86–87.

²⁴ M. Nowak, *Epistemologiczne, aksjologiczne i metodologiczne podstawy badań pedagogicznych* [Epistemological, Axiological and Methodological Bases for Pedagogical Research], [in:] *Podstawy metodologii badań w pedagogice* [The Basics of Methodology of Research in Pedagogy], ed. S. Palka, GWP, Gdańsk 2010, p. 15.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

the research approach referring to probabilistic variable determinants. Research of this type

[...] enforces the treatment of the obtained results as trial or anticipated results, and therefore it is realistic probabilistic research, involving the need for a critical debate about the problems, procedures and results of scientific research taking into account various significant perspectives²⁶.

At the same time, the author points out that such a research procedure does not guarantee objectivity or neutrality of the data obtained. Little wonder, then, that he states:

Pedagogy therefore is not a rigorously scientific field of knowledge in the positivist sense, divided and functioning according to definite rules, but is a sort of dynamic knowledge, which makes events considered from an epistemological perspective meaningful²⁷.

In the same textbook, Dariusz Kubinowski distinguishes two scopes of research essential for pedagogy and focusing on the essence of child-rearing, namely: "the studying of contexts of child-rearing in the pedagogical perspective, as well as the studying of child-rearing in the pedagogical perspective"²⁸. Because of the multi-paradigmaticity of pedagogy, the author questions its theoretical-methodological peculiarity, locating this discipline as a borderline science "between"

[...] humanities, art, ethics and action, between theoreticality and practicality, between factuality and potentiality, between philosophy and empiricism, between description and evaluation, between diagnosis, prediction and design, between experience and ideas, between democracy and obligation, between verbalism and commitment, between oneness and diversity, between reflection and methodology, between...²⁹.

Science understood in this way fades away in some space, aiming at the agreement of a complementary and adopted or binding pedagogical paradigm at a given time and place.

Reading this author's textbook devoted to qualitative pedagogical research, as this very approach is the subject of his particular cognitive and practical interest, we will find a thesis which may have been used by the already mentioned J. Górniewicz. What he writes is that if, since the time of J.F. Herbart, pedagogy has not managed to achieve its dream of its "scientification" in compliance with its positivist approach, then it is not surprising that a question emerges:

does such sweeping ambiguity of academic pedagogues' standpoints concerning the identity of their own discipline indicate pedagogy's weakness or does it perhaps show

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁸ D. Kubinowski, *Przyrodnicze i humanistyczne podstawy badań pedagogicznych* [Natural and Humanistic Basics of Pedagogical Research], [in:] *Podstawy metodologii badań w pedagogice* [The Basics of Research Methodology in Pedagogy], ed. S. Palka, GWP, Gdańsk 2010, p. 43.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

traits leading to the identification of its specificity – the idiom of pedagogy/education? This state is deepened by the – usually concealed – inferiority complexes of some academic pedagogues, who would like to be considered scholars in the same right as sociologists, psychologists or anthropologists, but who often are not precisely because of this ambiguity, which they themselves also raise; hence possibly their striving for the confirmation of their “scientific quality” through the turning towards positivist traditions. At the same time, they avoid the topic of the specificity and autonomy of pedagogy as a scientific discipline and, respectively, its methodology, declaring that they simply do research on child-rearing/education using various methods, interdisciplinarily, thus resigning from participation in the metatheoretical debate, which is essential for every discipline³⁰.

Child-rearing studies also do not usually obtain the highest marks from institutions and experts when it comes to the evaluation of the quality of research activity conducted by pedagogues and its results – this applies to the assessments carried out not only within academic entities but, first and foremost, by state agencies (the Central Committee for Degrees and Titles; the ministerial parametric assessment of the achievements of scientific entities; the State Accreditation Commission, which evaluates graduate schools; research grant reviewing boards). D. Kubinowski raises an objection against the positivist paradigm which continues to dominate the evaluations of the quality of dissertations in today’s Polish pedagogy, together with the quantitative approach which results in “humanistic quantophobia in pedagogy” (after Pitirim Sorokin). This consists in attempts at the giving of a numerical dimension to the subject of pedagogical research and to uncritically universalising the measurability of partially or entirely unmeasurable phenomena, by enforcing the use of mathematical and statistical methods as the only scientifically validated ones³¹.

Jacek Piekarski rightly asks to what extent it is still possible in the academic environment, and particularly in the pedagogical circles, to obtain acceptance for specific methodological rules in the situation when they are diverse and multi-paradigmatic and, also, what requirements can be applied, in the light of the broadening phenomenon of methodological tolerantism, to the scientific statements under evaluation when the reviewer wants to be guided by the generally accepted principles of the

continuity of knowledge, its consistency, the quality of referencing to the key pedagogical categories or precisely defining the possible conditions for [their – B.Ś.] further development and use. The detailed criteria accepted in this scope, which are varied also because of the specific kind of methodological orientation, seem to require a constant debate and critical confrontation of the solutions adopted³².

³⁰ D. Kubinowski, *Jakościowe badania...* [Qualitative Research...], p. 92.

³¹ Idem, *Metodologia spod znaku x a humanistyczna tożsamość pedagogiki* [The X Methodology or Humanistic Identity of Pedagogy], [in:] *Metodologiczne problemy tworzenia wiedzy w pedagogice. Oblicza akademickiej praktyki* [Methodological Problems in Creating Pedagogical Knowledge. The Aspects of Academic Practice], eds. J. Piekarski, D. Urbaniak-Zajac, K.J. Szmidt, Oficyna Wydawnicza “Impuls”, Kraków 2010, p. 80.

³² J. Piekarski, *Kryteria waloryzacji praktyki badawczej* [The Criteria of Research Practice Valorisation], [in:] *Metodologiczne problemy tworzenia wiedzy w pedagogice...* [Methodological Problems of Creating Knowledge in Pedagogy...], pp. 172–173.

Nowadays, there is no point in undertaking separatist work on the construction of the methodology of pedagogical research, because the phenomena or patterns constituting its subject require knowledge from various scientific domains and disciplines. The studied child-rearing and educational processes are determined by social, humanistic and natural science variables, and therefore, pedagogy, being one of many human sciences, has a supra-specialist and integrative nature. "Thus, pedagogy is a scientific multidiscipline rather than a discipline with a narrow profile. In this sense, it belongs to the group of 'comprehensive' sciences"³³. Scholars should cooperate with each other in this respect, taking into account the borders of their competences. For instance, educational diagnostics, which must involve data processing rather than registration of behaviour, is becoming merely a supplementary field, which is remarkably

[...] useful when combined with knowledge from the area of child-rearing, didactics or administration [...] and especially two other closely related disciplines: psychology and pedagogy³⁴.

In educational research, the voice of pedagogues is less and less important. It is sufficient to see who carries it out on political order today. The beneficiaries of the EU funds designated towards diagnosing the Polish education are mainly sociologists and psychologists. It is enough to read the latest reports and publications about school education to realise who makes these diagnoses and the level they represent, and at the same time, to increase one's own confidence looking at the low level of interpretation and analysis – even those obtained with the help of the best-standardised tools for empirical data. We must, therefore, start from becoming aware of the barriers, limitations and distortions of the scientific dialogue with those among us and, above all, from the other social sciences, who call themselves representatives of the "high" methodology.

The consciously understood situation (social, educational, political, etc.) has to be named in a language stepping beyond its determinants and enabling its explanation (i.e. a reference to what is exterior to it) and the undertaking of change-oriented actions. [...] Such shaping of the critical competency – competency in understanding exceeding situational restrictions, must be grounded in the two domains mentioned above – in direct experience determined by the particular social position, cultural identity and political situation, as well as in the "academic" knowledge. Only critical understanding may in turn be the basis for autonomous, subjective action leading to the change of the situation of enslavement³⁵.

Although fearfulness is one of the components of human nature, since the instinct of self-preservation prevents people from acting when in danger, one should not

³³ S. Kawula, *Pedagogika jako swoista nauka...* [Pedagogy as a Particular Science...], p. 14.

³⁴ B. Niemierko, *Diagnostyka edukacyjna. Podręcznik akademicki* [Educational Diagnostics. Academic Textbook], WN PWN, Warszawa 2009, p. 11.

³⁵ T. Szkudlarek, *Wyzwania pedagogiki krytycznej* [Challenges of Critical Pedagogy], [in:] T. Szkudlarek, B. Śliwerski, *Wyzwania pedagogiki krytycznej i antypedagogiki* [Challenges of Critical Pedagogy and Anti-Pedagogy], third corrected edition, Oficyna Wydawnicza "Impuls", Kraków 2000, p. 29.

give up in the face of a drama with a growing scale of difficulty, but struggle with oneself.

When in 1990, together with Tomasz Szkudlarek, I was preparing a book about critical pedagogy and anti-pedagogy, we treated it as a significant impulse (hence the name of the publishing house which published the book) to build the pedagogy of liberation and together with it to construct an emancipatory education and put it into practice. It is likely that no one noticed the thesis formulated by a scholar from Gdansk or bothered about it, although, as it turned out – it was almost prophetic. Let me quote a paragraph essential for these reflections:

The relationship between the pedagogy of liberation (i.e. a theoretical vision of guiding towards freedom) and the liberating, emancipatory education is like between any pedagogy and education – debatable. In the case of the radical critical pedagogy, the debatability is of particular importance. This is because, in a sense, radical pedagogy seemed to be another kind of theorisation, another attempt at grasping the complex realness of child-rearing – one satisfactorily encompassing these of its aspects which previously could not fit any other theoretical system, which had to be considered by any classical pedagogy as accidental, peripheral phenomena, or – at the most – co-existing with (if noticed at all) “decent” child-rearing. It is a group of theories breaking with any connection with scientific objectivism reduced to the translation of data into figures, with an obscure ideology concealed behind the declared appreciation of the universal values of traditional culture, and involving the closing in fossilised frameworks of ideas resistant to confrontation with living experience. Therefore, the perspective of the undermining of the theoretical pretence of this variety of pedagogy is of particular significance – it induces an absolutely fundamental question, one which is finally and radically first: the question about the possibility of the existence of pedagogy in general³⁶.

Today, after over twenty years of Polish transformation, I can see how much we ourselves facilitate the process of not only marginalisation and elimination, but also colonisation of our own scientific discipline. The scientist from Gdansk was not alone when asking whether pedagogy was still possible and necessary in the post-modern world. However, it seemed to him that it was justified to ask whether we are dealing with the end of pedagogy as a result of the death of politics broadly understood as the “[...] demise of social activity oriented towards the achievement of valuable objectives”³⁷. The demise was also to be understood as the end of pedagogy as a science serving the intentional rearing of the human being. In the pedagogue’s opinion, the only possible pedagogy is one which will abandon normativeness, thus submitting itself to the rigours of the social sciences.

[For] many pedagogues such a perspective, limiting the scope of claims raised by theory in relation to description and those raised by education in relation to “contextual” activity not guided by the awareness of the purposes or a conviction about the understanding of the nature of child-rearing, will not be satisfactory. It is very difficult to give up on the belief that what one has to offer to others is important; that our values are universally

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

acclaimed; that the goals of child-rearing stemming from these values may also serve well those who do not see any sense in them. It is difficult to forgo pedagogy³⁸.

After all, science as a part of culture is an area of the perpetual clashing of totalising (stating) and discriminative tendencies, of dominance and resistance; therefore, the struggle to be a DIFFERENT scientific discipline should be focused on the reinforcement of the difference of our knowledge about the subject of our research and the undertaking of an active but transformative resistance to attempts of its depreciation and preclusion from science.

As can be seen, the dichotomy: an other/our own, facilitates the analysis of pedagogy among other sciences, since from the perspective of every discipline of humanistic and social sciences, pedagogy is an other – a stranger, when due to the poor quality of its research, pedagogy excludes itself from the world of the disciplines, whose representatives care for maintaining the highest possible scientific level. Therefore, although it partly derives from philosophy, it no longer belongs to it and, due to its research results, it appears as strange in relation to psychology, sociology, ethnography and political science. The otherness of pedagogy results from the lack of readiness for even as much as the reading of dissertations in this field by scholars representing other disciplines and thus from the incomprehensibility of the scope and value of achievements which are indisputable in terms of methodology and content.

In highly developed countries, pedagogy is treated with respect as a distinct and fully acknowledged science. In one of the youngest scientific disciplines: text linguistics, which has been developing for about a quarter of a century within the interdisciplinary textual science (Germ. *Textwissenschaft*), West European humanists recognise the presence of pedagogy as significant and equivalent to other disciplines (rhetoric, theology, jurisprudence, psychology, literary studies, text linguistics). The subjects of the basic research done by pedagogues include the regularities occurring in the analysed texts, which determine their textuality³⁹.

In pedagogy, attention has been drawn for many years to whether its texts meet the criteria of being scientific or not. Theoretical treatises intrinsically have to comply with the criteria of cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativeness, situationality and intertextuality, whereas empirical dissertations contain theoretical studies which precede the conceptualisation of research and which describe and justify the research problem formulated, as well as are the basis for the defining and operationalisation of variables.

Lech Witkowski's works are extremely interesting attempts at the blurring of borders for the purposes of the integrity of the knowledge developed and of doing

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

³⁹ H. Vater, *Wstęp do lingwistyki tekstu. Struktura i rozumienie tekstu* [Introduction to Textual Linguistics. The Structure and Understanding of Text], transl. E. Blachut, A. Gołębiowski, Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT, Wrocław 2009.

research across all disciplines. In the introduction to his treatise on authority, the philosopher of education emphasised:

This treatise has been written across currents, traditions, perspectives and fields of activity, rebelling against the habit-honoured divisions, closures and symptoms of ignorance among them. Of course, I apologise again for tarnishing the “sanctities” of disciplinary specialisations, which at the very most deserve interdisciplinary debates⁴⁰.

Pedagogy, therefore, as any other humanistic science, should be an integral space for reflection, obliging pedagogues to avoid stiff adherence to their own scientific disciplines and subdisciplines as well as the pigeonholing of knowledge in them instead of problematizing it.




Diagram 1. Classification of text sciences

Source: H. Vater, *Wstęp do lingwistyki tekstu. Struktura i rozumienie tekstu*, transl. E. Błachut, A. Gołębiowski, Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT, Wrocław 2009, p. 14.

The 21st century marks the beginning of an entirely new scope of humanistic and social research in the metacognitive area, i.e. one the subjects of analyses and disputes of which focus on the most important and valuable ideas, phenomena, and trends in thoughts and theories, which connect the past, the canon, the tradition with the present and the challenges of the future. It was in every epoch that they became the current of searches for and the location of the essence and scope or intensity of research phenomena scholars found interesting. For pedagogy, like for all humanistic and social sciences (what an unfortunate division!), it has always been and will continue to be important what creates the knowledge about the condition of the human being of the past, the present, and the future as imagined

⁴⁰ L. Witkowski, *Historie autorytetu wobec kultury i edukacji* [Histories of Authority in Relation to Culture and Education], Oficyna Wydawnicza “Impuls”, Kraków 2011, p. 26.

by the futurists, and, thus, about its past, current and future impact on the practice of both education and child-rearing, and the whole of civilisation. As a result of the processes of globalisation and the parametrisation of scientific achievements enforced by scientific competition, the period of focus on national pedagogical sciences (which is not equivalent to the end of their inner development) is coming to an end, and is being replaced with their confrontation with pedagogical sciences from other countries, cultures and languages, so that their mutual interpenetration enhances their progress through dialogue. This creates a completely new circle of scientific relationships, which step beyond the state of isolation of varying degree, in favour of exchange, deepening, revision, mutual inspiration, trying renewed models or ideas in practice, and opening themselves up for new fields of research.

Summary

Pedagogy trapped between the humanities and the social sciences

The content of the article is a discussion on the place of pedagogy as a scientific discipline. The author characterizes pedagogy as a discipline located both in the social sciences area and the humanities. Such a location of pedagogy generates methodological problems – including the questioning of its scientific status. The author perceives pedagogy as an interdisciplinary science and discusses its chances for development enabling the break-up of the scientific discipline's isolation.

THEORIES

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Critical Pedagogy and Engaged Research: Ideology, Interests and Naivety

Ideology is an illusion consistent with interest,
but a well-grounded illusion.
P. Bourdieu, *Distinction*¹

The starting point for this article, which addresses the issue of the conditions for the possibility of engagement or non-engagement in empirical research, with a particular emphasis on pedagogical research, is a problem which Tomasz Szkudlarek points out with reference to the concept of empty signifiers by Ernesto Laclau. I am referring here to the “paradoxical quest to assess the *significance of the variety of emptiness*”² – as T. Szkudlarek puts it. Although the difficulties with the concept of empty signifiers are an inspiration for this article, I will not discuss the concept of E. Laclau at length, but I will limit myself to a mere statement that the assessment of empty signifiers means differentiating and evaluating signifiers that reflect the precarious balance of power, mobilisation of social groups, permanent conflict and makeshift universalism that is inevitably bound to lead to hegemony³. Bringing political life down to the transient life of successive populisms that gain legitimacy⁴, the issue of evaluating empty signifiers actually boils down to evaluating populisms, and to evaluating social orders. This task of assessing populisms, which is crucial for pedagogy, falls perfectly within the scope of the debate between E. Laclau and Slavoj Žižek, in which the former ridicules S. Žižek’s intransigence as “waiting for the Martians”⁵, while the latter responds to E. Laclau that from the point of view of thinking about a radical transformation

¹ P. Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, transl. Richard Nice, Harvard University Press 1984, p.74.

² T. Szkudlarek, *Dyskursywna konstrukcja podmiotowości („puste znaczące” a pedagogika kultury)* [Discursive Construction of Subjectivity (Empty Signifiers and Cultural Pedagogy)], *Forum Oświatowe*, special issue 2008, p. 132.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 125.

⁴ See E. Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, Verso 2005.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 232.

of social existence, it actually matters what kind of social order or “populism” we are dealing with⁶. Therefore, from the point of view of pedagogical research and action (if a meaningful distinction can be drawn between research and action at all), there remains the question of assessing the empty signifiers that affect such research and action, the question of populism that represents the founding moment of a particular school or educational practice, and the founding moment of the construction of the theory of such practices.

The “prototype” of the dispute between S. Žižek and E. Laclau over the evaluation of empty signifiers and populisms is the dispute over the concept of ideology between Karl Mannheim⁷ and Max Horkheimer⁸. A certain similarity to these discussions also exists in the classification introduced by Stanley Aronowitz and Henry A. Giroux, who, when analysing the role of postmodernism in pedagogy and education, coined a series of distinctions, which were to enable them to evaluate the theoretical achievements of postmodernism for the pragmatics of emancipation. These distinctions are as follows: “right-wing postmodernism” *v.* “emancipatory postmodernism”⁹, “reactionary postmodernism” *v.* “progressive postmodernism”¹⁰, while a positive variant of postmodern thinking (and within postmodernism) about education is the “postmodernism of resistance”¹¹. Noting the impact of postmodern thought on the methodology of research, it is necessary to make the reflections of S. Aronowitz and H. A. Giroux the focal point of my analysis of engaged research (with a particular focus on qualitative research) in education. The ending point will be to develop the theory of interests into a criticism of naivety made by P. Freire¹², but ultimately to develop a positive concept of cognitive naivety, as a technical proficiency that can be applied in the postulate of presuppositionlessness in conducting qualitative research. First of all, however, I will present the dispute between K. Mannheim and M. Horkheimer because, although it is oversimplified and, above all, of historical value, it contains all the structural elements of the issue of the relationship between research and reality that I am interested in.

K. Mannheim *versus* M. Horkheimer: ideology and interests

It was owing to K. Mannheim that the concept of Marx’s ideology, which in his opinion is inextricably linked to the reflection on socially determined forms of

⁶ Cf. S. Žižek, *In Defense of Lost Causes*, Verso 2008, pp. 264–336 and Cf. E. Laclau, *On Populist...*, pp. 65–172.

⁷ See K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, Routledge Classics in Sociology, Routledge 2013.

⁸ See M. Horkheimer, *A New Concept of Ideology?*, [in:] N. Stehr, R. Grundman (eds.), *Knowledge: Critical Concepts*, Taylor & Francis 2005.

⁹ S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux, *Postmodern Education. Politics, Culture & Social Criticism*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis-London 1991, p. 19.

¹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 67–80.

¹¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 110–121.

¹² I will also draw upon A. Gramsci’s views on ideology and the role of intellectuals.

knowledge in the context of diverse social conditions¹³, began to be appreciated academically. One may say, which will later be used by M. Horkheimer to criticize K. Mannheim, that the distinction made by the author of *Ideology and Utopia* between “particular ideology” and “total ideology” made it possible, by giving the concept of ideology a more universal, objective and neutral meaning, for this notion to be recognized by a wider circle of researchers than only those who directly (as representatives of the Frankfurt School, for example) declared their attachment to Marxist thought. Thus, although it is K. Mannheim himself who finds the sources of his sociology of knowledge in Marx’s radical thinking on the origins and functions of forms of knowledge, the modifications introduced by the author of *Ideology and Utopia* have made the category of ideology acceptable, as a category potentially cognitively fertile in academic circles. This moment can be considered an institutionalisation of the concept of ideology. The modifications in question did not consist merely in developing Marx’s vision by adding certain advances in sociology, but also deprived it of a radical dimension in thinking about emancipation and emancipatory action.

In any case, as K. Mannheim puts it, the basic assumptions of the sociology of knowledge are as follows:

The principal thesis of the sociology of knowledge is that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured. It is indeed true that only the individual is capable of thinking. There is no such metaphysical entity as a group mind which thinks over and above the heads of individuals, or whose ideas the individual merely reproduces. Nevertheless it would be false to deduce from this that all the ideas and sentiments which motivate an individual have their origin in him alone, and can be adequately explained solely on the basis of his own life experience¹⁴.

This starting point, the founding moment of the sub-discipline of sociology, which focuses on forms of knowledge and thought, gives rise to a multitude of consequences in the form of the detailed problems of the sociology of knowledge, which include the historical variability of knowledge and thought, their dependence on social conditions, the relationship between knowledge and thought in the relations between individuals and society, and the relationship between the language system and forms of knowledge and thought. However, the driving force behind the sociology of knowledge, which is a kind of relativism, is the “contemporary predicament of thought”¹⁵, as K. Mannheim puts it, i.e. problems with the broad category of mobility. It is about a certain implication resulting from the changes in society and the changes in the forms of knowledge and thought, which represent “a significant and visible fact for us”, as well as have “impelled

¹³ K. Mannheim, *Ideology...*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

us to reflect about the social roots of our knowledge"¹⁶. The mobility at issue here is linked to the social transformations that have taken place since the industrial revolution throughout the 19th century, and therefore to the historical impermanence of knowledge and thought, to migrations, and therefore to the creation of a certain sense of non-obviousness that certain forms of knowledge or thought will necessarily reflect the truth and that some universal truth is possible at all, and finally to the movement of individuals within a social structure in which new classes or social strata emerge and others lose their significance or disappear¹⁷. In the end, K. Mannheim, while also expressing the basic premise of the sociology of knowledge, points out that, in contrast to a "reasonably stable society", the democratising society in which he lives is, just as the Greek society in the period of Athenian democracy, an ideal place for reflection on the conditions for thinking and the formation of knowledge¹⁸. Searching for historical analogies, the author of *Ideology and Utopia* finds similar traits of thinking in sceptics, making a connection between this kind of thought and the historical moment in which the unambiguous interpretation of the world, as well as axio-normative structures, are disintegrating due to the growing social conflict resulting from unresolved contradictions within the society itself¹⁹. Here we come full circle: internal tensions, coming to light along with the rising awareness of the members of society, become the cause of the disintegration of the unambiguity and the prerequisite for asking questions about the roots of thinking, and consequently the cause of the crisis of knowledge and thinking, or the disintegration of the "monopolistic type of thought"²⁰. No one needs convincing that this is reminiscent of the "collapse of the grand narrative"²¹ announced by Jean-François Lyotard, and therefore an even more radical return to the questions that have become problems of the sociology of knowledge.

What are those questions, or in other words, when we ask about ideology as a form of knowledge, what are we asking about? It can be assumed that all the problems of the sociology of knowledge are compounded in communication processes, thus adopting the descending order (from language practice to material conditions of existence). Thus, following the scepticism of the sociology of knowledge one should: (1) ask about the genesis of the language system and its social dimension, since the individual "speaks not a language of his own but rather that of his contemporaries and predecessors"²²; therefore (2) also ask about the relationship between thought and language, as well as the autonomy of thinking and communicating, since "only in a quite limited sense does the single individual create out of himself the mode of speech and of thought we attribute to him. He speaks

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 5–7.

¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

¹⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²¹ See J.-F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge*, Manchester University Press 1984.

²² K. Mannheim, *Ideology...*, p. 2.

the language of his group; he thinks in the manner in which his group thinks"²³; and finally (3) ask about the basis of the collective experience, as "in every concept, in every concrete meaning, there is contained a crystallisation of the experiences of a certain group"²⁴, as well as a "particular style of thought", resulting from their "common position"²⁵. The last (4) question, which is of particular importance from the point of view of educational theory, is a question about forms of knowledge and thought in the context of the process of "inculcating the same meanings of words, the same ways of deducing ideas"²⁶.

Questioning the forms of knowledge, demonstrating their fragmentariness, changeability or inadequacy, but above all, showing their dependence on "politics"²⁷, seems to be an ideal instrument for critiquing monopolistic types of thinking whose social agenda is school. If we add, citing K. Mannheim, that in an antagonised society "consensus can be established only with reference to the formalized elements of the objects"²⁸, i.e. language, then, theoretically, it is still possible to find tools within the sociology of knowledge that are potentially effective in deconstructing forms of knowledge that enable the stabilisation of dominance relations. In other words, this is the moment when the author of *Ideology and Utopia* is very close to the orthodox, almost Marxist, interpretation of the concept of ideology, where the main issue is the collective unconsciousness naturalising, and thus preventing the abolition of asymmetrical social relations. The problem is, however, the concept of interest as a condition for the creation of forms of knowledge and thought, especially in the context of the "total conception of ideology", coined by K. Mannheim, which must imply also a total concept of interest, which – as a consequence – leads us to the conclusion that all forms of knowledge and thought are at the same time ideological, because they come to the succour of particular interest. To put it with maximum logical accuracy, if all forms of knowledge and thought are ideological, there can be no non-ideological forms of thought, and therefore by the very impossibility of adding a negation, it is impossible to distinguish between forms of knowledge and thought in terms of the criterion of ideology. Thus, the concept of ideology, which in Marx and Engels' *German Ideology*²⁹ clearly had the potential to "differentiate" between ideologies, by extending its deconstructive scope in Mannheim's interpretation, loses its critical and therefore emancipatory potential.

The assertion and the ramifications of this assertion that each social group, including the disadvantaged ones, has its own interests and ideologies, is met with criticism by M. Horkheimer, in the spirit outlined above. The author of *A New Con-*

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁹ See K. Marx, F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, [in:] Christopher John Arthur (ed.) *Volume 1 of German Ideology & Selections from Pts 2 & 3*, International Publishers Co., 1972.

cept of Ideology notes that the consistent implementation of K. Mannheim's postulate, built upon the existential conditions of all knowledge and thought, that "there is no reason why we should not apply to Marxism the perceptions which it itself has produced, and point out from case to case its ideological character", without addressing the problem of social divisions, leads ideology to become "devoid of content"³⁰. As M. Horkheimer puts it:

Wherever in history nations or classes have secured their position other than with cold steel, by relying on moral, metaphysical or religious ideas, the dominated sooner or later launched an attack against these conceptions. The struggle against the cultural pillars of the prevailing social conditions usually leads to and accompanies political opposition, and often in such a way that the division of parties during the spiritual struggle generally corresponds to their interests in regard to the outcome of the political and economic struggle³¹.

In other words, it does matter what ideology we are dealing with, because it matters whether certain interests that determine forms of knowledge and thought are the interests of the privileged or the social strata in the process of emancipation. Meanwhile, the criticism of ideology, applied "equally" to all forms of knowledge and thought, may be more "scientific", but most of all it is an unashamed surrender to the confessed claim about the existential conditions of knowledge and thought: a supposedly neutral academic disarms the tool of emancipation of the socially disadvantaged. As argued by M. Horkheimer:

For that reason, the devaluation of certain ideas which justify, support or transfigure a hated condition is as old as these struggles themselves. Such an attack is best characterised not so much by the Renaissance saying cited by Mannheim – that ideas are different in *piazza* than they are in *palazzo* – than by the speech attributed by Machiavelli in his *History of Florence* to the leader of the revolt of the masses: "Observe the way in which people act", we are told, "and you will see that all those who attain great wealth or great power owe them to force or fraud. What they have seized through deceit or violence they then gloss over with the false labels of conquest and achievement in order to conceal the reprehensible nature of their acquisition"³².

Using the rhetoric of M. Horkheimer, or rather Niccolò Machiavelli, to express the strategy of differentiation of ideologies more accurately than casting all forms of knowledge and thinking into a single set marked by the notion of ideology, one has to say that "wealth", identified with "power", which has its origins in "force", "deceit" and "fraud", has its reverse. The other side of the relationship, which is reflected in the difference in thinking between "palazzo" and "piazza", is poverty and deprivation of rights, being a victim of violence, deceit and fraud. Although it may be scientifically unbiased and neutral, K. Mannheim's approach

³⁰ Cf. M. Horkheimer, *A New...*, p. 36.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

is mistaken, because it is ideological, but not merely for this reason. The total concept of ideology can be approached from the perspective of much more recent disputes, which may be foreshadowed by the following argumentation. If, in an excessive simplification, we consider ideology to be an existentially conditioned unconsciousness, or even a false one, constituted by interests, then the socially disadvantaged groups (in any respect) have the “least” falsified consciousness in terms of ideology, which justifies their discrimination, abuse or exploitation. To put it in the categories defined by Jürgen Habermas, when analysing and interpreting (and also evaluating) ideology, it is relevant whether a given ideological construct or knowledge is founded upon technical and practical interest, or rather upon emancipatory interest³³.

Returning to the dispute between E. Laclau and S. Žižek, and the valuation of populisms, it would not be a matter of emancipatory interest in general, but of the fact that a certain particularism raised in the process of imposing hegemony by a certain populism is the cause of the exclusion of some part of the society. According to E. Laclau, some form of exclusion is necessary, also because there is no reason to regard any form of discrimination as fundamental, which S. Žižek disagrees with, considering that the purely material consequences of domination are at its stake, just as they are at stake because of emancipation. Thus, following S. Žižek’s rationale, it is possible to find a common ground for all emancipatory movements, and thus to think in terms of some kind of universalism in relation to emancipatory processes. Again, expressing this in the language of J. Habermas, we are dealing with “emancipatory-reconciling” and “repressive-alienating” aspects of societal rationalisation³⁴, and thus: E. Laclau may well be focused on emancipation, but at the same time excludes reconciliation, since every emancipatory movement ends in a “repressive-alienating” form of hegemony; K. Mannheim, in turn, does not offer the possibility of distinguishing between the “emancipatory-reconciling” and “repressive-alienating” ideology. Therefore, while trying to answer the question about the conditions enabling engaged research, despite the additional complication associated with the question about the conditions for neutral research, we have reached an attempt to define the limits of scepticism in the face of the “grand narrative” of emancipation. Thus, we will have to deal with the assessment of the value of postmodernism in the context of what J. Habermas describes as the “normative content of modernity”³⁵, as well as Gregory Ulmer’s claim that pedagogy “has always positioned itself in this ‘postmodern’ way”³⁶, but above all because it is applied science.

³³ Cf. J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Polity Press, 1972.

³⁴ J. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, transl. Frederic Lawrence, John Wiley & Sons, 2015.

³⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, Polity Press, 1998, pp. 336–385.

³⁶ G. Ulmer, *Teletheory. Grammatology in the Age of Video*, Routledge, Chapman & Hall Incorporated, 1989, p. 13.

Critical pedagogy and the valuation of postmodernisms

The attempt to distinguish types of postmodernism, the attempt to evaluate the theoretical solutions it provides, is organized in the work of S. Aronowitz and H.A. Giroux according to whether “we are to benefit politically and pedagogically”³⁷, since the perspective in which education is treated as a political project is their starting point³⁸. In this essentially modernist approach, the authors of *Postmodern Education* construct binary oppositions differentiating postmodern ways of thinking about education, but also propose a classification involving additional assumptions.

The first categorisation – right-wing postmodernism v. emancipatory postmodernism – also implies, according to Saussure’s principle of language as a system of oppositions, the existence of left-wing postmodernism (the emancipatory one) and counter-, or non-emancipatory postmodernism (the right-wing one). This division reflects two major assumptions, the first of which is that S. Aronowitz and H.A. Giroux think in traditional terms about the shape of the political scene and the disputes between the right and left. The authors of *Postmodern Education* manifest this traditional division by thoroughly criticizing the conservative ideas of Allan Bloom and Eric D. Hirsch for the “restoration of Western culture” in education and through education³⁹. However, S. Aronowitz and H.A. Giroux, tend to place only conservative educational theorists within this long-established division due to the traditional nature of their views, choosing “emancipation” as a label for their own variant of postmodernism instead. This is why they must therefore assume that such a thing as emancipation exists and is even achievable, and if emancipatory movements encounter difficulties, it is because of what we can describe as anti-emancipatory movements.

The second of the binary oppositions expressing the evaluative attitude of S. Aronowitz and H.A. Giroux in relation to postmodern forms of thinking about education, is probably even more rooted in modernist lines of thought, but it can certainly be shocking in Polish conditions. What I mean by this is the division into reactionary postmodernism, in relation to its progressive form. This pair of opposing concepts implies – which is crucial for the earlier disputes between E. Laclau and S. Žižek, as well as K. Mannheim and M. Horkheimer – a vision of history as a process that has both direction and some, perhaps distant, but still a finale: emancipation. In other words, the authors of *Postmodern Education*, trying to assess the merits of postmodernism for education, inevitably become entangled in difficulties resulting from the desire to maintain theoretical purity while not wasting the pragmatic values of education theories. The problem with the educational

³⁷ S. Aronowitz, H.A. Giroux, *Postmodern...*, p. 59.

³⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 117.

³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 24–56.

modernism of critical pedagogy may arise only in the context of postmodern discourse, but initially it is possible to make the following declarations:

Educational theory and practice have always been strongly wedded to the language and assumptions of modernism. Educators [...] have shared a faith in those modernist ideals that stress the capacity of individuals to think critically, to exercise social responsibility, and to remake the world in the interest of the Enlightenment dream of reason and freedom⁴⁰.

However, in view of the postmodern criticism of totality, the arbitrary claims to universal truth and some fixed, universal and unchangeable meanings in general, and everything that makes up the arbitrary closures that E. Laclau writes about, one cannot continue to indiscriminately revel in “the Enlightenment dream of reason and freedom”. If, as J. Habermas puts it, “the radical critique of reason exacts a high price for taking leave of modernity”⁴¹, then the price we need to pay for postmodern variations of thinking about education includes the loss of hope for ultimate emancipation, because this can always be seen as a tyranny of some sort of universalism and a kind of imposed, arbitrary closure. The problem, however, is that, in the opinion of the representatives of critical pedagogy, we are already dealing with an arbitrary closure, as “culture is about the production and legitimation of particular ways of life, and schools often transmit a culture that is specific to class, gender, and race”⁴². On the one hand, “the various discourses of postmodernism have provided a powerful new language that enables us to understand the changing nature of domination and resistance in late capitalist societies”⁴³, while on the other they lead us to be cautious about educational processes that may be challenged using arguments about their arbitrariness.

Critical pedagogists try to reconcile radical criticism of reason with maintaining a modern belief in its emancipatory power:

We believe that by combining [...] modernism and postmodernism, educators can deepen and extend what is generally referred to as critical pedagogy. We need to combine the modernist emphasis on the capacity of individuals to use critical reason in addressing public life with a critical postmodernist concern with how we might experience agency in a world constituted in differences unsupported by transcendent [...] or metaphysical guarantees⁴⁴.

And further:

⁴⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 57.

⁴¹ J. Habermas, *The Philosophical...*

⁴² S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux, *Postmodern...*, p. 50. Cf. H. A. Giroux, *Resisting Difference: Cultural Studies and the Discourse of Critical Pedagogy*, [in:] *Cultural Studies*, ed. by L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, P. Treichler, Routledge, New York – London 1992, p. 201.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

Postmodernism radicalizes the emancipatory possibilities of teaching and learning as part of a wider struggle for democratic public life and critical citizenship. It does this by refusing forms of knowledge and pedagogy wrapped in the legitimizing discourse of the sacred and the priestly; rejecting universal reason as a foundation for human affairs; claiming that all narratives are partial; and performing a critical reading on all scientific, cultural, and social texts as historical and political constructions⁴⁵.

The benefits of postmodern discourses include the appreciation of language, which for critical pedagogy implies a focus on language as a medium of power, or rather as the power of texts over the individual and his or her thinking⁴⁶, which must culminate – if we are oriented towards the process of emancipation – in generating the possibility of creating “counter-texts”⁴⁷. These counter-texts are the product of the pedagogy of voice and may be interpreted as a policy of the voice of the *fait accompli*⁴⁸. The mere fact that a student from a disadvantaged group takes the floor is in itself an act of taking the voice away from the dominant discourse. H.A. Giroux cites bell hooks, who recognizes “moving from silence into speech as a revolutionary gesture”⁴⁹ – a gesture impossible to theoretically grasp without a post-structural affirmation of language.

Another positive aspect of postmodern discourses in education is a critical approach to culture as a whole⁵⁰ – this is the “deconstructive trail in radical pedagogy”⁵¹ as defined by L. Witkowski, combining critical pedagogy with its Derridian inspirations. Deconstruction in its practical application means “challenging the commonsense assumptions that are inscribed in the dominant ideology”⁵², which is to lead, through the transformation of the framework of language and thought, to the redefinition of one’s own role and the position of those involved in the educational processes. Ultimately, it is about empowering both teachers and students, and this is done by constructing the sense, need or even the necessity of social change, by means of discursive measures that somehow minimize the demobilizing power of hegemonic discourse⁵³.

The third focal aspect of postmodern discourses in thinking about education is recognizing the problems of difference and identity, and although appreciation of the concept of difference has some democratizing potential:

⁴⁵ H.A. Giroux, *Border Crossings. Cultural Workers and the Politics of Education*, Routledge, New York – London 1992, p. 134.

⁴⁶ Cf. S. Aronowitz, H.A. Giroux, *Postmodern...*, pp. 24–56.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 118–121.

⁴⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 100–103.

⁴⁹ bell hooks [after:] H.A. Giroux, *Resisting Difference...*, op.cit. p. 205. Here we can also see the intertwining of discourses and inspirations of critical pedagogy, postmodernism and cultural studies.

⁵⁰ Cf. S. Aronowitz, H.A. Giroux, *Postmodern...*, p. 72.

⁵¹ Cf. H.A. Giroux, L. Witkowski, *Edukacja i sfera publiczna. Idee i doświadczenia pedagogiki radykalnej* [Education and the public sphere. Ideas and experiences of radical pedagogy], Impuls, Kraków 2010, pp. 339–349.

⁵² Cf. S. Aronowitz, H.A. Giroux, *Postmodern...*, p. 93.

⁵³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 297.

There is in this discourse the danger of affirming difference simply as an end in itself without acknowledging how difference is formed, erased, and resuscitated within [...] asymmetrical relations of power⁵⁴.

Here we have reached the boundaries of postmodern discourse, in the thinking of radical education theorists marked by modernism. The famous “celebrating difference”⁵⁵, as a result of the postmodern emphasis on the fragmentation and criticism of universalism, has its limitations in relation to the issue of identity. The problem of S. Aronowitz and H.A. Giroux consists in defining the limits of the affirmation of difference in the sense that they cannot get rid of the evaluative attitude towards the ethical aspects of the difference. In other words, the difference is related to power and not simply to the difference itself. By this I mean the process of aestheticizing the difference, which is connected with disregarding the primacy of the relations of power⁵⁶. The point is that one cannot simply describe the difference in the identity or lifestyles and demand that people from marginalised groups “remain themselves”, because it also implies that the representatives of dominant groups also remain themselves, and moreover, have the right to pursue their aestheticized lifestyle. This type of postmodernism is helpless in the face of social asymmetry (only the difference exists) and, as S. Aronowitz and H.A. Giroux put it: “there is little or no theoretical attempt to illustrate how dominant and subordinate voices are formed in the ideological and material contexts of real conflict and oppression”⁵⁷. Meanwhile:

The political economy of the sign does not displace political economy; it simply assumes its rightful place as a primary category for understanding how identities are forged within particular relations of privilege, oppression, and struggle⁵⁸.

Two key issues have thus returned: political economy and interests, which by “forging identities” translate into forms of knowledge and thought, but also into the question of the claim to be able to somehow assess these “forgeries”. If we go down the path of E. Laclau and K. Mannheim, we do not possess the instruments for such an assessment, since either everything is just a “provisional suture” of society through an affective investment in some identities that always mean the exclusion of a non-hegemonic group, or everything is an ideological “forgery” and in this respect the “relations of privilege, oppression, and struggle” are irrelevant. Therefore, it is only the “theory of interest” that in some way distinguishes reactionary postmodernism from its progressive counterpart, or reactionary education from emancipatory education in general. However, as explained by L. Witkowski, there is a problem with the theory of interest:

⁵⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 72.

⁵⁵ H.A. Giroux, *Resisting...*, p. 207.

⁵⁶ Cf. S. Aronowitz, H.A. Giroux, *Postmodern...*, pp. 72–73.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

Well, the theory of “interest” in macro-sociology and social philosophy seems to be the most sensitive and troublesome point of each concept and is usually the most questionable, just as it was in the case of the concept of “class interest”. The variant of the theory of interest invoked by P.L. McLaren, referring to the reflections of H. A. Giroux, does not seem to be sufficiently developed as yet, thus any attempt at “materialistic” improvement of the deconstructionism strategy for the use in critical theory remains more a project and a prelude than a ready-made intellectual construct⁵⁹.

However, this theoretical problem needs to be overcome in practical terms, or rather, it is being overcome and, from a pragmatic point of view, it is inconceivable not to be overcome. By this I mean a situation which makes it possible to distinguish, for example, sexism from feminism⁶⁰, since, whether from the perspective of the extremely consistent postmodernism of campuses or academic neutrality in research, male domination simply implies a gender difference, which can be described and shown as being discursively created and it can be proved that some other form of relationship will also be based on an arbitrary closure. Therefore, some form of assessing the difference is necessary so that postmodern discourses do not become a factor in preserving social relations in their asymmetry. In order to become engaged in social processes, also as a researcher, it is necessary to affirm ideological forms of knowledge and thought, including one’s own, on an equal footing with the need to affirm the “empty signifiers”, i.e. the values to which we devote ourselves due to an affective investment.

P. Freire and A. Gramsci: on intellectuals, criticism and naivety

At its best, critical pedagogy enables teachers and others to view education as a political, social, and cultural enterprise. That is, as a form of engaged practice, critical pedagogy calls into question forms of subordination that create inequities among different groups [...]. Likewise, it [...] refuses to subordinate the purpose of schooling to narrowly defined economic and instrumental considerations. This is a notion of critical pedagogy that equates learning with the creation of critical citizens, rather than merely good ones⁶¹.

Critical pedagogy advocates a radical form of democracy that constantly pursues equal rights for disadvantaged groups, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the inclusion of all manifestations of social practice within the framework of its thinking – no group or practice must remain undemocratic⁶². Fostering the

⁵⁹ H. A. Giroux, L. Witkowski, *Edukacja...*, p. 349.

⁶⁰ Antiracism, antisexism and anticapitalism are recognised by S. Aronowitz and H. A. Giroux as democratic struggles. Cf. S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux, *Postmodern...*, p. 123.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁶² See, inter alia, *ibid.*, pp. 122–126, H. A. Giroux, *Resisting...*, pp. 199–212.

development of critical civic competences is one of the objectives of critical pedagogy, while, at the same time, shaping competences that make a citizen, albeit critical, “not merely good”. Considering that the effects on which the authors of *Postmodern Education* are focused relate to forms of knowledge and thought, or rather deconstructive thinking in relation to forms of knowledge, the postulate formulated by them also refers to the proposed features of the researcher investigating social reality. To sum up, a critical researcher is not a “good” researcher, and a “merely good” researcher is not a critical researcher, as critical researchers are insubordinate, focusing their attention on inequalities.

Criticism and insubordination follow, in a sense, the formula of making social reflection (also on education) political⁶³, whose emphasis on power relations legitimized by arbitrary closures of discourse, will boil down to the understanding of theoretical work as an ultimate disruption of the dominant discourse and its subsequent reopening⁶⁴. In a nutshell, critical pedagogy is a counter-hegemonic project⁶⁵. On the other hand, we must have a “correct” discourse that does not address the voice of disadvantaged groups, a hegemonic discourse. In the American context and in relation to social theory in the broad sense, the authors of *Postmodern Education* observe a lack of classical tradition-oriented theories such as those of K. Marx, M. Weber or É. Durkheim. What you get instead is “antitheoretical statistical or ethnographic empiricism”⁶⁶. Furthermore and more importantly, this anti-theoreticality leads to the accumulation of data and their interpretation, which, according to S. Aronowitz and H.A. Giroux, does not offer greater insight into social phenomena, but in some way protects the authors of anti-theoretical research against the allegation of non-neutrality⁶⁷. Nevertheless, also in seemingly disengaged, presuppositionless, or even anti-theoretical and neutral research, “metacategories are tacitly employed but rarely if ever acknowledged”⁶⁸.

Why is there this ignorance of meta-categories, which represent the presuppositions for research procedures? From “affective investment”, as E. Laclau would put it. After all, all forms of knowledge and thought are, by necessity, ideological, as K. Mannheim notes. T. Szkuclarek, in turn, talks about “ideological commitment” or, which comes down to the same issue, but sounds “better” – “herme-

⁶³ See T. Bennett, *Putting Policy into Cultural Studies*, [in:] *Cultural Studies*, op. cit. pp. 23–37.

⁶⁴ Cf. S. Hall, *Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies*, [in:] *Cultural Studies*, op. cit., pp. 278–282, S. Aronowitz, H.A. Giroux, *Postmodern...*, p. 43.

⁶⁵ H.A. Giroux, *On Critical...*, p. 59.

⁶⁶ Cf. S. Aronowitz, H.A. Giroux, *Postmodern...*, p. 18. D. Silverman, in turn, uses the “analytic induction” category, which consists in separating the practice of qualitative research from social theory. Cf. D. Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text and Interaction*, SAGE 2006, p. 399.

⁶⁷ Cf. S. Aronowitz, H.A. Giroux, *Postmodern...*, pp. 18.

⁶⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 18. Alfred Schütz is of a similar opinion, and says that “All our knowledge of the world, in common-sense as well as in scientific thinking, involves constructs, i.e., a set of abstractions, generalisations, formalisations, idealisations. [...] Strictly speaking, there are no such things as facts, pure and simple”. A. Schütz, *Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action*, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1953, p. 2.

neutic pre-understanding”⁶⁹. In order to be able to study something, one needs to know how to do it, and to know how to do it, one needs to know what it is, but in order to know what it is, it is necessary to study it – a vicious circle of presumptionlessness closes, and researchers are forced to apply knowledge whose standards deviate from those adopted and adhered to by the positivists and which can hardly be deemed “objective”. This does not mean, however, that positivist-oriented researchers or qualitative researchers assuming the possibility of presumptionlessness actually conduct genuinely neutral research. All research is a form of social engagement; the problem that arises here is that it matters whose side we take.

The problem of engagement and impossible neutrality in research is formulated emphatically by P. Freire, who talks about the historical and social context of thought and action:

For this reason, to me, the taking of a naive, or worse, an astutely neutral position on the part of someone who studies, be it a physicist, a biologist, a sociologist, a mathematician, or the thinker of education, does not seem either possible or acceptable. Nobody can be in the world, with the world, and with others in a neutral manner. I cannot be in the world, with gloves on my hands, apprehending only⁷⁰.

The author of *Pedagogia da indignação* considers presumptionless and neutral methodology to be naive, in the sense that it is impossible. It is easy to proclaim neutrality from the height of academic pulpits, but, following P. Freire’s metaphor, apprehending the world in “white gloves” so as not to dirty one’s hands with research work is unrealistic. In other words, each study is entangled in some kind of power relations, each has political value, each concerns specific people and is conducted by a researcher who is also a specific person. Thus, P. Freire recognizes that it is impossible to conduct research for the sake of research itself, as this always inevitably implies engaging in social practice by making the decisions and choices underlying research procedures, as well as by making interpretations. Interpretations, on the other hand, are the domain of discourse, i.e. intervention in the sphere of culture, because, as S. Aronowitz and H. A. Giroux aptly point out, “people are mobilized or demobilized by discourse”⁷¹. Therefore, it is not surprising that P. Freire proposes a series of questions researchers need to ask themselves: “In favour of what do I study? In favour of whom? Against what do I study? Against whom do I study?”⁷²

The strongly employed theory of conflict in the thought of the Brazilian educator on the one hand enables P. Freire to fill a gap resulting from “antitheoretical empiricism”, and on the other hand, by focusing on social asymmetries and

⁶⁹ Cf. T. Szkudlarek, *Radyczna krytyka, pragmatyczna zmiana* [Radical criticism, pragmatic change], [in:] *Alternatywy myślenia o/dla edukacji* [Alternatives of thinking about/for education], ed. by Z. Kwieciński, IBE, Warszawa 2000, pp. 277–278.

⁷⁰ P. Freire, *Pedagogy of Indignation*. Routledge, New York 2016, p. 60.

⁷¹ S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux, *Postmodern...*, p. 151.

⁷² P. Freire, *Pedagogy of Indignation...*, p. 60.

dominance relations, enables educational intervention. Research is not an end in itself, but a key element of social change, be it adult literacy or democratisation. Moreover, and more importantly, according to P. Freire these two processes cannot be considered separately because literacy brings political effects and political changes are of educational value. Consequently, according to P. Freire, it is difficult to perceive education only in narrow technical teaching categories, because each of the educational undertakings should be regarded and planned as an action to increase conscientisation (i.e. social awareness, in Portuguese: *conscientização* – P.S.)⁷³. On the other hand, political processes have an educational value and bring cognitive effects, an example being the agrarian reform⁷⁴. The author of *Extensão ou Comunicação* draws attention to the excessively narrow and naive perception of parcelling out the fazendas in strictly legal and organisational terms, when these actions actually entail major social changes, the most important of which is the rise of the “new mentality”⁷⁵, where the world may no longer be perceived as “given, static, unchangeable”⁷⁶. P. Freire’s view in this respect is fundamentally Marxist: the change in the means of production and the relations of production leads to a change in the established forms of knowledge and thought, but more importantly it leads to a loss of conviction that if things are the way they are, they must always be so. The process of studying the world (reflection, learning, but also of action) at different levels can bring about potentially revolutionary social changes.

In any case, the category of naivety has three facets in Freire’s theory of education: (1) it concerns learners who remain in the area of “pure doxa” or “magic thought” and are therefore “simple forms of pre-scientific knowledge”⁷⁷; (2) it concerns teachers who, seeing the world as unchangeable, lead their students to an indiscriminate adaptation to it, which P. Freire considers an “indictment” of their teaching duties⁷⁸; (3) it concerns researchers – including, of particular interest to us, researchers of education, who, under the guise of neutrality, study the world as if it were given, static and unchangeable, or at least unchangeable under the influence of research. Combining threads related to the naivety, at the research level we will have to deal with such naivety, which, while implying neutrality and impartiality of research, will ignore the issue of social asymmetry, and the fact that the researcher is entangled in this asymmetry. It will also be a pure doxa or, as S. Aronowitz and H. A. Giroux would say, antitheoretical empiricism, whose flywheel is, be it as it may, “magic thought” about pure, independent and neutral

⁷³ Cf. *idem*, *Extension or Communication*, transl. L. Bigwood and M. Marshal, p. 69 [http://www.seedbed.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Freire-Extension-or-Communication.pdf].

⁷⁴ In his Chilean “period”, P. Freire makes the approach to agricultural reform an example of two types of consciousness: naive and critical. Cf. P. Freire, *Extension...*, p. 41, Cf. *idem*, *Educação e Mudança*, Paz e Terra, São Paulo 1979, pp. 10–11.

⁷⁵ P. Freire, *Extension...*, p. 45.

⁷⁶ P. Freire, *Educação...*, p. 11.

⁷⁷ P. Freire, *Extension...*, p. 18.

⁷⁸ P. Freire, *Educação...*, pp. 9–11.

research work. More importantly, however, from an ethical point of view, what implicates us in the paradox of disengagement is that one's "disengagement" is actually tantamount to one's engagement on the side of the dominant discourse; it is what P. Freire describes as a compromise with an alienated and alienating society, and therefore a disgrace⁷⁹. Using Freire's category of "anaesthetic education", which leaves educated people uncritical and naïve about the world they live in⁸⁰, naïve researchers are similarly anesthetized, dormant, unaware of social inequalities and the forms of knowledge and thought associated with them.

This brings us to two key issues that were relevant to A. Gramsci and which, through Gramscian inspirations of critical pedagogy, are still relevant today. What I mean here is the role of intellectuals and the relationship between popular and scientific forms of knowledge and thought. The central point here is the issue of "common sense" and the attitude of intellectuals towards it, also when it comes to their own "common sense", if we may say so. Gramsci asks:

[...] whether the philosophy of praxis excludes ethico-political history, whether it fails to recognize the reality of a moment of hegemony, treats moral and cultural leadership as unimportant and really judges superstructural facts as "appearances"? and answers: "One can say that not only does the philosophy of praxis not exclude ethico-political history but that, indeed, in its most recent stage of development, it consists precisely in asserting the moment of hegemony as essential to its conception of the state and to the 'accrediting' of the cultural fact, of cultural activity, of a cultural front as necessary alongside the merely economic and political ones⁸¹.

A. Gramsci refers thereby to the popular understanding of the metaphor of the base and superstructure, challenging the supporters of economism characterised by the one-sided determination of ideological forms of knowledge and thought through material and social conditions. At this point we are getting closer to the problems and solutions proposed by K. Mannheim (subject to M. Horkheimer's polemics), namely that hegemony is a form of domination that employs forms of knowledge and thought, as well as language, in other words, purely cultural media. What we are dealing with here is the "reality of human knowledge relationships", which lie at the core of the recognition of dominance relations and form an element of political hegemony⁸². Moreover, and more importantly, the researchers themselves are stuck in these hegemonic relations, which are their "reality of knowledge relationships". Socially-conditioned learning and popular knowledge are perceived by A. Gramsci as forms of knowledge that are in constant dialectical contact with knowledge of higher methodological standards:

⁷⁹ In the original text P. Freire uses a wordplay that is based on the fact that the terms "compromise" and "disgrace" in the Portuguese language have a common etymological origin. Cf. P. Freire, *Educação...*, pp. 7–13.

⁸⁰ Cf. P. Freire, *Extension...*, p. 64.

⁸¹ A. Gramsci, D. Forgacs (ed.), *The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916–1935*, NYU Press, 2000, p. 194.

⁸² Cf. *Ibid.*

Every social stratum has its own 'common sense' (*senso commune*) and its own 'good sense' (*buon senso*), which are basically the most widespread conception of life and of man. Every philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of 'common sense': this is the document of its historical effectiveness⁸³.

The same is true of the stratum of academics, but perhaps more importantly, they are the ones creating "philosophical currents" which leave behind a "sedimentation" in the form of, as A. Gramsci puts it elsewhere, the "folklore of philosophy"⁸⁴. In any case, it is "common sense" or "good sense", as a shared view of the world, that becomes the greatest problem connected with hegemony, because, for one, it is an expression of the relations of domination and a barrier to emancipation, and, secondly, it also defines the forms of knowledge and thought of the people who reflect on social existence. Therefore, A. Gramsci proposes:

To criticise one's own conception of the world means therefore to make it a coherent unity and to raise it to the level reached by the most advanced thought in the world. It therefore also means criticism of all previous philosophy, in so far as this has left stratified deposits in popular philosophy. The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is "knowing thyself" as a product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory. The first thing to do is to make such an inventory⁸⁵.

K. Mannheim argues in the same vein, as for both these researchers of social relations "self-evaluation" or "self-clarification of our orientation in the everyday world" are a *sine qua non* for the accuracy of the research process. As the author of *Ideology and Utopia* puts it:

It is clear, furthermore, that every social science diagnosis is closely connected with the evaluations and unconscious orientations of the observer and that the critical self-clarification of the social sciences is intimately bound up with the critical self-clarification of our orientation in the everyday world. An observer who is not fundamentally interested in the social roots of the changing ethics of the period in which he himself lives, who does not think through the problems of social life in terms of the tensions between social strata, and who has not also discovered the fruitful aspect of resentment in his own experience, will never be in a position to see that phase of Christian ethics described above, to say nothing of being able to understand it⁸⁶.

He adds that one must "continue to live with the unconscious uncovered"⁸⁷, leaving us with a "self-control" and "self-criticism" that should lead to a "new

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

⁸⁶ K. Mannheim, *Ideology...*, p. 41.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

conception of objectivity”⁸⁸. Thus, following this line of thought, a more honest research strategy would be to define the limits of one’s own thinking and knowledge, or leaving the assumptions that underpin our research, to the assessment of the readers or interpreters thereof. For the concept of neutral research not only ends once one goes out into the field, but the very idea of postulating such an approach is a voice supporting naive empiricism, and more importantly, it is a voice that petrifies the *status quo*. The only problem with Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, when one tries to argue with it from a critical pedagogy position, concerns the category of interest. Expressing this in the terms of J. Habermas, if it is interests that constitute knowledge and the communication of findings, we should re-examine our position and adopt a “hermeneutic severity in relation to [...] [our] own presuppositions”⁸⁹, in order to determine whether, as researchers, we can recognize the interest that guides us as an emancipatory interest. Objectivity in research will then represent certain solidarity with disadvantaged groups⁹⁰.

A positive notion of naivety: conclusion

At this point I could ask if such a detailed analysis of the relationship between interest, knowledge, researcher status and naivety, in the context of engaged research, and in the context of research located in the critical and radical paradigm of pedagogy, was necessary. After all, this kind of research approach has been officially recognised in textbooks, which means it has reached the moment of positive interpretation, rather than being problematized⁹¹. Maybe I should have resorted to simpler solutions, which would have been limited to a short overview of the critical paradigm in qualitative research, in terms of its features and what differentiates it from the positivist and constructivist paradigm.⁹² Perhaps I should have commenced by stating that I assume the historicity of social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic and gender conditions, and that I acknowledge the axiological mediation of results, and that I consider the questioning of forms of knowledge and thought, which may result in “revelation” and, consequently, in social action and change⁹³, to be an asset to research. It should also be added that this is one of

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁸⁹ J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1*, transl. Thomas McCarthy, Beacon Press, 1984, p. 109.

⁹⁰ Cf. Ch. Barker, *Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice*, SAGE, 2007, p. 32.

⁹¹ See Norman K. Denzin, Yvonna S. Lincoln, *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, SAGE, 2005.

⁹² I am referring to the typology and classification introduced by Egon G. Guba and Y. S. Lincoln. Cf. Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y.S. *Paradigmatic Controversies, Contradictions, and Emerging Confluences in: Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S., Eds., The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 3rd Edition, SAGE, 2005, 191–215.

⁹³ Cf. *ibid.*

the paradigms, and that although it differs from the functioning of the paradigms in the natural sciences, this is how research is done, although it is also possible to do research differently⁹⁴. In reality, however, the stakes are much higher, and this is about the legitimacy of the voice and, if not a claim to the truth, at least to making the interpretations acceptable.

Yet, as K. Mannheim puts it, “The disregard of qualitative elements and the complete restraint of the will does not constitute objectivity but is instead the negation of the essential quality of the object”, but, at the same time, “the reverse of the greater the bias, the greater the objectivity, is not true”⁹⁵. Therefore, “taking a shortcut” on the issue of engaged research involving interest-based presuppositions, which I continue to believe to be the only viable kind of research, would be to ignore the key problem when it comes to conducting social research in Poland, and especially when it comes to conducting qualitative research. This is the same type of problem encountered by L. Kopciwicz, who, while placing herself in the perspective of radical and critical feminist pedagogy, and considering qualitative strategies to be the most appropriate research strategies for the subject she has chosen, is simultaneously faced in Polish conditions with two possible charges, undermining the validity of her procedures, and thus of the findings and their interpretation⁹⁶. The charges in question here include, first of all, questioning qualitative research as such, because such qualitative inquiry, from the viewpoint of “hard” scientists, is regarded as unscientific critical journalism, simply because it is not free from subjective evaluation⁹⁷. Secondly, although equally important, the objections raised by those qualitative researchers, who, believing that it is possible to refrain from evaluation and presupposition, treat such actions as raising, probably only in the eyes of researchers who still believe in scientism, the “scientific” rank of qualitative research. Meanwhile N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln describe the latest phase (since 2005) of qualitative research in these words:

The eighth moment [in the development of qualitative research – P.S.] asks that the social sciences and the humanities become sites for critical conversations about democracy, race, gender, class, nation-states, globalisation, freedom, and community⁹⁸.

In Polish conditions, feminist research, of which L. Kopciwicz is a key representative in pedagogy, is a good, if not the best example of socially engaged research. By “good example” I mean not only that it is an accurate exemplification, but above all that it is an exemplification of accuracy, a good example of good prac-

⁹⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, See T.S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition*, University of Chicago Press, 2012.

⁹⁵ K. Mannheim, *Ideology...*, p. 349.

⁹⁶ L. Kopciwicz, *Nauczycielskie poniżanie. Szkolna przemoc wobec dziewcząt* [Degrading Treatment by Teachers. School Violence against Girls], Engram-Difin, Warszawa 2011, pp. 98–105.

⁹⁷ N. K. Denzin, Y. S. Lincoln, *Introduction. The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research*, [in:] N. K. Denzin, Y. S. Lincoln, *The SAGE Handbook...*, p. 2.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

tice in socially engaged research. In keeping with the issues raised in the eighth moment of qualitative research development, we can focus on social asymmetries, so we can deal with research engaged in hegemonic relations constructed on the basis of race, gender and class criteria. The choice of research topic is followed by the selection of methods and strategies of engaged research⁹⁹, which in Polish pedagogy are as follows: critical ethnography¹⁰⁰, feminist research¹⁰¹, critical discourse analysis¹⁰², queer theory¹⁰³, participatory research¹⁰⁴. These are specific examples of “biased” research within a “neutral” academic culture, as Joe L. Kincheloe and Peter McLaren put it¹⁰⁵.

The problem of bias returns, but it would be naive to assume that impartiality is achieved by means of some academic guarantees, certificates or degrees. So how to conduct qualitative research? If the central category for these considerations was the category of naivety, which included thinking about neutrality before the concept of ideology was invented, or before this category entered the world of academia through Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, is it possible to establish even a minimum dose of naivety, and thus a minimum dose of impartiality, while maintaining bias in research by opting for the emancipatory interest (also self-interest)? Although the issue is presented in a complex way, the solution is quite straightforward, but with a limited scope. What I have in mind is naivety (and impartiality, and therefore, in a sense, objectivity in qualitative research), which Steinar Kvale describes as “deliberate naïveté”¹⁰⁶ when referring to the researcher’s attitude in conducting a qualitative interview. S. Kvale proposes a certain technical solution, namely that “rather than the interviewer having pre-formulated questions and ready-made categories”¹⁰⁷, they should employ “deliberate naïveté and

⁹⁹ N.K. Denzin, Y.S. Lincoln, *Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research*, [in:] N.K. Denzin, Y.S. Lincoln, *The SAGE Handbook*...

¹⁰⁰ In Poland, a successful application of Philip F. Carspecken’s concept is the study by M. Boryczko, *Między oporem a adaptacją. Szkoła wobec procesów globalizacyjnych* [Between Resistance and Adaptation. School in the Face of Globalisation Processes], UG, Gdańsk 2012.

¹⁰¹ Cf. L. Kopciewicz, *Rodzaj i edukacja. Studium fenomenograficzne z zastosowaniem teorii społecznej Pierre’a Bourdieu* [Gender and Education. Phenomenographic Study Applying Pierre Bourdieu’s Social Theory], Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej, Wrocław 2007; Joanna Ostrouch-Kamińska, *Rodzina partnerska jako realizacja współzależnych podmiotów: studium socjopedagogiczne narracji rodziców przeciążonych rolami* [Partnership-based Family as the Fulfilment of Interdependent Entities: Sociopedagogical Study of the Narrative of Parents Overburdened with their Roles], Impuls, Kraków 2011.

¹⁰² See the articles by K. Stary and L. Stankiewicz in this collection.

¹⁰³ See Marcin N. Welenc, *Konstruowanie znaczeń coming out w prywatnej i publicznej przestrzeni doświadczeń homoseksualnych mężczyzn* [Constructing the Meanings of Coming Out in a Private and Public Sphere of Homosexual Experience for Men], Uniwersytet Gdański, Gdańsk 2012.

¹⁰⁴ See H. Červinkova, B. D. Gołębiak, *Badania w działaniu. Pedagogika i antropologia zaangażowane* [Action Research. Engaged Pedagogy and Anthropology], Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej, Wrocław 2010.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. J.L. Kincheloe, Peter McLaren, *Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research*, [in:] N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook*..., pp. 303–342.

¹⁰⁶ S. Kvale, *InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing*, SAGE, 1996, p. 33.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

absence of presuppositions”, which “implies an openness to new and unexpected phenomena”¹⁰⁸. In other words, in order for the answer not to include what the researcher wants, and to include what the researcher “does not want” and does not expect instead, they should not ask about it, because using a certain category in the question will cause it to appear on the signifying side, i.e. in the statement of the interviewee. Moreover, one should allow oneself a certain amount of deliberate naivety, when the subject of follow-up questions is the understanding of the terms used by the interviewee, or the relationship between the terms used. Therefore, deliberate naivety finds its practical realisation in the follow-up questions. In this case, however, we are dealing with a technical procedure and only a technical procedure which, even if performed with exceptional proficiency, does not relieve the researcher from the necessity to articulate the meta-categories underlying the research project, because this technical proficiency does not allow the researcher to place himself outside the social existence. Nothing, apart from the cognitive dissonance triggered by work in the field, exempts the researcher from the obligation to prepare a research project and interpret the findings to the best of their knowledge, the knowledge that precedes the research. However, neither does anything release the researcher from criticizing their own presuppositions.

Summary

Critical Pedagogy and Engaged Research: Ideology, Interests and Naivety

The article deals with the problem of engagement in social research. Although this problem seems to have been solved (Aronowitz, Giroux 1991; Denzin, Lincoln 2009, 2010; Fairclough, Wodak 2007; Rogers 2011), it is far from obvious in Polish conditions, especially among quantitative researchers and, more importantly, among qualitative researchers who are trying to establish a certain neutral, ideology-free and transcendent point of view. Thus the most important thing is to deconstruct ideologically-based critiques of ideology parallel to the apotheosis of the social neutrality of the social sciences, especially educational theory.

Critical pedagogy's ethical orientation in the area of social action as well as in the area of research procedures is based on the theory of ideology and interests (Aronowitz, Giroux 1991; Marx, Engels 1973; Habermas 1973). Awareness of necessary ideological involvement, however, is partly due to the postmodern awareness of the arbitrary imposition of meanings, which is the main problem for established emancipatory strategies (Laclau 2005). The author considers the discussion on the notion of ideology between Horkheimer and Mannheim to be a “prototype” of the latest dispute between Žižek and Laclau. In keeping with the distinction developed by Aronowitz and Giroux (1991), it is a problem of progressive and reactionary postmodernism.

Finally, the naive neutral point of view is faced with questions posed by Freire (2000) – in favour of what and whom do you study? Against what and whom do you

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

study? Attempting to establish some kind of neutrality in social research which will not be an instrument of petrifying social relations, the author supports the concept of naivety as a technical skill rather than as a serious devotion to the positivist vision of “objective” empirical procedures.

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Emancipation through Education: from the Enlightenment to Pragmatism

The notion of emancipation tends to be associated with the latter half of the 20th century. It is then that the term entered pedagogical and philosophical discourse on a greater scale. However, its history, as well as the history of emancipation itself – conceived as an environment that enables a life of dignity, autonomy and egalitarian participation in the community – goes back much further. This is the story I tell in my book entitled *Emancypacja przez wychowanie, czyli edukacja do wolności, równości i szczęścia* [Emancipation through Education, i.e. Education towards Liberty, Equality and Happiness] (GWP 2011). I begin with the Enlightenment, around which many stereotypes have arisen, making it difficult to reflect on its legacy in a reliable and accurate fashion. It was commonly perceived, whether by conservatives or progressives, as an epoch of the tyranny of reason, of pushing the body into a rigid framework, of subjugation to institutions, of contempt for the aesthetic experience, and so forth. Paradoxically, most of the emancipatory values that we hold dear today, indeed most of the critical perspectives that we recognise today, emerged at that very moment. Is it possible, then, to speak of a linear progress in sensitivity, dating back to the second half of the 18th century? Obviously not. The history of the doctrines of liberation is full of discontinuities and inconsistencies. These manifest themselves in exclusions and omissions, which contradict the universality of the concept of emancipation. When conducting my research, based on the analysis of source texts, I took it upon myself to examine the traces of these historical suppressions and their consequences.

The emancipatory impulse grew particularly strong on the eve of the French Revolution. In that period, it was the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau that offered the most significant reflection on both education and social philosophy. As we recall, *Émile*, the main character of his treatise on pedagogy, was supposed to grow up away from social influences and to learn reasoning by himself, owning “no sway but that of reason”¹. For instance, he was to choose his own religion or

¹ J.J. Rousseau, *Émile, or Education*, trans. by Barbara Foxley, M.A., London & Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1921; New York: E.P. Dutton, 1921, p. 217.

lack thereof. At the same time, paradoxically, the individualistic upbringing of the boy was supposed to lead to the creation of a close-knit community, where the thoughts of individuals would yield to the common good. The logic of this transition is explained by Rousseau's social philosophy. It represents a self-sufficient "noble savage", meaning a man before the advent of evil civilisation, a civilisation that flings "garlands of flowers" over the "chains" of feudal dependencies weighing people down². However, the alternative to the existing inequalities is not to return to nature, but rather to socialise at a higher level: entering into the social contract. It is about individuals voluntarily surrendering to the outcome of a ballot in which each of them has an equal vote. As a result of the clash of conflicting opinions, a democratic core emerges: the general will. The general will automatically becomes law that must be accepted by individuals even if they disagree with the outcome. This way the "natural freedom" gives way to "civil liberty, which is limited by the general will"³. This corresponds to a dialectic transition from Émile's education – first a "noble savage", then a rational individualist – to a collective education based on voluntary identification with a community of equals.

This dialectic later appears in the works of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller. The first calls for "a man's release from his self-incurred tutelage"⁴ and outlines a vision of "the kingdom of ends". No human being can be treated in it as a means to an end, and always only as an end. This is why the philosopher rejects the existence of the army, i.e. people who are treated as objects on the path to military victory. The aim of education is to bring closer the order in which everyone will be treated as a subject. A child needs to learn to think instead of to believe; to decide for himself or herself, rather than to follow commands. However, the pedagogical measures recommended to achieve these noble goals strike one with their severity and insensitivity to the suffering of the individual. In his pedagogical treatise, Kant advocates a truly military discipline towards children⁵, whereas in the *Critique of Practical Reason* adults are expected to follow exaggerated abstract moral norms that prohibit them from stealing or perjury even when their life is at risk. On the other hand, Kant does not allow suicide in the case of unbearable pain⁶. Schiller, who as a young man was subject to an educational regime based on the restrictive recommendations of his predecessor, revised this vision of education and morality, deeming it "grace repelling". Its severity is replaced by freedom and fun, deriving

² J.J. Rousseau, *A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences*, in J.J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses by Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, trans. with an Introduction by G.D.H. Cole, London and Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1923. p. 131.

³ J.J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourses by Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, trans. with an Introduction by G.D.H. Cole, London and Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons 1923, p.19.

⁴ I. Kant, *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, Penguin Books, London 2009.

⁵ See I. Kant, *On Education (ueber Paedagogik)*, trans. by Annette Churton, introduction by C.A. Foley Rhys Davids, Boston: D.C. Heath and Co. 1900.

⁶ See I. Kant, *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, B.D., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Dublin, 4th revised ed., London: Kongmans, Green and Co. 1889.

from Kant's aesthetics, which define beauty as "purposiveness without purpose"⁷. Schiller's *Letters Upon the Aesthetic Education of Man* constitute a great praise of spontaneity, freedom and creativity⁸. The same enthusiasm is expressed in his *Ode to Joy*, for which the music was written by another great supporter of the Enlightenment, Ludwig van Beethoven.

The philosopher's reference to the creative and vital potentials that lie hidden in man was seized by Herbert Marcuse, a much later theoretician advocating the unleashing of the suppressed powers of eroticism and the imagination. Schiller, however, unlike his successor, does not value spontaneity in itself. He does not perceive beauty and play as an end in itself or as desirable features of social order, but rather as a means of ensuring that human drives are effectively harnessed in the service of reason, the same reason on which Kant based his restrictive ethics and rigorous pedagogy, as well as his vision of social policy. Contrary to what it may seem, however, the latter is not democratic at all. Both philosophers feared allowing the lower classes to make political decisions and were in favour of an absolute monarchy. As pointed out by Terry Eagleton⁹, in their metaphors this monarchy embodies reason, while the force of the senses, the drive, corresponding to the masses, should, according to Schiller, "lend all the fire of its feelings to a celebration of a triumph over itself"¹⁰. The same applies to women who, despite being associated with the values of sensitivity and beauty lauded by the philosopher, do not deserve civil rights. This is also Kant's legacy, who excluded women from the political community on grounds that may seem surprising, given his pacifist inclinations. He argued that a "woman, regardless of age, is declared to be immature in civil matters" because "just as it does not belong to women to go to war, so women cannot personally defend their rights and pursue civil affairs for themselves"¹¹. It is worth noting that the military components of education perfectly match this vision of citizenship.

Both the aforementioned representatives of German idealism (followed, among others, by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel) drew on the social philosophy of Rousseau in this respect. Women are not involved in the establishment of social contracts and their voices do not form part of the general will. They are only meant to form the silent foundations of the political community of men, whose needs and desires they are obliged to fulfil. No wonder then that *Émile's* chapter on raising a girl is in stark contrast to how the boy is to be treated. While *Émile* was to think for himself, without any external authority, his future partner, Sophie, was to rely

⁷ See I. Kant *Kant's Critique of Judgement*, trans. with Introduction and Notes by J.H. Bernard (2nd ed. revised), London: Macmillan 1914.

⁸ See F. Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, trans. with an Introduction by Reginald Snell, Dover Publications Inc., Mineola New York 2004.

⁹ Terry Eagleton, *Schiller and Hegemony*, in: T. Eagleton, *The ideology of the aesthetic*, Basil Blackwell Ltd, Oxford-Cambridge 1990, p. 111.

¹⁰ Jane V. Curran and Christophe Fricker (eds.), *Schiller's "On Grace and Dignity" in Its Cultural Context: Essays and a New Translation*, Rochester, NY: Camden House 2005.

¹¹ I. Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. with an Introduction and Notes by Mary J. Gregor, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1974, p. 80.

on them unreservedly. When it comes to raising a girl, Rousseau says: "it is as well to observe that, until the age when the reason becomes enlightened, when growing emotion gives a voice to conscience, what is wrong for young people is what those about have decided to be wrong. What they are told to do is good; what they are forbidden to do is bad; that is all they ought to know"¹². The question of the choice of religion, so important in *Émile's* case, is not posed at all in relation to Sophie. She is simply to learn the truths of the parents' faith and abide by them for the rest of her life. She should also stay away from the abstract sciences, and in constant proximity to the mirror, because it is beauty, and not self-awareness, that is most important for her future. In Rousseau's vision, women are expected to get used to the fact that male opinion governs their lives from childhood onwards.

It is therefore evident that the tradition of thinking about politics and education originating from Jean-Jacques Rousseau contradicts its own emancipatory declarations. For a long time, however, both philosophical and pedagogical works have ignored the issue of women's exclusion. According to Carole Pateman, this was due to the lack of reflection on the third flagship value of the French Revolution, alongside liberty and equality. Fraternity is accepted to be another expression of solidarity between people, whereas in her opinion it should be understood more literally: as a community of men founded upon the subordination of women¹³. Contrary to the reasons commonly given for the omission of women from philosophical concepts as something taken for granted in early modernity, there was no lack of criticism of this approach, as well as of alternative concepts of social emancipation. Mary Wollstonecraft in her *Vindication of the Rights of Woman* presents a vision of education in which girls learn to think for themselves and are not yet groomed into weakness and cowardice, which translates into the professional and personal independence of adult women¹⁴. The philosopher points out many inconsistencies in Rousseau's argument about Sophie, such as the fact that if women by nature only want to appeal to and listen to men, why is he calling for so many restrictive educational measures to achieve this? Contrary to the "fraternal" definition of the public sphere, she believes that motherhood not only does not negate civic identity, but should in fact be one of its cornerstones, on the same footing as working peacefully for the good of society. Conversely, membership of a political community cannot be made conditional on the bearing of arms, as the army is a school of dangerous irrationality.

Jean Antoine Condorcet, one of Wollstonecraft's contemporaries, was also a critic of Jean-Jacques Rousseau with respect to his emancipatory positions. He rejected Rousseau's militarism and his exclusion of women. He created a project

¹² J. J. Rousseau, *Émile, or Education*, trans. by Barbara Foxley, M.A., London & Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1921; New York: E.P. Dutton 1921, p. 344.

¹³ Carole Pateman, *The Fraternal Social Contract* in: C. Pateman *The Disorder of Women. Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory*, Polity Press 1989.

¹⁴ See M. Wollstonecraft, *The Vindication of the Rights of Woman: A Sourcebook*, Adriana Craciun (ed.), Routledge, New York 2013.

of free, co-educational instruction for children and adults from all social classes, allowing the geographically and culturally excluded to attend school¹⁵. He opposed racism and rejected colonialism, calling for the right to “to participate in [...] independence, [...] liberty, and [...] illumination”¹⁶ for non-whites. He believed that technological progress would improve society, and his predictions of future inventions, such as airplanes, were astoundingly accurate. However, he warned against the rule of the knowledgeable elites over the ignorant masses, which would not differ much from the power of the clergy, which, according to him, would prey on the ignorance of the faithful. He also recognized the danger of relying on people’s enthusiasm, rightful as it may be, when it did not permit criticism. In his scientific research and teaching practice, he insisted on the right to make mistakes, the equivalent of which, as far as society is concerned, was the acceptance of dissenting opinions and criticism.

This shows that John Stuart Mill with his essay on *The Subjection of Women* was not, as the prevailing teaching curricula might otherwise suggest, the first feminist philosopher. While fighting for women’s political rights, economic independence and personal freedom, he considered it desirable for them to fulfil their role primarily within the family. It is only after the children have grown up, or if they do not have any, that he believes women are ready to take up a professional or political career. His wife Harriet Taylor Mill believed otherwise, and in her essay *The Enfranchisement of Women*¹⁷ she advocated access to civic activity also for pregnant women and women caring for children. However, neither she nor her husband mention that someone other than the mother or a woman hired for this purpose could possibly take over the childcare duties. At that time, some socialists already demanded that crèches be set up. On the other hand, other leftists called for a ban on women’s work, combined with a wage raise for men, sufficient to support the family. Taylor Mill challenged this view, arguing that a ban on child labour would be much more desirable. She cited Robert Owen, philosopher, MP and social activist, who, outraged by the fact that, at the beginning of the 19th century, children as young as 7 or 8 years old were working in factories like adults, i.e. up to 13 or even 14 hours a day, submitted a draft of an “industrial emancipation” bill to Parliament in 1815. This included a ban on child labour under the age of 12 and a limitation of its duration to 12 hours with a mandatory break of 1.5 hours for minors between the ages of 12 and 18. In a much more relaxed form, it was possible to introduce these demands into existing law after four years.

Owen also drew the attention of the public to the scandal of punishing proletarian and lumpenproletarian children for crimes directly resulting from their dire

¹⁵ See J.A. Condorcet, *The Nature and Purpose of Public Instruction in: Condorcet: Selected Writings*, Bobbs-Merrill 1976.

¹⁶ J.A. Condorcet, *Outlines of an historical view of the progress of the human mind, being a posthumous work of the late M. de Condorcet*, (Translated from the French), Philadelphia: M. Carey 1796, p. 154.

¹⁷ See H. Taylor Mill, *The Enfranchisement of Women*, http://www.pinn.net/~sunshine/book-sum/ht_mill3.html.

circumstances or caused by their ignorance through no fault of their own¹⁸. They received sentences as harsh as adults, and there was no hesitation in sentencing them to death. The philosopher also took the side of adults, who had previously been such children, and whose fate had by no means changed as they reached adulthood. Owen, however, did not stop at stigmatising the shortcomings of the penal system and fighting for a more humane employment policy. Even before he started his parliamentary activity, he was active as a social reformer on a limited, experimental scale. In his weaving plants in New Lanark, the working hours were shortened and a number of educational, cultural and entertainment activities were introduced for the employees and their children. In the ideal society that he designed, and because of which his ideas were called “utopian”, the division between the rich and the poor, between the countryside and the city, was to be abolished. People were to live in aesthetic buildings, surrounded by workplaces and agricultural landscapes. Housekeeping activities, which until now had been carried out with a great deal of effort and expense at home, would be undertaken by public institutions. The upbringing of children would also be largely taken over by the collective. The women, released from the burden, were to be given full personal and political rights. Religion would be a matter of choice, not coercion, and condemnation of those who departed from the faith would become impossible when believers of different faiths began to pray together in the same sanctuary of worship.

Charles Fourier radicalized Owen’s views, developing them in the direction dictated by artistic imagination¹⁹. In his vision, people were to live in palaces, eat together and cook delicious, gourmet meals, appreciated by feasters. Personal life, including eroticism, was to be shifted to the public sphere, where it would take on exuberant libertine forms. The fulfilment of drives and the desire for beauty would be combined with labour, hence called “attractive labour”. Children had a special role to play in this vision. Babies would already be entrusted to the collective of women who demonstrated genuine maternal instincts, alien, in the opinion of the philosopher, to most females. Later on, these youngsters would find themselves under the wing of other children, namely those from older age groups. All of them would actively participate in the life of the community called Phalanstère, where they would be entrusted with various responsible functions, including the cleaning of the toilets, in keeping with the children’s fascination with impurity. Fourier thus responded wittily and with psychological sensitivity to the question that has been asked of all utopists for centuries, namely who will be carrying out the dirtiest jobs in an ideal society. Governance was to be thoroughly democratic in Phalanstère, with everyone choosing the title they like or enjoy. The same applies to religion, which was to fill the life of the community in its many, non-orthodox and completely voluntary forms, excluding only the dogmas of hatred.

¹⁸ See G. Claeys (ed.), *The Selected Works of Robert Owen*, Routledge 2015.

¹⁹ See Ch. Fourier, *Œuvres complètes*, vol. I–XII, Paris: Anthropos 1966–1968.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels distanced themselves from Owen's and Fourier's views, but they did borrow more from them than they admitted. They advocated the right to divorce and illegitimate children, the introduction of crèches to relieve working mothers, public canteens and laundries, and education based on respect for work and incorporating its elements. Just like their predecessors, they were sensitive to the hardships suffered by children in the realities of the capitalist society. They condemned childrens' widespread employment and described their working conditions in factories as follows: "Dante would have found the worst horrors of his *Inferno* surpassed in this manufacture"²⁰. What Marx and Engels disliked about the programme of Utopian socialists, apart from its fantastic element, was the overly specific vision of a happy society and the fact that it was to be achieved through peaceful reforms. The authors of the *Communist Manifesto*, on the other hand, believed that it was the revolution that would determine the shape of the future society, which could not be predicted by the people shaped by the current reality. It was anchored in the claim that it is the social being that determines consciousness, but it unjustly reduced education, a practice with the potential for change at least equal to that of revolution, to economic change.

It was Antonio Gramsci²¹ who answered the question "How to educate educators" within Marxism. Referring to the famous statement from *The German Ideology* that "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas"²², he observes that it is never the case that there is only one ideology reflecting material relations. We should rather talk about various "tectonic layers" of consciousness, some of which no longer correspond to material relations, while others constitute a premonition of an egalitarian future. The role of educators is to become aware of the current type of "organic ideology" and to have a bearing on it. Of course, the most difficult thing to do is to convince people, especially the uneducated, of new, revolutionary views, even if they represent their interests. Therefore, the intellectual refinement of the emancipatory vision must be linked to the familiarity with the material life and mindset of the people. In the future society, the philosopher wants to introduce a "single school", that is, one that is free and offers the same comprehensive education to all children. It would to a large extent remove them from their parents' environment and introduce into their lives entirely new ideas and skills, which they would not acquire in their family homes, soaked in "folklore" ways of thinking. As we can see, in modern socialist thought, the family did not enjoy a good press. It was meant to have as little impact on children as possible, and the hope for reform was mainly sought in external institutions.

²⁰ K. Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (1867), Trans. from the 3rd German edition, by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Frederick Engels. Revised and amplified according to the 4th German ed. by Ernest Untermann, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co. 1909, p. 272.

²¹ See A. Gramsci, D. Forgacs (ed.), *The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916–1935*, NYU Press 2000.

²² K. Marks, F. Engels, *The German Ideology, including Theses on Feuerbach*, Prometheus Books 1998.

At the same time, another radical educational concept was being developed overseas. At first glance, John Dewey's proposals were no different from those put forward by the European emancipation pedagogy. According to him, children should become aware of civil rights and equality during their education and their interests should develop organically, which did not mean that they should develop without the presence of discipline, including self-discipline²³. It was important that they learned about and respected the key role of work. This was to be combined with the acquisition of artistic sensitivity, which would make work, like science before, a source of happiness and satisfaction. However, the American proposed a new theoretical basis for this purpose. His theory not only called for democracy and explained its principles, but was also intended to be its explicit articulation. Many of the philosophies to-date have failed in this respect, because "they have at bottom been committed to the principle of a single, final and unalterable authority from which all lesser authorities are derived. The men who questioned the divine right of kings did so in the name of another absolute. The voice of the people was mythologized into the voice of God"²⁴. Meanwhile, the "democratic ideal" of Dewey's pragmatism has nothing to do with any superimposed ahistorical truth, because it always originates from the current situation, from the attitudes and tendencies of individuals and society that prevail in a given moment of time. This means that there is no instance external to the material world, and the truth is what at the moment proves to be a valid solution. The philosopher did not consider revolution to be the way forward, as he believed it to perpetuate the old ways of thinking, based on binary divisions. On the contrary, he believed in thorough, simultaneous reforms of the economic sphere and education.

Focusing on the present situation did not mean that education could do without history. Children were to learn about the history of the United States by learning about the pioneers' struggles and performing their daily activities, which was to spark practical inventions. In the vision of the past passed on to children, there was no mention of robbing the indigenous peoples of America of their land or of the atrocities of slavery. Instead, a vision of a fertile blend of cultures, among which the philosopher does not mention African or Indian, was to be fostered. Also when it comes to women, it would be difficult to call his views emancipatory. In his opinion, feminism was one of the socialist extremes, and he considered it desirable to empower women only if it served to improve relations within the family and its general well-being. Nevertheless, pragmatism, with its aversion to dualism and immovable truth and emphasis on practice, has become an effective weapon for civil movements in the United States. It has also influenced the critical sociology of Jürgen Habermas, which is important to me not only as a philosophy of emancipation, but also from a methodological point of view. According to

²³ J. Dewey, Reginald D. Archambault (ed.), *On Education. Selected Writings*, University of Chicago Press, 1974.

²⁴ See J. Dewey, *Philosophy and Democracy*, [in:] *The Essential Dewey*, Vol. I, *Pragmatism, Education, Democracy*, L. A. Hickman, T. M. Alexander (eds.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1998, p. 77.

Habermas's guidelines, the study of history should be based on allowing the voice of the emancipatory aspirations of the past and entering into dialogue with them. I hope that I have succeeded in doing so, thereby bringing closer the fulfilment of the demands of emancipation of the present day.

Summary

Emancipation through Education: from the Enlightenment to Pragmatism

How to characterize the term "emancipation through education"? Emancipation is the process which leads to social equality, political freedom and a real possibility of individual progress for every human being. An egalitarian education means that knowledge is available for everybody irrespective of his or her social class, sex, race and nationality. It helps people from the oppressed or discriminated groups to fight injustice and teaches them how to defend their already achieved rights. The idea of emancipation through education understood in such a way emerged in the period of the Enlightenment, which encompassed the times before, during and right after the French Revolution. Then this idea evolved through the whole modern era, which ends with the beginning of the Second World War. In my essay *Emancipation Through Education: from Enlightenment to Pragmatism* I study the emancipatory threads present in the philosophical theories of such thinkers as Jean Jacques Rousseau, Jean Antoine Condorcet, Mary Wollstonecraft, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller, John Stuart Mill, Harriet Taylor Mill, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Antonio Gramsci and John Dewey. My research showed me that some of the modern thinkers held an emancipatory position in some parts of their ideas while in the other parts of their thought they remained conservative. For example, Rousseau, one of the fathers of emancipatory pedagogy, was against the participation of women in the public space. Another example is using the power of beauty and joy to bring the "impulsive" masses under the control of the "rational" elites in Schiller's vision of the aesthetic pedagogy. I analyse these "omissions" using critical discourses such as the philosophy of the feminist thinker Carole Pateman and the Marxist theoretician Terry Eagleton.

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Critical Pedagogy of Religion – an Outline

Introduction

This article aims to present the beginnings and the development of the pedagogy of religion from the critical paradigm angle. The main task is to introduce 20th century studies in the pedagogy of religion as ideologically involved analytical views in the area of critical interpretation. The article refers to the German tradition of religious education which was established at the beginning of the 20th century and flourished in the time between World War I and World War II, benefiting from the programme ideas of liberal theology and emancipative tendencies¹. Interestingly, the critical revision of religious education in the Protestant Church in Germany was a bottom-up initiative of school teachers and educators. In the academic world such an approach was represented by Otto Baumgarten and Richard Kabisch who, basing on the pedagogy of reform, advocated diminishing the position of the Church both in social life and education². In their understanding, religious education was not directly meant to shape piousness or theological, monotheistic or evangelical attitudes, but above all it aimed at developing humanity in its excellence, as it was designed by God. Their theses were unpopular as they were critical towards the fundamentals of education and religious teaching of the time. The conclusion drawn was that pedagogy of religion adversely affected the “interests” of protestant Churches. This stage in the development of pedagogy of religion – dated from the beginning of the 20th century – was associated with a critical approach, mainly with the basic meaning of this term. Critical thought – especially critical theory, hermeneutics and critical pedagogy – was directly referred to only in the second half of the 20th century, thanks to G. Otto, H. J. Doger and J. Lott. These authors were the first to propose a radical change in the paradigm of the pedagogy of religion: from kerygmatic and confessionary to ideological and critical. This change involved accepting F.D. Schleiermacher’s criteria for the relation between pedagogical theory and education practice, which

¹ See *Teologia liberalna* [Liberal Theology], [in:] H. Vorgrimler, *Nowy leksykon teologiczny wiara – objawianie – dogmat* [New Lexicon of Theology: Faith – Epiphany – Dogma], Warsaw 2005, pp. 380–381.

² See M. Konieczny, *Emancypacja* [Emancipation], [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii* [Lexicon of Pedagogy of Religion], C. Rogowski (ed.), Warsaw 2007, pp. 157–161.

should be considered completely separate³. In this case, theory was not meant to improve the effectiveness of a given practice, but its role above all was to make the practice more conscious – in terms of all the conditions possible. It had very serious consequences for religious education, since the pedagogical theory revealed philosophical, social, ideological conditions, etc. in the paradigm of critical interpretation. This article will present the basic theses of the critical pedagogy of religion, including Polish contributions in the field, in particular the works of Cyprian Rogowski (e.g. about the hermeneutic interpretation of a religious symbol⁴) and of Bogusław Milerski (e.g. works concerning the hermeneutic pedagogy of religion⁵).

Pedagogy of religion

The 19th century was a crucial time for pedagogy of religion, because the criteria of pedagogical analysis began to be included in religious education. This approach was introduced by the 19th century protestant philosopher and theologian F. Schleiermacher who was giving lectures on pedagogy and theology at the University of Berlin in 1826. In his work he emphasized the urgent need to add an empirical and spiritual dimension to religious education. He also advocated opening it up to contemporary humanities. This idea led to establishing the foundations of liberal theology, which above all promoted finding contemporary interpretations of biblical texts. Other supporters of reviewing the existing forms of religious education were Charles Palmer, who published his work on protestant religious education in 1861 (entitled *Protestant Religious Education*), and Tuiskon Ziller, the main representative of herbartianism⁶. They both advocated including humanistic analyses into the sphere of religion, but their main postulate was correlating the influence of the social sciences and theology. The stance of liberal theologians in the following years led to the avid opposition of the so-called kerygmatic movement, supported by Karl Barth (1886–1968) and Gabriel Bohne (1885–1977), which considered the revelation of the Bible to be the most essential part of religious teaching⁷.

The notion of *pedagogy of religion* as a name for the field combining the scope of studies of theology and pedagogy was first introduced by a German theologian

³ See M. Patalon, *Teologia a pedagogika* [Theology and Pedagogy], [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii...* [Lexicon of Pedagogy of Religion...], pp. 786–790.

⁴ See C. Rogowski, *Pedagogika religii. Podręcznik akademicki* [Pedagogy of Religion. University Textbook], Toruń 2011.

⁵ See B. Milerski, *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna. Perspektywy pedagogiki religii* [Pedagogical Hermeneutics. Perspectives of the Pedagogy of Religion], Warszawa 2011.

⁶ B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Religia, Encyklopedia PWN*, t. 8, [Religion, Encyclopedia of PWN, vol. 8], pp. 51–53.

⁷ M. Patalon, *Teologia a pedagogika* [Theology and Pedagogy], [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii...* [Lexicon of Pedagogy of Religion...], pp. 786–790.

and philosopher Max Reischle. In his dissertation *The Question of the Nature of Religion. Foundations for a Methodology of Theological Knowledge* (published in Freiburg in 1889), he stated that pedagogy of religion is not an independent field within religious studies, but it is a part of theology⁸. This is because the studies which belong to pedagogy of religion are always conditioned by a specific confession. Issues of religious education and childrearing belong in the structure of pastoral theology, which is a part of catechetics. At the same time, Otto Baumgarten and Richard Kabisch spoke in a slightly different tone. Their works initiated a new approach to religious education which derived from liberal theology and cultural emancipation. They proposed that the Church catechesis be distinguished from teaching religion at school. School religious education was supposed to be combined with humanistic education and practiced within public schooling. In this sense the confessional aspect was not the major goal of religious education at schools, its aim was mainly cultural⁹.

In the following years, catechetics, both Catholic and Protestant, started to benefit more and more from the achievements of pedagogy and psychology. At the beginning of the 20th century, O. Eberhardt and J. Gottler noticed that in the aspect of its problems and methods, pedagogy of religion gradually became more autonomous in the structure of Catholic theological teachings. Apparently, the more intensely pedagogy of religion was growing at that time, the stronger grew criticism of the traditional role of religion and the more visible the opposition to the role of the Church in the society became. The need for rapid changes in the language and the content of the religious message gradually led to the separation of pedagogical matter from pastoral theology¹⁰. The time abounded in lively discussions about the understanding of religious education and its needs. Many theologians and philosophers shared different views on the place, goals and tasks for the emerging independent field. Friedrich Niebergall was one of these people. In 1911, he published his manifesto *Die Entwicklung der Katechetik zur Religionspädagogik* [*The Development of Catechetics in the Direction of Pedagogy of Religion*]¹¹, in which he showed the innovativeness of studies covered by pedagogy of religion and their independence from classical Protestant catechetics. He suggested the need to create a discipline embracing the relationship between pedagogy and theology, with the dominant focus on pedagogy itself. This was one of the pio-

⁸ M. Reischle, *Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Religion. Grundlegung zu einer Methodologie der Religionsphilosophie* [The Question of the Nature of Religion. Foundations for a Methodology of Theological Knowledge], Freiburg 1889.

⁹ B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Pedagogika, subdyscypliny i dziedziny wiedzy o edukacji...* [Pedagogy, Subfields and Areas of Knowledge about Education...], pp. 45–68; C. Rogowski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii...* [Lexicon of Pedagogy of Religion...], pp. 561–565.

¹⁰ B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Pedagogika, subdyscypliny i dziedziny wiedzy o edukacji...* [Pedagogy, Subfields and Areas of Knowledge about Education...], pp. 47–49.

¹¹ F. Niebergall, *Die Entwicklung der Katechetik zur Religionspädagogik* [The Development of Catechetics in the Direction of Pedagogy of Religion], Berlin 1911.

neering ideas to build a pedagogical field, basing on the criteria of education studies, independent of Protestant theology. The major role of this new field was to develop ways of teaching religion. This moment marks the beginning of a large intellectual movement within Protestant catechetics, which aimed at building pedagogy of religion understood as an autonomous field of theology supported by the studies and solutions of pedagogy and general psychology¹². The situation was similar in the circles of Catholic theologians, where Joseph Göttler, head of the department of pedagogy and Catholic catechesis at the University of Munich, published works concerning the issues of religious education. There was, however, a difference between the Protestant and Catholic understanding of the new field. The former tradition situated pedagogy of religion as an independent pedagogical field, while the latter treated it as a subsidiary of catechetics, defining its purpose as a methodological renewal¹³.

The result of the work for the renewal and modernisation of religious education in German-speaking countries was the creation of new periodicals and journals strictly dedicated to didactic and religious issues. They were, among others, “Christlich-Pädagogische Blätter” published in Vienna, “Katechetische Blätter” and “Zeitschrift für den Evangelischen Religionsunterricht” and “Monatsblätter für den Evangelischen Religionsunterricht”. They were only issued until the 1930s. The main subjects concerned the internal development of Christian catechetics in general, but also the creation of contemporary religious education open to the current problems and dilemmas of the 20th century. They also featured a contestation of the dominant role of the Evangelical Church in a democratic society. In this case, the development of religious education was understood as working out mechanisms for the effective transmission of religious content, which would correspond to the unstable social situation. These changes concerned both the language of transmission and the reinterpretation and updating of the theological content. The idea of creating a pedagogical discipline supporting contemporary open religious education was based primarily on designing the most effective educational models. While the shape of these models was fluid and corresponded with the current social and cultural needs, it was intended to be applicable by various Christian Churches in a pluralistic society¹⁴.

The development of religious education theory in Germany was halted in the 1930s due to the political and social situation, since the Nazi state, using religious education for ideological purposes, reduced its methodological and academic context. Simultaneously, in the inter-war period, Protestant theology much appre-

¹² See B. Milerski, *Nurty w ewangelickiej pedagogice religii w XX wieku* [Trends in the Protestant Pedagogy of Religion in the 20th Century], “Paedagogia Christiana” vol. 8: 2001; *idem*, *Elementy pedagogiki religijnej. Status edukacji religijnej w Niemczech* [Elements of Pedagogy of Religion. The Status of Religious Education in Germany], Warsaw 1998.

¹³ B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Pedagogika, subdyscypliny i dziedziny wiedzy o edukacji...* [Pedagogy, Subfields and Areas of Knowledge about Education...], p. 49.

¹⁴ J. Bagrowicz, *Edukacja religijna współczesnej młodzieży* [The Religious Education of Contemporary Youth], Toruń 2000, pp. 275–289.

ciated the kerygmatic current represented by both Catholic and Protestant theologians, e.g. J. A., Jungmann, G. Bohne, O. Hammelsbeck and H. Kittel. By definition, this approach considerably eliminated the context of contemporary educational issues from the scope of theological analysis¹⁵.

In the following decades of the 20th century, starting from the 1950s, pedagogy of religion as a scientific discipline was becoming increasingly important in the context of social challenges, such as: cultural revolution, remodelling of family life, emancipation processes, secularisation and criticism of undemocratic authority in the Church. The German journal combining research in theology and education "Der Evangelische Erzieher" was instituted in 1948. In 1954, the Evangelical Church created the centre of the Munster Comenius-Institute, which worked on interdisciplinary studies integrating theological analysis with contemporary theories of education. At that time, intense criticism of the dialectical theology¹⁶ and kerygmatic conception of education¹⁷ led to the emergence of new theories and models in religious education, directly drawing from the systems of philosophical anthropology. Works by Martin Stallmann, Hans Stock, Gert Otto and, later, Hans--Bernhard Kaufmann, Dieter Stoodt, and Klaus Weggenast, introduced the methods of hermeneutics, phenomenology and emancipative criticism into religious education¹⁸. In Germany, the decades of the seventies and eighties brought stabilisation and institutional development in universities and state-run departments of the pedagogy of religion. The notion of the Protestant pedagogy of religion too came into use at that time. It denoted the area in educational studies that combined protestant theology and education theory. The Catholic Church also started introducing catechesis open to the findings of contemporary education theory. In 1984, the magazine "Jahrbuch der Religionspädagogik" was established. It covered issues of cross-denominational openness as well as interreligious and ecumenical dialogue in the scope of studies of pedagogy of religion¹⁹.

¹⁵ See J. Bagrowicz, *Problematyka katechizacji młodzieży w nurcie katechezy kerygmatycznej* [The Catechisation of Youth in Kerygmatic Catechesis], "Studia Theologica Varsoviensia", 1996, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 183–200.

¹⁶ *Dialectical theology* – a period in the development of theology of the 20th century, dated 1920–1933. Main representatives: Karl Barth, Eduard Thurneysen, Friedrich Gogarten, Emil Brunner, Rudolf Bultmann and Georg Merz. This concept objected to the liberal theology of the early 20th century, and tried to address the existential and theological questions associated with the events of World War I. See M. Patalon, *Teologia a pedagogika* [Theology and Pedagogy], [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii...* [Lexicon of Pedagogy of Religion...], pp. 786–790.

¹⁷ *Kerygmatic theology* – a trend in Catholic theology combining systematic and pastoral theology, in order to effectively influence the development of faith in the Christian community. See J. Bagrowicz, *Problematyka katechizacji młodzieży w nurcie katechezy kerygmatycznej* [The Catechisation of Youth in Kerygmatic Catechesis], pp. 183–200.

¹⁸ See B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Religia, Encyklopedia PWN...*, [Religion, Encyclopedia of PWN...], pp. 52–53.

¹⁹ C. Rogowski, *Czasopisma pedagogiczno-religijne niemieckojęzyczne* [Magazines on the Pedagogy of Religion of German Speaking Countries], [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii...* [Lexicon of Pedagogy of Religion...], pp. 89–90.

The pedagogy of religion practiced in the United States represented a different cultural and linguistic tradition. It was initially dominated by Protestant theologians, but quickly acquired an interdisciplinary and ecumenical character. This was possible because it cultivated religious education based on the so-called Sunday schooling, which operated from the mid-eighteenth century. Sunday schooling was introduced by an English theologian R. Raikes (1736–1811), who conducted education for children primarily about religion but also in general knowledge. At first it was an initiative of a few churches, then it transformed into a wider enterprise, with lay people serving as teachers. In 1803, the London Sunday School Union was established in Great Britain and by 1880 it had 12 million registered students. In 1824, the American Sunday School Union was founded in Philadelphia. Its goal was to establish a school in every American town. In the following decades, the range of Sunday education covered the area of the whole of the United States²⁰.

At the end of the 19th century, the need for profound discussion and reflection upon religious education resulted in the establishment of the Religious Education Association – REA (Religious Education Association) in 1903. William R. Harper, president of the University of Chicago, became the chairman. In his inaugural speech he indicated that the association's activity will be of an open and scientific nature. The next to speak at the first convention was George A. Coe, one of the precursors of the dialectical vision of religious education. According to this concept, based on the binary anthropological perspective, a human is both a social and religious being. The first approach puts a child in the central point of a schooling system, but at the same time it grants them a deep axiological nature and a transcendental reference point. In this case, pedagogy of religion contributes to dialectical religious education, understood here as one of the essential elements of the overall educational process. Another participant of the first congress was John Dewey, who in his lecture postulated that all research in the field of the pedagogy of religion should meet methodological conditions identical to those in other educational studies. The above discussion resulted in formulating the most relevant conclusion: contemporary religious education should develop alongside general education, and it should meet the same scientific and social requirements for verification²¹.

Successive annual conferences led to outlining a common goal for religious education, which was namely the mutual bilateral correlation of religious and educational dimensions in academic and social areas. The journal "Religious Education", which was established in Chicago in 1906, became the development centre of open and ecumenical reflection on religious education in America. In 1917, G. A. Coe published his first work in the field of religious pedagogy on the

²⁰ See M. Patalon, *Teologia a pedagogika* [Theology and Pedagogy], [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii...* [Lexicon of Pedagogy of Religion...], pp. 786–790.

²¹ See B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Pedagogika, subdyscypliny i dziedziny wiedzy o edukacji...* [Pedagogy, Subfields and Areas of Knowledge about Education...], pp. 47–48.

American ground: *A Social Theory of Religious Education*. It concerned theoretical principles of religious education, which were not to be limited to social or theological sciences, but were an autonomous combination of the two source disciplines²².

Alongside REA, the Catholic scientists community established the "Journal of Religious Instruction" in 1931, which was transformed in 1947 into the "Catholic Educator". At that time, religious education studies began to include psychological analyses, and Granville S. Hall established "The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education". In the following years, the REA activists widely promoted the idea of religious education as part of academic studies. Consequently, universities started opening institutes and chairs of pedagogy of religion within their religious studies departments. In America, the seventies and eighties of the previous century brought the discussion about a common religious education for Christian denominations. It was also the time of opening up to cross-religious dialogue, especially of Christianity with Judaism, Islam or religions of the East; and in the next stage – starting a cultural discourse with atheism²³.

The last decades of the 20th century brought a great revival in British religious education, which, unlike the American and German traditions, did not have a rich academic past. It was not until the 1980s that pedagogy of religion acquired its institutional structure as a scientific field, with the great role of an Anglican activist, John Hull. Starting in 1971, when Hull became the editor-in-chief of "The British Journal of Religious Education", the academic basis of Anglican religious education started developing its form. Institutes and chairs of pedagogy of religion were established. They were, however, not a part of theological faculties or studies of religion, but indeed of pedagogical faculties. British religious education became a strong pillar in the area of international interdisciplinary studies²⁴. The second half of the 20th century witnessed a very intensive development of pedagogy of religion as an academic sub-discipline. New educational concepts were created, since educational studies, philosophy, psychology and sociology introduced further dimensions for analysis. These new trends included the hermeneutic, existential and emancipation-critical pedagogy of religion in particular, but also the psychology of religion which developed in the following years and started uncovering the unconscious dimensions, so far non-existent in religious education. Towards the end of the 20th century, pedagogy of religion developed primarily in English- and German-speaking countries, obtaining the status of an independent field. The established institutes and departments became scientific institutions, which made way for cross-cultural cooperation.

The cultural and political situation in democratic countries at the end of the previous century was very diverse and societies struggled with many problems

²² *Ibid.* p. 48.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

resulting from cultural and social changes. In this dynamic structure, religion in general along with particular Churches was trying to redefine its role in the social hierarchy. Pedagogy of religion became a self-reflective and critical area, challenging also religion as such. General education, which comprised religious classes too, required that both the content and objectives of religious education be consistent with the basic objectives and framework of a pluralistic society. The particular national Churches became involved to act for the benefit of modern society at the same time trying to respond to individual and social needs. The notions of tolerance, freedom, equality, diversity, etc. were no longer just slogans from the past, but became the common reality of Western European countries and the whole world. In those circumstances, religions of the world and national Churches started seeking a modern means of communication that would allow them to participate in the debate about social challenges of the 21st century²⁵.

Currently the term “pedagogy of religion” is an ambiguous category, and there are a few reasons for that. Firstly, there are several language traditions, the most important of which are associated with German and English-speaking countries. Secondly, it is a relatively fresh concept, present in academic studies only since the mid-20th century. Thirdly, there is no consensus on the mutual relations and boundaries between the fields comprising pedagogy of religion, namely pedagogy and theology. Fourthly – a consequence of the previous point – the lack of consent on the relationship between the above fields results in inconsistencies in studies within pedagogy of religion²⁶.

The linguistic diversity of the notion of pedagogy of religion results not only from inconsistencies in translations, but also from the different understanding and interpretation of such close concepts as catechetics, religious instruction in schools, religious education, and the pedagogy of religion. In the German-speaking tradition, where the concept originates, the situation is quite clear: pedagogy of religion – *Religionspädagogik* – and catechetics – *Katechetik*, differ in their subject matter. In the history of German pedagogy and theology, these concepts always had a different subject and meaning. To put it simply: catechetics belonged to a given confession and served its purpose, while the pedagogy of religion was associated with the process of religious education in connection with the state institutions. The case is different in the English-speaking tradition, where the notion of the pedagogy of religion is not explicitly expressed, but is replaced by the concept of religious education or the theory of religious education. Both concepts refer to practical and theoretical pedagogical reflection on the subject of religion, while “catechetics”, and “religious instruction”, are sporadically used and only in the context of a given Church or confession where they are recognized as a means of evangelisation. The situation in Poland is much more diverse, especially due to

²⁵ *Idem, Elementy pedagogiki religijnej* [Elements of Pedagogy of Religion], Warsaw 1998.

²⁶ See C. Rogowski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii...* [Lexicon of Pedagogy of Religion...], pp. 561–598.

the ongoing discussion between advocates of catechetics and the pedagogy of religion. Basically, the polemic concerns the extent of distinction and independence between theology and pedagogy²⁷.

The development and status of religious education in Poland directly depended on the legal conditions of religion instruction in the general state education. Before the Second World War, in accordance with the 1921 Constitution, religion was an obligatory subject at all levels of education for students under 18 years of age. The Concordat of 1925 indicated the exceptional and dominant role of the Roman Catholic Church in the structure of the Polish State. The situation began to change radically in the post-Second World War Poland. Already in 1945 under the decree of the Provisional Government of National Unity, the Concordat ceased to have effect. The next step was complete separation of the Church from the state, which was introduced in 1952 and in turn led to the withdrawal of religion lessons from Polish schools. From 1961/1962, religion classes were held only as extra-curricular activities, outside educational buildings. This situation lasted until 1989, when, in the aftermath of democratic transition, religion returned to schools. It was not until the 1990s, however, that the notion of religious education appeared in pedagogical discussions for the first time, although studies in this area had been present much earlier. At the beginning of the 20th century, a figure worth mentioning, Walenty Gadowski, postulated complementing the Catholic catechesis with pedagogical context. Also in the Protestant Church, activists sought ways for growth: in the 1930s Karol Banzel advocated opening a chair of the pedagogy of religion at the faculty of evangelical theology. At the same time, Sergiusz Hessen indicated new sources and needs for development in Polish religious education. After the Second World War, especially in the academic circles of the Catholic University of Lublin, works on religious education were written, but only within the Catholic confession. In the 1970s, Stefan Kunowski formed the foundations of the Polish pedagogy of religion. He did not refer directly to the sources of European pedagogy of religion, but combined the analysis of the Catholic catechetical doctrine with the achievements of humanistic pedagogy. The 1980s brought another precursor – Janusz Tarnowski – who described the theory of Christian education from the pedagogical perspective, considering the philosophical and theological contexts. Along with the strictly pedagogical research, there were works in the field of catechetics, but enriched with a broad methodological context as well as a thorough anthropological perspective. We may refer here to the works of Marian Finke, Mieczysław Majewski, Jan Charytański, and in particular Władysław Kubikin, because he was the one to initiate a catechetical didactics programme. That moment marked the beginning of Polish religious education developing in two independent dimensions. The first of them was the traditional catechetics, based primarily on the sources

²⁷ See J. Bagrowicz *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Encyklopedia pedagogiczna XXI wieku...* [Pedagogic Encyclopaedia of the 21st Century...], pp. 242–249.

from catechetics and pastoral theology. The second was the pedagogy of religion, which used sources from both religion and pedagogy, as well as from philosophy, sociology and psychology²⁸.

To this day, there have been numerous political and educational polemics regarding the status and scope of religious education in Poland. It is only over the last twenty years that we have been observing increased activity in academic studies recognizing the achievements and wealth of European and worldwide pedagogy of religion. The socio-political situation of recent years has made it possible to conduct educational research on the pedagogy of religion, independent of catechetical studies. This has resulted in the growing awareness of an urgent need to reinterpret the status of religious education in the new reality. A renewal of religious education seemed necessary due to dynamic changes in the Polish society after 1989, but also because of the shift in status of the Roman Catholic Church in contemporary society. The debate on changes in religious education still continues. And even setting aside the political context and focusing on academic analysis and research, pedagogy of religion as well as catechetics found themselves in an authentic impasse in embracing and responding to the needs of the Polish society of the 21st century. This crisis seems to result from several reasons:

- an implicit dispute between the supporters and the opponents of the pedagogy of religion and catechetics preventing the transfer of theoretical and practical knowledge from one context into another;
- the permanent hostile attitude of the Roman Catholic Church towards theoretical models of contemporary education and practical recommendations for their implementation;
- the discourse on religious education giving prominence to power and politics, and not to the methodology of the social sciences, in particular educational, psychological and sociological disciplines;
- religious education based on the pedagogy of religion is still a new field without an independent status in the context of Polish pedagogy.

The paradigms of the pedagogy of religion

Representatives of the contemporary pedagogy of religion create their own theoretical concepts drawing from the theology of religion²⁹ in its broad sense,

²⁸ See B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Religia, Encyklopedia PWN...* [Religion, Encyclopaedia of PWN...], pp. 54–55.

²⁹ See J. Pawlik, *Teologia religii* [Theology of Religion], [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii...* [Lexicon of Pedagogy of Religion...], pp. 797–799; *Teologia religii, Chrześcijański punkt widzenia* [Theology of Religion, Christian Point of View], G. Dziewulski (ed.), Łódź–Kraków 2007; M. Patalon, *Pedagogika ekumenizmu...* [Pedagogy of Ecumenism...], pp. 159–171.

but also from various philosophical systems³⁰ as well as cultural pedagogy³¹ and critical pedagogy³². These concepts embrace the educational activity of individual Churches, but also analyse the religious dimension of general humanistic education based on a specific anthropology corresponding to the current socio-cultural changes. These are mainly works from the area of the pedagogy and philosophy of education, covering the specific religious content of a given denomination or Church. The contemporary global pedagogy of religion is diverse and heterogeneous: the differences root both from the cultural and linguistic background, but also from differing approaches to the subject matter. At this point, certain source communities and paradigms of religious educational thought should be mentioned. The first scope here is the American pedagogy of religion being tightly bound with the situation in the United States, the second – the European pedagogy of religion including studies in German-speaking countries like Germany, Austria and Switzerland covering also Scandinavian academic output, as well as English-language analyses in Great Britain. The few existing Polish studies into the pedagogy of religion can also be categorized as a part of the paradigm of European research.

American religious education has traditions dating back to the 19th century and earlier. Nowadays, it mainly draws from three foundations: neopragmatic philosophy, psychology of religion, and cultural studies. The fundamental pedagogical research in the field of the psychology of religion at the end of the 20th century was led by J. W. Fowler, a professor of theology and anthropology at Emory University in Atlanta, and Daniel S. Schipani who worked within the critical theory based on cultural studies. A crucial development in the area of pedagogical and religious studies was the merger of The Religious Education Association (REA) with The Association of Professors and Researchers in Religious Education (APRRE) into one institution REA:APRRE – working for ecumenical and cross-religious studies in North America. This organisation gathers not only professors and researchers, but also the community of teachers and clergy representatives of the world's largest religions. Currently the most important activists in the field of religious education include among others L. M. A. Bowman, Th. Brelsford, R. H. Cram, P. Gilmour, B. A. Keely, R. Nishioka, E. B. Price, A. C. Vrame, and A. S. Wimberly, who all contribute to the methodological and systematic foundation for this field in America³³.

³⁰ Especially the philosophy of dialogue, existentialism, phenomenology, hermeneutics or personalistic philosophy. See M. Buber, *Ja i Ty. Wybór pism filozoficznych* [I and Thou], Warsaw 1992; E. Levinas, *Całość i nieskończoność. Esej o zewnętrżności* [Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority], Warsaw 1998; J. Tischner, *Filozofia dramatu* [Philosophy of Drama], Kraków 1990; M. Heidegger, *Bycie i czas* [Being and Time], transl. B. Baran, Warszawa 1994; H. G. Gadamer, *Prawda i metoda. Zarys hermeneutyki filozoficznej* [Truth and Method], transl. B. Baran, Warszawa 2004.

³¹ See B. Milerski, *Pedagogika kultury* [Pedagogy of Culture], [in:] *Pedagogika, podręcznik akademicki...* [Pedagogy, University Textbook...], pp. 220–231.

³² See T. Szkudlarek, *Ibid.*, pp. 363–377.

³³ B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Pedagogika, subdyscypliny i dziedziny wiedzy o edukacji...* [Pedagogy, Subfields and Areas of Knowledge about Education...], pp. 47–68; *idem*,

In the European pedagogy of religion, from the very beginning to the present day, the German-language tradition has been playing a great role. The key stage in the development of this field seems to be the period after the Second Vatican Council, especially the turn of the seventies and eighties, when the Catholic and Protestant research centres from Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries opened up to cooperation. It can be assumed that this process was started in 1978 in Germany by the community of Catholic religious educators who founded the journal “Religionspädagogische Beiträge. Zeitschrift der Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Katechetik-Dozenten”, which was published first in Kaarst, then in Kassel, and now, after changing the auspices to Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholische Religionspädagogik Katechetik (AKRK) – in Mainz. The year 1991 brings the establishment of the “Osterreichisches Religionspädagogische Forum” in Graz, Austria, strengthening the cooperation of representatives of various confessions in Christian pedagogy of religion. Back in 1982, the community of Evangelical educators initiated the foundation of the periodical “Schulfach Religion” in Vienna; and the Faculty of Theology of the University in Vienna has now become involved in creating this magazine. The annual “Jahrbuch der Religionspädagogik” has been published in Neukirchen-Vluyn in Germany since 1984. It presents ecumenical content openly and promotes the dialogue between Catholic and Protestant pedagogy of religion. Karl E. Nipkow, a professor at the University of Tübingen, was a significant contributor to the development of the Protestant educational theory. At present, faculties and chairs of pedagogy of religion operate in many theological and pedagogical universities and colleges in European German-speaking countries. Currently the most important representatives of Evangelical religious education include: G. Adam, Peter Biehl, H.-J. Fraas, J. Lahnemann, Michael Meyer-Blanck, G. Schmidt, Heinz Schmidt, and Friedrich Schweitzer, whilst the Catholic pedagogy of religion is represented by G. Bitter, Anton A. Bucher, Rudolf Englert, Norbert Mette, Hans-Georg Ziebertz, and H. A. Zwergel³⁴.

The situation looks similar in the English-speaking tradition, where pedagogy of religion developed most intensively in the 1980s, mainly owing to John M. Hull from the Department of Education at the University of Birmingham. In Great Britain, the most active academic communities are directly related to periodicals on religious education, such as “The British Journal of Religious Education”, “Retoday” and “Journal of Beliefs & Values: Studies in Religion and Education”, as well as societies and organisations focusing on religious education, like The Professional Council for Religious Education or Christian Education. Several research

Pedagogika religii [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Religia, Encyklopedia PWN* [Religion, Encyclopedia of PWN], p. 53; J. Bagrowicz, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Encyklopedia pedagogiczna XXI wieku...* [Pedagogic Encyclopedia of the 21st Century...], pp. 242–248.

³⁴ B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Pedagogika, subdyscypliny i dziedziny wiedzy o edukacji...* [Pedagogy, Subfields and Areas of Knowledge about Education...], pp. 47–68; *idem*, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Religia, Encyklopedia PWN* [Religion, Encyclopedia of PWN], p. 53; J. Bagrowicz, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Encyklopedia pedagogiczna XXI wieku...* [Pedagogic Encyclopaedia of the 21st Century...], pp. 244–248.

institutes have been established as well, including The Culham College Institute, Welsh National Centre for Religious Education run by L. J. Francis, and the Warwick Religions and Education Research Unit headed by R. Jackson. The latter conducts international research on religious education with reference to politics and culture³⁵.

Polish pedagogy of religion received a strong intellectual impulse in the early 1990s. In 1990, Władysław Kubik established a chair of pedagogy of religion at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus in Krakow (today's Jesuit University "Ignatianum"). Since that moment, the term *pedagogy of religion* has been present in the dictionary of social and theological disciplines. Then, also in Krakow, the journals "Rocznik sekcji Pedagogiki Religijnej" ["Yearbook of Religious Pedagogy Section" and "Horyzonty Wychowania" ["Horizons of Education"] were established, and the publishing series "Library of Religious Pedagogy" was initiated. This research centre induced the creation of common ground for discussion on the scope of cooperation between theology and pedagogy at the academic level. The second key factor in the development of the Polish pedagogy of religion was the establishment of the Christian Education Department headed by Jerzy Bagrowicz at the Institute of Pedagogy of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun. The next step was the founding of the periodical "Pedagogia Christiana" in 1997, edited by Bagrowicz, which included interdisciplinary works combining the scope of theology and pedagogy. The journal also noticeably attempted to overcome confessionary limitations. The third impulse was establishing a chair of pedagogy of religion headed by Bogusław Milerski at the Christian Theological Academy in Warsaw. This initiative was all the more significant as it involved researchers of religious education from outside the Catholic community, which promoted balance in intellectual works concerning the whole of Christianity. The following years brought further developments: in 2001 Jerzy Bagrowicz established the Department of Catechetics and Pedagogy of Religion at the Faculty of Theology of Nicolaus Copernicus University, and a year later Cyprian Rogowski founded a parallel chair at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn. At the same time the Department of Christian Pedagogy and Dialogue, led by Romuald Niparko, was established at the University of Adam Mickiewicz in Poznań. The culmination and confirmation of the international range of Polish pedagogy of religion was the founding of the journal "Keryks" that publishes current research output in Polish and German language versions. It was possible thanks to Cyprian Rogowski and collaboration with the Catholic University of Lublin and the University of Vienna³⁶.

³⁵ B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Religia, Encyklopedia PWN* [Religion, Encyclopaedia of PWN], pp. 53–54; *idem*, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Pedagogika, subdyscypliny i dziedziny wiedzy o edukacji...* [Pedagogy, Subfields and Areas of Knowledge about Education...], pp. 55–68.

³⁶ C. Rogowski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], *Leksykon pedagogiki religii...* [Lexicon of Pedagogy of Religion...], pp. 561–565.

Pedagogy of religion in the last decade has received institutional and organisational foundations which enable development in a very broad spectrum of subjects. Researchers during this time made attempts "...to embrace the achievements of European pedagogy of religion, especially from German-speaking areas; they developed theoretical foundations of religious education in various teaching environments (parishes, schools, peer groups, etc.), addressed the subjects of religious education in a pluralistic society, pedagogical status of teaching religion at school and the educational dimension of schooling"³⁷. Close cooperation between Polish and German educators has also been established, and it resulted in the annual Polish-German Congresses of Religious Education, held since 2009, as well as in creating the international journal "Keryks"³⁸.

In the entire discourse of pedagogy of religion at the turn of the 20th and 21st-century, understood as a critical field for contemporary social and cultural changes, a strong tendency to seek up-to-date content and tools has become more and more prominent. The works representing this trend are present especially in contemporary discussions on the shape of theories, concepts, trends or models of today's religious education. This assortment of notions, however, amounts to two key questions, namely: what educational theories should contemporary religious education be based on, and what tools or methods should be used to convey its content. Both matters are inextricably intertwined, because usually a particular theory entails the use of a specific method or epistemic tool. The chosen theory also determines the thematic area. It affects the proportion between the particular disciplines of knowledge, specifically between theology and pedagogy.

Critical studies in the pedagogy of religion

In the second half of the 20th century, the pedagogy of religion developed rapidly, also due to entering research co-operations with other disciplines. Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the USA, Scandinavian countries and Poland are all exemplary countries where the reflection of religious education basing on Protestantism, Catholicism or Anglicanism has become extremely important for understanding the contemporary socio-cultural changes. At the same time, the development of pedagogy of religion has been connected with a practical analysis of the role and place of religion in everyday life: originally in the individual dimension, then in the community, and consequently also in the society. The links between teaching religion in schools and general education in a pluralis-

³⁷ B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Religia, Encyklopedia PWN...* [Religion, Encyclopaedia of PWN...], p. 54.

³⁸ C. Rogowski, *Czasopisma pedagogiczno-religijne niemieckojęzyczne* [Magazines on Pedagogy of Religion in the German Language], [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii...* [Lexicon of Pedagogy of Religion], pp. 89–90.

tic society, have in time become both the main category of description and the topic of works in the field of religious pedagogy. The emergence of works within the social sciences, which embraced the notion of religion objectively, created a new space in which broadly understood religious education had to be redefined. What required further specification was the relationship between religious education and such categories as: *human development in the process of upbringing and teaching, family, social change, social pluralism, communication and media*, as well as many other contemporary social phenomena³⁹. Thanks to the findings of the contemporary social sciences, especially general psychology and the psychology of human development, pedagogy of religion has been faced with a significant challenge in the overall process of education and childrearing. The key questions of the following text are: what exactly is the overall education/childrearing process, how should it be understood in this context, and what would be the challenge for pedagogy of religion?

The process of education and childrearing is defined as a set of activities aimed at shaping a human in the physical, intellectual, moral, spiritual or religious aspect⁴⁰. What is meant by “the human being” in this case is an indivisible and integral psycho-physical structure, seeking development in every sphere of their life. This is a significant provision for the entire educational process, because ideas for education and development of the human personality in limited areas only are always conditioned by a concrete ideological or political content. The history of the 20th century witnessed many of such educational models: fascism – raising a human in national socialism (for the nation), Nazism – raising a human within a race (for the chosen “race”), and communism – raising a human in a secular community (for the common good). These are just some examples of overt educational ideologies that deliberately reduced anthropology to ideologically self-serving moulds. Interestingly, the above mentioned 20th-century examples prove that the category of religion was not always reduced or excluded (like in Stalinism, communism, etc.), but sometimes it was used systemically to justify ideological content and practical goals (Nazism, fascism, etc.). In this case, the comprehensive and integrating structure of education seems to be an alternative to overtly ideological childrearing theories, both in the individual space of

³⁹ The explanation of the critical research area was made here basing on the most current discussions on the Polish pedagogy of religion. See: B. Śliwerski, *Pedagogika* [Pedagogy], [in:] *Encyklopedia Pedagogiczna XXI wieku...* [Pedagogical Encyclopaedia of the 21st century...], pp. 100–102; J. Bagrowicz, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], *ibid.*, pp. 242–249; *idem*, *Pedagogika chrześcijańska* [Christian Pedagogy], *ibid.*, pp. 212–225; Z. Marek, *Religia w szkole* [Religion at School], *ibid.*, pp. 222–223; A. Rynio, *Wychowanie religijne* [Religious Education], *ibid.*, pp. 456–457; J. Niewęglowski, *Wychowanie chrześcijańskie* [Christian Education], *ibid.*, pp. 313–335; J. Mastalski, *Wychowanie w kulturze chrześcijańskiej* [Education in Christian Culture], *ibid.*, pp. 482–487. It should be noted, however, that these matters certainly do not cover the entire area of critical studies, but rather serve as an example of the most current discussions on the subject.

⁴⁰ J. Bagrowicz *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Encyklopedia pedagogiczna XXI wieku...* [Pedagogical Encyclopaedia of the 21st Century...], pp. 243–244.

freedom and development of every human being, and in the dimension of local communities and entire societies⁴¹.

Secondly, it is assumed here that the human psychological structure needs formation and an introduction into the socio-cultural space to undertake interactions, which then enable further personal and social development of the individual. This space is always conditioned by the particular rules, norms or principles of a given society. Rules and norms explicitly or implicitly representing values from a given ethics are also the basic teaching content of religious education. We refer here to contemporary open education addressing the concepts of axiology, namely: tolerance, respect for others, responsibility, dialogue skills and consciousness of participation and creation of culture, etc.

Thirdly, in every human there is a personal space expressing itself in the pursuit of freedom and the need for self-determination. This sphere also requires realising, eliciting and demonstrating how to existentially implement it. Developing it strengthens rational, predictable and coherent behaviours. It supports making choices about our worldview and it encourages attitudes that are morally and socially acceptable. Also in this context religion and the associated education not only introduces and justifies the above-mentioned concepts and values, but above all develops a coherent internal anthropology. It seems to respond to the current needs of individuals in a society, in particular to the essential personal needs to comprehend the most existentially important questions, such as the meaning of life, purpose for values and relationship with broadly understood transcendence⁴².

It seems, therefore, that the process of shaping and developing a human personality may substantially benefit from religious education as it enriches and broadens self-understanding, understanding others and the world. It should be clearly stated, however, that this is only possible within the *critical pedagogy of religion*, which implicitly embraces the assumption that the goal of every education is to enable a human being to achieve the autonomy and freedom that leads to internal maturity. This supposition applies to all education, including religious education, which aims at instilling in a human a personality with a *mature religious structure*. This concept derives from the psychology of religion and it denotes a personality which, on the one hand, is characterized by a fixed content and normative structure, and on the other is open and processual, recognizing as a priority its own freedom and independence in relation to all cultural and social structures, including structures within a given religion. This assumption is significant in a way that the identity of an individual and compatibility between religious and psychological dimensions can only be accomplished within a mature human psyche, which

⁴¹ However, it has to be recognized that religious education in its essence is also directly connected with the wide range of ideological conditions, which may result from religion itself. See *Pedagogika* [Pedagogy], B. Milerski, B. Śliwerski (eds.), pp. 241–242.

⁴² J. Bagrowicz *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Encyklopedia pedagogiczna XXI wieku...* [Pedagogical Encyclopaedia of the 21st Century...], pp. 244–247.

very often opposes traditional, conservative or fundamentalist forms of religious life. Transposing religious content into everyday life and vice versa, which results in the development of an autonomous human personality, is only possible when an individual is open and ready to change, has a strong identity and self-esteem and is capable of intrapersonal and social dialogue⁴³.

The state of mature religiosity facilitates forming a flexible psychological structure, which enables continuous development on the intellectual, psychological, axiological or spiritual level. In this case, the considerable explanation, consolidation and classification of moral values that religious content provides, can lead to the clarification and internalisation of norms and values in an individual's life. This allows not only contestation or dissonance with norms that the individual finds inconsistent with their convictions resulting from social relations, but it also enables creating one's own system of values that reinforces the sense of identity and boosts self-esteem. Furthermore, religious education advocates the sacralisation of values and seeks an inner sense in the transience of life and inevitability of death. Such interpretations can contribute to strengthening the sense of a person's security and emotional stability. Moreover, the introduction of a transcendent frame of reference, a higher sense or the meta-law present in religion in the concept of God, may result in building consent and an openness to one's own fate and to critical situations in the face of suffering, death or illness⁴⁴.

Another important issue for critical research in pedagogy of religion is the relationship between the content of religious education and a human's life at the family level⁴⁵. Assessment of the contemporary condition of the family usually results from ideological assumptions, most often associated with a given religious or ideological system. Regardless of the critical interpretations, there is a certain overlap in the content addressed by both the family and religion. Both these categories correlate on two levels: individual and religious. The individual scope defines the family as a primal element analysed independently of social structure. It covers all manifestations of religious life in practice, which affects the inner existence of the family, independently of the Church or religious community. The second level is the social dimension, where the family is not only set, but also it is a source of influence and it is conditioned by the religious life. The first dimen-

⁴³ There is a direct correlation between immature religiosity and ideological forms of social participation, where the higher the degree of immature religiosity, the higher the probability of using religion as a socio-political ideology. This process can lead to explicitly ideological education. See Z. Chlewiński, *Religijność dojrzała i niedojrzała* [Mature and Immature Religiosity], pp. 111–115, *Pedagogika* [Pedagogy], B. Milerski, B. Śliwerski (eds.), pp. 241–242.

⁴⁴ A part of the critical debate, expressed in the analyzes pointing to the adverse psychological consequences of the influence of religion on the human psyche is deliberately omitted here, due to the above introduction of the category of a religiously mature psyche. See J. Bagrowicz, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Encyklopedia pedagogiczna XXI...* [Pedagogical Encyclopaedia of the 21st Century...], pp. 243–249; Z. Chlewiński, *Religijność dojrzała i niedojrzała* [Mature and Immature Religiosity], pp. 105–114.

⁴⁵ The discussion around the definition of family is intentionally omitted, as this issue requires a separate detailed analysis, which is not the subject here.

sion shows the correlation between family religious practices and family development, and the second – between community religious practices and their social consequences⁴⁶.

Again, the religiosity referred to here is, by definition, mature religiosity, which seems to affect understanding and the existence of a family regardless of the role assumed in the structure of participation. Moreover, the processes mentioned here directly affects family members, not only when they derive from conscious intentions, plans or actions, but also when they are unconscious but consistent with a given system of activities and goals. Specifically, these would be the transpositions of the contents of social hierarchy, the natural order, the right of priority, roles within the community, individual rights, etc., which overlap with the theological content, and prove to have an existential or even practical meaning in the life of a family. Typical examples include the following: shared family meals interpreted as an expression of integration and the recognizing of the importance of each of the family members; shared prayer representing an awareness of common goals and equality before the law, that is, before transcendence; the strengthening of the authority of parents within the hierarchy resulting from the theological content; but also the uniqueness and individuality of each family member regardless of the place occupied or the role played, reflecting the structure of a religious community or the Church. This analysis mainly refers to the individual and personal dimension, where the content of religious education affects the everyday course of life of the whole family, but also on the other hand, sets goals and tasks, and thus the norms of action. These norms, in turn, apply to all family members, though not in the same way, which consequently reveals another dimension of the collaboration between religion and the family, namely – the dimension of socialisation.

As mentioned above, examples of mutual influence between religion and the family may support the harmonious and integral development of both a family and an individual, the more so if the religiousness at the community level is based on mature criteria and norms. These criteria originate directly from the mature religious psyche which embraces autonomy and freedom within a given church or religion. This, in turn, translates into the autonomy of individuals in the family, and independence corresponding to age and the life situation, but granted to every member in the family⁴⁷.

There is a strong correlation between the theological content in the social teaching of most Christian churches and the needs of a family understood as an element of the social structure. This correlation is most evident in socialisation in its broad sense, whose main sense is inclusion: initially including an individual

⁴⁶ J. Bagrowicz, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Encyklopedia pedagogiczna XXI wieku...* [Pedagogic Encyclopedia of the 21st Century...], pp. 245–246.

⁴⁷ The issue of objectifying the family as a political category in the context of general and religious education is not the subject of a detailed analysis here, but it should be noted that this context is most often directly related to immature or not fully mature religiosity. See Z. Chlewiński, *Religijność dojrzała i niedojrzała...* [Mature and Immature Religiosity...], pp. 115–119.

in a family structure, and then the family in the social structure and in parallel including a family in the structure of the religious community. Family is not only the sum of the constituting individuals, but above all it is a partially independent unit, going beyond the quantitative understanding of the given group. This entity has its own structure of affinity, distinctive norms and moral values. The family is the subject of conditioning both from the side of society and religion, which means that it is treated as an end in itself – a supra-individual goal. It is shaped in terms of rights, obligations, privileges, and social and religious goals, which are aligned in order to support its internal development and partial independence from other social or religious entities. The family can also be used for manipulation, both in politics and in religion (by the Church). In this case, the family becomes a leverage in the broadly understood struggle for power, so its needs or internal goals are used as arguments. The family – implicitly and partly unconsciously – becomes an element of ideology, taught openly within the course of both general and religious education.

Another important element of critical study and analysis in both the religious and general education is the category of modern society, in particular its pluralism. Distinctive features of contemporary society include not only increased communication dynamics, high technology, fast information transfer, etc., but above all, an unprecedented openness and permeability of the cultural content of local societies that go to make up global society. It is a multifaceted and heterogeneous process on the scale of the whole world. However, in this dynamic structure of constant changes taking place in the society of the 21st century, a human, as never before, urgently needs a way, a tool or a language to comprehend the surrounding reality. Rapid social changes engender particular effects, such as alienation and estrangement. In this case possessing a tool for understanding change allows not only finding a fundamental overview of the world, but also determining one's own position. Due to this fact, the knowledge coming from both the general and religious education seems an opportunity but also a necessity to build the broadest perspective of understanding possible. This understanding, this broad perspective for perceiving what currently surrounds us, requires an epistemic method of viewing an event at various angles, from different worldviews and different morals. It is a difficult method, regarded as utopian at times, but it seems to stem not from theoretical assumptions, but from the vital needs of a human in the 21st century. This broad understanding of the world and oneself is to facilitate the construction of a worldview that is possibly free from stereotypes, myths or cultural, social or religious dogmas. The above epistemological outline shows the mutual permeability of the goals and tasks of the general and religious education in the context of pluralistic society⁴⁸. There is also a strong correlation between a pluralistic society and contemporary religions. This correlation consists in the

⁴⁸ J. Bagrowicz, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Encyklopedia pedagogiczna XXI wieku...* [Pedagogical Encyclopaedia of the 21st century...], p. 248.

hermeneutical dependence occurring in the culture of the 21st century between the global society and religions of the world. Basing on the internal context, pedagogy of religion reveals mutual relations between society and religion. The hermeneutics of connections has at least several aspects, but socialisation appears to be the most crucial one. When discussing socialisation, the pedagogy of religion, which is based on the social teaching of a given Church or religion, focuses its attention on trying to answer current questions and solving today's most pressing problems of a given religious group which is also a local community. Such an attitude may lead to more conscious understanding of rapid social changes, as it is constantly revised and reflected upon. In this case, religion directly affects human beings in their "here and now", i.e. the current situation, modifying the society locally and globally. There is, however, another side of the above influence, where pluralism and the ever-growing socio-cultural diversity are a challenge for religious education, but also a cause and driving force for internal changes in its structure. Religious education has the potential to influence the way how a human understands the modern world, due to expanding the sphere of conscious participation in it. But religions are also mobilized for internal development of their educational role. They are challenged to reformulate their language, and sometimes their theories and dogmas as well. Thus religions of the world exert an influence but also are influenced to develop by the surrounding world. Hence, contemporary religious education is one of the hermeneutic tools for understanding the world and a human being⁴⁹.

The dynamic structure of modern society makes room for the issue of new religious movements, where religious education, including the pedagogy of religion, can play quite a significant role providing reliable knowledge about new communities and denominations within specific religions, but also about isolated groups or ideological cults. In this matter, contemporary media and advanced communication technology play a double role. On the one hand, they are a source of very rich and easily available knowledge about world religions and new religious movements that would require long and tedious research several years earlier. On the other hand, however, these sources may be used to proliferate unproven and unreliable information, which may result in the spread of psychologically dangerous organisations and groups that meet the structural criteria of cognitive, emotional or psychological sects.

Alongside social, philosophical and psychological research, there have been instances of critical studies whose subject matter is the didactics and methodology of religious education. Following Bogusław Milerski, we can distinguish at least a few main methodological and subject matter problems in modern pedagogy of religion that constitute a critical academic discourse on religious education. The first one is the discussion on the current academic and methodological status of the pedagogy of religion, consisting in the search for theoretical foundations and

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

empirical justifications on the basis of the theory of science and research methodology. The second is the polemic about the contribution of the pedagogy of religion and the theory of general education. This contribution is discussed in the analysis of the correlation of both the theory and the tools of the above dimensions of education. The third area for discussion is the relationship between pedagogy of religion and cross-cultural education as a joint intellectual effort to respond to the contemporary needs of a pluralistic society⁵⁰.

Conclusion

Alongside the above-mentioned contemporary discussions on the critical pedagogy of religion, there are many more questions and issues that have not been addressed in this text. The essence of critical studies is noticing the instances of using religious content for obscure educational purposes, which usually go far beyond the standard scope of education. An instance of this could be the creating of a false opposition or a dichotomy between the course of general and religious education. These divisions usually result from political or ideological premises and are primarily based on the reduction of human cognitive capabilities, rejecting the tenet of the cumulative theory of knowledge. At this point, the integrating, holistic form of the general education, which inherently includes religion, seems to be to some extent a consequence of the critical studies in pedagogy of religion. Due to the mutual correlation of these dimensions of education, the general education may gain more width through the analysis of explicit and implicit areas of existence from the axiological sphere. In religious education, on the other hand, it may result in a methodological opening and accessing fundamental socio-cultural analyses. It should be remembered, however, that the priority in the critical paradigm of religious studies is not the possibility of their application or adaptation to current needs, but above all – the creation of a conscious and self-critical theory and pedagogical practice in the religious life of an individual.

Summary

Critical pedagogy of religion – an outline

The purpose of this article is to present the genesis and the development of religious education in the critical paradigm aspect. The main thesis introduces 20th century pedagogical and religious inquiries by means of analysis primarily involved in the phase of ideological and critical interpretation. A few major traditions connected with religious education are discussed, including the American, Anglo-Saxon and German research es-

⁵⁰ B. Milerski, *Pedagogika religii* [Pedagogy of Religion], [in:] *Pedagogika, subdyscypliny i dziedziny wiedzy o edukacji...* [Pedagogy, Subfields and Areas of Knowledge about Education...], pp. 60–67.

established at the beginning of the 20th century and most intensively developed over the interwar period, due to the demands of liberal theology and emancipation trends. The German analysis appears to be crucial, with its demands of critical reviews of religious upbringing in the Protestant Church in Germany, where they were initiated mainly by educators and school teachers. Religious education based on the critical paradigm was not focused on shaping theology, monotheism or even evangelicality then, but above all humanity in the excellent form of its Divine origin. The text not only presents the aspect of critical religious education, but at the same time discusses selected aspects of social, psychological or philosophical research. Therefore, the issues of upbringing and religious education receive a wider range of possible criteria and tools enabling its understanding. The research mostly concerns contemporary matters present in Polish religious education and a crucial role is played by the works of C. Rogowski, B. Milerski and J. Bagrowicz.

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Denaturalisation of Instrumental Rationality in Management Education in Poland

Introduction

From the perspective of the cultural responsibility of the role of the manager, the quality of education which prepares one to take it up is not insignificant. Management education¹ fulfilling the function of preparation for participation in culture, including participation in organisational reality, must facilitate the continuous development of a critical reflexivity by the persons who are involved in it. The quality of communication between the persons entangled in the educational process, the involved values and the content used in the process of education are of key importance for the quality of cultural competences and the level of symbolic capital deciding about the ethical dimension of organisational actions. This is because the role of the manager is related to the ability to recognise the normative nature and the structural complexity of both the reality and the pursued objectives in consideration not only of the economic effectiveness of the organisation, but above all of the existential condition of the subjects involved in an action².

Unfortunately, management education in Poland is today dominated by the technical imperative locating its main normative assumptions in the area of instrumental rationality. The educational content is over-economised, which locates it in the profile of the paradigm of functionalism and positivism. Communication between teachers and students, as well as contact with symbolic culture are apparent and boil down to the mere memorisation of information. Instead of learning about the humanistic aspects of management of an organisation, including people, which requires developed cultural competences and a humanistic imagination, allowing one to notice the complexity of organisational life and care for other people, students are only taught to calculate profits and losses, and to treat other people in the organisation as a resource necessary to achieve their economic goal. The cultural illiteracy

¹ I understand the notion of management education in Poland as studies in economics, studies in management (at private and public universities), as well as postgraduate studies, including the MBA.

² L. Witkowski, *Jak pokonać 'homo oeconomicus'?* (problem specyfiki zarządzania humanistycznego) [How to Beat 'Homo Oeconomicus'? (Problem of the Specificity of Humanistic Management)], [in:] *Humanistyka i zarządzanie. W poszukiwaniu problemów badawczych i inspiracji metodologicznych* [The Humanities and Management. In Search of Research Problems and Methodological Inspirations], Piotr Górski (ed.), Wydawnictwo UJ, Kraków 2009.

increasingly mushrooming among Polish managers largely results from the fact that the management education they receive is apparent and masked with the alleged prestige of a diploma, the position of the educating institution in the ranking, and high tuition fees (which is especially noticeable in the case of MBA³ studies).

Critical management education is an interesting, albeit not yet recognised in Poland, research tool allowing one to diagnose the pathologies of management education and propose relevant changes; it draws its basic assumptions from radical pedagogy and is simultaneously the most important emancipatory field for a broader critical approach in management studies (critical management studies)⁴. This article elaborates on both these trends, discusses their founding assumptions, and, using the critical tools they offer, undertakes an attempt at a critical diagnosis of the current normative condition of the management education in Poland. My reflections aim primarily at the indication of the illusion of the naturalness of the location of normative assumptions of management education on instrumental rationality, the showing of cultural pathologies resulting from such a location, and the offering of an alternative in the form of an emancipatory rationality. They are based on my own theoretical studies, in which I make recourse to Lech Witkowski's ideas of the ethics of reading, symbolic authority and the triad of moral development, as well as the existing empirical studies concerning Polish managers and management education.

Critical management studies

Sources

Critical management studies (CMS)⁵ are a transdisciplinary platform of critical humanistic reflection on the theory and practice of management and organisation. The approach adopted an institutionalised form at the beginning of the 1990s and although its popularity in the Western management discourse has been growing, it is still a poorly recognized area in its Polish counterpart⁶. The intellectual sources of the critical approach in management and organisation studies are very broad and include in particular the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, post-

³ MBA: Master of Business Administration.

⁴ M. Zawadzki, *Nurt krytyczny w zarządzaniu: kultura, edukacja, teoria* [Critical Management Stream: Culture, Education, Theory], Sedno, Warszawa 2014.

⁵ H. Willmott, M. Alvesson, T. Bridgman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009.

⁶ See M. Zawadzki, *Nurt krytyczny w zarządzaniu: kultura, edukacja, teoria* [Critical Management Stream: Culture, Education, Theory], Sedno, Warszawa 2014; Ł. Sułkowski, M. Zawadzki (eds.), *Krytyczny nurt zarządzania* [Critical Management Stream], Difin, Warszawa 2014; Ł. Sułkowski, *Epistemologia i metodologia zarządzania* [Management Epistemology and Methodology], PWE, Warszawa 2012; M. Zawadzki, *Rola i miejsce nurtu krytycznego w naukach o zarządzaniu* [The Role and Place of the Critical Approach in Management Sciences], "Culture Management / Kulturmanagement / Zarządzanie Kulturą", Vol. 5; M. Zawadzki, *Teoria krytyczna w epistemologii nauk o zarządzaniu* [Critical Theory in the Epistemology of the Management Sciences], "Przedsiębiorczość i Zarządzanie" 2011, Vol. XII, No. 12, pp. 13–28.

modernism, poststructuralism, critical realism, radical pedagogy, cultural studies, and feminism. Despite the multitude of sources powering the critical approach, which evolved and pluralised as the approach developed (and which often overlap in terms of the scope of their proposed normative solutions), it is the critical theory of the Frankfurt School which remains its basic source constituting the foundation for research efforts⁷.

In the field of the critical management studies we may identify two main approaches related to the adaptation of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School to the exploration of the world of management and organisation⁸. The first one is related to the critique of ideology and refers to the early works of researchers originating from the school. This approach is mainly interested in the critique of the managerial ideology, which is based on Marxist theory and highlights the problem of the exploitation of employees by managers. Concepts based on this approach are primarily directed at the critique of the following processes: the naturalisation and universalisation of managerial interests, the primacy of instrumental reason, and the hegemony of power.

Although the critical approach draws inspirations from the early Frankfurt School, researchers turn attention to the shortcomings of its proposal in the context of reflection on organisation and management. Representatives of the school, such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, devoted for example little attention to problems concerning the work of the manager, and when they did focus on the topic, they typically treated managers as a homogenic group of agents of capitalism who oppress employees to maximise their own profits. This idea, which originates from Marxism, does not allow to see that managers themselves can be oppressed as well, or that a single organisation can have different levels of management together with different organisational roles⁹.

The second approach to critical studies on management and organisation is connected with the use of research inspirations resulting from Jürgen Habermas's reformulation of the paradigm of critical theory. Although elements related to the critique of ideology can also be found in this approach, the emphasis in the use of the critical theory in the field of management is shifted to the diagnosis of the discourse of management in the context of the cognitive triangle¹⁰, as well as the use of the concept of the ideal communication situation for diagnosing attempts at the re-

⁷ A. G. Scherer, *Critical Theory and Its Contribution to Critical Management Studies*, [in:] *The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies*, H. Willmott, M. Alvesson, T. Bridgman (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, pp. 29–51.

⁸ M. Alvesson, S. Deetz, *Critical Theory and Postmodernism: Approaches to Organization Studies*, [in:] *Critical Management Studies. A Reader*, C. Grey, H. Willmott (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, pp. 60–106.

⁹ J. Duberley, P. Johnson, *Understanding Management Research: An Introduction to Epistemology*, Sage Publications, London 2003, p. 123.

¹⁰ J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Beacon Press, Boston 1972; H. Willmott, *Organization Theory as a Critical Science? Forms of Analysis and 'New Organizational Form'*, [in:] *The Oxford Handbook of Organization Theory: Meta-theoretical Perspectives*, C. Knudsen, H. Tsoukas (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York 2005, pp. 88–112.

formation of institutions by ethically-oriented discourse¹¹. In the first case, research focuses on the epistemology of management and involves critical diagnosis of the paradigms present in the management sciences with a view to the showing of the consequences resulting from the adoption of specific normative assumptions. In the second case, the main area of interest lies in the studying of organisational communication in terms of the possibility to eliminate communication disruptions in the context of the constitution of the type of communication being the basis for rational, reflexive, and moral decision-making. Moreover, the critical analysis of communication in an organisation facilitates the diagnosis of the role of concrete management models in an improvement/deterioration of the quality of communication.

Normative assumptions

Being based on the assumption of the necessity to care for people as participants of the world of organisation, the critical approach is in particular directed at the diagnosis of the social and cultural conditions of the relationship of domination or oppression in an organisation, which are often effects of management processes. These conditions are analysed as elements of such cultural pathologies in organisations as the managerial ideology, instrumental approach to others, and the hegemony of economism. In connection with its critical and humanistic orientation, the central issues for the critical approach include the notion of rationality and progress, technocracy and social engineering, autonomy and control, communicative action, power and ideology, the value of resistance, as well as the epistemological issues which are of fundamental importance for the construction of knowledge related to the discipline of management. When performing research into these issues, researchers are guided by an intention to humanise the discourse of management and to contribute to the improvement of the conditions of work by way of the democratisation of social relations, which would be connected with the necessity to constitute a reflexive and emancipatory dimension of human existence in an organisation.

Critical management studies are based on specific assumptions, which make it possible to differentiate between the criticality of research conducted from the perspective of this approach and of studies carried out in the management sciences. The approach of CMS does not claim the right to the indication of the only true meaning of critique (which would be consistent with positivist thinking constituting the main object of the critique of CMS¹²) – but only argues in favour of its un-

¹¹ J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action – Reason and the Rationalization of Society* (Vol. I), Beacon Press, Boston, MA 1984; J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action – Lifeworld and Systems: a Critique of Functionalist Reason* (Vol. II), Beacon Press, Boston, MA 1987; J. Forester, *On Fieldwork in a Habermasian Way: Critical Ethnography and the Extra-ordinary Character of Ordinary Professional Work*, [in:] *Studying Management Critically*, H. Willmott, M. Alvesson (eds.), Sage Publications, London 2003, pp. 46–65.

¹² I wish to kindly thank dr Piotr Zamojski for turning my attention to the problem during informal conversations we had during the Gdansk-based conference “Critical Pedagogy Today. Questions on Theory and Practice” (Institute of Pedagogy, University of Gdansk, 28–29 May 2012).

derstanding originating primarily from the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, which is markedly different to the popular understanding of the notion in research, taking an opposite position and indicating its shortcomings.

As pointed out by Alessia Contu¹³, in the contemporary civilisation of speed, innovation, and hyper-reflexivity (although we are talking about the reflexivity reduced to the dimension of the familiarisation with the information noise, which has nothing to do with the knowledge which needs to be digested and subjected to critical insight), no one (and in particular a researcher) is going to declare themselves as an uncritical conformist or dogmatist. However, from the perspective of the critical theory, considering oneself critical only as a result of the role one plays (researcher) or the amount of familiarized information one has is tantamount to irresponsible usurpation. This is because criticality necessitates the adoption of specific strategies in relation to reality as a part of the process of its exploration and change. The adaptation of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School to the area of management makes it possible to point out some of these strategies. They include: denaturalisation, anti-performativeness and reflexivity, as well as the idea of the engagement of research into the process of aiming at social change through emancipatory processes¹⁴.

Denaturalisation – the basic research strategy in the critical approach, from which the other ones result – is directed at the questioning of the elements related to management and organisation, which are universally considered natural and obvious, and having no alternatives. Therefore, researchers undertake the effort of demonstrating that every reflection and action are determined by vested contexts or interests; in other words, they indicate their inevitably political and normative value. This goes hand in hand with the adoption of an anti-performative position and a denial that social relations within an organisation should be considered as solely instrumental ones, i.e. that they should be analysed in terms of the maximisation of results by means of specific measures. For example, the acknowledgment that the quality of management processes or the work of a manager depend solely on the ability to increase the economic effectiveness of an organisation leads to the de-politicisation of reflection on the processes of management and organisation. This is because in this way deeper ethical and political issues such as the distribution of life chances in an organisation or the degree of democratisation of inter-organisational relations are omitted.

The knowledge concerning management must therefore be liberated from the domination of instrumental rationality – practical usefulness based on efficiency rules cannot be the sole criterion of the value of knowledge. The return of the ethical dimension of knowledge in the management sciences can be facilitated by the postulate of reflexivity, which refers to the ability to see all the issues concerning organisation

¹³ A. Contu, *Critical Management Education*, [in:] *The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies*, H. Willmott, M. Alvesson, T. Bridgman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, p. 538.

¹⁴ C. Grey, V. Fournier, *At the Critical Moment: Conditions and Prospects for Critical Management Studies*, "Human Relations" 2000, No. 53 (1), pp. 7–32.

and management as ones mediated by the vested tradition of their authors, including their decisions having the roots in philosophical assumptions. What is thus negated is the view on knowledge and truth as an objective and authoritative result of a positivistic rationality for the benefit of constructivism and epistemological pluralism.

Therefore, the critical approach indicates the inevitability of the adoption of specific values at every stage of the research process in the management sciences, simultaneously underlining that the separation of values from facts aimed at the fulfilment of the conditions of the objectivism of the research process is a positivist, unachievable illusion. The researcher is not a neutral observer, but inevitably involves themselves in the research process with his/her own personal values, which affect both the process and research results.

Denaturalisation, anti-performativeness and reflexivity are related to a commitment to *praxis*. It is one of the most important conditions for the execution of the emancipatory purpose constituting the leitmotif for the intellectual production of the critical approach. Emancipation is understood here as becoming aware or making others (employees, managers, scientists, students) aware of the fact that it is not necessary to adopt dehumanizing assumptions in thinking and acting and/or that it is not necessary to live in conditions which offend against human subjectivity and dignity, with the simultaneous intention of a change allowing a deeper care for humanity and subjectivity¹⁵. Attempts at changing the reality (also the organisational one) are some of the basic features differing critical management studies from other critical concepts and theories. Therefore, the critical approach aims not only at a different, critical view of the world of management, but, above all, at the introduction of changes to the theory and practice of management and organisation – also through changes in the area of education, including management education¹⁶.

Fields of intervention

The constructivist position of critical management studies makes it possible to design research and its methodology in the direction of the execution of the postulates of empowerment and emancipation. These postulates are executed in relation to three main areas and target groups: the area of the research discourse of management and scholars (researchers), the area of organisational discourse and employees of an organisation (including managers), the area of the discourse of management education and students together with teachers.

¹⁵ H. Willmott, M. Alvesson, T. Bridgman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009.

¹⁶ M. Zawadzki, *Autorytet symboliczny jako wyzwanie dla edukacji menedżerskiej i nauk o zarządzaniu* [Symbolic Authority as a Challenge to Management Education and Management Sciences], [in:] *Pedagogika i zarządzanie edukacją i rozwojem. W perspektywie troski o uniwersytet i kulturę humanistyczną* [Pedagogy and Management with Education and Development. In the Perspective of Care for University and Humanistic Culture], Lech Witkowski, Monika Jaworska-Witkowska (eds.), series: *Przebudzenia Humanistyczne. Kolokwia* [Humanistic Awakenings, Colloquia], vol. I, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2010, pp. 222–248.

The orientation of the critical approach towards research discourse is directed primarily towards the diagnosis of the epistemological area of the management sciences, where the subject of critical research is the assumptions adopted in research processes and being a part of the knowledge concerning management and organisation¹⁷. Using the constructivist perspective, researchers situating their research in the critical approach underline that the very construction of knowledge from the discipline of management sciences affects the discourse of management, shaping not only the assumptions constituting the basis for research, but also the awareness of the environment of management and consultants, as well as – ultimately – the manner in which the organisation functions¹⁸.

Research undertaken as a part of critical management studies can also be conducted directly in an organisation. In such cases, the research most often takes the form of critical ethnography directed at the processes of the denaturalisation of the existing order and the critique of the dominating ideology. The processes are directly related to the emancipatory goal of critical research: the studies not only aim at the construction of useful knowledge on the basis of a diagnosis of the research problem and an analysis of the reality, but also at influencing the attitudes and awareness of the subjects participating in the research process¹⁹.

The area of education – in comparison with the two other areas – is the most effective and influential field for the implementation of changes in view of the possibility of the long-term introduction of emancipatory impulses based on the growth of cultural capital determining the reality and depth of the impact. In this case, the care for the reflexive and emancipatory dimension of being within an organisation combines deepened reflexion on the area of management education, which plays the key role in equipping the subjects with the cultural competences deciding about the ability to speak up for (one's own or other subjects') emancipatory dimension of being in an organisation. Research into this dimension is powered by critical management education, which draws its basic philosophical assumptions from radical pedagogy²⁰. Of key importance in this context are the ideas of emancipation and empowerment, which point to the fact that the achievement of the emancipatory dimension of participation in the public sphere – including the organisational one – depends on the quality of the execution of the cultural mission to do with the implementation of individuals to participation in culture by education.

¹⁷ M. Alvesson, S. Deetz, *Doing Critical Management Research*, Sage Publications, London 2000.

¹⁸ N. Harding, *The Social Construction of Management. Texts and Identities*, Routledge, London and New York 2003.

¹⁹ J. Duberley, P. Johnson, *Critical Management Methodology*, [in:] *The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies*, H. Willmott, M. Alvesson, T. Bridgman (eds.), Oxford 2009, Oxford University Press, pp. 345–368.

²⁰ A. Contu, *Critical Management Education*, [in:] *The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies*, H. Willmott, M. Alvesson, T. Bridgman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, pp. 536–550; C. Grey, *Reinventing Business Schools: The Contribution of Critical Management Education*, "Academy of Management Learning and Education" 2004, vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 178–186.

Cultural pathologies in management education in Poland

Education and management in the perspective of instrumental rationality

Using Jürgen Habermas's types of rationalities²¹, as well as Henry Giroux's concept of types of rationalities²² based on the former, it should be pointed out that the main problem of management education in Poland lies in the placement of its normative assumptions on the technical imperative with the domination of instrumental rationality determining educational processes. I understand rationality, following Giroux, as a set of cognitive interests, philosophical assumptions and social practices which mediate the particular understanding of social phenomena²³.

The domination of instrumental (or, as Giroux prefers: technical or technocratic) rationality results primarily in the ritualisation of the apparentness of the apoliticalness of education and the knowledge transmitted as a part of it. The model of education based on the dominance of this type of rationality is marked by the absence of reflexivity concerning the normative assumptions adopted as a part of it, as well as (thus) the non-reflexive belief on the indisputable rightness of these assumptions and their universal validity. Socialisation in this model of education boils down to the preparation of its recipients to the objectification of the appropriate measures, which will make it possible to execute the undisputable goals. This takes place via the discovery of 'facts' providing what things really are – everything which remains outside the sphere of 'facts' is considered to be a worthless speculation. The question concerning the validity of facts related to a given social order is in this case removed from discussion²⁴.

The generation of knowledge is therefore directed at the increased effectiveness and efficiency of resources in the context of the pursuit of the predetermined objectives – however, the questions concerning the validity of the adopted goals and the rightness of such an analytical practice fail to appear. Reality is understood as a set of independent, external, objective and constant elements or processes which can be discovered and manipulated by the human being who strives to extend his/her control over the world. These elements are understood as manipulated and interdependent variables, while the value of a given theory depends on its usefulness in the context of the control of the environment and the production of foreseeable effects. In this orientation, the teacher is only a passive transmitter of knowledge rather than a negotiator of senses concerning reality.

Management education in Poland is mainly directed at the preparation of in-

²¹ J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Beacon Press, Boston 1972.

²² H. A. Giroux, *Teoria krytyczna i racjonalność w edukacji obywatelskiej* [Critical Theory and Rationality in Citizenship Education], transl. P. Kwieciński, A. Nalaskowski, [in:] H. A. Giroux, L. Witkowski, *Edukacja i sfera publiczna. Idee i doświadczenia pedagogiki radykalnej* [Education and the Public Sphere. Ideas and Experiences of Radical Pedagogy], Impuls, Kraków 2010, pp. 149–184.

²³ H. A. Giroux, *Teoria krytyczna...* [Critical Theory...], p. 153.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

dividuals for being able to calculate their own as well as the organisational interests and for acting in line with the established procedures in the context of the accomplishment of the imposed goals. The basic problem lies in the dominating presence of technicalised educational content based on the positivist paradigm, which accentuates the techniques of economic effectiveness at the price of the development of the humanistic imagination resulting from contact with humanistic content, not mentioning the lack of openness of subjects to the real digestion of the content²⁵. Thus, the education does not create the conditions for the acquisition of cultural competences and the broadening of symbolic capital, which are necessary for activity in the complex reality and for management, which constitutes a socio-cultural process of giving sense to reality²⁶.

It is assumed that the management practice requires only instrumental abilities, which are to allow rational action directed at the uncritical implementation of the appropriate measures leading, pursuant to the relation of cause and effect, to the achievement of the economic goal adopted as one having no alternative. In other words, in the area of the basic assumptions founding today's management education in Poland the *homo oeconomicus*²⁷ model is adopted as the ideal construct for the design of the role of the manager: independently of the complexity of the normative dilemma, the manager is to aim at the maximisation of subjectively expected results of his/her actions; the actions are reduced solely to the search for the measures necessary for the achievement of economic effectiveness. One of the results of such a state of affairs is the absence of the problematising dimension of education, which is usually reduced to the culturally-barren strategy of socialisation to ready-made prescriptions or solutions, which are considered to be indisputable facts allowing manipulation with the reality. This goes hand in hand with the absence of critical reflexivity and discussion on the discussed content or the reduction of such reflection solely to the instrumental issue of the potential of a given theoretical solution in the context of the pursuit of the economic goal in an organisation.

It should be noted that the very nature of the content provided as a part of management education in Poland reproduces an inability of autonomous thinking that is, however, justified by the apparent authority of the content. Of key importance in this context is the statement Lech Witkowski made following Hans Georg Gadamer, that "interpretation of a text sometimes plays a normative function [...], imposing its approach as the valid one"²⁸. The very construction of the content used in the didac-

²⁵ Which is visible in the field of management education both in Poland, and in the West; see J. Hendry, *Management Education and the Humanities: The Challenge of Post-Bureaucracy*, [in:] *Management Education and Humanities*, B. Czarniawska, P. Gagliardi (eds.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham-Northampton 2006, pp. 21–44.

²⁶ S. Magala, *The Management of Meaning in Organizations*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2009.

²⁷ See L. Witkowski, *Jak pokonać 'homo oeconomicus'?...* [How to Beat 'Homo Oeconomicus'?...], pp. 115–142.

²⁸ L. Witkowski, *Wyzwania autorytetu w praktyce społecznej i kulturze symbolicznej (przechadzki krytyczne w poszukiwaniu dyskursu dla teorii)* [Challenges to Authority in Social Practice and Symbolic Culture (Critical Walks in Search of Discourse for Theory)], Impuls, Kraków 2009, p. 190.

tic process – content which is filled with positivist schemes persuasively communicating about its alleged objectivism and universal validity, generates an illusion of its authoritarianism and in consequence activates the mechanism of releasing one from the obligation of critical reflexivity concerning the things such content proposes.

What is symptomatic in this context is the construction of Polish management textbooks used in management education. As Sławomir Banaszak put it, “[...] they present either solely the positive side of management, as a part of which even difficulties can be overcome owing to the application of the appropriate algorithm of action, or they try to show the social, economic, and organisational reality as something simple, with the possible complexities and adversities related to the fact that it is not understood by the participants of the organisational life”²⁹. This goes hand in hand with the over-economised point of view (where the positivism, functionalism or school of classical economics is considered a cure for all organisational problems), which is additionally presented as the only valid one.

The above problem is accompanied by the failure to initiate a real discussion problematizing the generated content, which ultimately reduces the educational dimension of education to the cumulative collection of non-problematic information, which in this case, as Erich Fromm writes, takes an alienated form, since it is considered true only because it comes from a recognized authority³⁰. Alienated knowledge is an effect of “scholastic reading”³¹, where the real dialogue with the symbolic authority is replaced with its uncritical glorification.

The mechanism releasing one from reflexivity under the influence of the comfortable subordination to an authority is strengthened by the presence of non-scientific books written by persons considered to be management gurus in the management education curricula³². As John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge see it, management gurus manipulate managers’ minds, teaching them what they should think about everything³³. Categorical statements which are to suggest “what it really is like” and what one should do to be successful in an organisation are a constitutive element of both the management gurus themselves³⁴ and the seminars they conduct, which due to their high price and content not requiring a deeper thinking effort become appealing and attract people who are willing to copy unreflectively.

²⁹ S. Banaszak, *Edukacja menedżerska w społeczeństwie współczesnym. Studium teoretyczno-empiryczne* [Management Education in Today’s Society. A Theoretical and Empirical Study], Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań 2011, pp. 171–172.

³⁰ E. Fromm, *Wolność, determinizm, alternatywizm* [Freedom, Determinism, Alternativism], transl. A. Żuk, “Colloquia Communia” 1990, No. 1–6 (48–53), p. 105. Quoted after L. Witkowski, *Wyzwania autorytetu...* [Challenges to Authority...], p. 131.

³¹ L. Witkowski, *Wyzwania autorytetu...* [Challenges to Authority...], p. 168.

³² A. Zawadzki, *Smuggling Panaceas by Management Gurus: A Critical Approach* [in:] *Handbook of Research on Management Ideas and Panaceas: Adaptation and Context*, A. Örtenblad (ed.), Cheltenham 2015, Edward Elgar, pp. 313–326.

³³ A. Wooldridge, J. Micklethwait, *The Witch Doctors: Making Sense of the Management Gurus*, Times Books, 1996.

³⁴ See e.g. T. Peters, R. Waterman, *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America’s Best-Run Companies*, Harper & Row, New York 1982.

Management education in the perspective of the moral development triad developed by Habermas and Kohlberg

It is worthwhile to analyse the consequences of the domination of instrumental rationality in management education in Poland in the context of the implications resulting from the reconstruction of Jürgen Habermas and Lawrence Kohlberg's concept of the triad of moral development carried out by Lech Witkowski³⁵ and the types of community related to the concept, where I consider a given type of community as equivalent to a given type of organisation. It seems justified to state that the model of management education which dominates in Poland socialises students to the profile of a pre-conventional "community of interests" (organisation of interests) and the conventional "community of tasks" (task organisation).

The "community of interests" is marked by a strong pressure on the similarity of vested, defined interests and is a means for the execution of goals "related to egoistically perceived interest and the desired effect of temporarily jointly undertaken actions"³⁶. This community is constituted by individuals marked by the pre-conventional – i.e. the lowest – level of morality, related to the adoption of the "radar orientation" in the social space. This orientation "expresses [...] readiness for agreeing and pursuing one's own interest with any interest which dominates in the [...] surroundings at a given time"³⁷. Therefore, the individual functions at the level of the profit and loss strategy, trying to act in line with the logic of the avoidance of penalties and the individual profitability of the undertaken measures ("peace of mind" strategy).

In turn, the "community of tasks" constitutes a set reality, which was organised and functions around rigidly determined goals and tasks which are "more important than the vested perspectives of the individuals who function within it"³⁸. The community is constituted by individuals marked by the conventional level of moral development, who act following the logic of approval for group (organisational) standards and values as a part of their non-reflexive resignation from their own subjectivity. Hence, participants of organisations function here at the level of the 'role identity', which does not allow involvement in actions inconsistent with the assumed group standards in view of the unawareness of the problem of the legitimacy of these standards³⁹.

The third type of community is the "community as a task", which is attained under "principles of its creation agreed by dialogue"⁴⁰. An indispensable condition

³⁵ L. Witkowski, *Tożsamość i zmiana. Epistemologia i rozwojowe profile w edukacji* [Identity and Change. Epistemology and Developmental Profiles in Education], Wydawnictwo Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej, Wrocław 2010.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

for its existence is the subjectivity and creativity of individuals, and group targets constitute a specific help in the possibility of the accomplishment of individual goals, where autonomous individuals accept (or question) the normative rightness of both their own and group targets and analyse their consistence in a critical dialogue. This community is constituted by individuals marked by the highest, i.e. post-conventional level of moral development, which involves axio-normative tension related to the ability to question the existing standards, values, principles, goals or interests, if they limit individual subjectivity and prevent personal fulfilment (competence to act in a dispute)⁴¹.

It should be noticed that – as results from Banaszak's research⁴² – Polish managers who graduated from management studies are marked by a high level of social capital with a simultaneously poor level of cultural capital. Although a generalisation of conclusions resulting from empirical research to the entire population of managers in Poland would not be legitimate, the results of the study nevertheless provide food for thought. We should agree with Witkowski's suggestion, that – following Pierre Bourdieu – the possibility of the existence of cultural pathologies should be sought in particular as a part of phenomena marked by social success⁴³.

The conclusion concerning the high level of social capital results from the fact that the managers participating in the study were strongly motivated to extend their network of contacts to include persons owing to whom they may achieve an egoistic advantage, to informally support mainly people who may offer something to them in exchange and to act in line with the logic of a mutual 'arrangement' of the most advantageous options. The respondents typically shared an opinion that professional success was determined above all by the social capital understood as the appropriate connections and good contacts. The pre-conventional level of moral development and radar orientation related to the taking of actions aimed at the achievement of one's own egoistic interest and agreeing it with every dominating interest in the environment are visible to the naked eye.

The actions of the researched managers dominated by an instrumental rationality: theories of management are believed to be ready recipes for success and people in the organisation are treated instrumentally as a manipulated economic resource. This goes hand in hand with the absence of the need for following, as a part of organisational reality, ethical principles and with subordination to the es-

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

⁴² S. Banaszak, *Edukacja menedżerska w społeczeństwie współczesnym. Studium teoretyczno-empiryczne* [Management Education in Today's Society. A Theoretical and Empirical Study], Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań 2011, pp. 188–280. The study was conducted between 2006 and 2008 using the techniques of an in-depth interview (31 respondents), questionnaire (211 respondents), and content analysis (*The GoldenLine* social media portal).

⁴³ L. Witkowski, *Jaka kultura? (tezy, wypowiedzenia i podsumowanie)* [What Culture? (Theses, Complementary Comments and Summary)], [in:] *Jaka kultura? Jaki dyskurs? Sfera publiczna a spory o edukację, pedagogikę i zarządzanie* [What Culture? What Discourse? The Public Sphere and Disputes Concerning Education, Pedagogy, and Management], M. Jaworska-Witkowska (ed.), "Pedagogium", Szczecin 2008, pp. 19–49.

tablished procedures, in relation to which submissive conformism is adopted. The managers treat management processes as a tool allowing them to eliminate their employees' resistance and non-conformist attitudes: it is assumed that the higher the level of non-critical acceptance of the dominating standards and values in an organisation, the higher the chance for the achievement of the imposed organisational goals adopted in advance⁴⁴. The stagnation of moral development at the conventional level of "role identity" resulting in the loss of individual subjectivity and the specific "corrosion of character"⁴⁵ is yet another feature marking the functioning of the interviewed managers.

The low level of cultural capital is reflected in the poor communication-related competences of the managers who participated in the study, as well as in their inability to reflect critically. Their inability to speak correct Polish or use logical sentence structure and longer narration is one of the symptoms of their lack of cultural competences – another one is the inability to conduct a reflexive dialogue based on the power of argumentation, and yet another – the use of the argument of power in the form of symbolic violence in relation to their subordinates. What is symptomatic in this context is that the majority of Banaszak's subjects-managers agree that it is necessary to use shouting as a motivational impulse, and positively assess the strategy of being merciless in relation to their subordinates.

The picture of the moral poverty of the managers covered by the study and their lack of managerial competences is supplemented with their egoism, high opinion of themselves, demonstration of self-confidence with the help of material attributes (cars, watches, gadgets) and the simultaneous belief that their subordinates are lazy and incompetent. The deficit of cultural competences on the part of Polish managers becomes all the more terrifying when we become aware that they are a significant group of reference for the other employees in an organisation, providing considerable ethical models. As can be easily guessed, in this situation it is not difficult to witness the reproduction of cultural illiteracy.

Towards emancipatory rationality – the ethics of reading as a manager's lifestyle

The post-conventional moral development stage and preparation for activity in the profile of a community as a task seem to be, as of today, unattainable for many of the Polish managers, mainly due to their deficiencies in the area of education. The poor level of cultural capital clearly results from the absence of critical

⁴⁴ Positive evaluation of attitudes directed at non-critical conformism in an organisation is a characteristic trait of Polish organisational reality, as confirmed by other studies; see e.g. I. Stańczyk, J. Bugaj, T. Oleksyn, *Diagnoza i kierunki zmian w zarządzaniu zasobami ludzkimi w przedsiębiorstwach z Listy 500. Raport z badań [Diagnosis and Directions of Changes in Human Resources Management in Top 500 Companies. Research Report]*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2011, pp. 119–128.

⁴⁵ R. Sennett, *The Corrosion of Character. The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York – London 1998.

discussions during classes, absence of contact with books marked by rich epistemological potential provoking reflection, as well as from a failure to step beyond the over-economised perspective of the perception of reality (including that of organisation and management) reducing the dimension of education to an attempt at the answering of the simple question of how to reach economic success with the help of the available resources.

As Banaszak notices, “managers of the contemporary organisations, although formally well educated, do not have valuable knowledge in the scope of human nature, human needs, social functions of workplaces, team-building principles, etc.”⁴⁶. This is an aftermath of the disciplinary closing of the management sciences in Poland to humanistic ideas, as well as a consequence of the fiction of contact with humanistic knowledge, which very often constitutes only an ornament without much significance for people seduced by the paradise of stark numbers and ‘facts’. This is pictured by the reduction of the amount of ethical issues in the educational processes in Poland to just a few dozens of hours of classes in ethics, which additionally usually take the form of the ritualisation of the appearance of the acquisition of knowledge, since students are typically offered barren memorisation of information concerning the features of the so-called ethical systems, without attempts at the initiation of discussion.

Management education in Poland requires that its focus be shifted from the normative assumptions resulting from instrumental rationality for the benefit of emancipatory rationality, which constitutes the basis for efforts undertaken as a part of critical management education. The emancipatory interest of the critical approach in the educational context is directed at the process of the empowerment of both students and teachers, and the conditions of management education are analysed in terms of the potential for empowerment. The main area of interest of the critical management education is the theoretical conditions constituting the possibility for the accomplishment of citizenship attitudes on the grounds of management education. Critical insight is therefore focused on the content used as a part of the didactic processes and the quality of communication in the lecture room, which determines the reality of the acquisition of the cultural capital.

The research questions which should be asked from the critical perspective may oscillate around the following issues: does the educational content include the potential of epistemological (paradigmatic) pluralism allowing a critical and multi-dimensional look at the organisational reality, or does it take the form of closed mono-messages marked by epistemological fundamentalism, generating the non-reflexive reception by seduction with a positivist or/and guided formula? Is the manner of the reception of the content based on critical reflexivity and real dialogue with symbolic authorities originating from the ethics of reading related to the digestion, awakening and transformation of the learning subject, or perhaps on non-reflexive, authoritarian copying of content undertaken towards a mislead-

⁴⁶ S. Banaszak, *Management education...* p. 197.

ing, instrumental goal of familiarisation with the information reduced to the question of how to attain a higher economic efficiency of an organisation? Does the space existing between the teacher and the students facilitate real, critical dialogue based on a stimulating exchange of arguments and the broadening of humanistic and organisational imagination, or is it a space based on the authoritarian imposition of content for non-reflexive memorisation?

The more extensive the critical openness to the problems discussed and texts analysed as a part of the didactic process and the higher the degree of openness to critical discussion, the better the chance for the accomplishment of emancipatory potential in the area of management education. This potential makes it possible to become aware of the oppressive pathologies of the power relation, the domination of economism and gender inequality in management-related texts, the practice of organisational life, and in the area of education. It is worthwhile to once again accentuate the emancipatory significance of critique in CME, which is to lead to changes in reality in the intention of care for the disclosing of cultural pathologies, and not boil down for example solely to the pondering on the problem of inadequacy of the knowledge acquired in the course of education aimed at the practice of management and organisation.

Every attempt at the accomplishment of emancipatory goals in management education in Poland should be related to the undertaking of specific strategies of change, in particular in the area of the curriculum of business schools or university courses, as well as in the sphere of communication between teachers and students, and between the educational content and its recipients. It seems that the common denominator of these strategies is the necessity of basing their normative assumptions on the idea of critical performativeness, which requires the enrichment of the educational processes with the element of the acquisition of knowledge through reflexive action⁴⁷.

Firstly, it seems justified to considerably enrich curricula with critical theories, which would allow reflexive distance in relation to the over-economised content based on the technical imperative present in the mainstream management, thus contributing to their delegitimisation, denaturalisation, and the dispelling of the myth providing that there are no alternatives to them. The use of these theories would therefore allow a specific deviation from the mainstream, shifting the focus of reflection from instrumental considerations devoted to the measures necessary for the achievement of the economic success of an organisation to ethical problems such as the issues of inequality, oppression or power. By mediating thinking in the categories of paradoxes, antinomies or ethical dilemmas, teachers and students would obtain a possibility to develop their awareness of the politicalness of management and organisation, which as a consequence would have an impact on their ability to notice the complexity of the normative organisational reality and to act more efficiently in it.

⁴⁷ A. Contu, *Critical Management...*, p. 545.

Secondly, it would be worth filling curricula with the symbolic heritage of art. For example literature (but also film or theatre) is a valuable medium of the transmission of knowledge on management, allowing to see the paradoxes of organisational life which are not recognizable in the scientific discourse⁴⁸. The development of the humanistic imagination by the contemporary manager as a result of contact with works of art seems to be fundamental in view of the increasing normative complexity of the sphere of organisation, as well as the necessity to use intuition and tacit knowledge⁴⁹.

However, let us notice that the very filling of curricula with critical theory or literature will not bring about the desired emancipatory advantages if the contact with symbolic culture will be based on apparent communication. In the context of thinking on the condition of management education, the above suggestion indicates that the very saturation of curricula with humanistic content will not be sufficient for education to fulfil its function of the broadening of reflexivity among the subjects engaged in that education. The very broadening of points of view without the ability to justify them and negotiate meanings may result in, as Andrzej M. Kaniowski put it after Ortega y Gasset⁵⁰, the attitude of a mediocre human being, which is related to the inability to think individually with a simultaneous sense of having the proper view and having the right to impose it on others. Therefore, what hides here is a trap of the authoritarianism of one's own judgements related to the absence of openness to their renegotiation.

The issue of the ethics of reading as a lifestyle is of key significance here, as it decides about the effects of contact with the absorbed content⁵¹. In the area of education – including management education – the achievement of empowerment requires above all the creation of conditions for the enrichment of symbolic capital, which depends on the “readiness to introduce the possibility to generate knowledge from the position of experience to educational content”⁵². In the scope under discussion, ethics requires in the first place that didactic processes be grounded in the vision of the symbolic authority as someone with whom it is worthwhile to disagree, rather than someone who should be copied⁵³. Regardless of the form in

⁴⁸ Which has been noticed in the West a long time ago; see B. Czarniawska-Joerges, P. Guillet de Monthoux (eds.), *Good Novels, Better Management. Reading Organizational Realities in Fiction*, Harwood Academic Publishers, Chur 1994.

⁴⁹ M. Kostera, *Organizacje i archetypy* [Organisations and Archetypes], Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warszawa 2010.

⁵⁰ A. M. Kaniowski, *Dyskurs publiczny a podstawy nowoczesnej kultury: kryzys jako wyzwanie* [Public Discourse and the Foundations of Modern Culture: Crisis as a Challenge], [in:] *Jaka kultura? Jaki dyskurs? Sfera publiczna a spory o edukację, pedagogikę i zarządzanie* [What Culture? What Discourse? The Public Sphere and Disputes Concerning Education, Pedagogy, and Management], M. Jaworska-Witkowska (ed.), “Pedagogium”, Szczecin 2008, pp. 77–92.

⁵¹ M. Zawadzki, *Etyka czytania jako sposób bycia* [Ethics of Reading as a Way of Life], “Twórczość” 2010, No. 8 (777), pp. 129–131.

⁵² L. Witkowski, *Wyzwania autorytetu...* [Challenges to Authority...], p. 448.

⁵³ *Ibid.*; L. Witkowski, *Historie autorytetu wobec kultury i edukacji* [Histories of Authority in Relation to Culture and Education], “Impuls”, Kraków 2011.

which the content is provided (an academic textbook on a discipline of management sciences, a single author's scientific book on management, a pop-management guide, a novel), its reception must be related to an attempt at undertaking a discussion with the author with the simultaneous discontinuation of the strategy of objectification based on an attempt at the answering of the barren question "what does the author want to say?".

Therefore, it seems justified to use the strategy of ferocious humility⁵⁴, which allows one to find in the text the explosive moments which are emotionally important for the reader, without submissiveness to the symbolic authority, but with the simultaneous avoidance of the authoritarianism of one's own normative position. It seems justified to say that there is no understanding of content without its digestion – otherwise, there is only familiarisation with a certain information resource without a chance for it to become knowledge which works within us and develops our depth of view and the quality of our justifications.

Let me add that from the perspective of the idea of critical performativeness, an important element enriching the processes of management education is enabling students to acquire knowledge via participation in organisational conditions, and via contact with working managers. The possibility of solving the organisational problems of a concrete organisation in real time (e.g. through a case study and group work in the space of the organisation) seems to be of key importance from the perspective of the development of cultural and professional competences. Similarly, a real dialogue with managers may foster a development of the organisational imagination and becoming aware of the complexity of the work of a manager. However, if this type of education is to bring real benefits rather than become an illusion hidden under the cover of marketing, participation in organisational conditions must not boil down to a promotional trip to a workplace, and contact with the manager to an empty lecture of a guru promoting his/her own brand. Moreover, it should be remembered that participation in organisational conditions may be a lost opportunity for the development of managerial competences when there is nothing but an appearance of education, which I discussed above, in the lecture room.

Conclusion

The implementation of the idea of critical management education in Poland seems to be a necessary and fascinating task, but also one which is extremely difficult. The assumption of the necessity to make critical practice a collective effort in the management sciences, management education and practice of organisational

⁵⁴ L. Witkowski, *Wstęp do problemu fenomenologii czytania (uwagi nie tylko seminaryjne)* [Introduction to the problem of the Phenomenology of Reading (not only Seminar Comments)], [in:] *Między pedagogiką, filozofią i kulturą. Studia, eseje, szkice* [Between Pedagogy, Philosophy, and Culture. Studies, Essays, Sketches], *Ibid.*, vol. III of *Tryptyk Edukacyjny* [Educational Triptych], Instytut Badań Edukacyjnych, Warszawa 2007, pp. 29–66.

life is hindered by many obstacles. Firstly, a clear majority of persons having a contact with management identify the discipline with the practice of effective money-making, additionally closing their horizons of thought in the tight disciplinary corset of positivistic version of economics. Therefore, it seems necessary to find a way to constitute a communication space, which would allow a real, transdisciplinary dialogue between representatives of the mainstream management and researchers originating from the humanities, who are interested in the development of the management sciences. Perhaps this must go hand in hand with taking away the management sciences from persons who presently claim to be their only advocates and who try to negate the achievements of great symbolic authorities (such as members of the Frankfurt School), who, according to them, do not deserve to be considered in the field of management as they are labelled as philosophers, sociologists or artists.

Secondly, it is worth turning attention to the problem of mass education in management-related courses, which for years have been among the most popular courses of study in Poland. Emancipatory education requires a direct contact between the teacher and the students, which must be based on the master and apprentice relationship. The disproportionately small number of teachers in relation to the number of students makes it impossible to enable such a relationship, which makes education an appearance based on the mass acquisition of diplomas which mean nothing in the cultural sense. In fact, as reported by Aleksander Sulejewicz and Mahmood Zaidi, the teaching staff related to management education in Poland is marked by an intellectual backwardness connected with the fact that they have obsolete information on management, while simultaneously they reproduce it in a ritualized manner in the didactic process in the form of multimedia presentations, typically in several universities at the same time (which makes it impossible for them to find time for self-education)⁵⁵. The teaching staff often includes the so-called 'shelf-fillers' – researchers writing books which are insignificant in the cultural sense, and the only role of which is that of staying on the shelves, but which give their authors academic promotion and social prestige⁵⁶.

The cultural pathologies mentioned above are just a drop in the sea of the cultural misery of management education in Poland, and this is why the necessary changes require a fast and radical reaction. In this context, it is worth pointing out that we should not close the search for the reasons for cultural pathologies in the world of management or management education in the statement that the market and capitalist realities are simply like that and that they are themselves pathologised by nature. This is an incorrect assumption, which additionally provides a convenient alibi for people who are unable to see the value of serious philosophical reflection concerning the sphere of economics and management.

⁵⁵ A. Sulejewicz, M.A. Zaidi, *Beyond MBA. Management Education in Transitional Economies*, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw 2010, pp. 143–152.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

It is also worth stressing that critical management education cannot be treated as one of the research (or didactic) approaches or models being elements of management education as such – just as critical pedagogy is not one of the fields constituting the research area of pedagogy. Pedagogy is either critical or it does not exist at all (although it is possible to effectively maintain the appearances of its existence)⁵⁷ – similarly, criticality testifies to the reality of the existence of management education. However, this paradoxical assumption makes it possible to fight against the danger of the reduction of the critical management education approach (as well as critical pedagogy) to the role of a familiarised, exchangeable idea which is useful on the academic market. The practical implementation of this assumption necessitates, among other things, the overcoming of exclusivist tendencies (the so-called cartelisation) among persons dealing with critical pedagogy and the critique of management education for the benefit of the strategy of openness. We should introduce, via symbolic culture and symbolic capital, the real, emancipatory changes to Polish management education.

The fight for a radical change towards critical emancipatory openness overcoming the danger of cultural illiteracy of Polish managers and persons dealing with management sciences is already much overdue.

Summary

Denaturalisation of instrumental rationality in the management education in Poland

In the article I diagnose cultural pathologies in management education in Poland using the critical tools proposed by the critical management education. The main aim of my reflection is to denaturalize an assumption that management education should be located on the positivistic paradigm with a domination of instrumental rationality. My reflection is based on my own theoretical research, in which I use Lech Witkowski's ideas such as the ethics of reading, symbolic authority and moral development triad. It is also based on empirical research concerning Polish managers and management education.

⁵⁷ I wish to kindly thank Professor Lech Witkowski for turning my attention to this thesis during the plenary lecture opening the conference "Critical Pedagogy Today. Questions on Theory and Practice" (Institute of Pedagogy, University of Gdansk, 28–29 May 2012).

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Learning and Democracy in the Workplace

The purpose of the present article is to reflect upon the relation between the conditions in the working environment of modern day enterprises – seen as a potential educational environment – and the possibilities of learning on-the-job participation in line with democratic values.

I shall begin my considerations by exploring a more general problem that has become visible today, which relates to the strong link between education and neoliberalism, and thus contribute to the critical discussion set around this issue. Firstly, the “clash” of these two contradictory ontologies (education and neoliberalism) presents an opportunity for opening a discussion on their non-problematic coexistence in social practice. Secondly, it offers a platform for demonstrating the fractures created by this “clash”. Teaching and learning today is strongly set in various political and economic contexts. This raises questions regarding the humanistic premises of education. What are the real goals and whom does it actually serve? The prime objective of this critical perspective is not only to identify education as a tool for legitimisation and cementing the existing neoliberal ideology, but also to create an opportunity to challenge the *status quo*. Such a transformation would involve a shift towards teaching citizenship and building democratic awareness among those living in the reality of the modern-day world. The perception of education needs to change. In the light of democratic values, education should display a commitment to transformations for the benefit of the society and effectively counteract the inequalities and the practices of exclusion. Most importantly, education should be aware of the political or economic premises that lay at the core of its foundation.

I shall now proceed to present the differences in understanding of the basic values underlying democracy and neoliberalism so as to direct the attention of the reader to the contrast between education for democracy and an education at the services of neoliberalism. The key aspect is to recognise the seemingly hidden yet fundamental contradictions.

Freedom, equality, and the public sphere: the spaces of the differentiation of neoliberalism and democracy

One of the basic principles of the neoliberal doctrine is freedom. It is, however, frequently reduced to the question of economic freedom, i.e. the so-called market freedom. The “free market” discourse becomes an ideological instrument, which not only legitimises capitalistic institutions, but also defines reality in a particular way¹. Thus initiated, the process of marketisation gradually colonises the awareness of its users, propelling them to reproduce the existent social order rather than to liberate themselves from it. Moreover, this limitless, individual freedom that consists of a right to choose and to reach for one’s own, independently selected goals can be achieved even at the expense of other individuals or even the entire society. It is the boundless freedom, the so-called “freedom from” that is the greatest political value – not the democracy, which involves commitment and responsibility for one’s choices, and is a freedom that is understood as the “freedom to”. Another postulate is to confer equal rights to all individuals. Human beings are capable of self-determination and taking full responsibility for themselves, and therefore they have the right to property and self-possession. This, however, is a “myth” with regards to this equality, as this superior democratic principle is shifted from an actual equality of social rights and responsibilities towards the chances for equality in terms of the possession of objects². It is a democracy of status³, a so-called “economic justice” that is based exclusively on the “equality of resources”. The link between capitalism and democracy is weak; the first serves private interests, while the latter serves the public needs which, as we know, are divergent. Consequently, we observe an indiscriminate affirmation of differences and a consent for growing inequalities, which are additionally deepened by the education. The neoliberal culture puts the market above the society. It uses mechanisms manifested in the use of populist discourse and the manipulation of slogans addressing free will, independence, and righteous governance. The process of the deep pauperisation of the public sphere and the visible weakening of the civic spirit is a result of neoliberalism’s peculiar perception of the civic sphere: civil society is embodied in the autonomous decisions of its members⁴. This is reasonable as long as it serves certain interests, but in itself it is pointless. Therefore its “atomisation”, i.e. focusing on the individuals rather than on the society as a whole, results in the

¹ E. Potulicka, *Teoretyczne podstawy neoliberalizmu a jego praktyka* [Neoliberalism’s Theoretical Background vs. its Practice], [in:] E. Potulicka, J. Rutkowiak, *Neoliberalne uwikłania edukacji* [Neoliberal Entanglements of Education], Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, Kraków 2010, p. 53.

² Eadem, *Pytania o skutki neoliberalizmu. Aspekt jednostkowy* [The Issue of Impact of Neoliberalism. Individual Aspect], [in:] E. Potulicka, J. Rutkowiak, *Neoliberalne uwikłania edukacji* [Neoliberal Entanglements of Education], p. 315.

³ J. Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society. Myths and Structures*, Sage, London 1970.

⁴ D. Boaz, *Libertarianism: A Primer*, Free Press, New York 1997.

disappearance of the civic sphere, and democracy along with it. It is impossible to consider these ontologies as one, all the more since they differ on the level of their basic premises. After these general considerations, I shall proceed to refer to the principal issue of this article, which addresses the learning and the shape of the educational on-the-job environment in a defined political and economic context.

Workplace democracy? On employees (not) learning citizenship in contemporary enterprises

Perhaps the idea to seek pro-democracy practices and attitudes in a workplace may come to some readers as unusual or downright aberrant. After all, a workplace, the same as any other formal institution, has a clear structure, along with a hierarchical management system. Furthermore, contemporary workplaces are designed to protect and secure further expansion of the neoliberal doctrine, rather than to cater to the needs of those who work there. From the standpoint of critical theory, there are no politically neutral places and all environments contain certain, invariably conflicting and competing discourses. Neoliberalism, being the dominant ideology of global capitalism, is visible in numerous spheres of contemporary human life. However, it is most strongly rooted, legitimated, and appreciable in workplaces, i.e. in places where the private and public interest should meet. Sadly, nowadays the work, which constitutes an important part among human activities, is being deprived of its ethos-related aspect. Thus it becomes a mere good that can be recalculated into the possession of means, which have economic and tangible value. This, in turn, may create an environment that adversely affects workers' learning of pro-democracy attitudes and teaches them instead to function within the framework of the neoliberal market principles. On the other hand, the so-called social enterprise becomes increasingly popular, and serves as an example of a practice that differs from the one seen in "traditional" enterprises. It is set on a premise to realise social goals and to function in line with principles that are closer to democracy than to neoliberalism. This, in turn, has the potential to positively influence the way the working environment is organised and to benefit the process of learning citizenship and foster attitudes of engagement in community life. As we know, the phenomenon of adult learning is highly complex in its nature and shaped by numerous factors. These include both external ones, such as top-down political agendas or market systems, as well as the internal ones, such as the negotiation of meaning by members of a given professional community, the creation of a company's own system, internal policy, etc. Similarly, adult on-the-job learning is not only conditioned by the manner the environment is organised, or by the adopted formal education system, but also by the culture created within the professional communities, which in itself constitutes a valuable source or a dimension of informal learning in a given workplace. Notably, this phenomenon is not as

much a cumulative result of all these factors, but rather an outcome of their mutual correspondence and their participation in a process that has its own unique and particular dynamics. Among my considerations dedicated to the phenomenon of learning in contemporary workplaces, I became interested in exploring the question of how the conditions of the working environment – designed in line with the neoliberal doctrine and the ubiquitous (market) “profits culture”, prevalent in most of the companies – can hinder or even prevent learning of pro-democracy attitudes? Or maybe the opposite: how can such conditions support an on-the-job learning of participatory democracy, when manifested as a workers’ resistance to the imposed manner of the learning of functioning in line with the neoliberal doctrine? After all, it is such a kind of pressure that can contribute the most to a swift development of dissent. I shall now consider in more detail the most common conditionings of workplace learning environment, i.e. the shape of contemporary enterprises.

The neoliberal context of learning in contemporary workplaces

The majority of modern-day enterprises are subject organisations with totalitarian traits, oriented against human beings and operating on non-democratic principles. Their goals contradict the good of human beings and their leaders use coercion while demanding unconditional discipline and obedience. This type of organisations weakens the responsibility, creativeness, and activeness of its members, numbing and discouraging them, often causing their frustration. In terms of management, we often observe imposing centralised solutions without prior consultative discussions, which leads to arbitrary decisions that have nothing to do with an on- or off-the-job dialogue with local communities. Employers are seen as producers – highly efficient, disposable and slavishly devoted to the employing corporations, externally motivated, competitive against each other, egoistic, and expansive-yet-internally-docile in the face of the threat of the incapacity to pay off their bank loans. Neoliberalism deepens the typical labour market divisions and social distance between the highly qualified professionals and low-skilled producers. Ever more often the workers are forced to take jobs below their qualifications. They are offered temporary contracts, which deny them the opportunity for permanent employment. Bad working conditions, common rights abuses and despotic attitudes of employers often render the workplace oppressive for contemporary people. An individual is burdened with responsibility for their fate at the enterprise, regardless of actually having a very limited say regarding the future of their employment at the company. Corporatism affects the culture of learning and the obtaining of qualifications that are indispensable for pursuing professions. Education becomes a means for increasing the value of work in the modern-day economy, which demands general analytic skills, reasoning capacities, and innovativeness. These can be obtained at universities, but the larger the

role of education in professional advancement, the larger the threat of the deepening of social inequalities⁵. The purpose of education in the service of neoliberal policy is to produce the labour force, which is reflected in the limiting of teaching plans, and the imparting of specific and narrow skills instead of knowledge. Thus, all sorts of specialists and experts are created, i.e. the so-called "Fachdioten", who possess a certain knowledge in their narrow field, but at the expense of a general, contextual knowledge on a given subject. Such a phenomenon can have not only negative consequences for the society and the environment, but also may become, in a wider perspective, a serious threat to humanity as such. Moreover, one can have an impression that, sadly, education understood as on-the-job teaching does very little for the development of workers and improving their quality of life, and is merely a tool for legitimating the dominant, neoliberal culture. In most cases, it is designed to serve the purposes of the organisation, i.e. to constantly increase the revenues of the company. All in all, it is difficult not to agree with the idea that "nowadays education is reduced to simply increasing the 'human capital', and educative activities to practical training exercises, often accompanied by a ludic element, ethos-related potentials of persons are limited to the instrumental effectiveness of an optimistic human and an efficient producer, while the ideal of human cooperation is reduced to the principles of competitiveness"⁶. On the other hand, a new, different, and increasingly visible trend is the setting of contemporary enterprises along the lines of social business.

Between society and the economy: learning in socially responsible enterprises

More and more attention is dedicated to the rebirth of the ethos of economics, whose duty is to serve the truth and the interests of the global community⁷, while proposing to abandon centralisation, specialisation, and standardisation in favour of diversity, flexibility, and creativity in action⁸. First and foremost, subject organisations are preferred over object organisations, i.e. those that serve the human being and accentuate cooperation in a team or, in broader terms, in the entire society *vs.* those in which the human being is merely a means for reaching goals. An organisation for human beings is adjusted to their physical and psychological

⁵ E. Potulicka, *Pytania o skutki neoliberalizmu. Aspekt społeczny* [The Issue of Impact of Neoliberalism. Individual aspect], p. 328.

⁶ J. Rutkowiak, *Czy istnieje edukacyjny program ekonomii korporacyjnej?* [Does a Corporate Economics Education Programme Exist?], [in:] E. Potulicka, J. Rutkowiak, *Neoliberalne uwikłania edukacji* [Neoliberal Entanglements of Education], p. 33.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁸ B. Klusek-Wojciszke, M. Łosiewicz, *Wiedza jako specyficzny zasób przedsiębiorstwa* [Knowledge as a Specific Resource of an Enterprise], [in:] *Współczesne przedsiębiorstwo. Zasobowe czynniki sukcesu w konkurencyjnym otoczeniu* [Contemporary Enterprises. Resource-related Factors in Competitive Environment], J. Frycy, J. Jaworski (eds.), *Prace Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Bankowej w Gdańsku*, Gdańsk 2009, vol. IV, pp. 133–146.

capabilities. It promotes a friendly culture of workers' coexistence based on the respect for human dignity and it includes the worker in the processes of management. This implies, in a way, the primacy of the human issues in the organisation – which, on the other hand, can result in the complete identification of the workers with the existent order, depriving them of any critical attitude. However, the postulates listed above are accompanied by conceptual solutions in the form of e.g. social entrepreneurship, which describes enterprises or agents undertaking innovative activities while following the values that are important from the society's point of view. Literature offers numerous definitions of the responsibility of an organisation. Lidia Zbiegień-Maciąg⁹ defines social responsibility as a company's moral responsibility and the commitment to be held to account by society for its activities. International organisations, such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, proposed a different group of definitions that see corporate social responsibility as an ethical behaviour of an enterprise towards the society. This includes companies' permanent commitment to ethical functioning and contributing to economic development, while simultaneously improving the quality of life of its employees, their families, local community, and the entire enterprise¹⁰. Most commonly, however, social responsibility is analysed in the following contexts: economic, i.e. the capacity to generate profits, but also improve the corporate image, increase the competitiveness and innovativeness, shape the social corporate culture, boost employees' commitment and motivation, attract potential investors, widen the outreach to loyal and regular clients, foster good relations with suppliers, form positive relations with local communities (e.g. the image of an attractive employer, reliable partner, donor, etc.)¹¹; legal, i.e. carrying out business activities, fulfilling fiscal obligations, meeting the standards of environmental protection, consumer rights and labour legislation, requirements related to the transparency of companies' activities, credibility and trust towards companies' initiatives, securing the reliability of accounting systems, financial reporting, the diligent and timely fulfilment of financial and contractual obligations, ensuring stable collaboration with stakeholders, and increasing attractiveness for potential investors and financial institutions; ethical, i.e. the awareness of the consequences of one's own activities and taking responsibility for them, giving priority to public welfare, even at the expense of a loss of profits; and, finally, charitable, i.e. consisting of charitable activities or the ability to share with others¹². Interestingly, according to the principles of social economics, there is a high likelihood that a company that undertakes socially responsible actions in an informed and coordinated manner will build trust, which over time will contribute to the formation of effective

⁹ L. Zbiegień-Maciąg, *Etyka w zarządzaniu* [Ethics in Management], PWN, Warszawa 1991, pp. 48–49.

¹⁰ J. Nakonieczna, *Spoleczna odpowiedzialność przedsiębiorstw międzynarodowych* [Social Responsibility of International Enterprises], Centrum Doradztwa i Informacji Difin Sp.z o.o, Warszawa 2008, p. 19.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹² M. Rybak, *Etyka menedżera – społeczna odpowiedzialność przedsiębiorstwa* [Manager's ethics: corporate social responsibility], PWN, Warszawa 2004, pp. 29–31.

relations between the company and its environment and will result in a better financial situation, along with a correspondingly better position in the market¹³. Still, such results as the increase of democracy in the workplace or cooperation with the local community, as well as the formation of the sense of community and improved atmosphere at the company are hard to measure, and economic results continue to prevail over the non-economic ones. The understanding of enterprises' social responsibility can be seen in the categories of the wide array of companies' obligations – thus the responsibility is placed among the concepts from the domain of social activities. Yet, it is more often considered as a means for improving public image, thus becoming part of marketing activities. Ever more frequently it is the human being that serves the organisation, while the organisations serve human beings less and less, which in turn complicates the area of social life. The assessment of the results of entrepreneurial processes is highly narrowed, usually limited to a single target group. It does not take into account the effects of companies' actions on other (wider) levels, e.g. the external ones, which include the environment or the society. Unfortunately, the principles of social responsibility stand usually in opposition to their actual implementation. It is the economic and legal aspects that are of greatest interest to the owners of the surveyed companies, while the ethical dimension remains in the background. Social responsibility in the surveyed companies is addressed only to a limited degree, i.e. more as a tool for public relations, for meeting short term financial indicators, or as a one-time charitable initiative to improve the image, rather than a purposeful, rational, and internally integrated concept¹⁴. One of the examples is the CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility).

Having in mind the links between neoliberalism and education, in my deliberations I have to admit that, beyond any doubt, the neoliberal principles affect mainly the quality of the learning environment – as I have already observed much earlier while investigating workplaces. Neoliberalism, or any other political concepts for that matter, have a very strong impact over specific places and create a sort of framework for the internal social life of a given group of workers. Seeing and being aware of this neoliberal context, one must not forget about the particular dynamics of social life within each organisation, its culture, etc., as these factors contribute immensely to the quality of learning. Perhaps, instead of seeking a workplace democracy that is embedded in top-down political agendas and management systems, it would be more appropriate to search through periodic or even singular situational contexts of workers' everyday participation at work.

¹³ A. Sokołowska, *Cechy społecznej odpowiedzialności małego przedsiębiorstwa w dobie kryzysu* [The Traits of Corporate Social Responsibility of a Small Enterprise in a Time of Crisis], [in:] *Współczesne przedsiębiorstwo...* [Contemporary enterprises...], pp. 51–61.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 59

Participatory democracy embedded in the daily social life of a workplace

Possibly, this democratic nature of workplaces or the readiness of people to engage in activities that conform to social goals remains hidden in the so-called “small things” created through participation in the daily professional practice and is observable in workers’ interactions? Maybe it manifests itself in certain defence tactics or the so-called survival strategies, or in grass-roots initiatives undertaken by the employees? A workplace, in spite of being a *sui generis* institution, dominated by the narrative in line with the neoliberal policy, does not determine definitively the life of workers. After all, humans in their working environment are not mere recipients or passive observers who only learn how to adjust to their surroundings. They do not only replicate unquestioningly certain existent patterns; instead they are an important “element” of an environment they proceed to change. The protagonists and creators of any institution are the persons who function within it. If we assume that people continuously create and co-create the world in which they live, also the social world of their professional sphere will be subjected to a ceaseless deconstruction and/or reconstruction amidst daily interactions. Learning of a professional role and a culture of a given organisations is invariably set in a context, but this context is never a petrified structure of a neoliberal system. My research experience shows that even in highly limited conditions for learning democracy in a workplace, certain practices that engage the workers in the life of the organisation are possible. A study at a Danish company serves as an example: in spite of having a strongly hierarchical management style, there was a significantly large space left for the employees to be arranged in accordance with their own vision of a workplace. This means not as much as a tendency to reproduce the context, in which human beings learn, but rather the constant construction of new micro-contexts by the learning subjects¹⁵. Mostly, it is the day-to-day practice or simply the pragmatic reasons that vest significance in humans as subjects. A human being not only cognises but also modifies the existent reality, which is exactly what constitutes the emancipatory potential of an individual. Therefore problematisation can only refer to the premise regarding the capacity of neoliberal culture to reproduce its properties. Having in mind the presumptions of constructivist philosophy, the role of those micro-worlds needs to be considered and appreciated, as the neoliberal culture can be perceived in different manners. Seen as a chance for the realisation of one’s own (private) interests, or on the con-

¹⁵ J. Rutkowiak, *Uczenie się w warunkach kultury neoliberalnej: kontestowanie jako wyzwanie dla teorii kształcenia* [Learning in a Neoliberal Cultural Setting: Dissent as a Challenge for the Theory of Education], [in:] E. Potulicka, J. Rutkowiak, *Neoliberalne uwikłania edukacji* [Neoliberal Entanglements of Education], p. 170.

trary, as an opportunity to deepen and modify one's own experiences, it results in learning dissent while the imperative to participate in such an oppressive environment is simply met with resistance. Therefore, I believe that any kind of change of the *status quo* seems to be more feasible as a form of the self-organisation of people through the stimulation of grass-root transformations, informal initiatives, local communities' activities, or individual civic activities, as only the real experience of persons present in these places can foster learning and social change. To achieve this, engaged learning is not only necessary but indispensable. The goal is not to reject or discard institutions, i.e. the workplaces, as one of the fields where the neoliberal reality can be transformed – and thus to negate the fact that democracy appears within them – but rather to accentuate the individuals who function there and who, in fact, constitute the core of these environments. Of course, my reflections on this matter are still only very recent and require further exploration of the issue in a form of empirical data. Nonetheless, from the perspective of education itself and the means of organising working environments, it is important to carry out research in the field of on-the-job learning. Since every learning activity is set in certain social conditions, it is crucial to study the impact the conditions – along with the social life and culture – in a given workplace have on the process of learning. Institutions and enterprises are always organised according to a certain model that is set from the top down, which defines a kind of context for learning. Hence, while studying workplaces, it is necessary to draw attention to the dialogue, or perhaps “a game” of sorts, between the members of a given learners' community and the framework of functioning imposed by a given organisation. Perhaps, instead of asking whether on-the-job democracy is possible, the question should be how is it possible? This also relates to the context for learning citizenship and commitment, and thus the matter of conditioning the workplace as an educational environment. In other words, it is simply the question of how and to what degree can a given workplace become a space for developing pro-democracy attitudes. Only a fully-fledged research of the learning processes in working environment can offer adequate answers to these questions (or challenges).

Summary

Learning and Democracy in the Workplace

The general aim of the paper is to reflect on the relation between the neoliberal educational environment in workplaces and the possibilities to learn to act in accordance with democratic principles in this environment. Institutions or enterprises are always organised in a concrete, prevailing model, which forms the context of learning. Neoliberalism as the global and dominant ideology is present in many areas of human life. It is most deeply embedded and most strongly legitimised in the workplace, where it “serves” companies' owners rather than the employees. Because of the design of today's workplaces, which frequently benefits the protection or further expansion of the neoliberal doctrine, employees

usually suffer from this ideology. This type of educational environment can hinder the learning of democratic attitudes. On the other hand, the social enterprise becomes the most popular example of a totally different practice compared to that encountered in traditional enterprises. Social enterprise demands acting according to democratic principles, pursuing social objectives rather than neoliberal, economic goals. It could have a positive influence on the environment for the learning of public spirit and encourage engaging in the community of practice inside the organisation. Unfortunately, social responsibility value is seen merely as a form of improving public relations between the society and the organisation in most of the companies that practice Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). At the same time, it is only a part of the market's promotion. Nonetheless, any kind of learning takes place in social conditions. This means that we also should take into account the internal conditions of the working environment and quality of social life in organisation, which have a huge impact on the whole process of learning. The author asks at the end of the paper, how these new conditions in companies, in the context of their extensive dominant 'culture of profit', can support learning of active citizenship that is supposed to begin the changes in culture of organisations in this way.

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Generating Gender Capital in the Education Process and its Impact on the Functioning of Men and Women

School education is a process in which the principle of equality should be implemented both as regards the treatment of those who participate in it and in terms of equal opportunities for learning. Democratic societies should recognise the child's right to having equal opportunities to education, as provided for in the Convention on the Rights of the Child¹. In the widely practiced model of co-education, school was to be free from gender inequality, and the introduction of this model at secondary and higher education level was connected with the implementation of the demands of the feminist movement fighting for equal access to education for women at all levels. Moreover, progressive educational activists argued that such a school model is superior as regards its educational aspects over gender-segregated schooling². They emphasized the positive educational atmosphere, camaraderie and cooperation in co-educational schools³. However, numerous studies indicate that in the field⁴ of school there is a process of generating gender capital in accordance with the old gender stereotypes and reproducing the gender gap in the treatment of boys and girls. Gender turns out to be a strong dividing line in school.

This paper will show the mechanism of generating gender capital within the school space – the mechanism, which undoubtedly has a detrimental effect on the functioning of women and men in the social environment. This text will provide an overview of the most important gender studies conducted by Polish education researchers, but it will also attempt to go beyond the mere diagnosis of school functioning in the context of gender issues.

¹ *The Convention on the Rights of the Child*, www.unicef.org, 15 August 2012.

² *Encyklopedia pedagogiczna XXI wieku* [Pedagogical Encyclopaedia of the 21st Century], vol. II, T. Pilch (ed.), Wydawnictwo Akademickie Żak, Warszawa 2003, p. 637.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 640–641.

⁴ P. Bourdieu, L. Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992.

The school operates essentially on the premise of hidden violence. Zbigniew Kwieciński, citing Pierre Bourdieu and Johan Galtung, describes the school as a place of symbolic and structural violence. These two forms of violence are concealed “from the awareness of the subject and the ability of the subject to discern the objective and mediated force exerted over them in order to subordinate their awareness and the way in which they perceive events, people and relations in the social and cultural world, so that they are accepted as natural, self-evident and therefore justified [...]”⁵ (structural violence) and consisting in the imposition of interpretations of the symbols and meanings of existing culture (symbolic violence)⁶. Symbolic violence, in Pierre Bourdieu’s view, legitimizes, perpetuates and strengthens real violence by symbolic means, adding to it a purely symbolic enslavement in the sphere of values. The mechanism of this violence consists, among other things, in shaping the habitus, which Bourdieu describes as “socially constructed nature”⁷.

In this paper, the school is regarded as a social field, which is one of the main categories in P. Bourdieu’s social theory. The field is “a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (*situs*) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital)”⁸. In Bourdieu’s view, access to the benefits of this power is the ultimate goal of the game that is being played in a given field. The social field is, therefore, a game. Players are drawn into it, they fight, they are united by their consent to the game and its stakes, its beliefs (*doxa*), and recognition of its importance. Just as the value of a card depends on the game, the hierarchy of capital (cultural, economic, social, and symbolic) is different in different fields⁹. “The principle of the dynamics of a field lies in the form of its structure and, in particular, in the distance, the gaps, the asymmetries between the various specific forces that confront one another”¹⁰. The field undergirds and guides the strategies whereby the occupants of these positions seek, individually or collectively, to safeguard or improve their position and to impose the principle of hierarchisation most favourable to their own products”¹¹.

Actions aimed at preserving a privileged position and imposing a subordinate position while assigning specific values also take place in the case of masculine domination. According to Bourdieu, masculine domination is a form of symbolic

⁵ Z. Kwieciński, *Ukryta przemoc jako podstawa racjonalności funkcjonowania szkoły* [Hidden violence as a rationale underlying the functioning of a school], [in:] *Socjopatologia edukacji* [Sociopathology of Education], Z. Kwieciński (ed.), Wydawnictwo Edytor, Warszawa 1992, p. 121.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁷ P. Bourdieu, J.-C. Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, SAGE Publications, 1977, 1990.

⁸ P. Bourdieu, L. Wacquant, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 97–98.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 101–104.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

violence. Such violence “accomplishes itself through an act of cognition and of misrecognition that lies beyond – or beneath – the controls of consciousness and will, in the obscurities of the schemata of habitus”¹². As noted by P. Bourdieu, the social order functions as a symbolic machine ratifying the masculine domination on which it is founded. It includes the sexual division of labour, the structure of space – with the opposition between the place of assembly or the market, reserved for men, and the house, reserved for women and the structure of time¹³. Even the perception of sexual organs and male and female bodies, as well as the understanding of sexual intercourse¹⁴, are subordinate to male domination. Differences between the female and male bodies are the result of social constructs – incarnation. The androcentric vision of the world establishes “the difference between biological bodies as objective foundations of the difference between the sexes, in the sense of genders constructed as two hierarchized social essences”, embedding the relationship of domination in a biological nature¹⁵. The structures of domination are “the product of an incessant (and therefore historical) labour of reproduction, to which singular agents [...], and institutions: families, the church, the educational system, the state – contribute”¹⁶.

There is a mechanism of generating gender capital in schools. This capital can be treated as a form of symbolic capital¹⁷. Research on gender capital is connected, among other things, with differentiating the positioning of individuals in the social (school) space, through the active contribution of the teaching staff to creating differences in the school career development of the male and female pupils. Teachers do this by “assigning them different tasks to perform, expecting or predicting mastery in different fields of knowledge, insisting on the mastery of qualitatively different skills, [...] through the practice of a double standard in the assessment process”¹⁸.

School is, therefore, the place where the system of gender roles is maintained, which, according to Sandra Bem, is expressed through the lenses of gender, representing implicit assumptions about gender and sex, rooted in social practices, socio-cultural norms and individual awareness. Bem mentions three constitutive lenses of gender: androcentrism (male-centeredness), gender polarisation and biological essentialism¹⁹. “Androcentrism is the privileging of male experience [...]

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 171–172.

¹³ P. Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 9–10.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 17–24.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹⁷ L. Kopciwicz, *Szkola i dramat płci. Teoria społeczna Pierre’a Bourdieu w badaniu rodzajowego kapitału i habitusu* [School and gender drama. Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory in the study of gender capital and habitus], [in:] *Teatr płci. Eseje z socjologii gender* [Gender Theatre. Essays in Gender Sociology], M. Bieńkowska-Ptasznik, J. Kochanowski (eds.), Wydawnictwo Wschód–Zachód, Łódź 2008, p. 130.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

¹⁹ S.L. Bem, *The Lenses of Gender: Transforming the Debate on Sexual Inequality*, Yale University Press, 1993.

males and male experience are treated as a neutral standard or norm for the culture or the species as a whole, and females and female experience are treated as a sex-specific deviation from that allegedly universal standard". Gender polarisation, in turn, makes the distinction between male and female the organizing principle for social life in a given culture. This distinction affects numerous aspects of the social life. And biological essentialism rationalizes and legitimizes both other lenses by treating them as the natural and inevitable consequences of the intrinsic biological natures of women and men. Thus, "looking through these lenses of gender perpetuates male power" in the society²⁰.

According to Dorota Pankowska, the essence of these lenses are gender stereotypes. Stereotypes, being mental constructs, usually prevalent among members of a specific social group, based on a simplified and schematic perception of reality, are passed on in a given culture in the socialisation process. Gender stereotyping is influenced by the social (gender) norms and roles. The mechanism of gender stereotyping works through assigning men and women different tasks and responsibilities that are related to allegedly certain psychological traits, interpreting these traits as "natural" for women and men, which reinforces the belief that men and women are created to undertake different activities, and extending the expectations of men and women's behaviour also to other situations. Individuals feel the pressure of norms concerning their functioning as a woman or a man and submit to them, following the imposed patterns of behaviour. Behaviour in line with expectations confirms the legitimacy of the female and male stereotypical representation²¹. One of the places where gender stereotyping (categorisation?) takes place in the process of secondary socialisation is, naturally, school.

The creation of the social order in the context of gender roles in the school field takes place through an official and hidden curriculum. According to Roland Meighan, "the hidden curriculum is broadly defined as everything else that is learnt in addition to the official curriculum"²². In Meighan's case, this phenomenon concerns the school space, timetables, forms of organisation of education, the official curriculum, teacher's expectations and language and ways of communicating in the classroom²³. The hidden curriculum is also implemented through the content of school textbooks.

The school textbooks incorporate content that moulds stereotypical gender roles, as confirmed by scientific research. Dorota Pankowska analysed 25 textbooks for elementary education, which were in use in 1989, taking into account the prevalence of women and men, their professions, mutual interactions, types of activity, personality traits and ways of communication. These studies show that in school

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 41–46.

²¹ D. Pankowska, *Wychowanie a role płciowe* [Education and Gender Roles], GWP, Gdańsk 2005, pp. 19–20.

²² R. Meighan, *A Sociology of Educating*, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1981, p. 133.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 63–176.

textbooks we can encounter all the determinants of the system of gender roles: gender-segregated tasks (gender polarisation), different mental traits of women and men among the textbook characters (stereotyping), and the domination of masculinity and men (androcentrism)²⁴.

In the textbooks under review, women work in the services and care occupations, while men dominate the other professional groups. In addition, men's work goes beyond the local environment, and the work that women do is related to their immediate environment and does not require qualifications or mobility. The world of women is focused on children and the home. The role of women is defined from a maternity perspective. The masculine world, on the other hand, is defined by dynamism, activity, independence and diversity. A man is open to expansion, mobility and activity. He fulfils himself in his professional work and through his work and impressive accomplishments changes the world, for the good of the whole society. According to the author, gender polarisation in textbooks seems inevitable and natural²⁵. Thus, textbooks create psychological portraits in accordance with the stereotypes of masculinity and femininity; masculinity in general is valued higher, "[...] in society it is accepted to value professional rather than domestic work, public rather than private activity"²⁶.

Iza Desperak also points to the stereotypical depiction of women and men in textbooks. The author argues that despite all the changes that have taken place in education, school textbooks continue to offer the same portrayal of boys and girls, men and women. Social transformation, changes in social communication, or education reform, have not contributed to changes in this area. There is still a double standard of femininity and masculinity²⁷.

Indeed, school textbooks are an area that largely supports socialisation into traditional gender roles. The mechanism of gender capital generation in female and male pupils is also influenced by the expectations and behaviour of teachers towards the pupils.

Mariola Chomczyńska-Rubacha, citing Kłoskowska, argues that school is a socialising agenda that activates the transmission and adoption of behaviours, models and norms, as well as a certain body of knowledge related to the reality²⁸. Chomczyńska-Rubacha conducted research using the diagnostic survey method.

²⁴ D. Pankowska, *Wychowanie a role płciowe [Education and Gender Roles]*, GWP, Gdańsk 2005, p. 96.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 96–97.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 97–98.

²⁷ I. Desperak, *Podwójny standard w edukacji. Kobiecość i męskość w podręcznikach szkolnych [A Double Standard in Education. Femininity and Masculinity in School Textbooks]*, [in:] *Płeć i rodzaj w edukacji [Sex and Gender in Education]*, M. Chomczyńska-Rubacha (ed.), Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Humanistyczno-Ekonomicznej w Łodzi, Łódź 2004, pp. 139–141.

²⁸ M. Chomczyńska-Rubacha, *Nauczycielskie i uczniowskie przekazy socjalizacyjne związane z płcią [Teachers' and Pupils' Socialisation Messages Related to Gender]*, [in:] *Płeć i rodzaj w edukacji [Sex and Gender in Education]*, M. Chomczyńska-Rubacha (ed.), Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Humanistyczno-Ekonomicznej w Łodzi, Łódź 2004, p. 53.

She found that at school there are two conflicting socialisation worlds: that of the teachers and that of the students. The author describes and interprets the message concerning gender and sex that is sent by teachers and the message that is sent by pupils. For the purposes of this text, I will present the results concerning the message conveyed by the teachers themselves. Socialisation messages in this study have been operationalised as egalitarian, stereotypical or mixed. The study has demonstrated, however, that the dominant messages to students are mixed messages (37%); moreover, teachers trigger more stereotypical messages, consistent with the dominant definition of masculinity and femininity and negatively evaluating manifestations of traits considered feminine in men and vice versa (33%) than egalitarian messages, renouncing gender-specific behavioural and personality characteristics attributed to men and women (29%). As the researcher points out, the school simultaneously emancipates, typifies and activates ambiguous mixed messages²⁹.

Konarzewski conducted research in the first grades of four Warsaw-based primary schools, which has shown that boys and girls are assigned tasks of a different nature: girls – exercises, while boys – problem-solving tasks. Success in solving tasks positions students differently with respect to the authority of the teacher. Boys become independent from the teacher's authority and are encouraged to seek autonomy, while the girls' success leads them to submit to authority, which in turn fosters interpersonal dependence.

Elżbieta Putkiewicz carried out a study on the communication between teachers and students in grades III-IV during mathematics classes. The researcher noticed statistical differences in teachers' relation to boys and girls. The messages addressed to boys were less dogmatic; what is more, teachers seemed to accept their own person and the person of the listener. The less dogmatic the manner of communicating with students, the greater the student autonomy. Girls, through dogmatic messages, tend to receive and memorize information in a dogmatic way, whereas boys are treated as partners. Such experiences can influence the different educational outcomes of boys and girls and the development of their personality traits.

The methods of persecuting female students were the subject of the research by Lucyna Kopciewicz. In assessing the data using critical discourse analysis, the author distinguished several types of persecution employed by teachers and distinct forms of hate speech. These were referred to as discursive formations. Normative discourse is a kind of preventative measure regarding "girls' sexual appeal"³⁰. What teachers evaluate here is the girls' appearance. The reason for persecution is the concern about "not spoiling boys in class" or "not provoking boys". The cat-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 53–62.

³⁰ L. Kopciewicz, *Nauczycielskie poniżanie: szkolna przemoc wobec dziewcząt* [Degrading Treatment by Teachers: School Violence against Girls], Wydawnictwo Difin, Warszawa 2011, p. 120.

egory that binds together the recollections of the study subjects is the category of a “prostitute”. A female student being persecuted is separated from the rest of the class and thus made visible. It is an example of a class discourse depicting the actions of teachers from a position that suggests their greater cultural capital, and female students as uncritically devoted to fashion, devoid of these cultural competences. Teachers discredit cheapness (poverty) and the kitsch of “new money”. Female students are commented on in public and teachers speak from the position of universal aesthetics, stigmatizing lack of taste, mediocrity and gaudiness. On the basis of this discourse, a figure of “vulgarity” emerges. Items of clothing that do not fit the concept of a school outfit are treated as symptoms of the lack of class. From the analysis of the data, one can discern a singular canon of girls’ appearance at school, assuming the imperative of being “transparent”³¹. In the discourse of submissiveness, the classroom is treated as the teachers’ private kingdom, where they are free to impose their own concept of order. There are even cases of school-girls being physically assaulted. Teachers impose strict rules, which often result in victims looking for guilt within themselves and not seeking help in institutions³². Regulatory discourse involves “generating gender”, forcing schoolgirls to return to “appropriate” girly outfits. In the case of people who cannot or do not wish to comply with the stereotype, the aim here is to “turn them back” from the “deviant” path. A typical example of preventive measures is the de-homosexualisation of the classroom space³³. Another discursive formation (distaff discourse?) in which “teachers refer to [...] biological facts – they denounce girls’ physiology, and ridicule the changes occurring in girls’ bodies” – creates “an exceptionally unfavourable learning environment, imposing numerous limitations, causing emotional tension and avoidance of contact with the teacher”, which can affect personal development and learning outcomes³⁴.

In the field of school, stereotypical gender roles are created through official and hidden curricula, textbooks, and teachers’ expectations and behaviour towards male and female pupils. This has far-reaching implications for the functioning of women and men in society. The negative consequences of raising children to fit the roles stereotypically attributed to women and men include, among others, discrimination and sexism.

Discrimination involves unequal treatment, the limitation of someone’s rights, and, from a sociological perspective, treating members of one or more social groups worse than others. Gender discrimination is therefore the unequal treatment of people on the basis of their gender. The system of gender roles, which assumes the supremacy of masculinity, allows for open discrimination against women. This

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 126–131.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 133–139.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 140–146.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 147–156.

phenomenon occurs in many areas of life, including legal, political, educational, professional, moral and family life³⁵.

This affects access to ownership and law, the justice system, education, the labour market, and the capacity to determine one's own destiny³⁶. Despite the social changes that have recently taken place in Western societies, there are still hidden forms of gender discrimination. Old stereotypes of femininity and masculinity continue to exist³⁷.

A fairly recent term is sexism, which includes social practices that stigmatise individuals on the basis of gender, contribute to inequalities between women and men, and restrict groups and individuals' opportunities for development. Sexism may occur at four levels:

1. individual, i.e. referring to individuals and their attitudes towards gender and sex. This is when we attribute to people gender stereotypical characteristics based on whether they belong to a group of women or men;
2. socio-structural, in which the status attributed based on gender to the partner in the interaction manifests itself in group and interpersonal relations; in an androcentric society higher status is attributed to men, which in relations with women may be represented by the superior-subordinate, dominant-submissive model;
3. institutional, i.e. gender discrimination in institutions and their structure, ideology, organisation, patterns of behaviour – e.g. inequalities between women and men in the labour market, the gender pay gap, the glass ceiling, the glass escalator, i.e. fast-track promotion for males in female-dominated occupations, the sticky floor, i.e. keeping women in low status jobs without promotion opportunities;
4. cultural, which refers to explicit and implicit assumptions about sex and gender that influence the behaviour of members of a particular culture. Such beliefs are the basis for social inequalities³⁸.

Is it possible for a school that should perform an emancipatory role to fulfil its mission and prevent discrimination and sexism? After all, pedagogical texts do deal with transcending stereotypes, partnership and self-actualisation³⁹.

Sandra Bem, on the other hand, advocates changes in the patterns of social life and culture that would eliminate gender polarisation and androcentrism in favour of gender neutrality⁴⁰. The author recommends accepting a certain level of male-female difference as axiomatic, thus shifting the debate from "difference per se to the society's [androcentric] situating of women"⁴¹. Reflections on the androcentric

³⁵ D. Pankowska, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 115–116.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 118–128.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁴⁰ S.L. Bem, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–192.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

organisation of social life concern, among other things, the organisation of work, in which one may have the impression that no account is taken of the fact that a woman may or has become pregnant. Bem claims that “social institutions [...] invisibly and automatically smooth the way toward whatever the historically pre-programmed options – or the conventionally standard behaviours – are for a particular group in a particular time and place”⁴². The author also proposes a utopian vision of the world without gender polarisation. Eliminating gender would entail limiting the distinction between women and men to the narrow sphere related to biological reproduction⁴³. “Gender depolarisation would require even more than the social revolution involved in rearranging social institutions and reframing cultural discourses. Gender depolarisation would also require a psychological revolution in our most personal sense of who and what we are as males and females, a profound alteration in our feelings about the meaning of our biological sex and its relation to our psyche and our sexuality”⁴⁴. Bem’s reflections contribute to policy changes that address gender issues.

The system of gender roles is undergoing a transformation; therefore it is worth adapting social awareness to those changes and helping individuals to develop an individual gender role that is consistent with their needs. Moreover, today, as Dorota Pankowska points out, more and more researchers believe that gender typification is discriminatory and has a negative impact on mental health⁴⁵. Krzysztof Arcimowicz points to the limitations of the traditional system of gender roles, describing the changes in the paradigm of masculinity over the years⁴⁶. Today, the price that women and men pay for traditional gender roles is being revealed.

The results of this study indicate that changes are called for, but how to accomplish them? The conclusion of this paper will provide some proposals for improvements in the field of education. Research has revealed a major problem, which may require radical steps in the design of educational activities. Therefore, there is a need for educational projects that will make people sensitive to gender issues. But how to design equality education in a school that, as I have shown earlier, referring to critical sociology theories, is a place of hidden violence and the imposition of stereotypical gender roles? This is a question that applies to the entire system.

Gender-sensitive teachers should be able to hold discussions and organise debates in the classroom. Debate is one of the best ways to mobilise pupils in the classroom, enabling them to genuinely confront different views. Making teachers themselves sensitive to gender is warranted. The attitudes and expectations of

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp.192–193.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 196.

⁴⁵ D. Pankowska, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–159.

⁴⁶ K. Arcimowicz, *Obraz mężczyzny w polskich mediach* [Male Image in the Polish Media], GWP, Gdańsk 2004.

teachers influence their behaviour towards male and female pupils, thus generating gender capital. But what about people who think in a stereotypical fashion and are guided by prejudice and gender bias?

Perhaps it would be appropriate to go beyond the institution of the school itself and to vet the people who will work as teachers in terms of their awareness of gender issues? The diagnosis will be difficult in a mass education setting, and there will always be an argument that the universities cannot afford it; but the consequences of such short-sightedness are painfully clear. In teacher training programmes there is a need for a curriculum which would make future teachers sensitive to gender issues. Gender, as a category more and more frequently encountered in pedagogical discourse, could be dealt with not only in optional but also in compulsory classes: lectures or workshops. It might be necessary to educate students about gender theory, to make them acquainted with the latest socio-pedagogical research in the field of gender education/sociology and to encourage them to carry out their own research on gender stereotypes and the consequences of these stereotypes.

Students could be able to conduct studies under the supervision of professors and assistant professors who explore gender issues, for example by participating in their research projects, which may inspire the future teachers to further broaden their knowledge in this area.

The issue of gender stereotyping in school textbooks is also an important problem. How is it possible to enact change when it is evident, as research by Pankowska or Chomczyńska-Rubach shows, that they reproduce and perpetuate gender stereotypes? How to reach out to people involved in the design of school textbooks? How to give a voice to those who are gender-sensitive and who are not afraid to take up important issues in the 21st century and make them influence the content of school textbooks? The problem is the invisibility of these people and the impression is that they are not allowed to enter the public debate. Let us therefore work on their visibility and equality in the broadest sense of the term in a democratic society. These are challenges for the contemporary critical pedagogy in Poland.

Summary

Generating Gender Capital in the Education Process and its Impact on the Functioning of Men and Women

Gender is a category more and more frequently encountered in Polish pedagogical research. This paper will present the problem of generating students' "gender capital" in the educational process and will demonstrate the mechanism of reproduction and its social implications for the functioning of men and women. School is the place where socialisation intensifies the social roles, including the roles stereotypically attributed to women and men. School reinforces the individuals' sense of belonging to a particular

gender, but it can also be a place of negotiating the meaning of gender. The article refers to Pierre Bourdieu's social theory, in which a school can be described as social field where the reproduction of the social order in terms of gender takes place. Gender roles in the school space are established through the formal and a hidden curriculum, textbooks and teachers' expectations and behaviour towards male and female students. The author refers to these issues, pointing to major socio-pedagogical studies. Socialisation into "normal" gender roles is treated by the school system as a desirable and positive process, despite the fact that it carries with it negative consequences in the form of discrimination and sexism.

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Creation of Pedagogical Knowledge from the Perspective of the Archetypal Dimension of Masculinity and Femininity

Subject is all something.
M. Merleau-Ponty

Unconsciousness as a forgotten dimension of the creation of pedagogical knowledge

If you consider that, on the one hand, knowledge is supposed to offer orientation in pedagogical activities and to orient these activities, and, on the other hand, that it is some kind of experience gained in communication (dialogue, constituted in QA dialectics), then it can be viewed in three aspects. Firstly, it is the knowledge about ourselves and about the world, the knowledge thanks to which we “somehow” understand ourselves and the world – we “somehow” understand the pedagogical world and the subjects present in this world. Therefore, it can be defined as anthropological knowledge. Secondly, it is the knowledge which comprises our approach to the pedagogical world and its subjects, establishing its meaning. This would be axiological and teleological knowledge, with its sources rooted in questions like “Why?”, “What for?”, and “What way?”. The above two aspects of pedagogical knowledge together produce the third kind of knowledge which I am going to call “contemplative knowledge”, which builds in the process of practice and the contemplation of practice¹. Pedagogical knowledge is also practical knowledge, because it is the knowledge “functioning in practice”. How can this be understood? Most of all, it is a knowledge referring to the area of extra- and inter-personal activities, which are the essence of any pedagogical activity². Practical pedagogical knowledge does not

¹ Cf. R. Kwaśnica, *Wprowadzenie do myślenia o nauczycielu* [Introduction to Thinking about the Teacher], [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki* [Pedagogy. Academic Script], Z. Kwiecieński and B. Śliwowski [eds.], vol. II, PWN, Warszawa 2007; A. Walczak, *Od refleksji do bycia refleksyjnym pedagogiem* [From Contemplation to Being a Contemplative Pedagogue], [in:] *Ibid. Spotkanie z wychowankiem. Ku tożsamości ipse pedagoga* [A Meeting with the Alumnus. Towards the Pedagogue's Ipse Identity], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2011.

² This aspect of pedagogical knowledge refers both to the knowledge created by, still dichotomously presented, so called pedagogues-practitioners, and also by pedagogues-theoreticians, only

reflect the pedagogical knowledge existing outside of it. Its practicality reveals and generates new qualities: the principles and meanings of its reality.

A three-aspect pedagogical knowledge can be treated as a paradigm of pedagogical activity. Then it would be a tool for noticing/learning/understanding/interpreting/producing pedagogical reality³.

I am interested in how pedagogical knowledge can be produced in the course of pedagogical practice and for its own sake. Therefore, I do not use such terms as acquiring or attaining knowledge, or even its discovering or substantiating. Knowledge given, which takes on the form of "reasoned" knowledge, is like the human world is given to humans: tame, i.e. also arbitrary⁴. It is usually knowledge dealing with substantiating pedagogical reality, the "real" one as well as the postulated one. It is based on the procedures of reason, or more precisely on the mind *aka* intellect, i.e. the conscious part of the human psyche which generates the adjustment approach. The mind, which we will call – following Alina Motycka – "a certain skill and also a certain approach", in the Western culture is a well-known instrument ensuring the reliability and sense of reality in which we participate. This is why knowledge is often associated with the work of the human mind as specifically a human ability. Motycka says:

Such an ability, comprises the ability of conceptual thinking (abstracting, i.e. obtaining a concept), judging (i.e. obtaining judgements), controlled thinking (i.e. the ability to have a discourse), argumentative, explanatory, justifying reasoning; proving (i.e. demonstrative thinking); it is also the ability of receiving and processing material supplied by the senses⁵.

Therefore, creating knowledge is not a free act, because its creators are not free of themselves. They are constrained by their own process of creating knowledge, on the one hand, by their mind with its rules and procedures which control this process and which depend on the human will⁶, on the other hand, by the uncon-

because in both cases it may be treated in the aspect of a produced text, which communicates "something" to "someone". This means that pedagogical knowledge is created in the medium of communication, and sustains, changes, creates this communication, etc.

³ Cf. T. Kuhn, [*The Essential Tension. Selected Studies in Scientific tradition and Change*], The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1977. It should be pointed out here that besides relations and similarities between the knowledge of the pedagogical reality and the pedagogical reality itself there are differences which can evoke tensions between them. This issue, however, is not the subject matter of this article.

⁴ A. Motycka, *Rozum i intuicja w nauce. Zbiór rozpraw i szkiców filozoficznych* [Wisdom and Intuition in Science. The Collection of Philosophical Treatises and Sketches], Eneteia, Warszawa 2005, p. 102.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 102

⁶ Cf. In his *Philosophy of Expression* Giorgio Colli writes about the mind as a reply to the dependence of human expression as follows: "The mind was born as a specific complementation, whose justification is something hidden, something external, which cannot be regained, but only pointed to by a 'discourse'. And then there comes an illusion that the mind is a purpose in itself. There emerges a new perspective and a new expression, the obedience towards structure and regulation of fate continues, which primarily was merely some auxiliary tool". *Idem*, after H. Buczyńska-Garewicz, *Prawda i złudzenie. Eseje o myśleniu* [Truth and Illusion. Essays on Thinking], Universitas, Kraków 2008, p. 297.

scious⁷. Neither of these factors – neither the mind as a disposition of the conscious part of the human psyche, nor the unconscious combined with the conscious – is an empty vessel gradually filling up in the process of individual experience. Following Kant's thinking, both the mind and the psyche, which cannot be reduced to this mind solely, contain certain a priori categories. *In the psyche*, the correlate of a priori categories of the mind "are unconscious dispositions which every man inherits, and does not gain by their own experience"⁸.

In this article, out of the concepts of unconsciousness – present in philosophy and psychology⁹ – I refer to the one conceived by Carl Gustav Jung¹⁰. It is related to such subcomponents of his theory as the concept of the collective unconscious¹¹, archetypes, psychological types and their functions, personality development, with its most important process of individuation, and the concept of the unity of opposites, as well as synchronicity. According to Jung – and later in post-Jungian psychological concepts, hence in all directions of depth psychology – the unconscious together with the conscious are integral forces stimulating the individual psyche. This means that the psyche cannot be identified with the conscious. Jung argues that [...] "the psyche is, in fact, the only immediate experience of life and existence. It is, in fact, the only immediate experience we can have and the sine qua

⁷ As representatives of the Polish psychology of culture underline, the implications of the psychology of unconsciousness in the area of the philosophy of education, the knowledge of culture (although theories of S. Hall, J. Campbell, E. Neumann, or J. Hillman ought to be mentioned at this place), theology, as well as in sociology, religious studies or the psychology of religion (apart from the studies of C. G. Jung, J. Rudin, A. Moreno, or E. Drewermann), in the psychology of language (F. Lacan), and, we must add, also in pedagogy (besides, e.g. the concepts of Bernie Neville implemented into the Polish background) are rather a concept of the future. Z.W. Dudek, A. Pankalla, *Psychologia kultury. Doświadczenia graniczne i transkulturowe*, [Psychology of Culture. Liminal and Trans-cultural Experience], Eneteia, Warszawa 2005. According to Jung, however, as Kazimierz Pajor writes: "an important criterion of the scholarly approach is if a given field is able to open itself to cognition of the whole reality. This thesis is of particular importance in psychology which 'has to take into consideration what is irrational' [...] Irrationality is not identical with unreality, and may mean, for instance, the specificity of subconscious processes [...]". *Idem, Śladami Junga* [Following Jung], Eneteia, Warszawa 2006, p. 181. I believe that this comment also refers to pedagogy.

⁸ K. Pajor, *Psychologia archetypów Junga*, [Psychology of Jung's Archetypes], Eneteia, Warszawa 2007, p. 158.

⁹ Cf. B. Dobroczyński, *Ciemna strona psychiki* [Dark Side of the Psyche], Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 1994; *Nieświadomość jako Kategoria Filozoficzna* [Unconsciousness as a Philosophical Category], A. Motycka, W. Wrzosek (eds.), IFIS PAN, Warszawa 2000.

¹⁰ As K. Pajor writes: "The Jungian concept of unconsciousness is unique, reaching far beyond the Freudian model, and covers the whole of the development of the human spirit as such". *Idem, Psychologia archetypów Junga...* [Psychology of Jung's Archetypes], p. 21.

¹¹ In Jungian psychology it is impossible to talk about man, and forget about culture. As Zenon Waldemar Dudek writes: "In order to test relations between psychic processes with culture, it must be assumed that the psyche possesses specific 'receptors' and 'activators' of the phenomena of culture". These are the archetypes, expressing the fundamental dimensions of mental, social, and spiritual lives. *Idem, Psychologia integralna Junga* [Jung's Integral Psychology]. Eneteia, Warszawa 2006, p. 141. The existence of archetypes is not dependent on the individual, on the individual's temporary existence, although on the other hand it is the *psyche* which constitutes the requirement of existence in a given cultural reality. "Collective unconsciousness is – to a certain extent – a kind of phylogenetic treasury in which all that man has continuously experienced over millennia, has become a heritage of each individual". K. Pajor, *Psychologia archetypów Junga* [Psychology of Jung's Archetypes], p. 172.

non of the subjective reality of the world"¹². However, what we do not experience directly is the unconscious psyche, and this is why we cannot explore it directly. We only explore its indications. The psychological processes of unconsciousness can be explored only indirectly, i.e. through the effects they evoke. Unconsciousness is not so much accessible in consciousness as it is manifested through it. However, it is an odd manifestation, because as Jung says, "*Whatever we have to say about the unconscious is what the conscious mind says about it*, and this is so because its language is acausal, timeless and alogical"¹³. And it is not a language we get accustomed to, or rather it is not a language which would be regarded as valid in the rationalized world, where the intellect comes down to the mind with its functions already well-known from cognitive psychology. Language and unconscious thinking are intuitive, spontaneous, instinctive, oriented – therefore they are largely independent of the will, unlike the language and conscious thinking, dominated by the principles of the mind's logic, which are ruled by selection, and [...] "selection demands direction. But direction requires the exclusion of everything irrelevant. This is bound to make the conscious orientation one-sided"¹⁴. Unconsciousness, however, is as alive as consciousness, and therefore unconscious perception – so essential in creating knowledge – is characterized by activity highly developed intellectually, whose effect "comes spontaneously and independently rather than automatically" as compared to consciousness¹⁵. The difference between consciousness and unconsciousness lies not only in the way of their functioning, but their content and their tendencies as well.

This paper is not supposed to be the glorification of Jung's thought, neither do I take a critical stance towards it. Referring to it, I want rather to point out one more of the possible perspectives in discovering pedagogical reality, its understanding and interpretation, and determining the directions of its changes. Nowadays, while conducting inquiries, not only on the humanities – like it or not – we come across Jung. He has as many supporters and followers as he has critics. In a nutshell, someone whose interests – excuse the banality of speech – oscillate around man, his personality and his relation with culture, cannot be indifferent to his analytical and integral psychology.

However, some comment would be in order at this point. In contemporary psychology, his perspective – which takes into account the psyche and the fact that humans have souls, and that the development of what is usually defined as personality arises out of the development of the spirit – turns out to be controversial. This is individuation understood – briefly speaking – as a process of the

¹² C. G. Jung, *Symbols of Transformation. An Analysis of the Prelude to a Case of Schizophrenia*, [in:] H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, W. McGuire (eds.), *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (Vol. 5) Bollingen Series XX. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1976.

¹³ C. G. Jung, *Analytical Psychology, Its Theory and Practice*, [in:] *The Tavistock Lectures, Lecture 1*, Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, New York, p. 6

¹⁴ C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types*, [in:] H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, W. McGuire (eds.) *The collected works of C. G. Jung* (Vol. 6), Bollingen Series XX. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1976, p. 419.

¹⁵ K. Pajor, *Psychologia archetypów...* [Psychology of Archetypes...], p. 165.

development of the individual self by going beyond the individual ego towards fulfilling oneself as a human being; in this process consciousness is both its part and its specific condition¹⁶. Connecting this conception with the vision of culture – for some researchers – very often takes the aspects of reductionism. This thought is dominated by psychologism¹⁷. On the one hand, it is hardly surprising, as it is

only the way of thinking coming from the mental trait of the individual, interpreting social phenomena as aspects or derivatives of the psyche, those favourably disposed will say. Psychologism, however, is sometimes a ‘nothing but’ attitude, nothing but the psyche – will say the indignant cultural studies researchers¹⁸.

In Jung’s conception, the reference of culture to man and man to culture does not stop on the surface of phenomena. The conception of the collective unconscious archetypes is the entrance to the deepest areas of culture, and therefore the entrance into the human “inside”, because it was based on the analysis of cultural phenomena and content reflected in the human psyche. For Jung, these archetypes reveal the dark side of human nature, and also they are creative tendencies towards the integration of the psyche. Man remained a creation of culture determined not only by its social aspects and his own consciousness, but also by unaware meanings. At this point, we can speak of the essentialism of Jung’s theory, at the same time pointing out its irrationalism and idealism. And so the conception of the collective unconscious archetypes would be the conception of certain significances – permanent, constant and existing under the surface of reality – which after all play the role of models in individual and cultural development. Jungian thinking, however, does not go in the causal direction (as Freudian does), but theological: it is oriented toward the future and finalisation. For Jung clearly said that it was his mission to lead what is unconscious to consciousness, to indicate the confrontation and dialogue between them, which are not only possible but necessary in individual development (leading to individuation) and cultural development.

Jung’s theory is saturated with a psychobiographical element: some may even think it is “diary-like”, and therefore lacks objectivity¹⁹. His peculiar style was also

¹⁶ Consciousness may also block the process. For Jung, however, it was not consciousness itself which plays a key role in the total process of individuation, but its relation to unconsciousness. It is an extremely important assumption for the discussed problems in this article.

¹⁷ Jung dissociated himself from psychologising the ego, even more so that the ego itself is not of a subjective nature – it is a certain whole, the identity and individuality of which is just emerging. It is also not the crowning of the spiritual development, but a requirement of all its higher forms.

¹⁸ A. Pankalla, *O spotkaniu kwadratu z kulą. Jung po polsku* [On the Meeting Between the Square and the Sphere. Jung in Polish], [in:] *Fenomen Junga. Dzieło. Inspiracje. Współczesność* [Jung’s Phenomenon. Works. Inspirations. The Present], K. Maurin, A. Motycka (eds.), Eneteia, Warszawa 2002, p. 219.

¹⁹ Cf. F. McLynn, *Carl Gustav Jung: a Biography*, St. Martin’s Griffin, New York 1996. K. Pajor says about the above-mentioned Jung’s biography as follows: “Many books devoted to Jung constitute a reliable presentation of the person and his psychology; however, there are plenty of books where the authors were satisfied with superficiality, producing or adopting from others various erroneous views about Jung and his psychology. A thorough biography of Jung written by Frank McLynn,

criticized, and as a consequence his theory was not considered scientific²⁰. Another problem – stressed in polemics and criticism of his thought – can be the mythic, and for some also the metaphysical, character of the conception of culture and personality and their symbiosis. Jung, combining numerous fields into one, analysed phenomena which are usually considered not worth academic interest. They include such things as alchemy, occultism, astrology, as well as magic and parapsychology. He studied Eastern philosophy, the religions of ancient Europe, the Gnostic texts of early Christianity, as well as mythological texts from the cradle of Western culture. He went on anthropological tours of America and Africa. However, his contribution to modern anthropology and psychology is often reduced to the category of esoteric gnosis, and he himself is described as some kind of possessed prophet²¹. He, however, considered himself an empiricist, although this empiricism is also criticized for a lack of respect for science²². He wrote:

It is certainly remarkable that my critics, with few exceptions, ignore the fact that, as a doctor and scientist, I proceed from facts which everyone is at liberty to verify. Instead, they criticize me as if I were a philosopher, or a Gnostic with pretensions to supernatural knowledge. As a philosopher and speculating heretic I am, of course, easy prey. This is probably the reason why people prefer to ignore the facts I have discovered [...]²³.

What should also be mentioned is the language of Jung's theory, which has an effect on its perception. It is often a language not only allusive, but also ambiguous (or multivalued), which some regard as devoid of precision. For example, some terms used to define the self are considered to be mutually exclusive. The self, which for Jung is the central archetype of the psyche's order and oriented toward this order, is also defined – according to Zofia Rosińska who cites J. Redfearn – as:

which has just been translated into Polish, is the best example. We can feel the lightness of writing of the author; however, that is all we can say [...] I would be pleased to call it a 'critical biography' had it deserved that name. Perhaps McLynn had such aspirations; however, the thing he achieved has nothing in common with the scientifically-critical monograph, from which one would expect in-depth analyses and publishing original opinions of the critically-assessed author. McLynn, however, refers to Jung's opinions, and, frequently, instead of quoting Jung's statements, he gives his own interpretations. In this way he criticises the Jung he has created himself" – K. Pajor, *Śladami Junga* [Following Jung], pp. 9–10. A critical review of another book about Jung's theory, written by Richard Noll, *The Jung Cult. Origins of a Charismatic Movement* was written by Mirosław Piróg. *Idem, Jung in the Eyes of a Critic*, [in]: *Fenomen Junga. Dzieło. Inspiracje. Współczesność* [Jung's Phenomenon. Works. Inspirations. The Present...], pp. 35–43.

²⁰ Sigmund Freud was also frequently accused of triviality and a non-scientific approach, and a trace amount of impact on philosophy and the academic sciences, particularly when the contact with his psychology was superficial and full of prejudice. Cf. P. Dybel, *Okruchy psychoanalizy. Między teorią Freuda i poststrukturalizmem* [Scraps of Psychoanalysis. Between Freud's Theory and Post-structuralism], Universitas, Kraków 2009.

²¹ Cf. articles in periodicals *Czwarty wymiar* and *Nie z tej Ziemi* [The 4th Dimension and Not From this Earth].

²² I am not getting involved in a discussion encompassing the "scientific approach" in science. The reader may find relevant literature concerning the issue of the contemporary philosophy of science.

²³ C.G. Jung, after G. Wehr, *Portrait of Jung: an Illustrated Biography*, transl. W.A. Hargreaves. Herder and Herder, New York 1971.

- a cosmic unity, understood as in the Eastern concepts, where it means the unity with all phenomena, both animate and inanimate;
- the totality of the individual;
- an experience of wholeness;
- primeval forces, organizing elements, outside the conscious 'I';
- the organizing centre of the unconscious;
- emerging parts of the unconscious self²⁴.

However, there is no doubt that Jung earned his place in the psychological and psychotherapeutic trends which are oriented toward human potential, human creative activity and the human spiritual dimension. Some of his conceptions, e.g. the conception of psychological types, archetypes and collective unconsciousness, introduce new perspectives in the analyses of culture, and allow for (or even force) the reinterpretation of culture-forming processes²⁵. Both Freud's psychoanalysis and Jung's analytical and integral psychology are not only a psychological theory; they had an enormous impact on the 20th-century humanities. Introducing a new discourse on man and culture, they both continue to inspire it – also by their criticism.

Unconsciousness and common knowledge as the archaeology of pedagogical knowledge

Taking into consideration the unity of consciousness and unconsciousness in individual development of the psyche, I point out – after Alina Motycka – a significant role of the idea in creating knowledge. It will mean that creating knowledge is mediated in the idea as something not directly perceptible, visible and cognizable, but is not quite free²⁶. The idea is vague and indistinct, but it is prior to creating knowledge of the world, and it lies in the very essence of knowledge in the way that decides about its structuralisation and function, as well as its boundaries²⁷. It is

²⁴ Z. Rosińska, *Jaźń i poczucie sensu* [Self and the Feeling of Sense], [in:] *Fenomen Junga. Dzieło. Inspiracje. Współczesność* [Jung's Phenomenon. Works. Inspirations. The Present...], p. 101.

²⁵ It is worth mentioning here that Jung is also presented as a disciple of Sigmund Freud, and as one of the dissidents of the psychoanalytic movement. As a consequence, this may result in the opposition; you either opt for Jung, or for Freud. However, we may discover traces of continuation or complementarity. Z.W. Dudek writes: "going in his deliberations towards the examination of myths, symbols, religion, and culture, Jung added to psychological claims his 'broadening' concepts (active imagination and the method of amplification besides the method of free associations, collective unconsciousness beside Freudian individual unconsciousness, archetypes beside complexes, etc.)". On the other hand, however, it can be stated that it is due to Jung and his criticism of Freudian psychoanalysis, and then thanks to his cultural studies that Freud in his writings took up the topics which combine psychology and culture, publishing works like *Totem and Taboo, Civilisation and its Discontents*. Z.W. Dudek, *Freudowska i Jungowska psychologia kultury – konflikt i dialog* [Freudian and Jungian Psychology of Culture – Conflict and Dialogue], [in:] *Fenomen Junga. Dzieło. Inspiracje. Współczesność* [Jung's Phenomenon. Works. Inspirations. The Present...], p. 200.

²⁶ A. Motycka, *Rozum i intuicja w nauce* [Wisdom and Intuition in Science], pp. 111–124, 156–157; *Eadem, Człowiek wewnętrzny a epistème. Zbiór rozpraw i szkiców filozoficznych o nauce*, [Internal Man and Epistème. Collection of Philosophical Treatises and Sketches on Education], Warszawa 2010, pp. 34–41.

²⁷ See: Comparing Giorgio Colli's philosophy of expression in her essay under the characteristic title *Kto mówi?* [Who is Talking?], Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz writes: "In what is present, visible and

the idea that decides about the choice of ways of seeing and understanding the world available to man. The idea as such – referring to the psychology of Jungian archetypes, more of which further on – besides images and symbols is the archetypal conception, which both throughout the course of history and in individual life can take various forms of rationalizing its content²⁸. Archetypal contents “are fundamental for any mental act, all our views – even scientific ones – and which considerably influence them”²⁹. Therefore, they are elements of the collective unconsciousness that “fight their way” to individual unconsciousness. Taking into consideration the importance of the personality factor in the process of creating knowledge, the factor connected not only with the rational sphere but irrational as well, it is the archetypal idea as the active archetype that directs the creation of knowledge and influences it. It is the idea that gives order and form to the material of consciousness, and thus the manifestations of rationality³⁰.

What is intriguing in creating pedagogical knowledge is not where the creators of pedagogical knowledge draw the material for it – from what idea regarded here as a conception – but how they get to the idea or rather from what area of their personality such an idea “appeals” to them.

The fundamental source of human knowledge of the world we live in is – argues Krystyna Ablewicz – “people’s popular existing in the world, or rather popular understanding of the world”³¹. “Popular existing in the world” can be defined as knowledge in a broader sense – as it is understood by Janusz Gnitecki, for example. Then knowledge could be defined as [...] “any set of information, views and beliefs attributed with cognitive and/or practical value. In this perspective, knowledge can refer to many different types of rationality and go beyond scientific knowledge”³². The

tangible lies thus an allusion to the invisible, absent and intangible. [...] The world as a demonstration, shining and glistening on its surface, hides in its inside unknown and elusive reality, simultaneously conditioning all the possible external emergence [...]”. *Idem, Prawda i złudzenie* [Truth and Illusion...], pp. 285–291.

²⁸ Cf. C.G. Jung, *Archetypy i symbole. Pisma wybrane* [Archetypes and Symbols. Selected writings], Czytelnik, Warszawa 1967 [Polish compilation – no corresponding publication in English]; *Idem, O naturze kobiety* [On the Nature of Women], Wydawnictwo Brama – Książnica Włóczęgów i Uczonych, Poznań 1992 [Polish compilation – no corresponding publication in English]; *Idem, Symbols of Transformation*, [in:] H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, W. McGuire (eds.) *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (Vol. 5); *Idem, Psychological Types*, [in:] H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, W. McGuire (ed.), *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (Vol. 6); K. Pajor, *Psychologia archetypów Junga...* [Jung’s Psychology of Archetypes...]; M. Piróg, *Indywidualność a archetypy* [Individuality and Archetypes]; *ALBO albo. Problemy psychologii kultury* [EITHER or. Problems of the Psychology of Culture] 2001, No. 3, *Archetypes*.

²⁹ C.G. Jung, *The Transformation Symbolism in the Mass*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955–1963.

³⁰ A. Walczak, *(Samo)świadomość vel (samo)wiedza Ja-aksjologicznego pedagoga* [(Self)consciousness or (self)knowledge of the Self-axiological Pedagogue], [in:] *Idem, Spotkanie z wychowankiem* [Meeting With an Alumnus...].

³¹ K. Ablewicz, *Teoretyczne i metodologiczne podstawy pedagogiki antropologicznej. Studium sytuacji wychowawczej* [Theoretical and Methodological Foundations of Anthropological Pedagogy. A Study of the Educational Situation], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2003, p. 37. *Colloquial being in the world* means for me a *real being* in Heidegger’s sense of the word, as it was worded by Marcin Potępa. *Idem, Fenomen faktycznego życia. Martin Heidegger* [The Phenomenon of Actual Life. Martin Heidegger], Genesis, Warszawa 2004.

³² J. Gnitecki, *Wstęp do ogólnej metodologii badań w naukach pedagogicznych* [Introduction to General Methodology of Research in the Pedagogical Sciences], vol. II, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań

popular understanding of the world is overlapped by knowledge in the narrower sense, i.e. scientific knowledge (understood in different ways within individual sciences, as well as in the philosophy of science). Scientific knowledge seems to be the creation of the human mind, usually identified with reason, about which I wrote earlier – except that in the process of creating this kind of knowledge, the factors that decide about the whole of man can no longer be eliminated. After all, man's thinking cannot be reduced to thinking that is solely logical – it can be, at the most, the effect of thinking from various “types of rationality”, if at this point it is still legitimate to use the term “rationality”. I assume that creating pedagogical knowledge builds on top of popular knowledge, connected with “actual life”, and contains it in itself, despite the fact that it frequently keeps a rationalized distance. It is a knowledge “speaking” from the unconsciousness of the individual psyche, therefore being also significant in the process of creating pedagogical knowledge in a narrower sense.

In summary here, pedagogical knowledge – not the one coming from books, but practical – is not created randomly and beyond any principles of epistemology and methodology, most often acquired during university studies. But it is more than that: the personality factor is also important. The cognitive aspect is still a key element in creating pedagogical knowledge; however, the importance of the personal factor in this process, which becomes a key issue in this article, also results from adopting the assumption on wiping out the subject-object relation, expressed by the division of the cognitive area into the cognitive subject and recognized object³³. The empowerment of the object of cognition means its construction in the process of its recognition (as well as its understanding) by the recognizing subject, without which the object itself cannot be imagined outside the subject-object relation. Being a pedagogue, you exist in the pedagogical world (whether it is a classically defined dichotomous world of theory or practice – it does not matter much) – you are inside it. In other words, being an element of created pedagogical knowledge, you cannot locate yourself outside of yourself. Therefore knowledge, being created by man, acquires his traits – it is constructed in complex cultural relations, because it is the main place where he stays and determines himself, which means it is constructed in the context of gender and its roles, class, race, language and other social contexts. Creating pedagogical knowledge is also creating “knowledge for us” – who create this knowledge. Through this knowledge we give significance to our experience, which in essence is the form of our presenting ourselves HOW we ARE WHO we are. In this sense, peda-

2006, p. 17. Cf. “The first thing that appears when we begin to analyse our common knowledge is that some of it is derivative, while some is primitive; that is to say, there is some that we only believe because of something else from which it has been inferred in some sense, though not necessarily in a strict logical sense, while other parts are believed on their own account, without the support of any outside evidence”. B. Russell, *Nasza wiedza o świecie zewnętrznym* [Our Knowledge of the External World], Routledge, New York and London 2002.

³³ Cf. the qualitative approach to methodology of research, e.g. *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, N.K. Denzin, Y.S. Lincoln (eds.), 3rd edn., Sage, London 2005; D. Kubinowski, *Jakościowe badania pedagogiczne. Filozofia – Metodyka – Ewaluacja* [Qualitative Pedagogical Research. Philosophy – Methodology – Evaluation], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 2010.

gogical knowledge has its structure, although it in itself can also be an incoherence of representations. Therefore, the created pedagogical knowledge is a certain supplement to the reality of pedagogical activities – it is their source, but at the same time it is born together with them. This is why it was earlier defined as a supporting tool in being a pedagogue, for it is always somebody's knowledge and for someone. Its usefulness consists in the basic function of the purposefulness of its creation – being present in pedagogical reality requires the participant to grasp the sense of “presenting” this reality. It is not an independent value, its value is revealed due to the need to make one's own activities sensible, even if in the end one notes they are pointless. Only knowledge acquired, tamed, and applied in practice has its sense through the pedagogue's personality.

Irrationality/unconsciousness is a structural element of creating pedagogical knowledge also when this knowledge is recognized and adopted from the arsenal of available pedagogical theories. Therefore a question arises about the quality of irrationality in the process of creating pedagogical knowledge. And here I see the possibility of combining the issue that interests me with the issues of both the Jungian archetype psychology and the post-Jungian psychology³⁴. The fact that you are a pedagogue because you ponder on yourself and what you do, does not tell you yet “what kind” of pedagogue you are. You may think about yourself but that does not mean that you think from the depth of yourself. Or you may think about yourself, but the depth of yourself has an effect on this thinking anyway. The motives of thought movement can be different, and the movement itself thinks too. Therefore I want to show a possible relation between the archetypal dimension of masculinity and femininity in the development of the individual psyche and the kind, structure and function of possessed and created pedagogical knowledge³⁵.

Anima and Animus as archetypal dimensions of femininity and masculinity – positive aspect

The Jungian concept of archetypes assumes the existence of a structure within the collective unconsciousness responsible for “the occurrence of a definite imaginary material”³⁶. Archetypes are these structures; they used to be described as the

³⁴ Why Jung's and post-Jung's psychology? I find the answers in Z. W. Dudek's words: “Jung's concepts [...] belong to the pioneers, and they particularly belong to the theory discussing the hereditary, archetypal dimensions of femininity and masculinity (the archetype of Anima in men, and Animus in women). They preceded academic psychology by at least half a century in their global view of femininity and masculinity as dimensions of personality, consciousness, unconsciousness, social attitudes and cultural identity”. *Idem, Pleć psychologiczna, wzorzec kultury i duchowość* [Psychological Gender, Standard and Spirituality], [in:] *ALBO. Problemy psychologii kultury* [EITHER or. Problems of the Psychology of Culture] 2007, No. 2, *Civilisation and Gender*, p. 63.

³⁵ K. Pajor writes about Jung's view about cognition: “[...] **substantiality of thinking or cognition** is not related to physical facts, but **constitutes a psychological issue**, i.e. it is conditioned by temperament”. *Idem, Psychologia archetypów...* [Psychology of Archetypes...], p. 161 [marked by A. W.].

³⁶ K. Pajor, *Śladami Junga...* [Following Jung...], p. 186.

universal dominants of the collective unconsciousness which “break through the individual consciousness even against its own will formed by tradition”³⁷.

[Between] the structures of collective unconsciousness and human experience as such there occurs mutual conditioning, i.e. on the one hand, gained and repeated many a time experiences which constitute the source and the beginning of primeval images, and on the other hand – archetypes, as formulated by human experience, primeval forms of human encounters and experience which must have a fundamental impact on human experience³⁸.

Archetypes are the psychodynamic forces of unconsciousness which, “breaking through the consciousness”, organise, make sense, and standardize experience at the level of individual consciousness and in the social and cultural dimension³⁹. Jung classified the Shade, the Animus, the Anima, the Great Mother, the Wise Old Man, and the Self as the fundamental archetypes that can be observed in various cultures, eras, and in the development of the individual *psyche*. Accepting the Jungian assumption that every human is somehow bisexual – meaning his/her *psyche* contains both masculinity and femininity – we are going to focus in this paper on the characteristic features of the Animus and the Anima as those which besides biological and psychological gender, determine a so-called archetypal (cultural) gender⁴⁰.

The Anima and Animus are treated as a fundamental pair of the oppositions in the development of the individual *psyche*, which is a personification of the masculine and feminine unconsciousness⁴¹. I am going to pay particular attention to the displaying of the immature forms of Anima assimilation – the feminine element within man – and Animus – the masculine element within woman, assuming that they exert the impact on creating pedagogical knowledge.

³⁷ Z.W. Dudek, *Archetypowe wzorce w rozwoju indywidualnej psyche* [Archetypal Patterns in the Development of Individual Psyche], [in:] *ALBO. Problemy psychologii kultury* [EITHER or. Problems of the Psychology of Culture] 2005, No. 4: *Inteligencja archetypów. Typy, stereotypy, symbole* [Intelligence of Archetypes. Types, Stereotypes, Symbols], p. 25. Jung writes: “The archetype would thus be, to borrow from Kant, the *noumenon* of the *image* which intuition perceives and, in perceiving, creates” – C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types...*, p. 446.

³⁸ K. Pajor, *Psychologia archetypów Junga* [Psychology of Archetypes]..., p. 156.

³⁹ Jung compared archetypes to invisible directors who direct the show from the backstage. In culture they manifest themselves in the form of symbols. See eg. A Walczak, *O symbolu w kulturze i jego rozumieniu* [On the Symbol in Culture and Its Understanding], [in:] *Kultura i wychowanie* [Culture and Upbringing] 2011, No 1, pp. 87–101.

⁴⁰ Z.W. Dudek writes: “What is currently described as a socio-cultural gender-related kind can be understood as cultural gender – male or female, conditioned by the innate, archetypical structure of the psyche which is expressed in a natural way also in culture”. *Idem, Pleć psychiczna...* [Psychological Gender...], p. 63. In the Jungian and post-Jungian psychology of gender it extends over sexual (non-erotic) aspects. It is the type of thinking about gender that is free of pan-sexuality.

⁴¹ Jung’s psychology is defined by the name of integral psychology, based on the assumption of the hypothesis of the oneness of the world, where everything is related to everything else. Also, the human psyche functions upon the opposition principle which may remain in a dynamic balance, razing one another or compensating. Jung specified the following pairs of discords: awareness-unawareness, extroversion-introversion, feeling-thinking, intuition-perception, and spirit-matter. Thus opposition is not a state of total exclusion, “these are rather – as K. Pajor writes – disparate psychological tendencies or modes of functioning of the psyche in diversified spheres”. *Idem, Psychologia archetypów Junga...* [Jung’s Psychology of Archetypes...], p. 188.

The archetypal features of unconsciousness in the form of the Anima and the Animus, besides the features acquired in the individual development by consciousness (biological factors, masculine and feminine roles and cultural principles, feminine and masculine orientation of consciousness) define the psychological gender and resultant identity⁴². Archetypal gender, usually unrealized, has the opposite sign than the consciousness of the gender, both biological and psychological. On the other hand, it complements the one-sided direction of the conscious gender orientation (the female or male *ego*). Archetypal gender has an enormous share in the process of constructing the internal personality of the individual woman or man, and has an effect on their functioning in culture, including their relations resulting from their social roles, matriarchal and patriarchal tendencies in social relations and in interpersonal relations⁴³. It also decides about the possibility of confronting the sexual identity with the values carried by the opposite gender. It has a fundamental impact on human experience – “[...] on specific behaviour, unconscious reactions and spontaneous life choices whose hidden sense becomes understandable after some longer time”⁴⁴.

The Animus and Anima as archetypes can be a source of development, providing knowledge and archetypal experience, or may become the reason for *ego* disintegration. Androgenisation of gender roles is decisive for the mature gender identity, i.e. the substitution of gender roles polarisation by the continuum; and, consequently, this unification of these opposites becomes an element of the process of individuation (Jung’s creation of the spirit). This means the understanding of gender as the complementary coexistence of the masculine and feminine elements, complementing the dimensions of the individual *psyche*⁴⁵. The point is the mutual affiliation not only of polar dimensions (masculinity and femininity), but the diversity of their manifestation. Thus, it is not an identification upon the “sameness” principle. If we discuss here the “sameness”, however, it is only within the concept of understanding the “unity” as an extracting power and transgressing towards something else than what is defined by the perspective of the biological, psychological, and socio-cultural standard of the gender – just transgressing towards something else, which is at the same time something primal. The acceptance of the opposite element and the awareness of its share in the dynamic relation of the opposition in the unity of the functioning psyche allows us to experience deeply our own personality as a woman or a man, and the values contributed

⁴² Cf. four contemporary patterns of masculinity, according to R. Moore and D. Gillette: the King, the Warrior, the Lover, the Magician, and four contemporary patterns of femininity according to T. Wolff (Jung’s co-worker), “modernised” by Pia Skogemann: the Mother, the Hetaira, the Amazon, and the Medium. Z. W. Dudek, *Podstawy psychologii Junga. Od psychologii głębi do psychologii integralnej* [Basics of Jung’s Psychology. From Depth Psychology to Integral Psychology], Eneteia, Warszawa 2006, , pp. 268–271.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

⁴⁵ E. Badinter, after: P. Gębala, *Schematy i transgresja płci* [Schemes and Transgression of Gender], [in:] *ALBO albo. Problemy psychologii kultury* [EITHER or. Problems of the Psychology of Culture] 2007, No. 2, *Cywilizacja i płeć* [Civilisation and Gender], p. 15.

to the experience by the opposite gender⁴⁶. A manifestation of the development and maturity of the awareness of the gender is also the awareness of the possibility of carrying out the dialogue between the opposite, the ability in certain situations, if the need be, to choose a behaviour characteristic of a given pole⁴⁷. This maintaining of the dialogue is important not only in the daily situations, but particularly in the decisive moments, which may include critical experience. The very recognition of the opposite pole "[...] gives a chance for drawing attention of "self" to what [...] includes – the unknown, but authentic and precious"⁴⁸. The well assimilated Anima in men and Animus in women are the guides around the labyrinth of their unconsciousness. They allow for the unconscious, symbolic, intuitive and emotional communication with the opposite sex, which as a result translates into psychological independence in the man-woman relations and the capability of partnership relations. They complement and activate the emotional power and maturity in men (the capability of empathy and the ability to express emotions) and inspire the intellectual and task-related independence in women (determination and resourcefulness). They are the source of mental balance in extreme, arousing existential anxiety situations. Summing up: we can single out the following features typical of a person with the androgenic identity – the high integration of the feminine and masculine dimension irrespective of the person's gender, the capability of quick adaptation under new conditions, the integration of numerous axionormative options, good social adaptation, maintaining control over one's own life, low level of anxiety, self-confidence, and the adequacy of demonstrating male or female traits depending on the situation. The main principle defining the androgyny and its functional meaning in contemporary culture was defined by Przemysław Gębała as "[...] striving after the social behaviour being free of gender features corresponding to the cultural scheme, so that they could be carried out, irrespective of biological conditioning"⁴⁹.

Polarisation of the Anima and Animus archetype

In the process of the assimilation of the Anima in men, and the Animus in women we can differentiate the characteristic aspects of attitudes towards the op-

⁴⁶ C.G. Jung, *Archetypy i symbole...* [Archetypes and Symbols...], Cf. footnote 28; Z.W. Dudek, *Podstawy psychologii Junga...* [Basics of Jung's Psychology...], pp.260–267; P. Gębała, *Schematy i transgresja płci...* [Schemes and Transgression of Gender...], pp. 22–23; Z. Krzak, *Tezeusz w labiryncie* [Theseus in the Labyrinth], Ossolineum, Wrocław 1989; P. Skogemann, *Kobiecość w rozwoju* [Feminine Gender Development], Eneteia, Warszawa 2003; O. Vedfelt, *Kobiecość w mężczyźnie. Psychologia współczesnego mężczyzny* [Femininity in Man. The Psychology of Modern Man], Eneteia, Warszawa 2004.

⁴⁷ Z.W. Dudek gives an example of adjusting a specific type of attitude and behaviour from the range of the opposite spectrum to a given situation: "[...] excessive tolerance from emotional reasons, 'feeling sorry for someone' does not bring appropriate effects, whereas cold logics and suspending one's feelings disillusion the immature mentality of a child and suggest the importance of the case". *Idem, Podstawy psychologii Junga...* [Basics of Jung's Psychology...], p. 188.

⁴⁸ *Idem, Psychologia integralna Junga...* [Jung's Integral Psychology...], p. 158.

⁴⁹ P. Gębała, *Schematy i transgresja płci...* [Schemes and Transgression of Gender...], p. 23.

posite pole which speak about their polarisation⁵⁰. The first one is polar opposition (unconsciousness of one pole). The unconscious archetype is subject to the mechanism of rejection. As a result, there occurs the ignoring of people with opposite features, intolerance towards their presence, and in the case of a contact with them – aggression, hatred and rejection, which may be typical of a general tendency for domination to emerge. It is a state of alienation from the archetype, it is a state of the lost or broken ties with it. Alienation from the Anima is characteristic of a one-sided masculine type of a man, negatively (defensively or aggressively) disposed towards the feminine sphere (the tough guy, macho, the cult of masculinity, power, and authority). This man often isolates himself from women or treats them instrumentally. He often fights them. In life, he often skips the role of art, beauty, gentleness, poetry, entertainment, and leisure. Alienation from the Animus, in turn, is typical of a one-sided feminine type of a woman. Their most typical features are: poor sense of individuality and independence, avoidance of mental diversification and mature feminine roles, surrendering to children as a mother, a weak, naïve, blind attitude towards partners, and imitation of famous figures with superficial personalities. However, the male and female consciousness may oscillate around the pole of the opposite tendencies of one's own biological and psychological gender. Then in the case of men, this polarisation "in extreme situations is an element of the mental effeminacy of a man, and the state of dependence from women [...]" which results in the state of internal inertia, a changeable disposition and sentimentalism, and in some cases – theatrical behaviour. And in the case of women we find "an excessive integration of the feminine ego with the Animus archetype which leads to forming a masculine type of a woman, i.e. dominating, competing relentlessly with a man [...]"⁵¹. Such a woman is characterised by egotism and emotional coldness, in her contacts with men she is not free of prejudice and insinuations, and indulges in criticism addressed against "feminine women", maintaining at the same time, however, certainty concerning her own opinions. This results from her extreme independence from the stereotypical image of the psychological features and social roles, and also cultural influences, of a weaker, yet fair sex – which often makes her a lonely woman.

We may also mention a one-pole integration, accompanied by low awareness of the opposite pole. This insufficient recognition is of the opposite pole and/or a renouncement of the, frequently hurt, mental function related to a given pole. In the second case, balancing between the poles is accompanied by the attenuation of the opposite pole. The opposite pole renounced from consciousness is a source of the so called complexes, phobias, low self-esteem, defence mechanisms, avoid-

⁵⁰ Z.W. Dudek, *Psychologia integralna Junga...* [Jung's Integral Psychology...], pp. 156–159, 217–229; *Idem*, *Podstawy psychologii Junga...* [Basics of Jung's Psychology...], pp. 185–189, 267–274; P. Gębala, *Schematy i transgresja płci...* [Schemes and Transgression of Gender...], pp. 17–21; C. G. Jung, *Archetypy i symbole* [Archetypes and symbols], cf. footnote 28, pp. 69–83; *Idem*, *O naturze kobiety...* [On the Nature of Women...], cf. footnote 28.

⁵¹ Z.W. Dudek, *Podstawy psychologii Junga...* [Basics of Jung's Psychology...], pp. 269 and 266.

ance of changes, helplessness, uncertainty, and general mental tension. As a result, there may occur the strengthening of defence mechanisms, such as rationalisation, denial, and avoidance.

The third possible attitude is formed on the basis of the conflict of the opposites (confrontation of the poles). In this case the unconscious image of the Animus in the woman and Anima in the man may be in conflict with the pattern which they consciously choose⁵². Only strong personalities, leaning on their strong *ego*, may survive the dilemma between the two relatively activated poles, while balancing between the opposites. "The conflict between the oppositions acts as mobilising, inspiring, and developing factors. They encourage the awareness of the importance of the poles"⁵³. Otherwise, people with the selective or fragmentary assimilation of the opposite pole are unable to function in various, alternative environments, as they lack the possibility of alternative behaviour, which is highly influenced by the informed choice. Thus their behaviour is characterised by subservience towards various people or situations, or isolation from them.

Cognitive function of the Anima and Animus

The Animus and the Anima like the other archetypes, as "living centres of not only unconsciousness but the whole psyche, constitute a coherent psychic system, playing all the significant functions within it"⁵⁴. Besides the integration function and thus related compensation function, common to all the archetypes described by Jung, the Anima and Animus perform a cognitive and prospective (anticipatory) function, i.e. they determine perception, cognition, and orientation in the world. They are targeted most of all at the goal of the experience instead of its cause, which in turn results from the logical functioning of consciousness. They are primary conditions of all the cognition and its factors upon which the creation of all the knowledge is based (pedagogical knowledge included). However, being a significant element of a subjective factor, they can dominate over the cognition. In this paragraph I am going to focus mainly on the presentation of the cognitive function, trying at the same time to characterise the knowledge of the "eternal boy" – *puer aeternus* – and the "eternal girl" – *puella aeterna* as an example of the polarisation of the male and female dimensions, created and sustained by the contemporary Western culture. At this point we should make a comment, referring to K. Pajor's opinion:

⁵² Z.W. Dudek presents an example of the *ego* being in conflict with its adversities as a bipolar behaviour of a woman suffering from the conflict between the Animus present in her, and her feminine part. He says: "Her intellectual, objective behaviour at work vs. her emotional behaviour among friends or at home may be an example here. To a certain extent it is a beneficial solution, if a family situation requires mainly objectivism, and, habitually, an emotional approach is being triggered, maintaining control decreases. And vice versa, when at work one has to keep the emotional attitude, a stiff intellectual approach proves useless if not ridiculous". *Idem, Podstawy psychologii Junga* [Basics of Jung's Psychology...], p. 187.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁵⁴ K. Pajor, *Psychologia archetypów Junga...* [Psychology of Jung's Archetypes...], p. 161.

“functioning of the archetypes as living organs of the psyche occurs comprehensively, i.e. their impact takes place simultaneously in various ways and on various levels”⁵⁵. Therefore, we should consider their functions together and in reference to the other archetypes. This, however, is not the subject of the paragraph.

The archetype activity in the cognitive process results from their own initiative and is based upon organising of the subject of experience, which follows “strict patterns, primary images which they constitute themselves”, and as an effect the subject gets a definite form⁵⁶. As a motif of organising the subject of experience in themselves, they are also recognizable as they represent themselves inside them. The archetypes as a subjective factor in the cognitive process signify the sense of the subject of the cognition which one identifies through them and fixes, although primarily (and usually only there) it occurs in the area of unconsciousness.

I suggest a thesis that the knowledge of the world and of oneself is sought for and created due to the “adjustment to one’s needs”, resulting from the polarisation of masculine and feminine patterns (or from the continuum – androgyny). I will try to show it by a brief characterisation of the “eternal boy” (*puer aeternus*) and the “eternal girl” (*puella aeterna*) in their negative aspect and the gender, and primarily from the perspective of the purpose of creating knowledge. Before I do that, I shall briefly discuss the criterion of the selection of the polarisation of the polar dimensions of femininity and masculinity. I will refer here to the well-known position in the psychology of culture inspired by Jungian psychology which says that the forms of expression of the male and female gender, described as poorly diversified (which are formed by the “hindrance in the development of certain personality fragments in the ‘premature’ stage”) by the contemporary Western culture, constitute quite characteristic dimensions of masculinity and femininity⁵⁷.

The “eternal boy” is motivated by the so called “positive psychology”, as he treats what is easy, convenient, and nice as positive. This is accompanied by some wishful thinking, which could be formulated in the following way: “one can think or imagine something, and it will come true” or “everything will be fine”. He is

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 159. Cf. Dan McAdams, for whom identity may be defined in the narrative category, because starting with adolescence, everyone becomes a biographer of one’s own Ego. McAdams believes that one’s main motive becomes significant in the narration of man; this motive can be compared to the dominating motive in the person’s life. It determines a thematic line, it is “a skeleton” or its “general structure”. It creates a thematic line (thematic lines) which together with the complexity of narration joins together the following categories: nuclear episodes, images, ideological background and generative scripts. For the contents discussed in this article, besides the dominating motive of narration, thematic lines seem to be important. They concentrate around the motive of intimacy, i.e. striving after closeness, warmth, maintaining relations, and the motive of power – striving after being strong, exerting impact on one’s environment, expansion, and conquering. D.P. McAdams, *Biography, Narrative, and Lives: An Introduction*, [in:] *Journal of Personality* 1988, No 56 (1); D.P. McAdams, *The Story We Live By – Personal Myths and the Making of the Self*, The Guilford Press, New York 1993; U. Tokarska, *W poszukiwaniu jedności i celu. Wybrane techniki narracyjne* [In Search of Unity and Goal. Selected Narrative Techniques], [in:] *Wybrane zagadnienia z psychologii osobowości* [Selected Issues of Personality Psychology], A. Gałdowa (ed.), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 1999, pp. 181–187.

⁵⁷ Z. W. Dudek, *Płeć psychologiczna...* [Psychological Gender...], p. 67.

also characterised by the lack of precision in thinking and actions, as well as initiating defence mechanisms in his thinking, thanks to which he feels good. In awkward situations, the "eternal boy" says to himself: "I can always put off what is not going as I hoped or does not fit my needs". He often adds "until later" however, he never stipulates the time for this, as he usually fails to find suitable conditions to carry out what is not "as he had hoped" and does not fit his needs. The problems with hypothetical and perspective thinking in the centre of which he does not occupy a significant place translates into the conviction that the mistakes he made, because they were not planned for ("so it happened", "so it just went"), will be amended by other people or circumstances. He often feels misunderstood, therefore he pampers himself even more as a creator of "positive" thinking. If he suffers from the impossibility of expressing his position or when he is exposed to criticism, he displays a lot of juvenile aggression, sorrow, and resentment. Summing up: his knowledge about himself and the world is characterised by the egocentric self that gives them meaning. It is the knowledge in which he can mirror himself as "me perfect". It is the knowledge which he uses as a "tool" in the interpersonal contacts projected by himself. And then the adult man, "bearing a feature of the eternal boy, maintains the child's spiritual features (androginia), at the same time operating an instrumental thinking of the adult, thanks to which he can control others, evoking extreme emotions, and manipulate the group"⁵⁸. On the other hand, it is also a permanently developing knowledge, so it is unspecified to a large extent at every stage. While creating it, the "eternal boy" leaves to himself a large amount of "creative" interpretation translated into practice. It is also the knowledge in which he finds the justification for wishful and positive (naïve) thinking about what he is participating in, starting with personal life, up to the professional and social one. There is no room for the precision of "his own consequences". He fails to take the responsibility for the quality of his knowledge, because he does not perceive it as a harmful intervention into the reality in which he himself participates. On the other hand, in his own opinion, the consequences of applying responsibility in reality lie within the scope of subjective and extra-subjective "external factors".

The "eternal girl" believes in her marvelousness and uniqueness. Therefore the significance she ascribes to her body, sexuality, intelligence, creativity, family and work is raised to the rank of an ideal and special mission. She treats the care she takes of a child or any other person in need as an exceptional task, though she fails to see its/their specificity or identity ("My child will be extraordinary, it is my pride"). This is why in her personal and family life, but also in her professional one, her actions are based on egocentrism. In the created knowledge of herself and of the world around her, she is looking for the justification of her position, but also the justification of her uniqueness as compared to others ("I do things the others don't"). She also often looks for such a knowledge, the possession and development of which

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

ensures the development of her uniqueness, her career path included. This is the knowledge through which she is able to realise a perfect image of her own self, and which confirms that image. This is the knowledge which, for instance, emphasises her work as a special mission. If she is a mother or a female pedagogue, her knowledge is utilised for “taming” a child’s potential into a form desired by her – she searches for directives in the knowledge how to turn the childish idol into a God.

From the perspective of depth psychology, you cannot choose your gender freely. We are conditioned to a large extent by the biologically-psychological sphere of influence, the conscious scope of socio-cultural life in a form of hidden and disclosed patterns, but also by the unconsciousness which is connected with the depth layer of the culture in which the individual used to live and is living. This, in turn, is a living symbolic matter, which is then crowned with what is becoming a material and immaterial element of Bauman’s “factory of permanence”⁵⁹. The images of the culture as the factory of the human meaning of life, thus as a factory of permanence, are subject to changes. In the contemporary culture of the West – the area of numerous transgressions, the distinctive and extreme, most diversified as far as gender is concerned – female and male patterns are no longer promoted; patterns like those identified by Ole Vedfelt of “father’s son” (the masculine type of a man) or “mother’s daughter” (female type of a woman)⁶⁰. Intermediate forms come to the fore: “mother’s son” (feminine type of a man) and “father’s daughter” (masculine type of a woman) with various levels of the polarisation of masculine and feminine features, down to the polarisation in the opposite direction to one’s biological gender, but also figures described briefly above as the “eternal boy” and the “eternal girl”. As Z. W. Dudek writes:

From the perspective of the psychology of culture [...] in the transforming civilisation, individuals with the features of the eternal boy and the eternal girl, and the representatives of the mixed psychological gender – the mother’s son and the father’s daughter (androgenic persons) – occupy higher positions. Such persons participate directly in cultural transformations, and their psyche undergoes a dramatic initiation process related to the cultural community, spiritual subculture, of the whole generation. [...] If a civilisation spends a lot of energy on gender equality, takes care of the rights of homosexual individuals, it means that it is looking for new patterns of identity, an important element of which is a dimension of masculinity and femininity⁶¹.

Conclusions

How do we learn what is an intentional subject of our cognition (both that directed by others and that directed by a specific man)? Well – referring to Martin Heidegger – we cannot learn about what is the subject of cognition (i.e. acquire

⁵⁹ Z. Bauman, *Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies*, Polity Press, Oxford 1992.

⁶⁰ O. Vedfelt, *Kobiecość w mężczyźnie...* [Femininity in Man...], cf. footnote 46.

⁶¹ Z. W. Dudek, *Płeć psychologiczna...* [Psychological Gender...], pp. 71–72.

knowledge about it) in isolation from the knowledge about the subject itself. On the other hand, it is impossible to know something and at the same time disregard what this knowledge concerns. The above statements would indicate that the process of creating knowledge takes place in the conscious sphere. Here I want to refer to the view of depth psychology presented in this article, which stresses an active participation of unconsciousness in all the processes of human individual existence, as well as in cultural processes. At the same time, if we do not know something at the consciousness level, then we cannot disregard it, because this mental operation is assigned to the conscious sphere. This does not mean, however, that in the created knowledge, the factor of the unconscious relation to what is its subject does not break through. Let me note – paraphrasing M. Heidegger’s philosophical assumptions – that knowledge is both an unconscious and a conscious attitude to its subject. An open question remains “What is its subject?”. In creating knowledge there is a dominating principle about its certainty which becomes its basis in general and testifies to its justification (even if the justification itself is temporary). As it is widely assumed, the certainty of knowledge is not determined by its subject, but by “whether and how something is certain, rather than by what the thing which is certain is”⁶². The created knowledge is certain for the creator himself when it shows him the reality as the one that matches the reality. However, it is only one of the conceptions of the certainty of knowledge we know consisting in the adequacy of knowledge and its subject. According to Heidegger, true knowledge is knowledge that discovers. And here comes the precondition for discovery: a priori interest. What is the subject of discovery must also be the object’s subject of interest. Since it is impossible to get to reality separated from knowledge, hence what the object’s knowledge is like, affects the way of getting there and discovering what its subject is. However, if a thing was supposed to show itself to knowledge as it is, then knowledge should be the one discovering. Coming from this, the Heideggerian perspective, it can be noted that the archetypal dimensions of femininity and masculinity – being the forces of the psyche and originally existing in the unconscious sphere – are what hides behind what is disclosed, i.e. behind human consciousness. It is important for the contents of archetypes – as foundations of the psyche, actively participating in creating knowledge – to get into consciousness and influence the process: generate knowledge to its more mature forms. This is possible when the contact is made and kept between human real – actual – experience and archetypal conditions of this experience. We are therefore talking about the activation of self-consciousness of being a being in the actual Being – at this point drawing a parallel to the conception of Being and being in Heidegger’s philosophy – whose experience is conditioned. Let me add here – conditioned by archetypes. The very awareness of this does not signify the authenticity of being a being – it occurs rather than belongs to dailiness (which also does not mean that it does not happen in dai-

⁶² On the creation of knowledge in Heidegger’s approach, see: K. Michalski, *Zrozumieć przemijanie* [To Understand Passing Away], Kronos, Warszawa 2011, p. 66. I refer the Reader also to the work of Heidegger himself and his perspective on truth-aletheia.

liness, but dailiness it is not). It is necessary to look at the very knowledge where it is important how certain something is as the knowledge created on the basis of discovering what is certain. What is certain is also what hides behind what is disclosed – therefore behind what is certain in creating knowledge, there are archetypes that are certain in the way we ourselves are a priori interested in them, i.e. in the way we are open to the happening truth of our existence.

Pedagogical knowledge, which cannot be reduced to methodological knowledge in a sense that it provides pedagogues with instructions, is the knowledge created by them, even if it is knowledge adopted by them and by their consent (unconscious rather than conscious) determining their actions. They create it in the sense that they support its reasonableness with their action – they also preserve it by contemplating it. It is the knowledge they have about themselves and about the purposefulness of pedagogical activities, as well as about their instrumentarium. But this knowledge – methodically studying its own subject (i.e. themselves too) – is always completed by itself as the knowledge being a phenomenon of “truth in primeval meaning”⁶³. The other side of knowledge eludes being presented as if from the outside – it is interwoven with the human being and the essence of his life so much that it cannot be observed from the distance. It lives its own life and only thanks to thinking – or thanks to consciousness – is it possible to participate in it. But it is possible by participation in primeval knowledge to obscure its nature (the polarisation of archetypes). This means that pedagogical knowledge is not only co-constituted by the pedagogue’s personality element, but it is also the source of this knowledge through the alive sphere of the unconsciousness getting through to consciousness.

If the teacher/pedagogue is to be a “transformative intellectual”, as suggested by emancipation and critical pedagogy, an ally of weaker social groups and a direct translator between humans and a complex social and cultural world – an assistant in critical understanding of this world – it seems important how his cultural gender identity develops, which is anchored in this world from the perspective of roles connected with gender category. I would like to stress, however, that “getting through” to unconscious reserves of one’s pedagogical knowledge only through “outside” knowledge about it cannot become an imposed obligation (in which sense we should doubt anyway from the ethical point of view)⁶⁴. Taking a “rosy perspective” off the pedagogue and coming back to “pedagogical earth”, let me say that not everybody feels the need for having knowledge about themselves – the one described above, i.e. the one that leads to the path of personality development and the one that is an element of this path. At this point I am inclined to agree with Jung’s opinion, cited by K. Pajor: “‘a higher level of consciousness’ will be achieved only by those who ‘are destined and have a calling, meaning ability and drive for higher diversity’”⁶⁵.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁶⁴ A. Walczak, *W kierunku estetyki jako sztuki odsłaniania i tworzenia pedagogicznego etosu* [Towards Aesthetics as the Art of Unveiling and Creating Pedagogical Ethos], [in:] *Spotkanie z wychowankiem...* [Meeting with an Alumnus...].

⁶⁵ Jung, after K. Pajor, *Śladami Junga...* [Following Jung...], p. 114. Taking into consideration the consciousness in reaching the full knowledge – the true knowledge, I can see the parallel between

The “tangible” reality of pedagogical activities, which can be seen and understood from the perspective of phenomenological-hermeneutic-dialectic theories (and/or rationally explained – by means of available, well-known, preferred, etc. pedagogical theories) – is overlapped by the reality of the pedagogue’s knowledge which is determined by, inter alia, their archetypal gender – a degree (level?) of the assimilation of masculine and feminine traits in the development of the individual psyche. However, this “overlapping” is rather specific, because it determines and defines the understanding and explaining the reality of pedagogical activities rather than being its additional element, some kind of surplus, or some kind of decorative element, no matter whether it matches or not the whole. According to Jungian and post-Jungian psychology, it is the “actual” reality, because symbolic activities (they are where unconsciousness is displayed) overlap the layer of visible activities in inter- and intra-personal relations, which are the essence of pedagogical activities. The former are present in every pedagogical activity, the latter – at least when we think about a “good” pedagogue – should be present too.

Because archetypal models of the development of the pedagogue’s individual psyche (e.g. different forms of assimilation of the Anima and Animus) are activities “from the depth”, then in actual extra- and intra-personal relations, being traces of unconsciousness, they are difficult to decipher. It means that their veiled form of manifestation (although observed in specific behaviours) does not give unambiguous conclusions when interpreted. This is the more so in that “problems” with the assimilation of the Anima and Animus can be confirmed by the rituals of domination, for example, or rather submission and submissiveness (also in the sphere of “symbolic violence”) in interpersonal relations (culturally, often taken for granted because of simply being a man or a woman)⁶⁶. We can hazard a guess that pedagogues whose assimilation of the Anima and Animus archetypes takes the form of polarisation, in the sphere of pedagogical activities need something that would be the compensation of this (usually unconsciously, because their activities are unintelligible even to themselves). Therefore, rites of resistance – stressed by critical pedagogy – are justified or unjustified in the sphere of pedagogical activities. On the other hand, as regards the “maturity” of the rites of resistance, those which fit into transgressiveness making its way to emancipation (in a broad sense), I assume

Jung’s words and Heidegger’s thinking approach, as discussed by K. Michalski: “[...] thinking does not exist for its own sake, but each time it is ‘an answer’ to ‘the call’ of being – or to say it in a less abstract way: thinking is a response to a certain need, not ‘human’ though, but the need of the truth itself. Or in other words: thinking has a deliberate structure, and it is thinking by nature due to the manifestation of existence. [...] it includes the moment of unfulfillment, secrecy – and this initiates its happening”. *Idem, Zrozumieć przemijanie* [To Understand Passing Away], pp. 115–116. Therefore, the purpose of thinking is discovering the problem rather than solving it. Cf. M. Heidegger, *Co znaczy myśleć?* [What Is Called Thinking?], [in:] *Filozofia Współczesna* [Contemporary Philosophy], J. Tischner (ed.), Instytut Teologiczny Księży Misjonarzy, Kraków 1989; A. Walczak, *Od myśli do myślenia dialogicznego pedagoga* [From Thought to the Dialogical Thinking of the Pedagogue], [in:] *Idem, Spotkanie z wychowankiem...* [Meeting with an alumnus...].

⁶⁶ Unaware of their sexual traits, teachers/pedagogues are present at schools, which following Foucault’s knowledge-power principle accept on “the surface” certain rites of resistance; however, from “the inside” they support the tradition, which only strengthens this resistance.

they depend on the “maturity” of the unconscious dimension of pedagogues’ masculinity and femininity (androgynousness, but also constructive traits of the “eternal boy” and the “eternal girl”, “mother’s son” and “father’s daughter”).

Adopting the hypothesis that polarized forms of the assimilation of archetypal masculine and feminine dimensions in the development of the pedagogue’s individual psyche can prevent or hinder entering the road to critical consciousness, to meta-discursive understanding of one’s own pedagogical activities, some questions opening the horizon of possible qualitative studies are:

- What are ritual indications of the unassimilated masculine and feminine element in the sphere of pedagogical activities?

- What and by whom, in the structure of pedagogical institutions, is “hidden” (compensated) and how?

- What are cultural strategies supporting polarized forms of the archetypal dimensions of masculinity and femininity in creating pedagogical knowledge (e.g. of higher education)?

We create and have pedagogical knowledge the same way we think. And we think from the perspective of what we are. In no way can we go beyond this whole and see it from the outside. Pedagogical knowledge created “in the area of practice and for practice” may be incoherent, language inexpressible, uncertain and unrealistic – yet it will always be the knowledge of a particular holder. Therefore, outlining a possible research perspective, it is important to consider:

- in what context of life experience pedagogical knowledge is created;

- in what language, or rather what languages, it is created;

- what is its “hidden programme” and what has been “hidden” in it;

- what happens with knowledge if it is characterized by “concealedness” in the form of the polarisation of the archetypal dimensions of masculinity and femininity.

These are only some of the possible research problems that seem obvious when you think about expanding the understanding of the sources of creating pedagogical knowledge by their discovery from the perspective of archetypal models in the development of the individual psyche. On the other hand, the subject of research outlined in this way offers the possibility of critical thinking in determining and understanding these sources of pedagogical knowledge for the creator of this knowledge and the types of relations the creator establishes with himself and others.

I can also see a possible use of the theory of archetypes in the pedagogical theory not only as the issue of expanding the language used to describe selected pedagogical issues, but as issues of practical solutions, e.g. in the diagnosis of the profile of the pedagogue’s personality according to the archetypal dimension of masculinity and femininity in their culture-bound conditions.

Although we all steer our own vessels, there is no doubt that we do not learn the art of navigating alone. We are helped by nature, as well as other people “somehow” experienced in this art. Therefore, it is reasonable to end the whole argument with a key question, which is quite simple (but usually simple things are the most difficult in life and to live through): How in the process of education, and

then in a job, to support pedagogues in reaching their own sphere of archetypal dimensions of masculinity and femininity, so that the pedagogical knowledge they create would be the knowledge revealing to them the sense of action – the disclosed one and hidden, but not before enlightenment?

Summary

Creation of pedagogical knowledge from the perspective of the archetypal dimensions of femininity and masculinity

This article mostly focuses on answering the question: “Who creates what knowledge in pedagogical practice?”. In search of an answer to this question it was assumed that there existed a relationship between the archetypal dimension of femininity and masculinity in the development of the individual *psyche* and the type, structure and function of the pedagogical knowledge created, which involves the following aspects: it is always anthropological, axiological, and teleological knowledge, and knowledge which “works in practice”. The archetypal gender of those creating pedagogical knowledge, according to Jungian and post-Jungian psychology – is rooted in the unconsciousness – as real as the consciousness with which the process of knowledge creation is usually associated. The method of assimilating feminine and masculine features of the individual *psyche* development forms a deep layer of pedagogical knowledge with overlaps on the tangible reality of pedagogical actions – on the extra- and inter-personal relations (as well as on intrapersonal ones). The assimilation complexities – usually set in cultural patterns – may consolidate ritual in the area of pedagogical actions – e.g. rituals of submission and submissiveness. The article also presents a hypothesis saying that immature forms of archetypal assimilations of femininity and masculinity prevent or restrict the entry to the road towards a critical consciousness of those creating pedagogical knowledge. In conclusions, it was proposed that empirical studies should include the areas determined by the main subject matter presented in the article.

RESEARCH

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The Taboo of Senior Sexuality as a Challenge to Contemporary Geragogy

Attentive consideration discovers to me four pretexts, for supposing age to be unhappy:

1. That it withdraws us from the business of life.
2. That it enfeebles the body.
3. That --it takes away nearly all our pleasures.
4. That it verges upon Death.

Cicero, *Cato the Elder: or, A Treatise on Old Age*

Societies age, and according to demographers, the phenomenon will gradually intensify. In Poland, there are currently about 4.7 million 60+ women and 2 million 65+ men; the Central Statistical Office estimates that by 2030 the number will increase to 9.6 million persons, with more than twice as many elderly women as men¹. In response, science has been increasingly interested in the quality of life of seniors. 2012 was even determined as the European Year for Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations².

Considering the above background, it is not surprising that we have been witnessing a strong development of geragogy, i.e. pedagogy of older people, which supports processes adapting one to old age³, and "analyses the last stage of development of human life, diagnosing the life situation of the elderly, and identifying the main factors determining the process of ageing. It explores the possibilities for prolonging and optimising conditions of active life of people who are outside working age"⁴. Its main tasks include, inter alia, preparation for old age, prevention of pathologies in the autumn of life, guidance and counselling for seniors, their activation, as well as preparation for suffering and death⁵. However, "in the social

¹ http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_648_PLK_HTML.htm, accessed on: 06.06.2012.

² Information on the European year 2012 – European Year for Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations, <http://europa.eu/ey2012/ey2012main.jsp?langId=pl&catId=971>, accessed on: 02.06.2012.

³ Adaptive processes are affected by two groups of factors: internal (emotions, motivations, expectations) and external ones (manifesting, inter alia, in other people's actions such as their treatment of the elderly), see Z. Szarota, *Gerontologia społeczna i oświatowa. Zarys problematyki* [Social and Educational Gerontology. an Outline of Issues], Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii im. A. Frycza Modrzewskiego, Kraków 2004, p. 45.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

sciences, issues related to old age continue to be neglected”⁶. It is true that there is a growing number of scientific publications on the subject, but we still lack works which are complementary, ones that would grasp the situation of an elderly person comprehensively, without shying away from such difficult topics as sexuality.

It should also be pointed out that there are several different theories of ageing in the context of social gerontology, to which geragogy is classified, i.e. the theory of deficit, the theory of activity, and the competence theory⁷. The first one is based on the belief that over time, older people function gradually worse and worse – in the physical, mental, and social areas. Their bodies become increasingly susceptible to various diseases, their social activity diminishes, and their intelligence as well as adaptive abilities decrease, making them gradually more and more dependent on the external environment (family, doctors, therapists, caregivers). When this theory dominated, the need for senior education was far from being recognised, as the area was considered pointless and doomed to failure. The theory comprises the theory of defect, and the theory of limited use. Basically, the difference between these boils down to whether seniors are considered as persons having no impact on their fate and entirely subject to external influences, or persons who can prolong their youth owing to individual activity. However, both theoretical orientations accept the category of loss and at best maintain that it is possible to postpone the gradual negative changes, but fail to mention the developmental potential of the autumn of life. This potential was only recognized by the theory of activity and the competence theory. Senior activity is not only possible, but also recommended. According to many researchers, activities replacing work after retirement, hobbies, and social life boost wellbeing⁸. Education is to largely help seniors undertake their new role in life. In turn, the competence theory assumes that the activity “should not focus solely on recreation. Education helps seniors to maintain their independence, and object to stereotypes and ignorance in the area of gerontological issues”⁹. The social capital of seniors is increasingly recognised and they are increasingly encouraged to pursue educational effort, accentuating that, being a senior, one can still develop oneself and extend the area of his/her independence, which has a considerable influence on the quality of life¹⁰. This theory is founded on the belief that “behaviour at an elderly age, just like in every other part of biography, must be understood as a relationship between the require-

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁷ J. Halicki, *Edukacja seniorów w aspekcie teorii kompetencyjnej. Studium historyczno-porównawcze* [Senior Education in the Aspect of Competence Theory. A Historical and Comparative Study], Wydawnictwo Uniwersyteckie, Białystok 2000, pp. 9–13; Z. Szarota, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–47.

⁸ B. Ziębińska, *Uniwersytety Trzeciego Wieku jako instytucje przeciwdziałające marginalizacji osób starszych* [Universities of the Third Age as Institutions Countering the Marginalisation of the Elderly], a doctoral thesis written under the supervision of prof. zw. dr. hab. Janusz Sztumski, Katowice 2007, pp. 77–79.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹⁰ Obviously, the promotion of this model of perception of old age is also politically justified – since if the process of the ageing of societies cannot be stopped, then at least the seniors’ social capital should be used effectively, as it can constitute a non-economic factor behind the development of national economies.

ments to be met by people and the resources enabling their satisfaction"¹¹, which testifies to its individualistic approach. This is because every stage of life is marked by different developmental tasks¹², and, besides, the demands of the continually changing reality alter, varying along the expectations we pose to the particular age groups, including the seniors. The competence theory therefore places emphasis on the development of senior competences in the physical, cognitive, and social dimensions, which can be jointly referred to as "one's ability to take responsibility for one's life and its independent shaping"¹³. The theory focuses on the development of seniors' creative attitude, affirmation of life and the implementation of autotelic values. Also, according to life-span developmental psychology, "the human being develops unbrokenly at every stage of their life and takes on specific tasks. The same is true about the sexual development in an elderly age"¹⁴.

The way in which older people cope with these developmental tasks is affected by their own and the younger generations' attitude to themselves. In relation to the autumn of life, seniors most often display attitudes marked by:

- constructiveness,
- dependence,
- defence,
- hostility,
- self-destruction¹⁵.

The above typology shows the possible responses to our own old age, ranging from the most desirable one, i.e. constructive, to the most harmful, self-destructive attitude. They depend on the particular senior's personality, life experience, support or absence of support from the people who are close to them, social attitude to old age, and many other factors.

The development of negative attitudes in seniors is hugely influenced by the beliefs of the younger generation – and these are rather unclear. A US study from the 1980s showed that young people have 3 positive beliefs about seniors and 8 negative ones. The former include the image of a "model grandpa, a sage, and a liberal family head". The latter reflect the image of a "weak, helpless, lonely, socially uninvolved person, an unbearable neighbour, a disheartened beggar and vagabond, someone

¹¹ J. Halicki, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹² Many of these tasks concern the attitude to oneself as an ageing person, including the satisfaction of the need to belong to a given age group, acceptance of changes to one's body and the worsening of health, preparation for the death of the partner, etc., see E. Kasperek-Golimowska, *Starość w perspektywie edukacji promującej zdrowie* [Old Age in the Perspective of Education Promoting Health], [in:] *Starość w perspektywie studiów pedagogicznych* [Old Age in the Perspective of Pedagogical Studies], A. Tokaj (ed.), *Studia i Monografie Wyższej Szkoły Humanistycznej im. Króla Stanisława Leszczyńskiego w Lesznie*, Leszno 2008, p. 35.

¹³ J. Halicki, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁴ M. Cichocka, *Biopsychosocjalne uwarunkowania seksualności ludzi starych* [Biopsychosocial Determinants of Senior Sexuality], [in:] *Seksualność w cyklu życia człowieka* [Sexuality in Human Life-Cycle], M. Beisert (ed.), PWN, Warszawa 2006, p. 216.

¹⁵ Z. Szarota, *op. cit.*, p. 48, and A. Kowgier, *Życie intymno-emocjonalne osób starszych* [Intimate and Emotional Life of the Elderly], Oficyna Wydawnicza "Impuls", Kraków 2010, p. 78.

who is malicious, a miser, a curmudgeon, and a sourpuss"¹⁶. In Poland, Agata Kowgier carried out a study which was mainly aimed at checking students' opinions on the intimate and emotional life of older people. Its results show inter alia that:

- the majority of the students participating in the study had negative associations with old age¹⁷;
- the majority of respondents believed that women cease to be sexually active between the ages of 56–60, and men after the 66th year of age¹⁸;
- responsibility for the cessation of the seniors' sexual activity lies equally with psychological (44% of answers), and physiological factors (43% of answers), while only 19% of respondents believed that it is related to social factors¹⁹;
- almost a half of the respondents believed that being a sexually active senior increases the level of satisfaction with life²⁰.

Geragogues should draw important conclusions from the research results: in particular that it is necessary to deliver a positive image of old age so that young people associate it in a less negative way. At the same time, it is necessary to remember that the young people's perception of a relationship between the sexual activity of seniors and the level of their satisfaction with life constitutes a good foundation for educational activity in this scope, including in particular fighting against stereotypes.

The notion of stereotypes and myths is extremely important in the context of the subject of my work. Many of them have arisen around the sexual life of seniors, strengthening its being made a taboo area and promoting ageism²¹. It even results from M. Grabowska's research that sexual life is negatively affected not only by stereotypes concerning old age, but also, in the case of women, those applying to their gender²². In turn, R. Bartel specified the myth of old people's asexuality among the seven main myths concerning ageing and old age²³, while Agnieszka and Artur Fabiś identified the following most popular myths related to the sexual activity of seniors:

- "people who are older and diseased are not interested in sex;
- older and diseased people after 60 should adjust to living a celibate life;
- older people who think of sex are infantile;
- masturbation in the elderly is unhealthy;

¹⁶ A. Kowgier, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

²¹ This notion "describes [...] negative stereotypical social attitudes to older people. The negative attitude is reflected in the way they are treated by individuals, institutions, in language, media, and jokes [...]", following J. Janiszewska-Rain, *Okres późnej dorosłości. Jak rozpoznać potencjał ludzi w wieku podeszłym* [The Period of Late Adulthood. How to Recognise the Potential of Old People], [in:] *Psychologiczne portrety człowieka. Praktyczna psychologia rozwojowa* [Psychological Portraits of People. A Practical Developmental Psychology], A.I. Brzezińska (ed.), GWP, Gdańsk 2005, p. 612.

²² M. Grabowska, *Seksualność we wczesnej, średniej i późnej dorosłości. Wybrane uwarunkowania* [Sexuality in the Early, Middle and Late Adulthood. Selected Determinants], Wyd. UKW, Bydgoszcz 2011, pp. 229–237.

²³ Z. Szarota, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

- men after 60 are impotent;
- in women, sexual desire ends with the menopause;
- women after 60 do not experience orgasms;
- sexual abstinence after 60 promotes good health;
- older people practice only vaginal contact;
- sexually active people after 60 are immoral²⁴.

The existence of these myths illustrates the fact that there are still many people who are not aware of or ignore the achievements of modern medicine, owing to which, already for a long time, one has been able to relatively easily solve various sexual problems of a biological nature. It is much more difficult to change the picture of senior sexuality in the social reception. Unfortunately, it still tends to be assessed in aesthetic and ethical terms and is heavily criticised. This is due to the persistent perception, especially in the Catholic societies, of sex primarily as a means of procreation²⁵, and also due to the very strong contemporary cult of youth and the body²⁶.

An old body can be perceived as “a factory of disgust, a source of misery and odiousness, distress and anguish”²⁷ – after all, “whatever is young is beautiful, and whatever is old – according to the common way of thinking and speaking – is ugly”²⁸. This is particularly visible in the case of women, in relation to whom the pressure to have a young, beautiful body is the strongest²⁹. As was pointed out by B. Bartosz and E. Zierkiewicz: “As much as older men are perceived as ones

²⁴ A. and A. Fabiś, *Aktywność seksualna osób starszych* [Sexual Activity of Older People], [in:] *Tabu seksuologii. Wątpliwości, trudne tematy, dylematy w seksuologii i edukacji seksualnej* [Taboo of Sexology. Doubts, Difficult Topics, Dilemmas in Sexology and Sexual Education], A. Jodko (ed.), Wyd. Academica, Warszawa 2008, p. 158.

²⁵ K. Imieliński even talks about the ideology of reproduction, which together with the ideology of vaginal sex add to the negative image of senior sexuality and for this reason should be overthrown; see A. Kowgier, *op. cit.*, pp. 102–103.

²⁶ “Another form of the contemporary consumerism created by fashion and media market is the culture of superficiality. On the human scale, Lasch (1978) describes it as a culture of smooth body, civilisation of depilation, plastic surgeries, massage, beauty parlours, gyms and cosmetics which capture and reflect the light, i.e. technologies persistently smoothing and polishing the human body narcissistically focused on itself. According to Bauman (1991), economic, social and cultural instability of modern societies is responsible for the disappearance of the traditional bases of social identity, with the exception to the bond with human body understood as the only permanent factor of the changing identity. Hence, in modern culture the current position of the cult of the body supported with the cult of youth and ‘superficiality’ as a high value of the current consumer society. Jogging, diet, slimming, cosmetic treatments which beautify and correct beauty, prolong the youth, preserve one’s health and offer longevity are perceived as manifestations of freedom and an important factor of social, sexual and professional attractiveness of people. The ‘culture of superficiality’ is exemplified by the dynamic, dramatic increase in the services designed to cater for the value of human life in the form of beauty, health, and youth”. K. Rembowska, *Kulturowy aspekt przemian rynku usług* [The Cultural Aspect of Transformations on the Services Market], <http://www.sse.geo.uni.lodz.pl/uploads/space8/rembowska.pdf>, accessed on 10.06.2012.

²⁷ M. Rusiecki, *Etyczno-religijne aspekty starszego wieku* [Ethical and Religious Aspects of Old Age], [in:] *Demograficzne i indywidualne starzenie się* [Demographic and Individual Ageing], A. Zych (ed.), Wyd. Akademii Świętokrzyskiej, Kielce 2001, pp. 65–66.

²⁸ A. Kowgier, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

²⁹ See M. Grabowska, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

‘in their prime’, an older woman is typically not only described as a ‘granny’ or ‘an old woman’, but also treated in this way, i.e. with tolerance, leniency, etc. [...] ‘Clinging to youth’ is considered a social necessity – it is sanctioned by media and observed by women themselves”³⁰. For this reason the said cult of the body, youth and beauty can have a very destructive impact on the self-esteem of women, who on a daily basis notice gradual changes to their bodyliness. What is most dangerous about such discourse is a situation when “the belief that a real woman must be physically attractive, makes a fifty-years old woman an enemy of her own body”³¹. She begins to spend her energy on fighting the signs of ageing, buys anti-wrinkle creams, and tries to hoodwink time. Unfortunately, even the very best cosmetics are unable to stop natural processes of ageing, which in many cases may result in self-aversion and the absence of self-acceptance. This is very straightforwardly expressed in the following statement: “we may say that through her strong bond with her body, the woman loses her brightness, loses a bit of herself. ‘For her [the woman – added by A.Z., A.C., M.B.], the look is not just a trait, as it is for a man: she is her looks. Practically every aspect of a woman’s look manifests who she is and how she should be treated”³². The above shows yet another extremely important task for geragogues, and pedagogues as such: the need to fight with the double discrimination against older women (on the grounds of age and the sex), and to shape attitudes which are full of understanding for the specific situation of women as early as in children.

It is also worth remembering that “it is not old age which is a difficult period – it is the very process of ‘becoming an old person’ which is the hardest thing”. K. Wiśniewska-Roszkowska (1986, 1989) discusses the so-called art of ageing, which she defines as the ability to adjust to the new situations introduced by the old age and to recreate one’s sense of life”³³. Changes in the sexual activity are one such new state of things with which seniors must cope. Older people display various attitudes related to the above. K. Imieliński believes that we may talk about two groups of people:

- seniors, for whom sexual life has always had an important value – and they are at the same time the persons who fear the loss of this value at the stage of old age;
- seniors, who very easily accept the label of asexual persons – sex has probably never been much of a value for them, and they can even perceive the period of old age as a rescue from this burdensome sphere³⁴.

³⁰ B. Bartosz, E. Zierkiewicz, *Starość w narracjach kobiet młodych i starszych* [Old Age in the Narrations of Young and Older Women], [in:] *Starsze kobiety w kulturze i społeczeństwie* [Older Women in Culture and Society], E. Zierkiewicz, A. Łysak (eds.), Wyd. MarMar, Wrocław 2005, p. 13.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³² A. Cieślak, A. Zubik, M. Bańczarowska, ‘Starość’ w narracjach kobiet w drugiej połowie życia [‘Old Age’ in Narrations of Women in the Second Half of their Life], [in:] *Starsze kobiety w kulturze i społeczeństwie* [Older Women in Culture and Society], E. Zierkiewicz, A. Łysak (eds.), Wyd. MarMar, Wrocław 2005, p. 34.

³³ Z. Szarota, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

³⁴ M. Grabowska, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

We should in particular remember about the second group so as to avoid an accidental going from one extreme to another and changing the seniors' label from that of asexual persons to the persons who want to be sexual at any price, thus putting them under just another sort of pressure. Human sexuality is a very intimate and delicate issue, and, consequently, interpersonal differences are of great importance here.

Another well-known Polish sexologist, Z. Lew-Starowicz, writes that the relevant literature mentions three basic attitudes:

- the defensive one: an ambition-based reaction to sexual failure, escapist strategies, failure to admit sexual failures, an individual does not seek specialist help or support from his/her partner;
- the destructive one: resignation from sexual activity when sexual problems appear, self-isolation, frequent depressive changes;
- the optimistic one: the individual tries to eliminate the emerging sexual difficulties and endeavours to make his/her permanent relationship with a partner satisfying³⁵.

The adoption of each of the above attitudes brings along certain easily anticipated consequences for a given individual and his/her partner as well as their relationship. Escapist strategies, self-isolation, a total abandonment of sexual activity, etc. – all this, if not frankly discussed by the lovers, can have a very negative impact on their relationship, since the other party will have to face a situation which is not understandable, and can rationalise it in a wrong way, e.g. blaming her-/himself. As it happens, changes in one's sexuality and physical attractiveness may be perceived by seniors as a crisis, and what can be desirable as a result is specialist help: not only of a medical kind, but also, or perhaps even mainly, psychological and pedagogical assistance related to informing, counselling, and supporting.

It is worth reminding both the seniors and the rest of society that sexuality is an integral part of human life, regardless of age. This was insightfully expressed by prof. Z. Izdebski, who said the following words during the Third Age Forum in 2011: "In love, the question of age should not matter at all – love is simply love and that is it. There is no point in looking at age"³⁶. Although the statement that people are sexual beings and regardless of their age have the right to experience love and sexual life is something obvious, not everyone is able to accept it³⁷. This is all the more so as the issue of senior sexuality is covered by a specific taboo, i.e. a culture-based ban on the performance of certain acts or talking about certain subjects, resulting from customs and morality, and including sanctions related to

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

³⁶ M. Wysocka, *Nie patrzmy na wiek* [Let us Not Look at Age], http://www.noweperspektywy.org.pl/materialy/press/puls_medycyny_2011_05_25_2.pdf, accessed on 07.06.2012.

³⁷ M. Beisert, *W poszukiwaniu modelu seksualności człowieka* [In Search of a Model of Human Sexuality], [in:] *Seksualność w cyklu życia człowieka* [Sexuality in the Human Life Cycle], M. Beisert (ed.), PWN, Warszawa 2006, p. 8.

its infringement³⁸. According to Wojciech Burszta, the sphere of sexuality is covered by a taboo in the majority of cultures³⁹.

The breaking of the taboo of the sexual activity of seniors may significantly contribute to an improvement of the quality of their life⁴⁰ of which sexuality is an important element. The introduction of these issues to the scope of interest of the contemporary geragogy should become a challenge to the discipline, especially when we become aware that the issue has so far been discussed mainly from the medical, psychological, cultural, and anthropological points of view, but there are few pedagogical works in this scope.

What is most important is “not to allow anyone to mentally castrate you: not to let anyone convince you that senior sex is ugly, inappropriate, improper, that you are an old satyr and a female sex addict all covered with wrinkles, that this is all filthy, disgusting and repulsive”⁴¹. Sexologists increasingly say that although human sexuality undergoes transformations during one’s lifetime, it never ceases to exist and we remain sexual beings until the end of our days⁴². Moreover, it can be an expression of a great affection, and not just a symptom of pure physicality. Therefore, it should be analysed in the context of a person as a whole, holistically. “What is wonderful is that we begin to talk about this aspect of senior life and notice its significance. The holistic concept of the human being postulates a co-dependency of the mind, body and spirit, and therefore we cannot refuse older persons the right to satisfy their needs: both spiritual ones and ones related to sexuality”⁴³. Moreover, old age as such needs to be approached in an interdisciplinary manner⁴⁴, and for this reason the modern geragogy should draw from many fields of knowledge (such as andragogy, geriatrics, geriatric rehabilitation, psychology, demography, and sociology) in order to be able to recognise the problems of life in this period from many different perspectives and as much as possible contribute to the improvement of the life of seniors. What is also important is to remember that the sexual activity of sen-

³⁸ See W. Kopaliński, *Słownik mitów i tradycji kultury* [Dictionary of the Myths and Traditions of Culture], Kraków 1994, following A. Tyrpa, *Losy słowa tabu w Polsce (od encyklopedii Orgelbranda do prasy popularnej)* [The History of the Word Taboo in Poland (from Orgelbrand’s Encyclopedia to Popular Press)], [in:] *Tabu w języku i kulturze* [Taboo in Language and Culture], A. Dąbrowska (ed.), “Język a Kultura”, vol. 21, Wrocław 2009, p. 16; A. Dąbrowska, *Zmiany obszarów podlegających tabu we współczesnej kulturze* [Changes of Taboo Areas in Modern Culture], [in:] *Tom jubileuszowy* [Jubilee Volume], A. Dąbrowska (ed.), “Język a Kultura”, vol. 20, Wrocław 2008, p. 75.

³⁹ W. Burszta, *Antropologia kultury* [Anthropology of Culture], Wyd. Zys i s-ka, Poznań 1998, p. 15.

⁴⁰ The quality of senior life was comprehensively discussed by Agata Kowgier, who turned attention to the various ways in which the notion is defined depending on the adoption of an objective or subjective perspective, a point of view of gerontology, or medicine; see A. Kowgier, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–60.

⁴¹ B. Pietkiewicz, *Urok siwych gołąbków* [The Charm of Grey Pigeons], <http://www.polityka.pl/psychologia/poradnikpsychologiczny/1503434,1,milosc-na-starosc.read#ixzz1qvLuImUS>, accessed on 03.06.2012.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ A. Kowgier, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ *Starość w perspektywie studiów pedagogicznych* [Old Age in the Perspective of Pedagogical Studies], A. Tokaj (ed.), *Studia i Monografie Wyższej Szkoły Humanistycznej im. Króla Stanisława Leszczyńskiego w Lesznie*, Leszno 2008, p. 8.

iors is primarily determined by “the frequency of sexual contacts in the earlier stage of their life, physical and mental health, as well as psychological factors”⁴⁵. I would like to once again stress the importance of the latter, and the fact that they are largely influenced by the stereotypes and prejudices functioning in our society.

And yet, according to the Declaration of Sexual Rights, “Sexuality is an integral part of the personality of every human being. Its full development depends upon the satisfaction of the basic human needs such as the desire for contact, intimacy, emotional expression, pleasure, tenderness and love.” [Every human being has, inter alia – the author’s addition] “the right to sexual equality. This refers to freedom from all forms of discrimination, regardless of sex, gender, sexual orientation, age, race, social class, religion, or physical and emotional disability. [What should also be universal is – the author’s addition] the right to comprehensive sexuality education. This is a lifelong process from birth throughout the lifecycle and it should involve all social institutions”⁴⁶. Therefore, the above results in two important things for geragogy. Firstly, age should not lead to discrimination in the area of sexuality. Secondly, sexual education is not something concerning solely persons entering adulthood with a view to their preparation for activity in this sphere, but the need for it exists at every stage of life. Perhaps it would be a good idea to include it in the curriculum of classes for seniors learning at Universities of the Third Age, or placing more emphasis on the topic in various institutions and organisations for older persons? This is because there is a shortage of concrete educational or counselling-related offers for seniors in this scope. Anyway, what is equally necessary is the undertaking of the issues with young people in order to make them aware that the autumn of life is not an asexual period. Reliable education in this context could increase the level of social acceptance for the sexual activity of seniors. However, not much is done in this respect. Some works concerning the issue, addressed to the older readers, are published, but unfortunately, despite the richness of topics they discuss, they are often written in an excessively medical language, and their authors entangle themselves in very detailed biological issues, which can significantly hamper the understanding of the content of such publications⁴⁷. Anyway, it results from my interviews with seniors that the topic of senior sexuality is discussed mainly with doctors and in leaflets available in their waiting rooms, although their very often complex language makes them entirely incomprehensible, and therefore useless for an average senior. In my opinion, the topic of senior sex is ignored in the public space from perspectives other than solely medical (and even this is infrequent). There are no social campaigns, media debates or any other projects of this kind which could have a positive influence on the perception of the issue by both seniors themselves and the younger generations.

⁴⁵ A. and A. Fabiś, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

⁴⁶ *Declaration of Sexual Rights*, <http://www.funpzs.org.pl/deklaracja-praw-seksualnych.html>, accessed on 07.06.2012.

⁴⁷ This can be exemplified by Zygmunt Zdrojewicz’s work *Seksualność człowieka w wieku późnej dorosłości* [Human Sexuality in Late Adulthood] published in 2011.

In order to check how seniors themselves perceive the topic of sexuality in the autumn of life and whether they believe that it is covered by a taboo, and if so, whether it is necessary to fight that taboo, I carried out a qualitative study comprising 20 unstructured interviews (with 12 women and 8 men). The subjects came from Wrocław and Rawicz, i.e. both from a city and a small town environment⁴⁸. Before starting my research, I had to define the point in which old age begins. "J. Piotrowski (1973) maintains that old age is a cultural phenomenon with a biological basis related to the weakening of strengths (involution). There is no objective or natural threshold of old age. Relating the onset of old age with the chronological age of 70, 65, or 55 years is purely arbitrary, conventional [...]. [Also – author's addition] many medical-biological concepts provide that the beginning of ageing is barely perceptible"⁴⁹. I therefore assumed, purely arbitrarily, that I would carry out my interviews with people of more than 55 years of age; eventually, my subjects included 8 persons aged 55–65, 7 persons aged 66–80, and 5 persons of more than 80 years of age.

I commenced each interview with the questions "what is old age?" and "when does it begin?" The answers were dominated by threads relating to the end of occupational activity, and the period of relaxation and calmness, as shown by the following statements of the subjects:

- "Old age is the time when you do not have to work. The time of looking after grandchildren" (Barbara, 71 years);
- "Old age is when you need calmness, relaxation, and when you are less active" (Włodzimierz, 66 years).
- There were also some very sad responses, showing old age as the period of loneliness:
- "It is hard, infirmity, something God has not been successful with. It is when people become unnecessary, when they are a burden" (Stefania, 87 years).

Moreover, in the opinion of almost all the subjects, it is impossible to clearly determine the beginning of old age. The majority of the subjects indicated the role of subjective feelings in its definition. Health-related problems as well as the role of the cessation of occupational activity were often mentioned as criteria defining the onset of old age. It is also worth quoting a statement which accentuates the fact that a loss of one's partner may result in the acceleration of the ageing processes: "Lonely persons age faster" (Włodzimierz, 66 years). This short sentence very clearly shows the importance of the presence and support of one's dear ones for the physical and mental health of the seniors.

Another issue discussed during the interviews was whether sex was at all important for people in the autumn of their life. Here, the subjects also highlighted

⁴⁸ Rawicz is a small town (about 25,000 inhabitants) in the Wielkopolskie Province. http://powiatrawicki.pl/portal/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=45&Itemid=46, accessed on 02.06.2012.

⁴⁹ Z. Szarota, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–23.

the importance of one's health, temperament, but also differences between individuals as well as the role played by feelings:

- "It depends on one's temperament and health" (Wanda, 61 years).
- "Everyone has different needs; feelings and health are important" (Piotr, 66 years).

There were also answers strongly stressing that human sexuality does not vanish with age: "Age has nothing to do with it. Everyone needs tenderness!" (Maria, 74 years). It is worth quoting one lady's statement: "Of course it is, people just do not talk about it" (Krystyna, 68 years). It shows best that the seniors themselves notice the problem of this issue being a taboo.

In the further part of the interviews I asked whether the subjects at all talked about sex, and if so, who they talked about it with. The majority of the subjects revealed that they only talked about it with their spouse/partner, or perhaps a doctor. Only 5 persons (all of them women) said that they also talked about it with their acquaintances and friends. At the same time, several persons revealed that they discussed sex very rarely, almost not at all. The results show that the seniors in question do not tackle the topic of sexuality in a free manner and that this area is reserved only to those people who are closest to them.

According to the subjects, the media do not discuss the issue very often. Only a single person expressed a belief that the media do not refrain from the topic. Four subjects stated that it is featured in the press, radio, television, and on the internet, but that it is treated in a jocular, or even offensive way. According to the majority, the topic is absent in the media. The subjects stressed that it is not attractive to the media and the fact that sex is shown only in the context of youth and beauty. "There is nothing about it in the media. If there is, then only in TV series, or brief episodes in films, but certainly not Polish ones" (Jadwiga, 59 years). The quoted statement also stresses the specific nature of Polish culture which, in comparison with the West, is, according to some people, much more closed to certain topics and develops stronger taboos of some spheres of individual and collective life.

The two previous questions were an introduction to the most important issue of whether older persons believed that their sexuality was a taboo: both from the general social perspective and in terms of their individual biographies. A decisive majority of subjects declared that it is. Several persons could not answer the question clearly. Differences between younger and older seniors were stressed many times:

- "For the younger seniors, it is perhaps decreasingly so, but for those born before the war it certainly is. They were brought up differently. Apart from this, it all also depends on one's education" (Bogdan, 68 years).
- "It no doubt is, although fortunately the younger ones [seniors – author's addition] talk about it more and more often" (Włodzimierz, 66 years).

Apart from this, the subjects also noticed the absence of the topic in the public space, and its marginalization in the discussion of sexuality as such.

Developing this line of thought, I wanted to learn whether, in view of the above, the fact that senior sexuality was considered as covered by a taboo by the

majority of the subjects, it was a problem for them, and whether they would like the situation to be changed. From among the responses, two of them grasped the essence of the issue:

- “Problem... it is hard to say. It is a pity that people talk about it so little, as later even if you do not know something, you do not even know who to ask, as it is a shame at this age, and you would not feel at ease to ask the doctor about everything” (Maria, 74 years).
- “It probably is a problem, because today people talk about everything – so it would be good to talk about it, too. But old age is ugly and unnecessary, so people don’t. [...] I once wanted to talk about it with an acquaintance, and she said that at my age I should better think of saving for my funeral than about such things...” (Jadwiga, 59 years).

The above statements tackle two important aspects of the issue. They confirm the thesis that seniors need sexuality-related educational/counselling actions. Apart from this, they show the feeling of shame, embarrassment and resentment that old age is typically perceived as asexual, and that older people are not in the position to deal with this sphere of life. The fact that one of the subjects described old age as ugly and unnecessary reflects her belief that this stage of life is marked by a low social status. It is here that education has its role to play.

Beliefs similar to the ones presented above provide us with evidence of the importance of the social image of old age for the self-evaluation and mental well-being of the seniors. For this reason, I also tackled the question of the perception of senior sexuality by young generations. The answers to this question were the most diverse. The subjects often indicated the generation gap and the differences between generations as factors which make it difficult to assess what young people may think about the topic: “ I do not know... At a certain age, everyone has different needs, sometimes tenderness is what counts more... It is difficult to say, because in general young people have a different perspective on life” (Józef, 85 years). It was noticeable that the question caused a certain embarrassment, which may have been an indication that the subjects are concerned about the way young people perceive them and that this is also important for them. They often evaded a clear answer and formulated their responses in a wishful tone: “Well, I hope that the young people look at it in a normal way. I would like it to be so” (Barbara, 71 years).

The last issue discussed in the interviews was whether it was at all necessary to discuss senior sexuality more often in e.g. the media, educational facilities, via social campaigns, or in any other way. The most important conclusion from this part of the study was that there was not a single response which would negate such a need or considered it senseless. Seniors expressed opinions stressing the naturalness of the sexual needs of older people, which shows in itself that it is necessary to talk about it: “Sex at this age is certainly no longer pretty, but it is still there. Older people also have their needs [...]. That is why it is necessary to talk about it more” (Jadwiga, 59 years). There were also some statements suggesting which concrete topics should be discussed and in what form: “Yes... mainly in terms of health-related issues. But it would be good to read about it in the press,

because older people read newspapers rather than use the internet" (Barbara, 71 years). I allowed myself to summarise the opinions collected with one short statement: "After all, it does not make any harm to talk about it. It is always better to know more than to know little" (Irena, 60 years). This sentence very clearly illustrates the belief concerning the role of education and the need for it.

The basic conclusion resulting from the study is that it confirms the finding of the earlier studies⁵⁰ that old age is definitely not asexual. However, what is more important than this, no longer surprising, statement is that many responses from the subjects include a regret or a feeling of social pressure that older persons should no longer deal with the topic of sex. The seniors participating in the study can see that this issue is missing from the media discourse and in the daily life practice and, at the same time, they believe that this should be changed and that it is worth talking about it.

For this reason I wanted to express a belief that the taboo of senior sexuality should become the subject of interest of modern geragogy, whose tasks include the combating of stereotypes concerning old age and the improvement of the quality of life of people at such a stage of life. Geragogues, starting from the holistic vision of the human being, should not ignore the sexual sphere of older people's life, but support adaptive processes also related to changes in this scope. Additionally, education concerning sexuality in the autumn of life should encompass both seniors and younger generations so as to combat negative stereotypes, create a better image of old age and shape more positive attitudes towards seniors, which will also have an impact on their self-assessment and the way they perceive their own old age. This was demonstrated by the research concerning the impact of cultural and ethnic factors on the sexuality of older people carried out in 1982 by Winn and Newton, who compared the issue in 106 various cultures of the world. What is no doubt worth attention from among the conclusions of the research project is that cultural expectations and social attitude towards senior sexuality support sexual activity in the autumn of life if they are positive, and weaken it if they are negative. Hence, we can see the significance of social attitudes to the topic and the related great role of education in this scope⁵¹. Society should learn to understand the specific nature of the life of older people, and to respect their needs and problems. Ignoring the topic or perceiving senior sex in the categories of something unaesthetic and immoral may even be treated as a sign of ageism, and certainly as an element of symbolic violence which causes seniors to feel that they do not have

⁵⁰ Over the years, a lot of studies focusing on senior sexuality were carried out, just to mention the ones performed by Pfeiffer et al. (1969), Brecher (1984), Kivela (1986), Bretschneider, McCoy (1988), Marsiglio, Donnelly (1991), Bergstrom-Walan, Nielsen (1990), or Call, Sprecher and Shwartz (1995). However, all of them were quantitative and were mainly concentrated on checking the sexual activity of seniors – measuring how often they have sex. Apart from this, the researchers analysed various age groups. Some of them defined people in their late adulthood as ones who were older than 60, while others as those after 70, or 80. This makes it problematic to compare the generated results. However, all the studies provide one common conclusion: seniors are sexually active. See M. Cichocka, *op. cit.*, pp. 219–225.

⁵¹ M. Cichocka, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

the right to joyful and full experience of sexuality as a part of their personalities. Therefore, the contemporary geragogy should, as a task, also use the assumptions of emancipatory education, which promotes critical reflection on the mechanisms of oppression and which, noticing the areas of social injustice and marginalization, diminishes them by distributing knowledge⁵².

Summary

The taboo of senior sexuality as a challenge to contemporary geragogy

The population is ageing and, according to demographers, this phenomenon will be subject to even greater intensification. Despite the fact that the specific problems of people in the autumn of life are increasingly recognised, we still have to deal with ageism, and topics such as senior sexuality remain a taboo. In addition, the prevailing consumerism and the cult of youth and the body seem to move any possible discussion to the margins of social life. Besides, the existence of numerous myths and stereotypes preserves the not always truthful picture of the sexual activity of older people. At the same time, the social sciences increasingly extend the necessity of learning into old age, and the task of the education should be to break senior-related taboos of various kinds. Moreover, we can recently witness an increasingly apparent need for the education which should address both the older people themselves and the rest of the society, shape the attitude of understanding and acceptance, and combat stereotypes and ignorance related to the problems affecting this age group, which in turn, would have the effect of improving the quality of their lives. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the taboo of senior sexuality should become the subject of interest and a challenge for contemporary geragogy. This paper was inspired by interviews with seniors and therefore its topic is outlined on the basis of the perspective of those concerned.

⁵² M. Czerepaniak-Walczak, *Pedagogika emancypacyjna. Rozwój świadomości krytycznej człowieka* [Emancipatory Pedagogy. The Development of Human Critical Awareness], GWP, Gdańsk 2006.

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Critical Contexts of the Creation of Knowledge at the Border Area between Radical Pedagogy and the Contemporary Engaged Art (or What the Analysis of Modern Art Discourse and Research into the Category of Disability May Have in Common)

In the eyes of society, the artist is perceived as a shaman, a demiurge, a flamboyant figure, a kind of a lunatic, or someone who's forever ill, consumed by a fever of a chronic malady. Of course, that's a socially generated fantasy. And this ubiquitous fantasy is what shields society from the actual contact with art.

Artur Żmijewski, *Trembling Bodies. Conversations with Artists*¹

It [art] is political because of the very distance it takes with respect to these functions, because of the type of space and time that it institutes, and the manner in which it frames this time and peoples this space.

Jacques Rancière, *Aesthetics as Politics*

Introduction

When pondering on the questions posed in the texts included in the book I am presenting – questions concerning the achievements and the condition of the contemporary critical pedagogy in Poland, the manner in which engaged research can be carried out, the methodology of studies based on the critical paradigm and the emerging results – one may propose a potential path leading to the area which seems to be distant to pedagogy, i.e. modern art, and in particular some of its trends or concrete works and actions. I understand the very notion of *art* in two ways²: firstly, as all forms of material creations and symbolic artistic activities (tak-

¹ Introduction. Artur Żmijewski in conversation with Sebastian Cichocki, [in:] Artur Żmijewski, *Trembling Bodies. Conversations with Artists*, transl. S. Gauger, M. Głogoczowski, K. Kościuczuk, A. Lamm, M. Wawrzyńczak, A. Zapałowski, D. Malone, CSW Kronika – Berliner Künstlerprogramm DAAD, Bytom–Berlin 2010.

² It is only a working reference to the space I am focusing on in the analyses included in this article and by no means an attempt at the defining of what art is in general, since I am far from undertaking such a task.

ing very diverse forms of a 'work' of art), i.e. whatever can obtain a working name of a discourse of art, and, secondly, as the discourse about art as a part of which these creations and activities function, being subject to analysis and interpretation (history of art, theory of art, and art criticism).

The analyses presented herein are based on the fundamental thesis of the existence of common areas in critically-oriented pedagogy as well as trends of modern art referred to as critical and politically engaged. These points of contact are inter alia related to the fact that both the field of art and the field of broadly understood education are shaped by social-cultural practices as a part of which symbolic representations and meanings are produced, i.e. certain knowledge on the reality around us is created. Both these fields are also marked by a certain type of – as T. Szkudlarek put it in relation to pedagogy – interference into the world of the social organisation of meanings³, involving a modification of the functioning manners of the understanding and interpreting of social phenomena and events, and the creation of different configurations and ways of understanding of social facts. Both in the area of pedagogy and art one may adopt a critical perspective manifesting itself in focusing on the unmasking of reality, overcoming the dominating discourse and giving a voice to the groups experiencing social oppression and marginalisation (the clearly expressed category of hope in pedagogy and the related project of the possibility to deliver social change)⁴. It is because the critical perspective contains the postulate of engaged action aimed at the transformation of cultural narrations, and, what follows, also a change of the social reality. Pedagogy and art are forms of social activity strongly permeated with politicalness. According to J. Rutkowiak, the politicalness of pedagogy is expressed in its being oversaturated with the thinking of education as a process inevitably rooted in an organized social space functioning in line with principles of a specific order⁵. The relationship between art and politics is convincingly shown by J. Rancière, describing politics not as a fight for power or the exercise of such power, but as a certain manner of the configuration of the social space and a specific sphere of experience, the distribution of the community and that which is outside it. The relationship between aesthetics (art) and politics is indeed contained "in the way in which the practices and forms of visibility of art themselves intervene in the distribution of the sensible and its reconfiguration, in which they distribute spaces and times,

³ T. Szkudlarek, *Radykalna krytyka, pragmatyczna zmiana* [Radical Critique, Pragmatic Change], [in:] *Alternatywy myślenia o/dla edukacji* [Alternatives of Thinking of/for Education], Z. Kwieciński (ed.), Gdańsk 2000, p. 278.

⁴ See H. Giroux, *Theories of Reproduction and Resistance in the New Sociology of Education. A Critical Analysis*, Harvard Educational Review 1983, No. 3(53), as well as texts included in H. Giroux and L. Witkowski's work *Edukacja i sfera publiczna. Idee i doświadczenia pedagogiki radykalnej* [Education and the Public Sphere. Ideas and Experiences of Radical Pedagogy], Impuls, Kraków 2010.

⁵ See J. Rutkowiak, *Z problematyki społecznego zaangażowania pedagogiki: upolitycznienie i polityczność jako jej „pulsujące” kategorie* [From the Problems of the Social Involvement of Pedagogy: Politicisation and Politicalness as its 'Pulsating' Categories], [in:] *Nauki pedagogiczne w Polsce: dokonania, problemy, współczesne zadania, perspektywy* [The Pedagogical Sciences in Poland: Achievements, Problems, Current Tasks, Perspectives], T. Lewowicki, M. Szymański (eds.), Wyd. AP, Kraków 2004.

subjects and objects, the common and the singular"⁶. Art, shaping elements of common experience, composing the space of the presentation of concrete subjects and objects, has a political nature; one may say that politics is, in a way, its essence: as Rancière put it, *it [aesthetics] is politics*. It seems that another trait which the areas have in common is the fact that both pedagogy and art function in the state of existence that balances at the border of presence/absence in the public space (critical pedagogy as one of the threads of the academic discourse, socially-engaged art as a trend in modern art discourses), marked by the classification to socially isolated circles perceived as elite, incomprehensible, alien and fancy, distant from real life or real science. There are some theoretical and interpretative approaches which are common to both these fields – they are most often associated with critical theory (Marxism, feminism, deconstruction, postcolonialism, postmodernism, poststructuralism, cultural studies), whereas on the methodological platform we may find certain common practices related to the visual aspects of the reality and the category of activity (in pedagogy, these include audiovisual research, critical and engaged ethnography, and action research, while in the area of art, apart from the visual aspect of traditional artistic forms such as painting, sculpture, and photography, also forms characteristic for contemporary art including performance, happening, action, events and artistic experiments).

I would like to show the process of the construction of pedagogical knowledge inspired by artistic expression and questions posed as a part of it, the messages and narrations emerging from it or, rather, their possible interpretations (the process of the construction of knowledge at the border between the two areas), on the example of an analysis of cultural meanings related to the category of the *body* and its injuries/deformations/dysfunctions. This is because the body functions as a certain type of basis for the construction of language shaping the way we think about the phenomenon of *disability*, and its 'defectiveness' becomes the source attribute establishing subjects. Under the valid definition of the *International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health* (ICF) and the so-called social model of disability adopted by the World Health Organisation (WHO)⁷ and accepted in the USA, Canada, Australia and the majority of European countries, disability is perceived as a consequence of an impairment of a body structure or function which can lead to social deprivation in the form of marginalisation and exclusion. As results from the above scientific definition of disability, a disabled person can therefore be described as an individual with a low biological capital, which significantly shapes the *habitus* ingrained in their body. As pointed out by P. Bourdieu, the relationship between the individual and the world is a relationship of a presence in the world

⁶ J. Rancière, *Aesthetics and its Discontents* [Malaise dans l'esthétique], transl. S. Corcoran, Polity Press, 2009, p. 25.

⁷ Cf. C. Thomas, *Disability Theory: Key Ideas, Issues and Thinkers*, [in:] *Disability Studies Today*, Barnes, M. Oliver, L. Barton (eds.), Polity Press & Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge-Maiden 2002, pp. 39–43; D. Goodley, *Disability Studies. An Interdisciplinary Introduction*, Sage, Los Angeles-Washington DC 2011, pp. 11–12; T. Shakespeare, *The Social Model of Disability*, [in:] *The Disability Studies Reader*, L.J. Davis (ed.), pp. 197–204.

strongly involving the body of the social actor – the body in which the order, silent commands and hierarchies of social structures are engrained⁸.

The body and identity – sources of relations, contexts of entanglements

In the contemporary humanistic reflection, the body plays an extremely significant role, stepping beyond the function determined by the Cartesian thought, of a biological being belonging to nature, and contrary to the sphere of the rational mind which constitutes an autonomous and thinking subject gifted with free will. The body and the bodily aspects of human existence became an impulse and a field of reflection in the area of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history, pedagogy, cultural studies, gender studies and many other disciplines, becoming an important and broadly-discussed element of reflection on the condition of the contemporary man and the world. The body, with its various meanings and related practices, is present in literature and art, becoming not only a means of artistic expression, but also a phenomenon bordering on nature and culture, which we are looking at closely, attempting to understand its experience, relations and the positions it takes in the social world. The body, which we are not only wearing as an external robe, but which is an immanent part of ourselves, has currently become (although it has long played the function) an entity which is managed, ordered and organised in a manner consistent with the needs and requirements of the social structures in which we function, as expressed in the discipline of biopolitics, which was fascinatingly described in the categories of knowledge/power by M. Foucault, and which can currently be found in works by such authors as G. Agamben, M. Hardt, A. Negri or – not directly in the same meaning, but touching the related issues – A. Giddens and Z. Bauman⁹.

⁸ P. Bourdieu, *Pascalian Meditations*, transl. Richard Nice, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2000, pp. 128–164. For further discussion of the social construction of the body and the concept of *habitus* see also the same author's *Masculine Domination*, transl. Richard Nice, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2002.

⁹ See M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, transl. R. Hurley, Pantheon Books, New York 1978, and *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, transl. A. Sheridan, Vintage Books, New York 1995 (second Vintage Books ed.); G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, transl. D. Heller-Roazen, Stanford University Press, 1998; M. Hardt, A. Negri, *Empire*, Harvard University Press, 2000; A. Negri, *Negri on Negri. Antonio Negri in Conversation with Anne Dufourmantelle*, transl. M.B. DeBevoise, Routledge, 2004; A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Stanford University Press, 1991; Z. Bauman, *Ciało i przemoc w obliczu ponowoczesności* [Body and Violence in the Face of Postmodernity], Wyd. UMK, Toruń 1995. The term 'biopolitics' literally means "politics dealing with life" and is a currently intensely developed and used approach covering diverse political actions related to medical research, epidemiology, preventive healthcare, economics, ecological trends, as well as racial issues, the problems of colonialism, biosociality, ethopolitics, and biocapital, as discussed by Thomas Lemke in his book presenting critical analyses of trends and notions of modern biopolitics, *Biopolitics. An Advanced Introduction*, transl. E.F. Trump, NYU Press, New York and London 2011.

We can talk about the body in many dimensions and contexts¹⁰ questioning the specific 'non-troublesomeness' of the bodily aspect of human life present in the naturalistic approaches and boiling it down to the issues of biology, physiology, and medicine. In the area of the philosophical reflection covering the body, as clearly expressed in the works of phenomenologists (in particular representatives of the French phenomenology such as M. Merleau-Ponty, M. Henry, F. Chirpaz, and J.-L. Nancy), it is the body which establishes the essential relation between man and the world, as well as the rooting of an individual in reality, thus constituting the basis for the constitution of the subject and their existence. In the socio-cultural dimension, the body is perceived as a social construct to which various meanings are ascribed¹¹; it becomes possible to understand it as a living *palimpsest*, on which the subsequent texts describing our existence and determined by time and the dominating values, are recorded. In this context, the human body becomes a fabric and a place in which history and culture are recorded. It is therefore possible to talk about a specific *language* of the body, its signs or bodily expression formulated by means of the Derridean metaphor of the *writing* of the body. Another aspect related to the body is the issue of its potentially negative stigmatisation, as expressed in the society's attitude to all manners of abnormalities, deformations and impairments which may be experienced by the body. In her already classical anthropological work devoted to the setting of the social order by means of the creation of categories belonging to the spheres of the sacred and the profane, on the example of an analysis of the functioning of the so-called primitive and modern societies, M. Douglas turned the readers' attention to a certain *taboo* related to human corporeality. Various bodily anomalies exist at the border between the sphere of the sacred, which constitutes an area of power over the attribution of meanings and the generation of rules, and the sphere of the profane, in which phenomena and activities stepping beyond the first area appear – ones which do not fit it, ones which are related to the questioning of the standards shaping the social structure. Anomalies of the body are often associated with a flaw, uncleanness, and social dirt, which does not fit the sphere of the accepted social order and interpretation schemes; reactions to it, closer to the profane, may include disqualification, control, distance, and tabooisation or a shift towards the other extreme – that of sacralisation and inclusion in ritual¹².

In the critical-emancipatory context, the body is a social construct subjected to oppression, in which mechanisms of power and domination, as well as resistance, are engrained. The body as a specific type of objectified socio-cultural construct

¹⁰ I am briefly referring to only a few selected perspectives which are significant for the presented analyses and consistent with the adopted theoretical assumptions.

¹¹ Sociological analyses of body-related issues are discussed by B. S. Turner in his famous work, first published in 1984, *The Body and Society. Explorations in Social Theory* (3rd edn., Sage, Los Angeles – Singapore 2008), in which the author analyses the different manifestations of corporeality present in many interpersonal activities and relationships as well as manners of body management and the establishment of order in the light of various social theories.

¹² See M. Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*, Routledge, London and New York 2002, pp. 36–50.

subjected to concrete, typically oppressive practices, which at the same time are able to establish subjects, was reflected on by, inter alia, M. Foucault, and P. Bourdieu. The issues of the oppressive nature of language, culture, and social practices consolidated in the body were also discussed by J. Butler, who questioned the sex-related meanings universally functioning in the society and referring to biological attributes¹³.

The body, disability and culture – an attempt at research exemplification

Reflection on the issues related to the body and corporeality in the context of the phenomenon of disability makes it possible to notice one of the most basic problems which may generate a certain cognitive conflict. On the one hand, one may perceive this relation in the perspective of scientific objectification generating verifiable knowledge, consistent with the observable facts, on biological impairments and shortcomings marking the disabled person as well as their consequences. On the other hand, one may adopt the perspective of a particular cultural engagement giving birth to many issues concerning the meaning of a concrete bodily dysfunction, the way it can be perceived, the related emotions, the meaning of being disabled and having a given impairment, the words used to talk about it, the meaning of these words, the language we use to talk about 'anomalies' of the body or the mind, and the discourse this language fits into¹⁴.

In order to bring closer the meanings which may appear during attempts at the answering of questions of this kind, I shall present the results of the research endeavours aimed at the identification of the areas of the presence of the *impaired/deformed/ill/weak body* (the body in the state of physical and symbolic oppression) and the language (discourses and meanings) marked by a certain potential of softening, diluting and transforming of the strongly opposite and normative categories (such as healthy/ill, normal/abnormal). The research was related to the search for interpretations breaking the heretofore existing narrations and stepping beyond the sphere of beliefs shaping the professional 'scientific' discourse of a disabled body/mind. In the texts which create it, one may clearly discern the presence, although not directly expressed for a long time and developed on the ground of the *episteme* of modernism, of the tradition of exclusion, which gives the phenomenon of disability the role of an anomaly, pushing it into the sphere of pathology and deviation. The tradition seems to be contemporarily deepened and strengthened by the discourse of culture promoting the healthy, strong, fit and beautiful body, which becomes the source of a specific 'aesthetic discrimination' and a promotion of the marginalisation of the disabled¹⁵.

¹³ J. Butler, *Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, Routledge, New York 2007.

¹⁴ I am writing more about it in my text *Niepełnosprawność i pedagogika. Pytanie o podmiot a kwestia tożsamości i zmiany paradygmatycznej dyscypliny* [Disability and Pedagogy. The Question of the Subject and the Issue of Identity and Paradigmatic Discipline Change], *Studia z Teorii Wychowania* 2011, No. 2(3), pp. 267–283.

¹⁵ P. Hughes, *Disability and the Body*, [in:] *Disability Studies Today*, p. 70 and further.

Cognitive perspective and research method

The research was focused on selected works representing the critically oriented and politically engaged modern Polish art (the 1990s) – the trend constituting a specific ‘social critique’ and represented by, inter alia, Grzegorz Kowalski (running the sculpture workshop, the so-called *Kowalnia* in the Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw) and people originating from the studio, including Artur Żmijewski, Paweł Althamer and Katarzyna Kozyra, as well as Zbigniew Libera, Joanna Rajkowska, Katarzyna Górna, Andrzej Karaś, and Jacek Markiewicz. As D. Jarecka put it: “[...] what is the essence of their art is not just [...] the undermining of the set social roles, but also addressing the evil”¹⁶. These brief characteristics express in a simple and accurate manner the ideas and postulates present also in the critically-oriented and socially--engaged pedagogy. I. Kowalska points out that the so-called critical art of the period “analysed mechanisms of the incapacitation of the body by the contemporary culture”, making strategies of its disciplining visible. The human body, shown in a variety of ways, in various situations and states, “became the basic area of artistic discussions concerning the human identity”. By showing the border states of physical existence, disease, death, sexuality, “art began to crumble the contemporary taboo areas”¹⁷. In turn, A. Żmijewski, the artist, whose selected works became the research material in the project concerning the phenomenon of disability, determined critical art as “[...] a line of thought and creation of resistance in the form of knowledge”¹⁸.

The essential research problem boiled down to the question of what an ‘impaired/dysfunctional’ body means/can mean, and to the related issue of what meanings constitute/may constitute the basis for the identification of the individual and collective identities of the subjects perceived as disabled. **The main analytical strategy** was discourse analysis understood as an attempt at the identification and deconstruction of the meanings of the text, or, as D. Howarth puts it: “the process of analyzing signifying practices as discursive forms”, in which all types of linguistic and non-linguistic materials can be considered as text¹⁹. Assuming, after M. Foucault²⁰, the understanding of discourse as a historically-determined notion, i.e. one marked by the changeability of the system of meanings shaping subjects through the concrete systems of relations and social practices functioning at a given time, I also based my analyses on the assumptions and methods of the critical discourse analysis

¹⁶ D. Jarecka, *Malowanie zła* [Painting the Evil], an article published in the internet portal of the “Gazeta Wyborcza” daily, 25 March 2005, www.gazeta.pl, accessed on: 27.07.2011.

¹⁷ I. Kowalczyk, *Problematyka ciała w polskiej sztuce krytycznej lat 90.* [Body-Related Problems in the Polish Critical Art of the 1990s], a website of the Interdisciplinary Group *Gender Studies*, University of Wrocław, www.gender.uni.wroc.pl/index.php?lang (articles, online texts), accessed on: 21.06.2012.

¹⁸ The quotation comes from the conversation between Sebastian Cichocki and Artur Żmijewski, constituting the introduction to A. Żmijewski’s book *Trembling Body. Conversations with Artists* (Seria *Krytyki Politycznej*, vol. II), Galeria Kronika&Korporacja Ha!art, Bytom–Kraków 2006.

¹⁹ D. Howarth, *Discourse*, Open University Press, Buckingham 2000, p. 10.

²⁰ M. Foucault, *The Order of Discourse*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Boston, London and Henley 1981.

(CDA). It is defined as a manner of studying discursive aspects of a subject and constitutes one of the main research strategies applied in the area of cultural studies²¹.

The analysed **research material** comprised images – the results of the photographic recording of portraits and situations showing people with visible bodily deformities, i.e. persons who in both the colloquial and scientific perception may be referred to as disabled. Selected photographs (photos of the original works) comprising Artur Żmijewski's cycle *An Eye for an Eye* were taken from the publicly available internet sources and a catalogue accompanying the exhibition organized in the Polish pavilion during the 51st Venice Biennale²², with some of the research materials illustrating press interviews with the artist. The author often undertakes the topic of the image of the body subjected to various forms of oppression, and his characteristic manner of work, a specific method of artistic activity, involves collecting people together and challenging them to perform an emotionally difficult, often controversial task.

The analysis of the research material covered two areas simultaneously: firstly, photographs, treated as text, of people with visible deformities (creations of artistic activities generated in the field of art, 'works of art'), as well as, secondly, texts in the form of statements of both the artist himself and other people, included in interviews, articles, reviews, disputes, etc. (discourse generated in the area of the theory of art and art criticism, related to the social perception of creations of art). This made it possible to identify **different areas of meanings grouping themselves in several categories**, including the visual level of description, the title, emotions, reversal of the situation/change of order, otherness/hybridisation, stepping beyond borders/the violation of borders, and terror of the healthy/terror of the disabled; the borders between the particular groups as well as the networks of meanings within single categories are blurred and intermingle, creating subsequent configurations and structures.

Research results – categories of meanings

At the level of the description of what one can see in the photographs, we may say that they present standing, sitting or lying individuals who are incomplete, as they do not have certain parts of their bodies – an arm or a leg. The crippled, incomplete people pose for the photographs, being supported by healthy individuals with all their limbs, whom the former use as prostheses. They jointly try to create a 'complete' fit body, able to act. From among the people in the photographs, as pointed out by D. Jarecka, referring to Andrzej Wróblewski's cycle of paintings entitled *Rozstrzelania* [*Firing Squad Executions*]: "[...] some are sound and

²¹ See the work *Krytyczna analiza dyskursu. Interdyscyplinarne podejście do komunikacji społecznej* [Critical Discourse Analysis. An Interdisciplinary Approach to Social Communication], A. Duszak and N. Fairclough (eds.), Universitas, Kraków 2008.

²² A. Żmijewski, *If it happened only once, it's as if it never happened. Co stało się raz nie stało się nigdy*, transl. M. Appelt, et al., Zachęta Narodowa Galeria Sztuki, Warszawa 2005.

healthy, while others injured, in pieces. We do not know why. This is the way cards were stacked. Are the healthy ones feeling guilty? So what? This will not rescue the crippled ones"²³. Such an interpretation of the situations shown in the photos turns attention to the evil present in the world, in nature – the evil the source of which remains unknown and which is a certain riddle, a secret, to a fate perceived as blind and cruel. The sense of such interpretation can be confirmed in the question which is frequently a part of the experience of the disabled or their loved ones: why me, why has this happened to me?

Another group of meanings is made up by the **title** of the cycle of photographs *An Eye for an Eye*²⁴, around which a certain symbolic order is organised. At the more direct level of interpretation, it can be described in the following way: healthy bodies replace the missing limbs, they are a 'depository of limbs', creating, together with the crippled bodies, a specific hybrid which does not remind one of the typical scheme of the human body. At a higher level of symbolism, these images can be interpreted in the perspective of a metaphor of compensation for damage fuelled by the sense of guilt – it is when the healthy offer their assistance and support to the ones who are crippled not only in the literal sense, but also by the oppressive cultural practices. We may also refer here to the metaphor of a return, a revenge of the disabled, using the healthy in an instrumental and, at the same time, physically and emotionally exhausting manner. But these human hybrids can also be treated in line with the spirit of the Biblical interpretation, which talks not so much about the return or revenge, as about the need to maintain a life balance.

Another group of meanings identified as a part of the analyses is related to **emotions**. Looking at the photographs, we may notice a very strong differentiation of strong emotions including surprise, astonishment, uncertainty, fear, anxiety, embarrassment, shame, distaste, aversion, disgust, curiosity, compassion, pity, sorrow, guilt, and relief. The presented images and the accompanying broad array of emotions strongly focus the viewer's attention on themselves and make it difficult for them to take their eyes off them. They are marked by a peculiar ability to seduce. Artur Żmijewski himself said during one interview that "disability can seduce in the same way as beauty; physical deformity makes one stand out. It is something unusual, amazing, you need to make an effort to understand it"²⁵. The difference between the presented image and everything which is typically shown in the context of the body, the uncovering and the 'shameless' presentation

²³ D. Jarecka, *Malowanie zła...* [Painting the Evil...].

²⁴ The title refers to fragments of the *Book of Exodus* and the *Book of Leviticus* of the *Old Testament*. "But if there is serious injury, you are to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise" (*Book of Exodus* 21,23–25). "Anyone who injures their neighbour is to be injured in the same manner: fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. The one who has inflicted the injury must suffer the same injury". (*Book of Leviticus* 24,19–20). The quotations come from the *New International Version of the Holy Bible: Old and New Testaments* available at <https://www.biblica.com/bible/>, accessed on 19. 10. 2018.

²⁵ The quotation comes from an interview with the artist carried out by K. Bielas and D. Jarecka, and entitled *The Depository of Limbs*, published in the *Duży Format* magazine (a supplement to the "Gazeta Wyborcza" daily) on 16 May 2005, p. 3.

of what we, people, try to cover and hide, may lead to a sense that one is being shocked by disability, bombarded with the images of bodies which contrast with the generally accepted aesthetic criteria.

Yet another set of meanings which emerged during my analysis is focused around the **change** of a certain typical order and a **reversal of the situation** that we are normally used to, which results in the deconstruction and reconfiguration of meanings. In the analysed photographs, healthy people were reduced to the role of the suppliers of limbs; they were treated as objects and perceived through their attributes and usefulness; they had to adjust to the situation in which they participated. This is most frequently the experience of the disabled, who are mostly perceived through the perspective of their own impairments and limitations and faced with the necessity to adapt themselves to the rules of the surrounding world. The actions of the healthy and the ones missing their limbs seem to be ambivalent: on the one hand, they can be interpreted as an attempt at an assistance offered by the fit, but on the other, the assistance and support, presented in the form of a literal, physical support of the impaired, non-independent bodies, can also be a certain type of violence in relation to the disabled, an attempt at 'repairing' or 'supplementing' them, making them complete, which strongly fits the social discourse of normativity and the discourse of the normalisation of the life of the disabled. When writing about the cycle *An Eye for an Eye*, I. Kowalczyk stated that it showed a positive vision of the symbiosis between the non-disabled and the disabled, as a part of which the differences between them faded, owing to which the division into the sphere of normality and whatever is excluded from it ceased to be meaningful. The exposed handicap showed in the situation of co-existence with the ones who do not experience it, led the author to an interpretation providing that "only through getting to know the 'Other', he/she can be included in the whole. His/her disability is not [...] negated, it is included into the closed area of social relations"²⁶. But getting to know the Other, resulting in his/her inclusion in a specific whole, a definite order and discourse, can also be understood as a possessive act of violence, a colonisation of the identity which does not fit the accepted rules, the identity of someone perceived as a 'worse Other' (A. Gramsci's notion of *subaltern*). Colonisers can be healthy, 'normal' representatives of society, including the artist himself, whose work can be interpreted in many ways, also becoming a potential space of symbolic violence or an act of artistic provocation. Another source of the appearing ambivalence is the interpretation in the light of which disabled persons may be treated as recipients of assistance, individuals who are weak, harmed by fate, but also a source of oppression for the healthy, which A. Żmijewski called a "rape of the disabled on the healthy"²⁷.

Yet another interpretation of the non-typical nature of the situations under discussion may refer to the already mentioned direct showing of what is normally kept

²⁶ I. Kowalczyk, *Problematyka ciała w polskiej sztuce krytycznej lat 90.* [Body-Related Problems in the Polish Critical Art of the 1990s].

²⁷ *The Depository of Limbs* – an interview with A. Żmijewski carried out by K. Bielas and D. Jarecka, *Duży Format* magazine (a supplement to the "Gazeta Wyborcza" daily) of 16 May 2005, p. 3.

in hiding (the deformed body). Its unveiling and making visible may be interpreted as 'the voice of the disabled', the presentation of their life and reality, their version of reality, which does not necessarily have to be consistent with what the healthy would like it to be (different articulations, different discourses, different versions of the truth). The picture of exhausting and imperfect attempts at the creation of one fit body, able to maintain stability or move, would be, as a part of this understanding, a particular struggle in the fight for the meaning, for one's own version, of the truth.

Another group of meanings identified as a part of my analysis has been included in the category **otherness/difference/hybridisation**, and is related to the exposition, present in the photographs, of the bodily difference and narrations concerning people and their stories written into their bodies. The manifestation of the impassable otherness, to which one can hardly remain indifferent, its persistent, or even intrusive presence, fosters a reaction, and calls upon one to respond in the rational and ethical sense. Deformed bodies awaken in us a Levinasian appeal of the Other to which we must respond. We may also treat in the same category a meeting of the healthy and the impaired as an area of the negotiation of differences, of the emergence of the significant differences which establish subjects. The constructs originating from the combination of the non-disabled and the disabled bodies may symbolise the process of the hybridisation of identity, in which – referring to the strategies of the construction of identities as described by H. Bhabha – *mimicry* is tantamount to becoming similar in order to vanish, dissolve, in the alien, other identity, *emulation* means becoming similar in order not to be worse, while *resistance* becomes a reversal of the heretofore existing order or emancipation²⁸.

The one but last of the identified categories of the analysis groups' meanings focused around the question of the **crossing/violation of borders**. The scenes presented in the photographs concern participation in a very intimate, emotionally difficult situation of the uncovering and presenting of literal and symbolic 'wounds', the specific 'touching of the scars' in close contact with others, including the viewers looking at the photographs. The revealing of a disease, the showing of the 'naked' truth – the sphere of the taboo, and the tackling of a very difficult aspect of human existence in the individual and socio-cultural dimension – may breed resistance towards the entire situation, but also resistance to the dominating discourse of the healthy, strong, non-disabled and beautiful body. A physical stepping into a situation which is full of irony, the inescapable grotesqueness and the irrationality of the presented figures, the clash of contrasting emotions, may breed uncertainty, emotional dissonance, and discussion with the standards of political correctness.

The last group of meanings was referred to as the **terror of the healthy/disabled**. They are related to the interpretations as a part of which the disabled can be accepted only if they become similar to the healthy. Therefore, the discourse of normativity becomes a condition for existence in the world, and the adoption of the identity of a 'disabled' person the only possibility to establish a subject. In

²⁸ See T. Szkudlarek, *Wiedza i wolność w pedagogice amerykańskiego postmodernizmu* [Knowledge and Freedom in the Pedagogy of American Postmodernism], Impuls, Kraków 1993, pp. 203–224.

E. Toniak's interpretation, "For a moment, handicapped bodies become normal again, the missing limbs once again returned to them"²⁹. However, attempts at making cripples healthy, at a particular complementation of the impaired body/subject, at the 'closure' of identity in the area of typical, domesticated meanings, is impossible, while the effort focused on the task is doomed to failure, since hybrid-like creations do not resemble normal bodies. Another possible interpretation refers to the 'terror of the disabled', who by their very presence disturb the peace of the healthy, making them confront the things which raise their existential fear, which are pushed away and often denied access to the consciousness of individuals, as well as social life.

Discourse of science, discourse of art – different but close worldviews

When making creations in the cultural text generated in the area of art the subject matter of my research analyses, I adopted an assumption that an artistic project may be a source of knowledge on subjects and society. The foundations of this decision can be sought, on the one hand, in the stepping beyond the borders of disciplines and the search for new spaces of knowledge generation as postulated by the critical pedagogy, while, on the other hand, it can be found in the relationship between pedagogy (the critical, radical, and engaged one) and art, the sources of which can be sought in the area of the very art as well as the discourse on art. I will try to elaborate on this relationship on the basis of several statements of the artist whose works were analysed.

In one of his interviews, Artur Żmijewski said: "There is no division into art and life. Art is life"³⁰. In this sentence, both life and art (just like all education and the discipline referred to as pedagogy) are real practices taking place in a definite time and space, which tell us something about the reality around us and as a part of which certain activities are undertaken, which interfere with reality as we know it, shape it, and introduce certain changes. In another conversation with a journalist, when asked whether he practiced politically-engaged art, Żmijewski answered [that he practiced]: "Art, which is interested in what is going on, takes a voice in the discussion. Silence can be considered as a consent, a confirmation of the status quo. You have to say something so that others know your position"³¹. This statement focuses on the necessity to take a voice, to express one's disapproval of the established order, and disagreement with the tacit consent to the evil and the injustice taking place around. The categories of *voice* and *resistance*, which are present here, are among the most basic notions of the radical pedagogy, which

²⁹ A. Żmijewski, *If it Happened Only Once, It's as if It Never Happened...*, p. 177.

³⁰ J. Ruszczyk, *Językiem elit jest tekst, a mas obraz* [Text is the Language of Elites, While Image – That of the Masses], an interview with A. Żmijewski, www.nesweek.pl (accessed on 21.07.2011).

³¹ A. Kowalska, *Nie jestem emerytem sztuki krytycznej* [I am Not an Old-Age Pensioner of Critical Art], an interview with A. Żmijewski, 17 April 2009, www.gazeta.pl (accessed on 21.07.2011).

postulates the 'policy of giving a voice' to those individuals and groups which are socially marginalised and oppressed, the expression of their identity as well as the emancipation and resistance against socially-sanctioned, oppressive practices.

Yet another quote from the artist: "Art [...] excluded as knowledge [...] preserves the "unfathomable" ability of following intuition, that which is repressed, but which art can retrieve and reinstate to public debate"³² shows attributes of art as spheres of life which are inaccessible or perhaps absent in other discourses, giving art the ability of providing critical reflection on and a demystification of the mechanisms of domination and oppression hidden in the rules of social order. Similar postulates are also formed by the project of politically-engaged radical pedagogy. In another quote taken from an interview, we read that "[...] artists are used by the society. The society asks a question and they provide an answer"³³, and in yet another that "Art itself could stop insisting that the answers it provides are in fact questions"³⁴. In these statements, we can find a specific redefinition of the status of the statements of art, providing it with the ability to not only present reality and comment on it, but also to formulate answers to various social problems and issues. Therefore, what is present in them, just like in critically-oriented pedagogy, the pedagogy of resistance, is the language of possibilities, which gives hope for the making of a change. The noticing of social problems, bringing them to the surface, and political engagement in the solving of the problems, breeds the attitude of an artist, and, similarly, pedagogue/teacher, to whom H. Giroux referred as a critically thinking 'transformative intellectual' who mistrusts *doxa* and creates conditions for the transformation of reality.

When conducting the research presented herein, one may pose a question as to what type of knowledge related to the category of an 'impaired' (disabled) body emerges from the above analysis and what the consequences of the above can be for pedagogy and social change? An answer to the above can be summarized with reference to the notions of diversity, non-clarity and ambivalence, which are expressed in the impossibility to grasp and clearly determine the meanings of the 'impaired body', and in the balancing at the edge of the grasping of the identity of the subject and the relationship with it (an attempt at the grasping of the identity of a 'disabled' subject becomes a ceaseless 'chase after the rabbit', which seems to be so close, but still continues to escape, and we cannot catch it, i.e. name and classify it, and determine its properties). Therefore, they are marked by a variety of subject positions, a diversity of the possible 'closures' of meaning, and openness to various social ontologies of disability, which E. Laclau understands as sets of meanings closed in structures of specific discourses³⁵. What becomes necessary as a result is critical reflection on the nature of the objectivisms performed in the

³² Introduction. Artur Żmijewski in conversation with Sebastian Cichocki, [in:] Artur Żmijewski, *Trembling Bodies. Conversations with Artists*.

³³ J. Ruszczyc, *Językiem elit jest tekst...* [Text is the Language of Elites...].

³⁴ Introduction. Artur Żmijewski in conversation with Sebastian Cichocki, [in:] Artur Żmijewski, *Trembling Bodies...*

³⁵ E. Laclau, *On Populist Reason*, Verso, London – New York 2005, pp. 67–68.

area of the traditional discourse of pedagogy, in which disability is treated, explicitly or, increasingly frequently implicitly, as an anomaly, as a deviation from the standard. Stepping beyond the area of universally practiced pedagogical searches and broadening them to include the sphere of art allows us not only to search for certain common areas, assumptions, discourses and meanings of the border area breaking the heretofore dominating voice, but also to find different interpretations, new threads, and definitions of reality constructed in a different way. It therefore allows the generation of a different type of knowledge concerning the problems and categories studied as a part of pedagogy, to adopt a different interpretative horizon, a different model of reality and social relations. I will again refer here to A. Żmijewski, according to whom, although art and science generate different types of knowledge, each of them can tell us something important³⁶. The discourse of science creates a structured network of notions, definitions, and analyses, which mutually refer to one another. It includes strong nodal points (knowledge on certain phenomena, considered certain and true) and empty places, which science cannot yet fill, and which group problems it is unable to explain and solve, or even perceive. On the other hand, the discourse of art creates a network of non-structured meanings, in which there are no nodal points, but only local turbulences grouping certain fragments of knowledge. Since elements of the network may move freely and in any way, all re-configurations of senses and meanings are possible, and so there are no 'impossible associations'. The type of knowledge generated in the areas of art and discourse on art, which are interrelated, allows one therefore to cross the borders between disciplines, undermine the scientifically-sanctioned 'truth' considered to be obvious, and gives a voice to 'local knowledge', to the personal experience staying on the margins of the dominating knowledge. What are the consequences of the above for the reflections concerning disability perceived as a social and cultural phenomenon and a certain theoretical category? The area of the *border* between pedagogy and art as well as the pedagogue moving there as a *border-crosser*, stepping beyond the borders between disciplines and areas³⁷, hides the potential of the breaking of the inevitable oppositionism of meanings (notions) shaping the discourse of normativity, and the practices (stemming from traditional knowledge and cladding such discourse)³⁸, which include specific ideologically-determined entanglements and relations of domination and oppression. It is an act, as S. Hall understood it³⁹, of a specific cultural recovery of

³⁶ A. Żmijewski, *Trembling Bodies. Conversations with Artists...* (the quotation comes from a fragment of S. Cichocki's conversation with the artist from the Introduction to the book).

³⁷ See H. Giroux, *Pedagogia pogranicza w wieku postmodernizmu* [Pedagogy of the Border Area in the Age of Postmodernism], [in:] *Edukacja i sfera publiczna. Idee i doświadczenia pedagogiki radykalnej...* [Education and the Public Sphere. Ideas and Experiences of Radical Pedagogy...], p. 227.

³⁸ In the pedagogical discourse, the knowledge is constructed and accumulated in the area of special education, and its sources can be traced to biology, medicine (mainly rehabilitation, neurology, psychiatry, and genetics) as well as psychology (in particular clinical and developmental) and sociology (e.g. deviation sociology, social identity theory, group sociology).

³⁹ See S. Hall, *Ethnicity. Identity and Difference*, "Radical America", Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 9–20; H. Giroux H.A. Giroux, *Wobec wyzwania tożsamości i różnicy (poza dyskurs edukacji międzykulturowej)* [Facing the

everything the discourse of normativity consigned to the margins of social life and into the area of 'special' (meaning: professional) knowledge on disability. Therefore, it can constitute a starting point for a change, for politically-conscious actions directed at oppression, which, however, require the understanding of its mechanism, often not visible, hidden behind the practices of assistance and support. It can constitute the basis and the beginning of a change which in relation to the phenomenon of disability, strongly rooted in the biological determinism characteristic for the essentialist understanding of the subject, is present in the very possibility to notice and recognize that a different point of view is possible.

Summary

Critical contexts of the creation of knowledge at the border area between radical pedagogy and the contemporary engaged art

This paper presents some considerations focused on the search for new areas of generating knowledge at the border between various disciplines, social life and culture. They are based on the thesis that there are some joint issues and common shared contents in the space of the critically-oriented pedagogy and contemporary art's currents, which are defined as critical and politically involved. These issues, among others, refer to fact that both the field of art and the field of education are shaped by socio-cultural practices in which the symbolic representations and meanings are generated, so they both create some kind of knowledge. Learning about reality on the borders is especially directed at searching for interpretations breaking the dominated narratives constructed in the area of formal knowledge and transgressing the sphere of beliefs which consist of the professional, scientific discourse of a disabled body. As an exemplification, the author presents an analysis of meanings connected with the category of the impaired body/corporeality, based on some chosen works coming from A. Żmijewski's *An Eye for an Eye* series [1998].

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Polish Education in Opinion-Forming Weeklies. Discourse Analysis in Practice

The aim of this paper is to present the findings of a review of texts on education published between 2009 and 2010 in five Polish opinion-forming weeklies: "Polityka", "Wprost", "Newsweek", "Gość Niedzielny" and "Przegląd". The analysis included 522 issues of magazines in which 115 texts on school and education were published. The subject of my research interests was to identify the ways in which the press depicts school and education, for I assume that these portrayals play an important role in shaping Poles' perception of school, i.e. how they define its role and tasks¹.

In this paper I have identified metaphors used by journalists writing texts about education. I treat the metaphor as a linguistic measure consisting in intentional transformations of the meaning of words, which subsequently acquire a new significance. This treatment enhances expression, adds vividness to the statements and fosters recall. Metaphors are a useful way of directing the audience's thinking and conveying the author's intended meaning. The primary function of the metaphor is explanatory, in the sense that through the metaphor the way of thinking and the audience's worldview is shaped.

The analysis that was performed of the metaphorical descriptions of school and education allows us to conclude that the opinion-forming press is involved in changing the mentality of Polish society, shaped by tradition, and in reconstructing the way of thinking about education. The aim of this reconstruction is to gain acceptance for the reduction of state spending on education and at least a partial shift of this area of social life to the private sector.

I approached the press statements published in weekly magazines as a discourse and therefore I did not limit myself to reporting on the information and judgements presented in the articles, but I tried to investigate the intentions of the authors of the texts, expose the conflict – or, at times, open warfare – between different views and interests, bring to light hidden agendas, and sometimes also

¹ A detailed linguistic analysis is presented in the book entitled *Obraz edukacji w polskim dyskursie prasowym* [The Depiction of Education in the Polish Press Discourse].

expose the manipulation of information by the discourse participants, who seek to create the most desirable version of reality for themselves.

I subscribe to the opinion of T.A. van Dijk², who has identified two types of social discourse analysis, i.e. firstly, the descriptive-explanatory analysis, oriented towards an unbiased examination of statements, aspiring to objectivity, and secondly, critical analysis, examining the instances of the domination or inequality or some other hidden interests in the discourses. The texts published in opinion-forming weeklies dealing with the contemporary Polish school and, in a broader sense, the entire Polish education system, express so much emotion and so many different concepts of educational reforms and such contradictory opinions that it seems advisable to employ the second type of discourse analysis mentioned by van Dijk, i.e. critical analysis.

Such a research position obliges the author primarily to deal with the language of journalistic statements, to conduct a linguistic analysis of texts, to identify the means used at different levels of the language in order to convey the desired meanings, and especially to address the measures aimed at ensuring that the reader embraces a particular point of view.

The texts on education published in the weeklies under analysis contain a number of metaphorical terms for school and education, which can be assigned to two groups:

- school and education in the battleground metaphor,
- school and education in the market metaphor.

Battleground metaphors are already evident in the titles of the reviewed articles:

1. *Do szkoły jak na wojnę* [To School as if to War] ("Newsweek" 2010, 46).
2. *Szkoła seksualnego napastowania* [School of Sex Abuse] ("Przegląd" 2010, 49).
3. *Operacja „matura” z matematyki* [Operation "Maths Exam"] ("Przegląd" 2010, 12).
4. *Amnestia dla dwójarzy* [Amnesty for F-graders] ("Przegląd" 2010, 22).
5. *Ankieta w profesora* [Appraisal Surveys Aimed at Professors] ("Przegląd" 2010, 47).
6. *Mękamatyka* [Maths Torture] ("Polityka" 2009, 25).
7. *Dziewczynka z nożami* [The Little Knife Girl] ("Polityka" 2010, 39).
8. *Dzieci rewolucji* [Children of the Revolution] ("Newsweek" 2009, 20).
9. *Śmierć entuzjasty* [Death of an Enthusiast] ("Newsweek" 2009, 36).

In the articles themselves, war or battlefield metaphors appear much more frequently. Here are some examples:

When Alek enters the school building, cats [i.e. students of lower grades] cower in corners; once he knocked down a classmate and broke his nose; the boy was hit so hard, because in the hallway he dared ask the older pupil to stop pushing him. [...] In their [junior high school] environment there is a very clear hierarchy, on top of which there are four boys. They are the stars at school. Occasionally they extort money from the kids lower in the school pecking order³.

² T.A. van Dijk, *The Study of Discourse*, [in:] *Discourse as a Structure and Process*, T.A. van Dijk (ed.), SAGE 1997, pp. 31–35.

³ V. Ozminowski, *Do szkoły jak na wojnę* [To School as if to War], "Newsweek" 2010, issue 46.

In an article published in *Newsweek*, a journalist is concerned about children starting school: “350,000 children born in 2003 will fall victim to the educational revolution. Minister Katarzyna Hall’s reform of primary education will do them unnecessary harm”⁴.

Joanna Podgórska in her article titled *Samotność katechety* [Loneliness of a Religion Instructor], while writing about religion classes in Polish schools uses battle metaphors of a slightly different nature. The article begins as follows:

Many religion instructors feel that the Church has sent them to the frontline and left them on their own; parent-teacher conferences are a nightmare, resembling something between a kangaroo court without the suspect-defendant present and an execution. [One of the religion instructors puts it bluntly:] my biggest problem when I go to school is that I am alone. No one has my back. I don’t have any working weapons or ammunition (textbooks or teaching aids), nobody to give me a hand, nobody to protect me⁵.

From the articles quoted above, a depressing image of a school as a dangerous, even threatening place emerges. It is hard to imagine that such a school could achieve the noble goals set out in ministerial documents. In an atmosphere of constant insecurity, or even fear of attack, one cannot introduce students to the world of values, teach respect for other people or develop sensitivity and empathy.

It should be noted, however, that the war metaphor is present only in the texts concerning free public education, which is not economically viable. Texts on private, community and Catholic paid schools show a completely different face of education. The manipulation of readers, who receive selective information: positive about private education and negative about public education, is clearly apparent here.

The “*Gość Niedzielny*” magazine published a text about the Private Catholic Junior High School and Secondary School in Sosnowiec. The article paints a very positive picture of the school, which, apart from high teaching standards, fosters the development of students’ interests, educates them, supports them and offers assistance in solving any difficulties they may have.

Depending on the students’ needs, study clubs are formed. A school theatre and a school schola have been in operation for years. Before or after lessons there are additional classes in subjects that young people have problems with. But they are also used by those preparing for the Olympiads and subject competitions. Every year the school has several competition finalists and Olympians – mainly in geography and history. In the past school year the school had such great exam results that it ended up among the best schools in Sosnowiec and beyond [...] That is why the school has no problem attracting students. They travel not only from the towns in Zagłębie Dąbrowskie, but also from Siewierz, Olkusz or even from as far as Katowice, Mysłowice or Silesia. The tuition fees are not a deterrent. If a given student comes from a poor background, we are willing to reduce the tuition fees, says the school headmistress⁶.

⁴ Z. Wojtkowska, *Dzieci rewolucji* [Children of the Revolution], “*Newsweek*” 2009, issue 20.

⁵ J. Podgórska, *Samotność katechety* [Loneliness of a Religion Instructor], “*Polityka*” 2010, issue 50.

⁶ B. Gruszka-Zych, *Sosnowiecki katolik* [Catholics in Sosnowiec], “*Gość Niedzielny*” 2009, issue 36.

In turn, Joanna Podgórska in "Polityka" describes community schools as:

open, friendly, and democratic. They nurture an intelligentsia ethos and civic attitudes. [...] For Dorota Dobroczyńska [mother of a pupil], community schools are not comfort bubbles, but places where the atmosphere fosters normal child development. Those children who feel supported and safe will be able to cope more easily with the world than those who are constantly having their wings clipped. A tough school of punishment, humiliation and pressure gives you a baggage that you have to deal with in adult life. [...] This is not a school for the nouveau-rich. For many parents, tuition fees are one of the most serious budget items. We treat it as an investment in our children. There are fantastic teachers who can naturally stimulate intellectual activity without the children feeling overburdened and pressured⁷.

Market metaphors, present both in titles and in the content of a number of articles, are as popular as the battlefield ones. Let us examine the headlines first:

1. *Dyplomy z zieleniaka* [Degrees from a Street Market], "Newsweek" 2009, 26.
2. *Głupio wydane pieniądze* [Money Down the Drain], "Newsweek" 2009, 34.
3. *Dorastający biznes* [A Growing Business], "Newsweek" 2010, 15.
4. *Szkoły z kasą* [Schools with Money], "Polityka" 2009, 40.
5. *Z dyplomem bez pracy* [Educated and Unemployed], "Przegląd" 2009, 40.
6. *Uniwersytet sp. z o.o.* [University Ltd.], "Newsweek" 2010, 8.
7. *Magister bez pracy* [Master's Degree and No Job], "Przegląd" 2010, 30.
8. *Uniwersytet z przeceną* [University at a Discount], "Wprost" 2010, 4.

Writing about school in market terms leads to the widespread economisation of thinking about education and is now common; one could argue that it has become a kind of a standard. This is hardly surprising. The recognition of the free market and the laws that govern it as the most effective mechanism for the circulation of goods, leads to the creation of a free social market governed by the laws of economics and the principle of profit, where all goods are tangible and quantifiable, and what they have in common is money. Again, a few quotations:

Katarzyna Zych from Krosno invested over 200 thousand zlotys in her first kindergarten. [...] Today she has 40 children in her care, 6 employees and a monthly income of about 20 thousand zlotys, more than half of which is spent on staff salaries. She is yet to make a profit, but the business is viable nonetheless⁸.

A recent graduate is an investment for the employer, and at times an uncertain one. After all, no one can guarantee that a young person, once they learn the basics of operating in a given industry, will not soon run away and join the competition⁹.

In 131 state schools there are 807 thousand full-time students. One student's year of study costs the taxpayer PLN 14,000. This is surprisingly much, considering that at the best private universities in Warsaw – the Kozminski University and the School of

⁷ J. Podgórska, *Efekt cieplarniany* [The Greenhouse Effect], "Polityka" 2009, issue 14.

⁸ L. Grzegórska, *Dorastający biznes* [A Growing Business], "Newsweek" 2010, issue 15.

⁹ A. Grabau, *Z dyplomem bez pracy* [Educated and Unemployed], "Przegląd" 2009, issue 40.

Social Sciences and Humanities – tuition fees for the year of the most expensive full-time master's studies amount to less than PLN 8,000¹⁰.

Another article uses such phrases as “pumping money”, “productivity” and “economic coercion”.

The greatest return on investment is generated by pumping money not into those with the best or even average performance, but into those who are lagging behind. Educating the excluded would benefit not only themselves, but also entire economies, as it would increase labour productivity and the domestic product. [...] Harvard economist James Heckman estimates that pre-school programmes for children from disadvantaged backgrounds cost \$10,000 a year per pupil – and thus quite a lot – but they generate annual returns in the range of 16 per cent.¹¹

Some articles depict education in both market and battle metaphors. One such text was published in the “Polityka” weekly and was titled *Wyższa szkoła kuszenia* [The University of Temptation]¹². The authors of this article point out that in the situation of demographic decline “a fierce battle for students is under way”, governed by the tough laws of the market. “At many universities education is treated as a commodity, and therefore both marketing ideas and the rhetoric of promotion can be identical to those observed in hypermarkets”.

The economisation of thinking about education leads to widespread disappointment with its effects, blaming it for unemployment and undermining the sense of participating in it. Writing about education in the language of economics results in the prevalence of thinking about it also in economic terms, i.e. in the categories of investment and return. Investing in education means incurring costs in the form of effort, time and energy. On the other hand, the return takes the shape of a career and, consequently, economic success. In other words, the effort invested in education should return in the form of well-paid gainful employment. If we were to continue with economic nomenclature, one may conclude that education is today a high risk investment. The costs incurred in order to obtain education often do not pay off. Hence the increasingly common questions: why should I learn? Why should I study, since a diploma no longer guarantees employment? Until recently, education was an autotelic value: it provided people with wisdom, allowed them to develop their interests and gave them social respect. Today, this is irrelevant. The value of education depends exclusively on whether it prepares for proper functioning on the labour market. Education has become a “commodity”, which must be acquired (as is the case with cars and mobile phones), and more and more often it is only the lack of financial resources for which a diploma could be purchased that hinders people from gaining the status of well-educated individuals.

¹⁰ E. Barlik, R. Omachel, *Uniwersytet sp. z o.o.* [University Ltd.], “Newsweek” 2010, issue 8.

¹¹ S. Theil, *Głupio wydane pieniądze* [Money Down the Drain], “Newsweek” 2009, issue 34.

¹² B. Igielska, A. Listoś, A. Sterczyńska, *Wyższa szkoła kuszenia* [The University of Temptation], “Polityka” 2010, issue 32.

Until a few years ago, it was mainly those who started their professional careers in the third or fourth year of studies and who did not have the time to write their dissertation who were interested in purchasing [their master's thesis]. In many cases, these included also young mothers who had difficulty reconciling childcare responsibilities with their studies. Now there are more and more people who simply do not know how to write their dissertation. Their honesty is disarming: they admit that they have always cheated in exams, they have been buying credit papers for years and they are doomed to do so, says 45-year-old Paweł from Gdańsk, who has been making a living writing papers on economic subjects for 12 years¹³.

Leading readers to believe that education makes sense only when it helps them get a job can be considered harmful. After all, it is widely known that the causes of difficulties on the labour market do not lie solely in poor education and are not unique to the Polish employment market. All international surveys report on the global rise in youth unemployment worldwide, and forecasts for the future are not encouraging. It is predicted that soon the majority of the society will be forced to live without permanent employment. Today, education can no longer be treated as a kind of "springboard" which will allow the student to climb the social ladder and achieve economic success. Such a scenario will prove true only with respect to a small group of children. A realistic assessment of reality requires looking at contemporary pupils as potential job seekers and developing programmes that prepare them for a meaningful life despite the lack of full-time work. Meanwhile, the press reaffirms the reader's belief that education makes sense only when it leads to an attractive job. Otherwise, there is no point in learning. Today, education is governed by economic pragmatism. Effort, time and money invested in education should pay off as soon as possible, otherwise educational activity is pointless.

In a crisis everyone wants to demonstrate that they are the best. But under normal circumstances, studying for two or three majors is nothing more than an excessive investment in education. A graduate works in a specific profession anyway. The same is true of the doctoral degree. This may or may not be a signal to the employer that you are good. A doctorate makes sense if someone's future involves working in institutions and research centres. [...] Post-graduate degrees are also of little use¹⁴.

Another consequence of the economisation of thinking about education is the loss of the high social status that schools and teachers have always enjoyed and the broad public perception of the serious crisis in this sphere of social life, while the crisis of education is, by the press, identified only with the difficulties in the labour market. But school education is not capable of meeting the new requirements set by employers. Today's graduates, unprepared for the labour market, participated in education 10–15 years ago, when completely different standards of education were in force. At that time, the education acquired was sufficient for

¹³ B. Mikołajewska, *Pokolenie kopiuj-wklej* [Generation Copy-Paste], "Polityka" 2010, issue 21.

¹⁴ B. Igielska, *Co studiować?* [What to Study?], "Polityka" 2009, issue 13.

a large part of professional life. Nowadays the situation looks completely different – it is estimated that education becomes outdated already after 15 years, and soon this period will become even shorter. And the school is not to blame, this is caused by rapid technological changes.

Moreover, the crisis on the job market is constantly escalating and its roots go much deeper than education. As a result of technological development, the number of vacancies that can be filled is declining dramatically and it is not possible to “adapt” education to this continuously shrinking market. The economy is undergoing constant change and is always generating new needs, and education, despite continuous reform, is not able to meet those needs. This inevitably gives rise to widespread disappointment with education, blaming it for unemployment and undermining the sense of participating in it. In this state of affairs, fewer and fewer people feel embarrassed by cheating or plagiarism. Since there is a widely-held belief that “education is pointless”, from an economic point of view investing in activities that do not bring any return is hardly worthwhile. The reduction in costs is greatest when a diploma, certifying education, is simply purchased by a young person. Such behaviour seems rational, especially as it is accompanied by the conviction that there is no connection between obtaining a diploma and possessing knowledge and competences. In the traditional world, obtaining education was a consequence of personal development and the accumulation of knowledge, competences and qualifications. Today, for the majority of students, what counts is only a diploma, referred to in the press as “a piece of paper”.

Every month millions of users visit websites where they can outsource their homework or dissertation. – I have recently heard from my 12-year-old son: “Why should I do my homework myself? We have the Internet!”, says a teacher of Polish in one of the secondary schools in Łódź¹⁵.

If we consider the explanatory function of the metaphor to be of primary importance, we need to ponder how this way of writing about education changes the reader’s thinking about this area of social life.

It seems that a critical approach to the current school system should, first and foremost, serve to raise awareness of the state of emergency in Polish education and the consequent need for change. Such intervention by the press can be regarded as justified. The crisis of education (not only in Poland) makes it necessary to introduce urgent corrective measures. The school system created for the needs of the industrial society cannot prepare young people to function in the information society. This problem was discussed by the participants of the VI Civic Congress held in Warsaw on 5 November 2011. The debate paved the way for a conclusion on the need for fundamental changes in the entire school system, or rather for a new concept of education – education that would meet the requirements of the contemporary world. However, in order for such a change to be possible, there

¹⁵ B. Mikołajewska, *Pokolenie kopiuj...* [Generation Copy-Paste].

must be a social demand for an alternative schooling. Meanwhile, both parents and teachers cannot imagine a school other than the one which exists at present and which they have completed themselves.

However, criticism voiced in the opinion-forming press does not in any way contribute to better understanding of the plight of contemporary schools and does not help to create a demand for a new type of education. This is because such criticism is not accompanied by an attempt to discover the mechanisms of the functioning of education or to find out the reasons for its ineptitude. When analysing the quality of critical texts on education, it is hard not to notice that the manner in which journalists write about this realm of social life reflects the pursuit in all today's media of a message that sells. In the world dominated by the media, this should not come as a surprise; today, the media must fight for the audience, and an attractive and sensational message guarantees success – for the survival of a given press title on the market depends on whether the texts it publishes capture and captivate the reader, i.e. whether they attract and retain the reader's attention. It is in the best interests of publishing companies that journalists construct texts in such a way as to make the greatest impression on the readers. Here are some examples of such criticism.

In 2004 the whole country learned from the media that an elementary education teacher in a remote village in Warmia and Mazury maintains that Christopher Columbus was a great Polish scientist, a whale is a fish, and a dive-bomber is a profession associated with going underwater. Anyone who questioned these words of wisdom was called a clod, a dunce, a backward bumpkin¹⁶.

A girl, who at the beginning of September this year nearly killed her friend during a break in one of the junior high schools in Krakow, was just 13 years old. The school surveillance camera recorded 13-year-old Agata stabbing her schoolmate several times with a knife. The video footage also showed that the teacher passing by, when she saw the fight, turned her head and walked away¹⁷.

Many teachers not only do not fight the epidemic of paid homework, but even earn money from it themselves. They write anonymous papers for money, as well as selling their students' secondary school-leaving papers without their knowledge and consent¹⁸.

And what happens [in religious instruction lessons] is easy to see in the videos uploaded to YouTube, which students record with their mobile phones during the class. Papers and inflated condoms fly around the classroom. The boys scream, dance under the blackboard, and jump on the desks. Someone pretends to be having an epileptic fit, another pupil is climbing out of the window, while yet another is trying to treat a completely helpless teacher to a joint¹⁹.

¹⁶ B. Igielska, *Nauczyciel non-fiction* [A Non-Fiction Teacher], "Polityka" 2010, issue 15.

¹⁷ V. Ozminowski, *Do szkoły jak...* [To School as if...].

¹⁸ B. Mikołajewska, *Pokolenie kopiuj...* [Generation Copy-Paste].

¹⁹ J. Podgórska, *Samotność katechety...* [Loneliness of a Religion Instructor].

The opinion-forming press does not help in raising demand for a fresh approach to education, but it trivializes its problems, suggesting a straightforward solution. According to the authors of press articles, the remedy for all evil in Polish education is a change in the way it is financed: limiting the financing of state education and expanding the area of private education – supposedly more friendly and effective, which guarantees students' success in life.

In the USA, there is a widespread belief that the state schools mainly educate children from less well-off families. Private schools enjoy a better reputation as they provide more choice of programmes, education in smaller classes and greater security. [...] For years, only private schools have been ranked first in the UK secondary school rankings. [...] The Swiss Federation of Private Schools has 260 establishments. These are some of the best and oldest schools in the country²⁰.

Therefore, the whole press discourse seems to corroborate the predictions of Tomasz Szkudlarek, who already in 2004 anticipated that the then ongoing debates on the streamlining of education management serve only to create social acceptance for limiting state spending on education²¹.

Summary

Polish Education in Opinion-Forming Weeklies. Discourse Analysis in Practice

This article presents the findings of a research project in which the author reviewed 115 texts about school and education published in five opinion-forming weeklies (“Polityka”, “Newsweek”, “Wprost”, “Gość Niedzielny”, “Przegląd”) between 2009 and 2010. This analysis has demonstrated which language instruments are used in constructing the education discourse in the Polish press. The author focused on two kinds of metaphors employed by press journalists, i.e. battle and market metaphors. She has attempted to investigate why journalists use these metaphors and write about school in this manner.

²⁰ A. Sijka, *Kuźnie elit* [Forging Elites], “Wprost” 2009, issue 1/2.

²¹ For more on the subject see: T. Szkudlarek, *Pozór i zmiana: o epistemologicznych unikach pedagogiki – dekadę i trochę później* [Appearances and Change. On the Epistemological Evasions in Pedagogy More than a Decade Later], *Ars Educandi* 2004, vol. IV.

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The Control of Interpretation and the Interpellation of Subjectivity. On Possible Uses of Critical Discourse Analysis in Textbook Research (Exemplified by the Results of Discourse Examination in Selected Social Science Textbooks for Lower Secondary Schools)¹

The aim of this paper is, first of all, to identify the opportunities offered by the critical paradigm, especially Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), in textbook research². Secondly, it is to demonstrate – on the basis of selected results of my survey of social science textbooks for lower secondary schools³ – the possible effects of studies involving the use of CDA instruments. In the paper, I pay special attention to what is called the control of interpretation and to Norman Fairclough's concept of the interpellation of subjectivity in discourse. The research has demonstrated that the discursive and linguistic devices employed have primarily been used to legitimise and justify the representation of the social reality constructed in the text in textbooks and are designed to control the possible ambivalence in the understanding of the presented knowledge. The application of the CDA perspective and the development of the resulting methodology, allows us to identify the means with which the aforementioned effects are produced.

¹ The theoretical and empirical studies described here were conducted within a research project No. 3637/H03/2007/32 funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (MniSzW) *Dyskursywna konstrukcja podmiotu w wybranych obszarach kultury współczesnej* [Discourse Subjectivity Formation in Selected Areas of Present-day Culture] implemented between 2007–2011 at the Philosophy of Education and Cultural Studies unit of the University of Gdansk.

² J.L. Kincheloe, P. McLaren, *Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research*, [in:] *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, vol. I, N.K. Denzin, Y.S. Lincoln (eds.), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd. 2005.

³ The textbook research was a part of a larger research project comprising three elements: a survey of the narration of teachers, of students and of textbook discourse. It must therefore be stressed that not all the textbooks available were studied, but only those used in the classroom by the teachers participating in the survey.

In the first and larger part of the paper, I discuss the essence of a critical textbook research, for which the CDA-based methodology was the foundation on which the research methods and tools have been built. I also present the adopted theoretical perspective, based on selected CDA conceptions. The second part of the paper is devoted to the presentation of some of the results of the conducted research.

Critical perspective and CDA in textbook discourse research

Jason Nicholls identifies four basic approaches to school textbook research: positivism, post-modernism, hermeneutics and criteria theory⁴. I have adopted the latter perspective, whose main representative is, according to Nicholls, Michael W. Apple and in which it is the textbook which basically establishes the material conditions for classroom teaching and learning and defines what is elite and legitimate and as such should be adopted⁵. As Falk Pingel says, an important elements of textbook content are the recognised norms, rules and patterns of behaviour, in other words all that the generation producing the textbook knowledge believes in and, above all, all that it would like to inculcate into the younger generations⁶. This enculturative and, in fact, duplicative approach to textbook function has been supplemented by the critical theory with another important element, namely the relation of power, hegemony and ideology. Viewed in this way, a generation or a society at a given time in history does not exist as a universalised, undifferentiated body. As Apple says, it is not the society as a whole that forms the school textbook content (and school curricula), but a defined group of people within it⁷. In this way, textbooks play an important part in defining whose culture is taught and passed on⁸.

⁴ J. Nicholls, *The Philosophical Underpinnings of School Textbook Research*, "Paradigm" 2005, 3/1.

⁵ M. W. Apple, *Teachers and Texts. Political Economy of Class and Gender Relations in Education*, Routledge, New York – London 1986, p. 81.

⁶ F. Pingel, *UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision. 2 Revised and Updated Edition*, UNESCO, Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, Paris/Braunschweig 2010, p. 7.

⁷ M. W. Apple, *Official Knowledge. Democratic Education in a Conservative Age*, Routledge, New York – London 2000, p. 47.

⁸ "Yet textbooks are surely important in and of themselves. They signify, through their content and form, particular constructions of reality, particular ways of selecting and organizing that vast universe of possible knowledge. They embody, what Raymond Williams called the "selective tradition": someone's selection, someone's vision of legitimate knowledge and culture, one that in the process of enfranchising one group's cultural capital, disenfranchises another's. Texts are really messages to and about the future. As part of a curriculum, they participate in no less than the organized knowledge system of society. They participate in creating what a society has recognized as legitimate and truthful. They help set the canons of truthfulness and, as such, also help recreate a major reference point for what knowledge, culture, belief, and morality really are". *Ibid.*, p. 46.

Close to this tradition is the approach whereby textbooks are viewed as social products and analysed with regard to a specific social, historical and cultural context⁹. The culturalist perspective is also focused on the examination of ideological influences on textbook contents, while contesting the perspective of traditional analysis, primarily oriented towards the possibilities of attaining the official, declarative objectives of education¹⁰. The textbook is treated here as one of the most important aids of both the teacher and the pupil¹¹, yet even in this case the concept of the concealed curriculum requires that its major functions be denaturalised. In this way, studies tend to focus on the one hand on the vision of the world the textbook creates, including the social realities and identity, and on the other – on the ways in which the process occurs¹². Issues undertaken in this research context include the sources of legitimising the construction efforts affecting the textbook content¹³.

The textbook, therefore, perceived in terms of a cultural artefact, is thus approached through its links with ideology. From this perspective, it is seen as a key instrument in the process of legitimating an ideology and a reflection of the beliefs, values and knowledge of the privileged social groups. Its content is studied as a manifestation of the cultural, ideological and political supremacy of the dominant groups, which by building the “valid” knowledge about the world and promoting the desired attitudes uphold their cultural hegemony¹⁴. In this way, the textbook provides ideologically mediated intellectual maps¹⁵ presenting a picture of the world which may be perceived as necessary and unbiased.

As Anyon says, the ideologies contained in textbooks, despite being a representation of “the” reality (thanks to the practice of interpretation), appear to be an objective reality. The objective validity of the representation occurs because of the status of truthfulness it has gained thanks to the process of justification, rationali-

⁹ J. Anyon, *Ideology and Unites States History Textbooks*, “Harvard Educational Review” 1979, vol. 49, No. 3, p. 361.

¹⁰ M. Chomczyńska-Rubacha, D. Pankowska, *Władza, ideologia, socjalizacja. Polityczność podręczników szkolnych* [Power, Ideology, Socialisation. The Political in School Textbooks], [in:] *Podręczniki i poradniki. Konteksty – Dyskursy – Perspektywy* [Textbooks and Handbooks. Contexts – Discourses – Perspectives], M. Chomczyńska-Rubacha (ed.), Oficyna Wydawnicza “Impuls”, Kraków 2011, p. 19.

¹¹ *Wartości i manipulacje w podręcznikach szkolnych* [Values and Manipulation in School Textbooks], E. Stawowy (ed.), Oficyna Wydawnicza “Impuls”, Kraków 1995, p. 3.

¹² M. Chomczyńska-Rubacha, D. Pankowska, *Władza, ideologia...* [Power, Ideology...], p. 8.

¹³ E. Zamojska, *Równość w kontekstach edukacyjnych. Wybrane aspekty równości w polskich i czeskich podręcznikach szkolnych* [Equality in Educational Contexts. Selected Equality Aspects in Polish and Czech Schools], Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Poznań 2010, p. 142.

¹⁴ K. Crawford, *The Role and Purpose of Textbooks*, “International Journal of Historical Learning, Teaching, and Research” 2003, vol. 3 No. 2, p. 5.

¹⁵ P.G. Altbach, *Textbooks: The International Dimension*, [in:] *The Politics of Textbooks*, M.W. Apple, L. Christian-Smith (eds.), Routledge, New York 1991, p. 244, after: M. Mirkovic, G. Skola and Y.K. Crawford, *Teaching History in Serbian and English Secondary Schools: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Textbooks*, “International Journal of Historical Learning, Teaching, and Research” 2003, vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 91–92.

sation and legitimation¹⁶. Group or class interests may take the form of ideological selection, either through ‘obvious exclusion’ or ‘concealed presumptions’. In this way, Anyon argues, the analysis of school knowledge as a social product is about exposing the vested and universalised interest of the powerful groups, which demonstrate their own concept of reality as legitimised. Consequently, groups which have not been empowered can be identified by disclosing the viewpoints, activities or practices that have not been included in the school curriculum or textbooks¹⁷.

For Ewa Zalewska, the school textbook understood as a “construction laboratory”¹⁸ and the knowledge constructed in it and viewed as a representation should be put in a perspective which she calls “analytical and discursive”¹⁹, as opposed to the ‘conventional’ approach²⁰. Within this framework, she refers to the process of textbook construction (and the construction of the underlying curricula) as discourse-entangled²¹.

The adoption of the perspective of discourse in the study of school textbooks enables an effective use of methodologies rooted in CDA²². From the ontological

¹⁶ J. Anyon, *Ideology...*, pp. 361–363.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 363.

¹⁸ E. Zalewska, *Programy kształcenia i podręczniki szkolne w edukacji początkowej jako “wybór z kultury”* [Curricula and Textbooks in Early Schooling as a “Cultural Pick-and-Choose”], [in:] *Pedagogika wczesnoszkolna – dyskursy, problemy, rozwiązania* [Pedagogy of Early Education – Discourses, Problems, Solutions], D. Klus-Stańska, M. Szczepska-Pustkowska (eds.), Wydawnictwo Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2009, p. 310.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 521.

²⁰ The conventional approach is connected with the concept of the textbook as a “didactic book”. If this approach is used, the research is focused on the didactic function of the textbook and the evaluation of its substantive content. *Ibid.*, pp. 519, 521.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 509. This means that the knowledge created in the textbook is of a discursive nature, so as Zalewska says, “textbooks present to the pupils a reality from a specific political, cultural and social perspective. They contain a picture of the world which concentrates ‘collective attitudes of the participants of culture and the rules for the creation of these attitudes’; the picture of the world thus constructed becomes a tool of socialisation. [...] it may be said that that curricula and textbooks are constructed with regard to ‘procedures of excluding’ – ideas, types of knowledge, values, attitudes and opinions which do not conform with ideas and opinions about what is desirable, legal and truthful”. *Ibid.*, pp. 511–512.

²² It should be stressed that according to the initiators of this research orientation, CDA is not in itself a research method or a sub-discipline of discourse analysis. Authors writing about CDA use phrases like “research approach”, “critical perspective or research” or “positioned discourse analysis”. M. Meyer, *Between Theory, Method, and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA*, [in:] *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, M. Meyer, R. Wodak (eds.), Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi 2001, p. 14; T. A. van Dijk, *Multidisciplinary CDA: A Plea for Diversity*, [in:] *Methods...*, p. 96. CDA, which is a research approach, accommodates a number of research methodologies and theoretical perspectives. It is not, therefore, a single, specific theory or research methodology. Studies within the CDA perspective are marked by diversity, different theoretical foundations, lack of homogeneity in the choice of data to be analysed, and by the adopted methodology or diversity of approaches to language and grammar. G. Weiss, R. Wodak, *Introduction: Theory, Interdisciplinarity and Critical Discourse Analysis*, [in:] *Critical Discourse Analysis. Theory and Interdisciplinarity*, G. Weiss, R. Wodak (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York 2007, p. 12.

and epistemological perspectives, the main distinctive element is the assumption that reality is discursive or partly discursive²³, and secondly, the attitude mentioned above, i.e., social and cultural criticism²⁴. Like any critical science, CDA poses questions in the first place about responsibility, interests and ideologies²⁵. Its task is the study of linguistically manifested transparent and structural relations of dominance, discrimination, power, control as well as factors which consolidate and legitimate social inequalities²⁶, and it “always chooses the perspective of those who suffer most and critically analyzes those in power”²⁷. As

The differences may arise from the perspective adopted, which depending on whether the analysis is focused on microlinguistic, macrolinguistic, textual, discursive or contextual issues, becomes an increasingly philosophical, sociological or historical perspective. R. Wodak, *What CDA is About – A Summary of its History, Important Concepts and its Developments*, [in:] *Methods...*, p. 8. Differences may also be generated by a specific theoretical approach and its focus of attention, like the reproductive or innovative (discourse) perspective, sociocognitive processes or genres (mediation relation between the text and what is social), or the multifunctionality of the text (a systemic-functional approach to language), or its discursive character (hermeneutical and interpretative approach). N. Fairclough, R. Wodak, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, [in:] *Discourse as Social Interaction. Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, vol. 2, T. A. van Dijk (ed.), Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi 2007, p. 262.

²³ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who are counted among the most prominent discourse theorists of our time, and whose theory is duly recognised by Fairclough – the author of crucial concepts for this paper maintain that “discourse is the primary terrain of the constitution of objectivity as such”. E. Laclau *On Populist Reason*, Verso, London – New York 2005, p. 68. This means it is the mechanism playing a fundamental role in constituting and shaping social reality. According to Laclau and Mouffe, “every object is constituted as an object of discourse”, but the acceptance of the discursive nature of phenomena does not mean that empirically observable reality does not exist; it is only the recognition of the existence of objects in the symbolic space whose assigned meaning “depends upon the structuring of a discursive field”. E. Laclau, Ch. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Social Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, Verso, London – New York 2001, pp. 107, 108. This, however, does not mean that the relation between discourse and social reality is unilaterally deterministic. Most discourse conceptions as well as theories developed within CDA assume there is dialectical relation between the two. Wodak says: “On the one hand, the situational, institutional and social settings shape and affect discourses, and, on the other, discourses influence discursive as well as non-discursive social and political processes and actions”. R. Wodak, *Introduction: Theory, Interdisciplinarity...*, p. 22.

²⁴ CDA is special not because researchers have declared a specific model of the method to be the correct one, but because of the primary goal of its research work, which is searching for a link between discourse and social inequalities. P. Tomanek, *O swoistości socjologicznej analizy dyskursu* [On the Specific Nature of Sociological Discourse Analysis], [in:] *Analiza dyskursu w socjologii i dla socjologii* [Discourse Analysis in and for Sociology], A. Horolets (ed.), Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2008, p. 31. The critical approach means concentrating on social problems, especially on the role of discourse in the constitution and reproduction of the relation of power, resulting in social inequalities. T. A. van Dijk, *Multidisciplinary CDA...*, p. 96; T. A. van Dijk, *The Discourse-Knowledge Interface*, [in:] *Critical Discourse Analysis. Theory...*, p. 87. “Like critical social science generally, CDA has emancipatory objectives, and is focused upon the problems confronting what we can loosely refer to as the ‘losers’ within particular forms of social life – the poor, the socially excluded, those subject to oppressive gender or race relations”. N. Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method in Social Scientific Research*, [in:] *Methods...*, p. 125.

²⁵ T. A. van Dijk, *Racism in the Press*, Arnold, London 1986, p. 4, after: R. Wodak, *What CDA is About...*, p. 1.

²⁶ R. Wodak, *What CDA is About...*, p. 2.

²⁷ T. A. van Dijk, *Racism...*, p. 4.

ideological dominance linked with hegemonic interests is always naturalised, the aim of critically oriented discourse analysis is to denaturalise it by showing the relationship between the discourse and the specific (contextualised) social formation²⁸.

CDA is connected with a definite determination of theoretical assumptions²⁹, usually explicitly stated by researchers. I have based my research on the following (essential in the context of the present paper) assumptions: a representative and formative conception of discourse³⁰, the assumption that discourse processes are socio-cognitive³¹, legitimation theories³², and the conception of the interpellation of subjectivity in discourse. The latter will be described in more detail.

²⁸ N. Fairclough, *Critical and Descriptive Goals in Discourse Analysis*, [in:] *Critical Discourse Analysis: the Critical Study of Language*, N. Fairclough (ed.), Longman, London – New York 1999, pp. 27, 35.

²⁹ M. Meyer, *Between Theory, Method...*, p.17.

³⁰ In one of his books, Fairclough defines discourse as follows: "I see discourses as ways of representing aspects of the world – the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the 'mental world' of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world. Particular aspects of the world may be represented differently, so we are generally in the position of having to consider the relationship between different discourses. Different discourses are different perspectives on the world, and they are associated with the different relations people have to the world, which in turn depends on their positions in the world, their social and personal identities, and the social relationships in which they stand to other people. Discourses not only represent the world as it is (or rather is seen to be), they are also projective, imaginaries, representing possible worlds which are different from the actual world, and tied in to projects to change the world in particular directions. The relationships between different discourses are one element of the relationships between different people – they may complement one another, compete with one another, one can dominate others, and so forth. Discourses constitute part of the resources which people deploy in relating to one another – keeping separate from one another, cooperating, competing, dominating – and in seeking to change the ways in which they relate to one another". N. Fairclough, *Analysing Discourse. Textual Analysis for Social Research*, Routledge, London-New York 2004, p. 124.

³¹ Cognition occurring in the context of attitudes shared by a given community is, according to Dijk, a process of interaction between the discourse and the society, and cognitive formations are considered at both the individual and social level (within the context of power, ideology, norms and values). Dijk believes the socio-cognitive approach provides a foundation for conceptualising the macro (social) and microdimensional process of interaction. From the discourse perspective, knowledge is public in a double sense; on the one hand as public attitudes, on the other as the representations of the discourse situation. In this way, the representations formed are both individual and socially rooted, they integrate the experience, goals or interests of particular users of language, which in itself is social. T. A. van Dijk, *Contextual Knowledge Management in Discourse Production. A CDA Perspective*, [in:] *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis. Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture*, P. Chilton, R. Wodak (eds.), John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, Philadelphia 2005, p. 87.

³² In this case, the legitimation theories of Wodak and Theo van Leeuwen as well as of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. In the former, legitimation is one of the discourse strategies designed to maintain and perpetuate certain semantic formations with the aim of supporting, maintaining and reproducing the created forms of identity and justifying the *status quo*. Legitimation is about "why social practices or parts thereof must be the way they are. This 'why' again is never intrinsic to the practice, but has to be construed in discourse". T. van Leeuwen, R. Wodak, *Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse – Historical Analysis*, "Discourse Studies" 1999, vol. 1(1), pp. 93, 98. In the latter approach, "Legitimation 'explains' the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings". P.L. Berger, T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 1991, p. 111.

In his concept, Fairclough assumes there are three levels of discourse, namely the text, the interaction/discursive practice, and the context (historical, political, economic and so forth)/social practice³³. There is a dialectical interrelation between them, which in this case may mean intermediation. Every moment is included in the next one, at a higher level of generality. The broadest perspective is the social context. It determines the social agents' capacity to produce meaning, which Fairclough calls "members' resources". The resources constitute the cognitive dimension, as they determine the socially internalized and generated, but also socially modified resources of meaning, which people use in the process of construction, reconstruction and interpretation³⁴.

This means that production and interpretation are an interplay between, firstly, social (semantic) resources internalised by social agents and, secondly, models of text production that, after decoding, constitute sets of cues for the interpretation process. The use of resources and the model decoding process take place automatically and largely nonconsciously³⁵. As Fairclough says, "A text only makes sense to someone who makes sense of it, someone who is able to infer those meaningful relations in the absence of explicit markers"³⁶, yet implied by the text itself.

In this perspective, Fairclough adopts Louis Althusser's theory of ideology (partly modified), in particular its principles that, in the first place, ideology materialises only in discursive practices; secondly, it interpellates individuals as subjects; and thirdly, that the object and venue of class struggle are "the ideological state apparatuses". Within this conception, we may only talk about subjectivity from the perspective of ideology, which as Althusser puts it, interpellates individuals to become subjects³⁷. Consequently, we may not talk about subjects beyond ideology and beyond the material form of their ideological practice.

This concept can be best illustrated by the following excerpt from Althusser: "But the vast majority of (good) subjects work all right 'all by themselves', i.e. by ideology... They 'recognize' the existing state of affairs..., that 'it really is true that it is so and not otherwise'³⁸. This means that self-recognition within the ideological order is a guarantee of subjectivity. Althusser illustrates the mechanism in a picturesque way by depicting a situation when an individual turns round on being hailed by a policeman: "Hey, you there!" His reaction is automatic identification with the hailing him (and naming) system. However, becoming a subject is only

³³ N. Fairclough, *Language and Power*, Longman Pearson Education, London 2001, p. 21; N. Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2009, p. 73.

³⁴ N. Fairclough, *Language...*, pp. 20–21.

³⁵ N. Fairclough, *Discourse and Social...*, p. 80.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³⁷ L. Althusser, *Ideology and the State Ideological Apparatuses*, transl. by Ben Brewster, [in:] L. Althusser (ed.), *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, Monthly Review Press, New York 1971, p. 170.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

possible if the subjects “are working by themselves”, which means that although they are animated by the system, they should maintain a certain degree of autonomy, in other words recognise the sources of their subjectivity³⁹.

According to Fairclough, the mechanism amounts to the very participation in discourse practice, within which subjective positions are partly settled. In the case of school textbooks, they are those textual elements which deploy individual participants of the educational situation in a certain order by linguistic means. As stated earlier, the mechanism is not approached in such a deterministic way by modern varieties of discourse theory.

Processes of production and interpretation, however, are to a significant extent socially constrained. They are, on the one hand, constrained by the internalised members’ resources (in this case functioning as a mental map of the social order)⁴⁰, and on the other, by the social practice formation within which production and interpretation actually take place and which affects the selection performed at the level of available resources⁴¹. At this point, Fairclough introduces two ways in which interpretations reduce the potential ambivalence of texts. The first one is that of ‘context’ (of the specific discourse practice within which the text is produced), the other is ‘coherence’.

The effect of context means that members of the public take (nonconsciously) into consideration the whole context of the social practice of which the text is a part. The context, therefore, firstly means predictions about the meaning of the text, which reduce its ambivalence by excluding some possible meanings, and secondly the member background setting their positions (formed in the discourse at the stage of its production)⁴². Coherence relating to the process of interpretation (and not the features of the text itself) means that texts interpellate subjects and the possible interpretations linked with the subjects’ set positions⁴³.

Every institution or specific model of social interaction (set in specific social practice) constitutes a basic reference framework which determines the possible interpretations by the individuals involved. In the case of the school and the textbooks used there, it means that every ambivalence they contain (giving an opportunity for a diversity of interpretations) is controlled by the context. The broadest context, as has been said, is the social reality (or to be precise, its hegemonic representation).

The social context is thus important not only as a framework in which textbooks occur as discourse or knowledge – which is produced as an important element of

³⁹ Identification is thus possible by a simple self-recognition in ideology, “...that you and I are always already subjects, and as such constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition, which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects”. *Ibid.*, pp. 172–173. Participation in rituals, therefore, confirms subjectivity.

⁴⁰ N. Fairclough, *Discourse...*, p. 82.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 80, 83.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p.81.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 83–84.

textbook production – but also as the defining of accompanying or underlying objectives. It has to be stressed that in the perspective adopted here, the relationship between the context and the knowledge constituted in the textbooks, and the educational objectives behind the curricula and the textbooks, is not a direct one. In the CDA perspective, the category which describes the relationship between the social practice characteristic of a given context and its discursive representation elsewhere is recontextualisation⁴⁴.

As Fairclough says, “every practice (and every network of social practices – every field) recontextualizes other social practices according to principles which are specific to that practice/field...”⁴⁵. In this way, the category of recontextualisation refers to the relation between production and representation⁴⁶. If we accept that every recontextualisation causes transformation, which is affected by interests, values or the goals of the discourse in its own social practice⁴⁷, (in this case a school textbook in the social practice of education), it is because the recontextualised discursive (or nondiscursive) social practice takes place outside the context of the represented practice⁴⁸.

Even if the process of interpretation is subject to so much control, it can never be total, simply because of the diversity of the members’ resources of individuals and communities. Nevertheless, assuming the existence of a dominant rationality and hegemony of a single ideological option, we may look at the process of education, in which textbooks are involved, from the perspective of Bourdieu’s classic theory of symbolic power. It should be stressed that the value of CDA for this type of research is not in the conception of the power that is exercised through discursive practices, but mostly in the possibility of perceiving the logic and the ways in which these processes take place, resulting in the continuation of the hegemony. The possible criticism of CDA’s circular nature is therefore ill advised. The purpose is not solely to prove what has previously been assumed –

⁴⁴ The category of recontextualisation has been borrowed by CDA scholars from Basil Bernstein, whose theory of “pedagogic discourse” is largely consonant with the discursive formation concept adopted in CDA. Bernstein views the social practice of a classroom as constituting not only pedagogic knowledge, but also identities and the relations between its participants. L. Chouliaraki, *Regulation in ‘Progressivist’ Pedagogic Discourse Individualized Teacher-Pupil Talk, Discourse and Society* 1995, 9 (1), p. 4. Bernstein claims that although pedagogic discourse is not a discourse *per se* (“discourse without discourse”), when interpreted as a principle it concerns the agreeing or matching of other discourses. In this sense, it means above all recontextualisation, or the principle of recontextualisation. B. Bernstein, *Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity. Theory, Research, Critique*, Taylor & Francis, London 1996, pp. 46–47. As a principle of recontextualisation, pedagogic discourse embodies two basic discourses, abilities and their interrelations (the discourse of instruction) and social order discourse (the discourse of regulation); the work of the two results in imaginary discourse and imaginary subjects. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47.

⁴⁵ N. Fairclough, *Discourse, Social Theory and Social Research: The Discourse of Welfare Reform*, <http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Discourse.pdf>, accessed on: 16.08.2012, p. 24.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁴⁷ N. Fairclough, *Media discourse*, Hodder Education, London 1995, pp. 114–115.

⁴⁸ T. van Leeuwen, R. Wodak, *Legitimizing...*, p. 96.

violence, power relations etc. – but to demonstrate the means and strategies used in this process.

Examples of CDA applied to analyse the mechanisms of interpellation and the control of interpretation contained in the examined textbooks

The mechanisms of interpretation control were not initially within the scope of the research. Its chief objective was to reconstruct and examine the representations contained in the social studies textbooks for lower secondary schools⁴⁹ and the discursive devices used to form these representations. During the examination, however, it turned out that the content of the textbook is a kind of controlled interaction with the reader, i.e., the pupil, in the first place. In this way, the knowledge constituted in the textbooks is not merely a form of authoritarian transmission or persuasion, but is accompanied by the mechanism of justification and legitimisation⁵⁰.

⁴⁹ Eight civics textbooks have been analysed, from three different publishers: two published by Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej (1. A. Pacewicz, T. Merta (eds.), *Kształcenie obywatelskie w szkole samorządowej. Podręcznik i ćwiczenia dla uczniów gimnazjum* [Civic Education in Local Government Schools. Textbook and Workbook for Lower Secondary Students], Part 1, CEO Warsaw; 2. A. Pacewicz, T. Merta (eds.), *Kształcenie obywatelskie w szkole samorządowej. Podręcznik i ćwiczenia dla uczniów gimnazjum*, Część II, [Civic Education in Local Government Schools. Textbook and Workbook for Lower Secondary Students], Part 2, CEO, Warsaw); three textbooks from Juka publishers (3. J. Królikowski, *To jest ważne. Żyję wśród innych. Wiedza o społeczeństwie. Podręcznik z ćwiczeniami dla gimnazjum 1* [It Does Matter. I Live among Others. Civic Knowledge. Textbook and Workbook for the Lower Secondary Grade 1] Juka; 4. J. Królikowski, *To jest ważne. Żyję wśród innych. Wiedza o społeczeństwie. Podręcznik z ćwiczeniami dla gimnazjum 2* [It Does Matter. I Live among Others. Civic Knowledge. Textbook and Workbook for the Lower Secondary Grade 2], Juka; 5. K. Brząkalik, *To jest ważne. Pracuję, zarabiam, gospodaruję. Wiedza o społeczeństwie. Podręcznik z ćwiczeniami do gimnazjum 3* [It Does Matter. I Work, Earn and Manage My Money. Textbook and Workbook for the Lower Secondary Grade 3], Juka; and three textbooks published by Nowa Era (6. K. Kryszka, R. Kryszka, T. Kowalewska, *Dziś i jutro 1. Wiedza o społeczeństwie – podręcznik z ćwiczeniami dla klasy pierwszej gimnazjum* [Today and Tomorrow 1. Civic Knowledge – Textbook and Workbook for the Lower Secondary Grade 1], Nowa Era; 7. A. Kucia, T. Maćkowski, *Dziś i jutro 2. Wiedza o społeczeństwie – podręcznik z ćwiczeniami dla klasy drugiej gimnazjum*, [Today and Tomorrow 2. Civic Knowledge – Textbook and Workbook for the Lower Secondary Grade 2], Nowa Era; 8. I. Janicka, A. Janicki, A. Kucia, *Dziś i jutro 3. Wiedza o społeczeństwie – podręcznik z ćwiczeniami dla klasy trzeciej gimnazjum* [Today and Tomorrow 3. Civic Knowledge – Textbook and Workbook for the Lower Secondary Grade 3], Nowa Era). The number assigned to each of the textbooks above is the same as in the code-numbered excerpts quoted below.

⁵⁰ This does not signify the absence from textbooks of standard forms of influence, like indoctrination (a device used to gain adherents of a specific ideology), manipulation (a bias in presenting information), authoritarianism (speaking in a moralising or directive manner), veneration (the use of exaggerated, lofty language), dogmatism (lack of criticism), information selection and blockade (muddling facts with evaluation, descriptions with interpretations, empirical observations with desired patterns, the use of persuasive definitions), bias in the selection of texts, information or visual material, selective representativeness of social phenomena, attaching more value to some versions of the reality than to others, biased evaluation and hierarchisation, attaching

Dan B. Fleming notes that social studies are a “sensitive subject”, which cannot be taught without introducing value judgments. Textbook authors, however, have not always been critical enough of the society they live in⁵¹. From the critical analysis perspective, the aforesaid “not being critical enough” is not accidental. If the dominance of a specific representation of reality is assumed, resulting from the hegemonic position of a specific social group or groups, the ideological, normative “investment” is set in a context, within which the textbook knowledge is produced, legitimated and justified. In other words, the justification and legitimation concern those aspects of reality which the authors explicitly intend to reflect, while being implicitly represented in the form of the specific (ideologically mediated) knowledge constituted in the textbooks. The ideology and particularity may therefore be acquired as a consequence of the process of legitimation and justification resulting in the naturalisation and reification of arbitrary representations contained in textbooks, which in fact is the very essence of the mechanism of interpretation control. The effect is that the constituted knowledge about the reality does not seem to be arbitrarily imposed, but rationally and independently recognised.

It should be pointed out that the discussion of discourse strategies – especially if they concern interpretation – without including the issue of representation is problematic. In CDA, discourse strategies are used in the perspective of their material effects. The analysis of formal mechanisms (i.e., how the discourse works) is subordinated to what is articulated in the discourse (which in CDA is interpreted through the theory of hegemony). Since representations are not the main focus of the present paper,⁵² I am going to, if necessary, briefly indicate with which type of representation the given example of interpretation control is connected.

labels, presenting realities as ideal and free from problems, referring to indisputable theses and argumentation. M. Chomczyńska-Rubacha, D. Pankowska, *Władza...* [Power, Ideology...], pp. 26–28. On the contrary, they are a significant part of the process. However, the basic phenomenon observed in textbooks is the mechanism of evoking or generating the readers’ acceptance of the chosen representations.

⁵¹ D. B. Fleming, *High School Social Studies Textbooks: Good or Bad Compared to What?*, *The International Journal of Social Education* 1989–1990, 4, p. 6, quoted after F. Pingel, *UNESCO...*, p. 8.

⁵² Elements of this problem have been discussed elsewhere: K. Starego, *Obraz porządku społecznego i tożsamości obywatelskiej na przykładzie wybranych podręczników wiedzy o społeczeństwie* [The Picture of Social Order and Civic Identity Exemplified by Some Civics Textbooks], [in:] *Podręczniki...* [Textbooks...]; K. Starego, *Obywatelstwo* [Citizenship], [in:] *Dyskursywna konstrukcja podmiotu. Przyczynek do rekonstrukcji pedagogiki kultury* [Discursive Subject Constitution. A Contribution to Redefining the Pedagogy of Culture], M. Cackowska et al., “Ars Educandi Monografie”, vol. III, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 2012.

Intertextuality – objectivation and legitimation as interpretation control

Like in most school textbooks, source texts appear in the analysed textbooks. Their choice and place in the structure of particular topics make it possible to determine their unassumed (embedded) yet performed functions. The starting point for their understanding may be the concept of intertextuality⁵³ (a key category used in CDA). This means that every text is rich in fragments of other texts, therefore each process of interpretation is generated and influenced by the whole chain of intertextuality appearing in the text. Fairclough calls this “manifest intertextuality”⁵⁴.

Constituting the subject position or interpellation of subjectivity within a discourse through intertextuality takes place because, as Fairclough argues, “Texts postulate, and implicitly set up interpretative positions for, interpreting subjects who are ‘capable’ of using assumptions from their prior experience to make connections across the intertextually diverse elements of a text, and to generate coherent interpretations”⁵⁵. The whole of the process is of a strictly ideological nature and produces ideological effects.

We may identify two main ways in which intertextuality enables the control of interpretation in the textbooks studied here. This is connected with two basic functions of intertextuality – both present in the textbooks – which may be defined as: objectivation and legitimation. In the former case, the framework is created for the discourse defining the constituted objectivity. Here, thematically selected quotations appear at the beginning of the text. This arrangement prevails in textbooks 5, 6, 7 and 8. It should be noted that in one of them, concerning economic knowledge, an epigraph from Friedrich Hayek (whose thought is considered a classic of neoliberal ideology)⁵⁶ is used:

The best way to understand how the operation of the market system leads not only to the creation of an order, but also to a great increase of the return which men receive from their efforts, is to think of it [...] as a game [...]. It is a wealth-creating game [...], that is, one that leads to an increase of the stream of goods and of the prospects of all participants to satisfy their needs [...] (5,4).

The use of intertextuality as legitimation constitutes in this case a representation of the market economy as a regulating force and universally shared welfare.

⁵³ The category of intertextuality, which Fairclough uses after Mikhail Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva, describes the internal textual diversity of any single text.

⁵⁴ N. Fairclough, *Discourse and Social...*, pp. 85, 117.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁵⁶ Which does matter in view of the fact that the textbook deals with economic knowledge.

Selected press sources are frequently used, most of which are conservative or conservative-liberal dailies and weeklies⁵⁷. This usually involves authorisation – personal (journalists, politicians) or impersonal (the press as the legitimised representation of realities)⁵⁸. In the case of personal authorisation, the position and significance of the person to whom reference is made in the textbook are specified, e.g.,

These are the words of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, an outstanding Polish politician, the prime minister of the first government [...] (4,5);

Dariusz Filar (professor of economics at the University of Gdansk) (5,63);

The author of the text you have just read is the 1974 Nobel Prize winner for economics Friedrich von Hayek – a prominent twentieth-century economist, lawyer, sociologist and philosopher (5,4).

The starting point is often the delegitimation of the preceding order, in contrast to which (through derogatory reference) the positive image of the present is built. Examples of this are provided by topics which are constituted by making a reference to pre-transition socialism in Poland. Within the topic of the market economy and the market, legitimation of the economic order after 1989 is constituted in opposition to communist Poland. The introducing quote is from an entrepreneur doing business before 1989, talking to the *Rzeczpospolita* daily. Legitimation of the order by derogatory reference, apart from the comparison itself, is coupled with the work of intertextuality – legitimation through evaluation.

The quote is saturated with disparaging words; on the contrary, the textbook description of the market system uses words having positive connotations. Thus, the former contains words and phrases like “were seized”, “took them over”, “apportionment”, “the government knows best”, “centrally decided”, “queues”, “long hours of waiting”, “poor quality”, “were wasted”, “there was shortage”, and “you couldn’t get it”. The latter, by contrast – “nobody orders you”, “I no longer have to write”, “you can buy anything”, “plentitude”, and “we’ve forgotten the empty shelves in the shops”. Within the framework built in this way, the specific form of the post-transition order, apart from selfreification, automatically gains legitimation, which secures it from being questioned or challenged.

The representation of the *status quo* constituted in this way is additionally secured by the contextual (the context of lesson structure) control of interpretation. In the lesson structure, the mediating function between the intertextually consti-

⁵⁷ Such as “Wprost” and “Rzeczpospolita”, sometimes “Tygodnik Powszechny”, less frequently “Polityka” and “Gazeta Wyborcza”.

⁵⁸ Personal and impersonal authorisation are a discursive form of legitimation through reference to authority (personal or impersonal). T. van Leeuwen, R. Wodak, *Legitimizing...*, pp. 104–105.

tuted representation (the quotation from Balcerowicz) and the legitimised representation of the present-day social system is performed by the questions the pupils are asked in the closing part of the lesson, which correspond with the goals set at the beginning:

...you are going to learn where some of Poland's economic problems have come from..., you are going to understand where the sources are of the difficulties we are going through..., you will try to conclude if the recovery of the Polish economy has been completed...; with the skills and knowledge gained, you will be able to formulate your opinion on the economic transition in Poland.

What, according to the author of the text, are the roots of Poland's most serious problems? Do you agree with what professor Leszek Balcerowicz says? Which economic problems do you consider to be most painful for the people? Try to identify the causes of these problems by yourself. What, in your opinion, has not been successfully reformed in the last two years? Which branches of the economy should be transformed in the first place?

Within the previously prepared semantic and interpretative universe (designated by the quotation from Balcerowicz) the process emerges of legitimising economic reforms primarily designed to wind up the social state, the reduction of the social functions of the state, etc. The final element of this mechanism is the repetition of the legitimation process through adequately formulated closing questions: "Was the introduction of such radical reforms necessary? Could we have done without them? What socio-economic price did we have to pay?".

Another example of objectivation achieved with the delegitimizing role of intertextuality is the quoting of statistics meant to prove there is no extreme poverty in Poland, or delegitimation of claims about the aggravation of poverty. This strategy appears with the topic of the income and expenditure of households. The accepted indicator of poverty is the limited use of consumer durables. In the final part of the lesson – "Key points to remember" – the following questions appear:

Do you agree with the 'common knowledge' statement that Poles were getting poorer and poorer throughout the 1990s? Do household expenditure and consumer durables possession statistics support this statement? So why do people believe they are getting poorer and poorer? (5,33)

It is worth noting that the topic in the textbook contains a statement designed to provide the answer to the last of the questions asked:

In the 1990s, more and more households acquired such goods, which shows that people in Poland were getting better off rather than worse off. People's feelings, however, are different – they will often say they are poor when they cannot afford to satisfy all their needs. This does not always mean living in poverty. (5,29)

In all the textbooks studied here, we encounter – apart from the source texts described above – short “occasional” quotes. They appear as insertions between the previously highlighted parts of the text structure. Their chief function is then to legitimate the previously constituted knowledge. An example can be legitimation through authorisation, an important element of which is “mythopoesis”⁵⁹. In one of the textbooks, when “alternative cost” is discussed, La Fontaine’s fable appears. This is an interesting example, as it shows how control of interpretation resulting from intertextuality is supplemented with interpretative control in the form of the exercise which goes with the fable. Like every fable, this one is based on a powerful normative message, moralising and contrasting the good heroes (usually rewarded) with the bad ones (whose behaviour is usually punished).

In the fable *The Grasshopper and the Ant* (2,91), quoted in a thematic subchapter, the example to follow is the ant, shown as industrious, responsible and provident, who has secured her survival in the winter thanks to hard work; the negative hero is the grasshopper, described in terms of thoughtlessness, irresponsibility and absence of forward thinking (as the ant was working all the summer, the grasshopper sang casually). Although a reverse interpretation of the characters in the fable is possible (the miserly ant refusing help to the grasshopper, who had put general interest before her own and with her singing made life nicer for all the inhabitants of the meadow and so on, and so forth), the task set for the pupils (below the text) leaves no room for such an interpretation. The presupposed interpretation (reflected in the questions asked) is to regard the grasshopper’s decision (about singing throughout the summer) as an economic decision with an alternative cost (the possibility of gathering supplies and surviving the winter). In this way, the decision may be ultimately considered to be irrational and irresponsible.

This fragment shows how intertextuality and two overlapping types of interpretative control relate to knowledge legitimation, but also contribute to the constitution of the recipient’s mental model, in which various types of behaviour will be assessed in terms of “rational choices”, each of which involves the cost of specific consequences. In this situation, the consequences an individual will have to bear in the context of alternative cost will be legitimised as a problem of his/her own making (every irresponsible economic decision entails punishment – in the grasshopper’s situation the punishment is sort of ultimate).

⁵⁹ Mythopoesis is also a form of discursively constituted legitimation, working through the telling of stories. They may be presented as ‘moral tales’ proving the existence of general, prescribed norms of behaviour, or as ‘cautionary tales’ used to show and censure deviant behaviour. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

Control of interpretation in textbook exercises

The description of interpretative control in the problems the pupils are expected to solve on the basis of the textbook presentation of a topic is difficult insofar as it requires the thematic context and the way of representation of diverse phenomena, evaluations, legitimations, etc. The tasks for pupils in the textbooks can be divided into two categories: problem solving and knowledge reproduction. It is also important that most of the tasks are to be performed as groupwork. As far as the control of interpretation in the exercises (meant to be problems to solve) is concerned, it is difficult to separate the strategy from the text, as the control is chiefly designed to legitimate the issues appearing as the topic is introduced.

One of its forms is a device which can be labelled “pretended ideological dilemmas”. In this case, the process of interpretation control is connected with the absence of either a genuine ideological choice other than the one preferred in the textbook, or of a real conflict in the exercise itself. This is the case with the tasks in textbooks (1) and (2) marked with a graphic symbol and highlighting “dilemmas emerging in the classroom, in other words very difficult questions to resolve” (1,VII). In this perspective, it is of great significance what appears in the tasks as a dilemma (thus considered to be difficult to resolve) on the one hand, and the way of its resolution suggested by interpretative control on the other, the latter working not only through the way in which the dilemma has been formulated, but also through the context in which it appears.

The most frequent strategy is the assumption of the right answer by reference to the text with which the pupils’ task appears, and which clearly indicates which of the confronted options is the appropriate one. Examples are provided by the following exercises: *Get involved or stay out?* The exercise appears in the context of forms of civic activity and begins with the following description:

‘It’s a waste of time.’ ‘Why bother about it?’ ‘It’s not going to make a change, anyway.’ – some say. ‘Those who get involved in public activity must have a vested interest.’ – others add. Many young people believe that civic activity is boring, if not suspicious. And what do you think about it? (2,5)

“Go to the polls, or not?” This “dilemma” is placed within the topic titled *Off to the Polls*. The possibility of a problem situation is also excluded right at the beginning. This is the text of the task:

[...] People who do not go to the polls say they are not interested in politics, there are no proper candidates, or that my vote doesn’t count, anyway. Some are simply too lazy to go out. In a few years’ time, this will become your dilemma – going or not going to the polls. Will you take part in the elections when you reach the age of 18? Why? (2,8)

Quite apart from the already assumed answer rendering the dilemma a pretended one, we should have in focus the constitution of a negative reference and the process of the delegitimation of certain attitudes (thought to be common in social realities). An exercise of this kind is based on a previously adopted assumption of desirable versus undesirable action, to which a particular matrix of reasoning is attributed (reflected by the justification of objections to civic activity and voting in the elections). The tasks, therefore, are not designed to form a genuine dilemma, but to stigmatise and eliminate attitudes thought to be frequent in the social realities. Moreover, the stigmatisation of attitudes is followed by the stigmatisation of those individuals who may be associated with such attitudes.

The exercises in textbooks 3–5, in which the device of pretended ideological dilemmas is used, require a more detailed analysis. In this case we have a separate subgroup of “dilemma” tasks, in which a major role is played by the context and the entire structure of knowledge presentation. The exercises are structured on the idea of a “for a and against” discussion of an issue, an opinion or a question on the basis of arguments given by the authors of the textbook. The arguments are listed in a table headed “Let’s talk”. Under the table, there are check-your-knowledge questions concerning the topic (usually about the content of the textbook, or problem questions, but these are always loaded questions). The task for the pupils follows after the questions – they are to take a stance and debate using the arguments given earlier. The task description is followed by another table: “Wish to know more”. It is only after all the elements of the exercise have been presented that it is possible to grasp the control of the interpretation logic, which makes the presented ideological dilemma a pretended one because a “proper” mental perspective, which the pupils are supposed to follow, is assumed from the start.

The first specimen of an exercise like this concerns the issue: “Is profit fair?” (5,12). The exercise is in the context of the topic “The market of goods and services”. It should be stressed that the text preceding the exercise (through the strategy of reification) constitutes the representation of the market as being ruled by objectively existing forces (quite like the laws of nature). Moreover, the market is represented as a field on which agreement is generated between the various players. Individuals are represented as beings having excessive needs which cannot be satisfied. Consequently, only arguments “for” are adequate or corresponding with the topic as they operate with categories already used and explained in the text (e.g., profit as a stimulator of entrepreneurship). Furthermore, one of the arguments resorts to the strategy of personal authorisation through manifest intertextualisation taking the form of a legitimating opinion from outside (a quotation from a book on management). Arguments “against”, on the other hand, are based on issues which have not been discussed in any context and in any of the textbooks (e.g., the profit of some is generated by the work of others, social injustice, the immoral nature of excessive profit and so on).

In every exercise of the type, the textbook constitutes two areas: the area of legitimated knowledge and the area of delegitimated “common sense” – with the assumption that the latter may be part of social awareness (including the pupils) which is to be delegitimated or even nihilated, and then resocialised through alternation⁶⁰. The arguments “against”, therefore, refer to emotions or morality (it is significant that the constituted representation of the market excludes the possibility of a moral assessment of the effects of its operation), and are presented in too general or even populist terms, as opinions rather than objectivated “facts” (NB., each of the studied textbooks constitutes this division as a criterion evaluating every statement), etc. Their wording is obscure or at least difficult to understand because they do not correspond with the content of the textbook. But, above all, they find no legitimation in the knowledge already constituted. As a result, the dilemma situation is no dilemma at all, but is meant to stigmatise opinions which do not comply with the ideological interpretation of the knowledge the textbook is to constitute.

As far as the context is concerned, the debate task does not appear immediately after the argumentation is presented, but after a check-your-knowledge exercise tagged “Key points to remember”, which contains questions about the topic and repeat its content. After running a debate, the pupils are supposed to answer questions like

Why do people consider profit to be unfair? Is such view, in your opinion, justified?
Can the amount of ‘fair profit’ be determined? (5,12)

With this wording of the questions, the possible profit-related injustice is again subjectivated by being referred to individual opinions rather than “real facts”. The possibility of an objective calculation is questioned also in the third loaded question (in this case suggesting that an objective criterion is impossible to introduce).

The whole of the interpretation strategy, however, is completed in the last part of the topic, namely with a table containing excerpts from articles in the press (it is headed “Wish to know more” and is the closing of each subchapter). They concur with the topic, but their function is also to legitimate the previously given representations. A box contains an excerpt from a book by Milton R. Friedman (another

⁶⁰ Within Luckmann and Berger’s concept of legitimation, nihilation, resocialisation and therapy are ways in which a specific symbolic universe copes with elements that should be excluded. Nihilation is a kind of “negative legitimation” and negates the reality of phenomena or identities, or re-interprets them so that they fit in a given universe. P.L. Berger, T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction...*, pp. 176–180. Re-socialisation is the pre-condition of legitimation. Re-socialisation understood as “a change of the worlds (or symbolic universes) is indispensable whenever there is a need for a counter-definition of the reality. One of the possibilities is a total modification, which the authors call alternation”. *Ibid.*, pp. 190–191.

major neoliberal thinker) about the “invisible hand of the market”, which also provides a basis for the delegitimation of the statement that profit is unfair.

Most economic fallacies derive from the neglect of this simple insight, from the tendency to assume that there is a fixed pie, that one party can gain only at the expense of another. (5,14)

A significant proportion of such exercises in the textbook is related to the ideological dispute about social justice in its different contexts. But for the mechanism of the interpretative control described above, one might think that they are designed to show the diversity of ideological foundations on which the understanding of particular social problems may be based. The ideological diversity, however, is subject to delegitimation and then to reinterpretation. Moreover, the strategy of interpretative control works not only through the textbook material, controlling the possible interpretation of its content, but also through evoking problems, which are subsequently subject to nihilation or delegitimation. Thus the control seems not only to cover the interpretation of the textbook discourse representations, but also to be extended to the social discourse (not represented before) which the textbook tries to generate and then to control, in order to anticipate its possible impact on the consciousness of the pupils, or remove the possibility of its emergence in their consciousness altogether.

Subject positioning in the discourse

The issue analysed from this perspective is the use of personal pronouns – “I”, “you”, “we”, “they” – as well as their absence and the use of impersonal forms. As Małgorzata Lisowska-Magdziarz says, while analysing discourse one should consider what starting point is assumed to be common to the author and the decoder (by the former), or what kind of cognitive and emotional community is established by the partners engaging in a discourse⁶¹. The use of personal pronouns like “we”, Fairclough claims, is to create a particular bond between the author of the discourse and its addressees; in the same way, the use of “they” works to exclude. On the other hand, “we” can be a manifestation of power, when the person using it positions himself/herself as legitimised to speak on behalf of a certain group. The use of the 2nd person singular “you” may be connected with building a relation of solidarity between the author of the discourse and its interpreters and be a call on them to take a stance on the problem appearing in the text⁶².

⁶¹ M. Lisowska-Magdziarz, *Analiza tekstu w dyskursie medialnym. Przewodnik dla studentów* [Text Analysis in Media Discourse. A Guidebook for Students], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Cracow 2006, p. 55.

⁶² N. Fairclough, *Language...*, pp. 106–107.

The attempt to build a unity with the interpreter/-s results from the fact that at the base of any discourse is the creation of a pre-imagined audience. This means that, to a certain extent, the text designs a specific interpreter (or interpreters) who is (or are) then subjected to the process of modelling, the effect being an ideal or typical individual or collective interpreter⁶³.

As Lisowska-Magdziarz says, the author “may choose a communication strategy that will emphasise community, unity and try to build a common identity of the recipient group”⁶⁴, in this way creating uniformity or diversity within the audience.

In the textbooks studied here, the use of personal as well as of impersonal phrases serves the aims like the distribution of experientiality, distribution of agency and distribution of access. The first one involves the areas of social realities which are constituted either as near or remote and abstract. When the experience is near, it is possible to take action in specific areas of what is social and, consequently, gain access to the areas themselves. This is of crucial importance in terms of subjects' influence on social realities, and therefore the shaping of a particular attitude to social realities. In other words, the use of either personal or impersonal forms is meant to constitute the representation of the scope of social agency of both the individual and social subjects. This is exemplified by the following textbook excerpts:

There is an adage which says: “Man is a wolf to man”. It is supposed to mean that each of us looks only about his/her interests and in an effort to secure them, is prepared to take things from others or act to their disadvantage [...] Naturally, each of us has needs and interests. We make efforts to get money to buy food, clothing, a car, books and toys for the children, to go on holiday and so on. But we try to get an education in order to have an interesting job and do something worth doing, in the first place. We want to have a family because one of human needs is to love and be loved. So we not only have material needs (money), but also what is called higher level needs (love, knowledge) or spiritual ones (living a meaningful life). What is more, man is not always driven by his/her needs or advantage. Every day, each of us does a lot of things for our beloved [...] We also get involved in activities for the sake of group interests or of the local community [...] The closer or more similar to us other people are, the more willing we are to do something for them. It is easier to help your relatives than people you don't know. But we are also able to help people who are different or far away from us, for instance by taking part in fundraising for children suffering from cancer or for the victims of war in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq. (1,35)

Executive bodies in Poland are the president and the government. The president is chosen in a general election for a five-year term of office. The president is the head of state, whose function is not so much day-to-day government, as to prevent major

⁶³ M. Lisowska-Magdziarz, *Analiza tekstu...* [Text Analysis], p. 62.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

conflicts between the various power organs. The president, therefore, should be an arbiter, the more powerful as he holds a mandate of trust of the majority of citizens, who elected him by direct vote. The President of the Republic of Poland has the powers typical of the head of state, like ratifying international agreements (although the ratification of most important agreements requires the approval of the parliament), appointing and recalling ambassadors who represent Poland in other countries, awarding state decorations, granting Polish citizenship, the power of pardon. (2,51)

Personal pronouns like “we”, “you” (both singular and plural) as well as their possessive forms “our”, “your”, or “their” appear with topics in which the strategy of legitimation is more visibly present. Where knowledge is presented through a description of procedures, definitions etc., impersonal forms are more common, or objectivated subject positions are applied, like “citizens”, “consumers”, “employers”, “employees”, “customers”, “children”, “pupils” etc.; topics with which legitimation strategy is more commonly used tend to build an impression of empowerment. While interpretation control is fully maintained, pupils are steered towards predetermined conclusions, but as they follow the argumentation and have to declare their acceptance (nonacceptance seems absolutely out of the question), they may have an impression of participating in knowledge building. Moreover, a specific bond emerges between the speaker/author and the interpreter – the bond of subordination to the order neither of them can control: majority opinion, what authorities say, accepted norms of behaviour, common-sense argumentation both have to accept their persuasiveness. With topics in which knowledge is presented in an objectivated language and the resulting practice is subject to iteration, the speaker/author looks like a person transmitting or reporting an objective order which has to be accepted.

The use of personal structures, which emphasize the community of the author’s and the interpreter’s experiences, not only makes the knowledge closer and contextualised in experience, but even more, it removes the status of knowledge from what is constituted and transmitted. The concepts or theories on which the argumentation is based get naturalised as common sense, thus gaining greater persuasiveness. The interpreter’s task is now not so much to acquire the knowledge constituted in this way, as to discover the described regularities in his/her own behaviour. When texts contain a large number of formal terms, the knowledge they constitute becomes decontextualised and the author’s or speaker’s position is concealed. Furthermore, the subject of the argumentation becomes completely separated from the interpreter’s experience as a result of the language of objectivation that is used. It should be stressed that the closeness to or remoteness from experience does not reflect the presence or absence of the possibility of participation in the phenomenon described, but the use of a particular form of the linguistic medium, which may in itself be a distancing tool, for instance by the use of other than everyday language.

Personal forms, signifying the proximity of experience and, consequently, the accessibility and possibility of influencing social realities, occur in topics like groups, local community, civic activity and the market. Distancing and abstracting comes with areas like government, local government, politics, democracy etc. As a result, we may talk about the following material effects of the above mechanisms: the distributive control of the political, the delimitation of the boundaries of power and control, the shift from social conflicts to the society versus the authorities/the state, the homogenisation of what is social, the romanticisation of localness and the formalisation of democracy. The first two cases are connected with the process of the delimitation of the boundaries of social agency, which in the textbooks discussed here is strongly separated from power and the ability to transform the reality, as a result of which civic activities lose their political dimension, to be confined to the manifestation of specific psychological needs. In the third, the fourth and the fifth of the cases, the society is deprived of the dimension of conflict. As a result, it is impossible for the relation of domination as well as the mechanisms of social distance development to surface. Such perspective makes it impossible to ask questions and, therefore, to challenge the existing social inequalities resulting from the given social stratification. Ultimately, democracy itself loses the dimension of social experience and is reduced to a set of formalised institutions and procedures.

The three examples described above of the analysis of interpretative control mechanisms in action illustrate how certain representations (of various dimensions of social reality) are protected from being challenged, which could undermine the specific form of the ideological *status quo*.

The presentation of the opportunities offered by CDA, especially from the perspective described in the first part of this paper, the control of the interpretation and interpellation of subjects in the discourse, provides a tool for the examination of the discursive constitution of school knowledge. It is really important that the tools are above all subjected to the critical interest of this variety of discourse analysis. Thanks to this, the CDA perspective allows a subsequent interpretation of the uncovered discursive and linguistic mechanisms from a broader social perspective, in particular the perspective of sustaining and supporting the dominant form of rationality. Moreover, it is possible with CDA to examine the relations (viewed otherwise than in narrowly deterministic terms) between the discourse produced and the discourse reproduced (here by textbooks) at school and the hegemonic social practices. It is vital that the CDA perspective must not be perceived only as a means of disclosing (actually anticipated) hegemonic social practices, but as a research approach designed to demonstrate how such practices materialise and through what measures the hegemonic effect may emerge and persist.

Summary

*The Control of Interpretation and the Interpellation of Subjectivity.
On Possible Uses of Critical Discourse Analysis in Textbook Research*

The first aim of this paper is to present opportunities arising from the use of the critical paradigm (particularly Critical Discourse Analysis, CDA) in textbook research. The second aim is to present an example of research that uses the method and theory of Norman Fairclough's CDA to analyse lower-secondary school social science textbooks. The main notions used in the research are interpretation control and Fairclough's interpellation of subjects in discourse. The results show that the discursive and linguistic mechanisms applied in the material examined are used to legitimise and justify the representations of the social reality constructed in the textbooks and to reduce the potential for ambivalent interpretations of the knowledge presented. The CDA perspective allows for the discovery of the means by which the aforementioned effects are produced.

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The Status of Students at the University of the Future – an Analysis of the Main Documents of the Debate on Polish Higher Education Reform

The post-1989 changes to Polish universities were the result of a triple pressure – first, there was the will to liberalise a system devoid of autonomy that was brought to life in the period of the People’s Republic of Poland; second, the need to conform to the processes of academic institution standardisation within supra- and international organisations (European Higher Education Area and the European Union); and third was the issue of corrections to the functioning of higher education facilities in Poland in the context of the post-Communist reduction of the welfare state combined with the high personal demand for academic-level education. In recent years, the three areas of pressure have been supplemented by a fourth, namely, the perception of higher education as a system which impacts the state’s economic growth and as a potential globalised branch of the service sector.

In the course of formulating the currently implemented higher education reform, a process ongoing for the last few years, all four abovementioned factors have played a role. The process of preparing the reform was accompanied by public debate that allowed varied public actors to express their interests and beliefs on the reform and the target shape of higher education. The debate drew participation from powerful actors, such as the state, ministry-hired experts and academic trade organisations, as well as a number of actors of lower standing – regular academics, students, the academic administration, entrepreneurs, and other social stakeholders.

One of the axes of the debate was the balance between the mass effect of higher education, which could be observed in the last twenty years, on the one hand, and the needs of the state and the economy with the added question of the quality of education on the other. The “problem” of the mass character of higher education, both in Poland and in countries which underwent the same process in previous decades, occurs with the clash between the interests of (future) students, the interests of the state which cannot provide financial support to higher education, and of academics that seek to protect the autonomy of their respective institutions. Within the Polish debate, the dominant voice was that of powerful institutions and

organisations, while the representatives of the student body did not play a major part. The goal of this article is to analyse, on the basis of two documents that played a major part in the debate, the way the dominating actors – the state and the academics – conceptualised the future position of students, the actor whose capability to publicly articulate their interests was the lowest.

Research context

The post-1989 reforms of Polish higher education were connected with the restitution of academic freedom, an increase of the autonomy of universities, the enabling of the founding of non-public higher education facilities and the charging of education fees if they were not paid by more than half of the students. These changes were accompanied by a major lowering of the part of the Gross National Product (GNP) spent on higher education and science¹, which, when combined with the abovementioned liberalisation, resulted in the emergence of a large higher education market. The market allowed for private resources to reach public and non-public universities, at the same time forcing the higher productivity of academics (the number of students grew five-fold between 1989 and 2010² with the number of academic teachers changing only to a minor degree)³. Similarly to other comparable episodes of the sudden massification of higher education, this caused fears of the lowering of the standards of education. Because the process of setting up new specialisations was totally dependent on market mechanisms – i.e. was dependent on the costs of conducting classes and demand – there was an additional element of the negative feelings towards the system, namely the structure of education, where the dominant specialisations are those within the humanities, the social sciences, management, and law. The structure of education dominated by the abovementioned specialisations is considered inadequate in the light of the dominant theoretical models that present the structure of developed economies as well as the needs of the Polish job market. Yet another element of the system which

¹ M. Kwiek, *Finansowanie szkolnictwa wyższego w Polsce a transformacje finansowania publicznego szkolnictwa wyższego w Europie* [Financing of higher education in Poland and the transformations of the financing of higher education in Europe], Centre of Public Policy Studies, "Research Papers" 2010, vol. 16.

² World Bank, *Tertiary Education in Poland*, Biuro Banku Światowego w Polsce, Warsaw 2004, p. 2; Eurostat, *Students in Tertiary Education*, accessed on 10.09.2012 from <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00062&plugin>.

³ According to the popularly referenced data, the number of FTEs of academic teachers in Poland had grown from 64 thousand in 1989 to 103 thousand in 2010, an increase of 61%, and has stayed on the same level since then (GUS, *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland 2011*, Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych, Warsaw 2012, p. 343). At the same time, there are sources indicating that if taking multiple FTEs per person, the actual number of academic teachers fell by 10% in the same timespan (M. Papuzińska, J. Cieśla, *Szkoły wyższe – reforma i mity* [Tertiary schools – reform and myths], accessed on 10.09.2012 from <http://www.polityka.pl/spoleczenstwo/artykuly/1513512,1,szkoły-wyzsze-reforma-i-mity-read>).

received negative remarks was academic achievements, considered inadequate to the potential of the state, as well as the weak cooperation with industry and the commercialisation of knowledge. Similarly to the structure of education, the aspect of academic achievements is criticised in the light of the dominant theoretical models of the economy, even despite the relatively low knowledge absorption of Polish industry⁴ and relatively high share of research contracted and financed by private and public companies among OECD states⁵.

The abovementioned assessments were formulated during a public debate⁶ which accompanied the process of formulating the subject matter of the reform of higher education. The intent to reform the higher education sector was communicated by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the newly-formed 2007 Civic Platform cabinet. The debate on the early design of the reform drew participants from the Ministry itself, media, trade organisations representing university rectors and students, non-government organisations, and to some degree commercial organisations. Earlier international organisation reports on higher education in Poland were also of significant importance to the debate – especially the 2007 OECD report⁷, as well as the plans of development of the state and higher education formulated in previous years⁸, and documents such as the *Autodiagnoza polskiego środowiska naukowego* [Self-diagnosis of the Polish academic environment]⁹, a report of the Collegium Civitas research.

Some of the crucial documents drafted during the debate were two complete strategies for the development of higher education and the reform of the existing system. One was prepared by the Institute for Market Economy Research (Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową, IBnGR) and the Ernst&Young Business

⁴ OECD, *OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2008*, accessed on 10.09.2012 from <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/453711056038>.

⁵ OECD, *OECD Reviews of Tertiary Education Poland*, OECD Publishing 2007, p. 149.

⁶ The abstracted versions of the assessment of the state of higher education can be found in many media reports, as well as in reports and strategies on the system of higher education in Poland, e.g.: Ernst & Young Business Advisory & Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową, *Diagnoza stanu szkolnictwa wyższego w Polsce* [Diagnosis of the state of tertiary education in Poland], Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową, Warsaw 2009; Konferencja Rektorów Akademickich Szkół Polskich, *Strategia rozwoju szkolnictwa wyższego 2010-2020 – projekt środowiskowy* [Strategy of the development of tertiary education 2010-2020 – the circle's project], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2009.

⁷ OECD, *OECD Reviews of Tertiary Education Poland*, OECD Publishing 2007.

⁸ Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, *Strategia rozwoju nauki w Polsce do 2015 roku* [Strategy of the development of education in Poland to 2015], Warsaw 2007; Zespół doradców strategicznych Prezesa Rady Ministrów, *Raport o kapitale intelektualnym Polski* [Poland's intellectual capital report], Warsaw 2008; Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego, *Narodowe strategiczne ramy odniesienia 2007–2013* [National Strategic Reference Framework], Warsaw 2006; Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego, *Program operacyjny kapitał ludzki* [Human capital operational programme], Warsaw 2006; Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, *Wyniki narodowego programu Foresight. Polska 2020* [The results of the national Foresight programme. Poland 2020], Warsaw 2009.

⁹ *Autodiagnoza polskiego środowiska naukowego* [Self-diagnosis of the Polish scientific circles], Collegium Civitas, Warsaw 2007.

Advisory (E&Y)¹⁰ – two organisations that won the tender for the preparation of the strategy, initiated by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. The other was prepared by the Conference of Rectors of Academic Schools in Poland (Konferencja Rektorów Akademickich Szkół Polskich, KRASP)¹¹, an academic trade organisation. These documents present the viewpoint of the two most important actors in the debate. On one hand there is the state, represented by non-government (IBnGR) and commercial (E&Y) organisations that possess expert knowledge and that are, by definition, neutral to the debate surrounding the reform; on the other, the representatives of academic authorities. Both strategies contain a complete assessment of higher education in Poland and suggest changes to the model of financing and managing the system.

In my research, I focused on the two strategic documents because they express the point of view of the two main actors of the debate to the highest degree, and the visions contained therein are complex and coherent. Both documents present a complete picture of higher education and the interconnections between actors in the area, both in the current and the intended state of the system. My main point of interest was the differences and similarities to the way the position of students was conceptualised; this latter actor neither drew excessive media attention nor led to the publication of a document of a similar calibre to the two mentioned above.

Theoretical foundations

I see the debate on the higher education system in Poland as a public space debate on its future shape. The actors of the debate apply discursive models in order to define the present and future state of their fields of interest. Following Fairclough, I chose to define the models as imaginaria, or discursive constructs that serve as “projections of possible states of affairs, ‘possible worlds’ [...], possible social practices and networks of social practices, possible syntheses of activities, subjects, social relations, instruments, objects, spacetimes, values, forms of consciousness”¹². In the words of Bob Jessop¹³, when describing debates between social forces on the shape of their institutional environment in the conditions of institutional crisis: “Which of these alternative outcomes eventually emerges will be mediated in part through discursive struggles over the nature and significance of the crisis and what might follow from it. In periods of major social restructuring

¹⁰ Ernst&Young Business Advisory & Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową, *Strategia rozwoju szkolnictwa wyższego w Polsce do 2020 roku* [Strategy of development of tertiary education in Poland to 2020], Instytut Badań nad Gospodarką Rynkową, Warsaw 2009.

¹¹ Konferencja Rektorów Akademickich Szkół Polskich, *Strategia rozwoju szkolnictwa wyższego 2010–2020 – projekt środowiskowy* [Strategy of the development of tertiary education 2010–2020 – the circle’s project], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2009.

¹² N. Fairclough, *The Dialectics of Discourse*, “Textus” 2001, 14(2), p. 233.

¹³ B. Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2002.

there is an intersection of diverse economic, political and sociocultural narratives that seek to give meaning to current problems by construing them in terms of past failures and future possibilities. Different social forces in the private and public domains propose new visions, projects, programmes and policies"¹⁴.

The clash of ideas is by no means free of conflict. "There is ample scope for competition among social forces over accumulation strategies, state projects, and hegemonic visions [...]. In this context a key role is played by the rivalries and struggles of intellectual forces, individually and collectively [...] to articulate strategies, projects and visions that seek to reconcile contradictions and conflicts and to resolve dilemmas for various sites and scales of action" (Gramsci 1971; Jessop 1990; Portelli 1973). The main forces involved in the competition are interest groups, political parties, and social movements, although it is the mass media rather than social areas that occupy the central position, allowing them to mediate the debate on hegemony¹⁵. Jessop's theory, using the idea of the *imaginarium* similarly to Fairclough, is mostly related to debates that allow new economic regimes to form at the time of crisis. In the scope of this research, I am using it as a model of debate with a narrower scope. It needs to be added that contemporary debates on higher education do not relate only to "instruction", but thanks to popular theories on interconnections between the system of higher education, the economy and government, are comprehended by the involved parties as debates in the future economic and political position of the state as a whole.

The above results in the conclusion that debates in the shape of specific institutions (a) take place in the public or media space, (b) occur with actors that seek to protect their own interest (c) and who employ specific discursive resources (*imaginaria*) in the discourse, which in turn are (d) coherent, abstract models of the situation that contain the information on the subjects and relations between them. The goal of the actors is to present *imaginaria* connecting the subjects within the field of the debate, that would solve "discrepancies" and "dilemmas" that endanger the field in its current state. Because the entirety of any area of human activity is too complex to be a subject of a holistic understanding or consideration, the describing *imaginaria* are selective and incomplete. One of the main goals of formulating such *imaginaria*, however, is to establish whether it is possible to "fix" some elements as possible objects of intervention or rule¹⁶. The "theories" describing the area of activity and formulated by the actors serve to create knowledge on the subject of the debate as well as to gain control by declaring what can be the subject of the field. The implementation of the *imaginarium* constitutes the component subjects, even if they were non-existent in the field before. Thus, knowledge, at least related to social relations, both applies to an area and helps constitute it.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 120; also cf. M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*, transl. A. Sheridan, Random House Inc., New York 1995.

Imaginaria are not created in a vacuum but in a cultural context, causing some solutions to be preferred over others. The influence of the context on local solutions and vision of the activity of individual social areas is a subject of discourse theory¹⁷ and institutional theory of organisation¹⁸ or, in a specific form, the actor-network theory¹⁹. In the context of this research, a precise definition of the way a transfer occurs, the way Discourses, with an intentional capital D, influence local practices²⁰, institutional logics²¹, rational myths²² or blackboxed sets of practices²³ is not necessary. This does not entail the transfer or the influence itself does not occur – there is a canon of discourses/myths/models/theories not abandoned by the participants of the debate and used to construct the field's imaginaria. In order to avoid ambiguity, in this paper, following the institutional theory of organisation, I will assign the name of rational myths to the external theoretical elements used as the basis for local imaginaria. From the perspective of this paper, the fact that the analysed documents are drafted by actors representing specific interest groups is more important than the influence of globally-spreading rational myths. The activity of such interest groups serves to secure their own position, and to define the future of the area in a way that allows specific actors to retain their institutional "state of ownership". Rational myths, often of global range, are interpreted, localised, and modified for this purpose, so as to allow space for subjects, practices, and ways of acting which are considered coherent with the interest of the actors. The discursive debate plays out on the level of these processes of redefinition – individual actors define their "own" positions, or rather positions that they will assume in the resultant system, as dominating, rational, and subjective; at the same time they redefine the positions of other actors that they will be interacting with, within the imaginarium, as subordinate and requiring constant supervision. Because imaginaria are coherent maps of practices, subjective positions, etc., there is no place for a purely utopian "reconciliation of differences" that would secure the interests of all parties, typical for less formalised ways of narration. The actors, when scrupulously designing the future institutional sys-

¹⁷ N. Fairclough, *Language and Power*, Longman, London, New York 1989; M. Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Vintage, New York 1982.

¹⁸ R.R. Friedland, R. Alford, *Bringing Society Back in: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions*, [in:] *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, W. Powell, P. DiMaggio (eds.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1991, p. 232; J.W. Meyer, B. Rowan, *Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony*, "American Journal of Sociology" 1977, p. 340.

¹⁹ B. Latour, *Reassembling the Social*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005.

²⁰ J.P. Gee, *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis Theory and Method*, Routledge, London, New York 1999.

²¹ R.R. Friedland, R. Alford, *Bringing Society Back in: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions*, [in:] *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, W. Powell, P. DiMaggio (eds.), University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1991.

²² J.W. Meyer, B. Rowan, *Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony*, "American Journal of Sociology" 1977.

²³ B. Latour, *Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1999.

tem, also define positions of power – subjective positions – and subordinate, objective positions, always striving for places that they or their clients occupy, to belong to the former category.

The goal of this research is to compare the imaginaria of the higher education systems as constructed in the two documents drafted for the purpose of the public debate. The main focus area is the students who, similarly to some other groups within the system of higher education, have an unclear status as opposed to a “standard” actor within a “standard” organisation – at the same time they are outside the organisation, as its client, and they are inside it, e.g. as apprentices that are being prepared by their masters to reproduce the education system. Determining who they are in reference to the universities – whether they are a product, a client, a student to the academic masters, a member of the community, etc. – is necessary for each coherent imaginarium of a university. The unclear status of students is especially prone to reinterpretations and “fixing” within the narration of the debate in which they play a limited part as a consequence of their low social status and lack of access to institutionalised forms of expressing their opinion. Therefore, they are in a position that needs to be defined, but at the same time they lack major influence on the definition process.

The research material – two strategic documents – was coded for two elements: first, the types of actors mentioned in the documents and constituting the internal and external “ecosystem” of higher education, and, second, the designed target relations between the actors. This allowed the definition of the positions that are positions of power, those that are subordinate, and the reasons and mechanisms of subordination.

Results

The models presented in both strategies can be said to be partially antagonistic. Following the publication of the reports, the authors entered a brief debate in the press²⁴. At the same time, there is no significant difference between the two documents in respect to the rational myths that are employed in the university narration. In both the IBnGR/E&Y and KRASP reports, the most important reference points are: a concept of economy based on the knowledge of a learning society²⁵, New Public Management²⁶, and analogous documents (OECD report) as well as models of the academic system (American model). Neither of the strategic documents makes references e.g. to the Humboldtian tradition, autotelic value of

²⁴ P. Węgleński, *Magister brojler* [Broiler, M.A.], “Polityka”, 16 March 2010, accessed from: <http://www.polityka.pl/kraj/analizy/1504212,1,jaka-strategia-dla-szkol-wyzszych.read>; B. Wyżnikiewicz, *Zerwany pakt o nieagresji* [Broken Non-aggression Pact], “Polityka”, 24 March 2010, accessed from: <http://www.polityka.pl/kraj/analizy/1504428,1,zerwany-pakt-o-nieagresji.read>.

²⁵ B.A. Lundvall, *The University in the Learning Economy*, Aalborg Universitet, Aalborg 2002.

²⁶ J.E. Lane, *New Public Management*, Routledge, London, New York 2000.

knowledge, etc., which have until recently been basic components of the imaginaria of continental Europe universities.

Despite the convergence of the “languages” used by the actors, both strategies differ significantly in their ideas of financing and managing tertiary schools. The parties of the debate present different reinterpretations of the abovementioned rational myths, constructing their own versions of higher education imaginaria, according to which the social actors of the document authors’ design ought to be in subjective charge of the basic higher education institutions, at the same time limiting their adversaries’ position²⁷. The issue of the status of the students was not in the heart of the debate but it was strongly intertwined into the narration on the reasons behind the “crisis” of Polish higher education and the suggestions of remedies to that crisis. Students, or rather the influence they exert through the education market, are placed in both documents as one of the core reasons for the crisis. Both sides present different concepts of the way the influence of students ought to be limited so that the desired shape of the system of higher education can be achieved, each side according to their own general logic of discourse.

Students as consumers and as a product

The interpretation of the status of a student is directly stated in the E&Y/IBnGR strategy:

(I) The key role of universities as the engine for civilisation development and innovation has seen the onset of criticism, although on the other hand the demand for **its most important product, qualified workforce, has increased**. (E&Y/IBnGR, p. 58)

Here, students are not treated as a subject of interactions within the area of higher education but rather as a product of the area. Such interpretation automatically changes the status of university students from a subjective one, allowing to co-shape the organisation with the use of various tools, towards an objective one – allowing to be merely shaped by other actors in the area.

This reinterpretation occurs through the change in understanding of the desired interconnections between the individual actors that constitute, or ought to constitute, the area of higher education: universities, the state, the job market, and students. The justification for such change is a negative assessment of the structure of education, closely connected with the structure of financing the universities.

²⁷ Both New Public Management and the Knowledge-Based Economy are theoretical constructs well-suited to the role of providers of discursive “ammunition” to both sides of the conflict. They can be freely interpreted either in favour of the wide autonomy of universities, or, more precisely, their administrators, or precise control by the state, even if it is performed through semi-market mechanisms. Both sides also make use of the discrepancies between the declared assumptions of the concepts and the varied practices across various countries that derive from the assumptions.

One of the fundamental changes in the structure of financing, as proposed by E&Y/IBnGR, is to replace the stationary grant, which all public tertiary education schools are eligible for and which is calculated with an algorithm, with a didactic grant, which would be granted following a bid submitted to the ministry. The bid would be for specialisations offered by the university and which, according to expert analyses, would allow for an “adjustment of the structure of tertiary education to social needs, especially the job market” (E&Y/IBnGR, p. 85). A potential problem with such a bureaucratic-expert mechanism of grantmaking is:

(II) A structure of tertiary education which is inadequate to the requirements of the economy **because of its expert, non-market character of defining the structure itself.** (E&Y/IBnGR, p. 85)

An expert character of prognoses on what specialisations are to be commissioned by the state:

(III) Results in the possibility of **errors which do not occur when contracting based on market principles.** (E&Y/IBnGR, p. 119)

In the further part of the analysis, the risk is considered acceptable for the following reason:

(IV) **The functioning of market solutions in the area of tertiary education does not always lead to a structure of education which is optimal from the perspective of economic development.** [...] A large part of disadvantageous phenomena in tertiary education focuses on the segment of non-public schools whose functioning is similar to that of open market institutions. (E&Y/IBnGR, p. 120)

In the above excerpts, we see a situation in which the state calls for the launching of specialisations based on the interest of the “job market” or the economy – the actual consumers of university products. The market-oriented decision of the emergence of specialisations is presented as a solution that can potentially help avoid mistakes in the construction of the education structure resulting from the abovementioned, see excerpt III, centralised bureaucratic control and the source of the majority of problems facing the system nowadays, see excerpt IV. The apparent contradiction between the two excerpts is the result of there being two interpretations of “market solutions”. In the case of excerpt III, the definition relates to the market where the consumers’ role is played by employers and students play the role of the product, while excerpt IV defines students to be consumers and the educational service plays the part of the product.

According to E&Y/IBnGR, student consumerism is one of the reasons for the pathologisation of the structure of Polish higher education. The actor that can remedy the situation is the state, undertaking the role of an intermediary and shaping the education according to academia in accordance with the interest of the actual client of the universities (job market, economy) at the same time not allowing for

a deformation of the structure of education if the students – in this case, the product – is placed in the position of a client.

KRASP's document provides a similar assessment of the situation. While summarising the results of the abovementioned OECD report on the state of tertiary education in Poland, the authors write:

(V) The didactic offer of tertiary schools is decided upon based on supply, while the communication with the job market ranges from weak to non-existent. (KRASP, p. 48)

One of the earlier excerpts analysing the structure of education supply and demand reads:

(VI) The market [...] needs specialists in technical, mathematical, and physical sciences, and universities, when shaping their educational offer, do little to take this information into account, instead following the **expectations of secondary school graduates**. The financial condition of universities is also a factor – the selective character of the specialisation offer is a major consequence of the costs of education. (KRASP, p. 44)

According to KRASP, the inadequate structure of education is a consequence of secondary school graduate demand, insufficient financial support of the state which results in universities launching “low-cost” specialisations, and lack of communication with the “job market” which is caused by its “lack of transparency” (KRASP, p. 44). Therefore, the actual problem is excess information from the market where the students act as the client, and insufficient information from the market where the students act as a product.

The discrepancy between the two interpretations lies mainly in the adequacy, or rather lack of adequacy, of their state funding – it is an element that KRASP considers as one of the main negative factors impacting Polish higher education, both in respect to the quality of education and science. Convergence of the two opinions is expressed in the division of markets into two types – irrational markets that distort the structure of education, where students buy educational services on one side, and the rational job market whose information ought to shape the supply of specialisations on the other.

The solutions to this situation are different in both the reports. The bureaucratic-expert supervision of the ministries as proposed by E&Y/IBnGR necessitates the creation of a list of specialisations without the participation of the universities, job market, and educational market. On the other hand, KRASP sees the way of changing the structure of education by:

(VII) [Cooperation] of the universities with employers, representatives of trade organisations and associations, and public life institutions where university organs undertake decisions related to the study process and programme. (KRASP, p. 73)

(VIII) The missions of individual tertiary schools will be decided autonomously **in cooperation with external stakeholders** but at the same time diversified in order to

adjust the functioning of the school to its own vision of development, including the academic profile and areas of education as well as to **social needs and preferences of candidates**. (KRASP, p. 64)

According to this solution, schools are autonomous actors whose decision-making process takes into account information from the job market as well as the consumer preferences of students.

The latter does not change the fact that the goal of both actors is to present such a vision of the structure of higher education in which the other actors will be to some degree deprived of subjectivity – those will be universities and students from the perspective of the strategy prepared for the Ministry and the state, and students from the viewpoint of the KRASP strategy. The goal of the authors of both strategies is to define the situation in a way according to which they, or their clients, are the interpreters of signals that come from the job market, whereas the job market is treated as the sole source of social rationality. In both the strategies, the presentation of the mechanism according to which students, deprived of the part of their subjectivity coming from their status as consumers will be shaped according to the needs of other social actors. According to both documents, one of the main elements of the imagined structure of the future university is the systems that serve for the “product” – in the current system, one which is deforming the structure of education by making consumer choices – to be controlled, directed, and divided into varied categories.

Fantasies of control

The main issue that the authors of both strategies needed to face was the inability of having the market and competition, as elements that would automatically solve the problem of the structure of education, included into their imaginaria of higher education. Market solutions were preferred during the transformation of Poland, and market fundamentalism²⁸, a significantly weaker way than in the Western states from the onset of the “great recession” of 2008–2012, is still a dominant ideological perspective in Poland²⁹. Traces of this ideological approach can be found in E&Y/IbnGR’s strategy, where the critique of educational markets’ shaping of the structure of education (excerpt III) can be read a page after a ritual confirmation of the advantage of market solutions over bureaucratic ones, of no consequence to the rest of the argumentation (excerpt II). According to the theory of the dependence on resources³⁰, the influence of the organisation’s environment is

²⁸ G. Soros, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered*, Public Affairs, New York 1998; J. E. Stiglitz, *Globalisation and its Discontents*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London 2002.

²⁹ T. Kowalik, *www.polskatransformacja.pl*, Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie Muza SA, Warsaw 2009.

³⁰ J. Pfeffer, G. Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective*, Stanford Business Books, Stanford 2003.

associated with the degree to which the survival of the organisation depends on the diversified resources gained through the contact of the subject organisation with others. The structure, as described both by the KRASP and the E&Y/IBnGR reports, indicates that universities are dependent on the state and fee-paying students. The state does not exert adequate influence on the dependent organisations because the funds are divided according to an algorithm which does not rely on the effects of the activity of the universities or because they are divided through a grant system run by non-political expert bodies. On the other hand, students exert major influence on universities through market mechanisms. It is a pathological influence because instead of leading to the emergence of specialisations according to the needs of the actual “clients” (employees) for the actual “products” (the qualified workforce), the universities need to sell their educational services to secondary school graduates who have no knowledge of what the state’s economy needs (excerpts V and VI). An attempt to visualise the regulation of such a system is complex because universities are not directly financially dependent on enterprises, the job market, the economy, etc. – their “real” clients do not have any influence over the structure of education. Both strategies contain preliminary ideas for solving this problem and both were described in the previous section of this paper. The first, present in the strategy that calls for specialisations to be requested by the state, would significantly lower the academic freedom, reducing it to the “freedom” of properly executing tasks commissioned by the subjects which are external to academia. The second solution, offered by the academic authorities, would in turn limit the influence of the state on the universities – the state would be separated from the managing of the universities by a network of apolitical expert bodies, and the role of the interpreter of the needs of the economy would be taken over by the tertiary schools themselves. The dispute on power and subjectivity is not related to students, as both strategies agree as to the need of limiting the students’ influence. In order to achieve this, the imaginaria of control systems are created where excess, irrational consumer freedom would give way to meticulous control in accordance with the needs of the actual clients of higher education.

KRASP

The control system according to KRASP’s strategy takes into account an interaction of five actors – tertiary schools, the state, secondary schools, the job market, and the knowledge economy. The state is to serve an advisory and informative function, with its goal as follows:

- (IX) To assure universal accessibility of information on:
- current state of the job market, including the differences in the earnings of the graduates of individual [...] schools;
 - the forecast, in a few years’ perspective, of the needs of the job market and the salary ranges in different professions;

- long-term forecasts of the job market [...] and supporting the institutionalised forms of counselling and assistance in career planning, aimed primarily at secondary school students but also tertiary school students. (KRASP, p. 74)

The state's activity would therefore be limited to providing information on the prospective choices from the viewpoint of the students, which would allow them to make "rational" decisions based on salary information.

The role of the tertiary schools is wider and is to include interactions with future students already in primary and secondary schools, as well as co-shaping the educational experience in the primary and secondary schools:

(X) Popularising different forms of "pre-matura" education [...] that would serve to better prepare students for tertiary education and to increase the **motivation to undertake studies in those areas which do not enjoy sufficient interest of candidates** but are important from the viewpoint of **fulfilling social goals** – especially the development of the knowledge-based economy. (KRASP, p. 74)

Encouraging students to enrol in less popular courses from the market perspective would also be associated with financial incentives:

(XI) Applying incentives to students in order for them to undertake studies in those **areas which are important for social and economic reasons**, in the form of material aid solutions. (KRASP, p. 74)

Encouraging students to undertake education in specialisations that "are important for social and economic reasons" is synonymous with supporting those specialisations which draw little interest on the educational market and which are more expensive for universities to run in the areas of nature, engineering and the technical sciences. This activity coexists with the vision of the developing knowledge-based economy – a segment which is elite and yet practically non-existent in Poland, whose emergence would be supported by universities in liaison with the state and industry. The mission of constructing the new economy is different from the actions whose goal is to prepare students for the "actual" job market, which requires a different set of skills. The diagnosis of the current situation reads:

(XII) Some skills sought after by the employers have never been the object of interest of many universities and still are insufficiently noticed [...] The skill of studying and the drive to raise one's qualifications are valid arguments in favour of employing a graduate, even if their subject or specialist knowledge do not completely match the company's profile. Entrepreneurship is also vital, as self-employment, which universities ought to promote, is a major part of the future job market. (KRASP, p. 45)

Ensuring convergence between the skills of the students and the actual job market requires cooperation with the latter, and, unlike with the E&Y/IBnGR document, ought to be a cooperation of equal partners, not the subordination of academia to state expertises, where the state acknowledges the needs of the economy on its own.

The division of the economy into two parts, where one is the knowledge-based economy, i.e. the common project of the state, the universities, and industry, and the other is the job market with its rather limited requirements, corresponds with the division of education into two paths – mass and elite. This differentiation is identified with the introduction, as part of the Bologna Process, of the first and second cycle frameworks of tertiary education. According to KRASP's strategy, "soft" methods of the differentiating of those levels are suggested, in order to assign an elite character to master's degree studies:

(XIII) Raising of the level of education in the second cycle programmes by limiting the percentage of students undertaking the said cycle directly upon the completion of the first cycle, with the use of administrative methods and through "hard" selection of candidates is unreal and would not be proper. Therefore, an evolutionary approach is necessary, that would shape the proper image of competences of first cycle graduates among the employers. (KRASP, p. 80)

The situation in which most students graduate with a master's degree is considered pathological from the viewpoint of the Bologna Process, but persuasive or educational activity is to be directed not only towards students but also towards employers. Students are to be motivated to undertake unpopular specialisations and employers to lower their requirements of employee education.

The overall picture of the KRASP strategy indicates the drive towards universities retaining their autonomy – their interactions with the environment are to be voluntary, partner-like, and non-mediated, and the state is to serve only in advisory and coordinating capacities. Pathologies from the educational service market are to be limited with the use of "soft" persuasion and educational methods. A vital part is played by specific "education on education" where the involvement of tertiary schools in the education process starts at the primary level, progressing through the lower to higher secondary schools. The goal of these interventions is to direct the future students so that their choices satisfy all the complexes of social rationality – both the existent ones, such as the job market, as well as the future ones, namely, the knowledge-based economy. The final goal of education is therefore to produce functional elements of the society, preceded by making the elements aware of what it means to be properly functional. This means that the perspective of the strategy entails that the general population is not capable of performing rational assessment of their needs and that the only sources of rationality are the market (the entrepreneurs), experts forming opinions on the market, and the experience of higher-developed countries, all enclosed on such imaginaria as the knowledge-based economy, together with the actions of the subjects whose goal is the implementation of such imaginaria (schools, companies, state agencies). At the same time, the introduction of "soft" control mechanisms ought not to be connected with limitations but rather with the increase of tertiary schools' autonomy. One of the elements that was not included in this general vision is the criterion of the distinction that allows to classify students into groups that would

form mass and elite material. This distinction criterion is the centre of control fantasy according to E&Y/IBnGR.

E&Y/IBnGR

The division of students into a number of groups that receive education of varying quality is one of the fundamental goals of the E&Y/IBnGR strategy:

(XIV) Schools are to ensure education suitable for the graduates to undertake various jobs: from **routine mental work** (the so-called “mental labourers”) through **socially-useful** tasks (medicine, education) to scientific discovery and creating technological innovations. (E&Y/IBnGR, p. 46)

The lowest level of education – multidisciplinary bachelor programmes – are, according to the strategy, equivalents of the American college studies:

(XV) Multidisciplinary programmes ought to contain subjects from various areas of knowledge (the requirement of diversity) and focus on the shaping of **transitive skills** which are needed in performing **various jobs**. (E&Y/IBnGR, p. 48)

Their goal, according to the referenced model, is to train the lowest class of unspecialised mental employees, ready to change their jobs often. These skills are analogous to those whose acquisition is postulated in KRASP’s strategy as the reaction to the needs of the actual job market (excerpts XII and XIII).

In their justification of the introduction of multidisciplinary courses, with their scope extending beyond the job market, the authors also quote didactic goals:

(XVI) The postponement of the selection of a specialisation, allowing the students to assess their potential and to use it to the fullest. As the research indicates, **the selection of a specialisation is mostly dictated by the opinions of others (teachers, peers, parents)**. Postponing this selection and allowing for a wide range of general education **gives chances to better understand the consequences of the choice and becoming independent of the opinion of the environment, which is especially important because of the drive towards levelling educational opportunities**. (E&Y/IBnGR, p. 50)

(XVII) Independent development of one’s study programme which **teaches responsibility for one’s educational and life choices**, allows to develop interests, and shapes the ability to learn. (E&Y/IBnGR, p. 50)

Thanks to these didactical processes, students of the mass type, the future knowledge workers, should have increased chances of assessing their prospects in the job market. The assumed inability of bachelor study graduates to perform proper self-assessment of prospects (which has certain analogies to the KRASP strategy, but there it relates to the whole population of students, see excerpts VI, X, and XI) can be the result of the low intellectual, social, and financial capital of the

group of their potential clients, included in the strategy. One of the later fragments reads:

(XVIII) Assigning proper status to first cycle studies and the bachelor's degree is of key importance to the process of levelling educational opportunities and to the **efficient use of human capital in the economy**. On one hand, **people coming from groups with lower social and economic status** may consider the perspective of two-cycle studies excessively long, especially if these are fee-paying studies. On the other hand, the competences gained during the first cycle are often sufficient to undertake a position in a variety of professions based on mental work. (E&Y/IBnGR, p. 54)

The didactic process, as intended by E&Y/IBnGR, should therefore allow students from lower classes to rationally recognise their own, class-determined paths of life, and take responsibility for them.

Unlike with multidisciplinary bachelor's programmes, the possibility to undertake second- and third-cycle studies (master's and doctoral programmes) would be limited in order to raise the significance of those courses:

(XIX) In Poland, the share of second-cycle students in the whole population of students is significantly higher than in the other OECD countries. First-cycle education ought therefore to be open to a rising share of secondary school graduates, and **second-cycle studies ought to become a selectively accessible commodity for the best**. (E&Y/IBnGR, pp. 54–55)

Unlike people of low material and social status, whose destiny is to assume the posts of knowledge labourers, the best students do not require, according to E&Y/IBnGR, additional didactic processes, since it is their destiny to assume more privileged and responsible positions within the social hierarchy. The main goal of didactic processes is therefore to limit rather than to stimulate or, like in KRASP's strategy, to direct the educational ambition.

The strategy suggests that there ought to arise a lack of obstruction between individual levels of education:

(XX) A graduate of any programme type may apply for any programme of a higher cycle. [...] When transferring from a lower cycle to a higher one [...], the university would be able to state what range of competences of candidates would be assessed in an entry exam. In order to decrease the obstruction between individual groups of programmes, schools would be able to offer **paid compensation courses** (cf. 7.E) that would allow the candidates to bridge the gaps in knowledge and competences that are required to undertake studies at the programme of their choice. (E&Y/IBnGR, p. 49)

The "lack of obstruction" between levels of education is therefore connected with introducing a double barrier – administrative, associated with the need to pass exams, and financial. Thus, despite the possibility of transferring between study cycles, the chances of attaining the "elite" forms of education by people of low social and economic status is, according to E&Y/IBnGR, limited to yet a greater degree.

Compared to KRASP's strategy which offers "soft" shaping of the students' choices based on the agreement of elite social actors, the strategy offered by E&Y/IBnGR includes a wider range of social goals.

First, it assumes that the right form of subjectivisation of students is to persuade them to internalise their class position. One of the goals of schools meant for them is to enable the students to make a "free" choice of what is deemed necessary by the authors of the strategy.

Second, in the three-cycle structure of studies, as introduced in the Bologna Process, the strategy sees a chance to reconstitute the distinctive function of education, limited by the phenomenon of "diploma inflation" in the light of the "excessive" number of second-cycle students and lack of diversification of schools according to their quality³¹.

Third, a specific innovation of the E&Y/IBnGR strategy is the notion of "efficiency of the utilisation of human capital", see excerpt XVIII which entails directing people with lower or higher entry human capital to, respectively, less or more demanding and prestigious education paths. Although such interventions are actually "efficient" in the sense that training people with human capital deficits to lower-ranking jobs, while training more privileged individuals for more demanding tasks, requires lower outlays as well as "wastes" less of the existing capital, the goal, in the presented form, can be considered synonymous with a top-planned, rigid reproduction of the existing class structure of the society.

Conclusion

The limitations of the present study come from two sources. First, from defining the subjectivity of students only in the context of the role of students as consumers of educational services, and second, from the status of the analysed documents, forming the declarations of parties to a political debate which has been ultimately solved in a way which did not owe much to any of the subject documents. I still claim that in the light of the positive effects of the liberalisation of Polish higher education, the almost openly hostile approach of a number of social actors towards the fundamental effects of the said liberalisation – assigning a mass character to higher education – is worthy of analysing, even if the analysis is of intentions rather than effects. At the same time, there is no better material that can be used as the source of insight into the intentions of the individual social actors in relation to higher education than the materials produced during the debate on the current reform.

Both the analysed visions are of a conservative character. KRASP's project assumes the protection of academic autonomy from student consumer choices,

³¹ The classical description can be found in P. Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1990.

while the version presented by E&Y/IBnGR attempts to formulate an image of a society whose class structure is protected from any excessive ambition of the lower classes and the devaluation of traditional sources of rationality by the advantage of the privileged. Subjectivity, understood as the subjectivity of a consumer rather than a person or a citizen, needs to be transformed into a controllable subjectivity with the help of complex social machinery so that it does not pose a threat to the social institutions valued by the authors of the individual documents. According to KRASP's strategy, it is the subjectivity of a functional element of the market economy, instructed as to what the rationality of social machinery requires of them and constructing their life story based on this understanding. E&Y/IBnGR visualises class subjectivity, allowing for all the individual members of the community to understand where their designated place within the social pyramid is, even if this understanding needs to be accomplished despite excess ambitions awakened by their "teachers, peers, parents". What is perhaps most paradoxical in both the strategies is the combination of their hierarchical conservatism and the strategy of a top-down control based on the arrangement between the elites, with the added concepts of the knowledge-based economy that call for the diffusion of knowledge and the "creative destruction"³² of the existing social structures; an added element is the existence of trust between the cooperating groups of knowledge producers³³. Although in the light of the ongoing crisis one may doubt in the fairness of any economic theories, at the same time it is difficult to envision a social model which would be less adapted to the potential growth of the knowledge economy than a class society, meticulously reproduced according to the plans plotted by the elites, recognising the people's ambition as a threat to the shape of its institutions and the legitimisation of their social standing. The authors, fending mostly for their static visions of society, seem to forget that the contemporary markets of new technology grew out of conversations held in garages rather than in parlours.

Summary

The Status of Students at the University of the Future – an Analysis of the Main Documents of the Debate on Polish Higher Education Reform

The actors taking part in the public debate concerning the current higher education reform in Poland had diverse interests but they operated in a fairly homogenous field of ideology/discourse. For the dominant actors such as the Polish state and the academic leadership, the ideologies/discourses of Knowledge-Based Economy, New Public Management and market fundamentalism determined what could and could not be said. United in ideology, the dominant groups struggled for power – trying to define the fu-

³² J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, Routledge, 2003, chapter VII.

³³ B.A. Lundvall, *The Social Dimension of the Learning Economy*, DRUID, Aalborg University, Aalborg 1996.

ture management and financial structures of higher education institutions in line with their interests.

This paper is based on an analysis of two strategic documents that had a large impact during the debate. The first document was produced by the Rectors Conference, the second one by Ernst&Young Business Advisory and The Gdansk Institute for Market Economics (on behalf of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education). The aim in researching these documents was to determine how the dominant actors conceptualized the future position of students – an actor that had a limited impact on the debate.

In both documents the students are defined as irrational social subjects, whose influence as consumers should be restricted for the good of the industry and the higher education institutions. The students' position is redefined from that of the 'client' to that of the 'product' of higher education – which allows for the positioning of the "labour market" and "knowledge-based economy" as the real clients of the universities. Because of the differentiated needs of the new clients, the product of higher education institutions is to be divided into two categories. The first of them is the "mass product" that is destined for the currently existing labour market and is to be created by processing the lower-class human material. The second category is the "luxury product" that is destined for the prestigious professions and the not yet existent knowledge-based economy.

PRACTICES

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Theatre's Heterotopia. Invading Urban Space: The FairyBus by the Wrocław Puppet Theatre

Due to the obviousness and multidimensionality of its nature, theatre can be viewed as a pedagogical place. In such a context, the concept of a travelling theatre, on the example of FairyBus, gains particular significance and allows, in turn, for interpretations in the categories of heterotopia.

Maria Mendel, the forerunner of the category of place-based education in Poland, notes: "Education, which beyond any doubt is a form of interference, always happens 'somewhere' and has a 'place', and since it initiates a dialectical relation between the pupil and the world, it becomes metaphysics; an ontology that occurs in the conditions of reciprocity and transcendence"¹. In her deliberations on space and culture, Mendel begins with, and expands, the understanding of a place as proposed by Michel Foucault. The philosopher defined heterotopias, the "other places", in opposition to the notion of utopia: a place with no place, an unreal space. Thus, a heterotopia is a real place existing in society – or more likely on its "fringes" – and is shaped by that society². In Mendel's interpretation, the culture shapes space as it is composed of "our own" intertwining places, to which we ourselves assign meanings. In other words, we co-create the world, making it "our own", "fitting inside of it", meaning "having our place (places) within it"³. In the words of the authoress, the culture "constitutes a place of places" that intersects in the gaze of human beings⁴, i.e. the reflections of the material fragment of reality,

¹ M. Mendel, *Wstęp* [Introduction], [in:] *Pedagogika miejsca* [Place-based Education], M. Mendel (ed.), Wydawnictwo Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej Edukacji TWP we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2006, p. 9.

² M. Foucault, *Of Other Spaces* (1967), *Heterotopias* [online], accessed on: 18.04.2012, available at: <http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html>.

³ M. Ejsmont, B. Kosmalska, M. Mendel (eds.), *Obraz, przestrzeń, popkultura. Inspiracje badawcze w polu pedagogiki społecznej* [Image, Space, Pop-culture. Research Inspirations for Social Pedagogy], Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2007, pp. 169–170.

⁴ Mendel refers to the mirror that Foucault describes both as a utopia and a heterotopia. A mirror is an intersection of the existing, i.e. heterotopia, and the non-existent, i.e. utopia, and the gaze of the person standing in front of it; M. Foucault, *Of Other Spaces...*; M. Ejsmont, B. Kosmalska, M. Mendel (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 170.

and can only be captured by a person who “is-in-place (Heidegger’s “being-in-the-World”) and interacts with it”. Therefore, heterotopias constitute “real places that can only exist socially in the conditions of social interactions and a distanced ‘insight’, which functions, as if in a mirror, on a principle of a twofold look, which moves away and returns to the same spot”⁵.

This multidimensionality of the meanings of places can be observed also in the case of Wrocław Puppet Theatre’s FairyBus, described by Roberto Skolmowski (the executive and art director in the years 2007–2011) as a travelling theatre with its traditions: “For centuries the puppeteers would take their theatres to places where there were no theatres and ‘the FairyBus serves the same purpose’”⁶.

FairyBus: the phenomenon, the firework of the year

The FairyBus is a stage that belongs to the Wrocław Puppet Theatre (WPT), which is housed in a neo-baroque building at Plac Teatralny 4 in Wrocław. The Theatre, apart from its mobile stage, has three permanent stages and a seasonal Summer Stage⁷. Although the WPT owes its name to its puppet performances, its audiences include not only children, but also youths and adults. The children’s repertoire offers adaptations of classic fairy tales (“Little Red Riding Hood”, “The Beauty and the Beast”, “Puss in Boots”, “Cinderella”), children’s literature classics (“The Humpbacked Horse” by Yershov or “Oh, Emil” by Astrid Lindgren), and the theatre’s own performances based on modern plays (some of them written specially for the WPT)⁸.

The FairyBus “is a unique, one of its kind in Europe, mobile theatre stage, which is a replica of the neo-baroque house of the Puppet Theatre. The entire stage area, i.e. the superstructure of the FairyBus, is hand-crafted and amazes with details and the superb representation of the beauty of the original building”⁹. Cutting edge lighting and sound systems contribute to the high mobility of the “stage-vehicle” (making it possible to deliver performances “anywhere”). “This allows the Theatre to both pursue an intensive repertoire policy and simultaneously carry out its social mission”¹⁰. The FairyBus has three stages: “The top stage on the roof, which opens automatically, is where we can perform with puppets” says Skolmowski, “the stage at the back, for marionettes, is where we present the tales

⁵ M. Mendel, *Spółczesność i rytuał. Heterotopia bezdomności* [Society and Ritual. Heterotopia of Homelessness], Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2001, pp. 16–17.

⁶ *O Teatrze* [About Theatre] [online], accessed on: 10.03.2012, available at: <http://www.teatrlalek.wroclaw.pl/index.php/o-teatrze>.

⁷ *Wynajem* [Rental] [online], accessed on: 10.04.2012, available at: <http://www.teatrlalek.wroclaw.pl/index.php/o-teatrze>.

⁸ *O Teatrze* [About Theatre], *op. cit.*, accessed on: 10.03.2012.

⁹ *Bajkobus* [FairyBus] [online], accessed on: 28.02.2012, available at: <http://www.teatrlalek.wroclaw.pl/index.php/separatory/o-bajkobusie>.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, accessed on: 29.02.2012.

about Wrocław dwarves, and there is also the shadow theatre stage"¹¹. The FairyBus is a travelling theatre (it has its own scene), which in the eyes of the director plays an important part in the mission of the vehicle: "This is a journey back to the roots. After all, puppet theatre was created to reach out to the audience. [...] With the technology, with the fact that we do not need anything, that we have everything with us [...] we want Wrocław Puppet Theatre to reach where theatre cannot reach, to children in all of Lower Silesia"¹². Katarzyna Krajewska, the literary secretary of the Theatre, also emphasises the need to search for the audience. Upon Skolmowski's initiative, says Krajewska, the WPT became engaged in a series of educational undertakings (the entertainment aspect was pushed into the background). The workers and the company focused on promoting texts and plays with high educational potential. And thus, "reaching out to persons who do not necessarily seek theatre and not necessarily know it" became one of the priorities¹³. Instead of waiting for the audience, the director and the company chose to step forward, in this case into the urban space, and meet them, and "move the theatre out of the building"¹⁴. What is more, they "appropriated" places that have never before been associated with the theatre as such. This is how the plays outside the WPT stage were conceived, e.g. "Sharks in the pool"¹⁵ at the Wrocław Waterpark or the plays performed at the Nova Stage in the Renoma Department Store¹⁶. This appropriation of space is one of the cornerstones of the FairyBus concept. The basic premise for the FairyBus activities is to deliver plays for children from peripheral areas of the voivodship, from the smallest towns, i.e. for those who do not have the opportunity to participate in the life of the theatre. This is how, at the beginning of its career, the fairy-tale-vehicle travelled to the remote areas of Lower Silesia. The second idea behind the FairyBus was to perform in the heart of Wrocław in order to reach viewers who lacked sufficient financial resources or, using Pierre Bourdieu's phrasing, had limited access to cultural and economic capital, or limited rights to such access¹⁷.

In line with this notion, and following the modern tendencies of placing art at entertainment venues, the WPT created stages outside the theatre house. Based on this premise, the stages were set in designated areas of the Wrocław Zoologi-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, accessed on: 06.03.2012.

¹² *Ibid.*, accessed on: 06.03.2012.

¹³ Respondent 1, *Interview 1 with Katarzyna Krajewska, the Literary Secretary of the Wrocław Puppet Theatre*. Interview carried out by Agnieszka Janik.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ A. Saraczyńska, *Teatr Lalek w Aquaparku: Na ratunek porwanej syrence* [Puppet Theatre at a Waterpark: Rescuing the Kidnapped Mermaid] [online], "Gazeta.pl Wrocław", available at: http://wroclaw.wyborcza.pl/wroclaw/1,35771,7615318,Teatr_Lalek_w_aquaparku__Na_ratunek_porwanej_syrence.html.

¹⁶ See *Wrocławski Teatr Lalek zaprasza [Wrocław Puppet Theatre Invites]* [online], accessed on: 18.02.2012, available at: <http://www.renoma-wroclaw.pl/wroclawski-teatr>.

¹⁷ Respondent 1, *Interview 2 with Katarzyna Krajewska, the Literary Secretary of the Wrocław Puppet Theatre*. Interview carried out by Agnieszka Janik.

cal Garden and Wrocław Waterpark. Also, another stage opened in the Renoma Department Store in Wrocław. Moreover, the FairyBus also overtook the most ancient areas of Wrocław. The plays are performed at the “FairyBus Stops” located around tourist attractions (Fig. 1) such as: the Market Square-Pillory, the Market Square-Kuźnicza, Plac Gołębi, the Cathedral Island, St. Elisabeth church, the Old Town Garden, the Centennial Hall, or the Wrocław Waterpark¹⁸. The selection of the locations is by no means accidental: these sites are heteropias.

On the other hand, the FairyBus serves as a daring example of a marketing campaign. As Krajewska points out, theatres face an increasing competition from a host of cultural and entertainment institutions that, in their majority, operate on commercial basis, e.g. shopping centres and cinemas¹⁹. Thus, the theatre can no longer rely on the group of faithful viewers who will “always be there”. In other words, it is necessary to actively attract viewers, and the FairyBus, according to Krajewska, is “a mobile advertisement for the Puppet Theatre. The FairyBus sends a message that the theatre is open, friendly, and democratic. The FairyBus overcomes barriers”²⁰. The commercialisation of the vehicle is also reflected in its non-gratuitous activities²¹. Still, beyond any doubt, each performance gathers hundreds of viewers and the audience continues to grow. “We do not know if it is because of the theatre vehicle itself” Krajewska comments “but the FairyBus has been declared a phenomenon”²².

The plays performed by the FairyBus represent an extremely important category of heterotopia, in relation to the aspects of place-based education that were the subject of my analysis. The spectacles enter, or “invade”, not only the urban space, but also its traditions, social practices, and legends associated with specific sites. Particular plays are performed in actual places where they are set (e.g. a play

¹⁸ *Bajkobus rozkład jazdy* [FairyBus timetable] [online], accessed on: 06.03.2012, available at: <http://www.teatrlalek.wroclaw.pl/index.php/separador>.

¹⁹ The increasingly heated debate on the commercialisation of public theatres and allowing them to enter the free market is an interesting topic. Actors and companies of Wrocław theatres undertake efforts to counteract the current situation, i.a. by calling upon the audience (e.g. Mariusz Kiljan, actor at the Teatr Polski in Wrocław during the play “Dwadzieścia najśmieszniejszych piosenek na świecie [World’s Twenty Funniest Songs] on 15.03.2012, Small Stage). In this context the activities of the WPT, i.e. the appropriation of commercial spaces by the theatre, gain particular significance. The spectacles performed on the Renoma Stage (from February 2009 to June 2010) were met with a mixed reception by the local community and a negative one on the side of the theatre milieu. The questions of how far should the theatres go to attract clients remains open, see R. Pawłowski, *Teatr to nie produkt...* [Theatre is not a Product...] [online], accessed on: 12.04.2012, available at: http://www.wysokieobcasy.pl/wysokie-obcasy/1,114377,11431304,Teatr_to_nie_produk.html.

²⁰ Respondent 1, *Interview 2...*, *op. cit.*

²¹ While in the remainder of my paper I shall focus on the gratuitous activities of the travelling theatre, including charitable initiatives, it is worth noting that persons who wish to use the services of FairyBus must incur the related costs, such as actors’ remunerations, fuel, technical team, etc.

²² It is also worth adding that while the FairyBus provokes exclusively positive reactions – both in the social and the cultural environment – the theatre performances at the Renoma Stage in the Renoma Department Store, or at the Wrocław Waterpark proved highly controversial and were criticised by the theatre milieu; Respondent 1 *Interview 2...*, *op. cit.*



Fig. 1. FairyBus Stops

Source: <http://www.teatrlalek.wroclaw.pl/index.php/separator> [accessed on: 05.03.2012].

dedicated to the history of Wrocław Cathedral was staged in the Cathedral itself, the story of the Piwnica Świdnicka restaurant was told in front of the entrance). “The FairyBus enters/invades” them, converting them into both the heterotopias of the theatre as such and the heterotopias of the theatre in relation to social and urban problems or matters that are addressed.

The plays presented by the FairyBus can be divided by their subjects into the following four categories:

1. Powrót Mamuta (The Return of the Mammoth);
2. Legendy wrocławskie (Legends of Wrocław);
3. Wrocławskie krasnoludki (Wrocław dwarves);
4. Spacerownik z Bajkobusem (FairyBus walking guide).

One of FairyBus’s key plays is the “Powrót Mamuta” (“The Return of the Mammoth”). This seemingly trifling story about a small animal found by ice-cream makers in a chunk of ice²³ addresses a socially important matter, i.e. the polluting of

²³ *Spektakle Bajkobusu* [FairyBus Plays] [online], accessed on: 06.03.2012, available at: <http://www.teatrlalek.wroclaw.pl/index.php/separator/spektakle>.

urban space (especially parks and green areas) with dog faeces. Agata Saraczyńska wrote bluntly in *"Gazeta Wyborcza"* that it was a "play against dog poop left on the pavement"²⁴. Skolmowski disputed the opinion of the journalist, since for him dog faeces were a pretext for educating the viewer and fighting bad habits using any means available that would effectively reach the target group, which in this case were the children. Skolmowski notes: "Our role is not to install trash bins, but to show that they should be where they are needed, which is everywhere. [...] I am convinced that after seeing our play the children will take better care of their surroundings. [...] We are not saying explicitly that littering is bad, we are just illustrating it. Showing it in a humorous manner is more efficient than a serious, argument-filled discourse [...]"²⁵.

The "Legends Wrocławskie" ("Legends of Wrocław") series represents another important category of plays. They are an adaptation of four novels ("Czarownica z mostka" ["The Witch from the Bridge"], "Dzwon grzesznika" ["The Sinner's Bell"], "Piwniczna opowieść" ["Cellar Story"], and "Opowieść Kamiennej Głowy" ["Stone Head's Tale"]) that present either true or fictitious historical accounts from Wrocław, collected in the form of legends and urban stories. The play was prepared by Mariusz Urbanek and directed by Józef Frymet²⁶. Each of the legends is set in its actual and original location, i.e. a place which is inseparably related to the fate of the protagonists. And so, by watching the "Stone Head's Tale", the viewers will learn of the origins of the mysterious stone head in the wall of the southern tower of the Cathedral, which gave the title to the play. The "Cellar Story" is set next to *Piwnica Świdnicka* (Świdnicka Cellar), one of the most popular restaurants in Wrocław. Meanwhile, "The Witch from the Bridge" and "The Sinner's Bell" transport the audience to the church of Saint Mary Magdalene. It is worth noting that the soundtrack to "Legends of Wrocław" was composed by a popular jazzman, Piotr Baron, and the theatre performances include pyrotechnical effects and stunts²⁷. In this manner random passers-by gain access to art filled with breath-taking effects.

"Spacerownik z Bajkobusem" ("The FairyBus Walking Guide") sheds a different light on educational initiatives of the FairyBus (which I will allow myself to view as the quintessence of FairyBus's activities). It combines elements of a history class, open air theatre play, and a guided tour. It is a folk tale dedicated to the curiosities and the history of the capital of Lower Silesia. It was written by journalists of "Gazeta Wyborcza": Beata Maciejewska (a historian, who appears on the roof of

²⁴ A. Saraczyńska, *Rozmowa z Robertem Skolmowskim, dyrektorem Wrocławskiego Teatru Lalek* [An interview with Roberto Skolmowski, the director of the Wrocław Puppet Theatre] [online], "Gazeta.pl Wrocław", accessed on: 06.03.2012, available at: http://wroclaw.gazeta.pl/wroclaw/1,35771,8013844,Sztuka_wymierzona_w_psia_kupe_zostawiana_na_trawnikach.html#ixzz1o-MfNtobN.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, accessed on: 06.03.2012.

²⁶ *Spektakle* [Plays] [online], accessed on: 03.02.2012, available at: <http://www.bajkobus.za.pl/spektakle.htm>.

²⁷ A. Saraczyńska, *Rozmowa z...* [An interview with...], accessed on: 06.03.2012.

the FairyBus during the performances) and Mariusz Urbanek, who was mentioned earlier. It was directed by Skolmowski. During the show, the audience explores Ostrów Tumski (the Cathedral Island), the oldest part of Wrocław. The places whose meaning the artists and actors of the WPT transform (into heterotopias) include, among others: the Churches of St. Giles and St. Martin, the Cathedral, and Brama Kluskowa²⁸. A story told in this manner becomes attractive for children. As Anna Broniszewska explains: "The theatre vehicle transports the audience into a world of legends and tales of people who once lived in this charming part of the city that sits on the bank of the river Oder"²⁹.

Another important aspect of promoting art and providing access to art among the social strata unequipped with cultural and economic capital is the spatial outreach of the FairyBus phenomenon. Apart from performing locally in Lower Silesia, in 2009 the vehicle started its mission across Poland, and in 2010 it initiated its first foreign travels³⁰. Moreover, this local-patriotic concept, as Broniszewska calls the FairyBus, received media patronage from "Polska The Times – Gazeta Wrocławska", which made it possible to draw several hundred persons to the performances and made its large (or even mass) outreach possible³¹. Statistical data gathered by the WPT also reflect the vast popularity of the initiative. In total, (in the years 2007–2010) the audience of the FairyBus reached 46,270 viewers (in 2007 it was ca. 1,000 persons, 5,390 in 2008, 16,300 in 2009, and 14,580 in 2010), while the "The FairyBus Walking Guide" attracted 2,350 viewers over a course of two months³². The theatrical and social success of the FairyBus was confirmed not only by the massive turnout, but also by the titles and the prizes it collected, such as the "Fajerwerk roku 2008" ("The Firework of the Year 2008"), which was awarded by the press in the category "theatre", or the 2008 Lower Silesia Voivodship Marshal's Award for the Most Important Theatre Event. Additionally, on numerous occasions, the FairyBus participated in the largest events in Wrocław, such as those organised for the Academic Christian Ministry "Maciejówka", the "Wrocławianie na polanie" initiative, or during large charitable events (The Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity 2008–2011, the 2008 Municipal Public Library's initiatives, the 2008–2010 Dreamnights in Wrocław ZOO, the 2009–2010 Long Nights

²⁸ *Spacerownik z Bajkobusem* [FairyBus Walking Guide] [online], accessed on: 11.03.2012, available at: <http://www.teatr-lalek.wroclaw.pl/index.php/separatorspektakle/spacerownik-z-bajkobusem>.

²⁹ A. Broniszewska, *Spacerownik po Ostrowie Tumskim* [Cathedral Island Walking Guide] [online], "Dziennik Teatralny", accessed on: 11.03.2012, available at: <http://www.teatry.art.pl/n/czytaj/22361>.

³⁰ B. Maciejewska, *Bajkobus rusza w świat. Odwiedzi Czechy i Niemcy* [FairyBus Sets Out to the World. It will Visit the Czech Republic and Germany], [online], "Dziennik Teatralny", accessed on: 11.03.2013, available at: http://wroclaw.gazeta.pl/wroclaw/1,35771,7847174,Bajkobus_rusza_w_swiat__Odwiedzi_Niemcy_i_Czechy.html#ixzz1ok3Xmcjg.

³¹ Apart from the Wrocław edition, the news of the timetable or the reviews of the plays were also published in regional editions, e.g. in Zgorzelec and Opole, *Ibid.*, accessed on: 11.03.2012.

³² The activities of FairyBus carried on also throughout 2011 and 2012, but owing to the fact that the WPT discontinued the detailed statistical analyses, the data presented above refers predominantly to the activities carried out up to the year 2010 inclusively, *Bajkobus* [FairyBus], *op. cit.*, accessed on: 10.03.2012.

of Museums at the National Museum in Wrocław, and the 2008 “Voltek” project for children from orphanages in Jelenia Góra)³³.

Theatre’s heterotopia. A desirable social practice

Here I would like to return to the concept of the heterotopia, postulated by Foucault, which I have briefly presented in the introduction. The FairyBus and the idea behind it oppose the vision of theatres as solemn and elitist institutions. Namely, the theatre as such (using the example of the WPT building, Fig. 2) is seen as monumental structure, an imposing hall that demands respect from those who enter, be it through requiring the audience to wear proper dress or expecting their solemn behaviour (the theatre is no place for children). In other words, only certain social groups are allowed go to the theatre, i.e. in the words of Bourdieu, those who were equipped with adequate cultural and economic capital by means of the reproduction of capitals. Meanwhile the FairyBus (Fig. 3) is the theatre’s “other place”, in the form of light entertainment, which does not entail financial expenditures or any prior preparations. It is dedicated to the general public, including also the one that is lacking the funds mentioned above. The FairyBus allows the two worlds to meet/intersect, i.e. the world of the privileged culture vs. the subordinate culture, stability *vs.* mobility, pathos and ceremonialism *vs.* lightness and everyday life, the intellectual class *vs.* the rest of society, theatre for adult audiences *vs.* family theatre, or intent *vs.* randomness. Finally, it confronts art, theatre, and entertainment *with* art, theatre, and entertainment.

I shall now refer to the understanding of the concept of heterotopia proposed by Maria Mendel. Although according to Mendel’s interpretation the heterotopias “phenomenologically happen, therefore they occur, but do not last permanently”, and to “see” them the researcher needs to take the effort of interacting with human beings, who through the creation of their own life narratives “see” themselves and their world, and allow others to perceive these visions³⁴, the social category created by the FairyBus transcends the intersection of the perspectives of the researcher, the culture, and the reality. The FairyBus is not as much located at the intersection of these meanings, as it comes forth to the researcher, like it does to the crowd of random persons (occasionally, to thousands at a time), challenging their current perception and understanding of a place (in the urban space), subjecting their life narratives to a reflection and, in a way, forcing them to reinterpret its dialectical relation with the spaces that shape them, and which they themselves shape as well. Therefore, the FairyBus can be considered a creator of new social practices.

³³ *Ibid.*; J. Bryndza, *Bajkobus bawił przed ratuszem w Jeleniej Górze* [FairyBus in Front of the Jelenia Góra Town Hall], [online], “Gazeta wroclawska”, accessed on: 10.03.2012, available at: <http://www.gazetawroclawska.pl/artyku/161715,bajkowoz-bawil-przed-ratuszem-w-jeleniejgorze,idt.html>.

³⁴ M. Mendel, *Spółczesność i rytuał... [Society and Ritual...]*, p. 17.



Fig. 2. The house of WPT

Source: http://www.rekreacja.wroc.pl/bazy_obiekt.php5?id=102.



Fig. 3. WPT FairyBus

Source: <http://wrocnam.bikestats.pl/520356,Dzien-siedemdziesiaty-siodmy.html>.

Using the language of cultural anthropology, it creates new rituals, such as: forcing the viewers (through the content of the plays, which addresses social taboos, i.e. dog faeces on city lawns) to critically reflect upon the reality perceived in the categories of time, space, people, and the culture, in which all these factors coexist and formulate one another.

I shall briefly refer to Bourdieu's understanding of "capitals". The sociologist sees the cultural capital as a basic factor that determines social stratification. Cultural capital, governed by the rules of accumulation, exchange, and other market principles, contributes increasingly to determining social position and the access to goods and services³⁵. Such capital can be seen as a form of cultural dispositions, which the individuals receive as a part of their own social background, the education they acquire, the class they belong to, or their position in an institution³⁶. In this context, the FairyBus may be seen as an exception that opposes the cultural reproduction through active promotion (the majority of FairyBus performances are free of charge, which implies dissemination and the promotion of theatre activities among the various social and educational strata of Lower Silesia), the appropriation of urban space or the intersection of perspectives of random viewers (the active search for the audience through organising performances on the outskirts of cities and peripheral locations of the Lower Silesian Voivodship being the basic premise of FairyBus's activities), and equipping them with cultural capital, thus becoming a theatre's heterotopia.

Nevertheless, the situation is not as clear as it may seem. With all the benefits the FairyBus offers, it seems appropriate to reconsider how economically viable would all these practices be if it was not for the "mobile advertisement" that carries the message of the friendly theatre. In other words, to what extent is the FairyBus a desirable social initiative that coincides with the critical theories that postulate the emancipation of the mind from the oppression of capitalism and consumption, and to what degree is it a mere neoliberal practice, perfectly in line with the proceedings of the capitalist market? Moreover, it is reasonable to investigate more closely the phenomenon of its mass outreach to the audience. The culturally excluded social elements of Wrocław or city peripheries (and those at risk of exclusion), who have difficult access to high culture, represent the target groups of the FairyBus mission, but only in terms of its initial premises. In practice, the FairyBus visits places that are highly attractive for tourists. This, in turn, poses yet another question: how many persons from dysfunctional families/excluded communities spend their Sunday afternoons at the Market Square or on the Cathedral Island? And also: To what degree can a single theatre spectacle equip a random viewer with cultural capital and encourage them to visit a theatre, if they do not possess the economic capital? The answers seem to be rather obvious.

³⁵ P. Bourdieu, J.-C. Passeron, *Reprodukcja. Elementy Teorii Systemu Nauczania* [Reproduction. Elements of the Theory of the Education System], transl. E. Neyman, PWN, Warszawa 2006, p. 346.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

In this context, also other initiatives undertaken within the wide array of the WPT activities should be brought to one's attention. The Old Town Park (which opened on the 11 September 2010, after over 1.4 hectare of the Copernicus Park, earlier known as the Hanka Sawicka Park was reconstructed) serves as one example. The area is organised so as to resemble the pre-war city garden, with neatly kept lawns, a high, forged fence, and alleyways that follow their 19th century layout, since it was the 1800s Tivoli Gardens that inspired the designers of the garden³⁷. Although the garden is the property of the City of Wrocław, it is most frequently associated with the WPT – mainly owing to its location (from the south it borders with Promenada Staromiejska street, Teatralna street is located to the north, the Proxima building and Promenada Staromiejska street are to the east, while the WPT sets its western boundary)³⁸. Skolmowski is the author of the pre-war design of the garden, which was warmly received and incorporated into the green rhythm of the life of the alleyways³⁹. Additionally, a monitoring system, a 24/7 security service, as well as a fence with a gate that closes at night⁴⁰ to protect the area against vandalism, give the park not only an air of prestige, but also require that a question is asked regarding its hidden function (agenda). The lack of the possibility to cross through the park (the entrance is located only from one side), the playground surrounded by a fence, a merry-go-round “watched-over” by the Gentleman in the Bowler hat (*Pan z Melonikiem*), and wide alleyways flanked with benches, shrewdly suggest: “do not walk on the lawn”, “do not touch”, “do not break”. Additionally, everything is being surveilled by the “big brother”, who efficiently monitors how the (educational) potential of the place is being put to use. In short, the Park invites the citizens of Wrocław to “feel comfortable”, “feel free”, and “have fun”.

Another question that needs to be answered (in the context of the access to cultural capital) is the following: what is, in general, the social background of the children who participate in the theatre initiatives, and in the case of this paper, in those offered by the WPT? It is impossible to answer this question unreservedly. It is not as much the children as the parents or the teachers – who as their care-takers take them to theatres – that constitute the audience of the theatre. The social backgrounds of school groups and individual viewers who attend the available classes and activities are diverse and heterogeneous; theatres gather children both from public and private schools. Moreover, this issue relates to the matter of the promotion of theatre institutions. The media, such as television, radio, or newspapers that have the capacity to reach wide audiences are rarely used to promote theatrical initiatives aimed at primary-school-aged children (except for the FairyBus,

³⁷ *Ogród Staromiejski* [Old Town Garden] [online], accessed on: 09.04.2012, available at: <http://www.teatrlalek.wroclaw.pl/index.php/park-staromiejski>.

³⁸ *Wynajem* [Rental] [online], accessed on: 10.04.2012, available at: <http://www.teatrlalek.wroclaw.pl/index.php/wynajem-sal>.

³⁹ Respondent 1, *Interview...*, *op.cit.*

⁴⁰ *Ogród Staromiejski* [Old Town Garden], *op. cit.*, accessed on: 09.04.2012.

which used inter alia the patronage of “Gazeta Wrocławska”, and was widely publicised particularly in the year 2008). In most cases, theatres use their webpages for promotion, and it is there where they publish the information regarding their on-going educational initiatives. In Wrocław there are plenty of posters and leaflets promoting spectacles and other shows, but those events are not necessarily intended for children. Thus, the conclusion is the following: to learn about a particular type of children-oriented initiatives undertaken by the theatres (WPT), it is necessary to take the effort and actively search for them. Therefore it would seem appropriate to ask, who is likely to make such an effort?

Using Bourdieu’s terminology, this effort will be undertaken by the persons who are interested in theatre and wish to instil this interest in their children. In other words, it is the people with access to cultural capital, i.e. the conscious and competent audiences, who place their knowledge on theatre and the pleasure of using its services high in their hierarchy of values. One can imagine that these are certainly not the parents from impoverished social backgrounds or those who were never interested in the city’s cultural life; those who represent the under-privileged strata with limited or no access to cultural or social capital – to use Bourdieu’s words.

However, let us return to the main subject of this paper. In conclusion, in comparison to other WPT initiatives, or those of other theatres, e.g. Teatr Polski or the Wrocławski Teatr Współczesny im. Edmunda Wiercińskiego (Edmund Wierciński Wrocław Contemporary Theatre), the FairyBus cannot serve as an example of radical emancipatory actions. Nonetheless, I do consider it a desirable social practice in terms of the formation and non-formal education of primary school children (more specifically the cultural education; theatre education in a narrow sense). It constitutes an exception, which stands in opposition to the cultural reproduction and the currently popular ghettoization of the urban space (i.e. the creation of gated communities; the ghettos of the rich and the poor)⁴¹.

Summary

*Theatre’s heterotopia. Invading urban space:
The FairyBus by the Wrocław Puppet Theatre*

Heterotopias, according to Michel Foucault, are perceived as “other spaces”, real places existing in the society (rather than that on the suburbs), which is easy to notice in the case of the FairyBus – the concept of a theatre packed onto a bus, conceived by the Wrocław Puppet Theatre. This article is an attempt at a critical approach to the reality in its cultural dimension. The paper intends to find, expose, and explain the relations between the ac-

⁴¹ B. Jałowicki, W. Łukowski, *Gettoizacja polskiej przestrzeni miejskiej* [Ghettoisation of the Polish Urban Space], Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2007.

tivity of the FairyBus, the transmission of cultural capital (by Pierre Bourdieu), and the location of individuals in the social stratification. In this process, the FairyBus is seen as an example of both a new (and a desirable?) social practice and a way of motivating individuals to reflect critically.

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From Critical Theory of Education to Post-Critical Pedagogy (in the context of the Montessori method)

The critique of critical pedagogy

What seems to be pivotal for critical pedagogy is the relation between social change and disclosure; naming areas of enslavement, oppression, and exclusion, as well as critical reflection regarding educational practices, constitute the imperatives of pedagogical research disguised as critical¹. These scientific investigations, in accordance with the premises mentioned above, expose, name, and critique, or – in other terms – demonstrate how and why educational institutions (or culture, in a broader sense) amputate the mind of the student², and train him/her to fit the roles established by the neoliberal world order³, and reproduce social⁴ and gender⁵ inequalities.

These unmasking activities are indispensable to pedagogy and their cognitive value is inestimable. They represent not only testimony to the sensitivity and the perspicacity of the researchers but furthermore to the paradigmatic maturity of critical pedagogy as a scientific discipline. Simultaneously, it may be worth noting that its conceptual apparatus is becoming increasingly sophisticated, nuanced, and hermetic. Critical pedagogy is becoming a form of intellectual play⁶ while the

¹ J. Wink writes: “To do critical pedagogy in the classroom, we must first stop and critically reflect upon the educational processes that we are living and perpetuating daily”. J. Wink, *Critical Pedagogy: Notes from the Real World*, Longman, New York 1997. Cf. T. Szkudlarek, *Po co nam dziś pedagogika krytyczna?* [What Do We Still Need Critical Pedagogy for?], [in:] H. Giroux, L. Witkowski, *Edukacja i sfera publiczna. Idee i doświadczenia pedagogiki radykalnej* [Education and Social Sphere. Radical Pedagogy Concepts and Experiences], “Impuls”, Kraków 2010.

² D. Klus-Stańska, *Mitologizacja transmisji wiedzy, czyli o konieczności szukania alternatyw dla szkoły, która amputuje rozum* [Mythologisation of Knowledge Transfer. On the Need to Seek Alternatives for a School that Amputates the Mind], “Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji” [“The Problems of Early Education”] 2008, nr 2 (8), pp. 35–44.

³ E. Potulicka, J. Rutkowiak, *Neoliberalne uwikłania edukacji* [Neoliberal Entanglements of Education], “Impuls”, Kraków 2010.

⁴ P. Bourdieu, J. C. Passeron, *Reprodukcja: elementy teorii systemu nauczania* [Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture], PWN, Warszawa 2006.

⁵ It needs to be added that feminist pedagogy does not focus exclusively on the critical approach to the *status quo*, but also offers certain solutions.

⁶ P. Zamojski, *Utrzymywanie się w żywiole myślenia jako zadanie pedagogiki* [Staying in the Realm of Thinking as the Task of Pedagogy], A paper delivered during the conference: “Kondycja Pedagogiki – dzisiaj. Kontynuacja, inspiracje i wyzwania pedagogiczne z perspektywy Gdańskiej” [“The State of Pedagogy Today. Continuation, Inspirations, and Challenges from Gdańsk’s Perspective”], University of Gdansk, 06.05.2005.

project of a revolution – which it was supposed to contribute to – has turned into a kind of opium of the intellectuals⁷.

However, the process at work is aberrant in character. On the one hand, this can be explained by the fact that the critical theory of the first and the second generation of the Frankfurt School has defined certain forms of individuals' enslavement by the structure. These forms in question, from today's perspective, had an easily identifiable character. Owing to the above, critical theory – and critical pedagogy along with it – unmasked areas and manifestations of the structure's oppression, all the while maintaining their transformative potential through communicability to various actors of the educational and, in a broader sense, social reality.

In search of different/further dimensions of exclusion, identity building, or oppression, the subsequent generations of critically-oriented social researchers turned to deeper, more shrouded and camouflaged forms of violence, which had to result in the use of a more sophisticated conceptual apparatus. The paradox of this situation comes in the form of tension between the search for ever more perfected methods of studying oppression and the loss of communicability with a more general public, resulting in the reduction of the transformative potential of critical pedagogy. This moment necessitates the first question into the very aim or goal of scientific investigations undertaken by "certain" critical researchers. One of the hypotheses can be briefly described using a metaphor: "revolution as opium of the intellectuals", or: the radical transformation of schools as the opium of critical pedagogues. It is a situation in which the said opium/catchphrase not only becomes an irrelevant *cliché*, but also intoxicates and thus weakens the critical approach to one's own efforts (including those of a scientific nature)⁸. The researcher distances themselves from the very subjects they were supposed to aid, and entrenches themselves within the confines outlined by a given discourse society⁹, whose task "is to maintain or create discourses, but only so that they circulate in a confined space [...]"¹⁰.

The second question that should be posed, refers to the manners in which we may understand the goal of the process of education. In his book titled *Pytanie o cel kształcenia – Zaproszenie do debaty* [The Question of the Goal of Education. An Invitation to a Debate]¹¹, Piotr Zamojski addresses this issue. The author puts forward a suggestion of approaching the goal in a tripartite manner. The first two approaches perceive the goal as something external to actions. "The goal is a descrip-

⁷ R. Aron, *Opium intelektualistów* [The Opium of the Intellectuals], Muza, Warszawa 2000.

⁸ E. Domańska points to the same issue while describing the conflict between the American Marxists and the representatives of the so-called French Theory. The Marxists claim that "it [i.e. the French Theory] converted specific social problems into debates set around texts, having reduced the idea of the conflict to a metaphor, while the 'class, racial, or gender conflict' was substituted by conflicts between texts". E. Domańska, *Co zrobił z nami Foucault?* [What did Foucault Do to Us?], [in:] *French Theory w Polsce* [French Theory in Poland], E. Domańska, M. Loba (eds.), Wyd. Poznańskie, Poznań 2010, pp. 66–67.

⁹ M. Foucault, *Porządek dyskursu* [The Order of Discourse]. The opening lecture at College de France on 2 December 1970, *słowo/obraz/terytoria*, Gdańsk 2002.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹¹ P. Zamojski, *Pytanie o cel kształcenia – Zaproszenie do debaty* [The Question of the Goal of Education. An Invitation to a Debate], Wydawnictwo UG, Gdańsk 2010.

tion of an ideal order of things, towards which and because of which we undertake a given activity"¹². This tendency of thinking about the goal has two varieties that differ in terms of the attainability of this goal. In a situation where "such an ideal order is impossible to attain [...], we are bound by utopian finalism"¹³, whereas if such an ideal order of things could indeed be turned into reality, we would rather refer to "eschatological finalism"¹⁴.

It is worth noting that in accordance with the aforementioned forms of finalism, education prepares for a world that is yet to be. Therefore, the goal is something external, an entity that is separate from the *subiectum*. Approaching the goal is this way (especially in its utopian variant) is precisely characteristic of (but perhaps not limited to) critical pedagogy¹⁵.

Processism¹⁶, on the other hand, offers a radically different way of thinking about the goal of education. In this approach, the goal is perceived as the sense of the action¹⁷. The author writes:

The goal understood as something that happens (that which proceeds) cannot be considered in isolation from the action, within which it occurs. The goal always happens within some action, and cannot be separated from it¹⁸.

In this approach, the setting of a goal for a pedagogical action is a sense-ification of an interaction occurring between the participants of the education process. It represents the rationality, or the horizon of that action. This line of thinking about the goal of education ceases to be a mere set of instructions, whose purpose is to direct towards some defined, achievable point¹⁹ (which, to a certain extent, coincides with eschatological finalism, as well as with the premises of conservative and liberal pedagogy), nor does it constitute a utopian vision of a better World (utopian finalism), characteristic for critical pedagogy²⁰. We consider that processism, as a principle of thinking about the goal of education, should be approached as a **post-critical** perspective, which allows for pedagogical designs and actions that, on one the hand, will be inspired by critical pedagogy (whose premises we perceive our own horizon of actions) and, on the other hand, will be capable of overcoming its impotence, which we have described above.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 301–302. Emphasis added by the author.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

¹⁵ This concept has been recently developed by Zamojski in, inter alia, a paper on the relation between philosophy and education. See: P. Zamojski, *Educational Theory as Rationality of Action. Towards a Post-critical Relation Between Philosophy and Educational Practice*, A lecture delivered on the 9 June 2012 during the conference titled "The Second Biennial International Theorising Education Conference" – University of Stirling, Scotland.

¹⁶ P. Zamojski, *Pytanie...* [The Question...], p. 312 and further.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ P. Zamojski, *Educational...*

²⁰ *Ibid.* Also see: I. Gur-Ze'ev, *Toward a Non-repressive Critical Pedagogy*, "Educational Theory" 1998, 48/4; G. J. J. Biesta, *Say you Want a Revolution... Suggestions for the Impossible Future of Critical Pedagogy*, "Educational Theory" 1998, 48/4.

Provided that the goal of the process of education constitutes the **horizon** of a given didactic system, which is understood as: “the entirety of organisational principles, the content, the methods and the means of teaching-learning that form an internally coherent structure [...]”²¹, it is necessary to point out that the question regarding the goals should be the **first and ever present** question that determines the selection of the content, the methods, and the didactic means in every pedagogical activity.

Dialectics²² as a rationality of pedagogical activities. Towards post-critical pedagogy

Should our proposition ever be considered as sort of a didactic system, firstly it would be appropriate to define a logic that would be consistent with the processualist understanding of the goal of education, then to focus on the content, the methods, and the means of teaching and, eventually, on the teacher, so as to create an internally coherent structure of education. The didactic system that we present is based on the dialectics proposed by Moacir Gadotti²³, in agreement with which education

attempts to capture the connection, unity and movement that engender, oppose and make the contradictory elements clash, that break them or surpass them²⁴.

Such education must, therefore, be characterized by four principles. The first one is **totality** – meaning that all the elements of the world are interconnected and they should not be considered in isolation, but, as the author puts it, in their concrete totality. The second characteristic is **movement**, which in this case is seen as an immanent quality of all the dimensions of the reality. This premise is the rebirth of Heraclitus’s *pantha rei* concept. All the elements of the reality are not only interlinked, but also perpetually moving and undergoing **changes** (the third premise). The last premise refers to the contrasts seen as a game of **contradictions**. A contradiction – writes Gadotti – is the fundamental law of a dialectic education²⁵.

When discussing the structure of any given didactic system we have postulated that the goal of the educational process effects that system continuously at

²¹ Cz. Kupisiewicz, *Podstawy dydaktyki ogólnej* [The Basics of General Didactics], PWN, Warszawa 1974, p. 35.

²² We set aside the semantic differentiation of this notion, since it is not the purpose of this presentation. We also do not refer to the critique against the dialectic logic from e.g. the perspective of formal logic.

²³ M. Gadotti, *Pedagogy of praxis. A dialectical philosophy of education*, State University of New York Press, New York 1996. Polish literature on the subject of the dialectical concept of education also exists; however, its understanding differs from the one we wish to present in this paper. See e.g. R. Łukaszewicz, *Dialektyczna koncepcja kształcenia* [Dialectical Concept of Education], Wyd. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 1983.

²⁴ H. Lefebvre, *Formal Logic, Dialectical Logic*, Civilizacao Brasileira, bmv, 1975; quoted from: M. Gadotti, op. cit., p. 21.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

every level. At this point, we present a hypothesis where, in a processualist interpretation, it is the goal of education that can be portrayed through the qualities used to describe dialectic education in Gadotti's approach. The totality of the goal of education is reflected in the notion of the rationality of actions. "The thinking in which we act"²⁶ is omnipresent in pedagogical activities in a sense that it constitutes a form of a filter or a lens, without which it is impossible to act reasonably.

A goal understood in this way is, of course, mobile. It rather **happens** than **is**. Sense-ifying actions, i.e. setting a goal – as Heidegger himself puts it – "[...] itself is a way. We respond to the way only by remaining underway"²⁷. This mobility of the goal is linked to its transformability.

Therefore, the transformability, imposed by non-algorithmic educational situations, which we face as pedagogues, must imply a qualitative change of the goal under specific conditions, in an interaction with a specific person, and in an interpretation of a specific event.

This redefining takes places when the meaning of an action that we temporarily recognise meets with the meaning of an action of other participants of the interaction. This, however, is not a simple substitution of the teacher's goal with that of their student's (as some champions of anti-pedagogy or the representatives of certain liberal pedagogy currents would wish) or vice-versa (transmission pedagogy). It is more an issue of the creation of a jointly recognised sense that transcends particular senses.

Referring back to the didactic system that we have defined earlier and the qualities of a dialectical education, we need to address the content of the process of education, the methods, and the didactic means it implies. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to begin with a caveat.

As Dorota Klus-Stańska indicates, there are times when the process of education in didactics is understood through methods, which points to the difficulty/impossibility of transformation on the level of the concept of a human being (here: the student and the teacher)²⁸. In other words, it is the methods, the content, and the didactic means that are mobile, whereas what remains immutable (and let us add: static) are the goals of education and their underpinning concepts of an individual. Therefore, modifications of the methods, the content, and the means serve exclusively the purpose of reaching the pre-established goals of education (which are external to the process itself).

In an attempt to avoid such a reduction, we emphasise once more the manner of understanding of the goal of education that we assume. If the didactic proposal we present in this paper is to be an internally coherent intellectual structure, we cannot afford to build it exclusively (or even predominantly) through changes on the level of the methods, the content, and the means.

²⁶ P. Zamojski, *Myslenie, w którym działamy (przeciw kawitacji mitycznej ogólności pedagogiki)* [The Thinking in Which We Act (Against the Cavitation of the Mythical Generality of Pedagogy)], "Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny" 2005, nr 4 (198).

²⁷ M. Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York 1968, pp. 168–169.

²⁸ D. Klus-Stańska, *Dydaktyka wobec chaosu pojęć i zdarzeń* [Didactics in the Face of Chaos of Terms and Events], Żak, Warszawa 2010, p. 106 and further.

Occasionally, the contents of education are defined as basic skills and the information that the students are expected to acquire during their stay at school²⁹. This implies that they have already been established, closed, and remain objective in reference to the subject that attempts to comprehend them. Clearly, such an interpretation of the content does not conform to our conception of education.

The contents of education is not a set of information that needs to be acquired (although, of course, information is indispensable), but rather represents the procedures of handling the information³⁰.

This interpretation of the content implies certain didactic methods. In this case, also the definition proposed by e.g. W. Okoń³¹ does not seem to be in line with the didactic concept that we describe. In this case, we would need to consider as a method the creation of a learning environment in which the student would have the possibility to construct and reconstruct their knowledge using didactic means, which provide such a possibility³². "Although in the traditional approach the didactic means served to illustrate the content, within the framework of the interactive-cognitive concept, these means serve rather to manipulate, transform, and experiment with this content"³³. We believe that this aligns with what J. Kruk calls an open-ended didactic aid³⁴.

As can be seen in the considerations above, our didactic proposal is neither our own, nor is it new. The reader, who will quickly notice its conformity with the constructivist vision of education, may ask the following question:

What should differentiate the supposedly post-critical pedagogy from the well-known constructivism-based pedagogy?

Our aim is, after all, not to side with **some sort of** constructivism, but to openly identify ourselves with the critical-emancipatory version³⁵ and, let us add, build a positive didactic project.

The last question that remains is: what teacher could implement such a didactic idea? It seems that it would be a person who gives meanings to their actions, who does not avoid controversial social, moral and political issues³⁶. Such educa-

²⁹ Cz. Kupisiewicz, *Podstawy dydaktyki ogólnej* [The Basics of General Didactics], Warszawa 1976.

³⁰ D. Klus-Stańska, *Konstruowanie wiedzy w szkole* [Constructing Knowledge at School], Wyd. Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, Olsztyn 2000, p. 95 and further.

³¹ W. Okoń, *Zarys dydaktyki ogólnej. Wersja programowana* [The Outlines of General Didactics. The Programmed Version], PZWS, Warszawa 1970, p. 194. The author writes: "A method is a systematically applied manner in which the teacher and student work and that enables the student to acquire knowledge along with the capacity to use it practically, as well as developing skills and intellectual pursuits".

³² J. Kruk, *Przestrzeń i rzeczy jako środowisko uczenia się* [Space and Objects as a Learning Environment], [in:] *Pedagogika wczesnoszkolna – dyskursy, problemy, rozwiązania* [Early Education. Discourses, Problems, and Solutions], D. Klus-Stańska, M. Szczepka-Pustkowska (eds.), Wyd. Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2009, p. 487 and further.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 496.

³⁴ See: J. Kruk, *Dziecko w świecie przedmiotów: studium projektowe pomocy dydaktycznych* [Child in the World of Objects: Design Study of Learning Aids], "Impuls", Kraków 2002.

³⁵ *Pedagogika wczesnoszkolna – dyskursy, problemy, rozwiązania* [Early Education. Discourses, Problems, and Solutions], D. Klus-Stańska, M. Szczepka-Pustkowska (eds.), Wyd. Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2009.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

tion would require “[...] the teachers to possess intellectual-reconstructive competencies and pedagogical boldness”³⁷. H. Giroux quite accurately describes the idea of the teacher as a transformative intellectual³⁸.

Montessori pedagogy as post-critical pedagogy?

Our attempt to interpret the achievements of the famous Italian in the framework of post-critical pedagogy may seem rather audacious. The first challenge is, as the authoress herself phrased it, the origin of the method.

Firstly, the Montessori method is rooted in the New Education movement and is sometimes associated with the romantic current of liberal pedagogy, i.e. the pedagogy that was vehemently criticised by the representatives of the New Sociology of Education.

Secondly, the method is accused of focusing on motor and sensory development, i.e. those key competences that are part of critical pedagogy, when children acquire knowledge about the world³⁹.

Thirdly, the limited freedom proposed by Montessori is an artificially prepared learning environment in which the student cannot fully decide on how to manipulate their developmental material, and thus, is deprived of the opportunity to act spontaneously, rendering the declared freedom of choice an illusion.

Finally, on some occasions Montessori’s excessive faith in psychological associationism is brought to attention. The conviction that all the complex mental acts arise through associations⁴⁰ is a factor which cannot be defended in any way from the constructivist standpoint.

Naturally, the above list is not exhaustive and it could easily be extended with more arguments. Still, although we do not intend to devise counterarguments, we would like to note that they remain valid exclusively within a certain manner of understanding of a pedagogical text.

Jolanta Kruk, when addressing the issue of the understanding of texts⁴¹, pointed to the fact that the vast majority of her respondents considered texts to be “a closed and complete form of written or spoken statement”. Such understanding of a text is not only a certain narrowing⁴², but also, in a way, blocks its interpretation. The dominance of unambiguousness, manifested in the pursuit of definite

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

³⁸ H. Giroux, *Teachers as intellectuals – Toward a Critical Pedagogy of Learning*, Bergin & Garvey Inc., Westport, Connecticut – London 1988, p. 121 and further.

³⁹ See e.g. S. Hessen’s critique of Montessori. S. Kot, *Historia wychowania* [The History of Education], vol. 2, Zak, Warszawa 1995, p. 338.

⁴⁰ B. Nawroczyński, *Zasady nauczania* [The Principles of Teaching], ed. 3, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1961, p. 181.

⁴¹ Kruk, *Pedagogiczne znaczenie rozumienia tekstu – między jednoznacznością a interpretacją* [The Pedagogical Significance of Understanding Texts: Between Unambiguousness and Interpretation], doctoral thesis under the supervision of J. Rutkowiak, Gdańsk 1997, p. 202.

⁴² Taking into account e.g. the observations of P. Ricoeur. See. P. Ricoeur, *Język, tekst, interpretacja: wybór pism* [Language, Text, Interpretation: Selected Writings], PIW, Warszawa 1989.

uncovering of the idea of the author⁴³, destroys the chances for its contextualisation⁴⁴ in a given place and the historical moment.

To put it slightly differently, the “dialogue” with the thought of an author or the critique of their texts functions, as Wanda Frankiewicz observes, on the level of applying theory in practice – in which the theory is evaluated based on its universalistically understood veracity⁴⁵.

Both Frankiewicz and Kruk demonstrate that interaction with a text can occur in a radically different manner⁴⁶. Although one cannot put what the first authoress defines as an inspiration on a par with what the latter calls an interpretation, both of them share the idea once expressed by B. Skarga:

One needs a master not to obey them throughout their entire life, or to sustain the master’s solemnity at all times even against the pervading facts of a new reality, but rather to be able to surpass them. Once one learns what the masters taught, one should rebel and move on⁴⁷.

Therefore, we treat the texts of Maria Montessori as an inspiration, which we critically interpret in each pedagogical act. We believe that this interaction with the text of the Italian pedagogue opens the possibilities of its post-critical lecture.

From the idea to practice (step one) or the piling up of problems and doubts

The intention of this part of the paper is to describe the educational practices in which we participate, the practices whose horizon is the didactic concept outlined above. At this point we would also like to share with the reader our doubts and dilemmas – both normative and those related to realisation. Nonetheless, we do not venture to offer a conclusive perspective of the presented educational reality. We rather see this section of the article exclusively as an invitation to think together, as an exercise in “weak thought”⁴⁸. This way of thinking, therefore, ought to be preceded with a description of the perspective from which we express our opinion.

⁴³ J. Kruk, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

⁴⁴ J. Rutkowiak, *Uczenie się w warunkach kultury neoliberalnej: kontestowanie jako wyzwanie dla teorii kształcenia* [Learning in Neoliberal Cultural Conditions: Dissent as a Challenge for Education], [in:] E. Potulicka, J. Rutkowiak, *Neoliberalne uwikłania edukacji* [Neoliberal Entanglements of Education], “Impuls”, Kraków 2010.

⁴⁵ W. Frankiewicz, *Naśladowanie – stosowanie – inspiracja – jako możliwe odmiany dialogu z pedagogiką Celestyna Freineta* [Mimicking – Applying – Inspiration as Possible Types of Dialogue with Célestin Freinet’s Pedagogy], [in:] *Pytanie, dialog, wychowanie* [Question, Dialogue, Education], J. Rutkowiak (ed.), PWN, Warszawa 1992; also see: M. Szuksta, M. Mendel, *Współczesne tendencje w nauczaniu inspirowane metodami M. Montessori, C. Freineta, R. Steinera* [Contemporary Trends in Teaching Inspired by Montessori, Freinet, Steiner], Iwanowski, Płock 1995.

⁴⁶ Cf. L. Witkowski, *Wyzwania autorytetu* [The Challenges for Authority], “Impuls”, Kraków 2009.

⁴⁷ B. Skarga, *Przegląd filozoficzno-literacki* [Philosophy-Literature Review] 2007, nr 3–4 (18), <http://www.pfl.uw.edu.pl>, accessed on 27.05.2012.

⁴⁸ G. Vattimo, *Dialektyka, różnica, myśl słaba* [Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought], “Teksty Drukie” 2003, nr 5.

We are English teachers at a private language school. We work with children, youth, and adults on different levels of linguistic proficiency.

The primary dilemma of our practice is described by the notion of **linguistic genocide**⁴⁹. The principle arguments in favour of teaching the English language (especially at schools established specifically for that purpose) were, and continue to be, the subject of critique for the representatives of the critical linguistics⁵⁰, who deem them to represent the hegemonisation and neo-colonisation of the culture of specific groups of persons – in our case it is the students, whose voice remains unheard, as it does not operate in the school's preferable code. Here, in slight contrast to B. Bernstein⁵¹, the code determines the belongingness to the English language culture. Following this reasoning, we should recognise our work as a colonising practice, and we should see ourselves as operating in the roles of functionaries of the Centre⁵².

The above-mentioned dilemma is also linked to another issue, which is the non-egalitarian nature of the school. Perhaps it is precisely here where the representatives of the privileged social groups move even further away from the peloton of those in a rush for success and position. If this is so, then the teachers who work here could be, in fact, perceived as persons supporting divisive processes.

Furthermore, being a private entity, in order to exist, the language school must generate profit. This, in turn, may result in organising actions so as to please particular interested parties. For students, for instance, these could include classes organised along the lines of "here I am – amuse me", i.e. a form of an easy and simple entertainment or, in a different scenario, classes aimed at building the careers of particular individuals.

In other words, they would represent education saturated with the qualities marking learning in the neoliberal context, thence and therefore filled with instrumentalism, polarisation, unilaterality, simplification, infantilism, and passivisation⁵³.

On the other hand, for the parents this would mean observable effects in the form of the "improvement" of grades at the schools the students attend, scoring a larger number of points on subsequent external exams, or obtaining specific certificates to confirm a given level of linguistic proficiency, which would also conform to the hypothesis on the "educational programme of the corporate economy", characteristic of neoliberalism⁵⁴.

⁴⁹ The term "genocide" was coined by Rafał Lemkin, by coupling the Greek *genos* with Latin *cidium*. The complementary word *linguistic* was added by the critically-oriented linguists. See e.g. R. Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism*, Oxford University Press, 1992; A. Canagarajah, A. Suresh, *Resisting Linguistic Imperialism in English Teaching*, Oxford University Press, 1999.

⁵⁰ In this case we think of e.g. R. Phillipson. R. Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism*...

⁵¹ B. Bernstein, *Odtwarzanie kultury* [Cultural Reproduction], PIW, Warszawa 1990.

⁵² On this side, we should also add that the problem of the English colonisation of other languages also touches the academic milieu in which a Polish author writes a paper on a famous Polish pedagogue for a Polish journal intended exclusively for Polish readers in... English. On the surface it may seem that the only goal of this practice is to accumulate more points, but the players in this game are the members of the academia, and the game itself is a manifestation of linguistic imperialism.

⁵³ J. Rutkowiak, *Uczenie się w warunkach kultury neoliberalnej...* [Learning in Neoliberal Cultural Conditions...], pp. 165–166.

⁵⁴ J. Rutkowiak, *Czy istnieje edukacyjny program ekonomii korporacyjnej?* [Does the Educational

In an attempt to face the challenges that were indicated above (which have been inevitably selected⁵⁵) we were forced to specify our intersubjective normativity. This is because we consider acting as the functionaries of the colonising Centre unacceptable. J. W. Goethe is reported to have said that “those who know nothing of foreign languages, know nothing of their own”⁵⁶. In Goethe’s statement it is possible to find the argument that taking away the students’ chance to learn the English language means, in fact, depriving them of the opportunity to use certain elements of the symbolic culture of the contemporary World, regardless of our opinion of it. Zbigniew Kwieciński, while presenting the potential of the category of “lack”, and simultaneously referring to P. Bourdieu, offered a distinction between the “taste of freedom” and the “taste of necessity”⁵⁷. The “taste of freedom” is the true choices typical of the middle class, which are based on the possibility to perceive the spectrum of opportunities (and understandings) of the day-to-day existence, while the “taste of necessity” “can only be defined in the negative, in terms of a lack, through the unavailability of other lifestyles”⁵⁸. Getting acquainted with the English language as a certain area of symbolic culture would, in this case, (also) represent the attainment of the cultural literacy indispensable for a critical view of the world and to make the possible changes⁵⁹, i.e. potentially developing the taste for freedom.

Moreover, the students’ voice – often drowned out during English classes at their schools – is mediated through the cultural illiteracy in this respect. In this context, our actions may be seen as giving the students the opportunity to express themselves, in a way, from within the discourse. We do assume, in fact, that change in the symbolic culture of the school is possible exclusively from the inside, i.e. in order to change or challenge the meaning of the rules of the game, one needs to know them. This is all the more so since over 70% of the participants of our classes are not the leaders of the race, but rather the tired, hard-peddalling cyclists at

Programme of Corporate Economics Exist?), [in:] E. Potulicka, J. Rutkowiak, *Neoliberalne uwikłania edukacji* [Neoliberal Entanglements of Education], “Impuls”, Kraków 2010, p. 33.

⁵⁵ At this point we withdraw from characterising other problems, one of which is the school. The students that attend our classes, who are tamed to conform to the culture of silence and passive reception, initially face enormous difficulties in “finding their place” in situations that require participation in the process of education (and its planning). They do not know how and often are unable to take responsibility for their learning, which inevitably results in various educational and didactic issues. Another problem is the uninterrupted period of student’s independent activity, which M. Montessori advises to extend to at least 3 hours, as only such a period of individual exploration will initiate spontaneous forms of students’ activity. Maintaining such working time in the conditions, which we have described earlier (the specificity of the functioning of language schools, i.e. offering afternoon, extracurricular classes; the imperceptible grip of neoliberalism, etc.) is somewhat difficult.

⁵⁶ <http://quotationsbook.com/quote/22375>, accessed on: 14.09.2012.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Z. Kwieciński, *Między patosem a dekadencją. Studia i szkice socjopedagogiczne* [Between Pathos and Decadence. Socio-pedagogical Studies and Essays], Wyd. Naukowe DSWE TWP, Wrocław 2007, p. 143.

⁵⁹ H.A. Giroux in an interview with Manuela Guilherme formulates a similar argument: global citizenship requires not only the capacity to understand the language of the new technologies and to search for information, but also the ability to display trans-boundary commitment, learn, understand, and take responsibility for the matter of differentness and diversity. H.A. Giroux, *On Critical Pedagogy*, Continuum, New York 2011, p. 170.

the back of the peloton⁶⁰. To stop or turn the peloton around, they need to become the key players in the game – thus their voice will be harder to ignore. To put it differently, we see the chance for a transformation in the macro context, through changes on the micro level, and only from within the game. In any other case, their voice will be reduced to an insignificant *gobbledygook*.

Different interests intersect at our school – as in every other educational establishment we work for – which implies the goals of the actions undertaken at the school also vary. We believe that the economic rationality of this institution is but one of the many horizons of its activities. Of course, its emancipatory, empowering function can stand in opposition to the said economical aspect. Although this may pose difficulties, it does not preclude the realisation of actions that we believe have such potential. Recognition of the primacy of the economical aspect, as the dominant rationality, would block all our activities. To acknowledge that the school determines every action that takes place within its premises and becomes a catalyst for its hegemony, would mean to surrender without a fight. However unsteadily substantiated, our **faith** does not allow us to passively accept such a possibility. In other words, we would describe the relation between the school and the actions taking place within it as contingent but not necessary⁶¹.

From the idea to practice (step two): a snapshot from the practice

The background, whose outline we wish to present here, depicts one of the series of classes we co-organise for younger students, although in terms of age the group is heterogeneous. When planning these classes we were inspired by both by the fragment of Maria Montessori's concept – i.e. the so-called “cosmic education”⁶² – and the English language teaching methodology based on the CLIL⁶³ approach. Nevertheless, it was the example of the French language teacher Joseph Jacotot⁶⁴, described by J. Rancière, that became our key guideline. Rancière is interesting to us in a twofold manner.

When entering into a debate concerning the deterministic and overpowering perspective taken by a significant number of the representatives of the New Sociology of Education, Rancière proposes not to assume that equality (utopian finalism as the goal of education) is something that may be achieved in an indeter-

⁶⁰ Based on the authors' own research.

⁶¹ Otherwise, any internal resistance would be futile.

⁶² We would like to direct any readers interested in this matter to: M. Montessori, *The Montessori Method*, Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York 1912.

⁶³ *Content Language Integrated Learning* is an approach where specified aspects of the surrounding reality become the content of the classes, e.g. biology or geography, which are then imparted in the foreign language. The foreign language is not the content but a medium for learning the World. Thus, this approach integrates the foreign language with a given “object”. See e.g. D. Lasagabaster, J.M. Sierra, *Language Attitudes in CLIL and Traditional EFL Classes*, “International CLIL Research Journal” 2009, vol. 1(2), www.icrj.eu/12/article1.html, accessed on: 27.09.2012.

⁶⁴ J. Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster – Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 1991.

minate future. Such an understanding of equality builds a distance between the enlightened teacher and the still-ignorant student⁶⁵.

However, the moment equality becomes the horizon for our actions, when it is put into practice (the post-critical, processism-rooted understanding of the goal), thus emancipatory pedagogy becomes possible.

Moreover, it is necessary to create conditions in which both the teacher and the students are faced with the same educational challenges – or in other words – share the same ignorance. This was the case of the said teacher. He did not know their language, they did not know his. In this linguistic situation “Explication is not necessary to remedy an incapacity to understand. On the contrary, that very incapacity provides the structuring fiction of the explicative conception of the world. It is [precisely] the explicator who needs the incapable and not the other way around”⁶⁶.

In our case, the natural history of the world, being the content of the cosmic education, has become such structuring fiction⁶⁷. We, who do not know the natural history, need each other to explain significant moments in the history of the Earth, and in this sense, we are on a par in our ignorance. In our case, the natural history of the world, being the content of the cosmic education has become such structuring fiction.

The classes commence with a deliberation on how the world had come into being. All the members of the group, using methods of looking for information of their choice, collect information and bring to the class their “own” versions of the origins of the planet Earth, which contradict one another. Everybody creates their own story on the creation of the World, using their own code. By collecting all the versions, a circle is created. The teacher also tells one of the stories. Some students do not fully comprehend and ask questions, but the task is difficult – they speak in different tongues. Nonetheless, everyone experiments with the language, since the drive to cognition is stronger than the ignorance in a given field.

The lights go out, and in the meantime someone has inflated a balloon. Others wait in the darkness. Suddenly the balloon pops, spilling out shreds of paper. One of the participants of the class is trying to explain “the Big Bang Theory”. The fiction structuring the conception of the world.

At the beginning there was nothing...

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶⁷ C.D. Kaul, *Manual on Cosmic Education – An Integrated Approach to a Responsible Attitude Towards People and Nature*, MoKa Verlags KG, Tegernsee 2005.

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Two Kinds of Critical Approach Towards Change Among the Academic Staff of Modern Language Faculties at Polish Universities

Change cannot be implemented by force.
Change is a process and does not follow ready-made schemes.
Problems are inevitable and need to be liked.
Establishing a vision too early as well as strategic planning may blind you.
Individual and team activities are equally important.
Neither centralization nor decentralization will work separately.
Relations with a wider environment are necessary.
Every person is a change agent¹.

Introduction

In the light of the above mentioned attributes of change, the presented article attempts to study critically the way in which the community of modern language faculties staff and language education researchers perceives the institutional and paradigmatic change associated with the implementation of the reform that has occurred in higher education². The purpose of this text is to diagnose by means of a survey the situation arising after or during work on adapting syllabuses to the guidelines of the National Qualifications Framework that were introduced by the amendment to the Act of 18 March 2011, on the law on higher education, entering into force on 1 October 2012, and signed on 5 April 2011³. The aim is also to observe whether or to what extent the modifications generated by the reform affect the representatives of this discipline i.e. change the perception of their work, their self-image or the surrounding social and professional conditions. The issue

¹ Based on: M.G. Fullan, *The Complexity of the Change Process*, [in:] *Change Forces: Probing the Depth of Educational Reform*, Falmer Press 1993, pp. 19–41.

² The text discusses the reform that took place at the turn of 2011/2012 [translator's note].

³ J. Jabłkowska, A. Różalski, *Zmiany w ustawach [Amendments to Acts]*, "Kronika. Pismo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego" 2011, No. 2 (124), p. 7.

is specifically noteworthy as this professional group is in a way “double marked” in the current context of change. On the one hand, it may seem privileged due to its high competence in foreign language command, enabling more adroit functioning on the global labour market. The group is in possession of tools that, by principle, allow crossing cultural boundaries, provide a profound insight into the mechanisms of other cultures (through the language), and give a sense of control over international literature in particular disciplines. Considering the purely economic dimension, language competence may also bring profits connected with doing oral and written translations. On the other hand, the current situation of modern language faculties staff might not necessarily be as comfortable. They are commonly regarded as “language engineers”, masters of language and its didactics. Language studies educate humanists – after all, elements of history, cultural studies and literary criticism are part of their curriculum. Yet, in recent decades, characterized by linguistic and cultural turns and thus methodological and paradigmatic breakthroughs, the academic staff of modern language faculties appear primarily as good speakers, experts in foreign language and teachers. However, the flagship language competence, even supported by broad cultural and historical knowledge, has already lost its value on today’s labour market. On this market, which is inevitably under the influence of neoliberal tendencies, this knowledge being merely humanistic is simply considered insufficient. It is hardly surprising, then, that this situation is not very welcomed by representatives of the discipline – especially in the face of the ever-increasing conflict between advocates of the Enlightenment university tradition associated with Kant, emphasizing the role of universal reason and freedom⁴, and those who claim that the 19th century abuse in power of reason led to violence, even if symbolic, and forced the university to undergo neoliberal standardization. Thus, all possible procedures that aim to change the established situation, which produces a quality of education incompatible with the standards adopted today throughout the Bologna process and EU regulations, become a hot button issue. A polemic arises, debating if this quality is worse or simply different. There is a dissonance in beliefs on whether this is a negative phenomenon or simply one necessary to adhere to. Using the words of Tomasz Szkudlarek, who reflects upon the future of education and trends within it, the option of “adhering” may turn out to be a fantasy of education for the masses, while the option of “ignoring” – for the elite⁵. Following Szkudlarek’s thought: we are now witnessing the formation of new divisions resembling the revolutionary creation of a society of knowledge which comprises elites “fleeing from mediocrity” and masses following the new authority, i.e. the EU legislation.

⁴ M. Gdula, *Władza krytyczna i siła wyobraźni* [Critical Authority and the Power of Imagination], [in:] *Uniwersytet zaangażowany. Przewodnik krytyki politycznej* [Engaged University. The Guide to Political Critique], Zespół KP, Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, Warsaw 2010.

⁵ T. Szkudlarek, *Edukacja przyszłości: Tendencje, fantazje i scenariusze* [Education of the Future: Trends, Fantasies and Scenarios], <http://www.instytutobywatelski.pl/2285/komentarze/edukacja-przyszlosci-tendencje-fantazje-i-scenariusze>, accessed on: 31.08.2011.

The profile of contemporary students to a large extent fuels this type of controversy. For several years young recruits of English studies have exhibited disturbing attitudes. As they are people of a new era: competent in media and culture, and often socially capable, they struggle with the education system that still cherishes practices and methods rooted in the past. Many of these young people show great adaptation skills, and therefore, in order to complete formal education, they stop thinking, as the system sends the message that *There is no alternative*. They start to live in a certain schizophrenia between life and their own abilities (as they often already work during studies), versus the knowledge offered at the academy, the method of passing it and the competences that are supposed to guarantee the quality of education, but which are increasingly incompatible with the labour market. Before the higher education reform formally empowers students (since in their opinion they are not properly empowered), and teaches them to construct their own knowledge, students who in the after-school life have already performed social functions that would surprise the older generations, are still startled when they are given the right to voice their opinions in ordinary classes and seminars. Perceived by multigenerational staff as overly emancipated (laptops, choosing faculties, students' rights, etc.), they themselves feel caught in the trap of an education system still reminiscent of the school drill. They are accused of a lack of reflectiveness in their own actions, but at the same time they are not taught or encouraged to be reflexive. According to Ryan, students aspiring to be teachers often try to meet reflection-based tasks that would result in professional learning, change, and self-improvement⁶. This requires immense effort, since, quoting Altrichter: "professional learning is not just an intellectual process (a process of acquisition and application of knowledge), but also a process of practical action in which knowledge is enacted in reflecting and developing a specific action"⁷. Students should therefore be able to translate their ambitions and learning strategies into action, and to implement the *learning by doing* model. This turns out not to be so easy, however, because it entails a complete redefinition of the desired and reinforced competences, including the linguistic ones. This situation is related to the attitude of the academic staff towards change, both in the institutional aspect, and in the new rendition of the content and level of education. This attitude is fundamentally critical: not in action, but, rather, in passive rejection. The two types of critical approach mentioned in the title of this article are to indicate the following two meanings: critical as negating, and critical as radically seeking, or urgently important. The purpose of the discussion presented below is perhaps to reveal which type of criticism is prevalent among the staff of modern language faculties. Following Gdula's suggestion, the question arises: is the critical perspective, if it ever touched the community of modern language faculties staff at all, closed "in a vicious circle of resistance and disclosure" and "giv-

⁶ T. G. Ryan, *The Reflexive Classroom Manager: a Required Pre-Service Mode*, Networks, 2006, vol. 9, issue 1.

⁷ H. Altrichter, *The Role of the 'Professional Community in Action Research'*, "Educational Action Research" 2005, 13(1), p. 11; T. G. Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

ing testimony” or is the community wondering what language to use “to expand areas of freedom”?⁸ Might this community stand a chance to not only distance itself and criticize, but create new solutions in new situations by following the encoded respect for different cultures and otherness, pursuing the Humboldtian idea of a research university that incorporates the researcher’s autonomy and external culture, treating it as a link, not a wedge?

Negative criticism can be justified. It suffices to refer to the scolding article of Ewa Nawrocka in “Gazeta Wyborcza” of 5–6 May 2012, quoting opinions delivered on 18 May 2012, at the University of Gdansk conference “Rage and indignation. Images of revolts in contemporary culture”. Listening to the argument cited by the author, it seems obvious that the intellectual and linguistic level (which is the most outrageous for the staff of language faculties) of young people applying for university language studies is plummeting⁹. What we are facing at university is considered an unwanted bitter fruit of the reform of the lower levels of education, because these schools “produce” graduates who are trained to do tests and to think in a schematic, fragmented and technical way. Those young people are quick, more or less capable, ambitious and adept, but not in the way desired by the humanist academic tradition. This applies to a large extent to the tradition of language education, as the rhetorical education assumptions have been formulated precisely within the language studies framework. Indeed, attempts have been made to help young people to develop the art of expressing themselves, the ability to understand oral and written texts, and the competence to compose and decode texts. The discrepancy between the original assumptions and today’s “consequences” is to be dealt with by language studies lecturers. Perhaps it would be easier to do so if the criticality in the sense of being a *transformative intellectual* (of H. Giroux) was more supported in the community. For the time being though it is only calling for its voice and looking for its place in the language studies faculties. A voice of dissent against reality is heard, but specific actions that could be taken to eliminate or satisfy this dissent are yet to be defined.

The research grounds and method

Curious about the level of this dissent about reality, and also in the name of academic reflectiveness promoted by Ryan, in February and March 2012 I conducted an anonymous diagnostic survey among staff of the modern language and culture faculties of seventeen¹⁰ classical universities in Poland. It concerned the attitude

⁸ M. Gdula, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–222.

⁹ E. Nawrocka, *Na diabla nam taka edukacja?* [What the Deuce do We Need Education for?], “Gazeta Wyborcza” of 5–6 May 2012.

¹⁰ The research covered the following universities: University of Gdansk, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Jagiellonian University in Cracow, University of Warsaw, University of Silesia in Katowice, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University and The

towards the implementation of the National Qualifications Framework for higher education at language faculties and was carried out via the Internet. The obtained results and quoted remarks of respondents show quite clearly, and in a surprisingly emotional way, how difficult it is to reformulate one's beliefs about the academic reality undergoing change. It is not the purpose of this article to assess whether the quoted statements of the respondents are justified or not. No assumptions were made while compiling this survey. Its goal is purely diagnostic and is supposed to show the experiential nature of the attitude towards change, without assessing its advantages or disadvantages. On the other hand, this research was also intended to serve as an example of a thought-provoking activity for teachers who, when answering the questions of the survey, were "requested" to reflect on the situation. Following Lewis's thought: self-examination is a popular trend in contemporary studies on education, as improving and building from within constitute the broadly defined goal of education. As Ryan puts it: "We are committed to questioning in order to examine and improve teaching, our curricula, and ourselves. The teacher-researcher is continually adding to current knowledge and skills by building onto what exists. Often new constructions require significant modification to overcome inertia, existing structures, and established norms"¹¹. What is more, Ryan quotes Lewis, according to whom the reflexive teacher-researcher resembles social constructionists who are always faced with the problem of having to "parenthesize" their substantive claims, distancing themselves from these claims in a way that constantly undermines their legitimacy, in order to foreground the anti-objectivism in judging the world and the self. But such an "outsider stance" towards your own opinions is an enormously powerful (and activating) tool of critical attitude towards your actions and thoughts. It allows for development and active change¹².

In addition to the results of the study given in the form of percentage calculations regarding selected answers in the survey, I will also present the qualitative analysis of respondents' remarks, obtained as comments to specific questions. These are statements that speak for themselves: we have a huge problem and we do not know how to solve it so that everyone is satisfied. Undoubtedly, the presented examples are only a drop in the ocean of issues, but through a certain exposure of resistance to change, they point to the two abovementioned types of critical approach. In spite of the prevalent criticism and indignation, some remarks supplied by teachers let us believe that the necessity of change is well-recognized and accepted. However, the manner of its introduction is deficient, infrastructure facilities are inadequate, and, importantly, teamwork is not welcomed. The concept of key competences, which involve teamwork as well, is at times quite unrecognizable as a theoretical concept.

John Paul II Catholic University in Lublin, University of Wrocław, University of Łódź, University of Białystok, University of Szczecin, Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, University of Opole, University of Zielona Góra, and The University of Rzeszów.

¹¹ T.G. Ryan, *ibid.*, p. 4.

¹² Y. Lewis, *The Self as a Moral Concept*, "British Journal of Social Psychology" 2003, 42(2), p. 231; T.G. Ryan, *ibid.*, p. 4.

Although key competences play a vital part in the democratization and universalisation of education (at the expense of presumed decline in quality), they seem to be a foreign notion to some representatives of the discipline. Nevertheless, certain respondents, however small in number, seem to be ready for change, even if for the time being it exhibits resignation rather than approval and the willingness to act.

Procedure and results of the survey

The attitudes of modern language faculties staff were examined by an anonymous online survey in February and March 2012. A return was obtained from 188 respondents. The selected questions and answers presented below are grouped into two thematic blocks. The first concerns the general attitude to the higher education reform, and the process and elements of institutional change understood as a set of new procedures (5 questions). The second block focuses on the stance towards change in the context of language education research (3 questions)¹³. These questions concerned the assessment of the general situation in language education research in the context of teaching competences, self-perception of the function and position of the modern language faculties staff in the process of the higher education reform, and the most controversial problem in the reform's assumptions: lowering the language competence threshold for candidates and graduates of language studies. The last, summarizing question asks about the respondents' individual attitude to change.

General attitude to reform and institutional change

Criticism towards the implemented reform is revealed in the answers to two of the questions regarding the formulation of objectives and learning outcomes whilst creating syllabuses of academic subjects. These questions and response statistics are shown in two diagrams: Chart 1 and Chart 2.

These charts show that for more than a half of the respondents, the need to adapt to the National Qualifications Framework guidelines was a hindrance and a "time-consuming task, with little substantive meaning". Also the comments placed under these questions indicate a definitely negative attitude of respondents towards the procedure of introducing the National Qualifications Framework in higher education. The criticism is so profound that it reaches even the entire Bologna process and its negative effects that are, according to respondents, already observable. The respondents criticized for instance a lack of appropriate training for employees ("Employees have not been introduced in detail to the objectives and

¹³ The entire questionnaire entitled: *The Process of Implementing the National Qualifications Framework at Classical and Modern Language Faculties*, consisted of 22 questions.

nature of the National Qualifications Framework; we received only rudimentary data, what purpose is it supposed to serve?”).




Chart 1.




Chart 2.

Opinions indicating a high level of criticism were expressed both in stern statements:

What limits academic freedom (not “so-called!”) is the generalized and thus extremely primitive criteria. In addition – reversing the order of operations: the effects are first

described (WHAT A GRADUATE IS SUPPOSED TO KNOW) and then the curriculum that leads to the effects. As you know, effects are something that lies within expertise of glib journalists and PR specialists, and not to academic teachers who give knowledge, the basis of all SKILLS.

The Bologna process, just like the so-called enrolment rates, is definitely negative in the long run, as it results in lowering the level of Polish education (the fact now evident in language studies faculties). Well, I understand that this is a deliberate action aimed at destroying Polish education, because it is common knowledge that stupid people are easier to rule.

as well as in more moderate ones:

The method of implementing the National Qualifications Framework, especially the obligation to create syllabuses during the academic year, makes the new syllabuses a burdensome administrative duty. I have many other duties, I will prepare the syllabus in a hurry and at the last minute.

In many situations the expressed opinions indicate the lack of information for employees and their general confusion in the subject. This problem has already been mentioned above as the absence of training:

I took part in the preparation of the National Qualifications Framework for under-graduate studies in our faculty, and when the tables and charts returned to us from the Institute, they looked completely different. Most of us, including those who work on it, have no idea what is going on, others are happy that they did not have to get involved, the information provided was confusing, and the result in our faculty makes me feel dissatisfied...

There were also comments indicating the inadequacy of reform procedures to the higher education processes, specifically while formulating objectives and learning outcomes in the recommended way:

It complicates a didactic process because it reduces the teacher's formal contribution into copying standard phrases from a template. It's worth consideration whether the term "reform" used here is not a semantic abuse...

It complicates the process, but not because it requires diligence. A lecturer may well be diligent without frames. The suggested learning outcomes are not transferable to academic studies. People used to go to university for knowledge, because the candidate was supposed to possess "skills", i.e. by definition "abilities to apply knowledge and solve problems", and without the "social competence" no one would have been admitted to university.

There were also those statements that forecast the future of the reform concisely and to the point:

Just a short appendix: the reform (if successful) will eliminate trustworthy knowledge and truly profound reflection. We'll be left with titles, degrees and reports (even if nice and orderly).

General lack of information and organizational hindrance in didactic activities during the year seem to be the dominant arguments against the NQF. There is a certain conviction in some statements (albeit less numerous) that if it were not for these difficulties, the procedure itself would make some sense and have a positive aspect. These few opinions suggest that with better process organization, more effective guidance and perhaps more time available, creating syllabuses would not cause so many negative emotions.

It makes sense, generally, but the form of these descriptions is far too complicated, confusing and unclear for the average recipient – only a trained official is able to break through such description.

It is also an opportunity to sort out some things, but I do not think this is the best possible way for such verification.

It is good to reflect on didactic activities, but creating charts does not make this happen. It could be beneficial if it stopped at the stage of determining what knowledge and skills a student should possess after completing a given course.

Only one result from **Chart 1**. allows for a small dose of optimism: over 20% of the answers suggest that the NQF has been an opportunity to verify one's didactic activities and intensify cooperation between academic staff. Similarly – there is the 20% result in **Chart 2**., reflecting an opinion that the NQF was an interesting though time-consuming challenge.




Chart 3.

The next question from the questionnaire indicates, with surprising consequence, a similar percentage of responses showing negative criticism. This time

the question concerned a change in the institutional perspective (whether it is perceived as a progression towards European standards) and in the strictly individual context (whether it is an opportunity to develop one's own competences).

As you can see, again the majority of respondents (over 60%) consider the change to be "yet another set of ineffective procedures". For 20%, however, this is an opportunity to follow European standards, and only 11% of respondents consider the reform to be an opportunity for professional development. The supplied comments confirm the modest score of the last answer, describing the change as follows:

It is the next level of disintegration of the Polish academic culture.

It will radically lower the level of students who will later become teachers.

It also deepens the frustration and desire to leave the Polish academic community.

They [the changes – author's note] will be very effective when it comes to destroying the critical thinking community at universities.

There is one more comment that seems critical: "We follow 'global patterns' blindly and mindlessly". The light in the tunnel, sought in the aforementioned 20% of responses about the perception of change as an opportunity, could shine in the comments such as: "The idea of introducing new models is the most inspiring, the problem is THE WAY IT IS IMPLEMENTED, with the bureaucracy obscuring the meaning of the whole operation; or: On the one hand, it is an opportunity, but with the minimum requirements for the student and lowering the threshold of requirements it becomes ineffective". Obviously the administrative side of the reform obscures its splendour at least for the time being. ("It could have been worse, there are some positive aspects, but basically the reform is defective").

In the group of questions about the general attitude to change caused by the reform, there was also one asking about a new system for submitting research grant applications to the National Science Centre. This is one of the few questions that received the highest percentage (41%) of responses that recognize the new system as an "understandable necessity, considering the way research is funded". It is hard to assess whether this is an optimistic or simply an adaptive attitude – especially in that the option that the system is a "procedural impediment without tangible benefits" – which constitutes a plain negative criticism – was chosen by 31% of respondents. The message is similar in comments emphasizing the financial aspect of this procedure ("I believe that research grants cannot replace the pay raises that are due for academic teachers"). The responses to this question were as follows:

Worth noting is also the remark about the competences necessary to apply for a grant, suggesting that it should really be a task given to specialists. The necessity to follow all the rules and requirements of the research grant application, which entails completing about a sixty-page form, is indeed a demanding and time-con-

suming task, which might appear intimidating to some. This comment is a good example of such an opinion:

I believe that this idea could work efficiently, if institutions decided to invest in employing a "grant advisor"; I find it completely absurd that everyone should individually study ministerial rules and break through the tangled bureaucratic web. I have a vision of dividing academic staff into two groups: 1. handling grant applications and 2. dealing with academic work.




Chart 4.

Only one person posted a comment: "An inspiring challenge, but radically reducing the possibilities of financing the elementary needs of an individual".

Attitude to change in the context of language education research

As the context of the article and the whole research is primarily connected with research in language education, some of the questions in the questionnaire concern issues more directly related to modern language didactics. Three of them will be quoted for the purposes of this text: the first asking about the relationship between the theory and practice of language education research, the second probing the perception of the staff of modern language faculties in the reform process, and the third tackling the key issue of lowering the expected competence level of a language studies student. Among the comments given here, what struck me most was more or less the direct confession of the respondents that it was not entirely clear to them what the terms "theoretical description of competences" or "theoretical compilations" meant when referring to issues of language educa-

tion research. ("I do not know what the 'theoretical description' is based on and where it came from. I would do some further reading, but the survey does not provide bibliographic data; I have no idea what the 'key competences' or 'substantive competences' are"). Perhaps the wording is too general, indeed. Therefore, I would like to explain here that it was simply about the subject literature on the development of research in language education, theoretical issues, the description of teacher's competences, updating the teaching methodology and the growing demand to satisfy the specific needs of particularly gifted students or those with specific learning disabilities.




Chart 5.

I assumed that the subject literature points to desirable situations and solutions, ones which are worthy of application and imitation. Questions about the relationship between theory and practice were aimed at getting respondents' opinions on the reasons for possible disparities between the theory and practice or the lack thereof. As it turned out, the highest percentage of respondents (41%) believe that the theory differs from the practice due to the financial and infrastructural problems of the school and university reality. The second argument was the lack of time for the professional training. Only 13% agreed that developing theory entails good practices thanks to the growth of both key and substantive competences. Such a result seems to show the sharp self-criticism of teachers and a valuable form of self-reflection. It is reinforced by the comments provided:

Language teachers are less and less humanists, and more and more ordinary menial workers who cannot understand a longer press article, let alone an academic one.

I don't read the subject literature.

Especially this last sentence should arouse concern and reflection on the reasons for this state of affairs. With this question it is also worth paying attention to the response chosen by 20% of respondents indicating that the disparity between theory and practice is because of the psychological resistance to change shown by academic teachers in general. You can probably look at this result positively, referring to the principle of a glass that is almost empty, and not incompletely full. It could mean that respondents feel more entangled in external circumstances that are not dependent on them, rather than that they personally dislike or resist new solutions. This allows a light to shine again at the end of the tunnel, if we consider the light to be an openness to formal and administrative transformations aimed at establishing the reform regulations. Still, the reform's potential benefits are too distant and cannot overcome the intense bitterness that is evident in the following commentary:

As for a teacher at an academic level, the whole problem is that nothing motivates him to do a good job and nobody, absolutely nobody, can control him. For a senior lecturer it's enough to be in class, stay sober and present. People in academic positions have to do a lot to keep up, a lot in the field of science... In terms of didactics, no points are awarded. Besides, we all have to make money... on such salaries that we get, we all work three jobs... How can we work well? How should we care to learn, change, read in a field of interest which generates zero points?! It is very sad (because the way we educate our students will then project on the quality of the nation), but it is what it is.

The aim of the next question was to check whether the surveyed respondents perceived their position as staff of modern language faculties as different than that of academics representing other humanistic disciplines or generally other sciences. Here, "different" should be understood with reference to language competences theoretically facilitating access to the texts of other cultures. **Chart 6.** shows a strong belief (44% of answers) about the irrelevance of the substantive competences of foreign language teachers and researchers, as well as specialists in other philological subdisciplines (e.g. literary studies) for the process of implementing the NQF and coping with writing syllabuses. The following comments seem to confirm this conviction:

I have no influence on anything, so my language skills are good for nothing.
Of course, substantive change DOESN'T HAVE TO correlate with foreign language skills.

I see no substance of the change.

No matter, because there is no substance. Contrary to the pseudo-reform, we will do our job, i.e. educate humanists who will be able to understand the surrounding reality of the human relationships, cultures and politics. Only such people can make the right civil and economic choices.

It should not matter for an academic mind (command of languages is obvious).




Chart 6.

Still, 20% of respondents consider their position to be privileged, and few (6%) see it as “advantageous due to the possibility of making translations”. One of the comments seems significant: “It is not so much command of the language that is important but rather knowledge of education systems in other European countries, where this system has been working for years”. This remark allows for some hope, as it indicates the direction of finding solutions for a difficult situation in the Polish higher education. It does not imply whether other countries have succeeded or failed, but it does suggest that understanding the mechanism and attempting to relate to the domestic issues would be useful. It seems a good example of a budding action criticism, and an opposition to opposition; it is a proposal to look critically at our own issues.

The question that raised perhaps the most emotions and extensive comments among the respondents was the one enquiring about the need to formally lower the language level expected from students at the beginning and at the end of their studies. Practical foreign language teaching has always been a key element of the syllabus of language studies and it vouched for their status and quality. Therefore, lowering the requirements in this respect is the most criticized result of massification in university education. This fact is considered wrong by 63% of respondents, while only 14% found it reasonable. In order to interpret this result, we should focus on those several per cent of respondents constituting a small yet present group of people who regard the descent from the level of current requirements as sensible. What could be the reasons for such an opinion? It may be, for example, transferring the emphasis from substantive to key competences, which is a European and global trend, or perhaps these people see the massification of education as a chance to improve the functioning of society in the broad sense?

Unfortunately, most comments reinforce the sharp criticism of the situation:

Terrible! Unreasonable and shameful. It is a compromise resulting from the ruined secondary education. Tragic and pathetic.

This is the downfall of English studies – going back to pre-war times and equalizing the language level of a graduate with the level of a talented upper secondary school student. English studies will accommodate candidates who are only little better than beginners.

A large part of respondents devoted time to supplying extensive comments describing how they perceive the reality and the causes of the current situation:

For years there has been an on-going deterioration in the level of language mastery and general philological knowledge among students. Language studies are slowly becoming a slightly more advanced language course, because nothing can be required from students any more. The National Qualifications Framework did not take into account the one competence that the university did develop: the student was able to think. Today the student has to be practically prepared for work.

As a language school instruction supervisor, I've been observing a constant decline in the language competences of teachers starting work in the profession, which in turn translates into lowering the level of language education of students.

These requirements apply to all students of humanities (e.g. history or philosophy) who should know a foreign language (usually English). In language studies, specific learning outcomes should indicate a higher exit level of language knowledge (otherwise we accept the fact that language education in language studies is comparable to language education in philosophy, where students are obliged to have foreign language classes).




Chart 7.

One more comment is worth noting: the one in which a respondent addresses the problem of the general decline in the intellectual condition of young people. The remark emphasizes the difficulty in transforming those young people into foreign language teachers in just three years:

This is a big issue: first thing – the general level of students in the last two years has dropped dramatically, those young people can't even speak their native language, they don't read books (at the start of language studies they're surprised they'll have to read books), they don't know how to learn!!! Secondly, in the current situation, when we only have three years to teach them the language and make them teachers, while the number of hours allocated for classes has been reduced, our work and all kinds of requirements become an absolute abstraction. I keep wondering when those who formulate these fantastic requirements will come down and take an interest in the actual condition of education in Poland.

However, this question also caused a lot of responses of a different kind, namely: resignation and acceptance of the inevitability of the described circumstances. With all its controversy, many respondents admit that it is “wrong, but unfortunately necessary, or wrong for substantive reasons, but understandable for economic reasons, otherwise we wouldn't have students”. This common-sense approach is revealed in the commentary:

Lowering the level is simply necessary because in recent years, with an average of 100 admitted persons, 15 were at level C1, and then the level dropped to A0. Faced with the choice of either not admitting 90% of candidates and the dismissal of 90% of employees or lowering the level, the conclusion is obvious.

Pragmatism and a utilitarian approach are revealed in remarks of the following type:

We are faced with a population decline and we have no choice, if we bet on quality from the start, we will not get enough quantity... We all want to have a job... Therefore, let us admit all and let us trust in progress... Of course without overdoing it, but let's trust in progress rather than believe that we will educate Oxford graduates.

Self-identity in the face of change

In the general question summarizing the survey, which concerned the perception of the respondents' attitude towards change, almost half of the respondents declared that although they were sceptical to the changes, they nevertheless “follow them carefully and conscientiously”. Furthermore, also 40% of the respondents stated that they “like professional challenges and easily adopt to new requirements”, and only 1% considered themselves to be people who do not like change in general. These results are presented in **Chart 8**.

These responses seem to contradict the opinions expressed in previous questions. The earlier declarations fundamentally negated the systemic change that is

currently changing place. However, it is arguably this very change and the way it is implemented (probably this aspect above all) that provoke resistance and criticism, and not the change itself understood as a process that involves development and new challenges. Looking back at the aspects of change formulated by Fullan and quoted in the introduction to this article, we should remember that change as the great unknown will always generate resistance. On the other hand, “everyone is a change agent”, so one’s own contribution to the process can bring satisfaction and a sense of agency. Perhaps this was on one respondent’s mind when they commented on their answer as follows:

Provided I see SENSE in the proposed changes. I am constantly astonished at the reform proceedings so far – do people who work on the reform have at least a shadow of the notion about the job of an academic in a modern language faculty, its conditions, and its specificity? I dare doubt. Therefore, if I see an interesting challenge, I undertake it, as for me constant development and self-education is an indispensable condition to be a scientist. But the attitude of the ministry to humanists and the humanities in general... I have no words.




Chart 8.

Summary and conclusions

The elements of the study presented above illustrate opinions of the academics who represent university faculties of modern languages in Poland about the elements of the higher education reform implemented in 2011. Despite the assumed impartiality of the process of research, I tried to find a shadow of doubt in the dominant negative criticism among the respondents’ comments, suggesting that perhaps the reform does not necessarily mean only the degradation of the

Polish academic tradition and that it can be regarded as renovating the scaffolding around a new building. In other words, I tried to identify two types of criticism, one of which would be based not only on dissatisfaction but on different reasons than just being horrified by the decline in quality of education, caused most often by the difficult economic situation of universities and Polish higher education; perhaps also on accepting that this new quality should be treated as different, not worse. This quality is described by other parameters, criteria of applicability, supported by already existing scientific studies (*English Lingua Franca Core*¹⁴, methodology of teaching English as an international language – *International English*¹⁵ etc.). Also, the attitude and competence of a language education researcher as an Intercultural Speaker have changed since the prior ideal of aspiring to be a nearly native speaker¹⁶.

The conclusions that arise in relation to the results of the survey do not allow us to believe that the teachers and researchers of language faculties in Poland have accepted the new regulations. With the high theoretical awareness developed in academic publications, there is still a problem with translating the theory into practice. The scope of knowledge about the modern school and methods of teaching foreign languages in connection with culture is being diligently expanded, but the conviction still remains that transferring this knowledge to young adepts of the teaching art, as well as teaching them the language up to the level of British Received Pronunciation, are the core of language teaching activity. According to the research, the majority of language faculties staff in Poland consider, in the name of the Kantian tradition, that by adopting this knowledge and skills, the young generations are supposed to build an intellectual (and linguistic) quality as high as years before. Certainly, this attitude includes the old critical tinge, a voice of a uni-

¹⁴ For example, J. Jenkins, *The Phonology of English as an International Language*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000; J. Jenkins, *A Sociolinguistically Based, Empirically Researched Pronunciation Syllabus for English as an International Language*, *Applied Linguistics* 2002, 23, pp. 83–103.

¹⁵ For example, B. B. Kachru, *Standards, Codification and Sociolinguistic Realism: the English Language in the Outer Circle*, CUP, Cambridge 1985; B. Seidlhofer, *A Concept of International English and Related Issues: From 'Real English' to 'Realistic English'?*, Language Policy Division, Council of Europe, Strasbourg 2003; A. Mauranen, E. Ranta (eds.), *English as a Lingua Franca: Studies and Findings*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2005.

¹⁶ For example: E. Bandura, *Nauczyciel jako mediator kulturowy [A Teacher as a Cultural Mediator]*, Tertium Publishing House Cracow 2007; L. Bredella, *For a Flexible Model of Intercultural Understanding*, [in:] G. Alred, M. Byram, M. Fleming, *Intercultural Experience and Education*, Clevedon, Multilingual Matters, 2003, pp. 31–49; M. Byram, *Intercultural Communicative Competence: the Challenge for Language Teacher Training*, [in:] *British Studies: Intercultural Perspectives*, A. Mountford, N. Wadham-Smith (eds.), Longman 2000; M. Byram, K. Risager, *Language Teachers, Politics and Cultures*, Clevedon, Multilingual Matters, 1999; B. Karpińska-Musiał, *Intercultural Speaker jako odpowiedź na współczesne wyzwania globalnego społeczeństwa wiedzy. Analiza procesu nabywania kompetencji międzykulturowej przez ucznia i nauczyciela języków obcych [The Intercultural Speaker as a Response to the Contemporary Challenges of the Global Society of Knowledge. Analysis of the Process of Acquiring Intercultural Competence by a Student and Teacher of a Foreign Language]*, [in:] *Komunikacja językowa w społeczeństwie informacyjnym [Language Communication in the Information Society]*, J. Krieger-Knieja, U. Paprocka-Piotrowska (eds.), Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 2005, pp. 261–272.

versity, which, being aware of the necessity of transformation, is still fighting to maintain the old *status quo*. At the same time, it is also a sentimental tinge. It is true that the traditional education at language faculties, i.e. before the reform of education in 1989, which most of the respondents remember, was first and foremost humanistic, and teaching to speak a foreign language was only a subsidiary activity. This is why one should perhaps agree with Klaus Bachmann, who expresses criticism of neoliberal tendencies, stating that “universities are not able to predict how the labour market will develop in 4–5 years, and even if they could, they would not be able to teach students specific professions, because university staff have neither the knowledge nor the skills to provide training in a particular profession”¹⁷. Academics do not consider themselves masters who train an apprentice teacher or translator (although this is exactly the goal of under-graduate studies). A large part of them claim that “a university graduate must demonstrate a required minimum of encyclopaedic knowledge in their field of interest”¹⁸. Bachmann, however, criticizes the traditional elitist form of university education, claiming that the encyclopaedic content should give way to demonstrating how to update your knowledge and how to find practical applications for the slogans of creativity or interculturalism in teaching practice, or how to teach culture in connection with language using a demonstrative method. This is the way academics should de facto practice academic studies: moving from positivist to transformational attitudes.

Surrendering to neoliberal tendencies in university education is all too evident in the area of language education and it is hardly surprising that foreign language teachers and researchers are at a crossroads. What is expected of them in the first place is practical occupational training, while they would like to offer something more: humanistic, cultural and linguistic awareness. Such idealistic aspirations are justified when we take into consideration the fact that the marketization of education, referring to Woods, Courpasson and Clegg¹⁹, promotes certain goals, assumptions and practices, marginalizing others at the same time. It promotes treating young people as potential units who are subject to economic activities, in which such skills as flexibility and team-work must be included alongside qualities that will maintain social cohesion (e.g. a sense of civic responsibility). And although such features are not detrimental in themselves, the educational approach which reinforces them, and whose vision emerges from the reform procedures so far, sees education as shaping a human according to a precisely defined pattern and evaluates a student in terms of instrumental congruence to a given socio-economic system. As the above-mentioned authors say, “the dominant goal, the planned effect

¹⁷ K. Bachmann, *Co z tego, że wiedzą, jeśli nie potrafią* [What Good Does It Bring If They Know But They Don't Know How To], “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 12–13 May 2012, p. 19.

¹⁸ K. Modzelewski, *Uniwersytet musi czuć problemy swojego czasu* [University Must Sense the Issues of its Times], [in:] *Uniwersytet zaangażowany...* [Committed University...], p. 56.

¹⁹ D. Courpasson, S. Clegg, *Dissolving the Iron Cages? Tocqueville, Michels, Bureaucracy and the Perpetuation of Elite Power*, “Organization” 2006,13/3, pp. 319–343; *Alternative Education for the 21st Century Philosophies, Approaches, Visions*, P. Woods, G. Woods Palgrave Macmillan

that can be institutionalized in the system, is to shape people in such a way that they become an entrepreneurial, instrumentally oriented personality, an object of rationality, believing that anything goes as long as it leads to the goal. Such a personality is highly valued by modern markets and new forms of bureaucracy"²⁰. Where do we have the space for development beyond the instrumental functional congruence? Defenders of an elite higher education have clear grounds for discontent and resentment.

It is not my intention to defend the vision of a student and teacher adapted to the new system, nor to advocate for the previous system of university language studies. The problem for each of us is to find a way to deal with this inevitable situation and its inherent contradiction, and to find our way around it. According to McCormack²¹, it requires a lot of internal strength and skills of reflexivity. Certainly, reflexivity on one's own practices is the basic tool for adopting a critical attitude: either towards innovation, following the path of non-constructive negative criticism, or towards traditional ways, accepting the challenge of constructive criticism. Critical pedagogy, whose contemporary, imposed role (which is also criticized for not going beyond mere fault-finding), among other things, reveals problematic situations and discloses the social reality created in discourse, could be a useful tool for confused academics. By acquiring critical awareness, they could regard the evolving educational reality from a wider perspective, and then use their own voice (and this survey is an example of this voice) to move to the action stage. This action may be, as Gdula puts it, the other variety of criticism, which is defined as "openness to politics and the necessity to seek allies for creating a world that better accommodates a larger number of agents"²². Indeed, the traditional, emancipatory feature of critical theory, which in this case entails resistance to utilitarian administrative procedures in order to defend elite structures and quality, may prove ineffective. Emancipation itself or even awareness of the problem, which the presented research attempted to raise, will not engender comfort and good practice. We should rather be less emancipatory (in the sense of mere rebellious unmasking), and more systematic and rational, and aim at building a new quality. This rationality, however, must be free of dogmatism and should depend on a translation of the old rationality into the rationality that meets the expectations of today. Perhaps, following Zalewska's train of thought²³, it is the duty of foreign language teachers to attain the post-conventional level of awareness of their professional identity, one that allows for distance, reflexivity and autonomy "to-

²⁰ P.A. Woods, G.J. Woods, *Introduction. Alternative Education for the 21st Century. Philosophies, Approaches, Visions*, Palgrave Macmillan 2009, pp. 2–3.

²¹ A. McCormack, *Classroom management: problems, strategies and influences in physical education*, "European Physical Education Review" 1997, 3(2), pp. 102–113; [in:] T.G. Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²² M. Gdula, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

²³ E. Zalewska, *Tożsamość zawodowa nauczyciela w „edukacji otwartej” i „edukacji zamkniętej”* [Teacher's professional identity in "open" and "closed" education], [in:] *Inspiracje, otwarcia, krytyki w edukacji* [Inspirations, openings, criticism in education], E. Rodziewicz (ed.), University of Gdansk Press, Gdansk, 1995

wards”, not “from”. Having this special key to multiculturalism, which is a foreign language, they have a chance to follow the kind of criticism that Gdula describes as “taking responsibility for every particular solution as if it were their choice – an opportunity among others”²⁴. Thanks to this, they may be able to co-create “a university model that can act as a channel of articulation in a case of opening to politics, seeking allies and creating new forms of social life”²⁵. In such a vision of university (that may be a modified version of Humboldt’s idea), the National Qualifications Framework or other code systems will not scare anyone, because they will simply be a mere administrative formality, one of the channels for an “articulation of interests” that does not threaten the essence. And above all, it does not threaten the personalities of the change participants. For this to happen, however, we must remember about the purely human, psychological aspect of change and its complex manifestations, which comprise many factors. Their analysis goes beyond the size and the thematic framework of this article, so in the ending let me just quote after Schwahn and Spady a few “rules” of the social aspect of change. And my conclusions and reflections based on the presented research may serve as a starting point to develop further analyses on the subject of the attitude to institutional change in modern language university studies.

People will not change unless they have a good common reason to change.

People will not change until they have their own share in the change.

People will not change until their leaders show that they treat the change seriously.

People will not be willing to change until they get a particular vision, what this change will give them in the personal dimension.

People will not change or consolidate the change effects unless they receive organizational support in this area²⁶.

Summary

Two Kinds of Critical Approach Towards Change Among the Academic Staff of Modern Language Faculties at Polish Universities

The text addresses the issue of how the academics at modern language faculties at Polish universities perceive selected aspects of the change implemented by the Higher Education Reform since 2011. The main objective is to present the results of empirical re-

²⁴ M. Gdula, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

²⁶ Based on C. Schwahn, W. Spady, *Why Change Doesn't Happen and How to Make Sure it Does*, “Educational Leadership. ASCD”, April 1998, vol. 55, no. 7, pp. 45–47; P.M. Keys, *Empowering Teachers in School and University Partnership*, “Learning Communities. International Journal of Learning in Social Contexts”, March 2008, no. 1, pp. 53–67.

search (an online questionnaire) based on opinions concerning work over adapting the programs and syllabuses of foreign language studies to the requirements of the NQF (National Qualification Framework). A secondary research objective was to observe whether the necessity to perform additional and demanding tasks to meet these requirements had induced teachers' reflection as to their own competences and the quality of their social, as well as professional work conditions. The two kinds of critical approach included in the title refer to the author's attempt to juxtapose a critical attitude of an emancipatory character, which is demonstrated predominantly in the research results, with the signs of a more transformative and constructive criticality: the one that would suggest building new quality on the new grounds. Foreign language teachers and researchers seem to be in the possession of tools that are especially helpful in meeting this challenge. Nevertheless, it is not yet clear how and to what extent they can be useful. The paper speaks with the voice of those academics who fight to maintain the high quality of philological education in the face of its "massification" and marketization processes.

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