Ars Educandi

20/2023

Indebted: The Philosophy of Education and educational cultural studies at the University of Gdańsk

scientific editing

Małgorzata Cackowska
Piotr Stańczyk

Contents

THEOLOGY

Lokal IV Kakegorii

Indebted: Philosophy of education and educational cultural studies at the University of Gdańsk – foreword

The current issue of "Ars Educandi" is devoted to issues concerning the philosophy of education and research in the field of educational cultural studies. However, it is accompanied by highly significant life circumstances, and the texts published here – which would probably have appeared in some form anyway – were inspired by this important event. That is, after many years of service, the retirement of Prof. zw. dr hab. Tomasz Szkudlarek – a person who, at some stage in his intellectual life, has inspired every Author publishing in this issue. Some of them, and certainly those writing this introduction, could interpret meeting Professor Tomasz Szkudlarek as an event of philosophical stature – the event, according to Alain Badiou (2007). Meeting such a person, such a teacher and master as Tomasz Szkudlarek constitutes an event from the category of the adventurous, or even the impossible. However, it did happen. It happened and had transformative power. An emancipating force. It took the form of a materialistically conceived grace that befell us.

With retrospective certainty, we can conclude that the relations between us had the nature proposed by Jacques Rancière (1991) in his famous *Ignorant School Master*. Even though this thought was only just emerging and this form of cultivation, of intellectual culture, still seems alien to the Polish university, Tomasz Szkudlarek applied solutions straight out of Rancière. He was not an all-knowing master who, in his intellectual power deriving from the privilege and curse of an earlier birth, leaves the pupil a mediocre role of apprenticeship in the fetters of his own ignorance and incapacity. *Enforced stultification* as a solution specific to traditional education, as a result of the myth of unequal intelligences, was something we did not experience in our relationship with Tomasz Szkudlarek. For many, it was a refreshing change after years of being in the education system. All the more so because the intellectual adventure we went on concerned mostly education.

The current, twentieth issue of the scholarly yearbook "Ars Educandi" contains – in addition to this introduction – Joanna Rutkowiak's manifesto and twelve scholarly papers. A unique feature of this issue consists in the drawings by Tomasz Szkudlarek, which we include as spacers between the texts. On the other hand, the papers have

been divided into three unequal parts in terms of text size. Firstly, there are seven texts concerning topics and methods similar to the philosophy of upbringing; these are texts with a theoretical character, in which the authors discuss pedagogical issues and those from related sciences. The four following texts present the results of empirical studies and can be placed in the field of educational cultural studies. Whereas the final text includes theological inclinations.

The opening text is Joanna Rutkowiak's manifesto *On educational dialogue – against burnout*, which – due to the form adopted – is easier to read than to summarise accurately and correctly.

Whereas Piotr Zamojski in his paper titled *To Apply, to Debunk, to Perform. Types and Uses of Educational Theory* asks how, at the metatheoretical level, education can be theorised in relation to the potential use of theory. Using (following Max Weber) the theory of ideal types, the author develops a typology of pedagogical theories in relation to their applicability, dividing theories into technical, critical and affirmative/performative. In doing so, Zamojski remains an advocate of a post-critical conception of education as a process – however imperfect – but one that is possible in its experience and practice.

Marcin Boryczko offers an article entitled *Decolonising social work. An analysis of theory in the perspective of the Legitimation Code Theory*, in which he argues for applying the postcolonial concept of decolonisation of the mind (following Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o) and Legitimation Codes Theory (following Karl Maton) to gain in-depth insights into social work's entanglement with processes of power. The paper also includes numerous examples of decolonisation-oriented social work. However, their significance is discussed in the perspective of the Legitimation Code Theory.

Piotr Kowzan writes about the pedagogical significance of geese. It was inspired by a competition including peculiar rewards organised by the Lviv School of Mathematics. A goose, which was one of the rewards for solving a mathematical problem, here becomes a symbol of intellectual problems which – although the very act of posing them may be a feat – cannot be solved at a given historical moment and are therefore passed on to the following generation. Kowzan's text is actually a case study that provides an in-depth insight into intergenerational intellectual bonding.

Agnieszka Woynarowska's article is entitled *Disability and work. Discursive constructions of exclusion and dissensus*. This article constitutes an example of successful philosophical inquiry at the border of pedagogy and *disability studies*. The author tackles the issue of work and employment in capitalist realities characterised by the exclusion of "unproductive bodies" that is crucial in special pedagogy. The author concludes by outlining (following Nancy Fraser) two conditions fulfilling which could bring contemporary society closer to greater justice concerning the issue at hand.

Jarosław Marzec, in his article entitled *The regress of culture, the end of the future and the end of development – reading culture with Bauman and Wilber,* proposes a reflection on the status of the future in contemporary culture marked – according to the author – by a process of regression. Marzec's text fits perfectly into the procedure of reading one author's works through another in the formula long proposed by Jacques Lacan (1989) with his famous text *Kant with Sade*. Mutual readings of Zygmunt Bauman and Ken Wilber provide some unusual insights into the phenomenon of the withering away of the notion of the future.

Monika Popow has included a text in the current issue under the title *Learning in the process of civilisation. An attempt of pedagogical reading of selected themes in Norbert Elias' theory*. It constitutes an example of successfully combining issues in the philosophy of education and the history of ideas. The author draws on Norbert Elias' reflections concerning the development of civilisation, which is identified with eliminating violence between individuals and reducing social asymmetries. In doing so, the opposing civilisational dynamic described as a process of decivilisation is emphasised. Popow makes an argument about the intertwining of these two dynamics in relation to educational phenomena.

The following article was proposed by Beata Karpińska-Musiał and is entitled: *Motion between the Stage and the Foyer: discursive shifts of the subjectivity of didactics in scientific narratives*. The author makes an attempt to look at the status of didactics from the perspective of the subjective use of selected categories from the field of Critical Discourse Analysis. In the course of the argument, Karpińska-Musiał proposes to unravel the question of the status of didactics by applying Szkudlarek's understanding of the identity of an individual, with particular reference to the notion of the "subject in drift". The author then develops this concept towards the notion idea of "semantic drift" to conclude with the hegemonic role of scientific discourses depreciating the status of didactics.

The section dedicated to educational cultural studies opens with an article by Lucyna Kopciewicz entitled: *"It was winter that finished Gierek's government" – climate narratives of two generations of women*. The text constitutes a partial research report of a qualitative study concerning the image of climate change in the narratives of two generations of women. The article presents extensive research material. In the conclusion, the author discusses the relevance of a pedagogical response to the climate crisis, when this response comes down to implementing the demand for sound education. Such a response seems, according to Kopciewicz, to be inscribed in apparent actions, since knowledge concerning the climate crisis is already there and has the character of biographical knowledge, both critical and adaptive.

Piotr Stańczyk in his paper entitled *Pornland school communications. Images of schools in mainstream porn* also presents a partial research report. The author undertakes an attempt to reconstruct the images of the school found in the image-texts created by porn cultures. Stańczyk accepts the premise (following Lech Nijakowski) that pornography is a mirror of society, and also (following Ludwig

Wittgenstein) that there is a family resemblance between the real school and the school in porn cultures. The author concludes that the genre characterisation of pornography has the effect of highlighting the violent nature of the school, which may account for the unintentionally oppositional nature of porn cultures.

For this issue, Jarosław Jendza proposed a text entitled *Symbolic inversion in the narratives of Montessori practitioners – additions to the Discursive Construction of the Subject*. The article constitutes a partial research report on how Montessori teachers experience their professional reality. The author directly refers to the results of research concerning the discursive construction of the subject conducted by a team led by Szkudlarek (Cackowska et al. 2012), as well as his insights into the "unusual school" (Szkudlarek 1992). After analysing the presented empirical material concerning inversion present in Montessori schools, the author interprets the particular case represented by the example of Szkudlarek's "unusual school". An analysis of a day on which a child's birthday is celebrated leads Jendza to raise fundamental questions concerning the status of a child in Montessori education.

The final text we include in the section on educational cultural studie`s is an article by Adam Jabłoński – at the time of closing this issue, the last doctoral student of Professor Tomasz Szkudarek. The author proposes the article *Violence-help as a pedagogical category. Part I. About the violent role of the teacher*. This is the initial part of a longer text, which we could not include in its entirety due to publishing requirements. On the other hand, the length of the text results from the Author's particular ability to tell stories. In his ethnographic tale, Jabłoński takes us to an Irish school where stories reminiscent of Dickensian prose happen. Jabłoński's story is structured by the notion of v i o l e n c e - h e l p proposed by the author, which problematises both the role of the school and the duties of the teacher and educator.

The issue closes with a text by Mirosław Patalon – one of Tomasz Szkudlarek's first doctoral students. Patalon, in an article at the intersection of philosophy of education, theology, and translation studies, attempts to answer the title question: *Do we need new translations of classical source texts?* The author gives an affirmative answer based on a comparison of translations of the *Ecclesiastes*. In his conclusion, Patalon emphasises the significance of knowing the texts from which the roots of contemporary culture grow.

Freely referring to Rancière (1991: 77): therefore, as independent forms of intelligence we move in the free orbits of our intellectual journeys. Due to the far-reaching relativity of language and the diversity of experience, our trajectories only occasionally intersect, although we gravitate towards the truth, we gravitate towards the material centre of our universe. At a certain stage in our lives, such an ability to attract our trajectories was demonstrated by Tomasz Szkudlarek. Perhaps not much has changed in the universe, but a lot has changed in our lives.

We are intellectually indebted to Szkudlarek. Just as Karl Marx was indebted to Hegel, the Frankfurters were indebted to Marx, while American critical educators to Frankfurters and Paul Freire. Now we also want to offset part of this debt.

Literature

Badiou A., 2007, *Święty Paweł. Ustanowienie uniwersalizmu*, trans. J. Kutyła, P. Mościcki, Kraków: ha!art.

Cackowska M., Kopciewicz L., Patalon M., Stańczyk P., Starego K., Szkudlarek T., 2012, *Dyskursywna konstrukcja podmiotu. Przyczynek do rekonstrukcji pedagogiki kultury*, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo UG.

Lacan J., 1989, *Kanta Sadem*, trans. T. Komendant, "Twórczość", No. 8.

Rancière J., 1991, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster. Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*, trans. K. Ross, Stanford: SUP.

Szkudlarek T, 1992, *McLaren i Agata. O pewnej możliwości interpretacji rytualnego oporu przeciw szkole* [in:] *Nieobecne dyskursy*, ed. Z. Kwiecinski, part 2, Toruń: UMK.

Małgorzata Cackowska
Piotr Stańczyk

oraz   bawełniej   pieprz

Joanna Rutkowiak
University of Gdańsk

On educational dialogue – against burnout

Wojciech Bruszewski, *Drawing of a chair, Izomorfie*, 1975, https://artmuseum.pl/pl/archiwum/
wojciech-bruszewski-2/2379/124447 (accessed on: 31.10.2023)

If we can find planes and points of support for the intersecting thoughts, then –
against burnout – one can hope to cultivate dialogue as a persistent reflection on
education that today is entangled in areas of:
– political collisions;
– ethnic and migration conflicts;
– armed clashes;
– exacerbating cultural differences;
– the quality and dynamics of forms of governance;
– climate breakdowns;
– injustice, the global collision of wealth – poverty;
– the tensions of social relations: egoisms, greed, aggression, competitiveness;
– educational inequalities;
– gender issues in education;
– the relationship between religion and education;
– the relationship of education to human labour and consumption;
– relation between education and law;
– relationships between nature, health, and education;
– relationships of art, beauty – education;
– relationships of things – education;
– the instrumentalization of education;
– populising, simplifying, desensitising education;
– virtualisation, the digitalisation of education;
– privatisation – commercialisation, de-socialisation of education.
    This is an open project…

Inspirations

Byung-Chui-Han, *The burnout society*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2015.
Anda Rottenberg, *Rozrzut*, Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, Warsaw 2023.

Philosophy of Education

SELER.

Piotr Zamojski
ORCID: 0000-0002-5505-7579
Polish Naval Academy in Gdynia

To Apply, to Debunk, to Perform.
Types and Uses of Educational Theory[1]

With this article I wish to express my gratitude to Tomasz Szkudlarek for the numerous gifts received from him, which resulted in the story conveyed by the argument below. His were the gifts: of inspiration regarding the intersection between humanities and education studies, of various opportunities to reach out to the world of the anglophone educational theory and philosophy of education, and of demand to stay critical in the most radical sense of the term, i.e. also towards critique itself. The other gifts were innumerable, and there is no space here to even enlist them.

Introduction

The very idea of writing the *Manifesto for a post-critical pedagogy* (Hodgson et al. 2017) stemmed from the experience of a new kind of theorising education that was, and still is, emerging – at least in the anglophone world – in the field of educational theory and philosophy of education, testifying to a change of today's *Zeitgeist* in this field of research. Hence, in this article I want to explore what kind of educational theories are possible to be thought of today, or, to be more precise: in what ways – on a meta-theoretical level – one can theorise education in relation to the potential

---

use of theory? Naturally, my focus is on the way of theorizing education which could be called 'post-critical'. Therefore it is my aim to investigate a manifold of possible ways to theorize education, and simultaneously add some clarity and substance to what we called 'post-criticality'.

In the end, the following argument is nothing but a story developing a particular typology of theorising education. It is a typology, and I will speak of types using Max Weber's (1958) understanding of ideal types and their function, as well as their relation to the empirical types, as a point of reference. In other words, the following exercise is not about making empirical claims about particular theories, but about gaining an orientation in the recent transformations of the field of educational theory. The story leads to the emergence of the post-critical – called also "affirmative" and "performative" – type, i.e. focusing on *how*, *why,* and *what* started to emerge. Since it is a story, it shall not and simply *is* not intended to function as an exhaustive typology of all possible ways in which one can theorise education.

The gist of the story is that one can distinguish three types of educational theories – technical, critical, and affirmative/performative – and each of these facilitates a different use of a theory of education.

Technical theories of education

The type of technical theories of education emerged against the background of attempts to theorise education in line with the idea of modern science. It is therefore instructive to go back to this idea at the very moment it was conceived. In 1620 Francis Bacon (2003) publishes his *Novum organum*, where he makes the case for the pursuit of knowledge that could be advantageous to humans by bringing nature under human control. He literally claims that we should aim at knowledge that will give us power over nature. The third aphorism reads:

> Human knowledge and human power come to the same thing, because ignorance of cause frustrates effect. (Bacon 2003: 33)

The knowledge Bacon aims at is therefore a tool, or it can easily be turned into one. *Knowledge* refers to an effective action, whereas *ignorance* means an inability to produce a particular, desired result. Therefore, he claimed, we need knowledge that would describe with highest precision and modesty the causal relations that rule a particular domain of the natural reality, so as to be able to render such a description of these mechanisms into a relation between means and ends. Knowing how a particular domain of the reality works, one can use that knowledge to change the reality in the way one wishes to (of course, within the limits of what is possible, i.e. within the limits of the mechanisms that are about to be discovered). Seventeen years before Descartes did, Bacon puts an enormous emphasis on the research procedure (i.e. the method) and human inclinations to ruin it by taking various shortcuts

(what he calls *idols*[2]). Finally, he invents and carefully describes the rigid procedure of an experiment – which is central for the sciences to this day, and in which we put enormous trust, especially in the times such as the recent pandemic, when we all hoped for a tool that would overpower nature and give us control over the virus.

Putting aside the well-known and widely discussed problems of the social and political dimension of such an understanding of science, nature, knowledge, and truth (cf. Horkheimer & Adorno 2002), in this article I shall focus on what kind of understanding of educational theory (and with it also education as such) is facilitated by the post-Baconian idea of modern science.

Within this imaginary, educational theory aims to determine the mechanisms ruling the reality of education, where this reality is being usually rendered in terms of a process or multiple processes. This type of theory describes how these processes work. The description is made in order to be used, i.e. to function as a tool for achieving particular goals. These goals, however, are not indicated by the theory itself, which is neutral and focused purely on describing how the educational reality works. In other words, such an educational theory aims to be an instrument that could be easily applied in educational action, making this action effective. If a theory describes causal relations ruling the process of education, it allows for designing actions that would insert a particular cause into the particular state of affairs in order to produce expected outcomes.

It is frequently recognised that such a type of educational theory assumes a deterministic understanding (via behaviourism or neuro-sciences) of human cognitive and psychological functioning (cf. the critique delivered by Biesta 2007). However, I would like to emphasise that this way of theorising, when applied to education, shapes an understanding of education as such, i.e. it reduces education to a production process. Education – within this imaginary – is a process that leads to clear, distinguishable, graspable, and measurable results or products.

But, what kind of products can one speak of in the case of education? The only possible answer is: people with certain properties. If education is a production process, it produces a particular set of properties in people that undergo this process. This has – at least – two consequences.

Firstly, on the level of sociological assumptions, this type of educational theory is always implicitly grounded in sociological functionalism. Ultimately, the recurring

---

[2]   Bacon's concept of *idola mentis* referred to the implicit distortions of human cognition caused by four different kinds of causes (2003: 40–45). Idols of the Tribe stem from the tendency of the human mind to deform the image of perceived things by following preconceived ideas about these things. Idols of the Cave refer to the individual preferences that influence the perception of things. Idols of the Market Place refer to the deformation of one's cognition caused by commonly shared convictions, ideas, and concepts. And finally, with the concept of the Idols of the Theatre, Bacon refers to the danger of academism. According to him, it is exactly through the careful examination of empirical data, and a scrupulous and unhurried induction, that one is able to overcome these idols.

questions here are "What kind of people do we need to produce?", "What functions will they perform in this particular society?", and "What properties will they need for these tasks?". Let me just briefly mention here that this functional way of thinking seems to be very attractive to people regardless of their ideological orientation (Zamojski 2017). There are various stances on what education is for, but all of them can be reduced to the question of what education should produce. Some would claim schools should produce skilful workers of the knowledge economy (creative, flexible, entrepreneurial, etc.), while others would claim schools should produce conservative patriots (ready to make sacrifices, subordinated to the community and its leader). Yet another idea would be schools producing critical and engaged citizens, or producing obedient militants of some great cause. While politically all these are opposing each other, they nevertheless share the same functional understanding of education.

Secondly, if education is understood in terms of a production process, then it can (and will) be assessed against its efficiency. Schools, as institutions that organise education, will be, therefore, required to maximise their outcomes measured against the a priori designed standards. This is the moment when the issue of the quality of education emerges: the products achieved by the school have to match the design.

But who is designing the desired properties of pupils? This is not done by educational theory, as it focuses solely on describing the causal relationships governing the production process. Therefore, technical theories require an external intervention of some ruling instance that will determine the aims of education, meaning: the results schools, teachers, and students should attain. This is the dominant understanding of 'aims of education' within the official state documents (like National Curriculum in the UK, or Podstawa programowa in Poland), but also the transnational documents issued by the EU, UNESCO, or OECD (like EQF, GEMR, or PISA reports).

This leads to the most interesting fact about technical educational theories. It occurs that by the virtue of their form, the very way they are designed, they assume three (and only three) positions one can take within the process of education. First, within this imaginary, education requires legislators – in the meaning Zygmunt Bauman (1987) has introduced some time ago, albeit in a different context. This is, education requires people who design and determine the desired properties of pupils or students to be produced by the process of education. Second, education requires executors, that is people who will apply educational theory in their doings, in order to produce effectively and efficiently the desired properties determined by the legislators. It is rather obvious that this is exactly how teachers are positioned within such an imaginary. And finally, education requires human material to be processed, people that are to be equipped with the desired properties – i.e. pupils or students.

This means – obviously – that theories of a technical type reify pupils and teachers, since both are required to subordinate themselves to the will of the legislators

and to do so as efficiently as possible. They are to be subordinate and thoughtless in regards to the aims they are set to achieve. This is exactly why technical educational theories facilitate instrumental rationality: they frame education in such a way that shies away from any ethical considerations about education, focusing solely on the matter of its effectivity and efficiency (cf. Giroux 1983).

Critical theories of education

The domination of instrumental rationality is exactly what Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) have warned us against in the middle of the last century. People who are used to reduce ethical matters to technical problems are willing to accept any goal imposed on them by – what I call here following Bauman (1987) – the legislators. In other words, the domination of instrumental reason enables ordinary people to participate in radical evil.

Horkheimer and Adorno's (2002) response to this was that selection of means to an end does not exhaust the capabilities of reason, which has also other dimensions. Critical reason can function as a fuse, a safety mechanism, practice that could make us unable to take part in radical evil. This is so, firstly because critique always discloses the complexity of things, and secondly because it exposes the ethical dimension of our ways of dealing with things and with others. We should therefore engage in social critique for the sake of what Adorno (2004: 365) called as *the new categorical imperative*, that is, making sure to "not let Auschwitz happen again".

A crucial note Adorno adds to this: critique has to be a never-ending task. The dialectic that critical reasoning is involved in is relentlessly negative: it can never be resolved into some kind of positivity. Exactly when we want to say: *Now, we finally won! We have gained freedom! We have reached equality!*, a new regime is born. Similarly, in the exact moment we would develop a positive project for the society – the danger of new totalitarianism would arise. Hence, we simply have to remain critical forever.

This stance later became equipped with very powerful tools for performing critique due to the contribution to the critical paradigm made by French post-structuralism. These tools (e.g. Foucault's genealogy, Bourdieu's field theory, or Derrida's deconstruction) translate the aim of eternal critique into firm reality. I would like to focus here on two consequences of using these tools.

First, these are post-structural means, and hence, they are playing with the opposition between the surface and the deep structure. Critique is therefore understood and performed as debunking: revealing the hidden layer of things, which is actually the fundamental layer. The general assumption of such critique is that people live at the surface level, and if only they would see underneath, they would understand how things really are – they would realise their own enslavement, the inequality

and the radical injustice that characterises the societies we live in and their own complicity in perpetuating such status quo.

Second, such critique is radical: it goes right to the bone, to the very roots (*radix*) of the status quo. Hence, the hidden structures revealed thanks to critique are enormous, supra-individual, overwhelming, and – what is crucial – ontologically necessary. Acknowledging the conceptual apparatus of Bourdieu's (1984) theory of society (i.e. field theory), one has to recognise that a flat social field is simply impossible within that perspective. Positions of social agents are defined here by their *situs* – that is, their place in the unequal distribution of capitals. Inequality is, therefore, imprinted into the fundamental assumptions of this vision of society. A similar story could be told about Foucault (2005). If one embraces this conceptual apparatus, it is impossible to think about social relations that are not power relations. Power is a gargantuan structure which is also dispersed, etheric, and sustained by the multitude of the overpowered, enslaved in every possible dimension of their life, even the internal life of their consciousness (which is guided by pastoral power).

Naturally, these radically critical perspectives enabled plethora of eye-opening research, producing immensurable and priceless knowledge about the dangers of the hidden layers behind our educational practices. Due to these interventions many things became apparent, such as hidden curriculum, or the fact that in spite of our intentions, we – as educators – contribute to the reproduction of inequalities in society, impose class distinctions, and support the dominant order of things, etc. However – as Giroux (1983) rightfully argues – education has a bipolar potential: apart from being an effective mechanism of enslavement and reproduction of inequalities, it can also emancipate. Therefore, education is at the same time the object of critique, as much as its medium.

Indeed, to conceptualise educational theory within the critical paradigm is to see it as a form of social critique taking education as its object, revealing its hidden layers responsible for inequality, injustice, and enslavement. But – Giroux (1983) notes – it is more than that. Firstly, it expands the perspective of understanding education, adding to the surface (technical) dimension many other layers: economic, political, cultural, racial, gender, etc. Within the critical type, educational theory opens up education as a multi-dimensional human practice that cannot be reduced to its technical side. Secondly, by putting emphasis on the revolutionary potential of transforming consciousness (Freire 2005), education can foster the ability to decode the dangers of the social world, and to use knowledge in order to strengthen one's ability to self-govern, i.e. to be autonomous. In that sense, education is a process of liberation, and hence, educational theory is a revolutionary theory: a theory of emancipation of the enslaved. It aims at facilitating critical reasoning of teachers and students that would lead to their liberation, and consequently, to the transformation of the human world.

Let me publicly admit that I hold this perspective dear. In terms of my academic life, I was raised in this tradition (via Szkudlarek 1993a; 1993b; as well as Rutkowiak 1995), and it still informs my understanding of being an academic.

Having said that, at a given moment it became clear to me that some of us involved in critical educational research with time became rather dogmatic in applying this perspective, and schematic in using the critical tools it offers. I felt that this goes against the absolutely fundamental call of Adorno (2004: 365): "if thinking is to be true […] it must also be a thinking against itself". Are we critical of the critical paradigm itself, then? And what would that entail? Obviously it cannot mean abandoning critique! On the contrary, the critical insights formulated against critical theory, critical pedagogy, or the critical paradigm altogether are stemming exactly from the very centre of Adorno's call.

There are quite a few powerful critiques of critical pedagogy (e.g. Ellsworth 1989; Gur-Ze'ev 1998) and of critical paradigm as such (e.g. Sloterdijk 1987; Latour 2004; Felski 2015). Displaying these in detail – a much needed work – would require a separate article, if not a book. Let me, therefore, briefly recall only a few of such attempts.

One of the most powerful critical interventions that the project of critical pedagogy has ever received was the seminal article by Elisabeth Ellsworth from 1989, *Why Doesn't This Feel Empowering? Working Through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy*. Ellsworth took Giroux' call seriously and tried to be a critical pedagogue in her teaching at the university, but she quickly noticed that putting the principles of critical pedagogy in practice actually entailed nothing else than what the practice should liberate people from: relations of domination and repression. This is, because she was taking part in "essentially paternalistic project of education" (Ellsworth, 1989: 306) being involved in "the institutionalized power imbalances", she quickly recognised that "[s]trategies such as student empowerment and dialogue give the illusion of equality while in fact leaving the authoritarian nature of the teacher/student relationship intact" (Ellsworth, 1989: 306). The basic assumption that the critical pedagogue can help emancipate the student, i.e. that a teacher is necessary for the liberation of pupils only reinforces the oppression it aims to fight. Ellsworth notices:

> As an Anglo, middle-class professor […] I could not unproblematically "help" a student of colour to find her/his authentic voice as a student of colour. I could not unproblematically "affiliate" with the social groups my students represent and interpret their experience with them (Ellsworth 1989: 309).

Hence, Ellsworth abandons not only the idea of critical pedagogy, but also the practice of teaching altogether, engaging with her students directly in political actions. As Joris Vlieghe and myself read it: being radically consequent in following the imperative of radical critique leads to abandoning education altogether in favour of politics (Vlieghe & Zamojski 2019: 152). However, for Ellsworth, as well as for

scholars like Ilan Gur-Ze'ev (1998), the key problem lies in the repressive structure of an educational endeavour designed to emancipate the enslaved, liberate the oppressed, empower the powerless.

How such a repressive structure emerges out of these noble goals is put on display by Jacques Rancière (1991), who argues that, if we assume that our students/pupils are oppressed and enslaved – that is, if they are positioned as unequal (and this is exactly what we have to assume if we want to liberate them) – then our own doings as teachers will make this assumption become true: within the very practice of education aiming at the liberation of students we will deal with them as with oppressed, enslaved, and unequal, making them appear as oppressed, enslaved, and unequal – and hoping that this will change in the future as a result of our educational intervention. However, if we hold dear the call for relentless radical critique, the realization of this freedom and equality is just a dream. While being critical one can never say: "now finally we reached equality and freedom for all" – that would be either pitifully naïve or hypocritical. This will never happen. There will always be the oppressed, enslaved, and unequal. Therefore, the goal of emancipation is deferred *ad infinitum*. Hence, the only way to establish equality and to emancipate, Rancière argues, is to treat our students/pupils as equal from the outset. To assume their equality, and to act in line with this assumption. In such a way – while being treated as equals – hic et nunc they *are* equal. This assumption, however, goes against everything our critical knowledge is telling us about them and the world. It is a fictional assumption – yet it makes equality happen in the classroom. Here and now they are equal, they experience their equality – and they can take that experience further with them. Such an experience of something that seems impossible within the horizon of radical critique is indeed emancipatory. This discovery functions as a key inspiration for many of the new educational theories that might be called post-critical.

Similarly, Peter Sloterdijk (1987) has cast doubt on the critical potentials of radical critique by showing that radical critique ends up ruining its own aims. This results from the fact that the more one engages in radical critique, and the more one experiences its relentless character, the more one becomes aware that oppression, enslavement, and inequality are ontological features of the social status quo. What is revealed by critique are the deep mechanisms of the world, not just some accidental and temporary ways people organise their living together. And if there is no possibility to reach the point of no oppression, no enslavement, no injustice, and no inequality, then our unhappy consciousness tries to make peace with this fact, and we become cynical. If, in principle, oppression can never be overcome, if there always going to be inequality – then why not try to make at least oneself comfortable in this tragic situation? As I read it, Sloterdijk's analysis shows that the result of the relentless radical critique is not emancipation, but cynicism.

Moreover, one should have in mind another intervention, rather recently provided by Bruno Latour (2004) in his seminal article *Why has critique run out of steam?*, the opening paragraph of which reads:

> Wars. So many wars. Wars outside and wars inside. Cultural wars, science wars, and wars against terrorism. Wars against poverty and wars against the poor. Wars against ignorance and wars out of ignorance. My question is simple: Should we be at war, too, we, the scholars, the intellectuals? Is it really our duty to add fresh ruins to fields of ruins? Is it really the task of the humanities to add deconstruction to destruction? (Latour 2004: 225).

Perhaps indeed, it is high time that we start to care for the world, instead of being at war with it. It regards – after all – our common world, the only one we have, and, as we are now fully aware, its very existence is threatened as it has never been before. This would, however, require us to look at the world not through critical lens which make us sensitive to the wrongs in it, but in a different way which would make us sensitive to what is good in the world, what is worth our effort to be saved from extinction, to be studied, and passed on to the next generation (Vlieghe & Zamojski 2019: 92–94; Zamojski 2023).

Post-critical / affirmative / performative theories of education

In view of the story sketched above and the theoretical deadlock the critical position seems to amount to, with Naomi Hodgson and Joris Vlieghe in 2016 we have started to elaborate a new way of doing educational theory that we felt to be emerging in the field already for some time. It was clear for us that the work of Gert Biesta (2010), Jan Masschelein & Maarten Simons (2013), Tyson Lewis (2013), Norm Friesen (2011), Max van Manen (1991), and many others could be classified as neither technical, nor critical theories of education. Our attempt consisted of making manifest what was common to this alternative educational thinking (Hodgson et al 2017). Undoubtedly, it must have felt uncomfortable for some of the aforementioned authors, but it nonetheless sparked a discussion[3] that revealed, for example, the same theoretical developments in literature studies (Felski 2015; 2020; Anker & Felski 2017). Moreover, since publishing the Manifesto, its authors also did some further work on developing theories of this kind (Hodgson & Ramaekers 2019; Vlieghe & Zamojski 2019). Hence, we are not dealing here with a solid and homogenous current of thought.

---

[3]   See: "On Education. Journal for Research and Debate" (2020) 3(9) – a volume dedicated to the reception of the *Manifesto for a Post-Critical Pedagogy* in educational studies and its dialogue with post-critical current in literature studies. *Manifesto* was also translated into Spanish (2020), Turkish (2021), and German (2022) – each time triggering a debate on post-criticality in educational theory and research.

The term 'post-critical' was the first attempt to find an adequate name for what was going on in the field of educational theory. But, as it often happens, once it has been invented, it started living a life of its own. Although we are not entirely happy with it, it still stays valid as a name for the type of theories we want to engage in. Let me stress it again: post-critical does NOT mean anti-critical, nor does it mean not-critical. Rather, it reflects the necessity of the next step to take after critique, when it has run out of steam (Latour 2004). In that sense, it refers to what Paul Ricoeur (1992) termed as *secondary naivety*. Knowing the importance and the power of the critical paradigm, but also being aware of the dangers it entails, we are not aiming at rejecting its heritage, but rather try to truly inherit it, and make the next step beyond its confines. Yes, from the critical perspective, it will entail naivety (e.g. of making fictional assumptions) – but it is a secondary naivety, made by those who were first trained in critique, and who are aware of its findings, strengths, and shortcomings.

Put otherwise, these kind of theories are affirmative[4]. Post-critical theories make attempts at rediscovering or reclaiming educational practices, phenomena, and experiences that are suppressed, marginalised, or obliterated by the dominant ways of understanding education. To be clear, the term 'dominant ways' refers here to both the technical and the critical understanding of educational theory.

Teaching – to give an example – has become an object of contempt from both the perspective of the Life Long Learning discourse and the perspective of critical pedagogy. For the former, it is just a practice of secondary significance (unlike the process of learning) that can both facilitate as well as hinder learning. For the latter, it is a practice of domination: it consists in the objective violence of imposition of meanings (Bourdieu 1990), and hence it would be better to practice something different than teaching – something like *engaging in collaborative inquiry and dialogue* (Freire 2005) or *fostering critical democracy and social justice* (Giroux 2005: 186).

It is precisely this kind of practices, suppressed from all sides, that post-critical theories want to affirm. There is something intrinsically good, beautiful, and worthwhile in teaching (Vlieghe & Zamojski 2019) and upbringing (Hodgson & Ramaekers 2019), as well as in studying (Lewis 2013), lecturing and notemaking (Vlieghe & Zamojski 2021), in school as such (Masschelein & Simons 2013), and many other practices, phenomena, and experiences that we share when educating, in spite of them being condemned or neglected by the dominant discourses concerning education.

---

[4]   However, not in the sense that Dietrich Benner (2023) develops. For Benner affirmation is a pre-critical phenomenon (cf. Benner 2015: 159), where education is subordinated to external (political, religious, or ideological) ideas. Affirmation, in such a vocabulary, refers to a particular vision of the past or the future, under which education is supposed to be subsumed. It goes without saying that the post-critical stance fully embraces Benner's point that such a subsumption is unacceptable. Contrary to him, however, we argue that education is itself something in need of affirmation, and that educational practices essentially *are* an affirmation of the common world as worthy of the effort of being studied.

To put it differently: what a post-critical approach is willing to affirm is education as such. Education is good in itself, and does not require any external justification. What both technical and critical discourses tend to do is to position education as a means to some economic, societal, or political goal. What those who claim that education should contribute to the knowledge economy and those claiming that education should equip students with the capacity to resist the demands of transnational capital have in common is the conviction that education is the means to secure these opposite goals. Affirming education means treating it as a separate and autonomous sphere of life (Arendt, 1961) that should not be subordinated to neither economy, nor politics (Vlieghe & Zamojski 2020; Korsgaard 2019).

Precisely because of this, affirmative educational theory aims to be immanent (see: Vlieghe & Zamojski 2019: 63–77; Agamben 2007). That is, it aims to articulate the meaning of educational practices on and in their own terms. It is the attempt of asking educational questions about education as opposed to sociological, psychological, historical, economic, or political questions about education (Biesta 2010). If education is a separate and autonomous sphere of life, then it has its own intrinsic logic which is neither political nor economic, but – exactly – educational. Affirming education would therefore mean engaging in attempts to express this logic. This entails: speaking and theorising about education from within, finding for it its autonomous language, speaking out the suppressed parts of our educational experience and making them recognizable as something essential that needs to enter the public discourse on education.

Essentially, education itself is a form of affirmation. It is an affirmation of the common world. If there would be nothing in the world that we would consider worthy of the effort of study, we would have no reason to educate. But this is not how things stand. By putting something on the table (to use Masschelein and Simons' expression) we affirm this part of the world as something that we want to pass on to the next generation, something we think is important, beautiful, or interesting (or all of that).

But what can one do with such theory, which tries to articulate education from within? It is obvious one cannot just simply apply it – as it does not provide any tools. It cannot be used, either, to debunk some hidden layer of our practices and doings as oppressive – as it affirms these practices instead of engaging in critique. In that sense, it is appropriate to refer here to Jan Masschelein's (2010) idea of a *poor pedagogy*. He writes that:

> A poor pedagogy does not promise profits. There is nothing to win (no return), no lessons to be learned. However, such a pedagogy is generous: it gives time and space, the time and space of experience and of thought (Masschelein 2010: 49).

Theory in that sense forms a conceptual space within which one can think, design, experience, and practice education. It is "a pedagogy which helps us to be attentive, which offers us the exercises of an ethos or an attitude" (Masschelein 2010: 49).

It describes educational practices from within, offering in this way a symbolic horizon within which one can practice and understand one's doings (Zamojski 2015). These are theories to be performed, in the meaning of performative arts. They give an account of what needs to happen (what kind of attitudes people can take, in what kind of state they need to put themselves, what assumptions have to be made and practiced) in order for education to take place. Assuming equality of intelligence, focusing attention, exposing oneself to the thing of study etc., all of these are *poor means* – as Masschelein calls them. They are "insufficient, defective, […] lack signification, do not refer to a goal or an end" (Masschelein 2010: 49). Still, one can try to practice them in order to make education happen.

Conclusion

In this article I have tried to give account of the story behind the emergence of a new way of theorising education. For that purpose, three types of educational theories were distinguished. Theories of the technical type aim to describe the mechanisms governing educational processes in order to deliver tools that can be used by educational practitioners and make their actions effective and efficient. Critical theories aim to disclose the hidden layers of educational practices and their entanglement with various social, cultural, and political phenomena in order to make educational subjects (as well as other political actors) aware of the bipolar potential of education (i.e. potentiality to oppress and to emancipate). Finally, the currently emerging post-critical theories aim to give an affirmative and immanent account of these educational practices which are neglected or marginalised by the hegemonic discourses on education. The point of making such redescriptions or reinventions of these practices is to open up a symbolic horizon, through which people engaged in education could recognise and appreciate their own doings and experiences, as well as a horizon within which they could perform education.

Crucially, the main intention of the argument presented here is not to suggest abandoning the technical and/or the critical types of theory altogether, but to justify the engagement in developing the post-critical type which is only emerging.

References

Agamben, G. (1999). *Potentialities. Collected essays in philosophy.* Heller-Roazen, D. (trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Anker, E.S. and Felski, R. (eds.). (2017). *Critique and Postcritique*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Adorno, Th. (2004). *Negative Dialectics*. Ashton, E.B. (trans.). London–New York: Routledge.

Arendt, H. (1961). The Crisis in Education. In: *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*. The Viking Press: New York.

Bacon, F. (2003 [1620]). *Novum organum*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bauman, Z. (1987). *Legislators and interpreters*. Cambridge: Polity press.

Benner, D. (2015). *Pedagogika ogólna. Wprowadzenie do myślenia i działania pedagogicznego w ujęciu systematycznym i historyczno-problemowym*. Stępkowski, D. (tłum.). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego.

Benner, D. (2023). On Affirmativity and Non-affirmativity in the Context of Theories of Education and Bildung. In: Uljens, M. (ed.). *Non-Affirmative Theory of Education and Bildung*. Cham: Springer.

Biesta, G.J.J. (2007). Why 'what works' won't work. Evidence based practice and the democratic deficit of educational research. *Educational Theory* 57(1).

Biesta, G.J.J., (2010). *Good Education in an Age of Measurement. Ethics, Politics, Democracy*. Boulder-London: Paradigm Pub.

Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, JC. (1990). *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. London: Sage.

Ellsworth, E. (1989). Why Doesn't This Feel Empowering? Working Through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy. *Harvard Educational Review* 59(3).

Felski, R. (2015). *The Limits of Critique*. Chicago–London: The University of Chicago Press.

Felski, R. (2020). *Hooked. Art and Attachment*. Chicago–London: The University of Chicago Press.

Freire, P. (2005). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed.* New York–London: Continuum.

Friesen, N. (2011). *The Place of the Classroom and the Space of the Screen. Relational Pedagogy and Internet Technology*. New York: Peter Lang.

Foucault, M. (2005). *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982*. Burchell, G. (trans.). Palgrave: Basingstone.

Giroux, H.A. (1983). *Theory and Resistance in Education. A Pedagogy for the Opposition*. Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey.

Giroux, H.A. (2005). *Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life. Democracy's Promise and Education's Challenge*. Second edition. Boulder–London: Paradigm Publishers.

Gur-Ze'ev, I. (1998). Toward a Nonrepressive Critical Pedagogy. *Educational Theory* 48 (4).

Hodgson, N. and Ramaekers, S. (2019). *Philosophical Presentations of Raising Children: The Grammar of Upbringing*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hodgson, N., Vlieghe, J. and Zamojski, P. (2017). *Manifesto for a Post-Critical Pedagogy*. Earth, Milky Way: Punctum Books.

Hodgson, N., Vlieghe, J. and Zamojski, P. (2020). Manifiesto por una pedagogía post-crítica (traducción al español). Thoilliez, B. (trans.). *Teoría de la Educación. Revista Interuniversitaria* 32(2), http://dx.doi.org/10.14201/teri.22862.

Hodgson, N., Vlieghe, J. and Zamojski, P. (2021). Eleştirel Pedagoji Sonrası İçin Manifesto. *eleştirel pedagoji – Journal of Critical Pedagogy* 67.

Hodgson, N., Vlieghe, J. and Zamojski, P. (2022). Manifest für eine Post-Kritische Pädagogik. In: Bittner, M. and Wischmann, A. (eds.). *Kritik und Post-Kritik. Zur deutschsprachigen Rezeption des »Manifests für eine Post-Kritische Pädagogik«*. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.

Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T.W. (2002). *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Jephcott, E. (trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Korsgaard, M.T. (2019). *Bearing with Strangers: Arendt, Education and the Politics of Inclusion*. London–New York: Routledge.

Latour, B. (2004). Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern. *Critical Inquiry* 30.

Lewis, T. (2013). *On Study: Giorgio Agamben and Educational Potentiality*. London: Routledge.

Masschelein, J. (2010). E-ducating the gaze: the idea of a poor pedagogy. *Ethics and Education* 5(1).

Masschelein, J. and Simons, M. (2013). *In Defence of the School. A Public Issue*. Leuven: E-ducation Culture & Society Pub.

Rancière, J. (1991). *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*. Ross, K. (trans.). Stanford (CA): Stanford University Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1992). *The Symbolism of Evil*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Rutkowiak, J. (ed.). (1995). *Odmiany myślenia o edukacji*. Kraków: Impuls.

Sloterdijk, P. (1987). *Critique of Cynical Reason*. Eldred, M. (trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Szkudlarek, T. (1993a). Wyzwanie pedagogiki krytycznej. In: Szkudlarek, T. and Śliwerski, B. *Wyzwania pedagogiki krytycznej i antypedagogiki.* Kraków: Impuls.

Szkudlarek, T. (1993b). *Wiedza i wolność w pedagogice amerykańskiego postmodernizmu.* Kraków: Impuls.

Szkudlarek, T. (2017). *On the Politics of Educational Theory: Rhetoric, theoretical ambiguity, and the constructions of society*. London–New York: Routledge.

van Manen, M. (1991). *The Tact of Teaching. The Meaning of Pedagogical Thoughtfulness*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Vlieghe, J. and Zamojski, P. (2019). *Towards an Ontology of Teaching. Thing-centred Pedagogy, Affirmation, and Love for the World*. Cham: Springer.

Vlieghe, J. and Zamojski, P. (2020). Redefining education and politics: On the paradoxical relation between two separate spheres. *Policy Futures in Education* 18(7).

Vlieghe, J. and Zamojski, P. (2021). Entering the world with notes: Reclaiming the practices of lecturing and note making. *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 53 (13), https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2020.1743271.

Zamojski, P. (2015). Philosophy for Education – an attempt at exercise in thought, *Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny* 1 (235).

Zamojski, P. (2017). Dialektyka funkcjonalizacji szkoły. In: Chutorański, M., Moroz, J. and Szwabowski, O. (eds.). *Subsumcje edukacji*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Katedra.

Zamojski, P. (2022). Verwerten, entlarven, erleben. Zu den unterschiedlichen Typen und Gebrauchsweisen von Bildungstheorie. In: Bittner, M. and Wischmann, A. (eds.). *Kritik und Post-Kritik. Zur deutschsprachigen Rezeption des »Manifests für eine Post-Kritische Pädagogik«*. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.

Zamojski, P. (2023). Studying with a teacher: education beyond the logic of progress. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad057.

Summary

In this article I perform a metanalysis of a particular moment in the development of the field of educational theory. I do this by distinguishing three (ideal) types of educational theory, and indicating the way these induce particular uses of a theory. Technical educational theories aim at describing causal mechanisms governing education, in order to give efficient means that would make education productive. Critical theories of education offer knowledge on the role of education in perpetuating inequalities, oppression and enslavement, simultaneously stressing education's emancipative or revolutionary potential. Post-critical, affirmative or performative theories try to make a next step after radical critique, that would indicate and express educational phenomena and practices which are marginalised and supressed by the dominant discourses on education. These theories create a symbolic horizon within which one can practice education. There theories are performed in order for education to happen.

Keywords

post-critical pedagogy, Rancière, critical pedagogy, educational theory

Streszczenie

Stosować, demistyfikować, performować. Typy i użycia teorii edukacyjnych

W niniejszym artykule dokonuję metaanalizy określonego momentu rozwoju pola teorii edukacji, wyodrębniając trzy typy (w sensie typów idealnych) teorii edukacyjnych, które facylituję trzy sposoby używania teorii (tj. wiązania jej z praktyką edukacyjną). Techniczne teorie edukacyjne, skupiając się na opisie mechanizmów rządzących procesem edukacyjnym, próbują dostarczyć skutecznych narzędzi działania pedagogicznego, tzn. skutecznych środków, które czynią edukację produktywną. Krytyczne teorie edukacyjne oferują wiedzę demaskującą rolę edukacji w utrwalaniu społecznych nierówności, opresji i zniewolenia, jednocześnie kładąc nacisk na jej emancypacyjny czy rewolucyjny potencjał. Po-krytyczne, afirmatywne czy performatywne teorie próbują zrobić kolejny krok po radykalnej krytyce, który polegałby na afirmatywnej ekspozycji i ekspresji zjawisk i praktyk edukacyjnych spychanych na margines przez dominujące dyskursy edukacyjne. Teorie tego typu tworzą symboliczny horyzont, w którym działanie pedagogiczne staje się możliwe. Takie teorie performuje się.

Słowa kluczowe

po-krytyczna pedagogika, Rancière, pedagogika krytyczna, teoria edukacji

starzy przyjaciel

Marcin Boryczko
ORCID: 0000-0002-1764-4772
Uniwersytet Gdański

Dekolonizowanie pracy socjalnej. Analiza teorii w perspektywie Teorii Kodów Legitymizacji

Kolonializm i postkolonializm

Postkolonializm jest próbą zmiany asymetrycznych relacji między ludźmi Zachodu i resztą globu (Young 2020)[1]. Kluczową ideą w myśli postkolonialnej jest „dekolonizacja umysłu", koncepcja, która jest szczególnie istotna dla rozwoju współczesnej pracy socjalnej. Termin ten, pierwotnie ukuty przez Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, został użyty do analizy sposobu, w jaki kolonializm wpłynął na brak uznania dla rdzennych języków i kultury przez m.in. narzucenie języków, takich jak angielski czy francuski. Jego diagnoza imperializmu obejmuje sposoby, w jakie powiązania między ludźmi i krajami pozostają asymetryczne i wytwarzają tzw. kolonialną alienację, która oddziela ludzi od ich tożsamości, języka i sposobów poznania (wa Thiong'o 1992). Podobnie jak w przypadku teorii dekolonizacji koncepcja „dekolonizacji umysłu" została wykorzystana początkowo do takich zjawisk, jak rasa, tożsamość płciowa, migracja czy *border studies* (Young 2020). Z drugiej strony eurocentryczne i paternalistyczne tradycje „zawodów pomocowych", takich jak praca socjalna, opierają się na różnicy władzy między pracownikami a odbiorcami pomocy i kulturowych reprezentacjach biednych, którzy zostają podporządkowani „władzy specjalistów". Dekolonizacja umysłów pracowników socjalnych wymaga reorientacji, która dowartościuje znaczenie wiedzy spoza zachodnich tradycji intelektualnych i przeniesie emancypacyjną wiedzę z peryferii do centrum. Współcześnie wydaje się, że pracownicy socjalni powinni zaniechać patrzenia na świat z uprzywilejowanych

---

[1] Tekst bazuje na ustaleniach autora opublikowanych w: Madew, Boryczko, Lusk 2023, i stanowi ich rozwinięcie wraz z próbą dostosowania do polskiego kontekstu.

pozycji i przyjąć od czasu do czasu peryferyjną, oddolną orientację, tak aby móc solidaryzować się z tymi, z którymi pracują.

Od pewnego czasu pracownicy socjalni zaczęli dostrzegać historyczne dziedzictwo kolonializmu w kontekście populacji i narodów żyjących niegdyś pod jarzmem kolonializmu, jak również żyjących dziś w postkolonialnej rzeczywistości. Kolonializm imperialny oznacza ekonomiczną, geograficzną i kulturową dominację określonego terytorium przy użyciu siły militarnej lub politycznej. Zakres, w jakim znaczna część świata została zdominowana przez zachodnie sposoby myślenia, kulturę, język i systemy polityczne, był najczęściej nierozpoznany w świecie zachodnim. Europocentryzm Zachodu opierał się m.in. na założeniu niewidzialności doświadczeń zdecydowanej większości ludzi, która obecnie żyje w postkolonialnym świecie, a mimo to nadal podlega paradygmatowi co najmniej symbolicznej władzy kolonialnej. Spojrzenie na świat przez zachodni pryzmat nie tylko zniekształca sposób, w jaki zorganizowana jest reszta świata, ale także błędnie prezentuje doświadczenia konsekwencji kolonializmu. Kolonializm wymazał lokalną historię, zniszczył kultury tubylcze i regionalne, a także zignorował lub zdyskontował ugruntowaną lokalną wiedzę. Dlatego teoria postkolonialna dąży m.in. do przywrócenia i dowartościowania historycznie podporządkowanej rdzennej i lokalnej wiedzy, mądrości i tradycji. Celem artykułu jest omówienie głównych teorii dekolonizacji w obszarze pracy socjalnej, ich analiza i klasyfikacja w oparciu o Teorię Kodów Legitymizacji. Wnioski odnosić się będą do możliwych dróg rozwoju dekolonizacji w analizowanym polu wytwarzania wiedzy.

Praca socjalna: program nauczania i postkolonialna lobotomia

Analiza programu nauczania pracy socjalnej wymaga nie tylko podkreślenia eksponowanych treści, lecz również tych, które są pomijane czy wykluczane. Jak wskazuje Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014a), istnieje przepaść między tym, co może być współobecne lub pomyślane, a tym, co jest nieobecne i niewyobrażalne we współczesnej myśli zachodniej. W perspektywie kolonializmu w teorii i praktyce pracy socjalnej zauważyć możemy „przepastną granicę" (ang. *abyssal line*), która:
– reprodukuje podział na społeczeństwa metropolitalne i peryferyjne;
– utrwala dominację eurocentrycznej perspektywy (Hall 2005);
– podkreśla nieoczywistość i brak uniwersalności treści (potrzeb, praktyk i tendencji) spoza Europy;
– konsoliduje „białość" wyrażoną w lekceważeniu niebiałych twórców i kolonialne ramy epistemiczne (Clarke 2022).

Praca socjalna traktowana jest w zachodniej Europie i USA jako dyscyplina tworząca teoretyczne i praktyczne podstawy społecznego dobrostanu. Według globalnej definicji pracy socjalnej jest to „zawód oparty na praktyce i dyscyplina akademicka, która promuje zmiany społeczne i rozwój, spójność społeczną oraz

upodmiotowienie i wyzwolenie ludzi" (IFSW 2014). W perspektywie dekolonializacji wiedzy kluczowe są refleksyjność oraz krytyczność pozwalające na usłyszenie, zrozumienie oraz poparcie oddolnych głosów, zagłuszanych dotychczas przez wielkie narracje emancypacyjne oparte na eurocentrycznej zglobalizowanej racjonalności. Istnieje jednak szereg przeszkód dla aporii współczesnej myśli krytycznej (Santos 2014b), związanych z ograniczaniem się do naukowego języka opisu oraz budowaniem przekonań w perspektywie idei eurocentrycznych. Nieumiejętność wyjścia poza owe ramy myślenia, ujmowanie wszelkich kwestii społecznych przez pryzmat zachodnioeuropocentryczny uniemożliwia znalezienie nowych rozwiązań, a w konsekwencji przyczynia się do kryzysu zachodniej pracy socjalnej. Kluczowe jest w tym kontekście odróżnienie „wiedzy jako emancypacji" od „wiedzy jako regulacji", o ile eurocentryczna wiedza oparta na neutralności nadal jest istotnym elementem dyscypliny pracy socjalnej i pełni funkcję regulacyjną (Santos 2014b). Rozumienie poznania jako doświadczania pozwala na rozumienie rzeczywistości kolonializowanej, a w dalszej perspektywie budowanie solidarności i więzi pomiędzy społecznościami kolonializowanymi. Jako alternatywny dla eurocentrycznej pracy socjalnej rodzaj krytyki społecznej może ona włączyć, wykluczone m.in. w ramach projektu kolonizacyjnego, wiedzę i światopoglądy. Zmiana podejścia do „epistemologii Południa" i eliminacja „przepastnej granicy" w ramach teorii pracy socjalnej, programu nauczania wydają się niezbędnym warunkiem prawdziwej demokratyzacji i zerwania z kolonialną matrycą władzy.

W polskich warunkach na temat teorii postkolonialnej pisał Tomasz Szkudlarek następująco: „jest to teoria niemal gotowa do wykorzystania w analizach wszelkich problemów ujmowanych w relacji do «zmiany społecznej». «Zmianę» ową teoria mieści bowiem w swoim wnętrzu – nie jest niczym innym, jak właśnie wizją dynamiki zmiany. Z perspektywy tej teorii można mówić o edukacji w jej podwójnej roli: jako o sile zniewalającej, kolonizującej «świat życia» jednostek i społeczności, oraz jako o czynniku dekolonizacji, wyzwolenia, emancypacji" (Szkudlarek 1995: 11).

Ramy koncepcyjne analizy procesów dekolonizowania pracy socjalnej

Teoria Kodów Legitymizacji (ang. *Legitimation Code Theory*) zainicjowana przez Karla Matona (2014) pozwala na identyfikowanie możliwości tworzenia i rozwoju wiedzy, a także procesów jej reprodukowania, w kontekście społecznym. Maton ukuł termin „urządzenie epistemiczno-pedagogiczne" (ang. *epistemic-pedagogical device*), aby opisać „sfery dominacji oporu, walki i negocjacji, zarówno w edukacji, jak i w szerszym społeczeństwie" (Maton 2014: 53). Podobnie jak nauki humanistyczne, praca socjalna opiera się na hierarchii wiedzy, w której teorie często kolidują ze sobą lub uzupełniają się nawzajem, inaczej niż w naukach ścisłych, gdzie mamy do czynienia z kumulacją wiedzy (Maton 2014). W szkolnictwie wyższym

instytucje i różne podmioty walczą o kontrolę nad polami kontrolowanymi przez tzw. narzędzie epistemiczno-pedagogiczne:

– pole produkcji wiedzy, w którym tworzona jest nowa wiedza (w oparciu o logikę epistemiczną);
– pole rekontekstualizacji, w którym wiedza, która została wcześniej stworzona, jest rekontekstualizowana i włączana do programów nauczania (w oparciu o logikę rekontekstualizacji);
– pole reprodukcji – miejsca nauczania i uczenia się – w których wiedza zamienia się w dyskurs pedagogiczny (w oparciu o logikę ewaluacyjną).

Cały proces ma dwie dynamiki: „uprogramowienie" (ang. *curriculization*), które rozciąga się od produkcji do rekontekstualizacji oraz „pedagogizacja" (ang. *pedagogization*), która rozciąga się od rekontekstualizacji do reprodukcji.

Jeśli zapytamy o warunki epistemicznej dekolonizacji w pracy socjalnej, to w procesie tym konieczne będzie włączenie do korpusu wiedzy o pracy socjalnej m.in. tradycji globalnego Południa, jak również zmiana pola produkcji wiedzy. Warunek ten wiązałby się z przejściem od produkcji wiedzy jako zachodniej domeny akademickiej (zachodnie teorie jako opisy naukowe) do wiedzy tworzonej przez społeczności globalnego Południa, które posiadają tradycyjne formy wiedzy, ale też rozwijają nowe jej formy jako akty oporu i adaptacji.

W ramach procesów „uprogramowienia" wymagałoby to zmiany logiki rekontekstualizacji, która w pracy socjalnej wyklucza niezachodnie formy wiedzy. Ma tu znaczenie wskazana wcześniej „przepastna granica", ze względu na którą dyskurs pedagogiczny reprodukuje epistemiczne struktury kolonialne. Konieczny wydaje się namysł zarówno nad treścią programów nauczania pracy socjalnej (nad „regułami gry"), jak i nad podmiotami je konstruującymi. Ważna w tym obszarze byłaby rola badaczy, recenzentów, instytucji i funduszy badawczych, stowarzyszeń badawczych i sieci promujących wiedzę opracowaną na globalnym Południu, gdyż to ich aktywność może implikować dekolonizację programów nauczania pracy socjalnej.

Dekolonizację pracy socjalnej należy analizować w kontekście pola reprodukcji – miejsca nauczania i uczenia się oparte na logice ewaluacyjnej, która reguluje uczenie się i nauczanie dyskursu i praktyki pedagogicznej. Pole to ma kluczowe znaczenie dla procesów uczenia się, ponieważ wymaga zrozumienia, w jaki sposób działają różne systemy hegemoniczne – w tym kolonialne systemy władzy – oraz możliwość rozwijania transformacyjnych form praktyki w pracy socjalnej poprzez krytyczne myślenie i działanie.

Twierdzę, że wszystkie trzy pola – produkcji, rekontekstualizacji i reprodukcji – są definiowane w obszarze kolonialnego myślenia „przepastnej granicy" i że są polem walki o kontrolę nad każdym z pól i relacjami między nimi. Problem zidentyfikowany przez Matona (2014) polega na tym, że „reguły gry" są często niejednoznaczne, jednak postrzega się je jako uniwersalne i w większości niekwestionowane; dlatego musimy być świadomi tego, jak relacje wpływają na pozycje i praktyki aktorów społecznych, badaczy, intelektualistów, osób odpowiedzialnych

za rekontekstualizację, nauczycieli i studentów. Rekontekstualizacja jest procesem, w którym znaczenia z pola produkcji są przekształcane w dyskurs pedagogiczny. Ta pedagogizowana wiedza jest następnie przekształcana w pola reprodukcji, takie jak wiedza przekazywana w akademii, gdzie nauczyciele mogą ponownie kontekstualizować dyskurs (Bernstein 1990). Przyjrzyjmy się, jak wygląda w praktyce pole rekontekstualizacji pracy socjalnej na podstawie analizy literatury, której celem jest dekolonizacja dyscypliny i praktyki pracy socjalnej.

Teorie i praktyki dekolonizacji w obszarze pracy socjalnej

Zdekolonizowane podejścia w pracy socjalnej mogą być bardzo zróżnicowane. Poniższy przegląd perspektyw dekolonizacji w pracy socjalnej odnosi się m.in. do wykorzystania wiedzy lokalnej lub szerzej lokalnych perspektyw na koncepcyjne i praktyczne podstawy procesów dekolonizacji. Znaczące jest również pytanie o uniwersalne wartości i zasady dekolonizacji, które będą napędzać ten proces. Charakterystyki owych teorii dokonuję w sposób hasłowy, starając się zaakcentować ich kluczowe aspekty:

1. Indywidualistyczne koncepcje oparte na autoetnografii: koncentracja na procesie, podróży prowadzącej początkowo do odzyskania „rdzennego dziedzictwa i tożsamości poprzez przebudzenie, eksplorację, «indygenizację», odzyskanie, przynależność i wreszcie pielęgnowanie wyłaniającego się Wojownika" (St-Denis, Walsh 2016).

2. Rdzenne badania rodzinne osadzone w tubylczej metodologii:
   – ukierunkowanie na zachowanie, zapamiętanie i zaangażowanie mocy poznania własnych historii, darów i obowiązków;
   – Jaźń, rodzina i relacje jako krytyczne miejsca oporu i odrodzenia;
   – szersza koncepcja członków społeczności w porównaniu z perspektywami zachodnimi (St-Denis, Walsh 2016);
   – nacisk na osobistą transformację;
   – koncentracja na poziomie mikro, indywidualnej zmianie, która wpływa na poziomy mezo i makro, które ostatecznie obejmują zbiorowy empowerment, samostanowienie rdzennej ludności;
   – konsekwencja podniesienie dobrostanu grupy;
   – antyopresyjna praca socjalna.

3. Neurodekolonizacja:
   – opisanie sposobów, w jaki kolonializm wpływa na procesy poznawcze osób żyjących pod jego jarzmem;
   – redukcja poznawczych i emocjonalnych konsekwencji kolonialnej traumy i ucisku również na poziomie neuronalnym (Yellow Bird 2013);
   – nawiązanie do praktyki uważności oraz filozofii buddyzmu;

- „neurodekolonizacja dąży do zrozumienia, w jaki sposób umysł i funkcjonowanie mózgu są kształtowane przez traumę kolonializmu i zagrażają dobrobytowi rdzennej ludności" (Yellow Bird 2013: 300, tłum. własne);
- joga i medytacja jako czynniki wyzwalające zrozumienie, w jaki sposób umysł i poznanie wchodzą w interakcje z negatywnymi skutkami kolonializmu.

4. Koncepcje opierające się na wieloaspektowych lineażach pracy socjalnej interpretujących jej pochodzenie i historyczny wzrost przez pryzmat podejścia postkolonialnego (Clarke 2022):
   - krytyka kolonialnych ram epistemicznych wzmacniających kolonizujące epistemologie;
   - koncentracja na poszerzeniu pola pracy socjalnej w relacji do przodków i krewnych;
   - celem jest lepsze zrozumienie rdzenności, lokalnych kontekstów i różnorodnych epistemologii pracy socjalnej;
   - nawiązanie m.in. do koncepcji historii publicznej, która opiera się na sposobie rozumienia przeszłości w procesie wspólnego współtworzenia historii (Dean 2018).

5. Dekolonizacja eko-duchowa (ang. *eco-spiritual*):
   - analiza znaczeń dla odbiorców pomocy w perspektywie relacji między jednostką i światem przyrody (Ferreira 2010);
   - założenie, że przyszłość ludzi musi być wspierana przez świadomość wzajemnych powiązań wszystkich istot oraz aktualnego i przyszłego życia, tak aby zmniejszyć negatywne skutki późnego kapitalizmu (Coates 2013);
   - proces dekolonializacji eko-duchowej w sześciu krokach (wg Coatesa): uznanie różnorodności kultur i różnych światopoglądów; uznanie faktu, że dana osoba została poddana procesowi dekolonizacji; rozwinięcie perspektywy historycznej, która wyjaśnia uwikłanie jednostki w obecne relacje władzy; zrozumienie, w jaki sposób dyskursy i relacje władzy kształtują tożsamość jednostki i ramy pojęciowe; krytyczna autorefleksja, która bada, w jaki sposób indywidualny styl życia i wybory często wspierają „opresyjną ideologię"; dyskursywna zmiana języka z języka dysfunkcji na „świętą witalność" (Coates 2013);
   - bazowanie na interdyscyplinarnych badaniach.

6. „Indygenizacja":
   - odpowiedź na krytykę zachodniego modelu pracy socjalnej i domniemanego znaczenia lokalnych zwyczajów i tradycji;
   - wiedza, na której opiera się praca socjalna, „powinna wywodzić się z kultury, odzwierciedlać lokalne zachowania i praktyki oraz być interpretowana w lokalnych ramach odniesienia, a tym samym powinna odnosić się do kulturowo istotnych i specyficznych dla kontekstu problemów" (Gray, Coates 2010: 615, tłum. własne);
   - ograniczone zastosowanie do populacji innych niż rdzenne;

– ryzyko związane z przyjęciem etnocentrycznego punktu widzenia, które ogranicza rdzenną wiedzę do lokalnych kontekstów i uniemożliwia jej szersze znaczenie kulturowe (Gray, Coates 2010).

7. Teoria postkolonialna:
   – teoria ta służy jako przewodnik do dekolonizacji praktyki pracy socjalnej poprzez zwrócenie uwagi na negatywne skutki kolonializmu i zachęcanie do nieopresyjnej praktyki;
   – ukierunkowanie na „niezachodni" punkt widzenie – teoria ta „podnosi możliwość twórczego czerpania z wiedzy z różnorodnych kultur rdzennych lub tworzenia nowej rdzennej wiedzy mającej zastosowanie do współczesnych wyzwań społecznych" (Baikie 2009: 56, tłum. własne).

8. Rdzenna teoria postkolonialna:
   – celem jest dekolonizacja rdzennej edukacji i ustanowienie suwerenności edukacyjnej, która ucieka od „kolonialnej otchłani" i jest zdolna do projektowania przyszłości, uwzględniając niezachodnie perspektywy;
   – nacisk na rdzenną humanistykę, biorącą pod uwagę podobieństwa i różnice posiadane przez wszystkie grupy ludzi, które rozwinęły się w konkretnym ekosystemie będącym podstawą oporu społeczności wobec kolonizacji (Battiste 2013);
   – podkreślenie alternatywnych (w równowadze z eurocentrycznymi kategoriami dyskursywnymi) ujęć człowieczeństwa; celem jest zrozumienie, co to znaczy być człowiekiem w konkretnym ekosystemie;
   – rodzaj uniwersalnego roszczenia do połączenia „podstawowych zdolności" wszystkich kultur, które są zdolne do „komunikowania się za pomocą języka i sztuki, do naznaczania naszego miejsca i postępu w czasie i przestrzeni oraz do refleksyjnego i duchowego umiejscowienia się w stosunku do siebie nawzajem, do świata, który wszyscy dzielimy, oraz do sił, które leżą poza naszym zrozumieniem lub kontrolą" (Battiste 2013: 114, tłum. własne);
   – skutkiem elitaryzm etniczny oraz inkluzywne i uniwersalistyczne twierdzenia, których wspólnym mianownikiem jest dążenie do dekolonizacji myślenia naukowego.

9. Buen vivir (Sumak Kawsay):
   – południowoamerykański tubylczy (inkaski) ruch społeczny;
   – promowanie sposobu życia i model rozwoju, w którym kwestie społeczne, kulturowe, środowiskowe i gospodarcze mają charakter zrównoważony i funkcjonują razem, nie zaś indywidualnie i hierarchicznie;
   – zarówno koncepcja teoretyczna, jak i żywe doświadczenie, które ma na celu realizowanie harmonii społecznej poprzez koncepcje wzajemności, komplementarności i relacyjności;
   – dzieło tubylczej ludności Andów; kompleksowa strategia dekolonizowania, skoncentrowana na przeciwstawianiu się dominującym zachodnim, liberalnym i antropocentrycznym ideologiom rozwoju (Jimenez et al. 2022);

– gospodarka komunitarna, suwerenność żywnościowa i prawa natury: praca jako wyraz więzi społeczno-kulturowych i wspólnotowych, a także prawo do godnej płacy; konstruowanie praw społeczności do ochrony przed systemem globalnego handlu oraz prawa rolników i rdzennej ludności do wolności wyboru systemu rolnego, który wykracza poza paradygmaty ekstraktywistyczne lub produktywistyczne (Calderón Farfán et al. 2021);

– założenie, że organizmy inne niż ludzkie posiadają prawa, nie mogą być w nieskończoność utowarowiane i eksploatowane, a także muszą być traktowane z szacunkiem tak samo jak istoty ludzkie;

– umożliwienie rozwoju sieci wzajemnych, komplementarnych i solidarnych więzi społecznych na kanwie odzyskiwania tradycyjnej, wypartej ludowej wiedzy tubylczej;

– sukcesy w obszarze praktykowania Buen Vivir w różnych kontekstach społeczeństw Ameryki Łacińskiej (Pimentel 2014).

10. Ubuntu:

– szerokie podejście filozoficzne, polegające na postrzeganiu jednostek przez pryzmat społeczności, duchowości i środowiska, odnoszące się do zestawu przekonań i praktyk, które Afrykańczycy postrzegają jako definiujące autentyczność bycia człowiekiem;

– stawanie się człowiekiem poprzez relacje z innymi, współczucie oraz empatię;

– środowisko jako żywa istota zdolna do myślenia, czucia i posiadania emocji integralną częścią ludzkiej społeczności.

11. Teoria krytyczna:

– potencjał rozwoju rdzennej krytycznej pracy socjalnej odzwierciedlany jest w czterech koncepcjach, istotnych dla lokalnej wiedzy ludów tubylczych, związanych z pracą socjalną: sprawiedliwość społeczna, emancypacja, praktyka antyopresyjna i samorzecznictwo;

– potencjał rdzennej pracy socjalnej w kontekście australijskim oraz wady europejskiego krytycznego podejścia w pracy socjalnej, w którym brakuje optyki światopoglądowej ludów tubylczych, gdzie rozumienie pojęć, takich jak zbiorowe samostanowienie, współzależność, wzajemność, zobowiązania oraz rola ziemi i rodziny, jest odmienne niż w kontekście zachodnim (Green, Baldry 2008);

– opracowanie ram teoretycznych mających na celu stworzenie podejścia edukacyjnego opartego na paradygmacie dekolonizacji, w którym zakłada się, że aby edukować nie-rdzennych pracowników socjalnych na temat praktyki, trzeba włączyć zagadnienie walki z siłami dominacji wrogiej uzdrawianiu nie tylko rdzennej ludności, ale także każdego, kto ma w sobie doświadczenie kolonizacji (Rowe, Baldry, Earles 2015).

Zauważalne różnice i napięcia między teoriami a praktykami dekolonizacji można scharakteryzować za pomocą kontinuum perspektyw: od lokalnych, indywidualistycznych, poprzez podejścia kolektywne, działające na poziomie rodziny

i społeczności, po bardziej szerokie idee koncentrujące się na eko-duchowości lub perspektywie ludów tubylczych, a także abstrakcyjne i uniwersalne, mniej wrażliwe na lokalne uwarunkowania, takie jak teoria postkolonialna czy też teoria krytyczna (Coates 2013). Rozwój nowych sposobów zdobywania wiedzy (edukacja, światopoglądy, ontologie itp.) oraz tożsamość osoby zgłaszającej roszczenia do wiedzy (rola podmiotów praktyk związanych z tworzeniem, rekonstrukcją lub wykorzystaniem wiedzy) wydają się być podstawowymi formami legitymizacji i ugruntowywania teorii i praktyk dekolonizacji w obszarze pracy socjalnej. Teorie dekolonizacji podkreślają rolę rdzennych, lokalnych i tradycyjnych, jak również zachodnich, nowoczesnych lub i bardziej uniwersalnych form wiedzy i ich znaczenie w procesie dekolonizacji wiedzy, praktyki i życia wspólnotowego.

Dlatego też, aby zidentyfikować i zmapować znaczenia przypisywane dekolonizacji w obszarze całego zakresu pojęć, posłużę się poniższymi kategoriami analitycznymi. Po pierwsze, istnieje znacząca rola osoby (która mówi i głosi pogląd) i po drugie, jej umiejscowienie (z jakiej pozycji lub perspektywy mówi) w spektrum możliwości między rdzennymi, tradycyjnymi i nowoczesnymi, zachodnimi. Chodzi o sposób, w jaki dekolonizujące podejścia są legitymizowane przez określone praktyki, i kto może być ich podmiotem.

Istnieje jeszcze jeden możliwy wymiar, który charakteryzuje te podejścia, a mianowicie zależność od kontekstu. Dlatego możemy powiedzieć, że niektóre praktyki wiedzy związane z dekolonizacją pracy socjalnej mogą być bardziej zależne od kontekstu lub niezależne od kontekstu, ponieważ w tym przypadku kontekst może zależeć od lokalizacji osoby, podmiotu lub autora zgłaszającego roszczenia do wiedzy na temat dekolonizacji. Lokalizacja ta może być rozpatrywana w szerokim znaczeniu: bycie częścią społeczeństw globalnej Północy lub globalnego Południa, lub w węższym rozumieniu: bycie częścią społeczeństw lokalnych, tubylczych, tradycyjnych lub nowoczesnych, zachodnich lub globalnych. Możemy również zapytać o zasady integrowania różnych form i tradycji wiedzy w ramach dekolonizacji pracy socjalnej. Dlatego możemy spodziewać się tendencji do oddzielania tradycji i podejść, budowania na lokalnych kontekstach i rozwijania ich zgodnie z wewnętrznymi, lokalnymi zasadami (Ubuntu, Buen Vivir) lub tworzenia podejść opartych o zasadę integracji (neurodekolonizacja, eko-duchowość), gdzie zgodnie z potrzebami różne tradycje, światopoglądy mogą być łączone w ramach różnych podejść do dekolonizacji w obszarze pracy socjalnej.

Teoria Kodów Legitymizacji: analiza pola przez pryzmat specjalizacji

KOD WIEDZY (ER+, SR–)

specjalistyczna wiedza, zasady lub procedury jako znacząca,

a cechy aktorów są nieistotne

(w kontekście dekolonizacji oznacza to bezosobowe sposoby, metody i podejścia do dekolonizacji pracy socjalnej)

Przykłady:
teoria krytyczna,
teoria postkolonialna,
lineaże pracy socjalnej

KOD PODMIOTU WIEDZY (ER–, SR+)

specjalistyczna wiedza, zasady lub procedury mniej znacząca,

rola atrybutów aktorów jest podkreślana jako wskaźniki osiągnięć

(w kontekście dekolonizacji oznacza to, że główną rolę odgrywają cechy aktorów, które są podkreślane jako wskaźniki osiągnięć, niezależnie od tego, czy cechy te są uważane za społeczne, np. bycie członkiem skolonizowanych społeczności, wyuczone, np. bycie spadkobiercą lokalnej, rdzennej wiedzy, czy wrodzone, np. naturalna zdolność wynikająca z bycia członkiem rdzennej społeczności)

teoria kodów legitymizacji – analiza pola

Przykłady:
Ubuntu, Buen Vivir,
rdzenna teoria krytyczna,
rdzenna teoria postkolonialna,
neurodekolonizacja, podejście
eko-społeczne

Przykłady:
Ubuntu, Buen Vivir, rdzenna teoria
krytyczna, rdzenna teoria
postkolonialna

KOD ELITARNY (ER+, SR+)

znaczące bycie odpowiednim podmiotem wiedzy i posiadanie specjalistycznej wiedzy. Są to warunki legitymizacji praktyki zwanej dekolonizacją pracy socjalnej

(oznacza to posiadanie wiedzy, zasad lub procedur dekolonizacji, a jednocześnie bycie odpowiednią osobą, która jest częścią skolonizowanych społeczności, posiadanie trakdycyjnej wiedzy)

KOD RELATYWISTYCZNY (ER–, SR–)

Wszystko może być legalnie zaakceptowane, ani wiedza ekspercka, ani cechy wiedzącego nie są istotne, stanowisko „wszystko jest dozwolone"

Ryc. 1. Kody specjalizacji dekolonizującej pracę socjalną

Źródło: Badania własne.

W obszarze czterech powyższych kodów znaczenie ma „to, co wiesz" albo „jakiego rodzaju podmiotem wiedzy jesteś" – jedno i drugie istotne jest w przypadku kodów elitarnych lub żadne z nich nie ma znaczenia, jak w przypadku kodów relatywistycznych.

Wnioski

W badaniach opartych na kodach specjalizacji zauważyć można tzw. „zderzenie kodów" (Maton 2014; Maton, Chen 2020). Oznacza to sytuację, kiedy różne podejścia w obrębie tego samego pola intelektualnego lub praktyk tworzą spektrum możliwości. Teza tu prezentowana zakłada, że dzieje się tak w przypadku podejść

dekolonizacyjnych w obszarze pracy socjalnej. Różne podejścia w danym polu intelektualnym można scharakteryzować za pomocą kodów, wskazując, że w grę wchodzą różne formy wiedzy i dyspozycje autorów/aktorów oraz leżące u ich podstaw zasady organizujące praktykę. Uderzający jest w tym kontekście brak kodu relatywistycznego, który wiązałby się z przyjęciem postawy „wszystko wolno". Jest to wynik założenia, że dekolonizacja powinna obejmować przynajmniej minimalny zakres wiedzy czy osobistej dyspozycji – w każdym przypadku relacje społeczne lub epistemiczne odgrywają rolę w tym procesie.

Ryc. 2. Mapowanie pozycji dekolonizacji pracy socjalnej w ramach kodów specjalizacji

Źródło: Badania własne.

Jeśli nałożymy na układ współrzędnych ukazujących możliwości w zakresie kodów specjalizacji i zmapujemy możliwości w zakresie ER i SR, to zauważymy możliwe scenariusze i zasady organizujące dekolonizację wiedzy w obszarze pracy socjalnej: od lokalnych, odizolowanych, indywidualnych lub opartych na społeczności lokalnej koncepcji wiedzy istotnych dla pracy socjalnej wyłaniających się z lokalnego kontekstu (mogą one przybrać kształt elitaryzmu etnicznego czy poglądów etnocentrycznych), po uniwersalistyczne, abstrakcyjne i niezależne od kontekstu, takie jak teoria krytyczna lub teoria postkolonialna. Pytanie można sformułować w następujący sposób: jakie są zasady organizujące to, w jaki sposób wiedza może być wykorzystywana i jaką pełnić rolę w procesie dekolonizacji pracy socjalnej?

Wymienić można co najmniej dwie potencjalne drogi: integrujące podejścia uniwersalistyczne oraz separujące wiedzę i praktyki dekolonizacji „lokalne esencjalizmy". Walka o ustanowienie metod i podejść dekolonizowania w obszarze pracy socjalnej oscyluje między esencjalizmem a uniwersalizmem, w których ten pierwszy skupia się na treści wiedzy i powiązanych praktykach „lokalnych", w tym przypadku na tradycyjnym i mniej lub bardziej zależnym kulturowo zbiorze wiedzy, który w niektórych kontekstach może być określany jako rdzenny czy tubylczy. W przypadku uniwersalizmu zaś mielibyśmy do czynienia ze zdekolonizowaną dialektyką, nowym zdekolonizowanym uniwersalizmem, który wymyka się eurocentrycznemu uniwersalizmowi jako stale przemieszczający się uniwersalizm, opisany przez George'a Ciccariello-Mahera w następujący sposób: „To, co może wydawać się sprzecznością, jest jednak rozwiązywane tylko czasowo poprzez ciągłą i otwartą walkę, która definiuje naszą zdekolonizowaną dialektykę: nie może być jedności, dopóki nie nastąpi walka, i to właśnie w twierdzeniu o potrzebie takiej «przyszłej walki» uniwersalność jest nieustannie przemieszczana" (2017: 136, tłum. własne). Natura uniwersalizmu – czy jest on „nieustannie przemieszczany", czy „tymczasowy" – pozostaje kwestią nierozstrzygniętą. Z teoretycznego i praktycznego punktu widzenia jedynym możliwym uniwersalizmem jest uniwersalizm, „który nie jest jeden". Według Lindy Zerilli „nie jest to kwestia ważenia każdego konkretnego roszczenia do uniwersalności w stosunku do jakiegoś transkulturowego lub transhistorycznego uniwersalizmu, ani decydowania, które roszczenie zostanie uznane jako «prawdziwie uniwersalne» zgodnie z pewnymi istniejącymi wcześniej kryteriami normatywnymi, etycznymi lub poznawczymi. Jest to raczej kwestia mediowania relacji między tym, co partykularne, a tym, co uniwersalne w przestrzeni publicznej, przy czym każda mediacja pozostaje otwarta na dalszy uniwersalizm" (Zerilli 1998: 18, tłum. własne). Idea uniwersalizmu „który nie jest jeden" wyraża możliwość zachowania niedoskonałych i oczywiście tymczasowych uniwersalizmów. Wydaje się, że aktualne procesy dekolonizowania pracy socjalnej odzwierciedla ten proces mediacji, tworząc tymczasowe pluriwersalizmy (Escobar 2020) i otwarte ramy teoretyczne dla perspektyw innych niż zachodnie.

Nie ma wątpliwości, że teorie w ramach dekolonizacji pracy socjalnej będą rozwijać się zgodnie z zasadą integracji, zmierzając w kierunku kodu wiedzy i kodu elitarnego, mówiąc językiem Teorii Kodów Legitymizacji, gdzie relacje epistemiczne i społeczne staną się bardziej istotne. Można założyć, że mozaika wielu tradycji zaowocuje integracją możliwych zlokalizowanych sposobów dekolonizacji pracy socjalnej lub też znaczenia nabiorą nowe lokalne ruchy uniwersalistyczne, takie jak afrocentryczne Ubuntu lub południowoamerykański Buen Vivir zmienią „reguły gry", stając się częściowo globalnymi obszarami rozwoju wiedzy w obszarze np. nauk społecznych i środowiskowych.

Literatura

Baikie G., 2009, *Indigenous-centred social work* [w:] *Wicihitowin: Aboriginal social work in Canada*, eds. R. Sinclair, M.A. Hart, G. Bruyere, Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.

Battiste M., 2013, *Decolonizing education: Nourishing the learning spirit*, Vancouver: Purich Publishing.

Bernstein B., 1990, *Class, codes and controli*, vol. 4: *The structuring of pedagogic discourse*, London: Routledge.

Calderón Farfán J.C., Dussán Chaux J.D., Arias Torres D., 2021, *Food autonomy: Decolonial perspectives for indigenous health and buen vivir*, „Global Health Promotion", vol. 28 (3).

Ciccariello-Maher G., 2017, *Decolonizing dialectics*, Durham: Duke University Press.

Clarke K., 2022, *Reimagining social work ancestry: Toward epistemic decolonization*, „Affilia", vol. 37 (2).

Coates J., 2013, *Ecospiritual approaches: A path to decolonizing social work* [w:] *Environmental social work*, eds. M. Gray, J. Coates, Hetherington–Oxon–New York: Routledge.

Cook S., 2020, *If social work knowledge is still based on western values, can practice really be anti-oppressive?*, https://www.communitycare.co.uk/2020/02/03/social-work-knowledge-still-based-western-values-can-practice-really-anti-oppressive/ (dostęp: 30.11.2023).

Dean D.M., 2018, *A companion to public history*, Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Escobar A., 2020, *Pluriversal politics: The real and the possible. Latin America in translation*, Durham: Duke University Press.

Ferreira S.B., 2010, *Eco-spiritual social work as a precondition for Social Development*, „Ethics and Social Welfare", vol. 4 (1).

Gray M., Coates J., 2010, *'Indigenization' and knowledge development: Extending the debate*, „International Social Work", vol. 53 (5).

Gray M., Coates J., Hetherington T., 2013, *Environmental social work*, Oxon–New York: Routledge.

Green S., Baldry E., 2008, *Building indigenous Australian social work*, „Australian Social Work", vol. 61 (4).

Hall R.E., 2005, *Eurocentrism in social work education*, „Journal of Social Work", vol. 5.

Hölscher D., Chiumbu S., 2019, *Anti-oppressive community work practice and the Decolonization Debate*, „Community Practice and Social Development in Social Work", vol. 2 (2).

Ibrahima A.B., Mattani M.A., 2019, *Social work in Africa: Decolonizing methodologies and approaches*, „International Social Work", vol. 62 (2).

International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW), 2014, *Global definition of social work*. https://www.ifsw.org/what-is-social-work/global-definition-of-social-work/ (dostęp: 30.11.2023).

Jimenez A., Delgado D., Merino R., Argumedo A., 2022, *A decolonial approach to innovation? building paths towards buen vivir*, „The Journal of Development Studies", vol. 58 (9).

King J., 2022, *Decolonizing social work education through indigenous family-based research. Intersectionalities*, „A Global Journal of Social Work Analysis, Research, Polity, and Practice", vol. 10 (1).

Kurevakwesu W., Maushe F., 2020, *Towards afrocentric social work: plotting a new path for social work theory and practice in Africa through Ubuntu*, „African Journal of Social Work", vol. 10 (1).

Madew M., Boryczko M., Lusk M. (eds.), 2023, *Decolonized approaches to human rights and social work*, London: Springer.

Maton K., 2014, *Knowledge and knowers: Towards a realist sociology of education*, Oxon–New York: Routledge.

Maton K., Chen R.T.H., 2020, *Specialization codes: Knowledge, knowers and student success* [w:] *Accessing academic discourse: Systemic functional linguistics and legitimation code theory*, eds. J.R Martin, K. Maton, Y.J. Doran, London: Routledge.

Pimentel Marañón B., 2014, *Buenvivir y descolonialidad. Crítica al Desarrollo y la racionalidad instrumentales*, Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

Rowe S., Baldry E., Earles W., 2015, *Decolonising social work research: Learning from critical indigenous approaches*, „Australian Social Work", vol. 68 (3).

Sasakamoose J.L., Scerbe A., Wenaus I., Scandrett A., 2016, *First Nation and Métis youth perspectives of health*, „Qualitative Inquiry", vol. 22 (8).

Santos de Sousa B., 2014a, *Globalizations*, „Theory Culture Society", vol. 23.

Santos de Sousa B., 2014b, *Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistemicide*, Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.

St-Denis N., Walsh Ch., 2016, *Reclaiming my indigenous identity and the emerging warrior: An autoethnography*, „Journal of Indigenous Social Development", vol. 5 (1).

Szkudlarek T., 1995, *Wydarzenie, urzeczywistnienie, różnica: edukacyjna autokreacja społeczeństwa* [w:] *Różnica, tożsamość, edukacja. Szkice z pogranicza*, red. T. Szkudlarek, Kraków: Impuls.

Tamburro A., 2013, *Including decolonization in social work education and practice*, „Journal of Indigenous Social Development", vol. 2 (1).

Thiong'o wa N., 1992, *Decolonising the mind: The politics of language in African literature*, Nairobi: East African Publishers.

Yellow Bird M., 2013, *Neurodecolonization: Applying mindfulness research to decolonizing social work* [w:] *Decolonizing social work*, eds. M. Gray, J. Coates, M. Yellow Bir, T. Hetherington, Oxam–New York: Routledge.

Young R.J., 2020, *Postcolonialism: A very short introduction*, Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press.

Zerilli L.M., 1998, *This universalism which is not one*, „Diacritics", vol. 28 (2).

Streszczenie

Celem artykułu jest omówienie głównych teorii dekolonizacji w obszarze pracy socjalnej, ich analiza i klasyfikacja w oparciu o Teorię Kodów Legitymizacji. Wnioski odnoszą się do możliwych dróg rozwoju dekolonizacji w analizowanym polu tworzenia wiedzy. Tekst bazuje na koncepcji dekolonizacji w obszarze teorii i praktyki pracy socjalnej rozumianej jako globalna profesja. Wprowadzona został koncepcja Teorii Kodów Legitymizacji, za pomocą której dokonano analizy perspektyw teoretycznych w obszarze dekolonizowania pracy socjalnej. Wnioski dotyczą możliwego rozwoju procesu dekolonizacji w obszarze integrowania oraz separowania inspiracji teoretycznych.

Słowa kluczowe

dekolonizacja, praca socjalna, Teoria Kodów Legitymizacji

Summary

Decolonizing Social Work.
An Analysis of Theory from the Perspective of Legitimation Code Theory

The aim of this article is to discuss the main theories of decolonisation in the field of social work, their analysis and classification based on the Legitimation Code Theory. Conclusions will refer to possible ways for decolonisation in the analysed field of knowledge production. The text is based on the concept of decolonisation in the field of social work theory and practice understood as a global profession. The idea of Legitimation Code Theory is introduced with which theoretical perspectives in the field of decolonising social work are analysed. The conclusions concern the possible development of the decolonisation process in the field of integrating and separating theoretical inspirations.

Keywords

decolonisation, social work, Legitimation Code Theory

2 maj 1982

Piotr Kowzan
ORCID: 0000-0002-6506-8327
University of Gdańsk

The Pedagogy of Geese Sent into the Future:
On the Theory of Value

I like it when pedagogical thinking confronts the dread of the future, softening the boundaries between disciplines in the process. Pedagogy is an applied science, so we seek to address problems. Today, this sense of dread arises from the climate catastrophe, wars, and the ways in which humanity will use artificial intelligence. And although educators can do little on Earth, where the extinction of species rather than their persistence is the rule, they continue to try. We promote education for peace, climate change education as well as media literacy.

These attempts to bring out the potential of humanity, however, face difficulties due to the socio-economic order known as capitalism. Adding dynamism to the processes of exploitation and emancipation are *general-purpose* (GP) technological innovations, with artificial intelligence being the most disruptive of them, more discovered than merely invented, thanks to machine learning techniques. Therefore, in this article, in a somewhat post-apocalyptic spirit, I will address the issue of creating values that mobilise people to act regardless of the challenges.

The paper that I would include in the "educator creatively terrified of the world" trend is "'Koniec pracy' czy koniec zatrudnienia? Edukacja wobec presji światowego rynku" by Tomasz Szkudlarek (2005). This was the first and, for years, the only pedagogical publication to address the problem of the morphology of money in shaping cooperation between people. Szkudlarek drew attention to the monopoly of money as a source of social problems. He diagnosed that it is the lack of money in the region that causes apathy, even though there is "plenty of work to be done" around (Szkudlarek 2005: 30). This paradox was already worrying John M. Keynes a century ago (Dowbor 2023). Szkudlarek attempted to address the problem by writing about money of a structure different from the state, whose circulation is coordinated by time banks:

It would seem that the lower the degree of formalisation and "materialisation" of money, the safer from the point of view of the legal protection of the money monopoly. For this reason, "time bank" organisations, where the only criterion used to account for work is the duration of the work, are relatively widespread (Szkudlarek 2005: 26).

And he urged:

I believe that educational circles should – and have the chance to – begin a public debate concerning the legal conditions for time banks and other work exchange systems and lead to an unambiguous legal interpretation that enables safe animation work (Szkudlarek 2005: 30).

"'Koniec pracy' czy koniec zatrudnienia? Edukacja wobec presji światowego rynku" is an instructive paper even today. It is not just about the pressure of the labour market caused by the development of artificial intelligence; the challenge of undervaluing human labour also includes "expendable people" (Czarnowski 2018), who may be drawn into the service of social media violence if other activities do not seem more meaningful, profitable, or simply accessible to them. I was captivated by a small detail in this article, a sentence starting with: "A few years ago while cycling through Central Pomerania…", because it revealed the spontaneous origin of the empiricism appearing in the article. It was just an accidental discovery in the laboratory of everyday life. An eyewitness account of the living conditions of people deprived of access to state money reduced the now traditional critique of capitalism in its then neo-liberal form to seeking solutions to the problem of depriving people, places and activities of value by cutting them off from money, the universal mechanism for regulating access and inducing mass cooperation.

In retrospect, this article could constitute a good reason why Tomasz Szkudlarek became the supervisor of my doctoral dissertation. In it, I addressed the educational role of debt. During the course of my work, I drew on an anthropological approach, exploring the multiplicity of what can serve as currency (*monies*). I have been exploring how people cope with the expansion of those deviously regulating access to the world of goods that is modern money (Kowzan 2021). Today, I understand that many of the problems with capitalism that Szkudlarek wrote about could then and can still be solved even on a regional level, making it so that instead of hoarding money, it can be treated simply as a regulator of exchange. An example of an effective solution is negative interest money, which discourages hoarding and encourages actions in favour of protecting values with zero productivity, such as investing in a forest reserve. All this while maintaining the monopoly of money, which Szkudlarek identified as a fundamental problem.

Of course, this potentially quick and technically easy (one decision) solution would cause other problems. However, no one would stifle people's activity anymore by keeping money away from them.

In this article, I will focus on the second function of money – the storage of value. We identify numerous values that are worthy of passing on or even storing, but it is difficult for educators to find the tools to make these values sustainable in

a world where money with universal convertibility dominates. I will discuss the possibilities opened up by the function of storing wealth, showing how to weave it into scientific exploration at school, in a lecture or seminar. I will use a historical example from a café, not a lecture hall.

During the interwar period, a group of mathematicians emerged in Lviv who became famous for both their discoveries and the scale of their impact on mathematics. They were remembered as the Lviv school of mathematics and were characterised by their work not only at the university, but also in a café. There, they formulated and solved problems, interspersed with discussions on various topics. Their specific work was documented by the so-called *Scottish Book*, where identified mathematical problems were posted as challenges:

> They were placed on one side of consecutive pages of the notebook, leaving, space on the other for the solution. They were labelled with a number, the date, the name of the problem's author, and information concerning the reward they were establishing. A reward appeared first with the sixth issue. Stanisław Mazur promised to buy the author of a good solution a bottle of wine. The amount of the reward depended on the difficulty of the problem and the ingenuity of the author. The rewards varied, "ranging from a small black coffee to a live goose" – Steinhaus recalls. Or from one small beer to five, also small ones, funded by Mazur and Knaster, to 10 dag of caviar promised by Steinhaus, a kilo of bacon from Stanislaw Saks to dinner in the restaurant of Lviv's best hotel George (Steinhaus). There were also rewards to be claimed abroad: lunch at the Dorothy restaurant in Cambridge (funded by Englishman A.J. Ward) and even a fondue à la crème, which Swiss mathematician Rolin Wavre promised to feed (in Geneva!) to the author of the solution. The most frequently declared reward was alcohol. A bottle of wine (a bonus for solving the tasks of Banach, Mazur, Ulman, and Sobolev), champagne (funded by Łazar Lusternik) or whisky ("of a measure greater than zero" – which was promised by John von Neumann). But the strangest award was a live goose. The problem posed by Stanisław Mazur in the summer of 1936 waited to be solved until 1972 (Urbanek 2014: 10–11).

Rewards were usually simple and available in the café, although it was the most eccentric ones, such as a live goose, that made history. And did so because the problem, for the solution of which the reward was a live goose, was solved many years later, and the winner was indeed given a goose.

Perhaps only connoisseurs of economic anthropology will appreciate the detail that the goose ultimately handed over as a reward did not exist when it became the object of the promise. Stanisław Mazur, i.e. the person who cared about solving a given problem, went into debt voluntarily, i.e. took resources from the future to assign the problem an interesting value. Several decades later, he had to make this goose real, so that it could be collected by Per Enflo for solving the posed problem.

An *I Owe You* is basically money and works as long as people share the belief in the promise being fulfilled. Interestingly, fulfilling the promise makes this money cease to exist. Adding a condition, fulfilling which entitles individuals to end the existence of money, makes it impossible or extremely exclusive to convert it into other goods, as it is restricted to a group of individuals who fulfil the condition. The

goose opens a meritocratic tournament in which you have to use certain skills in a unique way to win. Winning the goose changes basically nothing in the material status of the winner. The award simply becomes an excuse for the shared laughter of witnesses to the ceremony, because having a live goose is more trouble than a benefit. Nevertheless, it is difficult to overestimate the prestige of solving a problem that is associated with such an eccentric reward that can be proudly shown.

Why are geese pedagogically relevant?

Geese can be used to mark abandoned lecture threads. Geese will invite you to undertake research from where the previous generation left off. Geese are offered democratically, that is, to anyone, not just to loved ones, students, or acolytes.

Let's start with a lecture. Let's take a look at the practical challenges of implementing a thing-centred pedagogy (Zamojski 2019). The teacher presents an object or topic worth studying on a table or board. The logic and dynamics of a lecture or seminar do not allow for addressing all aspects of the object at once. Thus, threads that are indefinitely suspended come into play. Sometimes, a lecture leads students to issues that are intriguing and worth resolving, but too distant from the object of study. These, however, will not be the threads that constitute what students will call knowledge, but, at most, a digression. If those studying do not spot someone else's geese from the edge of a pier (which is what the digression is) or release their own, they will turn back on the trail, looking for the path that they later recognise as the main thread. And when it is another lecture on the same subject, even if one approaches it with a teacher's love (Vlieghe, Zamojski 2019), the initial excitement about the exploratory nature of the lecture gives way to the feeling of visiting a collection that has already been described many times – museum-like, so to speak. At that point, we see the geese rather stuffed, meaning we measure the state of knowledge by our own achievements in the given field or those of our predecessors.

Geese are important for the intergenerational dimension of scientific inquiry. In the humanities, researchers declare to which of their predecessors they owe their choice of research problems or even their own way of thinking. It is a kind of intellectual debt that no one forces them to accept. The descendants decide which threads to pick up from where. However, they are often deprived of guidance, like the list of open problems that the *Scottish Book* once provided. Without the V-formations of geese, the work of the descendants begins and sometimes ends with reinterpreting the thoughts of predecessors in the face of contemporary challenges and sensibilities. A substitute for the geese are the mere ritualistic remarks at the end of the paper, suggesting what else should be investigated to gain a fuller picture than just what was covered in the described study. However, problems in science, and especially in pedagogy, are "hairy", meaning they have branches or difficult-to-grasp rhizomes, to which we sometimes promise (ourselves!) to return

in a later paper. And when this does not happen, it should be acknowledged that the potential goose did not hatch from the egg. Researchers familiar with the topic ran out of time, and the future ones won't notice it. The problems will remain "hairy", and the rhizomes will remain synonymous with indeterminacy.

One may regret that pedagogical knowledge is not always cumulative in nature and that the multiplicity of paradigms (actual theoretical-cognitive limitations or mere doctrines) is the cause of incommensurability of achievements. However, this does not have to be a permanent diagnosis. By releasing V-formations of geese, we force ourselves or our successors to establish criteria for success and resolution. Mathematicians, with their formalised language and proof procedures, had it easier in this respect when proposing their geese. Yet, they have not given up on breaking down the barriers between strongly distinct fields of mathematics (number theory, harmonic analysis, geometries, etc.) and they continue to build bridges between them through the Langlands programme. By releasing V-formations of geese, we not only inspire educators to search and explore, but also create opportunities to establish new criteria for success that can contribute to the advancement of pedagogy as a scientific discipline.

Why should a goose be eccentric?

Geese in their potential state, meaning those promised, not only facilitate intergenerational continuity in research. They also cross borders and cultural boundaries because, if they are eccentric enough, they gain recognition in other countries. In the historical context, these were probably geese intended for consumption. This culinary nature of designating a research problem is related to the festive nature of mathematicians' meetings. A shared meal is synonymous with hospitality, and it is a time free from calculations like "What's in it for me?" or "Who are you to me?". It is egalitarian. The symbolic goose can be anything, from a bottle of wine waiting for a brave person to complete a challenge, to a few grams of cannabis to be picked up in a friendly country. It should be spectacular and eccentric (hence the cannabis example), because it is not about financial resources but about the cosmopolitan bond between enthusiasts of a particular field.

The term "eccentricity" is used loosely here, but the essence of the mechanism for creating value is to connect a demanding task with an unusual reward that breaks behavioural norms. This unique approach is important because without a distinctive lifestyle (almost aristocratic), i.e., the eccentricity of the group setting the rewards, the creation of value may become culturally barren, despite its apparent productivity. Let the account of how Lviv's tradition continued in Wrocław after the Second World War serve as a warning against routine:

The New Scottish Book, established in Wrocław after the war, survived for forty years. There were 968 issues and problems entered into it, as calculated by Professor Roman Duda. The first was placed by Steinhaus in early July 1946, and the last one appeared in 1987. There were also rewards. In the style of the pre-war ones: a bottle of champagne to drink in Paris (from the French mathematician Gustav Choquet), 300 litres of Pilsner beer (Czech Vojtech Jarnik), but also in the spirit of the new regime (Urbanek 2014: 229).

And further:

The Wrocław Book (that was its other name), despite its much longer duration, has not become as legendary as its original. There was Hugo Steinhaus in Wrocław, there was no shortage of other eminent mathematicians and originals, a notebook similar to Lviv's was bought (and then two more), but the spirit of the Scottish café was missing (Urbanek 2014: 229).

Not only has sitting in cafés apparently disappeared in Wrocław, but sitting in them in modern times is no longer perceived negatively. Creating values is an act that requires transgression. If the awards are "in the spirit of the new regime", this is insufficient. If almost everything valuable can be bought with money, it means a profanation of these previously non-exchangeable values. It is a similar profanity to set up a live goose as a reward for solving a scientific problem, or a few cows for killing or injuring a neighbour, which used to break the cycle of family revenge. Establishing the value of one case against another is arbitrary. Therefore, it requires an event, in the sense given to the term by Alain Badiou (2010), i.e. something that escapes representation and to which people will want to bear witness. Then the procedure of assigning values is bearable and becomes culture-creating.

It is most likely that this eccentricity was missing from the time banks, which were given attention by Szkudlarek. A logical and technically efficient system for converting work into time can be developed, which was quite anchored in Marxian analyses. However, such a system failed to handle commodity fetishism, i.e. the magic of money itself, when it also represents wealth (*cf.* Winczewski 2017).

Geese in the language of value theory

In the field of pedagogy, when we deal with values, we can observe efforts directed at identifying values and establishing their hierarchy, which involves indicating what is good and desirable in social life (*cf.* Koźmińska, Olszewska 2014). Then, there are attempts to understand the interchangeability of values, often inspired by linguistics and involving the localisation of meanings, as simply naming something is a form of valuing. In this context, it is about preventing everything from being subordinated to the value of state money (*cf.* Rutkowiak 2010) and understanding the processes by which certain values are combined with or subordinated to others in social life. Regarding this latter issue, Ernest Laclau's theory of hegemony, developed by Szkudlarek, is relevant, even though it does not directly mention values. It grew out of an

analysis of how various social demands converged under the common demand of Solidarity (Laclau 2009; Szkudlarek 2016). The third perspective is thinking about values in terms of cultivating them (Mendel et al. 2018; Nikitorowicz 2019), with an emphasis on the role of memory, particularly institutional memory.

The weakest aspect of pedagogical research is the identification of material carriers of value, which in recent years has led to an increase in biased reviews of popular culture offerings such as games, toys, and books. This approach generally does not even attempt to recognise the hidden program within them but instead relies on a "witch trial" approach – viewing cultural artefacts through the lens of a pre-imposed doctrine, usually religious in nature.

Against this backdrop, geese (and other eccentric promises) constitute an attempt to take an instrumental approach in establishing values and creating opportunities for cultivating them by future generations. Geese initiate a tournament, challenge, or game and can be woven into didactics as an addition to a task without a known solution. Geese do not operate according to the logic of the gift, in the way we are accustomed to interpreting the theory of Marcel Mauss (1966), because they do not initiate reciprocal social relations. Rather, they encourage hard but hidden work, because in a tournament it is the result that counts. Cultivation, meaning this largely hidden effort, becomes a side effect of the value-setting process. The eccentricity of geese towards a field in which the task is anchored can make the goose-reward an object of desire, analogous to receiving state money for its own sake.

The emergence of a winner ceremoniously brings to an end the work of many others who also attempted to meet the challenge. And from the perspective focused on the efforts of working people, geese fit into the Marxist theory of value, as they cannot materialise without work. However, it is, by definition, unpaid work, and its aggregate quantity cannot be measured. Attempts to solve the posed problem ultimately turn out to be a form of active support. Therefore, cultivating values is less about defining what a value is and more about the act of valuing, which stimulates people to act. Thus, it constitutes the construction of a fundamentally Piagetian structure, because "Piaget insists that the basis of any system of knowledge is always a set of practices: Mathematics, for example, is not derived from the "idea of number" but from the practice of counting. The abstract categories, however important, never come first." (Graeber 2001: 61).

The geese are closest to the interpretation of values proposed by Nancy Munn (1986), who linked them to control over time and space in her model of value creation – developed on the tiny island of Gawa in Papua New Guinea. In the context of geese, control and shaping of the world, which is the field of science, is taking place. For Munn, acting is a value in itself, meaning that the act of giving constitutes the value, not what is given:

> Value, then, is the way people represent the importance of their own actions to themselves – though Munn also notes that it we are not talking about something that could occur in isolation […], it

can only happen through that importance being recognized by someone else. The highest level of control over space and time is concretized simply as "fame," that is, the fact that others, even others one has never met, consider one's name important, one's actions significant. (Graeber 2001: 45).

Therefore, it sidesteps the issue of whether values are manifested in gifts or goods (including money):

> Rather than having to choose between the desirability of objects and the importance of human relations, one can now see both as refractions of the same thing. Commodities have to be produced (and yes, they also have to be moved around, exchanged, consumed . . .), social relations have to be created and maintained; all of this requires an investment of human time and energy, intelligence, concern. If one sees value as a matter of the relative distribution of that [this effort P.K.], then one has a common denominator. One invests one's energies in those things one considers most important, or most meaningful. (Graeber 2001: 45).

In this view, the goose is merely a prop, a synecdoche drawing attention to itself. It is important that geese prevent apathy when "there is a lot of work to do" (Szkudlarek 2005: 30). They serve as fleeting incentives for action (someone might solve a task before us) and, at the same time, as signposts in a space that, to the novice, may seem devoid of reference points. In fact, this applies not only to novices. We value maps for their ability to offer a view of the whole by recognising boundaries. The V-formations of geese are arrows on the trail, pointing the way to the door behind which the unknown awaits. And there is also someone who cares about opening them.

Conclusion

I examined the issue of money monopoly raised by Szkudlarek. Based on my own research, I assumed that dismantling monopoly itself is not necessary for social change, and instead I focused on the functions of money in society. It serves two basic functions: the exchange of goods and the measurement (and ultimately the accumulation) of value. Szkudlarek demonstrated that there are procedures that could replace the function of the exchange regulator. For my part, I have drawn attention to a practice that could support the attribution and enhancement of value to people's creative activities. Having a specific theory of value and creating instruments based on it to address the dominance of state money constitutes an essential exercise in pedagogy if it to remain an applied science.

Instead of concluding the article with the usual ritualistic indication of what should be further explored on this topic, I would like to bring up a goose. It is a personalised challenge. I am offering a reward of 3 litres of fermented red beet juice to Professor Tomasz Szkudlarek if he releases his goose (or a V-formation of geese), as discussed in this article.

Literature

Badiou A., 2010, *Byt i zdarzenie*, tłum. P. Pieniążek, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.

Czarnowski S., 2018, *Ludzie zbędni w służbie przemocy*, Poznań: Oficyna Wydawnicza Bractwa Trojka.

Dowbor L., 2023, *O społeczną funkcję ekonomii*, Warsaw: Książka i Prasa.

Graeber D., 2001, *Toward an anthropological theory of value: The false coin of our own dreams*, New York: Palgrave.

Kowzan P., 2021, *Dług jako urządzenie wychowawcze*, Gdańsk: Stowarzyszenie Na Styku.

Koźmińska I., Olszewska E., 2014, *Z dzieckiem w świat wartości*, Ożarów Mazowiecki: Świat Książki.

Laclau E., 2009, *Rozum populistyczny*, trans T Szkudlarek, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej.

Mauss M., 1966, *The gift: Forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies*, trans. I. Cunnison London: Cohen & West Ltd.

Mendel M., Naumiuk A., Skrzypczak B., 2018, *W trosce o społeczeństwo. Pedagogika społeczna w czasach nacjonalizmu*, "Pedagogika Społeczna", No. 4 (70).

Munn N., 1986, *The fame of Gawa: A symbolic study of value transformation in a Massim (Papua New Guinea) Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nikitorowicz J., 2019, *Pedagogika międzykulturowa w rewitalizacji heterologii w warunkach zróżnicowania kulturowego*, "Przegląd Pedagogiczny", No. 1.

Rutkowiak J., 2010, *Nauczyciel w dramacie wartości wychowawczych. Problem na pograniczu pedeutologii i ekonomii* [in:] *Neoliberalne uwikłania edukacji*, eds. E. Potulicka, J. Rutkowiak, Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza "Impuls".

Szkudlarek T., 2005, *"Koniec pracy" czy koniec zatrudnienia ? Edukacja wobec presji światowego rynku* [in:] *Rynek i kultura neoliberalna a edukacja*, eds. T. Szkudlarek, A. Kargulowa, S. M. Kwiatkowski, Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza "Impuls".

Szkudlarek T., 2016, *Laclau's ontological rhetoric, universality, and collective identity: A lesson for cosmopolitan education* [in:] *Cosmopolitanism: Educational, philosophical and historical perspectives. Contemporary philosophies and theories in education*, vol. 9, eds. M Papastephanou, Springer Cham, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-30430-4_15.

Urbanek M., 2014, *Genialni. Lwowska szkoła matematyczna*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Iskry.

Vlieghe J., Zamojski P., 2019, *Towards an ontology of teaching: thing-centred pedagogy, affirmation and love for the world*, Springer Cham, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3--030-16003-6.

Winczewski D., 2017, *Modern Monetary Theory a marksistowska krytyka ekonomii politycznej*, "Praktyka Teoretyczna", No. 25.

Zamojski P., 2019, *Pedagogika skupiona na rzeczy – wprowadzenie do idei*, "Parezja", No. 11(1).

Summary

The Pedagogy of Geese Sent into the Future: On the Theory of Value

I have examined the problem of the money monopoly posed by Szkudlarek, focusing on aspects related to the cultivation of values. Breaking the money monopoly may not be necessary to trigger social mobilisation. When we scrutinise money's purpose, it fulfils two functions: it serves as a medium of exchange and a tool for accumulating value. Szkudlarek has shown that there are procedures that can replace the role of the exchange regulator. In my considerations, I directed attention to a procedure that could help in attributing and adding value to creative human activities. Inspired by the Lviv School of Mathematics, a challenge with eccentric rewards may prove to be an effective way of attributing and cultivating values.

Keywords

money monopoly, cultivation of values, eccentricity, theory of value, Lwów School of Mathematics

Siostrzyczka.

Wreszcie rysunek.   3 06 79

Agnieszka Woynarowska
ORCID: 0000-0001-8798-2358
University of Gdańsk

Disability and work.
Discursive constructions of exclusion and dissensus

Introduction

In 2005, I joined Tomasz Szkudlarek's doctoral seminar. My research explorations concerning the subject of disability at the time were located in the field of special education and seemingly distant from the interests of my future dissertation supervisor. Seemingly, because my reflections on the theoretical contexts for the conceptualisation of the phenomenon of disability were already directing my search towards Martin Buber's philosophy of encounter/philosophy of dialogue (1992), the I–You relationship, or the concept of postmodernity presented in Zygmunt Bauman's publications (2000). At the time, it seemed highly important to me to have a different view of people with disabilities, one that eschewed the patterns of normality, fitness, and pathology. Perceiving disability as difference and of people with disabilities as an oppressed and forced into silence minority group has become a common area, a place of interface, a space that connects special pedagogy with educational cultural studies.

Constructing and implementing the doctoral dissertation research project constituted an extremely important stage, indeed a milestone in my scientific development. Participating in Tomasz Szkudlarek's doctoral seminar, I discovered extremely interesting theories for interpreting the phenomenon of intellectual disability, which transferred the explorations undertaken onto the ground of *Disability studies*, which were new and still unknown in Polish special pedagogy at the time, in 2006. Through this scholarly encounter, I have for years been fascinated

by poststructuralist conceptions of discourse (Foucault 2000; 2002; Laclau 2005), which assume that most social phenomena (which I consider to be disability, work, or emancipation) are constructed in and by discourse, which is a tool for enslavement, oppression, exclusion, and forcing "alternative versions of reality" into silence, and for emancipation – since "the world is always bigger than any version of it in people's minds" (Melosik 1994: 203). Language/discourse as "a system of human utterances and a practice that forms the objects of which the discourse speaks" (Foucault 2000: 10), a key factor in the social construction of social life and an important element of power relations plays an extremely significant role in creating both exclusionary and inclusive practices, as meanings and discourses are not only forms of "talking about" but are also tools for generating social practices, "actions as the realisation of what follows from content" (Szkudlarek 2008: 127).

In this article, in gratitude for all the scientific inspiration, I would like to highlight the issue of the exclusion of people with disabilities from the field of employment and bring to light the causes of the still present and extremely difficult to overcome discrimination on the open labour market of this social group. In presenting this issue, I will present areas of economic oppression that emerged in the era of early industrial capitalism and have survived to the present day, discursively perpetuated exclusionary practices and actions attempting to resist the imposed order through the painstaking "gouging of new lines of outlet" (Deleuze, Guattari 2015) fighting against the despotism of the capitalist labour market.

At the same time, it should be noted that the dividing line outlined in this text between "us and them" is only one of many possible ones, and concerns practices resulting from the consequences of the label of "unproductive body". Indeed, oppression against people with disabilities in contemporary societies takes various forms: from exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, violence, to cultural imperialism (Twardowski 2018), but it is always the result of some discursive recognition, a discursive construction, given a label by the "normals" (Goffman 2007), to all those recognised as other/alien, who are blatantly separated by some feature/difference from the known Ones. In addition, as Dorota Podgórska-Jachnik points out, at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, a multidimensional perspective began to be taken at the phenomenon of marginalisation and exclusion, to which people with disabilities also – but not exclusively – succumb, hence social policy increasingly takes solutions aimed more at specific horizontal problems (e.g. low labour force participation) than at measures targeted only at these people (Podgórska-Jachnik 2016: 16). In this text, the unmasking of oppressive factors and actions taken therefore only refers to the existing domination, subjection and exclusion in the labour market area.

I will begin my idea by introducing the reader to the discipline of disability studies and the socio-cultural model of disability, as conceptualising this social

phenomenon through this prism captures and explores its discursive constructions and, consequently, all the action and practices undertaken.

Introduction. Disability Studies.
Disability as a discursive construct
in a socio-cultural model

Disability is a permanent feature of societies but manifests itself in very different ways at different stages of their historical development (Gąciarz 2014). What is defined as disability is determined by the meanings attached to physical and intellectual "deviations from the norm" in a given social group or culture. *Disability studies* constitutes an academic discipline that analyses the meanings, nature and consequences of disability as perceived as a socially/discursively constructed phenomenon, or a product of cultural practices and their interpretations. In addition, it has a strong emancipatory overtone, linked to the awakening of an awareness of rights and the claim of direct impact over all disability solutions (Podgórska-Jachnik 2016: 20). *Disability studies* with its explorations encompass the study of disability history, theory, legislation, politics, ethics, art, literature, media, the political economy of disability or disability activist social movements and is embedded in the cultural model way of thinking about disability. In 1994, Tom Shakespeare called for more attention to cultural representations of persons with disabilities. Inspired by feminist debates, he discussed various theoretical approaches and suggested that "disabled people are objectified by cultural representations". By cultural representations he meant theatre, literature, images, movies, and the media (Shakespeare 1994: 283–299).

In 2006, Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell introduced the concept of the "cultural model of disability". In their assumptions, "the cultural model provides a more complete conception than the social model, in which 'disability' means only discriminatory encounters. Formulating a cultural model makes it possible to theorise a political act of change that identifies disability as a site of resistance and a source of previously suppressed culture" (Snyder, Mitchell 2006: 10). Furthermore, in Snyder and Mitchell's perspective, the cultural model approach tends to identify identity, and the body as constructed (2006: 10).

Anne Waldschmit, referring to the Anglo-Saxon concept of the cultural model of disability, points out that in the perspective of this model, disability is not seen through the lens of a single fate, as in the individualist-reductionist model of disability. Nor is it simply the result of discrimination and exclusion, as in the social model. On the contrary, the cultural model questions the other side of the coin, the universally unthreatened "normality", and explores how practices of (de)normalisation

lead to the social category we have called "disability" (Waldschmit 2017: 22). As the author further explains, the cultural model of disability should not treat disability as an explicit category of pathological classification that automatically, in the form of causation, results in social discrimination. On the contrary, this model considers disability and normality as effects generated by academic knowledge, mass media and everyday discourses (Waldschmit 2017: 24). In any culture at any given time, these classifications depend on power structures as well as the historical situation, and depend on and determined by hegemonic discourses. In short: the cultural model considers disability not as a given individual or fact, but describes it as a discourse or process, an experience, a situation, or an event. Both *disability* and *ability* refer to dominant symbolic orders and institutional practices of producing normality and deviance, the familiar and the different. Assuming the constructivist and discursive nature of disability, one can take into account the historical and cultural perspectives on the creation of processes of inclusion and exclusion, stigmatisation, as well as socio-cultural patterns of experience and identity, meaning-making and social practices, power and resistance (Waldschmit 2017: 23). Referring to analyses of the field of *Disability studies* and the reflections of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (2017), Jolanta Rzeźnicka-Krupa portrays disability as "a certain set of meanings by which we differentiate and label bodies and minds, thus producing those with disabilities and upholding the ideal of a naturally stable, essentialised being. This concept is a label, a signifier that, by initiating an assignment to a particular category of identity, marks a defect and produces oppression" (2019: 11).

For many years, disability was regarded as a personal tragedy individually and independently faced by the person "affected" by it in order to overcome it. In this context of the individual/medical/clinical model, disability is perceived as a defect caused by damage to body structures. Michael Oliver (1990), elaborating on Victor Finkelstein's (1980) account attempting to explain the development of an ideology that perceives disability as a tragedy, personal passivity and dependency, stated that "a disabled person is an ideological construct linked to a primary ideology of individualism and secondary ideologies linked to medicalisation and normalcy" (Oliver 1990: 58). Inspired by the work of Antonio Gramsci (1971; 1991), he emphasised the crucial role of a reinforced ideology or mindset, that is, a set of values and beliefs that form the support for social practice, in sustaining social oppression (Barnes, Mercer 2008: 35). In the 1970s, British activists (UPIAS and the Disability Alliance) opposed such definitions and practices of disability, taking action that led to developing a social model of disability. They initiated criticism of a "non-disabled" society that "handicaps" people with disabilities. This has given rise to the so-called sociopolitical model of disability (Barnes, Mercer 2008), which draws attention to the impact of social and environmental barriers. The sources of discrimination and oppression lie in the belief that people with disabilities

(defined and perceived as defective, weak, flawed, abnormal) must conform to the non-disabled majority. Besides, the division formed over the years between "able normality" and "abnormal disability" has made the "able" group a privileged group that sets the normative, i.e. universally valid, standards by which we all judge others. Persons with disabilities, perceived as non-normative or unproductive, are pushed away and excluded. They belong to a despised minority and the rationalist culture contributes to the rise of cultural imperialism and violence (Young 1990: 11, after Barnes, Mercer 2008: 31).

Paul Abberley (2002: 120) notes that if we are to look at disability as a form of oppression, we must develop views concerning what society should be like so that disabled people are not rendered disabled by that society. Oliver, on the other hand, believes that the "social theory of disability" requires answering the questions: "What is the essence of disability? What are its causes? How is it experienced?" (Oliver 1996: 29–30, following: Barnes, Mercer 2008: 21). Furthermore, by claiming that disability is socially constructed and represents a kind of social oppression, the social model of disability raises another new question: if disability constitutes a limitation of activity imposed on disabled people by contemporary social structures and practices, how is it created/formed? In British studies concerning disability from the 1980s some leading thinkers sought answers to these questions in Marxist or materialist paradigms (Finkelstein 1980; Oliver 1990; Gleeson 1997; Russell 1998; 2017; 2019).

The perspective of historical materialism was introduced into disability studies by Finkelstein in 1980. In his book *Attitudes and disabled people*, published at the time, he put forward a theory according to which three qualitative changes in the social relationship towards disability can be related to three main phases of economic and technological development: pre-industrial (feudal society), industrial capitalism and post-industrial society (Barnes, Mercer 2008: 33). Building on Finkelstein's early insights, many scholars of disability and social oppression of disabled people have analysed the relationship between disability and capitalist relations of production. Michael Oliver (1990; 1996), like Martha Russell (2017), believes that the exclusions and dependencies experienced by persons with disabilities in the twentieth century are due to the pre-existing economic degradation of the disadvantaged, combined with their categorisation as "unproductive" and dependent. Whereas, both through the functioning of the labour market and the social organisation of work, the economy has played and continues to play a key role in creating the category of disability and in determining social responses to persons with disabilities. Moreover, the oppression faced by persons with disabilities today is rooted in the economic and social structures of capitalism, which themselves produce racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism, and disability (*disablism*) (Oliver 1996: 33).

Thus, disability can be constructed as a personal tragedy, in a medical model based on an ontology of lack (Rzeźnicka-Krupa 2019) it is a defect, an individual trait, a disease and the person who has it or is stigmatised by it should be treated so that, more like the healthy ones, he or she can fit into a world governed by a normocentric discourse, because otherwise he or she will remain marginalised. Disability also appears as the result of an oppressive social relationship, but above all, for many scholars, it is a category or label that underpins all practices of exclusion sanctioned by industrial capitalism and the early capitalist work ethic, a system that both then and now perpetuates and reinforces inequality and discrimination in the labour market. Discrimination that is inevitable, ever-present, and impossible to overcome.

Disability in the economic model.
The "unproductive body" stereotype and exclusion from the labour market

Along with the spread of industrial capitalism, the hegemony of "able" normality became, in the assessment of disabled people, a measure of their "incomplete humanity" (Oliver 1990: 89, following Barnes, Mercer 2008: 36). Barbara Gąciarz notes, "the most important transformations, the effects of which continue to this day, took place in the era of capitalist industrialisation, which firmly entrenched in social consciousness, customs and culture the stereotype of the unproductivity of this category of people, stigmatising them as expendable people and imposing on them the status of outsiders. This was a logical and consistent consequence of the dominant ideology of individualism and the cult of economic rationality as the main determinant of value. People with disabilities did not fit into such a social framework, they did not meet the requirement of participants in economic competition, they were not fit to be full participants in labour relations" (Gąciarz 2014: 20). In this way, as Russell (2017) conjectures, industrial capitalism created not only a class of proletarians, but also a new class of "disabled" who did not meet the requirements of the "standard body of workers" and whose labour power was effectively wiped out, excluded from wage labour. Industrial capitalism imposed a category of disability on those "non-compliant bodies" deemed unfit for use by the owners of the means of production. As a result, people with disabilities born in communities began to be considered a social problem, which triggered practices of separating them from mainstream life. "Unproductive bodies" began to be perceived as a social problem, which led to justifying removal and segregation policies.

Along these lines, Russell (2019) acknowledges that the phenomenon of disability has its roots in economics, and that the economy, through both the functioning of

the labour market and the social organisation of work, plays a key role in creating categories of disability and determining social responses to people with disabilities. Therefore, Russell believes that disability is a (historical) social creation of capitalism that determines who has a job and who does not, and what this means depends on the level of economic activity. The term "disabled" is used to describe/classify people deemed less exploitable as labour or not exploitable at all by the owning class that controls the means of production in a capitalist economy (Russell 2019: 12), and a disability policy that fails to recognise this is at best attempting to push flawed anti-exclusion reform strategies.

Workers with disabilities experience permanent economic discrimination in the capitalist system due to employers' perceptions of incurring additional costs when hiring or retaining a non-standard worker. In this context, as Jihan Abbas argues, economics should be perceived as a key part of the disability and employment debate, a type of individual intervention and advocacy that has historically failed in developing an understanding of disability issues, and the employment promotion agenda is seen to have failed because it relies on individual contexts and tends to ignore structural barriers as well as the broader political and economic context that drives marginalisation (Abbas 2017). Capitalism is a system of social relations in which profit maximisation and the constant need to revolutionise the forces of production are basic and unavoidable conditions for survival. Capital is only interested in work that will increase material wealth. From the point of view of an individual capitalist, productive work is simply work that generates profits, and thus the notion of a "productive individual" is important in the economic model of disability, because the idea that the value of an individual is directly related to participation in the labour process constitutes a key aspect of understanding the need to create jobs for people with disabilities (Abbas 2017).

Changes of place, acts of dissent, and the never-ending fight against discrimination in the labour market

Similarly to Olivier, Russell believes that it was early industrial capitalism that created and eliminated the "disabled, unproductive and substandard body" from the circle of paid labour, and now, in its version of turbo-capitalism, upholding profit and productivity sustains the *status quo*. Russell was an American activist and researcher whose work brings to the fore an explicit critique of the oppression of disability and an analysis of the economic inequalities faced by people with disabilities due to austerity and the lack of economic democracy in capitalism. Her analyses exposing the modes of exclusion of people with disabilities generated in the capitalist economy of the United States of America, together with

her perspective explaining the impossibility of abolishing discrimination against people with disabilities in the field of employment, despite many reforms and actions of the disability movement, are very helpful in understanding the contemporary employment situation of persons with disabilities in Poland. In Poland, which after 1989 took the course of a free-market capitalist economy shaped by neoliberal productivism.

However, before this happened, it is worth noting that in both socialist Poland and liberal democratic Poland, work was/is of great importance. On both sides of the "wall", slogans related to "getting to work" or "giving people jobs" were/are present. As Bauman writes, "they were present on both sides of the great divide that was to distinguish the capitalist as well as the communist version of reality. The slogan 'he who does not work does not eat' became the rallying cry of Marxist-inspired opposition to capitalism" (2006: 42). Work provided a livelihood, but was also a major determinant of social identity and self-esteem. Therefore, it can be considered that exclusion from employment constitutes a fundamental form of discrimination against persons with disabilities and that work/opportunity to work remains a key element of a just society (Roulstone, Barnes 2005). The awareness of this fact, combined with an awareness of the importance of work for human beings, existed in the policies and practices of the Polish state both in the era of outmoded (socialist) and contemporary (neoliberal) productivism. Despite similarities in their approach to the work ethos, the two Polands differ in the ways in which they combat the exclusion from paid work of people with disabilities and in the socio-economic context that determines the actions taken.

In socialist Poland, before the political transformation of 1989, a Poland of socialist work ethos and socialist productivism, in which the rehabilitation of disabled people was considered almost exclusively in a medical context, a rehabilitation subsystem termed the "Polish employment model" was developed (Mikulski 1995: 226). Some people with disabilities found employment in disability cooperatives, which from the very beginning were one of the characteristic features of the Polish rehabilitation model, combining economic and rehabilitation goals. Marcin Garbat (2017) notes that the Polish People's Republic was a period of dominance of disability co-operatives, where indeed graduates of special schools found employment, mainly in simple jobs. The long-standing experience of the disability cooperative, which was abolished by a resolution of the Sejm on 20 January 1990, was used for the widespread reconstruction of the protected labour market and the establishment of the State Fund for the Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities (Waszkowski 2016). The system supporting the employment of persons with disabilities in socialist Poland was based on a medical model and a separation policy. Everyone who did not obtain employment in the disability cooperatives was condemned to an existence in nursing homes. Therefore, specific reserves, ghettos, living spaces

for "unproductive and sick individuals" were created. However, it is noteworthy that in those days a space of "unconscious inclusion" of persons with intellectual disabilities unexpectedly emerged in State Farms (Jabłoński 2016). As Maciej Jabłoński notes, it was precisely in the State Farms that it was not the inefficiency that was important, but finding a job that matched a person's abilities, competences (Jabłoński 2016: 132).

The Polish post-transformation system of vocational rehabilitation and support of employment for people with disabilities was built on different ideas and assumptions: separation policy was replaced by integration policy counteracting exclusion from many social spaces, the medical model of disability gave way to a social model, people with disabilities admitted to public discourse and debate in a democratic space could start demanding the realisation of their rights, including the right to work on the open labour market. However, above all, people with disabilities have regained a voice, a voice that allowed them to make their presence visible, to become visible, a voice that has begun to shatter the stereotypes perpetuated over the years that condition exclusionary social practices, a voice that has shouted: we abandon the reserves, our rights are human rights, disability is normal. Persons with disabilities began to create and carry out their project of emancipation by challenging the boundaries of visibility and audibility that had been sanctioned for years (Rancière 2007, after Szkudlarek 2015). Their project of emancipation manifested itself in acts of *dissensus*, of acting "out of place" and saying "not at that time", of demonstrating a presence where they were not supposed to be, and of manifesting a capacity for competences they were by definition not entitled to (Rancière 2007, following Szkudlarek 2015: 69). One could say that a difficult and unequal struggle against sedentary thought (Deleuze, Guattari 2015) began, which has been/is aimed at bursting the given label of "incapable of working" and appearing as a worker in the open market, a struggle against thought that marks all these Others with their rightful place on the periphery.

The system built in democratic Poland to counteract the exclusion of persons with disabilities from the field of employment, supported by numerous social campaigns aimed at reversing the meaning from "disabled – unproductive" to "disabled – able at work", had to meet the demands of neoliberal productivism and the goals of the capitalist economy. On the horizon loomed the spectre of new divisions and discrimination not stemming this time from a socialist policy of separation, but from a neo-liberal call for profit and productivism guarded by an accountant's calculus. In his analyses of the situation of post-socialist countries, Teodor Mladenov (2015) draws attention to the problem of neoliberal productivism. As he writes, in the post-socialist countries after 1989, we may be facing a new invalidation of persons with disabilities and a new cause of their exclusion from the labour market, which is linked in these countries to the neoliberal regime's move

towards market productivity. Productivism is considered as a cultural-material mechanism reducing people to resources that can be taken advantage of in order to increase production (Mladenov 2015). A person with a disability, defined in a medical-productivist perspective as inefficient, is marginalised and invalidated in a productivist society.

However, in order to meet the demands of the new reality and enable people with disabilities to enter the open labour market, the Employment and Vocational Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities Act was enacted in 1991. At that time, the State Fund for the Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities (PFRON) was established, whose task was, among other things, to subsidise jobs for persons with disabilities in the open, but also in the protected labour market. The Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Persons with Disabilities was established. On 27 August 1997, the Act on Vocational and Social Rehabilitation and Employment of Persons with Disabilities came into force (Journal of Laws of 1997, No. 123, item 776) introducing a system of incentives for employers in the form of wage subsidies for employees with disabilities and a quota system to persuade businesses to hire employees with disabilities. The constructed employment support system, the state's social policy, and the activities of NGOs, including the introduction of the supported employment model, were/are aimed at increasing the employment of people with disabilities in an open and inclusive labour market. The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ratified by Poland in 2012, reinforces and promotes this course of action. The European Union's strategy also supports enabling a significant proportion of people with disabilities to earn a living on the free labour market (Giermanowska 2016: 82). According to Ewa Giermanowska (2016), such a trend is linked to a policy of normalisation, inclusion, and social integration, treating the rights of people with disabilities as equal to other members of society. The new vision of an open labour market for persons with disabilities, established on 10 May 2023 thanks to an initiative by the Activation Partnership Inclu(vi)sion Foundation, constitutes another initiative fighting for implementing the right to work included in Article 27 of the UN CRPD. The partnership aims to increase quantitatively and qualitatively the employment of people with disabilities in an open, accessible and inclusive labour market to 40% by 2030. As the initiators of the project state, "increasing the employment of persons with disabilities in an open, inclusive, and accessible labour market creates opportunities for a dignified, independent life for representatives of this community, but also positively influences the economic development of Poland. The optimal environment for change on the labour market for people with disabilities is open dialogue and

cooperation between representatives of business, government, local government, and NGO institutions"[1].

Therefore, it can be considered that the disability community, together with many NGOs, supported by social inclusion policies, has been fighting for years for equal access to employment for people with disabilities in the open labour market, for carrying out Giddens' politics of emancipation (Giddens 2012) or for carrying out the idea of equality of participation which is the normative core of the "two-dimensional concept of social justice" (Fraser 2005). Activists with disabilities are struggling and unfortunately they are running into a wall, because despite all these efforts, a broad base of institutions, services, projects directed at professional activation and employment support, social campaigns deconstructing the stereotype of the "unproductive body", the labour force participation rate of persons with disabilities of working age in Q4 2022 was 33.5% and the employment rate oscillated at approximately 31.6%, (GUS BAEL 2022) and has remained basically unchanged for years. The professional activity of persons with disabilities is also highly diverse. Across the group, those with a university degree perform best. Analyses by Giermanowska (2016: 72–76) show that almost one third of people with higher education, one in five with post-secondary, secondary vocational, and basic vocational education are economically active. The highest professional activity is in the 35–44 age bracket, while the lowest is in the under 24 and over 55 age brackets. According to the researcher, this means that after leaving school young people have problems with entering the labour market, and people who have become disabled while in employment also have problems reintegrating into work and maintaining employment (Giermanowska 2016: 73). Giermanowska also notes that the factors that most strongly determine the professional activity of persons with disabilities include the degree and nature of the disability. One in four people with mild disabilities are economically active, and one in five with moderate disabilities. Only 3.7% of people with severe disabilities are professionally active. Persons with intellectual disabilities and on the autism spectrum are the most excluded from the open labour market. The rate of professional activity for people with intellectual disabilities is 8.5%. These persons constitute the group of unemployed people who have the greatest difficulty in obtaining employment. This situation is caused by the existence of social barriers and stereotypes regarding society's belief that their work is not worthwhile (Kukla, Duda, Czerw-Bajer 2011: 127). Of the 400,000 people on the autism spectrum living in Poland, only 2% are working despite promoting diversity management policies in companies (Kutwa 2022) and, as Giermanowska (2014; 2016) points

---

[1]   https://incluvision.aktywizacja.org.pl/partnerstwo (accessed on: 31.08.2023).

out, the reality is that employers largely prefer to pay penalties to PFRON for not hiring employees with disabilities.

Therefore, the emerging image outlines the clash between all the activation activities: initiatives, partnerships, NGO projects, anti-exclusion policies, equal opportunities and diversity policies, i.e. all those civic activities and voices pointing to the need to create a new, open and inclusive labour market and the realities of a free market capitalist economy focused on profit and productivism. All these activities attempting to give resistance to discursively encoded ways of thinking about the place of persons with disabilities outside the labour market, these initiatives resisting the hegemony of ableist culture and exclusion from employment by assigning "unproductive bodies" with the belonging, closed space of a care home, all these socio-political activities that can be considered as "actions of non-sedentary thought" (Deleuze, Guattari 2015, after: Rzeźnicka-Krupa 2019: 25) that open up space and oppose being stuck in established regimes of thought clash with a despot: the rules governing the contemporary labour market, but at the same time, by opposing them, they attempt to disrupt and open it up to labour diversity. This kind of "nomadic war machine" (Braidotti 2007; Deleuze, Guattari 2015) rolls very slowly encountering resistance.

This resistance directs us again to the considerations of Russell (2017), who believes that it is the work of NGOs or social movements of people with disabilities that identify the source of unemployment for this social group in the discriminatory attitudes of employers, seeking change through establishing individual rights and remedies in accordance with the liberal theory of "equal opportunities" for employment, which in essence means equal access to work not available to all. In her opinion, no anti-discrimination law can break the systemic economic discrimination against persons with disabilities without affirmative action. Russell believes that, in practice, civil rights, which focus primarily on attitudes and prejudices, do not pay enough attention to the barriers posed by the economic structure and power relations towards the employment of persons with disabilities. According to the researcher, class interests perpetuate the exclusion of persons with disabilities from the workforce through systematic corporate accounting practices and forced unemployment. She believes that if we conceptualise disability as a product of the exploitative economic structure of capitalist society, one that creates and oppresses the "disabled body" in order to allow the small capitalist class to create the economic conditions necessary to gain enormous wealth, it becomes clear that anti-discrimination legislation that fails to recognise/perceive the contradictions of promoting equal opportunities in an unequal society is insufficient to address the unemployment of this group, and that the liberal rights model is designed to prevent criticism of power because of the exclusion from employment and the inequalities experienced by people with

disabilities (Russell 2017). Furthermore, Russell believes that a liberal society promotes equality by establishing social and political rights, in theory, because in reality it rarely distributes them equally. This means that individual rights are considered to be above the rules of the market. However, there is a mutual relationship between market institutions, inequality, and equality of opportunity. Policymakers are well aware that laws affect the functioning of the economy and, at the same time, the market affects the functioning of laws. It is more likely that certain regulations will be elevated to the status of law if they have a relatively low cost. Therefore, the theoretical right of a worker with disabilities is not a right, as it is determined by the employer's account (Russell 2017).

Russell believes that discrimination against people with disabilities in the labour market in a capitalist system is natural, as business owners and managers discriminate against those workers whose handicap increases the cost of production. In the contemporary world, the politics of inclusion, integration and equality is a process that is increasingly described as dependent on participation in standardised economic activities. Russell believes that discrimination can be ameliorated but cannot be eliminated by changing attitudes, because the power lies in production belonging to the owners of capital. Productive capital is privately owned, and owners are not forced to make capital available for the employment of workers. Therefore, denying access constitutes an important property right of capitalists over which workers have no control (Russell 2017: 235), and civil rights legislation does not intervene in the labour market to mandate the employment of disabled people.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is worth recalling the questions: what is the purpose of the economy: to promote market profits or to sustain social ties and encourage people to participate and cooperate? Should the ability to generate profit be the measure of a person's worth (Russell 2019: 21)? Russell claims that the struggle for rights and the liberation of independent living is a strong theme of historical change and there is an opportunity to reconfigure disability and eliminate the oppression of people with disabilities. The biological justification for the exclusion of disabled people from the realm of work must be challenged and replaced by a materialist justification calling for a radical and legitimate change in political economy (2019: 22). Disability, being a reflection of social class – in this case the proletariats displaced from the workforce – provides an opportunity to force a broader discussion on the legitimacy of contemporary work organisation (2017: 236). According to Russell, persons with disabilities have been socially conceptualised by capitalism

as "bodies" mature for economic exploitation, and discrimination persists despite the rhetoric concerning rights and inclusion policies. If this is understood, perhaps then the struggle of persons with disabilities for an equal place in the sphere of work will be met with the class consciousness necessary to challenge the current problem of disability unemployment (Russell 2017), and the attempt to build the kind of social organisation advocated by disability activists that allows all members of society to participate in social interactions on an equal footing would make Nancy Fraser's concept of social justice more feasible. However, for this to happen, two conditions must be met. The first means distributing material goods in such a way as to ensure independence and a voice for the participants, as well as to exclude all forms of economic dependence and inequality that reduce the equality of participation. The second condition requires that institutionalised patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and provide them with equal opportunities to achieve social respectability (Fraser 2005: 50), which is carried out through acknowledging distinctiveness as well as specificity (Fraser 2005: 58). Therefore, social justice, "could, in addition to recognising the common humanity of all people, also require recognition of their distinctiveness and particularity" (Fraser 2005: 59).

Literature

Abbas J., 2017, *Economy, exploitation and intellectual disability* [in:] *Disability politics in a global economy. Essays in honour of Marta Russell*, ed. R. Malhotra, Oxfordshire: Routledge.

Abberley P., 2002, *Work, disability, disabled people and European social theory* [in:] *Disability studies today*, eds. C. Barnes, M. Oliver, L. Barton, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Barnes C., Mercer G., 2008, *Niepełnosprawność*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sic!.

Bauman Z., 2000, *Ponowoczesność jako źródło cierpień*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sic!.

Bauman Z., 2006, *Praca, konsumpcjonizm i nowi ubodzy*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM.

Braidotti R., 2007, *Poprzez nomadyzm*, "Teksty Drugie: Teoria literatury, krytyka, interpretacja", No. 6 (108).

Buber M., 1992, *Ja i Ty. Wybór pism filozoficznych*, Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax.

Deleuze G., Guattari F., 2015, *Kapitalizm i schizofrenia*, vol. 2: *Tysiąc plateau*, Warsaw: Fundacja Nowej Kultury Bęc Zmiana.

Finkelstein V., 1980, *Attitudes and disabled people*, New York: World Rehabilitation Fund.

Foucault M., 2000, *Filozofia, historia, polityka. Wybór pism*, Warsaw–Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Foucault M., 2002, *Porządek dyskursu*, Gdańsk: Słowo/obraz terytoria.

Fraser N., 2005, *Sprawiedliwość społeczna w epoce polityki tożsamości. Redystrybucja, uznanie, uczestnictwo* [in:] N. Fraser, A. Honneth, *Redystrybucja czy uznanie? Debata polityczno-filozoficzna*, Wrocław: WN DSWE TWP.

Garbat M., 2017, *Społeczny wymiar niepełnosprawności w teorii ekonomii*, "Studia Oeconomica Posnaniensia", No. 10 (5).

Garland-Thomson R., 2017, *Extraordinary bodies: Figuring physical disability in American culture and literature*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Gąciarz B., 2014, *Przemyśleć niepełnosprawność na nowo. Od instytucji państwa opiekuńczego do integracji i aktywizacji społecznej*, "Studia Socjologiczne", No. 2 (213).

Giddens A., 2012, *Nowoczesność i tożsamość*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Giermanowska E. (red.), 2014, *Zatrudniając niepełnosprawnych. Dobre praktyki w Polsce i innych krajach Europy*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo AGH.

Giermanowska E., 2016, *Niepełnosprawny jako pracownik i pracodawca* [in:] *Samodzielni, zaradni, niezależni. Ludzie niepełnosprawni w systemie polityki, pracy i edukacji*, eds. J. Niedbalski, E. Zakrzewska-Manterys, Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.

Gleeson B., 1997, *Disability studies: A historical materialist view*, "Disability and Society", vol. 12 (2).

Goffman E., 2007, *Piętno. Rozważania o zranionej tożsamości*, Gdańsk: GWP.

Gramsci A., 1971, *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, New York: International Publishers.

Gramsci A., 1991, *Zeszyty filozoficzne*, Warsaw: PWN.

Jabłoński M., 2016, *Zapomniana rzeczywistość. Rzecz o (nie)świadomej inkluzji społecznej osób z niepełnosprawnością intelektualną w Państwowych Gospodarstwach Rolnych*, "Parezja", No. 2.

Kukla D., Duda W., Czerw-Bajer M., 2011, *Osoby niepełnosprawne w systemie edukacji i poradnictwa zawodowego*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Difin.

Kutwa K., 2022, *Droga do otwarcia rynku pracy w Polsce dla osób autystycznych*, Warsaw: Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny.

Laclau E., 2005, *Emancypacje*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo DSW.

Melosik Z., 1994, *Poststrukturalizm i społeczeństwo (refleksje nad teorią M. Foucaulta)* [in:] *Edukacja wobec zmiany społecznej*, eds. J. Brzezinski, L. Witkowski, Poznań-Toruń: Wydawnictwo Edytor.

Mikulski J., 1995, *Rehabilitacja zawodowa osób niepełnosprawnych* [in]: *Polityka społeczna. Stan i perspektywy*, ed. J. Auleytner, Warsaw: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna Towarzystwa Wiedzy Powszechnej.

Mladenov T., 2015, *Questioning productivism through the lens of disability: Reflections on state socialist and postsocialist disability policy*, https://alterconf2015.sciencesconf.org/conference/alterconf2015/pages/Livret.pdf (accessed on: 22.04.2020).

Oliver M., 1990, *The politics of disablement*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Oliver M., 1996, *Understanding disability: From theory to practise*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Podgórska-Jachnik D., 2016, *Studia nad niepełnosprawnością (Disability Studies) i ruch włączający w społeczeństwie jako konteksty edukacji włączającej*, "Problemy Edukacji, Rehabilitacji i Socjalizacji Osób Niepełnosprawnych", No. 22 (1).

Rancière J., 2007, *Dzielenie postrzegalnego. Estetyka i polityka*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Korporacja Ha!art.

Roulstone A., Barnes C. (ed.), 2005, *Working futures? Disabled people, policy and social inclusion*, Bristol: Policy Press.

Russell M., 1998, *Beyond ramps. Disability at the end of the social contract*, Monroe: Common Courage Press.

Russell M., 2017, *What disability civil rights cannot do: Employment and political economy* [in:] *Disability politics in a global economy. Essays in honour of Marta Russell*, ed. R. Malhotra, Oxfordshire: Routledge.

Russell M., 2019, *The political economy of disability* [in:] *Capitalism and disability. Selected writings by Marta Russell*, ed. K. Rosenthal, Chicago: Haymarket Books.

Rzeźnicka-Krupa J., 2019, *Społeczne ontologie niepełnosprawności. Ciało. Tożsamość. Performatywność*, Kraków: OW Impuls.

Snyder S.L., Mitchell D.T., 2006, *Cultural locations of disability*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shakespeare T., 1994, *Cultural representation of disabled people: Dustbins for disavowal?*, "Disability & Society", vol. 9.

Szkudlarek T., 2008, *Dyskursywna konstrukcja podmiotowości ("puste znaczące" a pedagogika kultury)*, "Forum Oświatowe" (special issue).

Szkudlarek T., 2015, *Różnice, równość i edukacja. Polityki inkluzji i ignorancja* [in:] *Różnice, edukacja, inkluzja*, eds. T. Szkudlarek, A. Komorowska-Zielony, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego.

Twardowski A., 2018, *Społeczny model niepełnosprawności – analiza krytyczna*, "Studia Edukacyjne", No. 4.

Waldschmit A., 2017, *Disability goes cultural* [in:] *Culture – Disability – Theory*, eds. A. Waldschmit, H. Berressem, M. Ingwersem, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag.

Waszkowski H., 2016, *Ruch spółdzielczości inwalidów i jego znaczenie dla rozwoju rehabilitacji osób niepełnosprawnych w Polsce*, "Niepełnosprawność. Zagadnienia, problemy, rozwiązania", No. 4 (21).

Young I.M., 1990, *Justice and the politics of difference*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Summary

Disability and work. Discursive constructions of exclusion and dissensus

In this article, the author sketches the issue of the exclusion of persons with disabilities from the field of employment and explains the causes of the difficult-to-surmount discrimination on the open labour market that affects this social group. The discussed issues are presented with reference to the theory of disability studies and the socio-cultural model of disability perceiving disability as a product of the dominant discourse. Presenting the problem of the marginalisation of people with disabilities on the labour market, the author goes back to the roots of any exclusion created in the era of early industrial capitalism, which created and then excluded the "unproductive body" from the field of employment. In the following section, referring to the concept of the economic model of disability, areas of economic

oppression, discursively perpetuated exclusionary practices and actions attempting to resist the imposed order, through the painstaking "forging of new lines of outlet", fighting against the despotism of the capitalist labour market are discussed.

Keywords

Ergonomia :
Kubatura.

Jarosław Marzec
ORCID: 0000-0003-0681-8295
Gdańsk

The regress of culture, the end of the future and the end of development – reading culture with Bauman and Wilber

Introduction: social theory at the dawn of the 21st century

The contemporary social theory is becoming one of the challenges facing researchers in the educational world. There are discussions by social scientists raising the issue of the status of the social theory – over the dense field of application of diverse perspectives in theorising about the nature and role of social theory. On the one hand, they touch upon the subtle process of transcending the postmodern era in social research; on the other hand, they appear in the context of the aftermath of cultural turns in the research field of contemporary cultural studies and the social sciences. I would like to focus on some of the contexts of the outlined problems. At this point there is definitely a need to articulate the thesis concerning the cultural crisis and regression that is included in the analyses of several social researchers. Two important analyses by prominent cultural experts should appear in the context of the title cultural regression: Zygmunt Bauman and Ken Wilber. On the one hand, Bauman is a figure who has brought to the analysis of contemporary culture extremely load-bearing categories, metaphors and rhetoric that transcend sociology, its domain, and assigned discipline. At the very beginning I would like to add that, in the context of the titular regression of culture, I will definitely refer to Bauman's recent analysis in *Retrotopia* (2018). The analysis of this peculiar "theoretical testament" in the form of the "retrotopia" of Zygmunt Bauman, an eminent contemporary thinker, clearly becomes a significant category allowing to read the essential relations between culture and its domains, including education. The second figure from the circle of prominent representatives of the trend presenting also the analyses of the regression of culture and the breakdown of the trajectory of cultural

evolution in the light of own integral theory is Ken Wilber. In the sketch presented here, it is precisely the work of Bauman and Wilber that provides me with a source of inspiration for the creative analysis of culture through a reference to the interpretation of culture in a state of regression and crisis developed by these scholars.

I want to present the synthetic view of the proposed subject. However, at this point I would like to propose a provisional solution, a kind of categorical scaffolding or quasi-mapping of social theory – following the example of Joanna Rutkowiak (1995) – and in this sketch in a way sort out the many interpretative tropes raised. Therefore, contemporary social theory will be explained by showing the multiplicity of so-called cultural turns in the reflection of contemporary cultural studies, as done by Doris Bachmann-Medick (2012), and Charles Taylor's (2010) included in his concept of the "social imaginary".

As an introduction to this strand of analysis, it should be noted that the social world, as well as the world of education, is currently experiencing a crisis of theorisation, and this phenomenon has been the subject of an important text by Maria Mendel and Tomasz Szkudlarek (2013). As the authors emphasise: "The narrative-discursive interpretation of the crisis carried out here gives an *ontological* dimension to attempts of creating such languages. That is because, the social world is built on communication activities. Its structure is the structure of discourse and its changes are trajectories of the narrative. The multidimensionality of this world at the same time constitutes its multilingualism, and the crisis situations only add to this complexity in that no single language can gain the status of a defining language" (Mendel, Szkudlarek 2013: 24). According to the authors: "Therefore theory plays *a reconfiguring* role in the field of educational discourse and as such […] makes it possible not only to grasp relations occurring (or precisely *not occurring,* deficient) in the here and now, but also to 'foretell' the entire narrative trajectory linking the past, the present as a time of its crisis and a vision of a possible future" (Mendel, Szkudlarek 2013: 29–30). Whereas, according to Anthony Elliott: "Contemporary social theory is a kind of dual enterprise: on the one hand, an imaginative, dynamic and interdisciplinary project of the social sciences and humanities; on the other, an urgent critique of ideological thought and discourses of reason, freedom, truth, subjectivity, culture, and politics" (Elliott 2011: 9–10). In this work, I wanted to show a trailblazing approach to the challenges facing social theory at the dawn of the 21st century and, using innovative examples, point to its multilingualism and a certain unifying problem of a breakthrough in theorisations concerning its nature. This limited intention reveals the fact that "such a reconstruction of the discourse *structure* can have an impact on the understanding of the social *process* and thus – creating a narrative different from the one that has been 'suspended' in the crisis phase" (Mendel, Szkudlarek 2013: 30).

Cultural turns

I would now like to pause for a moment on a number of topics relating to the status of theory and the possibility of exploring cultural reality. The first context I will discuss is the concept of the multiplicity of cultural turns presented by Bachmann-Medick, an attempt to "map the discourse of cultural studies". In order to explore the belief expressed above, I will refer to the work of Bachmann-Medick *Cultural Turns. Nowe kierunki w naukach o kulturze* (2012), constituting a theoretical account of the process of the emergence of cultural turns in the reflection of cultural studies.

As Bachmann-Medick noted: "In the period of postmodernism, the cultural sciences have, as is well known, hailed the end of the 'grand narrative' of emancipation and progress (Lyotard 1997). However, in doing so, have they not themselves became a product of a 'grand narrative'? After all, we are still talking about the *Cultural Turn*, which has seemingly taken a paradigmatic leap across all social and cultural disciplines and is still under the spell of the overwhelming *linguistic turn*. Admittedly, the *linguistic turn* gives the impression of a 'mega'-turn, even some kind of abrupt paradigm shift, but has it really dominated cultural studies theory-making so much that it now determines the following new theoretical directions?" (Bachmann-Medick 2012: 3). According to Bachmann-Medick, this approach can be "contrasted with the idea and image of a different history of the cultural sciences, in which the multiplicity of *cultural turns* was chosen as the guiding idea" (Bachmann-Medick 2012: 3). According to Bachmann-Medick, it is "[…] the tendency of cultural studies towards pluralism, going hand in hand with critical self-reflection and with the (inter)cultural positioning of its own theories, that has been and continues to be fertile ground for producing momentous *cultural turns* both within and across disciplines" (Bachmann-Medick 2012: 6). As Bachmann-Medick explains, she does not intend to write a history of cultural studies, rather, she emphasises: "A more fertile method might be to map cultural studies discourse in such a way that its dynamics can be anticipated and used directly in current struggles with the objects, subjects, or texts under study" (Bachmann-Medick 2012: 7). Viewed from the *cultural turns* perspective, the cultural sciences – according to the author – "do not produce linear sequences of theoretical 'progress'" (Bachmann-Medick 2012: 7). From this perspective, the cultural sciences "are rather distinguished by the fact that they create developmental spaces when, as *turns,* they still only initiate turns – including backwards – or constructive detours, shifts of focus, new focuses or changes of direction" (Bachmann-Medick 2012: 11). According to Bachmann-Medick, "[…] turns, with the leading ideas and categories introduced, the change of direction and the transformation of theory, are something significant, both in their own contextual

references and because they modify the 'scientific field' in cultural studies and the social sciences" (Bachmann-Medick 2012: 12). According to the author of *Cultural Turns*, "one can only speak of a *turn* when the new research focus from the object plane of a new kind of research field 'is thrown' to the category plane of analysis and concept, when it therefore no longer merely points to new cognitive *objects*, but itself becomes *an instrument* and *a medium of* cognition" (Bachmann-Medick 2012: 31). Fundamental to the formation of *cultural turns* is the first "Mega"-turn – as Bachmann-Medick calls it – the linguistic turn.

Social imaginary

It will be important, in the context of considering the peculiarities of social theory at the dawn of the 21st century, to zoom in on some characteristics for Charles Taylor's concept of the "social imaginary". According to Taylor, "the social imaginary is something broader and deeper than the intellectual schemas that people reach for when thinking about social reality in a detached way. It is […] rather about the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they adapt to others, how things go on between them and their fellow human beings; it is also about the expectations that tend to be fulfilled as well as the deeper normative concepts and images underlying them" (Taylor 2010: 37). Taylor uses the concept of "imaginary" in the aforementioned work because, unlike social theory, the concept of "social imaginary" makes it possible: firstly, to capture "how ordinary people 'imagine' their social environment, which they often express not in theoretical terms, but rather through images, stories, and legends"; secondly, "in the social imaginary […] what is really of interest are the beliefs shared by large groups of people, even entire societies"; thirdly, "the social imaginary of legitimacy shared by broad social groups" (Taylor 2010: 37). The interplay between social practice and understanding can be put this way: "[…] because just as practice without this understanding would not make sense – so it would not be possible – and therefore, this understanding, if it is to create meaning, presupposes the necessity of knowing where we are: how we relate to each other, how we got to where we are now, our relationship to other groups, and so on" (Taylor 2010: 39). I invoke the concept of the "social imaginary" mainly because often, as participants in social life in the age of liquid modernity, we do not perceive very clearly the meaning of the practices we enter into and we do not understand very clearly the meanings that our participation in them reveals.

Problematisation

This sketch constitutes a record of my struggles in trying to find the critical moment in contemporary culture analysis that regression and cultural crisis are becoming. I would like to make the issue of regression and cultural crisis the problematisation in this sketch. In the words of Helena Ostrowicka: "I am trying in it (the book) to capture the tropes and traces that can be followed by pedagogical thought seeking in scientific theory and methodology points of support for the critical valorisation of various versions of educational reality and truths about it" (Ostrowicka 2022: 7). According to Ostrowicka, "the appearance of the term 'problematisation' in the analysis signals a critical intention, a kind of challenge to the social and political *status quo*" (Ostrowicka 2022: 8). Problematisation is understood, "both as an object of research interest and as a scientific procedure and method of analysis. Researchers using this concept – despite the differences in its detailed approaches and applications – describe social relations as adventurous and non-obvious and are usually averse to positivist methods of analysis" (Ostrowicka 2022: 8). As stated by the author: "[…] I situate the concept of problematisation in the context of interdisciplinary discourse studies and their encounters with educational research, while being aware of the presence of this category in other theoretical contexts related to education" (Ostrowicka 2022: 9). It can be said, following Ostrowicka, that problematisation is characterised by a double meaning, "which refers both to the method, the mode of research procedure (to problematisation in the sense of the activity of problematising), and to the object of research, the object of thought" (Ostrowicka 2022: 103). The author proposes to frame discursive pedagogy as follows: "Here, discursive pedagogy functions as a concept that creates a convenient space for reflection that integrates the problematic of the discursivity of education in its multilayered view" (Ostrowicka 2022: 11). According to this: "From the perspective of discursive pedagogy, both science and scientific categories are objects of discourse, and thus their meanings depend on historically conditioned systems of norms and rules of knowledge formation. In this sense, discursive pedagogy is characterised by a kind of linguistic sensitivity to the processes of defining and constructing meanings, and thus to the context of its discursive identity formation" (Ostrowicka 2022: 12). In the conclusion to this work, Ostrowicka noted that "working with the category of problematisation, discursive pedagogy adopts a critical perspective. Based on past experiences and expectations related to the need to unmask various origins of truth claims, ambitions to universalise theories, and scientific explanations, it highlights the adventurous nature of pedagogical knowledge and its social relevance" (Ostrowicka 2022: 196).

Problem field: Bauman and Wilber
in the contexts of cultural theory

I believe that it is worth noting that the current crisis and regression of contemporary culture provides the context for the reflections of both Bauman (2018) and Wilber (2017). Bauman's aforementioned regressive trend appears in his work *Retrotopia* (2018), and Wilber's analysis of cultural regression in the light of the integral theory of cultural evolution appears in his work *Trump and the post-truth world* (2017). Although, Bauman's diagnosis touches on "retrotopia", i.e. reversing the course of evolution, and instead of the projects of the future, there is a return to the past, to the traces of the work of the past, which are not very durable as a foundation. The past is sometimes treated as a safe and secure era in the face of anxiety and uncertainty in the future. These regressive trends are reflected in other domains of culture and social life. In my opinion, the thesis concerning the regression of culture and its institutional background defines both the spiritual field of culture and contemporary education (also in Poland).

Retrotopias

In this section of the study, I intend to refer once again to Bauman's work, this time to his posthumously published work *Retrotopia* (2018). Bauman's views appear in this this text in a number of places, but in the context of the reflections undertaken here, his recent work may provide a counterpoint to the views of Jean-François Lyotard (1997). This work contains numerous ideas concerning the complex nature of the contemporary cultural world, which is characterised by a certain perceptible mood of nostalgia. In the context of considerations concerning the nature of social theory at the dawn of the 21st century, I wish to recall more closely some of Bauman's theses on the retreat from utopian projects and the focus of contemporary inhabitants of the global village on the past. Therefore, what is "retrotopia" and how does it work within social theory? Will it provide an understanding of the contemporary world and reveal trends in developing culture and social theory itself? These are important questions taken up by the author in his "theoretical testament".

It seems that Bauman's work touches upon the general tendency of late twentieth-century culture, and for this reason seems to be a significant voice of an experienced researcher of social life, who created many inspiring analyses of the world of liquid modernity. In the introduction Bauman quotes Svetlana Boym's reflections and concludes that "the 20th century began with utopia and ended with nostalgia" (Bauman 2018: 8). Below is an extract from the text:

Five hundred years after Thomas More bestowed the title of utopia on the dream, dreamt of by mankind for millennia to return to paradise or establish heaven on Earth, another Hegelian triad, created as a result of the double negation, is now approaching its starting point and bringing the cycle full circle. Once the hopes of achieving human happiness – since More's time linked to a topos (that is, a fixed place, a *polis*, a city, a sovereign state, each ruled by a wise and benevolent hand) – have been freed and severed from the concrete topos and individualised, privatised and personalised (in other words, deposited, like snail shells, on the shoulders of individuals, according to the principle of "subsidiarity"), it is apparent that it is precisely these hopes that are now to be negated by that against which they have so valiantly and almost victoriously attempted to act. Out of the movement of the double negation of utopia as understood in the tradition of More – its rejection and subsequent resurrection – today "retrotopias" are born: visions grounded in a lost/stolen/abandoned but undead past, rather than an attachment to what is yet to be born, and therefore to a future not yet in existence (Bauman 2018: 10).

Giving the floor to Bauman:

As old fears slowly faded into oblivion and new ones grew in significance and intensity, encouragement and humiliation, progress and retrogression swapped places, with a growing number of reluctant pawns in this game doomed – at least according to their own understanding – to failure. Such developments resulted in that the pendulum of public sentiment swung in exactly the opposite direction: from investing the hope of improved living conditions in an uncertain and all too evidently doubtful future to a renewed investment in a barely remembered past, valued for its supposed stability and thus for the impression that it could be trusted. As a result of such a radical turnaround, the future is transformed from a natural refuge of hope and legitimate expectations into a space of nightmare: the fear of having one's home and remaining life's possessions seized by creditors, the fear of being forced to watch passively as one's own children roll down the slope of well-being and prestige, and how one's own skills, acquired and assimilated by the sweat of one's brow, lose whatever remains of their marketability. The road into the future appears alarmingly as a path marked by decline and degeneration. Therefore, the road back, the road leading to the past, perhaps will not fail to turn into a route of purification, removing the obstacles that the future inflicts as soon as it turns into the present (Bauman 2018: 11).

The above quotations serve as an introduction to the author's definition of the meaning of "retrotopia". As stated by Bauman: "By the term retrotopia I refer to the phenomenon derived from second-degree negation – that is, something that is a negation made by utopia" (Bauman 2018: 13). According to Bauman: "Be that as it may, only those real or imagined aspects of the past that are considered effective, but have been prematurely abandoned or irresponsibly exposed to erosion, will now serve as major landmarks as we plot a map showing the path to retrotopia" (Bauman 2018: 13). The author traces the work of "retrotopia" in four contexts: back to Hobbes, back to tribes, back to inequality, back to the womb.

I have been wondering, since the publication of Bauman's book *Retrotopia* (2018), about the possibilities of reading the current state of culture and the social conditions of our time through the prism of this category of reality that Bauman's "testament" brings to the order of analysis. Is it possible to use this category in relation to the current situation of education, life in the face of disturbing developments in

politics and climate alarmism? To clarify, it is important to get ahead of the reading, the title does not point to "retrotopia" itself as a profiled category through which I perceive the world of education, the social world. In the face of the collapse of the project of neoliberal hegemony of educational discourse, in the light of numerous analyses that *de facto* indicate explicitly that education is missing something valuable to it, but forgotten in this approach. For an introduction to the subject matter, this is not enough – however, "retrotopia" appears rather as an invitation to address the themes of education, politics and ecology using various tools to analyse culture and education. Bauman's "Retrotopia" appears next to integral theory, next to weak theory or depth ecology, which indicates both the multifaceted nature of culture and the diversity of tools for analysing culture, as well as the multifaceted and multi-perspective nature of culture and education, and that politics here is not merely a background in the process of mapping contemporary culture".

These are all too obvious clues to explain the meaning of the titular "retrotopia": on the one hand, it raises questions concerning the meaning of education; on the other, it points to a weakening and undermining of the hegemony of neoliberalism, which, like postmodernism, has exhausted its compelling magic of simple prescriptions.

On the evolution of culture in the light of Ken Wilber's integral theory

The moment of the "transition" of culture to the integral level and the situation of postmodern culture, together with the dangers of the evolutionary trajectory to the integral stage, became the focus of Wilber's analysis in his recent texts. The topography of "transition" as well as the significant threats and some disturbing tendencies exemplified by Wilber's integral theory provide an opportunity to grasp several features in our cultural surroundings and also delineate symptoms of the existential condition of the inhabitants of the world undergoing these processes.

In my sketch I want to present Wilber's reflections from his recent work, above all from *Trump and the post-truth world. An evolutionary self-correction* (2017). Wilber's interesting analyses touch on matters concerning the essence of the integral approach to culture and the status of integral theory, and his most recent work deals with important resolutions in the face of disturbing regressive moves and his attempt to defend the delineated developmental process of cultural evolution towards an integral level. Wilber also continues his observations concerning the gravity of the green meme and regressive tendencies that have already appeared in his earlier work (e.g. Buddhist boomeritis and "boomeritis") (Wilber 2006).

Evolutionary correction

In *Trump and a post-truth world. An evolutionary self-correction* (2017) Wilber intends to present a more general and integral view in contrast to Americans disappointed with or satisfied with the election of Donald Trump. The example of electing Donald Trump is, in his view, a sign of deep adaptive moves within the evolution of culture. Wilber presents a more general picture that is perhaps "more enlightening and liberating" and expresses what no one before him has articulated. Wilber believes that "the evolution of culture itself must regulate the direction, in the light of new information, of how its path unfolds and begins (apparently spontaneously), but with a deep morphogenetic field (operating indeed) by making various movements that are in effect self-correcting evolutionary rearrangements" (Wilber 2017: 3). The forerunner of cultural evolution has been, for the past four or five decades, the "green wave", which means "a fundamental stage of human development referred to in many developmental models as pluralist, postmodern, relativist, individualist, multicultural – generically referred to as 'postmodern'" (Wilber 2017: 3). As Wilber expresses it, "the original purpose of the evolutionary summit is precisely to be the leader of evolutionary development", which means: "the search for the arenas that are the most appropriate, the most complex, the most capacious, and the most conscious forms that are possible at a particular time and point in evolution (in terms of integral theory, the forms that are best aligned with the ongoing development of the AQAL matrix in all its elements)" (Wilber 2017: 3). The beginning of the green wave dated to the early 1960s initiated many positive changes in culture and society, associated with liberating minorities from social oppression (the civil rights movement, the environmental movement, the development of personal and professional feminism) and soon surpassed the gains of the orange wave (known in many models as the modernist, rational, formal operations level, achievement, developmental) that preceded the green wave. The green wave, it should be added after Wilber, acknowledges "an understanding of the essential role of context in all truths of knowledge and a desire to be as inclusive as possible" (Wilber 2017: 4). In order to discuss Wilber's views, it should be briefly added that, in the light of the integral theory of cultural development and evolution, the various developmental stages have their positive, healthy expressions and also carry dangers that their pathological incarnations can produce. According to Wilber, the green wave has also produced a pathological variant of the green meme in the course of the passing decades, which he refers to as boomeritis. It is worth characterising its features in more detail, because Wilber's argument concerning the evolutionary correction is based largely on diagnosing a pathological version of the dominant green wave. According to Wilber, in the course of evolution, the gains of the green meme have contributed, in the extreme, to postmodern culture's aporias and the internal (performative) contradiction of discourse. It is worth pausing to take

a closer look at this form of green wave. Wilber puts the matter in the following way: "His tolerant pluralism slipped into a violent and evasive relativism (collapsing into nihilism), and the view that all truth is contextualised (or achieves meaning from cultural context), slipped into the view that there is no universal truth, there are only reflexive cultural interpretations (which in effect slipped into a pervasive narcissism)" (Wilber 2017: 4). Let me quote a few more sentences characterising this attitude: "Central views (which began as an important notion of 'true but partly', but collapsed into extreme and deeply contradictory views) containing the ideas that all knowledge is, in part, a cultural construction; all knowledge is context-bound; there is no privileged perspective; which imports truth as a cultural fashion and is always overtaken by one oppressive force or another (racism, sexism, Eurocentrism, patriarchy, capitalism, consumerism, greed, environmental exploitation)" (Wilber 2017: 4).

According to Wilber, the position of postmodern science has fallen into an internal contradiction, because since there is no privileged perspective or position, and therefore "knowledge is a cultural construct" of a particular culture, it cannot be inferred that this "truth" applies to all cultures and all humanity. This position is repeatedly referred to by Wilber as "aperspectivist lunacy", which has infected the lodgement of cultural evolution, and with it, its capacity for self-organisation and self-development has also collapsed.

According to Wilber, Trump's anti-green rhetoric resonates with and has activated three earlier pre-green developmental stages: the orange meme (world-centric – focused on achievement, development, excellence, profit); the blue meme (ethnocentric – racism, sexism, xenophobia, anti-immigration, hyper-terrorist sensitive); and the red meme (egocentric – pre-conventional, narcissistic). All these pre-green wave developmental stages are united by their shared anti-green character. According to Wilber, the described antinomies in the post-truth culture have allowed regressive tendencies of aggression, narcissism, hatred, also ethnocentric beliefs (sexism, racism, xenophobia, political bigotry, religious fanaticism – fundamentalism), conspiracy theories to erupt and fail to meet these challenges. Wilber also links this to the crisis of legitimacy in culture as a mismatch between the lower left (cultural quadrant) and the left right (social quadrant). This results in denying cultural beliefs concerning equality with social inequalities and in the belief that culture lies.

This conviction also led to the conclusion that "when all truth is cultural fiction, therefore, there is simply no truth – to epistemological and ontological nihilism" (Wilber 2017: 8). According to Wilber "nihilism and narcissism are no trope, and no developmental wave can properly operate here" (Wilber 2017: 8). The response to this consists in the development regression seen around the world. When the forefront of evolution falls into an internal contradiction, the evolution of culture makes certain movements, regressions to a point from which it can restart development.

According to Wilber, two ways to move forward are possible:

1. The first way is more likely, but less effective – it involves healing the broken abutments of the green wave, the green-on-green movement for self-healing and self-correction;
2. The second way is to go directly to the turquoise integral level and take the vanguard of development and evolution through the turquoise integral wave.

According to Wilber, it will be important in this context to heal "the disastrous confusion between hierarchies of domination (violence) and hierarchies of actualisation (development)" (Wilber 2017: 61). According to Wilber, "the green meme – fighting absolutism, nominalism, and hierarchical rule (characteristic of the blue and orange memes) – found all hierarchies equally destructive; opposed any hierarchies and got bogged down at the level of first-order thinking" (Wilber 2006: 53).

In the perspective of integral theory, developmental hierarchies constitute a belief that "the totality of each level contains itself as part of the totality of the next higher level' or, in other words, "each level is a whole/part" (Wilber 2017: 61). This is expressed by the basic force of evolution: "transcending and containing" or "distinguishing and integrating" (Wilber 2017: 62). Whereas, the green wave is associated with a lack of understanding of development hierarchies and an attachment to hierarchies of violence. From an integral level of development, all previous stages are necessary in the course of evolution, while at the same time this level generates strong pressure on the green wave to heal its broken and fragmented manifestations.

According to integral theory, "following waves become more and more closely linked, becoming more integral and therefore less and less marginalising and mutually exclusive – each successive wave includes the previous ones and at the same time transcends them" (Wilber 2006: 52). Whereas, in the context of critical analyses of boomerosis, Wilber adds at the same time that "by criticising the 'pre-green' levels in the green stage, one is just as effectively combating all the 'super-green' levels – with very destructive consequences". This struggle makes it difficult and often impossible for the green to take a step towards genuinely holistic, integral thinking" (Wilber 2006: 37). Referring to Wilber's reflections, using the work of Don Beck and Christopher Cowan's *Spiral Dynamics*, it should be supplemented that the six initial stages of evolution are levels of existence and characterise first-order thinking, while development also contains distinguishable three second-order levels, or levels of being. Wilber presents a brief characteristic of the yellow, turquoise, and coral memes. "The ability to think in both horizontal and vertical planes, using both hierarchies and heterarchies (and therefore the category of ranking levels as well as combining various dimensions). In this way, for the first time in the evolution of consciousness, it will be possible to grasp perfectly the entire spectrum of inner development and to see that the health of each level, each meme and each wave is fundamental to the health of the entire spiral" is characteristic for second-order thinking" (Wilber 2006: 32).

Summary

Culture often constitutes an area of interpretations, and conflicts of interpretations. According to the post-structural perspective, the conflict of interpretations within cultural domains, including education, should be perceived as a normal state of affairs. Michał P. Markowski (2019) believes that education is the art of interpretation. I would like to quote some of Olga Tokarczuk's thoughts from the collection *Czuły narrator* (2020). As the Nobel Prize winner writes:

> The world is a fabric that we spin every day on the great looms of information, discussions, films, books, gossip, anecdotes. Today, the reach of the work of these looms immense – thanks to the Internet, almost everyone can participate in the process, responsibly and irresponsibly, with love and with hate, for good and for evil, for life and for death. In this sense, the world is made of words. Therefore, the manner in which we think about the world and – perhaps more importantly – how we talk about it, matters enormously. Something that happens and is not told ceases to exist and dies (Tokarczuk 2020: 263).

According to Tokarczuk:

> The problem today – it seems – is that we do not yet have ready-made narratives not only for the future, but even for the specific now, for the ultra-fast transformations of today's world. We lack language, we lack points of view, metaphors, myths, and new tales. Instead, we are witnessing an attempt to draw these incongruous, rusty, and anachronistic old narratives into a vision of the future, perhaps on the assumption that an old something is better than a new nothing, or in an attempt to deal with the limitation of one's own horizons. In a word, we lack new ways of telling about the world (Tokarczuk 2020: 264).

Risk constitutes a clear aspect leading to Bauman's "retrotopia", but there are other social phenomena, such as political populism and environmental education linked to climate alerts. A culture of risk can lead to "retrotopia", while political populism can lead to division, the social disintegration of communities and a return to the idea of a closed society. Hence, the gains of liberal democracy can be undermined by populist policies that no longer appeal to the idea of the common good. Therefore, examples of "crisis" in culture are all too numerous. And should that be remedied by the mindfulness movement, which Ronald Purser calls "neoliberal pedagogy"? The ongoing crisis also accompanies education researchers, who declare a crisis of theorising in education. I have chosen these few themes not previously exposed only to show the causes of the cultural crisis and the impotence of education in the face of the influence of cultural institutions and the fundamentalism associated with the idea of a "closed society".

However, a legitimate question can be raised about the sense of juxtaposing the "developmental correction" of Wilber's evolutionary trajectory under discussion with Bauman's diagnosis of culture. As Wojciech Burszta wrote in a study on this work entitled *Ostatnia Metafora Baumana*: "In his posthumously published book,

Zygmunt Bauman left us yet another word useful to describe a world of mutual distrust, disbelief in the future and idealisation of the past: retrotopia" (Burszta 2017). One may risk to argue that, like according to Wilber, activating earlier stages of development and waves triggered by a misunderstanding of the importance of the green wave in the course of the evolution of culture to the integral stage, and thus the activation of the past and the strong gravity of the green wave triggering regressive tendencies and a return to the past, and a misunderstanding of the necessity of transcending these tendencies in the evolutionary ascent into the integral bands, Bauman's work, also presenting "retrotopia", touches on the essence of our tendency to return nostalgically to the past and disbelieve in utopian projects. According to Burszta, "retrotopia constitutes a turning to the imaginary of the past, a nostalgic return to realities considered safe, comprehensible and – less importantly – stable because predictable. It concerns collectivities, but also individuals, it is a search – for various reasons – for certainty and an escape from the unknown" (Burszta 2017).

Bauman's work concerning "retrotopia" may provide a closing bracket for reflections on the atrophic mood of utopia in the thought and attitudes of post-modern culture.

Both works provide a record of the breakdown and regression in contemporary culture, they may provide a diagnosis of culture and present mature variants of social theory that pose the problem of the future of theoretical analyses of culture, contributing much to the understanding of the search for the sources of the trends that have occurred. The concepts discussed can also serve as a background for explaining the situation of a crisis of theorising in education, which as a domain of culture is becoming an area of regression.

The titular categories represent a greatly capacious semantic field, but the sketch nevertheless develops several contexts to think about and look for the logic and "hidden grammar" of a culture that re-presents these themes in accessible ways. If one adopts Wilber's and Bauman's perspectives, it will be possible to take advantage of these metaphors, as well as to use "culture mapping" as a method to study it. It is possible to perceive Bauman's work – his "scientific testament" – as indicating the momentous role of cultural analysis around the four types of "retrotopia", while Wilber's vision also has an emancipatory character, as it makes the category of the map an operative concept and gives the phenomena and tendencies described a meaning in a new context. The "hidden logic" governing the tendencies of contemporary culture is captured in the category of "retrotopia" and in Wilber's concept of cultural evolution and integral development. One can say that these two perspectives shed much light on the processes currently taking place in the culture and its domains. One can confidently conclude that these two works represent a unique opportunity to capture processes that are difficult to analyse, while these researchers have left works that can still challenge social scientists, including educators.

In his last work *The religion of tomorrow* (2018), Wilber made some summary statements concerning the status of integral theory in the context of considering

"integral semiotics". According to Wilber, the upcoming world also demands a new language, and the practice of describing the integral world has a profound emancipatory value against the entanglements and reductive practices anchored in the flat earth. The contemporary problem with spirituality is a semiotic one: "most modernist and postmodernist cultures simply did not have a vocabulary for any third-order structure or any experience of a higher state of Spirit" (Wilber 2018: 642). Returning to the problem of the map, Wilber adds that "one should not confuse words with reality, map with territory, sign with referent, theory with fact. But at the same time when we don't want to confuse a map with a territory, we also don't want to have a completely inadequate map" (Wilber 2018: 642).

Literature

Bachmann-Medick D., 2012, *Cultural Turns*, trans. K. Krzemieniowa, Warsaw: Oficyna Naukowa.

Bauman Z., 2007, *Płynne życie*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie.

Bauman Z., 2006, *Płynna nowoczesność*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie.

Bauman Z., 2012, *O edukacji*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej.

Bauman Z., 2018, *Retrotopia*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Burszta W., 2017, *Ostatnia metafora Baumana*, "Polityka", No. 9.

Elliott A.*,* 2011, *Współczesna teoria społeczna*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Kielar M.B., 2012, *Integralna wizja Kena Wilbera i jej zastosowanie w edukacji*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Akademii Pedagogiki Specjalnej.

Kielar M.B., Gop A., 2012, *Integralny pluralizm metodologiczny. Teoria i badania naukowe*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Akademii Pedagogiki Specjalnej.

Lyotard J.F., 1997, *Kondycja ponowoczesna. Raport o stanie wiedzy*, trans. M. Kowalska, J. Migasiński, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo "Aletheia".

Markowski M.P., 2019, *Wojny nowoczesnych plemion. Spór o rzeczywistość w epoce populizmu*, Kraków: "Karakter".

Mendel M., Szkudlarek T., 2013, *Kryzys jako dyskurs i narracja. Konteksty edukacyjne*, "Forum Oświatowe", No. 3.

Ostrowicka H., 2022, *Problematyzacje. Studia nad dyskursem w badaniach edukacyjnych*, Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza, "Impuls".

Rutkowiak J., 1995, *Odmiany myślenia o edukacji*, Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza "Impuls".

Szkudlarek T., 2017, *On the politics of educational theory*, London: Routledge.

Taylor Ch., 2010, *Nowoczesne imaginaria społeczne*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo "Universitas".

Tokarczuk O., 2020, *Czuły narrator*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie.

Wilber K., 1998, *Krótka historia wszystkiego*, trans. H. Smagacz, Warsaw: Jacek Santorski & Co. Wydawnictwo.

Wilber K., 1999, *Jeden smak*, trans. H. Smagacz, Warsaw: Jacek Santorski & Co Wydawnictwo.

Wilber K., 2003, *Psychologia integralna. Świadomość, duch, psychologia, terapia*, trans. H. Smagacz, Warsaw: Jacek Santorski & Co Wydawnictwo.

Wilber K., 2006, *Integralna teoria wszystkiego*, trans. C. Urbański, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Zysk i S-ka.

Wilber K., 2008, *Małżeństwo rozumu z duszą: integracja nauki i religii*, trans. H. Smagacz, Warsaw: Jacek Santorski & Co Wydawnictwo.

Wilber K., 2017, *Trump and post-truth world. An evolutionary self-correction*, Boston–London: Shambhala.

Wilber K., 2018, *The religion of tomorrow*, Boston–London: Shambhala.

Summary

The regress of culture, the end of the future and the end of development –
reading culture with Bauman and Wilber

The text presents two important analyses by experts of contemporary culture in the context of the regression and crisis of culture. On the basis of a Zygmunt Bauman's "retrotopia" and the work of Ken Wilber concerning the breakdown of the course of the evolution of culture within the last decades, I intend to present the significance of these problems in the context of the dispute concerning the status of the social theory. An analysis of the peculiar "theoretical testament" in the form of a "retrotopia" by Bauman, an exceptional contemporary thinker, becomes a significant category allowing to read important relations between the culture and its domains, including education. Whereas, in the case of Wilber, analyses of the regression of culture and the breakdown of the course of the evolution of culture are shown in the light of his own integral theory. In the work presented here it is precisely Bauman and Wilber's body of work that constitutes a source of inspiration for me to perform a creative analysis of culture through the references to interpreting culture in the condition of regression and crisis carried out by these researchers

Keywords

cultural studies, regression, crisis, retrotopia, postmodernism, integral theory

Monika Popow
ORCID: 0000-0002-6763-7474
The Polish Naval Academy

Learning in the process of civilisation.
An attempt of pedagogical reading of selected themes in Norbert Elias' theory

The aim of my article is to theorise the category of learning in the light of selected strands of Norbert Elias' theory. I will look at the function of learning in the process of civilisation, as well as the learner. Therefore, the aim of the text is to reconstruct Elias' thought in the context of the transformation of learning in the process of civilisation.

Reflection concerning learning belongs to the field of general pedagogy, but through its intrinsic connection to education it is an important complement to the field of the philosophy of education. In the context of the development of civilisation, I perceive learning as an area of normative construction. Who the learner is, and how learning changes over time, is a significant question when considering education. Currently, learning is perceived as a natural phenomenon, which can be seen especially in the discourse of lifelong learning, as well as in the discourse of competence, personal development, or the career discourse. Gert Biesta even writes about the learning orientation of educational discourse. This can be seen for example in speaking about students as "learners", and about schools as "learning environments". Whereas adult education has become a lifelong learning (Biesta 2013: 5). The existing critical analyses show that discourses built around the category of learning can serve the purpose of social arrangement (Ostrowicka 2013; Szkudlarek 2017; Szkudlarek, Zamojski 2020). I therefore propose to look at these transformations in the context of the development of civilisation.

Learning as "a process in the course of which, on the basis of experience, cognition and exercise, new forms of behaviour and action are created or the previously

acquired forms are changed" (Okoń 2004) has not traditionally been analysed from an Eliasian perspective, even though learning functions as an integral part of the process of civilisation. This is because it requires continuous learning. Looking at how it is a socio-cultural process in a civilizational manner will complement previous analyses of Elias' theory with a pedagogical perspective.

Learning in the theory of Norbert Elias

Civilisation is, according to Elias (2011), the gradual elimination of coercion in favour of more subtle, invisible forms of it, which make us feel embarrassment or shame towards certain behaviours, even those previously practised. Even though it does not focus on the category of learning itself, it is possible to reconstruct from Elias' analyses how learning and becoming a learning individual is the norm that defines our civilisation.

By analysing habits and behaviours, Elias shows that learning was integral to the process of civilisation. At its beginning, learning was linked to the state or spiritual development of the individual, as reflected in Plato's *State* and also in the *Bible*, where Jesus is referred to as a Teacher. However, in the process of civilisation learning was gradually attributed to the acquisition of culture, which Elias reconstructs by analysing the norms of behaviour contained in the codes of chivalry. He writes that with the development of civilisation, the need to manage human affect and drives increased until it became an internalised rule. Among other things, it analyses court etiquette in detail, showing how successive strict rules civilised people. Today, we rely on rules that have already been relaxed, which is made possible by the self-management principles we have learned. These have developed as a result of four pressures: 1) resulting from man's animal nature, 2) resulting from other natural processes, 3) arising from social life, so-called social pressures, and 4) internal pressures that the individual imposes on himself, otherwise known as self-control. The last two are the most significant in the civilisation process, and their role is increasing processually.

Elias links the progressive self-control at the level of moral norms to the transformation of forms of state power. Civilising learning consists of institutionalisation as well as instrumentalization, and balancing the control of the state and parents, and then the individual, over their own learning. A key category for Elias is upbringing, which he understands as modelling, whereby we learn the emotional and cognitive constructs that allow us to understand the social world. Children are formed to live in a particular society, learning what it means to be a member of that society, to behave according to the accepted rules and to restrain their emotions so that the accepted social form can survive at all. In his essay *The civilizing of parents* (2008), Elias wrote about the individual civilizing process of children, i.e. becoming adults

and thus learning gradual self-control and anticipation of their own behaviour. Children are gradually subjected to the authority of institutions, i.e. the nursery, kindergarten, and school, acquiring not only new knowledge but also learning appropriate behaviour.

This shaping allows an individual to direct his or her behaviour in a conscious manner rather than depending on drives. Elias assumes that people have biological instincts that are managed within a specific social context. At this point analyses of Elias' theory cite the example of the death drive, which has been civilised in some cultures by the encouragement of combat and in others by the encouragement of a consumerist lifestyle or emotional investment in sport (Lybeck 2019: 132). Over the centuries, according to Elias, a similar function has been performed by teaching manners, as he demonstrated by analysing Erasmus of Rotterdam's Manual of Manners or the historical changes in the perception of the role of the child. In the context of learning that interests me, this is the centuries old development of concepts in the field of educational theory towards bringing out the individuality of the child, as well as the transformation in the perception of learning as the responsibility of the individual.

In the changes concerning the social understanding of learning, we can observe a process of gradual transformation of our thinking about learning up to today's perception of it as a lifelong process. Therefore, learning has become the task of an individual throughout his or her development. Secondly, the changes associated with the properties attributed to learning are gradual and processual. The various functions and learning objectives do not displace the following ones, deriving from each other.

Researchers of Elias' theory link the transformations of learning and education described above to the assumption of a dominant social role by the bourgeoisie during the French Revolution and Restoration, which led to the emergence of a kind of "romantic ethic" of the modern consumer (Campbell 2005). In parallel, a gradual differentiation of forms of education by social class can be observed. More authoritarian forms began to be attributed to the lower classes, while the middle class became associated with more egalitarian forms.

As shown by Elias, the emergence of a system of universal education was not the result of a spontaneous interest in knowledge. Rather, it resulted from the societal belief that children should not be raised solely by their parents. Schools, as shown by Elias, have become a central tool in the process of civilisation. The upper class began to send their children to boarding schools, the bourgeoisie, in imitation, sent their children to similar types of schools, while the working class began to address courses in running a house, which can be considered one of the earliest forms of popular education. In Victorian societies, the school constituted evidence of social advancement, while the education of the lower classes was a gift to the primitive through which they could learn how to conduct their affairs

responsibly. Children who enrolled in these institutions were gaining social power – they were given the tools they needed to navigate this increasingly complex world. In an increasingly diverse and "civilised" society, where long-term planning and specialised knowledge dominate, it is knowledge that has become a form of power. This in turn established the need for education, including an expanding higher education sector (Lybeck 2019: 143–144).

Despite the evolutionary development of the category of learning towards the development of an individual, we should not lose sight of the aspects of learning related to social management, i.e. the control of drives, as well as phenomena with decision-making potential. The researchers point out that contemporary popular thinking about learning at any point in life is dominated by a technical and normative understanding of learning. This type of approach can trivialise the process without being able to maintain a critical perception on whether we are really, apart from the amount of information, learning anything that changes us (Maliszewski 2011: 35). Witkowski even writes about the end of the culture of learning, arguing that the massification of education and training has made it impossible to reflect deeply on the content being absorbed:

> Permanent education can permanently wean off motivation and the need to "learn", equipping individuals with the efficiency of a banal habit of schematic, unreflective actions (Witkowski 2009: 106).

The transformations of learning described above exemplify how civilisational and de-civilisational trends are intertwined in learning. On the one hand, learning reinforces an individual and has an impact on the possibility of advancement in the social structure. However, on the other hand, an unreflective model of learning, manifested in the collection of successive certificates or course diplomas, may not bring about real change in the individual and thus fail to fulfil the civilisational function of reducing the social distance between individuals. It even constitutes an area of increasing competitiveness and a gradual loss of autonomy in favour of becoming a collector of knowledge.

Learning is becoming an exalted process that requires continuous improvement. New techniques are emerging to constantly develop the ability to learn. Further elements related to learning technology are emerging in the public discourse: brain development, the use of appropriate exercises, diets and habits to make lifelong learning a habit. In them, the human being becomes a learning machine. According to Elias' theory, it is an increasingly complex figuration, so it needs more and more regulatory mechanisms.

In today's society, referred to as a knowledge-based society, lifelong learning, indeed in every life situation, is becoming a desirable way of functioning and its effectiveness an indicator of social utility. The contemporary discourse of society

based on knowledge suggests that the knowledge-dependent economy relies on constantly learning individuals, whose knowledge and skills are assets for driving economic growth. Education, in this view, is an investment and investing in an individual is investing in human capital. However, the perspective of investing in human capital, driven by the logic of competition, is counterbalanced by the concept of investment in social capital. In this way, the focus goes beyond individuals to include their communities, families and cultures, all requiring investment and learning. Ultimately, the complex interaction between knowledge, politics and the economy is thus mediated by education, often referred to as learning (Szkudlarek 2016: 79). These transformations, read in an Eliasian perspective, allow looking at the knowledge-based society as the following stage in the civilisational development of Western societies, and at learning as the key area of social normativity construction for this phase.

There is another element to looking at learning as an area undergoing civilisational change and it is related to the technical development of societies. In his text *Technisation and civilisation* Elias (1995) writes that technicisation is linked with the development of civilisation. As part of this process, people are learning to use technology to improve their standard of living, just as they have historically learned to use fire or motorization. Today, in the face of the greatest technological development in history, we as a society are faced with the opportunity for enormous progress. In the process of learning, we have gained new tools, above all artificial intelligence, but the acquisition of knowledge is no longer attributed solely to humans.

According to Elias, technological development requires involving the entire society in the adaptation process. The view that technological development requires a social process of adaptation underlines the significance of collective learning in the effective management of new technologies. As innovation arises from the collective efforts of innovators, society as a whole must learn to take advantage of these technologies safely and responsibly. This underlines the social nature of technological learning and the need for individuals to develop self-regulatory mechanisms to navigate the complexities of a technologically advanced society. Emphasising the role of self-control and self-regulation in reaping the benefits of technological advances while minimising risks and negative impacts, Elias presents a complex understanding of the challenges and opportunities associated with technological change. He points out that technical progress gives impetus both to improved development and growth as well as in the opposite direction, thus generating regression. Therefore, acquiring and developing new knowledge can have both civilisational and de-civilisational potential. Alongside functional democratisation, there is also functional de-democratisation, which can be a reaction to democratisation processes. The de-civilisation of the formation of information bubbles, the spread of fake news or the alienation of individuals,

whose lives are inextricably linked to the constant use of smartphones, can have a decisive impact in this context.

Analysing the contemporary discourse concerning learning and technology, it is easy to see that elements of moral panic are emerging around selected aspects of learning. This concerns the use of artificial intelligence in the learning process for children and young people, or the fact that machines learn too quickly, which can lead to them being highly competitive on the labour market compared to humans. According to Elias's theory, as a result of moral panics, so-called "civilisation offensives" emerge that aim to restrain problematic trends or, in Elias's language, to civilise the less civilised. In the case of moral panics surrounding learning and technology, we can observe a tendency to emphasise the importance of "honest" learning, to criminalise the use of technology in learning, and to link machine learning to safety and morality. Therefore, we are talking about the good and bad use of technology, but also about the immoral co-creation of knowledge with technology, as we can see in the context of the discussion on the use of artificial intelligence in schools.

Parallel to the described processes, the notion that we learn for ourselves is alive in the public consciousness. In general, learning constitutes an unequivocally positive process. However, this makes it difficult to grasp the tension between learning as a process that is needed and good for the individual, and a regime that disciplines and fills them with anxiety. In the perspective of Elias's theory, the construction of the learning subject becomes a field of civilisational tensions.

Civilising the learning individual

Using Elias's theory, I look at a learning individual as undergoing a process of civilisation. One of his key concepts is the critique of *homo clausus* – the closed, unlearning human being, characterised in the essay *Thinking Statues* as a separate entity created by philosophy and sociology. He subjected the cognitively closed "living statue" to criticism, which he extended to the Kantian conception of man:

> In this juxtaposition of an objectivist theory of time with a subjectivist one, a fundamental property of the traditional philosophical theory of cognition becomes apparent. It accepts that there is a universal, eternally reproducible starting point, a kind of zero point of knowledge. According to this perspective, each individual faces the world all alone – as subject before object – and begins to know (Elias 2017: 24–25).

Therefore, man learns about the world as a member of society – and in doing so, uses the tools with which that society equips him. As Marta Bucholc writes in the introduction to *Esej o czasie:* "Cognition of the world never and for no one starts

from scratch, it is never pure, and it never remains isolated either – it is always included in a process whose subjects are communities on an equal footing with each of its members. Thus, a person acts, learns about the world, and communicates knowledge about it, being neither fully dependent on others nor fully free, but, as Elias put it, 'semi-autonomous' or 'relatively powerless', both vis-à-vis the human world and vis-à-vis the natural world" (Bucholc 2017: 9–10).

Man in the process of history is shaped, according to Elias, by human relations, forms of life and figurations. Drives undergo modelling and people acquire lifestyles defined by interpersonal relationships:

> The question of why people's behaviour and emotional structure is changing is essentially a question of why the forms of human life are changing. The medieval society developed certain forms of life, and the life of an individual was shaped within these forms, whether as the life of a knight, a guild craftsman, or a peasant. Societies of later phases opened up other possibilities for the individual, developed other forms of life to which the individual had to adapt […]. This is essentially the same question as the question of what causes the structure and functioning of drives, the pattern of emotional life, and all that this entails to change (Elias 2011: 272).

The critique of *homo clausus* is extremely useful for thinking about the learner. That is because Elias creates a conception of man as an open personality, departing from the Cartesian model, destroying the vision of man as an absolute unity. It is dependent on and shaped by others, regardless of the degree of autonomy attributed to it. The process of civilisation he describes constitutes, in other words, changing individual structures under the influence of changes in figuration.

Elias concludes that the structure of the emotional life of people of other eras was different from ours. As a society, we have modelled a sense of shame, which has led to the formation of a predictable individual. Self-control is, for Elias, a symptom of the progress of civilisation:

> People who eat according to medieval rules, take meat with their hands from the same vessel, drink wine from the same bowl, scoop soup from the same pot, or plate – not to mention other peculiarities of their behaviour […] – these people have a different relationship to each other than people of our time. And not only in the sphere of consciousness, in the sphere of conscious and specified motivations, for the structure and different nature of their emotional life is different […]. What is lacking in this world […] is this invisible wall of emotional tensions that rises between people's bodies during our times, separating them and pushing them away from each other (Elias 2011: 139).

Therefore, civilising the learner is a process of restraining affect and behaviour in order to achieve a more predictable and guided learning process. On the basis of Elias' theory, we can reconstruct a lifelong, complex and time-varying process that includes developing habits, patterns, and even the stimulation and shaping of the learner's body. This is because shaping the learning process is not only about

acquiring intellectual competence, but also about building a modernist body with the desired affective, perceptual, and motor functions (Rakoczy 2023: 88).

In the process of civilising the learner, we are dealing with changing methods and techniques over time, transformations in the field of teaching, changes in didactic paradigms, and the production of more inclusive and democratic discourses of learning. However, all these changes are part of the same civilisational process, because democratisation and egalitarianisation are derived from civilisational processes aimed at normalising behaviour. Modern states, as Elias notes, have undergone processes of inclusion of ever wider social groups independent of nation-building processes. Therefore, it was necessary to create mechanisms for regulating behaviour in such a way that a broad spectrum of individuals from diverse social groups could function within it. Democratisation and egalitarisation in the learning process thus constitutes, in this view, an offshoot of these transformations and is linked primarily to the spread of mass schooling.

In considering the construction of the learner in an Eliasian perspective, it is important to refer to the category of childhood, as it is childhood learning and socialising that for Elias constitutes the image of an individual's condition. A key question for him is: when does the transformation of children into adults take place? In other words: how do people learn to function in increasingly complex figurations? Elias acknowledged the belief that children are unready human beings who must be administered by adults as socially constructed. According to him, both adults and children are elements of the civilisational process within which forms such as childhood and adulthood are constructed.

Civilising the learner has the effect of creating the belief that learning is a lifelong obligation. Biesta makes a similar note, writing that nowadays, instead of a right to learn, we have an obligation (Biesta 2013). He writes that constructing a learner is a process of the Foucaultian dispositif in which an individual begins to identify with the demand for lifelong learning. Writing about the *learnification of the learner*, he points out that the identity of the learner is encapsulated by tasks, requirements, and responsibilities that should be the responsibility of the entire collective. Within the learning policy, a learner identity is produced – it can be internalised or discarded as a gesture of emancipation (Biesta 2013). This account of discipline in the policy of learning can be related to the mechanisms described by Elias in the process of civilisation.

The learner is disciplined and managed primarily through shame. Not learning is one of the most frequently shamed behaviours at school. It is punished with bad grades and may also be the object of derision or ridicule. This was aptly captured in the historical process by Marta Rakoczy, analysing the literacy process of young children in pre-war Poland, showing the importance of shaming children into belonging to the dark ages and the associated moral panic (Rakoczy 2023). Currently, children are no longer embarrassed in a similar way and teaching has changed, but

grades and speed of progress still play a key role in educational success. As shown by research, children and adolescents continue to be embarrassed at school, not always solely because of their learning, even though the progress in learning is an important pretext (*cf.* Kopciewicz 2011; Goodman, Cook 2019).

However, the learner is not civilised by shame alone. Fear is also a key element. That is because not learning can lead to a deterioration in one's life situation as a result of a lack of educational success. This situation gives rise to anxiety, which Elias wrote about as follows:

> Anxiety […] thus acts directly as a driving force to stimulate adherence to a code of behaviour, to develop a superego in the individuals belonging to it. This anxiety transforms into individual anxiety, into the individual's fear of personal degradation or just a decline in their prestige in their own community. And it is this fear of being discredited in the eyes of others, assimilated as an internal compulsion and manifested in the form of either shame or a sense of honour, that is the factor that ensures the continued habitual reproduction of distinctive behaviour and, consequently, a sharper regulation of drives in an individual (Elias 2011: 518–519).

The fear of being unlearned, and therefore a fool, a failure, or a simpleton, is one of the most widespread civilisational anxieties present in the lifelong experience. Its civilizational importance in the world of children is evident in proverbs (e.g. *What Johnny didn't learn, John won't know*), as well as the popular fairy tales of Koziołek Matołek or Nieumiałek. In the experience of adults, to be unschooled is to be socially degraded, associated with low social class as well as low intellect and thus intellectual disability. In the case of adults, not learning can even lead to brain deterioration, as described in popular press articles encouraging lifelong brain exercise (*cf.* Wykształcenie i zaangażowanie w życie towarzyskie pomagają chronić przed demencją. Badanie)[1]. Therefore, failure to learn risks the loss of brain function and, consequently, the degradation of the human being as an independent individual.

Elias writes that as long as we function in society, we will not be able to get rid of anxiety. That is because its source is other people. Anxiety is also, according to Elias, a necessary condition for the process of transformation of children into adults. It becomes stronger the stronger the need to maintain status or social advancement.

Even though the modern rise of populism has introduced the glorification of anti-intellectualism, it has not abolished the fear of unlearning by introducing alternative sources of knowledge in the form of in-house experts or by appealing to the will of the people. In his book *The American civilising process*, Stephen Mennell (2007) shows how in the process of civilisation, de-democratising tendencies emerge in response to democratising or innovative tendencies. These are most

---

[1] https://pulsmedycyny.pl/wyksztalcenie-i-zaangazowanie-w-zycie-towarzyskie-pomagaja-chronic-przed-demencja-badanie-1158027 (accessed on: 13.12.2023).

often movements fighting to maintain the traditional family model with strong parental authority, fighting against technological progress, extreme religious or political movements. Anti-intellectual protest movements or populist movements protesting against scientific action can be interpreted in these terms. All of them, according to Elias' theory, have a role in the process of civilisation.

An important question is what happens when we acquire critical awareness in the learning process. According to Elias, this allows one to achieve a sense of happiness or freedom in harmony between social obligations, demands and personal needs and inclinations, at most (Elias 2011: 590). However, according to Elias, liberation from social pressures is not possible as long as the process of civilisation continues.

Recalling the transformations of the knowledge-based society mentioned in the first part of the text, it can be seen that the civilisation process is progressing, intertwining the processes of civilisation and de-civilisation. The social accessibility and universality of learning constitutes, on the one hand, a method of reducing the distance between individuals and social classes, but on the other hand a field of social discipline.

Conclusion

My attempt to interpret the process of learning as a civilisational phenomenon at the same time constitutes an attempt to take a pedagogical look at a thriving, one of the more interesting, in my opinion, trends in contemporary sociology (*cf.* Suwada 2011; Bucholc 2013, Bucholc 2023a; 2023b), which can be inspiring for pedagogy. My work is a pedagogical reading, which means that I use the categories of general pedagogy for interpreting Elias in an attempt to adapt the theory of the process of civilisation to the needs of my discipline. This is certainly not a new approach in pedagogy, it has been done before by Lech Witkowski (2013), interpreting the paradigm of duality in Elias. In my reading, Elias' theory allows us to understand the change that the learning process is subject to. It occupies, as I mentioned earlier, a special place in the Eliasian perspective. Being an immanent element of the process of civilisation, it is not itself interpreted through this process. Meanwhile, learning permeates the process of civilisation, itself being a field of that process. By analysing the transformation of the learning process from didacticism, by gradually giving the individual responsibility for his or her own learning process, we can observe a modelling towards the individual being responsible for his or her own learning process. This is an inspiring perspective to reconstruct the discourses that are part of the learning management process, linking Elias' theory to the extensive tradition of pedagogical readings of critical theory, for example interpretations of Michel Foucault's views and analyses of the knowledge society.

In conclusion, I owe an explanation. I decided to submit a text on learning in an Eliasian perspective to the issue of Ars Educandi dedicated to Tomasz Szkudlarek, despite the fact that it does not deal *strictly* with the category of learning, because it is an experimental text for me, which is also a new field of research and interpretation in my work. Certainly, one of the things I have learned from Tomasz Szkudlarek is not to be afraid to experiment with theory. We have stated on numerous occasions that even unexpected combinations and borrowings can bring interesting and, above all, contributing solutions to our understanding of the world. I remain with this belief.

Literature

Biesta G., 2006, *What's the point of lifelong learning if lifelong learning has no point? On the democratic deficit of policies for lifelong learning*, "European Educational Research Journal", vol. 5(3–4), https://doi.org/10.2304/eerj.2006.5.3.169.

Biesta G., 2013, *Interrupting the politics of learning*, "Power and Education", vol. 5(1), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315147277-18.

Bucholc M., 2013, *Samotność długodystansowca: na obrzeżach socjologii Norberta Eliasa*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Bucholc M., 2017, *Wstęp do polskiego wydania* Eseju o czasie *Norberta Eliasa* [in:] N. Elias, *Esej o czasie*, trans. A. Łobożewicz, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

Bucholc M., 2023a, *Civilizing parents in the digital age* [in:] *Families and new media: Comparative perspectives on digital transformations in law and society*, eds. N. Dethloff, K. Kaesling, L. Specht-Riemenschneider, Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39664-0_8.

Bucholc M., 2023b, *Wychowywanie dzieci jako motor procesów cywilizacji (i decywilizacji)* [in:] *Cywilizowanie dzieci? Społeczno-kulturowe badania dzieciństwa w perspektywie teorii Norberta Eliasa*, eds. Z. Boni, M. Rakoczy, Warsaw: Oficyna Naukowa.

Campbell C., 2005, *The romantic ethic and the spirit of modern consumerism* (3rd ed.), York: Alcuin Academics, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-79066-4_9.

Goodman J.F., Cook B.I., 2019, *Shaming school children: A violation of fundamental rights?*, "Theory and Research in Education", vol. 17(1), https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878518817377.

Elias N., 1995, *Technization and civilization*, "Theory, Culture & Society", vol. 12(3).

Elias N., 2008, *The civilising of parents* [in:] *Essays II*, ed. R. Kilminster, S. Mennell, Dublin: Established and the Outsiders.

Elias N., 2011, *O procesie cywilizacji: Analizy socjo-i psychogenetyczne*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo WAB.

Elias N., 2017, *Esej o czasie*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

Gabriel N., 2017, *The sociology of early childhood*, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, https://doi.org/10.29173/cjs29370.

Kilminster R., 2021, *Norbert Elias and the sociology of education*, "British Journal of Sociology of Education", vol. 42(3), doi: 10.1080/01425692.2021.1890407.

Kowalski M., Albanski L., 2022, *Relacyjny aspekt wychowania w ujęciu Norberta Eliasa*, "Studia z Teorii Wychowania", No. 13(41), doi: 10.5604/01.3001.0016.1638.

Lybeck E., 2019, *Norbert Elias and the sociology of education*, London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Maliszewski K., 2011, *Implozja przestrzeni uczenia się*, "Edukacja Dorosłych", No. 2(65).

Maliszewski K., 2013, *Zwichnięty czas uczenia się – paideia o rozwidlających się ścieżkach*, "Rocznik Naukowy Kujawsko-Pomorskiej Szkoły Wyższej w Bydgoszczy. Transdyscyplinarne Studia o Kulturze (i) Edukacji", No. 7–8.

Mennell S., 1990, *Decivilising processes: Theoretical significance and some lines of research*, "International Sociology", vol. 5(2).

Mennell S., 2007, *The American civilizing process*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Okoń W., 1995, *Nowy słownik pedagogiczny*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Żak.

Ostrowicka H., 2013, *Dyskurs pedagogiczny jako element urządzania młodzieży*, "Teraźniejszość-Człowiek-Edukacja", No. 2(62).

Rakoczy M., 2023, *Pisanie, przymus, wstyd. Alfabetyzacja dzieci jako medium cywilizowania w międzywojennej Polsce* [in:] *Cywilizowanie dzieci? Społeczno-kulturowe badania dzieciństwa w perspektywie teorii Norberta Eliasa*, eds. Z. Boni, M. Rakoczy, Warsaw: Oficyna Naukowa.

Suwada K., 2011, *Norbert Elias i socjologia figuracyjna*, "Kultura i Społeczeństwo", No. 55(1), https://doi.org/10.35757/KiS.2011.55.1.4.

Szkudlarek T., 2017, *On the politics of educational theory: Rhetoric, theoretical ambiguity, and the construction of society*, London–New York: Routledge.

Szkudlarek T., Zamojski P., 2020, *Education and ignorance: between the noun of knowledge and the verb of thinking*, "Studies in Philosophy and Education", vol. 39.

Williamson B., 2019, *Psychodata: Disassembling the psychological, economic, and statistical infrastructure of 'Social-Emotional Learning'*, "Journal of Education Policy", No. 36(1), https://doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2019.1672895.

Williamson B., Macgilchrist F., Potter J., 2021, *Covid-19 controversies and critical research in digital education*, "Learning, Media and Technology", No. 46(2), https://doi.org/10.1080/17439884.2021.1922437.

Witkowski L., 2009, *Jak pokonać homo oeconomicus? (problem specyfiki zarządzania humanistycznego)* [in:] *Humanistyka i zarządzanie. W poszukiwaniu problemów badawczych i inspiracji metodologicznych* ed. P. Górski, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.

Witkowski L., 2013, *Przełom dwoistości w pedagogice polskiej – historia, teoria, krytyka*, Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza "Impuls".

Wykształcenie i zaangażowanie w życie towarzyskie pomagają chronić przed demencją. Badanie, https://pulsmedycyny.pl/wyksztalcenie-i-zaangazowanie-w-zycie-towarzyskie-pomagaja-chronic-przed-demencja-badanie-1158027.

Summary

Learning in the process of civilization.
An attempt at a pedagogical reading of selected threads
of Norbert Elias' theory

The purpose of this article is to theorize the category of learning in light of the theory of N. Elias. In the first part, I interpret learning as a social process shaped by civilization, in which civilization and de-civilization tendencies are intertwined, including those related to moral panics concerning learning. In the next, I analyse the process of shaping the learner in a civilizational process that assumes gradual restraint of affect and anxiety as a disciplinary factor. The final part consists in a conclusion, summarizing the described analysis.

Keywords

Sąsiada, Pana Druchowskiego, który wie-
lokrotnie już nie dopełniwszy obowiązków
gospodarza zezwolił zwierzętom swoim
dodzić w szkodę. A to: kurom
siedmiu swoim, baranom niedoletniemu
i nadmiernie rogatemu, ósemce świ-
krów mlecznych i jednej jałówce, oraz
pawiowi. Paw szczególnie mnie się
naprzykrzał jako zwierz nie dość, że
krzykliwy, to i potrokaty bardzo, co
widoki z okien moich obu zarzenek,
a obie mają okna ku północy,
na gospodarstwo Pana Druchowskiego,
zakłócał niepomiernie, o tak:

Rys. 1.
Zakłócał niepomiernie.

2.

Beata Karpińska-Musiał
ORCID: 0000-0001-5171-9224
University of Gdańsk

Motion between the Stage and the Foyer: discursive shifts of the subjectivity of didactics in scientific narratives

Empty and floating signifiers, discursive construction of the subject, amoeba models, symbolic interactionism, habitus, discursive field. The small and big A in Lacanian psychoanalysis, neo-Marxism and *emancipation, critical discourse analysis, hegemonic ideologies, oppressive education, systems theory,* and *the social construction of the world through discourse....*

These are just some of the notions that were rumbling around in my head after each seminar meeting [with Prof. Tomasz Szkudlarek – B.K.M.]. I frantically searched for points of reference in linguistics as well as theories of literature and semiotics. I was grasping Habermas' theory of communicative action, trying to combine it with critical discourse analysis as a research method. I strenuously patched up psychoanalysis with semiotics and Wittgenstein's analytical philosophy. It was most difficult for me to find analogies for hegemony, neo-capitalism, or neo-Marxism in educational policies, but I eventually found their tropes in literary theories, cultural studies, and issues concerning intercultural communication. Neo-colonialism, hitherto associated with the histories of Britain and the USA, has suddenly moved into meta-theoretical discursive or political appropriation in so-called borderland pedagogies and critical theory. Language philosophy suddenly appeared as only a tiny point on the map of "paradigmatic translations", and Joanna Rutkowiak's "pulsating categories" (Karpińska-Musiał 2021: 200–201)

Prologue

To write about what has remained in me after reading and listening to Professor Tomasz Szkudlarek, let alone authoring my doctoral dissertation under his tutelage a dozen years ago, goes beyond the capacity of a single text. It is impossible to summarise laconically what has extensively shaped my academic career. This career

consisted of *praxis* and, consequently, also of a specific type of conceptual thinking, both categories having been already recognised as inseparable since Martin Heidegger. The direction of their mutual correlation, as well as their "nominal weight", were, in the case of my travesty of Szkudlarek's thought, variable, unstable, even chaotic, which, overall, is an immanent feature of the relationship between thought and action. The manner of thinking awakened at the onset of this path initially induced concrete action in me, and this up to a certain point in my career was not fully conscious. It was only in the second phase of the transgression referred to as an academic career that acting (professionally) in a mature and painfully conscious way reflected a certain way of thinking and framed my social, professional, and geo-cultural world. I describe this process in a monograph entitled *Harcowanie na planie* (Karpińska-Musiał 2021). In both sections of this timeline, up to the present moment, it has been a process decisively marked by the category of *subjectivity*: the one resulting from the scientific theories that Szkudlarek masterfully juggles, as well as from his scientific and purely human attitude towards his academic environment.

It is impossible to summarize the complexity of this process of influencing and shaping an academic manner of thinking and action. It included various dynamics. However, the approaches chosen, the categories analysed by the supervisor of my PhD dissertation and, above all, the way in which he analysed thoughts have certainly seeped into my spectrum of cognition and given it shape. I met Tomasz Szkudlarek as an already professionally and academically experienced graduate of English philology at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. I used to be a scholar cognitively embedded in Anglo-Saxon systems of language analysis and discourse perception, marked by the dimensions of communication theories, Foreign Language Teaching, and all subbranches of linguistics. I used to be the scholar who made her so far research in the field of linguistic pragmatics and embraced a structuralist, although also communicative and slowly postmodern/poststructuralist definition of human subjectivity. I still value these approaches and areas of cognition and remain faithful to them. They have given the original shape to my view of subjectivity as such, in all its multidimensionality. However, at that point I suddenly encountered – at the borderline between the humanities and social sciences – a discourse understood more socially than socio-linguistically, more philosophically than pragmatically. What I found were differently defined subjectivity and autonomy, and new conceptualisations of freedom vs oppression. I also rediscovered discursively than just semiotically and syntactically constructed category of a subject, observed the juggling of discourses as agents of social change and entered the world of critical analysis of education. I began to decode unique perspectives of perception, the spiral of my hermeneutic cognition began to stretch, and the carousel of academic activities began to spin. However, as is the case with springs, it can bounce into space when excessively stressed. And the carousel has a high centrifugal force. I felt it years later, although I still do not regret getting on that carousel.

In this text, I will not be able to make a significant contribution to the philosophy of education by action or to the new theory of the culture of education. However, in accordance with the invitation of the Editors of the volume dedicated to Professor Tomasz Szkudlarek, I want to invoke some categories of discourse analysis and use them to point to a certain phenomenon noticed in recent years. It concerns scientific narratives about academic didactics. I call this phenomenon, in accordance with the leading categories in the writings of Szkudlarek, among others, *the discursive shift of subjectivity*. The case I have chosen to represent is naturally hybrid in my subjective argumentation, as I juxtapose my structuralist-linguistic roots with the narrative, poststructuralist construction of simulacra of social structures in the postmodern imaginary. I hope to demonstrate that the title metaphor of motion between stage and foyer tells a lot about certain aspects of how an 'academic theatre' functions, and about roles didactics and teachers play on its stage.

Problematizing questions and method

In the text, I apply elements of philological hermeneutics (based on analytical philosophy) very generally. Through an argumentation based on analysing phraseological associations, I will try to demonstrate how a linguistic (humanistic) perspective can have an impact on the social perception of narratives concerning science and educational practices. I base my interpretation on an original understanding of the semantic location of didactics among disciplines and scientific fields. I introduce it by explaining how, for the purposes of this text, I understand *subjectivity* and *its construction or deconstruction*. I refer here to Szkudlarek's introductory text concerning the reading of *Dyskursywna konstrukcja podmiotu* (Szkudlarek 2008), although I interpret the terms used in this text more broadly, drawing also on other writings and sources. However, this does not constitute a wide range of examples of scholarly literature on didactics, as my aim is not to analyse them comparatively. Rather, it is to focus on subjectively selected themes or categories present in the writings of Tomasz Szkudlarek, Karolina Starego, Anna Karpińska, Elżbieta Rybicka, or Norman Fairclough, around whom I attempt to build a subjective narrative concerning the discursive shifts surrounding the subjectivity of didactics.

Therefore, the aim of the analysis carried out in this chapter, is an exploratory diagnosis of the discursive turns (called also shifts) in the aforementioned areas of academic action and cognition: the construction of narratives about didactics as scientific discipline and, consequently, its praxeological practice and adequate research. For this reason, I pose minor questions that should not be regarded as standard research questions, but rather questions that problematise the discussed issues: What causes the discursive turns within these areas? What needs to happen to dismantle the hegemony of the current narrative about didactics (with an attempt to identify what it *de facto* is) in favour of changing it? What and whose levels of

causation (agency) and subjectivity have impact and application here? How does the transversal permeation of specific power relations, in Michel Foucault's terms, occur here?

Subject and discourse versus subjectivity – a subjective understanding of interconnection

In my discussion I refer to the category of *subjectivity* rather than the *subject* itself. Since I will be operating with the notion of *discourses* and not "just" language, I prefer to match *subjectivity* and *identity* to this dance, rather than "only" the heavily blurred face of the *subject*. Especially since Szkudlarek himself concludes that in pedagogical discussions "the subject is an assigned rather than a given dimension of humanity, a problem rather than a basis for action" (Szkudlarek 2008: 9f–10). In doing so – obviously showing only one of the possible optics of looking at the *subject* and its levels of agency or lack thereof – he dismantles the concept of a subject as a primordial data that can be formed, in favour of the active causal function of the subject itself. In this aspect I do not significantly search for counterarguments concerning the greater or lesser essentialism of the subject. Its post-structuralist definitional journey from the point of detachment from the titre of "fixed being" towards the position of a "creating being" is beyond the scope of my argumentation in this text. Hence, I follow more readily the notion of *identity*. It seems also to be closer to the relationship with the *epistemic subject*, which Szkudlarek distinguishes within the three perspectives of understanding the *subject*: structural, related to consciousness, and defined by agency.

> A subject in drift, a subject as a shifting consciousness in subject-object relations – and a shifting agency, a "locus of control" [as the first two perspectives – B.K.M.]. But here we touch on a third range of meaning. Therefore, the third perspective is to understand the subject as a subject of action, more generally of agency. That on or towards which we act becomes the "object", including the person taking the action itself, if it is directed "at the self" (as may be the case with an epistemic subject – capable of treating the *self* as an object of cognition) (Szkudlarek 2008: 11).

The epistemic subject can treat itself as an object of cognition, and it is my intention to confer the title of causal subject (by extending its identity) precisely to didactics as an autonomous scientific discipline. Didactics is, to my mind, a 'causal' subject, despite being entangled in a system of hegemonic narratives working in the field. Therefore, I require a definition of discourse to identify and determine the shift of the subjectivity of the subject, meaning to screen the narrative positioning of didactics as a scientific (sub?)discipline.

Norman Fairclough (2004) describes discourse as something with representational qualities, as "differentiated ways of representing various aspects of the world:

the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the mental world – thoughts, feelings, beliefs etc., and the social world" (Old 2008: 27). Also, it always gets into relations with other discourses and by this fact has the power to create the "new". As Starego writes:

> Therefore, they [relations of discourses – B.K.M.] depend primarily on people's relations towards the world, conditioned by their position in reality, social and personal identities, as well as inter-personal relations. As a result, discourses do not simply present the world as it is (or rather as it is perceived), but are also projective, they contain an imaginative element and present possible worlds different from the current one, projecting specific changes (Old 2008: 27).

Since constructivist discourses continue to create new discourses, and these enter power relations with each other, it must be inevitable that the position of subjects as their generators will change. It is exactly with the change of position in the discourse that the leitmotif of my argumentation in this text will be linked.

Therefore, the relationship between *subject* and *subjectivity* and *subjectivity* and *discourse* can be reduced – for the aim of the following discussion – to two assumptions. Primo, subjectivity as a constitutive element of identity, with a causal subject, requires agency (and implements it) also in the construction or deconstruction, depending on the positioning, of narratives (scientific, public, private). If this is the case, various *subjectivities* have the power to construct new discourses, and these – and here secundo – while entering into a relationship with each other, are subjected to the filters of certain structures of hierarchies of importance (such as Thought Collectives after Ludwig Fleck, significant voices) and power relations (after Foucault). And if we add here Ernesto Laclau's hypothesis concerning the ontological nature of discourses and their striving for objectivity, which he expresses in the statement that "[rhetoric] becomes a principle for constructing social objectivity" (Szkudlarek 2008: 13), it is more than certain that *subjectivity* can never escape from the power of discourses, although it can move among them, drift, and establish its new unveilings (identities). In terms of a certain discursive entrapment (here: language use), subjectivity (here stretched over and emodying didactics) continues to struggle for agency. In this process it reconstructs its meanings in scientific narratives according to the structures of the hierarchy of meaningful voices. I dare to claim that it is on the constant move and drifting.

In these discursive displacements of subjectivity given to or taken away from teaching within structures of power, I notice many controversial threats to the social life of the academia, as well as interesting opportunities for change in "writing" science. Both types of drifts: psychosocial and semantic ones shall be reflected below, although in the approach presented by me, the former is more of a consequence of the latter.

Didactics in academic narratives as a case of displaced subjectivity in the field of scientific cognition – a linguistic perspective

For some time now, at least in the second decade of the 21st century, there has been a heated debate in Polish scholarly communities about the scientific status of didactics as a sub-discipline of pedagogy. It is not a prioritized debate among scientific discussions, nor does it stand as a topic on the podiums of major scientific conferences in Poland. However, it is heard more dynamically at the backstage, as if in the foyer of the Grand Theatre stage, where the "real" science is being performed. Chatting about teaching can be heard during the intervals, when, over a glass of wine or water, some audience focuses on specific tasks or projects carried out locally in universities scattered around the country or abroad. Didactics reverberate at minor didactic conferences, teacher training workshops, sometimes didactics is a guest – by chance or without a ticket – at scientific conferences. It happens usually when research on teaching and learning is related to pedagogy, psychology or other basic disciplines as core agents. Despite this, teaching and learning issues have already found their place in the extensive Polish and foreign scholarly literature of recent years, (e.g. Klus-Stańska, Hurło, Łojko 2009; Karpińska, Wróblewska 2014; Sajdak-Burska, Maciejowska 2022; Sajdak-Burska 2018; Gołębniak 2020; Lave, Wenger 1991 and many other). However, this subject-matter area is mostly covered by pedagogy as a core discipline. Didactics is still majorly defined as its "sub-discipline".

However, can we conclude that taking pedagogy as a dominant field of study for didactics is unambiguous and obvious? A substantial number of researchers have been reflecting on this issue in recent years, most notably Anna Sajdak-Burska (2018) and Bogusława Gołębniak (2020). Didactics discursively has been inserted into the role of a sub-discipline of pedagogy, although it is a much broader category than the formerly "methodology" used for teaching technology. In the scholarly narratives, if one now looks at it not only as a social phenomenon but also as a linguistic discourse, didactics still languishes as a lexeme (followed by its semantics and scope of influence) reserved for a task-based, practical, and even instrumental approach to learning and teaching. Whereas, it has already been recognised that there exists a specified area of cognition and practical action, differentiated by specified subject matter, embedded in personal teachers' theories and theories of education, as well as paradigms of thinking about social reality. The practice-based research in didactics as a scientific field has already been described as an important, but mainly praxeologically oriented cognitive territory, instrumentally oriented towards achieving certain *effects and results*. In this context, particular attention is given to subject didactics and their specificities. These successive derivative lexemes, as well as their meanings constructed in the narratives of certain social theories (e.g. the

anti-neoliberal one, which criticises neoliberalism for the instrumentalization of educational processes), place didactics – in its methodological and aim-oriented dimension – on the peripheral borderlands of the narrative centre. At the centre of semantic fields and research in pedagogy as a core science, despite its being recognised as multi-paradigmatic and drawing on many "neighbouring" disciplines, the most immediate focus is laid on the philosophy and theory of upbringing, as well as the specificity of educational processes in anthropological-ontological terms. Here we can find: the universally understood well-being of a child/pupil/student/ human being in culturally-politically and socially profiled institutions (family, school, state). This ontologically desirable and scientifically debated good is by definition unquantifiable, unmeasurable, and praxeologically undefinable. Played (that is obviously a metaphor) on the main stage of science by popular and prominent actors, and not being subject to chatting in a theatrical foyer.

Of course, this is only one way of perceiving the construction of narratives concerning didactics and weighing its status as an autonomous area of study. That is because, on the other hand, one also observes *the movement between the stage and the backstage of the theatre*. Sometimes the actors also need a break, a cognitive integration with the audience, because of which scientific concepts are decompressed, dismantled, modified. We read that:

> We begin to deal with a gradually forming structure of didactic sciences, consisting of specific didactics, until recently called subject-specific teaching methodologies, and sub-disciplines of general didactics, the so-called sub-didactics, e.g. university didactics, military didactics, medical didactics, onto didactics, neurodidactics. Therefore, didactics is undoubtedly a science – one of the basic sub-disciplines of pedagogy – a living science, with an excellent output, a rich history, many varieties, and many opportunities for development, as well as considerable potential for creative impact on educational practice (Karpińska 2021: 56).

The Polish researcher and theorist of didactics acknowledges that didactics has its own object of research, history, research goals, and "territorial" (subject) specificity. As well as that it carries considerable potential for "creative impact on educational practice". I agree with the author. However, let us note that we do not find in this description one component that is important from the perspective of the definition of the scientific character of the discipline: i*ts own distinct research methodology*. Perhaps this is an individual oversight, or perhaps evidence of a prominent issue that is still often overlooked in scholarly narratives concerning didactics: the difficulty to explicitly specify and define this methodology. There are even claims that such a separate methodology is not legitimate, because didactics in its nature hooks into too many disciplinary research subjects and these will always determine how the research procedures are conducted.

Seeking justification in research methodology

This problem may, with the emphasis on "may", have its origin (or indeed its cause?) if only in the official, only seemingly irrelevant, discursive "removal" of pedagogy from the humanities and its "assignment" to the social sciences in 2011. It has rather been a political-discursive shift, because it has been known since Jan Ámos Komenský's *Didactica Magna* that the study of human education combines issues and questions encompassed by other fields of social sciences, as well as is grounded in the theories and cognitive assumptions that characterise the humanities. Without a detailed discussion, impossible to conduct reliably within the framework of this text, I merely draw attention to one possible outcome of such a discursive displacement. It is a cross-domain *divergence in terms of research methodologies*.

Each of the two research fields: social sciences and humanities, can be defined by the criteria of: history, object and purpose of research, scope of theoretical and research impact, canonical authors and representatives, methodological paradigms, research techniques, and traditions of research methodology. And just as in most of these criteria pedagogy as a social science would find common parameters within *the aims of research* with humanistically qualified history, literature, linguistics and glottodidactics, it is more difficult to find analogical similarities *in the research paradigms and methodologies*. Let me look at this hypothesis to reconsider where didactics should be placed in this respect. Perhaps it will be possible to discover what could enhance the subjectivity of didactics and relocate it to a different position in educational discourses. In this regard, let me weigh up what might constitute the purpose and object of research in didactics, if viewed as an autonomous scientific discipline rather than merely a sub-discipline of pedagogy.

As a potentially independent discipline in the social sciences, didactics covers the creative impact of ideas and research on educational practice, but also touches upon social relations in institutions, aim at *learning analytics* and the use of AI in education, studies the impact of didactic interventions, explains philosophical paradigms and their role for understanding didactic phenomena. Research methods accessible to didactics are available across the entire spectrum of techniques and tools known in the social sciences (Table 1).

In turn, didactics as an independent discipline in the humanities possibly covers the dimension of the aesthetic impact of cultural texts on educational processes as its object and research goal, uses the creative character of literature for didactic purposes (Wenzel 2022), applies the tools of historiography, geocultural studies or ecopoetic (Rybicka 2011), finds references to the history of language or its sociology, psycholinguistics, or communicology. In the table below, I propose an arbitrary juxtaposition of research approaches, methods and techniques used

more frequently (which does not mean exclusively) in the humanities, separately in the social sciences, and those that are more likely to be applicable in both fields.

Table 1. Research methods, tools, and techniques as distinct and shared criteria between the social sciences and the humanities.

Humanities	Social Science	Common for both areas
Text analysis and work on corpora	Diagnostic survey	Critical discourse analysis
Aesthetics	Interview (several types)	Grounded theory
Comparative linguistics	Statistical comparative methods	Case study
Conversational analysis	Psychological tests	Transactional analysis
Engaged humanities	Participant observation	Autoethnography
Geopoetic	Pedagogical monograph	Historiography
Media archaeology	Pedagogical experiment	Narrative methods
Research methods in translation studies		Historical and comparative methods
NLP – natural language processing (including AI)		Phenomenography
Literary criticism		Analytical philosophy
Phonological and acoustic testing		Hermeneutics
DIDACTICS AS AN AUTONOMOUS SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE?		

Source: own elaboration.

I dare to draw a following conclusion from the above juxtaposition: research methodologies that can successfully be applied in didactics as a research and practice area, are not only limited to approaches reserved for social sciences (including pedagogy), or even "common areas". Research methods traditionally reserved for the humanities can equally well serve as methods for research in didactics, depending on t*he research aims*. Therefore, didactics appears semantically as a category (term, lexeme) with a wider frame of meanings than pedagogy, of course if one takes the methodological context as a reference point (i.e. semantic frame).

Consequences for the displacement of the subjectivity of didactics

Following a linguistic (discursive) perspective, should we then not consider didactics as an area of scientific cognition mistakenly ascribed a hyponymic name of "sub-discipline" or "sub-field" in relation to the "core discipline" that pedagogy is viewed to be? From the perspective of linguistic semantics, didactics is *hyperonymous* to pedagogy, so far taken as a framework and core. If we consider a methodological criterion, didactics deserves to be referred to as a broader semantic category in the field of "humanities and social sciences", being a *hyperonym* of pedagogy and, analogously, of literary, linguistic, psychological, sociological core disciplines. What is more, once we consider a specific object of cognition and research as another defining factor of an autonomous scientific discipline, teaching and learning processes (within didactics) represent a powerful theoretical-cognitive area for description and empirical analysis. As aforementioned, didactics in its struggle to redefine its *subjectivity* in scholarly discourse, still requires delving deeper into bridging its assumed hyperonymous position between the humanities and the social sciences. The study of a social relationship (of any kind) is, after all, done through an analysis of communication and language. Creating an educational diagnosis constitutes a combination of analysing students' performance based on their texts and narratives (among other things). Pedagogy also examines developmental and educational processes with the help of tools and didactic aids typical of a specific area of knowledge (e.g. in the subject areas of conversation analysis, dialogue in education, text analysis, corpus research in linguistics, cognitive analysis of learning processes in mathematics, processes of linguistic inference, analysis and mental synthesis in chemistry education, cross-cutting competences in earth or biological sciences, case studies in medicine or legal sciences etc.). Therefore, is it not the time for so called "subject didactics", not fully recognized in scientific narratives, to be granted greater subjectivity in the discourse structure?

Let me argue in favour of this hypothetical question below. This kind of questioning the completeness of the narrative about didactics is caused by my assumption that in a purely narrative discussion of the aims and objects of research in didactics one does not find attempts to displace or change the discursive character (and, as we know, this also means the social scientific practice and research) of the lexeme "didactics" against the lexeme "pedagogy". This suggests that approaches found in linguistics (and therefore the humanities), which draw attention to lexical and semantic relations between words in a cultural text/narrative, are not used in constructing these narratives in social sciences. Let me try to do so, drawing on the analytical approach and from the perspective of philological hermeneutics. Where would we position didactics if we looked at its subjectivity from the perspective of linguistic semantics? How does the understanding (and semantic load) of the category such as "didactics" change if we located it syntactically (i.e. create collocations) in relation to its leading/ core disciplines? The language use present in narratives concerning didactics today

(i.e. established collocations) show us, for example, the following customary categorisation of subject didactics, most of which are also names of scientific disciplines: didactics of chemistry/ biochemistry, didactics of biotechnology, biological and life sciences; didactics of mathematics, physics, computer science; didactics of foreign languages; didactics of the Polish language; didactics of history, archaeology; didactics of culture, religious studies and media studies; didactics of biology, nature, environment; didactics of economics, management; didactics of law and administration. In the following cases, just for the sake of a linguistic experiment, I will apply a kind of *semantic drift* to do justice also to other scientific disciplines, with an equal status after all, yet less frequently visible in scientific discourses, i.e. with a rare collocation. At the same time, this drift (due to the syntagmatic relations between the elements of the phrase) makes it possible to notice the reflexive and reciprocal interconnection of the discipline and its didactics. They serve both (1) as a teaching style (acknowledged, subject function), but also (2) as a quasi-basic discipline (less acknowledged, subject function), emerging through the new collocation of research areas within didactics. Let me explain this by the following examples:

–   didactics of literature, linguistic studies, translation studies – we teach about literature in a certain way, but there can also be a linguistic analysis of this teaching (a study of its differentiated metalanguage, e.g. a linguistic analysis of the metalanguage of didactics) – so: why not a "linguistic analysis of didactics/ narratives and didactic registers"?;

–   didactics of psychology – we teach about psychology with a specific set of professional register and research instruments. In this sense, it is subject didactics. However, when this research is used practically and realistically to construct/ diagnose didactic relations, to build the well-being of the subjects of education, this already becomes a process of a separate activity and can be an area of further research, so: why not a "psychology of didactics"?;

–   didactics of sociology – the language of sociological education is a specific idiomatic register; but also, didactics develops as a science thanks to sociology (e.g. by using data from the sociology of education, population studies, generational studies and sociolinguistics), so: why not "the sociology of didactics"?;

–   didactics of geography, earth sciences – education around earth sciences introduces certain register and methods of research. But can we speak of a "geography of didactics"? It is difficult to doubt that there exists topography of education, i.e. education methods specific to dialectical, cultural, and regional areas. Since geocultural studies and *geopoetic* have already been recognized as situating discourses spatially and underpinning cultural and literary studies (Rybicka 2011), why not assume that "geography of didactics" is an equally legitimate collocation behind which there lies a perfectly legitimate educational practice and the field of its study?

    In contrast, how can a semantic drift be made between the lexemes "pedagogy" and "didactics"? Primarily it needs specifying the meaning of "pedagogy of didactics",

in which, when taken for a phraseological association, we see the dominant position of pedagogy as a subject and didactics as a complement. Thus we can presume that the main semantic content (in social practice: the dominant content and methods of education) will rather be constituted by all that relates to the pedagogisation of teaching and learning processes. However, we must not forget the analogous specificity of teaching "about pedagogy", i.e. the nature of the pedagogical meta-language and registers, the forms of experiencing education, the transmission and construction of pedagogical meanings. The teaching "about pedagogy", the relationship between pedagogical theory and practice included, must be, no doubt about it, performed by the whole complex narratives concerning this relationship. "Didactics of pedagogy" is therefore a perfectly legitimate linguistic collocation, carrying meanings different from those of "pedagogy of didactics". And if so, this may also imply specific didactic measures in the sphere of teaching about education.

In view of the above considerations, it is worth noting that if discourse constructed in a certain way is to be followed by practices of perceiving and constructing real, educational social practices and ways of researching them, it is high time to notice the nuances of the discursive hegemony of certain scientific narratives. In the discussed case, this hegemonic discourse unfairly places didactics as a sub-discipline in a subordinate position against pedagogy. Didactics, as I have tried to demonstrate above, enters a semantically supportive collocation with every scientific discipline. Also having the feature of manoeuvrability. Pedagogy forms a relatively significant semantic cohesion (coherence of meaning in a subordinate or superordinate relationship) only with didactics.

Conclusions

The drift of subjectivity of didactics as an autonomous science, which I attempted to explore in this text, is not purely semantic. In line with the discursive nature and potentiality of induced change in research and educational practices, it is also psychosocial in nature. That is because it can be perceived as an opportunity to change the practice of narrating science by establishing a real social practice for the multitude of researchers involved in academic teaching. After all, what does a purely theoretical reflection on the linguistically constructed positioning of didactics in sentence construction and, by extension, scientific narrative, bring us? Well, by presenting the semantic frame, it inverts the meanings of subordination and super-ordination, which discursively dislocates and diminishes the *subjectivity* of didactics. It reveals the discursive inconsistencies that have occurred so far. By habitually talking about the didactics of a foreign language or the didactics of chemistry, but no longer by analogy about the didactics of pedagogy, we are committing an eristic, rhetorical error. We show inconsistency grounded in a linguistic tradition, which brings consequences for the social (but in effect also scientific) understanding of

the place and importance of didactics in narratives about it. We subtract from the (ontological and epistemological) relevance of this "didactic proximity" between learners and the subject matter: knowledge, its areas of understanding, processing, emotion, and application (Szadzińska 2012). Since we perceive the world through language, and language forms our perceptions, this "semantic proximity" (or the currently existing discursive, or socially created "distance" implicit in defining didactics as a subdiscipline) is crucial for changing the extra-linguistic, epistemological perspective towards learning and teaching. This change should therefore be discursively redirected from far to near, as this *didactic proximity (semantic and cognitive)* of students to their areas and subjects of cognition in the respective disciplinary subject lies at the heart of education. Therefore, it is time for didactics to move from the foyer to the main stage of the Grand Theatre of Education and to actively (co-)participate in the performance. The end of the interval has come. It is time to get back into the spotlight. But will this discursively and newly constructed subject (i.e. didactics as autonomous science) have enough agency to perform independently on stage? Or will it continue to be a subject merely passively "made" by external factors and discourses? This strongly depends on plentiful social circumstances and factors, but certainly reflects existing – not only discursively, but also politically – patterns of power relations. However, without escaping from them, the subjectivity of didactics remains in a drifting phase, which can be regarded as its immanent feature, leading though to further development.

I am not sure whether I have managed to answer the questions posed at the beginning, or have merely added more doubt to them.

1. What causes discursive turns within power structures and narratives of subjectivity in relation to didactics?
    These are certainly critical events, throwing us out of homeostasis, out of the rhythm of cultural and linguistic usus. Whether they will be heard depends on where the voice is coming from and how loudly. The scale of these effects will depend on the message of that voice and its form.

2. What needs to happen to dismantle the hegemony of the narratives present in doing science in favour of any change?
    Too much for it to happen quickly and efficiently. This is a complex process consisting of multiple social narratives built up successively, overlapping and leading to minor symbolic or semantic displacements.

3. What levels of agency and subjectivity have an impact and apply here?
    Undoubtedly, those that are born in the processes of bottom-up (often individual) actions performed by individual or symbolic entities in a continuous search for their own identifications. As Louise Althusser would say: subjects on a "continuous march" determined by systems (Althusser 2006: 26–27), or following Jacques Lacan in constant search of filling their – psychoanalytically understood – lack. The self-identifications born in this way are capable of permeating institutional regulation over time. And this phenomenon may apply

both at the level of scientific and teaching activities, and the level of construing new scientific discourses.

4. How does the transversal permeation of a specific power relation, in Foucault's terms, occur here? Neither the discourses nor the actions of individual subjects can escape power relations (symbolic and institutional), but they are certainly constantly drifting, oscillating and either hitting moments of acceleration or persisting in the force of inertia. The level of agency of the units-agents of change (or ongoing stagnation) is most likely to determine the change that is taking place, although its sustainability is much more likely to be determined by chance. It remains for researchers – of various disciplines – to identify and translate this randomness within their chosen philosophy of culture and education.

Epilogue

Applying a grid of new meanings onto concepts and categories that are already known, only from a unique perspective, is an adventure once offered to me by Tomasz Szkudlarek. Professor Szkudlarek promoted my doctoral dissertation in pedagogy in 2010. The opening quote for this text comes from my monograph (Karpińska-Musial 2021), in which I described, among other things, this cognitive clash and its significantly turbulent effects. It is still bearing fruit today. It has caused me to know what discursive subversion, hybridisation of disciplines, crossing the boundaries of sciences, cognitive experimentation and intellectual autonomy are all about. This is a great added value that has had its creative, but also turbulent, consequences. However, it is for these consequences that I am grateful to him and forever and irrevocably indebted academically. Thank you, Professor.

Literature

Althusser L., 2006, *Ideologie i aparaty ideologiczne państwa*, Warsaw: Students' Circle of Marxist Philosophy, UW.

Fairclough N., 2004, *Analysing discourse. Textual analysis for social research*, London – New York: Routledge.

Gołębniak B.D., 2020, *Konstruktywistyczna edukacja do konstruktywistycznego nauczania. Redefinicja relacji teorii i praktyki w akademickim kształceniu nauczycieli*, „Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji / Issues In Early Education", No. 4 (51).

Klus-Stańska D., Hurło L., Łojko M. (ed.), 2009, *Paradygmaty współczesnej dydaktyki*, Kraków: Impuls.

Karpińska A., 2021, *Nurty myślenia o dydaktyce* [in:] *Edukacja w przestrzeni społecznej. Paradygmaty zmian*, eds. A. Karpińska, K. Borawska-Kalbarczyk, A. Szwarc, Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku.

Karpińska A., Wróblewska W. (red.), 2014, *Dydaktyka akademicka – wybrane obszary badawcze*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Żak.

Karpińska-Musiał B., 2021, *Harcowanie na planie. Herstoria stawania się matką-akademiczką w polskim uniwersytecie*, Lublin: Episteme.

Lave J., Wenger E., 1991, *Situated learning. Legitimate peripheral participation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rybicka E., 2011, *Geopoetyka, geokrytyka, geokulturologii. Analiza porównawcza pojęć*, „Białostockie Studia Literaturoznawcze", No. 2.

Sajdak-Burska A., 2018, *Różnorodność paradygmatów dydaktyki akademickiej. O potrzebie komplementarności podejść*, „Kultura – Społeczeństwo – Edukacja," No. 2 (14).

Sajdak-Burska A., Maciejowska I. (red.), 2022, *Dydaktyka akademicka – nowe konteksty, nowe doświadczenia*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.

Starego K., 2008, *Dyskurs* [in:] *Dyskursywna konstrukcja podmiotu. Przyczynek do rekonstrukcji pedagogiki kultury*, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego.

Szadzińska E., 2012, *Podstawy poznawcze procesu kształcenia*, Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.

Szkudlarek T., 2008, *Wstęp* [in:] *Dyskursywna konstrukcja podmiotu. Przyczynek do rekonstrukcji pedagogiki kultury*, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego.

Wenzel R., 2022, *Science fiction and fantasy in general education*, „Beyond Philology", vol. 19(2).

Summary

Motion between the Stage and the Foyer: discursive shifts of the subjectivity of didactics in scientific narratives

In this chapter, an attempt is made to subjectively use selected theoretical categories from the area of Critical Discourse Analysis to analyse the narrative location of didactics in the ranks of scientific fields and disciplines. Specifically, the author proposes to look at a selected fragment of the scientific discourse from the perspective of linguistic sema ntics, which, through linguistic collocations, induces a specific understanding, and thus also the practice (social praxeological function) of didactics as an educational process and as an autonomous (against pedagogy) area of scientific cognition. Thus, in this process of fluid (discursively) understanding, the eponymous movement of the subjectivity of didactics takes place, determining – in the social perspective – its primary functions in academic education, and in the linguistic perspective – a position in scientific narratives about it. The author concludes with a recommendation to draw attention to the social consequences of the discursive "moves between the stage and the foyer" of the theatre that is the academy, in the context of the drift of specific discourses related to education in fields of power that are not only symbolic.

Keywords

subjectivity of didactics, shifts of identity, didactics, linguistic semantics, discourse, semantic drift.

Grana vicino alla Valori

30. 01. 75

Educational cultural studies

Lucyna Kopciewicz
ORCID: 0000-0003-0888-7665
University of Gdańsk

"It was winter that finished Gierek's government" – climate narratives of two generations of women

The aim of this article is to analyse the climate narratives of women representing the eighty and fifteen year old generations. The category of climate narratives of two generations of women was invoked as a proposal for analyses of the climate crisis in a lifeworld.

It seems that knowledge is an important pedagogical issue – what people know about climate change and the consequences of climate change. However, the empirical project in question has been embedded in the paradigm of the emotionalisation of climate change, which raises – in my opinion – more relevant questions concerning how people feel about the changes experienced in the world of their own lives.

This empirical project in question is part of the discussion on how to study, describe and interpret climate phenomena from a pedagogical perspective: whether to approach the climate crisis as a problem of knowledge and the consequent need for climate protection awareness, or rather to reach out to the lifeworld and grassroots practices of caring about the relationship between people and the world.

The theoretical choices made are not free of weaknesses. The paradigm of emotionalisation in which the climate narratives of the female participants in the study are embedded is not a record of the history of climate change, but a biographical account whose lives are intertwined with weather and climate.

Therefore, weather and climate are not considered as physical phenomena, states of the atmosphere, but as co-creative aspects of the lifeworld. Weather is understood as one of the important factors that form the foundation of social experiences such as change, order, normality, and predictability (Szwejkowski 2004). Weather forms the foundation for experiencing change and makes change an obvious part of the lifeworld. Linking the components of the weather in repeating patterns creates a foundation of experience of order – weather changes are not chaotic,

directionless, and unclear. These changes make sense as part of larger wholes and, as such, create a sense of normal weather patterns for a given season. Thanks to structured weather patterns, we are able to recognise the seasons in the climate zone and place where we live. In turn, the notion of climate is linked to the experience of the predictability of the lifeworld – the idea of reproducing regulated cycles of change in a certain order and harmony.

The climate crisis in a generational perspective

The climate crisis is presented as a generational issue – an important axis of generational conflict. Younger and older generations are – allegedly – divided by an axis of cultural and political dispute. The younger generation is described in the literature as being sensitised to climate issues and aware of their rights to own the future, while older generations are usually described as being passive towards the issue or even denying its political and social significance (Boykoff, Raian 2007).

Pedagogical research most accurately describes the state of children and young people's knowledge concerning environmental issues (Daniel, Stanisstreet, Boyes 2004; Lee, Bernett 2020; Morote, Hernández 2022). Child and youth climate activism is also relatively well described (Kowalik-Olubińska 2020; 2021; Ojala 2013). Moreover, the role of schools in shaping children's and young people's knowledge concerning climate change, the causes and consequences of global warming, undermining the impact of catastrophic media discourses on the mental condition of the youngest generation is analysed (Monroe et al. 2017).

Research concerning climate issues with adults appears in several perspectives. Most often, studies document attitudes of climate denialism by politicians, adults defending consumerist (high-energy) lifestyles in rich Western societies, attitudes of indifference or hostility displayed by communities associated with the oil industry, attitudes of irony towards observed climate change (Doherty, Clayton 2011). Analyses of educational attitudes (parenting, teaching) in relation to the mental health crisis of the youngest generation caused by climate uncertainty also place adults at the centre (Cunsolo, Ellis 2018; Sanson, Burke, Hoorn van 2018; Baker, Clayton, Bragg 2020).

The outlined composition of the research field shows that the interest in adulthood in the perspective of the climate crisis has to do with the key position of adults as decision-makers, professionals, researchers, knowledge creators, educators, counsellors, or therapists.

The discussed project concerns two generational groups that do not fit into the identified research trends. The oldest participants in the study do not hold key positions – they are not socially or politically influential in relation to the climate crisis. Whereas the teenage female participants in the study do not represent activist attitudes and are not climate movement activists.

The paradigm of the emotionalisation of climate crisis change

Environmental and climate issues are not a new research topic in the social sciences. Research of this type intensified after 2000: the research have studied public perceptions of the climate crisis, the problem of knowledge about the causes and potential consequences of global warming, the production of media representations of the climate crisis, the ideologization of the climate crisis, and climate denialism (Macnaghten, Urry 2005; Bińczyk 2018). In the following years of the 21st century, the issue of climate emotion as a response of societies to the global warming crisis emerged in research. Initially, only climate anxiety was analysed (Neckel, Hasenfratz 2021). Over time, research undertaken by climate change psychologists has included complex emotions: anger, powerlessness, apathy, and despair. Adaptive emotional responses and pathological emotions associated with the climate crisis have begun to be studied (Gulla, Tucholska, Ziernicka-Wojtaszek 2020; Gawrych 2021). The climate change emotionalisation paradigm has been used mainly in studies concerning adolescent and youth climate activism, although it has also emerged in analyses of the affective dimensions of scientific research concerning global warming (McMichael 2014; Clayton 2018; Wu, Snell, Samji 2020).

A milestone in developing the paradigm of emotionalizing the climate crisis was Glenn Albrecht's research on solastalgia – complex emotional states that can, in some simplistic terms, be called climate sadness. Solastalgia has been defined as a longing for a place to live – to settle. Home signifies "my place on Earth", in which a person's attachment to the environment, connection to nature, and people's belonging to a particular "piece of the world" is expressed. Solastalgia, according to the author, manifests itself in the form of profound stress and suffering of groups or individuals as a result of environmental changes in their surroundings. People suffer from displacement, gentrification processes, wars, and environmental disasters. In their narratives, it is possible to perceive not only sadness over material losses – possessions and home, loss of loved ones – but also sadness and a longing for a specific place – for nature, climate, and landscape (Albrecht 2007).

Methodological framework for own research

The discussed research constitutes part of a project on climate change analysed through gender and generational perspectives. The main intention in the part of the project discussed in this article is to reconstruct an image of climate change from thirty-five narratives of the oldest generational group (women aged 75–87) and the youngest group (girls aged 14–16). The empirical research were conducted in December 2019 and January 2020 and in December 2022 and January 2023.

The research problems were contained in the formulation of the following questions:

What retrospective image of winter as a season emerges from the narratives of the female participants in the empirical research?

What image of possible climate change emerges from the narratives of the women participating in the study?

In planning the research procedure, it was important not to confront female research participants with questions concerning climate change, the climate crisis or global warming, so as not to highlight the issue of change as the issue around which their narrative should be constructed (Silverman 2016). One question was formulated about how the research participants remembered winter from their own childhood, without specifying the time frame. Subsequent questions were designed to complement, concretise, or deepen the narratives. The question initiating the interview was sufficiently general so that the research participants were able to determine for themselves the scope, the framework of their answers, the length of their statements, or the number of events they considered relevant to the constructed narrative.

The empirical material was collected in the form of a recorded narrative interview (Nowak-Dziemianowicz 2006), the content of which was subject to transcription. The collected transcriptions have been anonymised – information that could contribute to the identification of persons, places, or institutions has been removed.

The snowball technique was used in constructing the sample, which resulted in a high degree of diversity in social experience: women from large cities, small towns, and rural areas, women of high, average, and low material status, women with higher, secondary, vocational, and primary education participated in the study.

The research procedure was partly conducted collectively – male and female students at the Institute of Pedagogy in Gdańsk participated in the empirical data collection and transcription process.

In the process of analysing the empirical material, the following questions were important dispositions:

Are defining elements present in the climate narratives: temporal boundaries, specificity, particularities of the weather phenomena, of the childhood winters of the female participants in the study?

What meanings are given to the described weather phenomena?

What categories of description concerning weather phenomena appear in the narratives?

Are elements of valuation, comparisons, and assessment related to weather phenomena in the past and present included in the narratives?

Excerpts from the women's narratives are labelled to indicate being part of generational group (e.g. p. 80 – generation of 80-year-old women, p. 15 – generation of 15-year-old women) and the interview number from which the narrative excerpt was taken. The original categories referred to by the research participants are also

referenced in the analyses. These categories as elements of the analysis are marked with inverted commas.

„There are no real winters anymore" – outcome space

The narratives of the female participants in the study were analysed from the point of view of the emerging lifeworld images of the past (the 80-year-old generation) and the present (the teenage generation). The starting point for all narratives, regardless of the generational group, are statements about climate change, even though the content of the questions did not address the climate crisis. The collected narratives within the generational group are characterised by a high degree of consistency, with the older group referring to descriptions of a "real winter" that is now gone, while the teenage group referred to descriptions of climatic losses that are part of a contemporary "just a gist of winter".

The narratives of women from the older generational group suggest that winter was a very long ("the longest") season in Poland. The older women relate this observation to the present, where winter – if it occurs at all – is very short. Statements about winter being a "very long" season and winter lasting "a few days" constitute the result of climate experience, which is constructed independently of the truth of the calendar[1], according to which the seasons in our climate zone last three months.

Women from the older generational group pointed out the clear boundaries that separated this time of year from the others. They contrasted the climatic situation of their own childhood with the present, in which the boundaries of the seasons are "blurred", "there are actually no seasons", "new seasons have appeared – an extended autumn", "neither autumn nor winter". As a result, older women have a sense of climatic disorientation:

> I don't know what season we live in (p. 80, v. 12).

A significant category that appears in the narratives of this generational group is that of "real winter", as illustrated by the example narrative extract:

> In order to state that the winter is a "true winter", there would have to be at least 20 degrees below zero and a lot of snow – at least a metre, two metres. This would resemble winter. There must be a big blizzard and snowstorm (p. 80, v. 9).

The onset of "true winter" is, according to the women, linked to important events in the liturgical year (the periodisation of the seasons is embedded in the religious order). The older women referred to either 1 November (All Saints' Day) or late November/early December (the beginning of Advent). Christmas was a time of

---

[1]   Astronomical winter, calendar winter, meteorological winter are not identical concepts. The individual types of winter are linked by their duration: approximately three months.

"white winter", "full winter". Whereas, the months of January and February were a period of "harsh winter". The months of March and April were only referred to in the context of the long duration of winter and were not associated with any specific categories of description in the collected narratives:

> All Saints Day was a l w a y s the beginning of winter. One would pull out woollen jumpers, sheepskins, and warm boots so as not to freeze while visiting the cemetery. Mostly there was snow. Well and it was a l w a y s very cold (p. 80, v. 31).

> Winter lasted from November even sometimes until April. And now? It's December and what's up? It's already Spring. Flowers bloom at the neighbours (p. 80, v. 10).

> Winter started in November and ended in April. It was a l w a y s white and cold. It often came as early as All Saints Day. There was snow. There has not been a winter without snow during my entire childhood. Christmas and New Year's Day were a l w a y s white (p. 80, v. 2).

Indications in the following excerpts from the older women's narratives lead to a different beginning of winter:

> Back then, it was winter from December up to March, and sometimes winter lasted even as late as April. We went to church during Easter, and it was still snowing or so cold. Those winters were quite different (p. 80, v. 22).

> Winter a l w a y s began during Advent (p. 80, v. 1).

In the narratives of the older women, the accentuating participle – always – is emphasised. Its role in the narratives is to highlight the idea of order in nature and climate predictability. These ideas are juxtaposed with the current chaos and uncertainty.

The narratives of the teenagers demonstrate that winter is essentially a short-lived winter episode – it is a calendar season that is not grounded in corresponding weather phenomena:

> Winter is virtually non-existent. The climate is changing and everything is changing (p. 15, v. 30).

> Everything got complicated, mixed up. Today there is no summer or real winter (p. 15, v. 22).

> I don't know winter as a season, because nowadays winter is like an extended colder autumn. Winter lasts for a few days (p. 15, v. 3).

The narratives of teenagers indicate an experience of climate loss – they do not specify the beginning or end of winter, the only "winter" event they refer to is Christmas. Teenagers describe the difference in climatic conditions they know from intergenerational communication (family photographs, stories, films) or school information, they describe it in the context of a lifeworld characterised as ugly, boring, unattractive, and depressing:

I don't like winter. Everywhere is wet, grey, dirty, and slippery. This snow, which doesn't have time to melt, turns grey and changes to mud, making the shoes dirty. Cars driving down the street splash this mud and annoy everyone. Wet sand or salt is spread everywhere and yet it is still slippery and you can fall over in the lanes on the carriageway or on steps (p. 15, v. 19).

Winter is basically non-existent because there is no snow. And when there is snow, it immediately melts or disappears with rain. Recently four centimetres of snow fell, but when I was away [in the mountains] there was about ten centimetres. I don't like winter in my town because there are no hills to go down, and when there are, it's full of drunks and it smells like beer. There is also a lot of trash on the hills, cans and beer bottles (p. 15, v. 29).

I don't like winter in my village because there is no snow, there is mud everywhere, it rains and there is a strong wind. The sun doesn't come out from behind the clouds and it's gloomy. In my opinion, it is not winter but autumn. You can't go sledding or make a snowman. There is not much to do. It would be different if there was snow. Then you could go outside (v. 15, v. 32).

Using the collected empirical material, it is possible to reconstruct the differences in the duration of calendar winter and the winter described in the narratives of the older and younger female research participants.

Winter	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII
Calendar winter	▢	▢	▢									▢
Winter in the older women's narratives	▨	▨	▨	▨							▨	▨
Winter in the teenage women's narratives		‖										‖‖

Diagram 1. The duration of the calendar winter and that remembered by women

Own elaboration

The narratives of the older women show that in the mid-20th century winter lasted longer than the three months of calendar, astronomical, and meteorological winter. Winter lasted a minimum of four months (December to March) and a maximum of five and a half months a year (November to April). Whereas the narratives of teenagers suggest that winter appears episodically in December.

Meanings given to winter by an older generation of women

A significant dimension of the reconstruction of the lifeworld image consists of the meanings given to winter. These meanings emerge only in the narratives of older women. The women explained and justified what winter is in terms of the

structure of the seasons, the functions of winter as a season, and how they have experienced it in the past century. These findings are important because they reveal which dimensions of women's lifeworlds have been altered or eroded by perceived perturbations in the normal course of the seasons. Four diverse conceptions of winter were reconstructed from the women's narratives, three of which are represented throughout the research material and one of which is marginally revealed.

Winter as beauty

The concept is developed from an anthropocentric perspective. Winter was the subject of the aesthetic experience of the study's female participants. Winter provided positive emotions from the pleasure of experiencing beauty: "white", "pristine", "fairy-tale-like", and "magic". In an aesthetic sense, winter is described as a unique and unusual season. It was a time of complete transformation of a well-known world. Winter aestheticized everyday life in a democratic way, offering universal access to tangible beauty in its pure form. This significance is illustrated by passages in the narrative:

> When there was snow then it was beautiful. As you drove through the forest, well it was wonderful. The snow on the trees and all that… it's indescribable, how beautiful (p. 80, v. 1).

> Everything was white, beautiful, and just like in a fairy tale. I miss the white view outside the window (p. 80, v. 4).

> And the winters were just beautiful because they were, not only white, but somehow so cheerful (p. 80, v. 2).

> I liked it most when the trees were frosted. The road was planted with old ash trees. There were ash trees and when it was frosty like this, these trees were as if you've painted them, so white, snowy. And the snow was there, it was sparkling, and as you walked it was crunchy. I loved it (p. 80, v. 13).

The narratives of teenagers confirm the relevance of this category, indicating that the experienced climate clash is linked to the ugliness of modern winter:

> The winter is mild and very ugly. There is very little snow, practically zero snow in Pomerania. Temperature is up to two degrees Celsius below zero (p. 15, v. 35).

Winter as a force

Winter is conceptualised from an anthropocentric perspective as a strong and "harsh" season. Winter was a serious climatic opponent that people had to reckon with, to be treated with seriousness and even fear:

The winters back then were harsh, even though everyone was waiting to just make a snowman, everyone was dreading it (p. 80, v. 25).

It is noteworthy that the essence of this concept is to emphasise the inseparable connection of physical and spiritual human life with nature. In the older women's narratives, winter was a transformative force in people's lives. As a difficult but predictable season, it forced people to prepare and protect themselves against the cold:

Securing windows. In our basement we used to make straw rolls and secure the windows. There have been winters where this had to be done. Also, the supply of clothing. When the children grew out of clothes then there were problems. And, above all, parents converted clothes from the older ones to the younger ones because there was no money. Those were tough times. Now one turns the furnace on, and the entire house is warm. back then, the entire house didn't get warm, only the kitchen, because that's where the fire was (p. 80, v. 17).

In the older women's minds, the difficulties concerning schools, communication etc., were perpetuated. Winter constituted a serious impediment to people's daily lives. Childhood memories also include interruptions concerning schools due to breakdowns caused by very cold temperatures:

There was a winter where there was so much snow that bread was delivered by sledge from the main road, it was impossible to get to the shop. To water the animals, the water had to be heated because it froze when poured into the trough, and the same to water the birds. Tunnels were dug in the backyard to reach the farm buildings. The snowdrifts were enormous. I am currently having a hard time getting used to a winter without snow (p. 80, v. 31).

The snowdrifts were so high that they were at the level of the roofs of buildings. There were times when it was freezing – 30 degrees, we sat by the tiled furnace because there was no heating. There were no buses running, the children had to get there themselves, or their parents took the children by horse-drawn sleigh. We skated, skied on frozen floodplains. Schools were closed during such high frosts. Children were able to play outside and make snowmen. It was a lot of fun. No one seemed to mind that the winter was so harsh. At the time, no one imagined a winter like the present one (p. 80, v. 23).

The essential memories of the winter in the middle of the last century consist of the remembered bodily sensations: the inability to breathe freely during a blizzard, the penetrating cold irritating the hands, clothes restricting movement, limited mobility – wading through snowdrifts:

There came such snowstorms, such wind, that everything was blown away. I remember it was snowing so hard, and I had to walk and couldn't catch my breath (p. 80, v. 16).

The cold was piercing every possible nook and cranny of the body, even if we were only sticking our noses out from underneath. But no wonder, the temperature in my childhood days reached 25 degrees below zero! Until now, chills go through me at the very thought! (p. 80, v. 5).

When I was ten, eleven years old, as I remember, well it was freezing cold. But it was fun. Legs were freezing, hands were irritated (p. 80, v. 9).

From a child's point of view, the winter of the middle of the last century was a time full of opportunities for action, a time of joy, passing through dangerous explorations and games in snowdrifts or on frozen lake surfaces. The women were aware that some activities, from the point of view of current standards of safe play, might seem very controversial. However, they highlighted the health benefits of children being outside in sub-zero temperatures. Therefore, winter was a force of nature hardening the strength of a child's body:

> An ice rink was being made near the school, so everyone who knew how to skate did it. Those brave enough skated on frozen lakes (p. 80, v. 4).

> There was so much snow that it reached almost up to the waist. We walked along such special corridors, but for us kids it was incredible fun. There were hills and you could go sledding. We had fun until the night came. Children were not afraid even if they were without their parents (p. 80, v. 9).

> We also used to have a better immunity. We were able to spend half a day outside, in the cold, chasing each other in the snow. And if you were now to let your child out for half a day with an unbuttoned jacket, without a scarf or hat, they would immediately get sick. And they would end up taking antibiotics or other medication (p. 80, v. 5).

Teenagers refer indirectly to this conception of winter, pointing out that its nuisance is minor – winter has lost its power to transform people's lives. It requires only minor adjustments:

> On the plus side, it's not slippery on the road, the bus isn't late, I'm at school on time. I also don't get cold while waiting for the bus. I only like it in the sense that I don't have to dress up as much. My grandmother probably freezes fruit for the winter. Because we have a piece of land and when there are a lot of strawberries or other blueberries, my grandmother takes half of them and freezes them for later, supposedly for the winter. Although I don't know. Maybe to avoid going to the store later. When it's winter and it's so grey, it makes you want to do less. That's what I think (p. 15, v. 30).

> I know from my grandmother that it used to be necessary to prepare for winter. Today we are preparing for Christmas, not winter – buying a Christmas tree, ornaments and, of course, gifts (p. 15, v. 24).

> Winter is no longer harsh, it's actually mild and people don't have to prepare as they used to. They don't have to buy thick jackets, clothes, tighten the windows because the weather is more or less the same as in autumn and spring. The only household member who prepares for the winter is my dog. It has a thicker coat (p. 15, v. 21).

> Dad prepares the car for winter as he has to change the tyres from summer tyres and changes the windscreen washer fluid, from summer to winter, so it doesn't freeze. Generally, summer clothes are already put into the wardrobe. One has to dress warmer, because if it's a bit colder we can catch a cold (p. 15, v. 16).

Winter as protection

This concept was formulated by older women from a partly deanthropocentric perspective. Participants representing the older generation highlighted the natural benefits of cold and snowy winters. They drew attention to the state of balance in nature, which is currently disturbed. In this conceptualisation of winter, nature is understood by the older generation of women as a living organism that needs rest after its work. Therefore, winter was understood as a time of "pause" and "sleep" in nature, which are necessary for maintaining the normal rhythm of nature's reproduction. The protective effect of winters consisted, according to the older women, in a specific ordering of nature, mainly through mechanisms of killing ("freezing) the excess of superfluous organisms that burden humans and nature:

> The soil rests under the snow, the soil needs this water from the snow, and also various vermin die due to the snow, slugs and all that ails us during summer (p. 80, v.13).

People also benefited from the protective effect of winter. The predictable and orderly climate – snowy, cold, and long winter – has been beneficial in terms of people's health and ensuring food security. The health benefits referred not so much to the beneficial effects of low temperatures on the human body, but to the killing of potential threats: "viruses", "bacteria", and "pests":

> All sorts of pests like ticks, mosquitoes froze, which was very good for crops, among other things (p. 80, v. 19).

> Temperatures below zero are necessary to freeze out viruses and bad bacteria, for example (p. 80, v. 23).

The narratives of teenagers do not include references to this concept.

Winter as an ideologically appropriated force

The final concept marginally represented in the older women's narratives is evoking the image of winter as an ideologically and politically appropriated force. In communist propaganda in Poland, winter was portrayed as a force hostile to man that causes damage to agriculture and the economy. The women were aware of the manipulation carried out by the communist authorities distorting the true essence of the season:

> When [the communists] didn't manage, they blamed it on the winter. But it was not the harshest winter. The most severe winter was at the turn of '62 to '63. This really has been a harsh winter. And then in '74 they said it was the winter of the century, because it was an excuse for economic inefficiency (p. 80, v. 17).

> In fact, it was winter that finished Gierek. Back then it was the winter of the century. The entire Poland stood still. And everyone could see for themselves that this Gierek-era paradise was just a scam (p. 80, v. 35).

Winter was also a time of enforced community service, performing socially useful work or clearing up breakdowns in very difficult weather conditions:

> When the bus bogged down, people from the village had to come. There was a so-called tax – it was called a szarwark. It was a tax that had to be worked off in kind during the winter. All farmers. They had so many hours to work off. Like 5 or 10 days a year. During winter, when the roads were blocked, well, people would walk 2–4 kilometres with shovels to dig up the bus and help it out (p. 80, v. 8).

The narratives of teenagers do not relate to the meanings contained in this concept.

Concern for others, concern for self?
Dimensions of climate sadness. Seeking solutions

Procedures of contrasting past and present are present in the older women's narratives: the past was a time of normality, order and predictability, while the present constitutes its negation. This narrative construction allows women to reveal their emotions concerning perceived changes. Older women are concerned with the disappearance of winter as a season:

> Now we don't have snow. Snow will soon be an attraction (p. 80, v. 3).

> Today I miss the snow and such a real winter especially during Christmas. it's no longer the same without snow, no longer as enjoyable as it once was (p. 80, v. 12).

> The winter today constitutes just a gist of winter, as there is no real winter in our area. It lasts a short time, begins late. It doesn't have that charm (p. 80, v. 9).

Analyses of the narratives show that the reasons for anxiety vary – sometimes it is the loss of a particular aesthetic, sometimes it is a certain version of the landscape and the emotions that are associated with it.

Sometimes at this stage of the analyses there are references to emotions that are revealed indirectly and impersonally – in the form of categories of description of the world: "it is sad":

> And now it's so grey. It's raining, it's raining, it's windy…. A person feels worse because of it. Sad or depressed. I really miss true winter (p. 80, v. 9).

An important narrative convention that the older women resorted to is to juxtapose past and present and to compare the climatic experiences of their own childhood with those of contemporary children, as illustrated by the sample narrative excerpts:

A n d   e v e n   n o w, c h i l d r e n   mostly sit in front of computers at home. They also have the Internet on their mobile phones and sit in front of them. And it used to be that we didn't sit, there was just constant playing outside, or something had to be done. N o w   t h e r e   a r e   n o m o r e   c h i l d r e n   p l a y i n g   outside. It was fun in the snow! We returned with red noses and cold legs (p. 80, v. 4)

Today it is definitely w o r s e   f o r   t h e   c h i l d r e n,   f o r   t h e   g r a n d c h i l d r e n. They can't take full advantage of a true winter, sledging, skating on frozen ponds. I dream of those times from my childhood. At the moment, t h e   c h i l d r e n   d o n ' t   k n o w   what it is to play in such heavy snow and a hard frost (p. 80, v. 11).

Now when you go to the Christmas Midnight Mass, it's muddy, it's raining. In the past, the snow creaked under your feet. We were chasing each other, throwing snowballs. N o w   t h e   c h i l - d r e n   c a n   t h r o w   m u d,   a t   m o s t   (p. 80, v. 33).

In the older women's narratives, contemporary childhood is devoid of experiences of "enjoying the world", of play associated with climatic conditions specific to winter: snowfall, sub-zero air temperatures, etc.

Using comparisons and assessments of one's own childhood and that of generations of grandchildren and great-grandchildren argues that the victims of climate change are today's children. Old women recall their own childhoods as a closed chapter to which there is no return. Their narratives attest to the fact that the order of the predictable world has disintegrated, and with it a certain range of climatic experiences:

Everyone liked winter. One liked what one had, and everyone had the same. People didn't have much. We didn't have much, but everyone had a lot of fun with winter. Now it is the other way around. People have everything, only joy is absent. Well, and winter is gone (p. 80, v. 9).

Older women realise that their climate experiences will not appear in the biographies of their grandchildren and great-grandchildren ("children don't understand", "worse for the children", "children don't know", etc.). The study's participants express sadness, grief, and compassion for generations of children who have been irretrievably robbed of a version of the world they themselves had the chance to experience.

In the narratives of the granddaughters, there are references to the intergenerational transmission of climate narratives as a reference point for their own "climate dreams":

I would like to experience strong sub-zero temperatures to feel the winter, but unfortunately winter is around zero. And then there's the mud! Now they are saying that it will be ten degrees above zero during Christmas. Winter is no longer a distinctive season. It looks bland, like the others. Sometimes a light dusting of snow. Recently, my mum came up with the idea of going to the mountains for the holidays, because there we are sure it will be winter – snowy and cold. Winter in the city is terrible. There is rarely any snow, or it is non-existent. The only attraction is an artificial ice rink, where the temperature is maintained for the ice. I have a dream to try skating on a lake one day. I hope the ice will be thick enough some day and I will succeed. My mom said that she and her friends always skated on the lake when she was my age (p. 15, v. 24).

Grandma often talks about winter, especially during Christmas time. I know what the winter of the century was, and this is the winter I dream of. That's the kind of winter I'd like to experience, as people did in those days (p. 15, v. 16).

The intergenerational transmission of climate narratives is helpful in constructing an image of real winter as an attraction to be experienced, rather than as a climatic peculiarity of a place of life. It is probably for this reason that the narratives of teenagers feature the "towards winter" travel projects:

I don't like winter without snow. Winter and Christmas without snow is not cool. I really like the winter cold and snow. I would be willing to move to the mountains for the winter, as snow is definitely my favourite part of winter. When I was in Finland, I remember there was snow up to my knees (p. 15, v. 26).

Winter in the narratives of the younger generation is mainly a landscape accessible in specific enclaves (e.g. in the mountains). Winter is becoming a climatic asset to be enjoyed during short winter holidays. The teenagers are positive that winter is not "completely lost" – it can be experienced in other places. The categories of choice, mobility (free movement), tourism and consumerism meet the desire to "experience winter as it was in the old days". Teenagers seem to follow the formula: "there's no winter in my city, then buy a trip to somewhere that has winter". They look at the winter landscape through the eyes of tourists (Urry 2007) eager for excitement and attractions. This perspective can lead to superficial framings of the problem: "it's a pity it's not so pretty, white, fairy-tale-like". Presumably, a liberal remedy for climate loss at the point of living may constitute one strategy for adapting to climate change. Climate tourism as a practice for coping with climate loss can at the same time exacerbate the problem (emphasis on low-cost travel, on converting new areas to tourism development, emphasis on developing tourism services, turning nature into an attraction accessible to the mass public, etc.):

During winter, you have to go to the mountains. Besides, they make snow on the slopes there, so you can ski without any problems. I love skiing. There is only one ice rink in our town, but I rarely go there (p. 15, v. 22).

We live in such times that travel is cheap, so there really is no problem. Winter aficionados can go to Norway, while those who prefer warm climates can go to Australia. Everyone can have what they like (p. 15, v. 18).

Conclusion

Usually, the conclusions of climate research are concerned with outlining a pedagogical response: demands for reliable education, the awakening of critical consciousness, the transmission of knowledge concerning the causes and effects of

global warming as a basis for the formation of attitudes and values such as empathy, responsibility for the planet, and solidarity with those experiencing the effects of the climate crisis. The aim of climate education would therefore be to shape sensitivity to the needs of the planet and the capacity to act effectively and address the global challenge of the climate crisis.

With the perspective defined in such a way, a doubt arises concerning the substance of the educational measures advocated: whether they are not part of a project of sham actions that in no way translate into people addressing the global challenges of this crisis. Another highly debatable issue is human agency: whether people are able to challenge global processes, whether ecologically reformed life-styles can effectively transform the ways in which energy is produced and used, challenge global capitalism, change global transport networks – the flow of goods, people, and services.

Climate narratives derived from lived knowledge appear as an alternative to the postulated educational measures. Climate narratives are linked to biographical learning, knowledge, and care as practices actually occurring in the lifeworld. These narratives grow out of locality and address the close relationship between climate and life. Analysing them is helpful in identifying and describing the effects that a changing climate has on people's lives, health, emotions, work activities, and family life (Terry 2009; Walters 2018; Du Bray, Wutich, Larson 2019). Analysing climate narratives has made it possible to describe variations related to gender, life stage, wealth level, place of living (Karlovic, Partick 2003), which is important in the perspective of adapting to climate change and strengthening people's capacity to cope with the course and effects of global warming (Griswold 2017). These narratives do not address the logic of appearances – the necessity of bringing knowledge, because this knowledge is already present in life experience. Women notice climate change in the lifeworld and are convinced about the impossibility of stopping it or restoring the climatic equilibrium. These narratives indicate possible remedies – the logic of degrowth. These narratives also document a critical awareness – no remedies will be taken.

Climate narratives indicate how people come to terms with and adapt to inevitable climate change, how they accept climate loss, what they fear, what they regret, who they sympathise with, where they seek comfort or hope.

Literature

Albrecht G., 2007, *Solastalgia: The distress caused by environmental change*, "Australasian Psychiatry", vol. 15, doi:10.1080/10398560701701288.

Baker C., Clayton S., Bragg E., 2020, *Educating for resilience: Parent and teacher perceptions of children's emotional needs in response to climate change*, "Environmental Education Research", vol. 27.

Bińczyk E., 2018, *Epoka człowieka. Retoryka i marazm antropocenu*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Boykoff M.T., Raian S.R., 2007, *Signals and noise. Mass-media coverage of climate change in the USA and the UK*, "EMBO Reports", vol. 8 (3), doi: 10.1038/sj.embor.7400924.

Clayton S., 2018, *Mental health risk and resilience among climate scientists*, "Nature Climate Change", vol. 8.

Cunsolo A., Ellis N.R., 2018, *Ecological grief as a mental health response to climate change-related loss*, "Nature Climate Change", vol. 8 (4).

Daniel B., Stanisstreet M., Boyes, E., 2004, *How can we best reduce global warming? School students' ideas and misconceptions*, "International Journal of Environmental Studies", vol. 61 (2).

Doherty T.J., Clayton, S., 2011, *The psychological impacts of global climate change*, "American Psychologist", vol. 66 (4).

Du Bray M., Wutich A., Larson K.L, 2019, *Anger and sadness: Gendered emotional responses to climate threats in four island nations*, "Cross-Cultural Research", vol. 53 (1).

Gawrych M., 2021, *Zmiany klimatu a zdrowie psychiczne. Przegląd aktualnej literatury*, "Psychiatria Polska", No. 223.

Griswold W., 2017, *Sustainability, eco justice and adult education*, "New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education", vol. 152.

Gulla B., Tucholska K., Ziernicka-Wojtaszek A., 2020, *Psychologia kryzysu klimatycznego*, Kraków: Biblioteka Jagiellońska.

Karlovic L., Patrick K., 2003, *Environmental adult education: Women living the tensions.* "New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education", vol. 99.

Kowalik-Olubińska M., 2020, *Dzieci w obliczu zmiany klimatu – obraz dziecięcej partycypacji w raportach międzynarodowych organizacji pozarządowych*, "Forum Pedagogiczne", No. 1 (10).

Kowalik-Olubińska M., 2021, *"Nie jesteś za młody, żeby zmieniać świat" – studium przypadku zjawiska dziecięcego aktywizmu klimatycznego*, "Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji", No. 53 (2), https://doi.org/10.26881/pwe.2021.53.12.

Lee K., Bernett J., 2020, *"Will polar bears melt?" A qualitative analysis of children's questions about climate change*, "Public Understanding of Science", vol. 29 (8) https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662520952999.

Macnaghten P., Urry J., 2005, *Alternatywne przyrody. Nowe myślenie o przyrodzie i społeczeństwie*, trans. B. Baran, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.

McMichael C., 2014, *Climate change and children: Health risks of abatement inaction, health gains from action*, "Children", vol. 1.

Monroe M.C., Plate R.R., Oxarart A., Bowers A., Chaves W.A., 2017, *Identifying effective climate change education strategies: A systematic review of the research*, "Environmental Education Research", vol. 25.

Morote A.F, Hernández M., 2022, *What do school children know about climate change? A social sciences approach*, "Social Sciences", vol. 11 (4),
https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci11040179.

Neckel S., Hasenfratz M., 2021, *Climate emotions and emotional climates: The emotional map of ecological crises and the blind spots on our sociological landscapes*, "Social Science Information", vol. 60 (2), https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018421996264.

Nowak-Dziemianowicz M., 2006, *Doświadczenia rodzinne w narracjach. Interpretacja sensów i znaczeń*, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Naukowe DSW.

Ojala M., 2013, *Regulating worry, promoting hope: How do children, adolescents, and young adults cope with climate change?*, "International Journal of Environmental and Science Education", vol. 8 (1).

Sanson A.V., Burke S.E., Hoorn van J., 2018, *Climate change: Implications for parents and parenting*, "Parenting", vol. 18.

Silverman D., 2016, *Prowadzenie badań jakościowych*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Szwejkowski Z., 2004, *Pogoda, klimat, środowisko*, Olsztyn: Wydawnictwo UWM.

Terry G., 2009, *Climate change and gender justice*, Oxford: Oxfam.

Urry J., 2007, *Spojrzenie turysty*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Walters S., 2018, *The drought is my teacher: Adult learning and education in times of climate crisis*, "Journal of Vocational, Adult, and Continuing Education and Training", vol. 1.

Wu J., Snell G., Samji H., 2020, *Climate anxiety in young people: A call to action*, "The Lancet Planetary Health", vol. 4.

Summary

"It was winter that finished Gierek's government" – two generations of women's climate narratives

The aim of the article is to discuss the results of empirical research concerning climate narratives. The research involved 35 women representing the oldest generation (75–87 years old) and 35 girls representing the generation of fifteen-year-olds. The qualitative research procedure used – interview, enabled the collection of narratives. The research problems included the following questions: What retrospective image of winter as a season emerges from the narratives of the participants of empirical research? What image of possible climate change emerges from the narratives of the women participating in the study? The theoretical framework of the project is the paradigm of emotionalization of climate change. The research results include the identified meanings of winter as a season, an analysis of the emerging significant description categories, and an analysis of the climatic emotions of the study participants.

Keywords

winter climate narratives, climate change, women, generation, Poland

Piotr Stańczyk
ORCID: 0000-0001-5092-9879
University of Gdańsk

Pornland school communications.
Images of schools in mainstream porn

The aim of this text is to present the results of a qualitative study of images of schools in mainstream pornography. Therefore, welcome to the schools of *Pornland* (Dines 2011). One of the main features of this imaginary realm is that it explicitly depicts scenes of sexual intercourse or autoerotic activity. This is no different in the schools of *Pornland*. Scenes of sexual intercourse constitute the most important part of the films in quantitative terms. What is overt and explicitly stated, seems – to the person writing these words – less interesting than what these explicative sex scenes are wrapped-in plot-wise. Far more interesting – from the point of view of analysing porn culture and the broader culture – are the plot developments that constitute the prelude to the depicted sexual intercourse. In the case of pornography depicting the school motif, it is in the plot aspect of the films that we are confronted with a reservoir of meanings, values and visual representations that make up the image of the school shared in a dialectical way by the makers, producers, and consumers of pornography. It is the fictional scenes, not the close-up scenes, that contain forms of knowledge about education, didactics, upbringing, social roles or teaching duties, and ultimately knowledge about how the school subsystem functions in the social system, the cultural system, and the linguistic system. There is a presumption here that pornography is a mirror of society (Nijakowski 2007). Although perhaps another optical metaphor may work in these contexts. Tomasz Sikora (2011: 9) writes about pornography in culture as a "blind spot" which, although it remains at the centre of the retina, is devoid of photoreceptors. Pornography seems to be at the centre of culture and at the same time (Dines 2011) remains invisible because marginalised by official culture.

In the case of school and in the case of porn, we are dealing with signifying practices according to cultural studies theory (Barker and Jane 2016: 9). School as

a form of culture and porn as a form of culture include inherent specificity (Barker and Jane 2016: 66–67) and are therefore fundamentally different. Nevertheless, there must be some – as Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009: 36–37) puts it – "family resemblance" in the common part, where pornographic content extends to the school. A school in the pornographic imaginary must resemble a school outside this imaginary. Just as the Hogwarts school also has to show a family resemblance to a school for this language game to exist at all. The language game bears a family resemblance to games much like the society game, which is played out through linguistic moves. The language game at school constitutes a particular variation of the language game and the society game, just like the language game in pornography. The school language game in pornography is just another level of language practice. The educational discourse in pornography depicting the school provides the empirical material for creating this text. And even though Gail Dines (2011: 11) disavows the value of "pseudo plotlines", it is precisely this part of the material that is crucial, as it is where the references of porn culture to the broader culture are found. In different words, cultural content is processed by porn cultures according to the specificity of the genre to which the work belongs and is thus processed through what is referred to in pornography studies as the "pornographic imagination" (Smith, Liz, Addy 2022: 241). The content in porn cultures does not just appear out of nowhere, and the issue of the "broader culture" (Labinski 2019: 102), derived from social constructivism (Setty 2022: 162), is used to embed porn cultures in a cultural context. The innovation I propose here is to see the relationship between school and porn cultures in terms of a Wittgensteinian's family resemblance.

School and pornography are cultural forms that the person writing these words looks at from the perspective of pedagogical cultural studies, a multi-strand approach that has its origins in the British school of cultural studies and the American school of critical pedagogy. In view of this, the terms that make up the intellectual repertoire of this variety of social theory will appear in the text without any further explanation. I mean, for example, the theory of the hidden program (Apple 1990; Kwieciński 2017), the theory of school resistance (Willis 1981; McLaren 2015), voice politics (Szkudlarek 1993), and the role of schools (Althusser 2014; Foucault 1995). This collection of thoughts, concepts, and theories contains visions of a school caught up in material work in favour of the prevailing ideology.

The major axis of dispute in terms of pornography studies

Pornography studies are interdisciplinary (Attwood, Smith 2014: 3) and the main criterion for the definition of their identity is the object of study, pornography. It is therefore difficult to speak of any methodological or theoretical coherence in pornography studies. Among the researchers of pornography are representatives of the humanities, such as literary studies, film studies or art history (e.g. McGlotten

2014; Pietrantonio 2020; Floyd 2023). Legal issues constitute an important topic of *porn studies* (e.g. Johnson 2014; Thorneycroft 2020). However, among the researchers dealing with pornography are primarily representatives of the social sciences: sociology (e.g. Barker 2018; Irvine 2018); psychology (among others Barker 2014; Labinski 2019; Gómez, Pasikowski, Bruno 2022); as well as pedagogy (among others Noble 2014; Albury 2014; Marks 2018; Setty 2022). The field of *porn studies* seems to fully implement Roland Barthes' (1989: 72) radical postulate of interdisciplinarity, according to which a new research object no longer belongs to any one scientific discipline.

Linda Williams (2014) metaphorically describes *porn studies* as a "weedy field". The term consists of far-reaching interdisciplinarity, but also methodological and – above all – ideological disputes. Currently, pornography studies are in the midst of a rapid process of institutionalisation in the academy, an important symptom of which is the establishment of a journal entitled "Porn Studies" in 2014. The transition from empirical obscene material, its colloquial view, through the development of research methodology, and institutional recognition by pornography researchers is figuratively described as the transition from *plumbing to narrative theory* (Smith, Attwood 2014: 7).

The main theoretical divisions in pornography studies date back to the phenomenon of moral panics surrounding pornography in the late 1970s called *porn wars* or *sex wars* (McNair 2014; Galbraith 2017; Oeming 2018). During that period, strong divisions were established between researchers, who were forced to take an antagonistic or celebratory stance towards the phenomenon of pornography without being able to take a middle ground or move beyond the dividing line (Attwood, Smith 2014: 4). Therefore, there were anti-pornographic or pro-pornographic positions available, as well as either sex-critical or sex-positive positions (Smith, Attwood 2014: 7; Attwood, Maina, Smith 2018: 1; Irvine 2018: 16). While the "anti-" positions are characteristic of feminist understandings of pornography as an epiphenomenon of structural sexism and rape culture (McNair 2014: 161–162), they have – paradoxically – evolved from a conservative Puritan sexual ethic that treats the bodily aspect as something suspicious (Smith, Attwood 2014: 11). "Pro-" positions, on the other hand, are founded on the assumption that human sexuality and the right to express it can have a positive impact on human life, society, and culture (Queen, Comella 2008: 278). Both positions towards pornography are threatened by the *petitio principii* fallacy, but the fallacy of anti-pornography feminism is more interesting.

A good example of a feminist researcher who takes an anti-pornography stance is Gail Dines (Dines, Jensen, Russo 1997; Dines 2011), from whom, incidentally, the title *Pornland* is derived. This researcher is involved in the Stop Porn Culture movement, which immediately reveals her attitude towards the research subject, and at the same time may raise doubts as to her scientific integrity. On the other hand, the great figures of the social sciences are well known, such as Karl Marx,

who engaged in the struggle against capitalism, or Frantz Fanon, who fought against colonialism. At this point the question arises whether the social sciences may not be socially engaged, or at least until the reduction of social conflicts, which is how Paulo Freire questioned the possibility of neutrality (Stańczyk 2012). However, the problem with the feminist anti-pornography position is somewhat different, as this research position precludes more subtle interpretations than simply reducing the explanation of the phenomenon of pornography to rape culture and sexism coupled with late capitalism. A perfect example of the cognitive incapacity of this position is the impossibility of understanding the phenomenon of feminist pornography (Lust 2010; Libermann 2015), in view of which some representatives of *porn studies* propose that the former "criticality" towards pornography should be replaced by a new form of criticality that takes into account a "reparative reading" of pornography (Sedgwick 2003; Paasonen 2014). As Susanna Paasonen (2014: 137) writes, such a reading of pornography leads from a "weaker theory" that remains "partial" and "open to moments of ignorance" and therefore leads to ambiguous conclusions. Hence the justification for choosing research methods from the repertoire of qualitative methods.

Methodology of research concerning schools in *Pornland*

A research project involving images of school in mainstream porn constitutes a comparative, qualitative, inductive, and exploratory project aimed at achieving in-depth insights into the meanings given to education in porn cultures. The body of images-texts included 30 scenes from six films from the North American series *Slutty times in Innocent High School* (IH) as well as 28 intercourse scenes and seven feature scenes from the British series *Young Harlots* (YH). The analysed material included more than 27 hours of recordings. Both series meet the definition of mainstream porn, i.e. they are easily accessible and cheap (Dines 2011: 9–10). Both series are popular on streaming services: the most popular scene in the series (IH) had 3.6 million views at the time of data collection, and the most popular scene in the series (YH) had 200,000. The body of images-texts meets the criteria of a pragmatically conceived theoretical saturation of the sample (Low 2019).

The study was organised around the question of the meanings given to education in pornography. Specific questions included: communicative relationships between educational entities, school architecture, object-symbols surrounding actors, concepts of teaching and learning, school curriculum content, and character identity. This article mainly reports on the communication relationships between the characters involved in the learning process in *Pornland* schools.

The film is composed of image and text and is therefore an example of multimodal discourse (Kress, Leeuwen 2006), hence the need for hybrid methodological solutions. Solutions developed by grounded theory (GT) were applied to visual data

(Konecki 2008; 2011). Even though the (GT) methodology is inductive in nature, it is permissible to locate the research results in a broader cultural or social context (Konecki 2011: 140), which is crucial for the hypothesis of a family resemblance between the school and the image of a school in pornography.

Solutions specific to critical discourse analysis (CDA) were used to analyse the textual data (Fairclough, Wodak 1997; Wodak, Meyer 2016; Fairclough 2018). However – and this should be emphasised – (CDA) as a methodological solution emerged due to the specificity of the material collected. In other words, among the multitude of varieties of discourse analysis, its critical variety, which focuses on power relations, proved to be the most pertinent, as the school depicted by porn cultures is a school in which the plot is based on power relations. Such an idea is crucial in terms of getting ahead of the possible accusation of a "paranoid reading" (Sedgwick 2003) of both porn and school cultures. In both cases, the application of (CDA) could face the objection of an error of *petitio principii*, in which power relations are at the starting point and at the point of the analyses. My analyses, like many studies using (CDA) (e.g. Cackowska et al. 2012; Popow 2014; Ostrowicka, Stankiewicz 2019; Kopińska 2020; Szkudlarek 2022), however, do not aim to uncover power relations, but to describe their cultural specificity.

Schools of *Pornland*: initial findings

Selecting the body of images-texts is deliberate, as the two schools are, in concept, diametrically opposed to each other. IH is a product of the American and YH of the British porn industry. IH represents a co-educational public school and YH an elite boarding school for girls. This difference, which is crucial from a pedagogical point of view, allows us to risk a certain thought experiment of treating the empirical material as it is treated by comparative pedagogy, which deals with differences in the functioning of education systems in different countries. This will, of course, be a virtual variation of comparative pedagogy. Let's take a closer look at both institutions.

Determining the level of schooling the IH poses a bit of a problem. On the one hand, there are threads that would suggest that it is a college, i.e. an institution of higher learning (dean, campus, tuition fees). On the other hand, the IH series features educators, the principal, there is talk of teenagers, and they stay in detention after hours. In addition, the setting suggests a secondary school with distinctive décor, equipment, teaching aids, or social action posters. However, the scenes (3/29) are decisive, as they feature the motif of verifying the age of a schoolgirl, as in scene [IH8S3].

The schoolgirl sits in the library in front of a computer screen and shows off to a webcam. She makes pink bubble-gum bubbles. She touches herself sensually to finally remove her bra. Without removing her blouse. She slowly unbuttons her

uniform blouse with the IH logo and exposes her breasts. Suddenly a librarian teacher approaches her and takes her to the back room, stepping definitely into the teaching role.

Sit down, sit down here, missy! – the librarian commands in a raised voice, maintaining the archaic form of politeness. *OK. What's your name?* – he asks at the beginning of this interrogation. *Jade* – the student replies. *And your surname?* – the teacher asks. *Nile* – she replies. *And your tutor is?* – the librarian persists. *I have done nothing wrong* – she explains. *Of course you were doing something wrong! Who is your tutor?* – the teacher accuses and shouts trying to force a confession from the student. *Who!* – the teacher shouts out the question. *Professor McLean* – the student replies quietly. *McLean?* – repeats the teacher. *Yes, but still, I did nothing wrong* – the student explains. *What were you doing at the computer?* – the librarian seeks to force a confession from the student. *I was just talking to my friends* – the girl insincerely explains, resisting admitting a real or imagined offence. *You were talking to your friends!? Let's see what you were actually doing. I've been watching you* – the librarian doesn't relent, and she smiles. In a moment the tables will turn. Meanwhile, he accuses in a raised voice – *Oh, it looks like you've been showing off to online viewers on quite obvious sites. And this is blatantly against our policy. You will be expelled. Now tell me Missy, what grade are you in?* The librarian accuses, alludes to shared values and some assumed moral consensus, explains, and finally threatens, but inadvertently asks the question of age. *I'm in senior grade and I'm eighteen* – she replies, and he repeats under his breath, as if he needs time to process this information. And then she takes the initiative by accusing half-jokingly, half-seriously: *I saw you looking at me.* – *Nooo, no, no, no, not at all, no…. I, I, I…* – mumbles the librarian clearly experiencing an internal conflict. Meanwhile, she stands up, goes around the desk and undoes the buttons of her uniform blouse again, and he can do nothing more except make a series of mumbled sounds that are a substitute for explanation and disagreement with this accusation – *What, what are you doing?…. I don't, no, no…* The student does not relent – *I know you want to see more. Is that why you called me here?* – she asks, but actually accuses. *We have, we have a strict policy here* – the librarian explains after regaining his elemental balance. *Oh, Mr. Deep* – she states. And he, looking at the student's bare breasts, says to himself: *Nice, beautiful.* He adds after a while in a full voice: *No, no, no, no, no, no! You see, we have a policy here. I have to suspend you. Oh god, oh, oh. I see you are trying to get me suspended, fired* – the teacher loses and regains his temper. She, undressing, states: *I know you like it.* The teacher mumbles on: *Yes, oh…. I know what you're trying to do*, but she's the one with the initiative, asking and accusing: *Is that why you made me come to your class?* He, out of helplessness, can only appeal to extraterrestrial entities: *You know… oh god*, and at that moment she shoots at him using her underwear like a slingshot. *Oh god, you know…* the teacher mumbles helplessly. *It's OK, relax now, no one will know,* – the student commands, referring to the value of keeping a secret. *Okay, okay, let's do it quick* – the teacher gives up, giving his explicit consent to the intercourse.

The scene is quite typical of a school from the American *Pornland*, that is, a school that has been touched by the idea of a new education, of the Dewey variety, with the idea of the school as a mirror of social life, and therefore a school that prepares young people for democracy (Dewey 1930). At the same time, the democratic nature of the American school is called into question (Bowles, Gintis 1976), as if democratic relations in education had to be dosed with small doses in order not to harm the pupils in their adaptation to a late capitalist world characterised by a permanent democratic deficit (Bowles, Gintis 1987), in the face of which, however, it is the teacher (superior) who has the discursive advantage over the pupil (or student, i.e. subordinate). It is the teacher who is more likely to ask questions, interpellate, accuse, explain, threaten, praise, shame, or invoke shared values. The students rather respond, nod, and explain. To emphasise this strongly: the key difference in what both sides of the educational relationship in American *Pornland* can and cannot do is summed up in the difference that teachers rather explain and students rather excuse. A reverse situation happens rarely. Whereas, an opposite situation does not happen in British *Pornland*, nor does what can be observed in the scene quoted above, i.e. educational resistance in the form of lying, negotiation and agreement between the parties to the sexual intercourse, as well as the weaker party taking the initiative in the pedagogical relationship.

So, what are the characteristics of a school in British *Pornland*? Enough said that the setting is a palace, and the scenery consists of its interiors with rooms such as bookcases, studies, playrooms, boudoirs, or rooms arranged as dormitories. In the scenes that serve as interludes to the scenes of sexual intercourse, schoolgirls dressed in school attire are constantly going somewhere, strolling through the garden adjacent to the school building, or standing in the windows. SfYH interiors do not contain the usual public school items: blackboard, teaching aids, charts, globes, etc. The essence of a school is conveyed through uniforms, pedagogical relationships, and pervasive discipline. Here is a scene that depicts the founding moment of SfYH [YHFS0].

Two middle-aged men are talking while standing in the entrance of a historic palace. They are laughing. *This place is great!* – enthuses the first. *Wonderful, isn't it? Especially looking at the price I paid* – the investor and future headmaster of the school is pleased. *What will you do with it? Will you turn it into a hotel or resort or something?* – the former asks. *Fuck no! This definitely requires too much work* – the future headmaster replies. *Wait! I know! Maybe a brothel? This way we make money and get pussy* – speculates the former. *Yes, but that's illegal* – replies the future headmaster. *Only technically…* – the former doesn't give up. The future headmaster puffs on a cigar and says – *I've come up with something better. Friend!* – Placing a hand on his shoulder, he points to the front door – *Welcome to the school for young ladies.* At such a statement the former explodes with enthusiasm – *Fuck yes! Excellent! We'll get those rich bitches whose rich daddies send them here for extra lessons.* With an appreciation of his own genius, the future headmaster nods

– *Yhm.* Meanwhile, quite new possibilities open up in the former's mind – *And we can give fake diplomas with fake degrees.* – *Degrees of suffering* – interjects the future director. – *And we'll finally get Cousin Harold a job. You know how he likes to keep things clean* – concludes the former. An image of cousin Harold sweeping the floor appears on the screen, turns suddenly to the camera and stares at it with madness in his eyes.

Another important scene [YHCE00] that betrays the mercurial nature of SfYH depicts the school headmaster hiring a new teacher. From this scene, it appears that a novice English teacher named Mr. D hands over £4,000 cash bribe for being employed by SfYH. The characters of cousin Harold and Mr. D fit into the hierarchical ladder of relationships recognised by participants in pedagogical relationships in SfYH. There are no exceptions to the hierarchy. The headmaster is at the top of the social ladder. One level below is an experienced teacher. Two ranks below a novice teacher like Mr. D. Three ranks lower the caretaker, the cousin in question – Harold. At the bottom of this social ladder are the schoolgirls and a student who appears in just one scene. Slightly higher up is a student on-duty who tells on her fellow students to the teachers. This strict hierarchy is reflected in the modes of communication that occur between unequal actors. Irrespective of what objective social position one has, what matters in a given communication situation in SfYH is the relativity of these social potentials. To illustrate this phenomenon, let us use the scene [YHFS1] with a schoolgirl, janitor, and teacher.

The janitor, cousin Harold, sniffs a pair of panties found somewhere and starts masturbating. A schoolgirl in uniform comes down the stairs to the dungeon and calls out again and again – *Hello! Hello! Hello!* Cousin Harold grabs the schoolgirl from around the corner and starts groping her. *Shhhhhh!* – he commands the girl to be silent. Suddenly a teacher appears in the dungeon and shouts in a commanding tone – *Harold! You know I've ordered that you can't do this without me!* The teacher joins the intercourse by issuing a command to the girl – *Suck it!*

One can also use the scene [YHYO4] or any other scene, especially one with more than three characters, to consider the hierarchy as an explanation of the statements and actions following each other in SfYH.

Scene [YHYO4] takes place in the dormitory, where one of the female students is undressing for her evening rest. Suddenly, a second student appears and begins to embrace and hug the first one. Just as they are about to have intercourse, two teachers, who a moment ago were still patrolling the corridors, wielding rods in their hands, burst into the dormitory. The more experienced teacher tries to discipline the students by shouting – *Girls!* The younger says only – *Oh dear!* The older one embarrasses the girls with a question – *What are you thinking?* The schoolgirls respond politely together – *Sorry, sir.* The more experienced teacher addresses his younger colleague in a mentor-like tone – *Do you see, Mr. Tailor? This is the kind of behaviour I warned you about. These girls need severe punishment.* The younger asks like a diligent student – *With the rod?* The older one does not step out of his

role as a mentor – *Not with a rod, but with a dick. I think you know what to do.* The schoolgirls tacitly agree to have a group intercourse, and if they even silently do not agree to it, it doesn't matter in a British *Pornland* school.

The hierarchical nature of the relationship finds expression in the fact that from a higher position something is explained to someone, from a lower position someone excuses himself/herself to someone. From a higher position one accuses and from a lower position one apologises. From the higher one asks, interpellates, threatens, and from the lower one nods, answers, and agrees in an explicit, though mostly silent, manner. One can be an experienced teacher but step aside before the headmaster. One can even be a headmaster, but ultimately step aside before a visiting supervisor as in scene [YHIJ5].

Concluding the introductory characterisation of SfYH, it is important to emphasise that, although the idea of this school initially boiled down to making quick money and gaining other benefits, by the second film of the series the school begins to improve its level. In the third film there is a clear theme of hard work and a culture of perfectionism. Finally, SfYH becomes an elite school – at least in the perception of one of the candidates from scene [YHIJ2] – *Yes, I really want to be admitted to your school because it is the school that is the hardest to get into. And they will do absolutely anything to get here. I want to get in so badly that I am completely open to you.*

Communication in the schools of *Pornland*: empirical flesh

All forces in *Pornland* push the participants towards intercourse. This is no different in the schools of *Pornland*. The language game that plays out between the characters ultimately leads to a sex scene. IH is a co-educational school, so there is a rapprochement between male and female students (6/29), because she feels attracted to him, she jokes with him, whoever likes each other likes each other, she needs help on a test and he fantasises about her or she about him. In SfYH, even though it is a single-sex school, a student appears in one scene. He won't say anything. Silently follows the teacher's instructions. They will be testing what she already knows.

IH teachers are constantly asking for something (22/23). They ask *what is written on the blackboard and what was the topic of the lesson?* because she talks to him in an incorrect way. They ask, *have you handed out leaflets*, because that's the task she was given. They ask *aren't you late,* because she probably is. They ask, *what are you willing to do to raise your grade?* They ask how she is feeling, expecting her to say she feels good when he spanks her. They are already asking candidates for IH. They ask for her name and the name of her tutor because she was just doing something inappropriate. They ask, *what the fuck is this, what the fuck?, what were you doing? what are you doing? what are you doing here*? and *what do you hope to*

achieve, young miss? because they have been caught selling their own underwear to *kids*, burglary, organising a party, providing sex work, trying to seduce a teacher or other school offense. *You don't want to go to the principal, do you?* – they ask, and *doesn't she want to become a porn star*? because she wrote that in an essay. They ask and negotiate (8/23) if she *will do anything* for the chips and *what can she give?* or *how will we handle it*? And they agree for the intercourse, to keep quiet, to turn a blind eye to rules and regulations, higher grades or passing a subject.

They keep explaining (17/23) because they were selling underwear for tuition fees, because they didn't have that experience, because they didn't have time to produce their school ID, because they thought the hall was empty, and in general they were just a little late and that they were studying, and it's still early. They explain that they have to pass volunteering and that they can't repeat a grade or they have to win the election for prom queen. They explain that they don't understand anything and don't drink alcohol or smoke pot at all. They make excuses for truancy, burglary, and for the fact that the credit work has stains and scribbles. She *has done nothing wrong*. She *will take his penis into her mouth*.

And they keep explaining (19/23) their role, school traditions, what tasks need to be done and what affects the final grade. They explain the principles of test writing and testing. They explain the rules of the school, that the *bell is about to ring* and that *she has to behave like a student and not like a slut*, that she should not sit on the teacher's lap and should avoid conflicts of interest. That's just the way they explain it, because in the end he'll show her anyway that *Valentine's Day with a man is different to Valentine's Day with a teenager* or that *you have to practice to achieve professionalism*, and we know what that means at a *Pornland* School.

IH teachers give commands, orders, and prohibit (17/23): *you can't sell your panties and bras to kids*; *don't do that*; *show your ID*; *come closer*; *turn around*; *sit on the lap*; *don't think too much*; *smile*; *let him*; *sit here*; *be hones*; *come to the centre*; *to the blackboard*; *come in*; *go out*; *you can't be here*; *get dressed*; *you have to stay in class*; *show it*; *no cheating*; *no looking*; *don't cheat*; *on your knees*; *come here slut*; *you have to practice*; *move away*; *learn page 69 by heart*; *no running in the hallway*; *pull your skirt down*; *don't be late*; *calm down and spread your legs*.

And they sometimes initially disagree (5/23) with the consequences, with oral sex with a substitute teacher, with blackmail, with a behavioural assessment, with intercourse, because *you can't do that, you're a teacher!* They resist (8/23). She lies that she was praying, when really she was kneeling for a completely different reason; that she handed out leaflets, when she didn't; that she lost something under her desk, while she made a break into the test question room. They pretend activity. They offend – *Don't be a dick* – one demands. *Suit yourself, dickhead* – says another. From behind the frame, it's easier to shout to the teacher – *Fuck you fucking asshole!* or *The coach is a homo!* You can say to the teacher's face – *I don't give a shit.* Add to that – *You're in charge of shit*. And even though IH is a different school than SfYH, even there a female student will be forced into a intercourse as penalty (1/23).

IH is fundamentally different from SfYH. In IH, we often deal with an explicit and informed consent for intercourse between characters. With one exception mentioned above. IH students also initiate a intercourse. Out of pity (2/23), because he doesn't have a valentine or no one came to celebrate his birthday. Out of lust and decided to seduce him (2/23). However, more often they initiate intercourse in order to gain benefits: fries, passing an item, avoiding consequences, *having their backs*, becoming captain of the cheerleaders (5/23). This may not be a pupil-initiated intercourse, but with her explicit consent, although also under pressure of circumstances or as a result of negotiations (10/23). Even if the consent is lined with mockery – *Fine, dickhead!* It can eventually be a silent agreement (3/23) because they have had an affair before or the intercourse takes place because of manipulation. Meanwhile, in SfYH, the intercourse is initiated by the student in only one case (1/25), when she is trying to get into this elite institution. Once a student of it, silent agreement prevails (17/25). Explicit consent means, in SfYH, agreement to do additional practical exercises or homework together, and we already know (7/25) what this means in UK *Pornland*.

The SfYH area is an area of culture of silence (Stańczyk 2011). They silently agree or explicitly agree. They nod (9/25) and apologise (3/25). They do not resist, although there is one exception, as she says *no*. She denies that she wanted to escape from the boarding school. The teacher's authority makes her confess to everything in the next sentence. Values and teacher authority are mutually reinforcing, because the hierarchy, the rules and the punishment for not following them, because the uniform is supposed to be regular, we are perfectionists, he will help her with that. He will educate her, it will be hard work, but *practice makes perfect*. He will explain everything to her, how to dress and that she needs to be taught a lesson. He will explain why it is important to establish a student's level of prerequisite knowledge and that it is better to learn by doing and that she needs practical demonstration. No theory, just practice. He will tell her – *So you see Roxy, a cock is made for more than just pussy. It is also made for the anus*, and that *it is time for a practical demonstration*. She agrees, because if schoolgirls are naughty, they will be punished. Besides, it's about feeling the words, not seeing them. He will recite *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and then place her hand on his genitalia.

Suck it! – he will give the command. *Come in!* – he shouts. *Come to me! You have to know the rules.* She needs it. Let her just relax. He will ask her, let her continue. He can do it, let her be natural. The drill continues – *Silence! Get up! Bras off! Panties off! Take it off! Suck it! Don't interrupt me! Take off those bloody things! Away!* He will give her the opportunity – *You can start by taking off your jacket.* He encourages – *Get to work! Don't be shy.* Why are they still ashamed after receiving such an education?

He will do a lot for her wellbeing (YHYO5). He will go to distant London and say – *Miss Lee! I had to come all the way to London this evening to have discussion with you. About your behavior, yes? I mean, do you have something to say?* She will

only reply – *I'm sorry*. He will explain to her, embarrass her – *I'm sure you are sorry but there is no excuse for your behavior in school*. She admits – *I know that I've been bad and I know that you came all the way to London to talk to me but… and I know I've been expelled but I really will do anything to stay*. Then he tells her that – *It's like, if you don't change for the better, it's over. It's like this, you see. If you don't change to the better, that's it. You are finished. Finito. There is no future for you anymore. So let me give some advice to you… Let me finish! Don't butt in… There is a couple of pointers for you. One! The uniform*. And she will ask in a weepy tone – *What's wrong with my uniform?* He will point to the fishnets and ask – *Is this a part of school uniform? And what with the tie and with that knot in the shirt here*. He will grab her around the waist and shout – *In fact, I think that the uniform should come off right now! This very instant. Take this bloody thing off! Now! Don't let me repeat myself*. And she is already laughing gleefully, as if she sensed that instead of expulsion from school there would be the usual punishment in the form of intercourse with the teacher.

The extraordinary school of *Pornland*. Ending

> Part of that Power, not understood,
> Which always wills the Bad, and always works the Good.
> <div style="text-align:right">(Goethe 2005).</div>

The school, on the other hand, is part of one that, while eternally desiring good, is constantly doing evil. The perspective of long term (Braudel 1958) in education goes back to the dawn of scientific pedagogy, namely Johann Friedrich Herbart (1806), who wanted to "merely" convert Kantian thought into a working pedagogical system, which, after a series of more or less intentional misrepresentations, led to the existence of the Prussian school system (Szkudlarek 2017). Teachers learned to teach from their teachers. Forms of thinking and knowledge concerning schooling are remarkably durable even if the school system is to be set up in opposition to Herbartian thought, as John Dewey (1930) and his disciples aimed to do. This always resulted in a fetishistic attachment to discipline (Bowles, Gintis 1976). Technologies are changing, but these are still ideas straight out of *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1995).

Sexual violence in the schools of *Pornland* is hardly concealed, but this feature is not necessarily related to the peculiarity of *Pornland*, but is due to the peculiarity of the school. While it is possible to imagine pornography without violence – for example feminist porn – in line with the idea of "good porn" (Lust 2010), a school fitted into the pornographic imaginary is a place that clearly cannot be thought of and played out without violence. Without the thought of punishment, no hierarchical structure, no imposed rules, no teacher authoritarianism, no socialisation into the role of the obedient student. All this makes the abuse of power seem as

a natural feature of a school language game in *Pornland*. The origins of this image lie in the school experiences of the creators of pornography and the anticipation of these experiences in its consumers.

Both analysed schools are different, different from a real school or a school from other cultural texts, but they all remain schools. There is a family resemblance between all the schools of the world and the real ones and those from the different universes of our cultural imagination. The school both here and there, yesterday and today, as well as perhaps tomorrow, remains an oppressive institution, and this sociological fact fertilises our imagination. It is impossible to think of a school in any other way, as even an unusual school will be structurally similar to an ordinary one.

Many years ago, Tomasz Szkudlarek (1992) published a text that does not allow me to pass quietly over the phenomenon of the normalisation of school oppression. A picture of a school that is only superficially unusual emerges from an assigned school essay on the topic of an *Amazing School*. This school remains a school with its rationality, norms, authority, hierarchy, and organisational culture. It is no different with a school transformed by a pornographic imaginary. It's still a school, but with a surplus of meaning appropriate to the genre. But what direction does the analysis of communication in *Pornland* schools take our thinking about schools?

Pornography is "a bit subversive, a bit hegemonic" (Paasonen 2014: 137) – so what does the eroticisation of school violence mean? Of course, the material analysed here constitutes a product of hegemony, that is, material resulting from the wielding of cultural resources, but it can also be seen as a form of resistance. The shameless addition of sex scenes to the image of a school makes the hidden violence of the school against the student obscene. Quite simply, it becomes naked. Moreover, the pornographic representations of a school mean that it is on the school that the odium produced by the official culture falls, because, after all, the porn culture is all the same. The cultural conservatism that relegates porn culture to the margins exposes itself to criticism when marginalised culture represents one of the favourite institutions of an enlightened society. The image of a school in mainstream porn is that of an obscenely critical school, though probably unintentionally so.

Literature

Albury K., 2014, *Porn and sex education, porn as sex education*, "Porn Studies", vol. 1 (1–2).

Althusser L., 2014, *On the Reproduction of Capitalism. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, London – New York: Verso.

Apple M.W., 1990, *Ideology and Curriculum*, New York: Routledge.

Attwood F., Smith C., 2014, *Porn Studies: an introduction*, "Porn Studies", vol. 1 (1–2).

Attwood F., Maina G., Smith C., 2018, *Conceptualizing, researching and writing about pornography*, "Porn Studies", vol. 5 (1).

Barker C., Jane E.A., 2016, *Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice*. London–Thousand Oaks––New Delhi–Singapore: SAGE.

Barker M., 2014, *Psychology and pornography: some reflections*, "Porn Studies", Vol. 1(1–2).

Barker M., 2018, *The problems speaking about porn*, "Porn Studies", vol. 5 (1).

Barthes R., 1989, *The rustle of language*, Berkeley–Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Bowles S., Gintis H., 1976, *Schooling in capitalist America: Educational reform and the contradictions of economic life*, New York: Basic Books.

Bowles S., Gintis H., 1987, *Democracy and capitalism: Property, community, and the contradictions of modern social though*, New York: Basic Books.

Braudel F., 1958, *Histoire et sciences sociales: La longue durée*, "Annales" 13–4, pp. 725–753.

Cackowska M., Kopciewicz L., Patalon M., Stańczyk P., Starego K., Szkudlarek T., 2012, *Dyskursywna konstrukcja podmiotu. Przyczynek do rekonstrukcji pedagogiki kultury*, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo UG.

Dewey, J., 1930, *Democracy and Education. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Dines G., 2011, *Pornland. How porn has hijacked our sexuality*, Boston: Beacon Press.

Dines G., Jensen R., Russo A., 1997, *Pornography: The production and consumption of inequality*, New York: Routledge.

Fairclough N., Wodak R., 1997, *Critical discourse analysis* [in:] *Discourse as social interaction*, ed. T.A. van Dijk, vol. 1, London: SAGE.

Fairclough N., 2018, *Critical discourse analysis: The critical studies of language*, New York: Routledge.

Floyd J., 2023, "*The words which sailor John put to them when unrestrained were the veriest filth*": *Situating chanteys in the field of porn studies*, "Porn Studies", vol. 10 (1).

Foucault M., 1995, *Discipline and punish. The birth of the prison*. New York: Vintage Books.

Galbraith P.W., 2017, *RapeLay and the return of the sex wars in Japan*, "Porn Studies", vol. 5 (1).

Goethe J.W., 2005, *Faust*, trans. B. Taylor, [https://gutenberg.org/cache/epub/14591/pg14591-images.html]

Gómez S.A., Pasikowski S., Bruno L., 2022, *Adolescents' cyberdating relationships and the socialisation background: Links with sexism in Spanish society and pornography consumption*, "Educational Studies Review", vol. 40.

Herbart J.F., 1806, *Allgemeine Pädagogik aus dem Zweck der Erziehung abgeleitet*, Göttingen: Röwer.

Irvine J.M., 2018, *Dirty words, shameful knowledge, and sex research*, "Porn Studies", vol. 5 (1).

Johnson P., 2014, *Pornography and the European convention on human rights*, "Porn Studies", vol. 1 (3).

Konecki K., 2008, *Wizualna Teoria Ugruntowana. Rodziny kodowania wykorzystane w analizie wizualnej*, "Przegląd Socjologii Jakościowej", vol. 4 (3).

Konecki K., 2011, *Visual Grounded Theory: A methodological outline and examples from empirical work*, "Revija Za Sociologiju", vol. 41 (2).

Kopińska V., 2020, *The concept of citizenship in the Polish school education. Political change and the change of core curricula. Discourse analysis*, "Educational Studies Review", vol. 30.

Kress G., Leeuwen T., 2006, *Reading images: The grammar of visual design*, London–New York: Routledge.

Kwieciński Z., 2017, *The sociopathology of education*, Wrocław: DSW.

Labinski M.A., 2019, *The social/political potential of illusions: enthusiasm and feminist porn*, "Porn Studies", vol. 6 (1).

Libermann R., 2015, "*It's a really great tool*": *feminist pornography and the promotion of sexual subjectivity*, "Porn Studies", vol. 2 (2–3).

Low J., 2019, *A pragmatic definition of the concept of theoretical saturation*, "Sociological Focus", vol. 52 (2).

Lust E., 2010, *Good porn: A women's guide*, London: Hachette.

Marks L.H., 2018,"*That wasn't meant to be funny*": *mirth and the porn scholar*, "Porn Studies", vol. 5 (1).

McGlotten S., 2014, *Zombie porn: necropolitics, sex, and queer socialities*, "Porn Studies", vol. 1 (4).

McLaren, Peter. 2015. *Life in Schools An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education*. London–New York: Routledge.

McNair B., 2014, *Rethinking the effects paradigm in porn studies*, "Porn Studies", vol. 1 (1–2).

Noble B., 2014, *Porn's pedagogies: teaching porn studies in the academic – corporate complex*, "Porn Studies", vol. 1 (1–2).

Nijakowski L.M., 2007, *Pornografia internetowa jako zwierciadło społeczeństwa*, "Studia Socjologiczne", No. 3 (186).

Oeming M., 2018, *A new diagnosis for old fears? Pathologizing porn in contemporary US discourse*, "Porn Studies", vol. 5 (2).

Ostrowicka H., Stankiewicz Ł., 2019, *The truths of business and the lies of academia: the order of discourse on higher education in Poland*, "Higher Education Research & Development", vol. 38 (3.).

Paasonen S., 2014, *Between meaning and mattering: on affect and porn studies*, "Porn Studies", vol. 1 (1–2).

Pietrantonio N., 2020, *Pornography and Indian miniature painting: the case of Avadh, India*, "Porn Studies", vol. 7 (1).

Popow M., 2014, *The analysis of discursive constructions of national identity in Polish literature textbooks*, "IARTEM e-Journal", vol. 6 (2).

Queen C., Comella L., 2008, *The necessary revolution: Sex-positive feminism in the post-Barnard era*, "The Communication Review", vol. 11 (3).

Sedgwick Kosofsky E., 2003, *Touching feeling: Affect, pedagogy, performativity*, Durham: Duke University Press.

Setty E., 2022, *Pornography as a cultural resource for constructing and expressing gendered sexual subjectivities among students in a co-educational boarding school*, "Porn Studies", vol. 9 (2).

Sikora T., 2011, *Władza, opór, pornografia*, "uniGENDER", No. 6–7.

Smith C., Attwood F., 2014, *Anti/pro/critical porn studies*, "Porn Studies", vol. 1 (1–2).

Smith J. G., Liz E., Addy P., 2022, *F*ck the police: resistance, agency, and power in Black male racial–sexual pleasure*, "Porn Studies", vol. 9 (2)

Stańczyk P., 2011, *Tacit agreement, the culture of silence and the politics of voice*, "Contemporary Learning Society", 61–73.

Stańczyk P., 2012, *Critical pedagogy and engaged research: Ideology, interests and naivety*, "Ars Educandi", vol. 9.

Szkudlarek T., 1992, *McLaren i Agata. O pewnej możliwości interpretacji rytualnego oporu przeciw szkole* [in:] *Nieobecne dyskursy*, ed. Z. Kwiecinski, part 2, Toruń: UMK.

Szkudlarek T., 1993, *The Problem of Freedom in Postmodern Education*, Westport–London: Bergin & Garvey.

Szkudlarek T., 2017, *On the politics of educational theory: Rhetoric, theoretical ambiguity, and the construction of society*, New York: Routledge.

Szkudlarek T., 2022, *Discourse: education, theory of politics, and politics of theory,* "Educational Studies Review", No. 40.

Thorneycroft R., 2020, *If not a fist, then what about a stump? Ableism and heteronormativity within Australia's porn regulations*, "Porn Studies", vol. 7 (1).

Williams L., 2014, *Pornography, porno, porn: Thoughts on a weedy field*, "Porn Studies", vol. 1 (1–2).

Willis P., 1981, *Learning to labor: How working class kids get working class jobs*, New York: CUP.

Wittgenstein L., 2009, *Philosophical Investigations*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Wodak R., Meyer M., 2016, *Critical discourse analysis: History, agenda, theory and methodology* [in:] *Methods of critical discourse analysis*, eds. R. Wodak, M. Meyer, London: SAGE.

Summary

Pornland *school communications. Images of schools in mainstream porn*

The article is a research report on images of schools in mainstream pornography. Due to the multimodal nature of the empirical material, hybrid methodological approaches based on Grounded Theory (GT) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) were used. The main topic of the presented text is the communication relations between the parties to the educational processes presented in pornographic materials. The article presents the hypothesis of a family resemblance between the real school and the school in the pornographic imaginary. The conclusion boils down to recognizing in pornographic representations of school and education a non-intentional form of resistance against official culture in general and school in particular.

Keywords

school, pornography, porn studies, communication relations, educational cultural studies

Ślady kultury Twiżeckiej

[Bo nie chce iść do pracy]

* Zidiociałem duchem i ciałem)

IX 1918

Jarosław Jendza
ORCID: 0000-0001-7598-9085
University of Gdańsk

Symbolic inversion in the narratives of Montessori practitioners – additions to the *Discursive Construction of the Subject*

Introduction

The following article constitutes an attempt to continue and develop the scope of research carried out by and under the leadership of Tomasz Szkudlarek, focused on the category of the subject and its discursive construction in various dimensions of culture, as well as the phenomenon of symbolic reversal. In the first part of this article, I return to the methodological hints present in this part of Szkudlarek and his colleagues' works, which deal explicitly with identity, discourse, and subjectivity (Stańczyk, Cackowska, Stare 2012). I do so in order to sketch out the premise of my own project, which puts *childhood* at its centre. At this stage I report on the research procedure and briefly discuss the social field of Maria Montessori's pedagogy, within which I am specifically analysing childhood.

Thanks to the findings of Szkudlarek and his team, at the stage of interpreting the results, I direct attention to the less explored dimensions of the analysed field, and – following the Professor's idea inspired by the work of Peter McLaren – I refer to the issue of *inversion* or *the symbolic reversal* (McLaren 1985; Szkudlarek 1992), which I reflect upon in the context of the collected empirical material. Turning to these dimensions has made it possible to look at some aspects of Montessori's pedagogy related to the figure of a *child*, the category of *childhood* and the meaning of education, which I consider particularly important today, especially at a time of a renaissance of various educational approaches derived from the child-centred concepts of the New Education Movement, also known as the New School, or Reformpädagogik in

German. Therefore, in my analyses I draw on both Szkudlarek's developing proposal to creatively combine critical analyses of discourse and phenomenography, descriptions of the phenomenon of *symbolic reversal* and its relevance to possible analyses (Szkudlarek 2023), as well as Małgorzata Cackowska's findings regarding the discursive "nature" of constructing the cultural phenomenon of childhood (Cackowska 2012: 37–38).

Material and methods

Between 2019 and 2022, I've conducted in-depth, individual, semi-structured interviews, which were then analysed according to the procedure of phenomenography (Martön 1986; Richardson 1999) and the seven steps of analysis and interpretation involving: problem formulation, study design, interviewing, transcription, analysis, interpretation, and reporting described by Steinar Kvale (1996).

The time context of this research is significant because it included the COVID-19 pandemic, which, according to many researchers in various parts of the world, affected the reality of education – not only in the Montessori approach (Malm 2004; Beatty 2011; Christensen 2016; 2019; Aziz, Quraishi 2017; Andrisano-Ruggieri et al. 2020; Ender, Ozcan 2019; Siswanto, Kuswandono 2020; Efe, Ulutas 2022).

In the light of the above research, it can be concluded that teachers faced numerous challenges related to, among other things, the involvement of children and limitations relating to the prepared environment and other dimensions of education, which must undoubtedly have influenced the content of the collected empirical material. At the same time, I would like to emphasise that in this text I only analyse the parts of the statements that I coded as possible symbolic inversions concerning school and childhood. This is because I assume that these are the relatively permanent rules of the grammar of discourse, or, as Pierre Bourdieu would say, the rules of this social subfield (2008).

The research sample consisted of twenty-eight Montessori teachers (aged 23–58) working in 14 institutions (2 nurseries, 8 kindergartens, 4 primary schools) located in various regions of Poland. The main research question of the project was formulated as follows: How do Montessori teachers experience their professional reality?

Experiencing professional reality constitutes an important scholarly problem due to the fact that it has the potential – in Erving Goffman's terminology – to frame practices, including discursive ones (Damore, Rieckhof 2021; Bavli, Kocabaş 2022), and not only in relation to early childhood education in general, but also in terms of the meanings given to childhood (Slovacek, Minova 2021), the meaning of Montessori education in the context of schools at subsequent

levels (Rathunde, Csikszentmihalyi 2005), and other alternative pedagogies (Dodd-Nufrio 2011).

However, for the purpose of the analyses presented here, focusing on the categories of a *child* and *childhood* as well as *symbolic reversal*, I have narrowed the scope of inquiry and selected only those parts of the narratives identified as related to the aforementioned categories. For this purpose, I applied open coding using MaxQDA software and then formulated analytical categories.

In other words, the phenomenographic analysis "procedure" applied involved (a) reading "natural" sense units (verbatim transcripts of interviews) oriented to specific parts of the narrative, (b) coding passages, (c) condensing and comparing codes, (d) identifying, labelling and describing analytical categories, (e) illustrating categories with "representative" quotes, as well as (f) data-driven interpretation (Martön 1986; Szkudlarek 2023). In the following part, I limit myself to quoting a few verbatim statements, unaltered in terms of grammar, syntax or lexis, and discuss them in the context of the category of symbolic inversion as well as the meanings attributed to childhood.

Research results

The issue of symbolic reversal/symbolic inversion – as a concept relating to a specific culture and interesting in terms of research – has been analysed in anthropology for at least fifty years. Already in 1978, Victor Turner wrote the following:

> One aspect of symbolic reversal may be to pull people out of their culturally defined and even biologically assigned roles by making them play the exact opposite roles (Babcock 1978: 287).

In this sense, this inversion refers to a cultural situation in which a person or a certain group of people in specific circumstances play their roles "backwards". In this context, it would be necessary to establish what roles we are dealing with in the field of education. For the purposes of this work, I propose to focus on a child, an adult and their mutual relationships.

The issue of childhood is widely discussed within the pedagogical sciences (Smolińska-Theiss 2000; Łaciak 2013; Magda-Adamowicz, Kowalska 2020). Large body of research allows us to conclude that the cultural conditions of child-rearing undergo changes in terms of the preferred family model and parenting style of Polish women and men towards the partnership model, and the while the traditional model is weakening (Kubicka-Kraszyńska 2022: 37). Nonetheless, the author of this report notes: "However, changes in practices in the daily functioning of partners in households are occurring much more slowly and are still largely based on the woman's greater responsibility for household duties" (Kubicka-Kraszyńska 2022: 39). Therefore, it can be said that the declarations concerning upbringing are changing,

but the cultural practices in this regard are relatively permanent, largely traditional and "leaning" towards a conservative patriarchy.

As shown by numerous analyses of the world of early childhood education in Poland, the traditional, behaviourist-based model of education has not changed significantly (Mendel 2006; Klus-Stańska 2007), hence a change or even a reversal of the paradigm is sought in alternative pedagogies (Klus-Stańska 2008).

At this point, I would like to offer a slightly different analysis of the issue of *symbolic reversal*. The practices, metaphors and perhaps even values underlying Montessori pedagogy are sometimes compared to traditional model of parenting, relationships, and education. Pedagogy inspired by the idea of the famous Italian woman can therefore serve as a reservoir of resistance against a certain dominant vision and educational practice with a different and perhaps even opposing vision of childhood and children's relations with adults. In this sense, I sugget to interpret the narratives relating to the realities of how Montessori pedagogy works in a similar way as Szkudlarek treats the story of Agata, a fourth-grade student, about an unusual school (Szkudlarek 1992: 48–49).

In other words, the transmissive school, the post-figurative model of upbringing and childhood are, for me, the norm, the ordinary, "domesticated" cultural conditions (Klus-Stańska 2012b; Kosowska 2018), with Montessori pedagogy (potentially) being their symbolic reversal.

As we remember from Szkudlarek's analyses cited above, Agata inverts certain dimensions of the school's "ordinariness", but others are not inverted and remain unchanged (Szkudlarek 1992: 49–50). Such an observation leads the researcher to the conclusion that:

> [t]he elements of school life that are associated with "deterministic" rationality, with a norm prohibiting spontaneous activity […] and with the authority of the teacher expressed through ritualised forms of "corporeality" (body posture, dress, behaviour) have been explicitly reversed (and thus singled out as specific "objects"). What has not been reversed […] are the relationships of hierarchical power and the organisation of the learner's behaviour, time, and space. One may risk a generalisation that those elements of the hidden agenda that were related to the structure of the school institution (its hierarchy, rules of organisation) turned out to be "more deeply hidden" and those that are related to the functions performed by it "more shallowly" […]. (Szkudlarek 1992: 50)

Using Szkudlarek's findings, I select such fragments of the narrative from the research material that indicate a symbolic reversal. I then look at those dimensions that have been inverted and those that have remained unchanged. Let us first recall the statement of Anna, a teacher working in a Montessori kindergarten with a mixed-age group of children between the ages of three and five:

> I feel that with some children you can see that they want something. They want choice, they want to achieve something, they want to do something, they want rewards, they want things.

So, Montessori could work. Instead of saying "go stand in the corner" when a child actually does something bad, we first remind the child that there are rules, for example Janek hits Zosia […], so I go to Janek and explain to him: "Janek. We have these rules. Do you remember? No hitting, no biting, no pushing – kids feel sorry. I ask: Janek, how do children feel afterwards? Well usually Janek says – sad. And what do the children do, I ask – they cry. And why do they cry? – Well, because they are sad. Well then, why are you pushing children? To make them feel sad? – Well, no. Well, Janek. I remind you for the last time. I will not remind you about the rules any further. We don't push children, we don't bite children, we don't take away toys… that's all there is. So, I'm saying that if this situation happens again, you'll have time-out at the table. Well then the child usually says noooo [symbolises begging], no… So instead of this kind of time-out there is this relaxation with an earlier reminder of the rules. But the case is that some children adapt to it very well and you can see that… this works for approximately with 90% of children (Anna, W26).

Anna directly addresses a certain cultural norm regarding the punishment of children. Not only is the form of punishment itself ("time out") reversed, but also the communication. The teacher uses the first-person plural for verbs describing desirable and undesirable behaviour in the environment. This initial "we" removes the "they" from the discourse (Bauman 2016), or, as in Szkudlarek's Agata, the norm disappears as an overt imperative: "be polite" (Szkudlarek 1992: 49).

In Montessori, together we form a group of people who are subject to exactly the same rules. This is how the conversation with the child begins, i.e. by referring to rules that apply to everyone without exception. However, if we look at the next stages of the teacher's communication with the child, two further important discursive phrases can be distinguished. First, the adult formulates questions in the nature of disjunctive alternatives, precluding the child from giving an answer contrary to the adult's expectation. Then, the adult already explicitly expresses the expectation of the child's desired behaviour with an articulation of the possible consequences of non-compliance. The corner is replaced by a table where one "relaxes". What remains unchanged in the evoked narrative is the power of the adult over the child, the power over the distribution of voice, the positive valorisation of the child's adaptation according to the expectations of the institution.

Let us now look at another part of a statement. This time, Barbara, who works in a Montessori nursery, describes a certain pedagogical solution that – at least at first glance – is meant to benefit the child:

There is, of course, also a shelf with clean cutlery and plates as well as table mats that are prepared for children. These table mats are a sheet of paper that's laminated, on which the spaces for the plate for the glass and for the cutlery are drawn. So that when a child picks up a mat like this, they know straight away where to put what, right? It is then easier for the child. With such a mat, the child has sort of an own space at the table, knowing that it's his or her space. When the child eats it is supposed to eat there. Each child has a mat like this and knows that they have their own place to eat (Barbara, W18).

Mats made to make it easier for children, made to have their own space at their disposal invert the traditional order. At the same time, there is a disturbing "sort of own space" in the quoted narrative passage that invites analysis of what has not been transformed. The child follows – as Dorota Klus-Stańska puts it – the "footsteps" of the adult (Klus-Stańska 2012a). The adult person makes it clear which part of the space serves which purposes and who clearly defines how the plate and glass should be placed. Authority over the space and therefore the child's body is held by the teacher.

In another interview by Celina, the adjectives "conventional" and "ordinary" appear explicitly in relation to the mainstream school, the transmission model school. The transition from the extraordinary world that in this case is a Montessori kindergarten to the traditional education involves the inevitable boredom of the child and the passive experience of education below the level of intellectual development.

Another aspect that distinguishes the "ordinary world" and the reversed realities of Montessorian education and upbringing is the shouting and noise, running, physical violence present in the "conventional" school. Such a transition will therefore be associated with the child's terror. Because Montessori children want development and ask questions, they become "inconvenient" for the traditionalist teacher.

> I believe that a child will be bored if a child from a Montessori kindergarten goes to a primary school, a conventional school, they will be bored because a lot of the kindergarten material goes strongly beyond this curriculum of an ordinary primary school. In such a conventional school, the child in that case will also have to sit and listen to something he or she in fact already knows. But I think it can also be lost precisely because of the fact that in such kindergartens [Montessori – J.J.], I mean, you know it depends on the group and the day, but we rather try to make peaceful. And so that there isn't a lot of shouting and running or some beating, but it's very noisy in schools, both during lessons and breaks, and a child can be scared. But I think that it would be difficult for teachers who get such a child coming from a Montessori kindergarten, because the child would be inconvenient, because he or she asks a lot of questions, wants to know a lot, and since the child has already learnt a lot from kindergarten, going beyond the school material, I think that he or she would be very inquisitive, which could be a problem for the teacher. Actually, we usually know what the child will be asking. We have prepared tables of the child's progress, i.e. all the aids are listed and the child's age and the aids he or she should have mastered by this age are written down. And we try to follow that, the child can reach for whatever it wants, but if the child reaches for the maths section into the divisions because it likes the material on the shelf we then rather just go for the sand paper numbers and start working from there. But there are these progress tables and there we mark what the child can already do, and I verify it with the material, so if the child, for example, wants to work with some letters, I first ask it about the ones I remember teaching, I also have the ones I taught the child before and I check if he or she remembers them. If not, I repeat it once again, and just ask the same thing again the next time. And I introduce new ones if the child has actually

mastered the ones we previously introduced. The teacher should give the child the freedom to decide. But nevertheless, such decision-making by the child … sometimes there are rules. But also, the teacher should be firm, perhaps that's too big word, the teacher should be able to say – stop, I don't agree, or stop, we don't work like that, or first me then you, because I also want to present something to the child (Celina, W25).

At the same time, it is easy to identify those dimensions that have not been inverted. This will include, for example, the regime of the necessity of intellectual development, perceived as a transition from simple to complex forms as a consequence of specific educational interventions planned and implemented by adults. Such a configuration of the discourse and the meta-discourse in the logic of developmental necessity is critically and creatively described by Maximilian Chutorański (2015) inspired by the works of Foucault.

However, even at "shallower" levels, the dimensions of *the ordinary* of this supposedly *extraordinary* pedagogy can be clearly seen. There are developmental tables describing specific developmental norms and related teaching resources (here called *material*), and there is also the principle of grading difficulty, which has been valid in didactics for at least five centuries (Comenius 1956). The children's evident decisiveness and relative freedom of choice meet here with the teacher's rather traditional authority over the use of didactic resources and the objectives assigned to them – goals defined by adults.

The adult presents the world to the child through specific materialities and then enables the child to work with them. Therefore, we are dealing here with a partially reversed order. First, the child, through their curiosity concerning certain material, gives an indication to the adult about the teaching work, but in a later phase, the child returns to their *usual* role, i.e. that of the recipient of the presentation, in order to eventually gain relative freedom again in terms of individual work.

It is also worth noting the irreversible definition of knowledge and the ways in which it is constructed. Celina mentions the ideal of "mastering" knowledge, which would be evidenced by a child's ability to reproduce certain content from memory. If a child cannot prove memorisation, the presentation procedure should be repeated.

Let us now recall an extract from another interview. Danuta said:

[…] and in a traditional school there is no time to pay attention to the child, to look at the child a bit more, to work on something. Or, I don't know… at least check if the child prefers visual or auditory or kinaesthetic learning, just which way to go so that this child starts to understand what's being said. And what's cool here is that there's simply stimuli coming at the child from every possible direction and there's no way the child won't understand something. Secondly, I believe it's much easier for the child later, even when they go to a traditional school, the child has already some foundations. And in fact, the child coming out of kindergarten can read fluently, and it happens in traditional school that children cannot read, even in the first grade (Danuta, W16).

In an "inverted" school, there is time, unlike in an ordinary school where this time is lacking. However, it is *productive time*, so the function of time at school remains unchanged. The organisation of the day is therefore inverted. The rush and "chasing time" in an ordinary school give way to an apparent slowdown, and yet the logic of the capitalocene subordinated to the productivity (Haraway 2015) of the educational institution is unreversed (Rancière 2013; 2015; Räber 2023).

The concept of knowledge and the mechanisms of its acquisition are also interestingly unchanged. This is because the stimuli "push" on the children, making them understand all those elements of knowledge that will enable them to function effectively later on in ordinary school. Such a basis consists in, for example, the ability to read, we should add – common in an "inverted" Montessori school, but rare in a regular school.

In terms of development, there is no identifiable inversion, but rather a return to the question of time, acceleration, and the maintenance of a stable cultural norm of "faster is better" (Lakoff, Johnson 2008), the problematic nature of which is widely reported in the literature (Berg, Seeber, Collini 2017; Laasch 2017; Rosa, Duraj, Koltan 2020).

Another extract from the interview deals with a certain possibility of an educational relationship between an adult and a child. Elżbieta mentions a type of children who are reluctant or insecure to go beyond their comfort zone or, as Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky would probably say, enter the zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, Cole 1978).

The teacher defines her role as that of an adult who provides positive feedback designed to encourage the child to – to use the sporting metaphor present in the interview – "set the bar higher", to be ready to take on a developmental challenge.

> Well, there are some children who will reach for such materials that they know are easy, and they know they can handle it. They don't set the bar a bit higher themselves, but rather reach for easy things that they know for sure they can do. Well, I approach such kids and say 'well look you already know how to work with this, you simply do it very well already. I'd like to show you something else now, or some new material', and then I involve the child in the presentation a bit, to show something more, to get the child to know something more (Elżbieta, W23).

Let us note that not only the choice of educational content, but also the forms/methods of didactic work are reversed here. Before proposing a form of activity or learning content to a child that may be educationally challenging, it is important to diagnose the child's potential in terms of attitudes towards transcending the familiar and the easy.

Then, the teacher provides reinforcement in the form of a positive message to encourage the new activity/content, to finally "involve" showing the content in a format of a presentation. Such a model of behaviour is in accordance (to some extent) with the general assumptions of Montessori pedagogy, especially the postulate

of following the child (Montessori 2013), but also with behaviourist concepts of motivation (Dilshad 2017: 64).

At the same time, in this case we are dealing with aspects that have not been inverted. Firstly, in the statement "[…] you are already doing it very well", we find the norm that (1) adults can and should evaluate children's activities, because (2) this is a motivating factor for further work.

Moreover, it is the adult who explains and shows the world and, in this sense, is the guide. Such an assumption is often problematised, for example, in the context of the complexity and uncertainty of the mechanisms of constructing children's meanings (Klus-Stańska 2004).

Another excerpt presented in this text is from Fiona, who explicitly states that Montessori education is something very different from mainstream education. She illustrates her view with the precise characteristics of a certain pedagogical form, particularly characteristic of Montessori kindergartens, called the three-period lesson, which consists of three stages/periods: association (naming), recognition, and memorisation. The idea itself was borrowed by Montessori from Eduard Seguin, who, as a physician, worked with children with special educational needs in France and the United States in the late 19th century, however, research into the validity of its use is still controversial today and has inspired subsequent researchers to pick up the thread (Larrow 2009; Jackson 2011; Feez 2023).

It's very different at our Montessori. Just look, we have something like the three-period lesson. A three-period lesson means that we have objects, if they cannot be objects, then pictures, in the relation. My aim is to teach the child what it is. So that it can identify what it is dealing with. This means that the child should know one of these things, should know, for example – "Oh! This is a pen". And the child knows it's a pen, but for example doesn't know it's a notebook, doesn't know it's a phone. And I, for example, in the first stage, I tell the child, I show. I take one thing. It is very important not to put all the things in front of the child at once. Just one at a time, I take all the rest, put the pen down and say "this is a pen". The child mostly repeats, I say that the child can touch, see, smell if he or she wants to, so that it can sort of fully imagine, see, smell what it is and what he or she associates it with. And I then take this pen, give the child a notebook and say, "see – this is a notebook". The child once again takes it, touches, checks, repeats after me, I take the notebook away. I show a phone and say the same thing: "this is a phone". The child takes it, touches in various ways, sometimes even tastes it. I take these three elements I put them next to each other and I say to the child for example something like this: "I want you to cover the phone with your hand" and the child covers the phone with the hand, I say: "and now I'd like you to turn the notebook upside down" and the child turns the notebook upside down [shows how it does it]. I say this several times, if the child gets confused, I start again, from the first period, so when I show it to the child, present these objects one by one and say: "this is a pen, this is a phone, this is a notebook". Again, I move on to the following stage. If a child, in the second stage, after a few such attempts, because I don't say every single thing once, just to move things around, for example, I will say: "bring Małgosia's pen, for example". And the child goes with the pen, well … in general kids love to go with things. After this stage, when the child

does not make mistakes and I can already see that he or she more or less knows what is what, I take the three things again (*shows)* and again one by one show it the child and ask: "what is this?". And the child replies: "a pen". I take it away, and show the other thing. I say, "what is this?". "This is the phone". I take again and show the last thing and say, "and what is this"? The child replies to me that it's a notebook. And I say, "see, you've learned new words today". Well, this is what a three-step lesson looks like. If, for example, a child, during this final stage, when I ask: "what is this"? the child answers me wrongly that this is the phone where it's the notebook, then I start again from the first stage. So, I once again show it to the child, then the child has some movement related to these things, and at the very end I ask if he or she has remembered. It is also important to emphasise at the end that the child has learnt these new things today, so that the child knows that he or she knows, that he or she is able, and so that he or she can be pleased with oneself. So, this can be used as well and it just works in every situation. I have to honestly say that even at university when I was learning vocabulary for English, I used the same method. And it gets into your head quickly (Fiona, W7).

At this point I do not undertake an exhaustive explanation and description of the solution reported above in working with a child, but in the context of the issue of symbolic inversion it is worth highlighting what has been inverted and what remains the same.

What we have here is an individualisation of teaching, an empathetic approach to error, which is a reversal of the logic of the transmission school. The idea of the three-period lesson also implies a focus on the content/thing that brings the child and the adult together. They meet around a particular concept, issue, word in different roles. It is this thing that is central to this triangle, and therefore this form can be seen as a departure from both child-centred and pedeutocentric pedagogies towards thing-centred approaches (Vlieghe, Zamojski 2019a; 2019b), although, of course, Montessori approach itself is often located as child-centred (Śliwerski 2007).

Thus, in this case there is a problem with the concept of inversion itself. Because inversion assumes the existence of two oppositional orders, yet here perhaps some form of synthesis of the dialectical relationship between child-centred and pedeutocentrism becomes apparent. It is therefore difficult to treat the turn towards things (thing-centred pedagogy) in education as a symbolic inversion in the sense described by Szkudlarek. It seems that an interesting continuation of this thread would be research oriented towards identifying symbolic shifts in education, perhaps in the spirit of the methodology of the "archaeological" part of Michel Foucault's œuvre.

However, returning to Fiona's account, it is possible to notice the aspects that have not been inverted or displaced. It is probably undeniable that a form of didactic work such as the three-period lesson described by the teacher above can be regarded as – as Dorota Klus-Stańska called it *following the teacher's footsteps* (Klus-Stańska 2012a). Moreover, there is an unstated assumption here

that repetition is necessary when an error occurs. This repetition may occur at a different point in time, but this does not change the general assumption that *repetitio est mater studiorum*.

Moreover, the architect of the entire situation of the three-period lesson is the adult, who determines the scope of the content, the degree of assimilation of this content by the child, the sequence of successive presentations and the possible need to repeat the activity.

Concluding this text, I would like to refer to one more piece of the collected empirical material. Grażyna, a teacher working in a Montessori kindergarten, defines what is unusual, inverted in a facility whose idea already represents an inversion of what we used to call traditional transmission education.

> Sometimes we have a completely different, unusual day. If, for example, it's a child's birthday, we also throw the child a little party, the parents often bring fruit, because it's more likely that you don't eat sweets in environment like ours, so the parents bring a very large amount of fruit or jellies and we have such a treat. Of course, the child also brings things related to their childhood or their favourite toys… pictures… or some of their favourite clothes so that the child can show it to other children. We make a crown for the child. So that's more or less how it goes, and we make sure that the child knows that it's their day, so that they are happy (Grażyna, W24).

Grażyna tells about a situation of a *fun day*. The occasion for organising such days is a child's birthday. I believe that this phenomenon can be perceived from at least two perspectives.

Firstly, the adults note the need for special treatment for the child who celebrates their birthday on a particular day. The child is given the role of monarch and a party is organised for them.

On the other hand, the question can be raised as to which aspects of that day "belong" to the children. The party is arranged by the adults in such a way that the child is happy. It is on this day that "the child brings things related to their childhood". In the view of locating this situation on this particular atypical day, questions must be raised concerning the (non-)presence of such elements on *typical* days.

Is there room for favourite, important toys in an already inverted Montessori environment?

Does collectively looking at a photo album fit into the logic of usual educational work in this kindergarten?

Is a child's satisfaction as important on a typical day?

Thanks to concepts of discursive construction of the subject and analyses of symbolic inversion, it is possible and – by all means – legitimate to ask such questions, and attempts to answer them can lead us towards a deeper understanding of specific cultural practices.

Literature

Andrisano-Ruggieri R., Iervolino A., Mossi P., Santoro E., Boccia G., 2020, *Instability of personality traits of teachers in risk conditions due to work-related stress*, "Behavioral Sciences", vol. 10 (5): 91, https://doi.org/10.3390/bs10050091.

Aziz F., Quraisi U., 2017, *Effects of Political Instability on Teachers' Work Decorum in Pakistani Universities: A Teachers' Perspective*, "Pakistan Vision", vol. 18 (1).

Babcock B.A. (ed.), 1978, *The reversible world: Symbolic inversion in art and society*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Bauman Z., 2016, "*My" bez "onych"*, "Więź", No. 59 (666).

Bavli B., Kocabaş H.U., 2022, *The Montessori educational method: Communication and collaboration of teachers with the child*, "Participatory Educational Research", vol. 9 (1), 443–62. https://doi.org/10.17275/per.22.24.9.1.

Beatty B., 2011, *The dilemma of scripted instruction: Comparing teacher autonomy, fidelity, and resistance in the froebelian kindergarten, Montessori, direct instruction, and success for all.* "Teachers College Record: The Voice of Scholarship in Education", vol. 113 (3), 395–430, https://doi.org/10.1177/016146811111300305.

Berg M., Seeber B.K., Collini S., 2017, *The slow professor: Challenging the culture of speed in the academy*, Toronto–Buffalo–London: University of Toronto Press.

Bourdieu P., 2008, *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.

Cackowska M., 2012, *Dzieciństwo* [in:] *Dyskursywna konstrukcja podmiotu: przyczynek do rekonstrukcji pedagogiki kultury*, eds. P. Stańczyk, M. Cackowska, K. Starego, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego.

Christensen O., 2016, *Proving Montessori: Identity and dilemmas in a Montessori teacher's lived experience*, "Journal of Montessori Research", vol. 2 (2), https://doi.org/10.17161/jomr.v2i2.5067.

Christensen O., 2019, *Montessori identity in dialogue: A selected review of literature on teacher identity*, "Journal of Montessori Research", vol. 5 (2).

Chutorański M., 2015, *Urządzenie (edukacyjne): sieci, dyskursy, ludzie, nie-ludzie*, "Teraźniejszość–Człowiek–Edukacja", vol. 18, No. 4 (72).

Damore S., Rieckhof B., 2021, *Leading reflective practices in Montessori schools*, "Journal of Montessori Research", No. 7 (1).

Dilshad M.N., 2017, *Learning theories: Behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism*, "International Education and Research Journal", vol. 3 (9).

Dodd-Nufrio A.T., 2011, *Reggio Emilia, Maria Montessori, and John Dewey: Dispelling teachers' misconceptions and understanding theoretical foundations*, "Early Childhood Education Journal", vol. 39.

Efe M., Ulutas I., 2022, *Beyond teaching: Montessori education initiatives of public preschool teachers in Turkey*, "Educational Research for Policy and Practice", vol. 21 (3).

Ender D., Ozcan D., 2019, *Self-efficacy perceptions of teachers on using the Montessori method in special education in North Cyprus*, "Cypriot Journal of Educational Sciences", vol. 14 (4).

Feez S., 2023, *Perceiving, labelling and knowing: Mediating educational meanings through multimodal dialogue in Montessori early years classrooms* [in:] *Dialogic pedagogy*, London: Routledge.

Haraway D., 2015, *Anthropocene, capitalocene, plantationocene, chthulucene: Making kin*, "*Environmental humanities*", vol. 6 (1).

Jackson R., 2011, *The Montessori method's use of seguin's three-period lesson and its impact on the book choices and word learning of students who are deaf or hard of hearing*, Doctoral dissertation, Columbia University.

Klus-Stańska D., 2004, *Światy dziecięcych znaczeń*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Akademickie "Żak".

Klus-Stańska D., 2007, *Behawiorystyczne źródła myślenia o nauczaniu, czyli siedem grzechów głównych wczesnej edukacji* [in:] *Wczesna edukacja. Między schematem a poszukiwaniem nowych ujęć teoretyczno-badawczych*, eds. D. Klus-Stańska, E. Szatan, D. Bronk, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego.

Klus-Stańska D., 2008, *Mitologia transmisji wiedzy, czyli o konieczności szukania alternatyw dla szkoły, która amputuje rozum*, "Problemy Wczesnej Edukacji", No. 2 (8).

Klus-Stańska D., 2012a, *Konstruowanie wiedzy w szkole*, Olsztyn: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego.

Klus-Stańska D., 2012b, *Wiedza, która zniewala – transmisyjne tradycje w szkolnej edukacji*, "Forum Oświatowe", No. 24.

Komeński J.A., 1956, *Wielka dydaktyka*, trans. K. Remerowa, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo PAN.

Kosowska E., 2018, *Instytucja kulturalna a tożsamość narodowa* [in:] *Palimpsest. Miejsca i przestrzenie*, Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.

Kubicka-Kraszyńska U., 2022, *Dzieci w rodzinie* [in:] (ed.), *Dzieci się liczą 2022. Raport o zagrożeniach bezpieczeństwa i rozwoju dzieci w Polsce*, eds. M. Sajkowska, R. Szredzińska, https://fdds.pl/_Resources/Persistent/5/c/a/7/5ca73e9f944c2977d6e90f12048802ef9f67284e/Dzieci%20się%20liczą%202022%20-%20Dzieci%20w%20rodzinie.pdf (accessed on: 23.09.2024).

Kvale S., 1996, *InterViews: an introduction to qualitative research interviewing*, Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Laasch O., 2017, *The slow professor: challenging the culture of speed in the academy*, "Academy of Management Learning and Education", vol. 16 (4).

Lakoff G., Johnson M., 2008, *Metaphors we live by*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Larrow P., 2009, *Three period Montessori teacher education*, "Montessori Life", vol. 21 (4).

Łaciak B. (red.), 2013, *Dzieciństwo we współczesnej Polsce. Charakter przemian*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Akademickie "Żak".

Magda-Adamowicz M., Kowalska E. (ed.), 2020, *Dziecko i dzieciństwo w badaniach pedagogicznych*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.

Malm B., 2004, *Constructing professional identities: Montessori teachers' voices and visions*, "Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research", vol. 48 (4).

Martön F., 1986, *Phenomenography – a research approach to investigating different understanding of reality*, "Journal of Thought", vol. 21 (3).

McLaren P.L., 1985, *The ritual dimensions of resistance: Clowning and symbolic inversion*, "Journal of Education", vol. 167 (2), https://doi.org/10.1177/002205748516700208.

Mendel M., 2006, *Przekraczanie progu szkoły jako "rite de passage"* [in:] *Pedagogika miejsca*, ed. M. Mendel, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej Edukacji TWP we Wrocławiu.

Montessori M., 2013, *The Montessori method*, New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company.

Räber M., 2023, *Whose time is it? Rancière on taking time, unproductive doing and democratic emancipation*, "Philosophy & Social Criticism", https://doi.org/10.1177/01914537221150457.

Rancière J., 2013, *In what time do we live?*, "Política Común", vol. 4.

Rancière J., 2015, *Béla Tarr, the time after*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Rathunde K., Csikszentmihalyi M., 2005, *The social context of middle school: Teachers, friends, and activities in Montessori and traditional school environments*, "The Elementary School Journal", vol. 106 (1).

Richardson J.T.E., 1999, *The concepts and methods of phenomenographic research*, "Review of Educational Research", vol. 69 (1), https://doi.org/10.3102/00346543069001053.

Rosa H., Duraj J., Kołtan J., 2020, *Przyspieszenie, wyobcowanie, rezonans: projekt krytycznej teorii późnonowoczesnej czasowości*, Gdańsk: Europejskie Centrum Solidarności.

Siswanto I.L., Kuswandono P., 2020, *Understanding Teacher Identity Construction: Professional Experiences of Becoming Indonesian Montessori Teachers*, "Indonesian Journal of English Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics", vol. 5 (1), https://doi.org/10.21093/ijeltal.v5i1.539.

Slovacek M., Minova M., 2021, *Training of undergraduate preschool teachers in Montessori education in Slovakia and the Czech Republic*, "Research in Pedagogy", vol. 11 (1).

Smolińska-Theiss B., 2000, *Dzieciństwo w Polsce*, "Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny", No. 183 (3–4).

Stańczyk P., Cackowska M., Starego K. (ed.), 2012, *Dyskursywna konstrukcja podmiotu: przyczynek do rekonstrukcji pedagogiki kultury*, Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego.

Szkudlarek T., 1992, *McLaren i Agata. O pewnej możliwości interpretacji rytualnego oporu przeciwko szkole*, "Nieobecne Dyskursy", No. 2.

Szkudlarek T., 2023, Discourse: Education, theory of politics, and politics of theory, "Przegląd Badań Edukacyjnych", No. 2 (40), https://doi.org/10.12775/PBE.2022.016.

Śliwerski B., 2007, *Pedagogika dziecka. Studium pajdocentryzmu*, Gdańsk: Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne.

Vlieghe J., Zamojski P., 2019a, *Towards an ontology of teaching: Thing-centred pedagogy, affirmation and love for the world*, Cham: Springer.

Vlieghe J., Zamojski P., 2019b, *Education for Education's Sake: The Idea of a Thing-Centred Pedagogy* [in:] J. Vlieghe, P. Zamojski, *Towards an ontology of teaching: Thing-centred pedagogy, affirmation and love for the world*, Cham: Springer.

Vygotsky L.S., Cole M., 1978, *Mind in society: Development of higher psychological processes*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Summary

Symbolic inversion in the narratives of Montessori practitioners – additions to "The Discursive Construction of the Subject"

In the presented article, which is a part of a larger research project, the author analyses fragments of narrations of Montessori female teachers (working in Polish institutions of this type) concerning the issue of childhood and analysing *the symbolic inversion* present in their narratives. Using the procedure of phenomenography and the tools of critical discourse analysis, the author poses questions about what undergoes symbolic inversion

in Montessori pedagogy and which aspects of its functioning remain unchanged. Thus, the aim of the research is to identify and describe inverted and unchanged aspects of education at the preschool level. The results show that in the narratives of Montessori female educators, some methodological, organisational and communicative solutions are symbolically inverted, but the distribution of power in education and its fundamental purpose is relatively constant. The results of the study also show that the category of symbolic inversion has its limitations, especially when there is a shift of emphasis rather than an inversion of order.

Keywords

Montessori pedagogy, symbolic inversion, Szkudlarek, research report

28,87

Adam Jabłoński
ORCID: 0000-0003-2205-4379
Educational Institutions Complex in Nowy Targ

Violence-help as a pedagogical category.
About the violent role of the teacher

> Every pedagogical action (PA) constitutes objectively symbolic violence as an imposition of cultural arbitrariness by an arbitrary authority (Bourdieu, Passeron 2012: 75).

> […] power produces knowledge, […] power and knowledge are directly related; there is no power relation without a correlated field of knowledge, nor knowledge that does not presuppose and produce a power relation (Foucoult 1993: 29).

> A certain understanding of the mechanisms of power, can […] be obtained […] by beginning with analysing the detailed practices of everyday life and tracing their consumption by more general mechanisms of domination (Szkudlarek 2009: 50).

Introduction

This text constitutes an attempt to understand the role of the teacher in the context of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of cultural reproduction and, in particular, the violent role that this theory would indicate. The question has to be asked: to what extent does the teacher's role boil down to being a "sower of violence" and to what extent is it about helping the student to develop, to acquire competences, skills or knowledge. Reading Pierre Bourdieu's *Reproductions* from the perspective of a pupil, then a student, it is easy to see how much the school system, through the symbolic violence at work, influences our decisions, our academic performance – our entire school trajectory. We can then identify with the role of a "victim of the system". The reception of *Reproduction* is completely different, when being a teacher. To what

extent, being a teacher, do I help students and to what extent am I a mere functionary of a system of symbolic violence? On the one hand, as a special educator, I have a considerable range of support at my disposal (e.g. remedial classes), and on the other hand I have a repertoire of violence up my sleeve (sending a pupil for a diagnosis to the Psychological-Pedagogical Counselling Centre, or "insight into the child's family situation").

A certain attempt to handle this theory and my own experience of being a teacher is precisely my introduction of the category of violence-assistance. This category would include both that which is violent in a teacher's work and what is a form of assistance. Hence the questions: is it possible to imagine methodologies for working with students that are less violent and more supportive? How to work with a student to minimise the violent in favour of the helpful?

The topics addressed in the following text are fully in line with what Tomasz Szkudlarek described as thinking within critical pedagogy: "[…] unmasking, demystifying the power of theories from this circle of thinking, revealing hidden dimensions of educational processes, explaining hidden dimensions of educational processes […] and, more importantly, interpreting that side of school life with which anyone who has been a pupil is familiar: coercion, violence, the promotion of mindless submission, the killing of individuality and independence (Tomasz Szkudlarek 2010: 11).

About the category of violence-help

The phenomenon of violence-help is present in many human activities. It is also similar to Foucault's category of power-knowledge in that every helping action seems to be correlated with a violent action. This can easily be seen in medical interventions (antibiotics, chemotherapy in the case of cancer detection, anaesthesia in the case of necessary surgery, or even a visit to the dentist with a two-year-old); care (forcing younger children to brush their teeth, handling a runny nose with a nasal aspirator in a young child who cannot yet sneeze on its own, cleanliness training, periods of adaptation in the nursery, kindergarten, school); educational interventions, e.g. educational, e.g. independence training for intellectually disabled people with moderate or severe disabilities (cleanliness training, when physiological needs are taught to be taken care of in the toilet and not in trousers); safety (intervention in the case of pupils with suicide attempts, especially those discovered on school premises (call for an ambulance, sometimes a straitjacket and usually a longer stay in a psychiatric ward).

In this text I will try to present, using material from my own research, how the category of violence-help is revealed in pedagogical action. This category indicates that most pedagogical activities are twofold in nature. On the one hand, they contain a dose of violence: coercion, being forced to do some work, some behaviour

against our will (e.g. discipline in the school classroom). On the other hand, a dose of wide-ranging assistance, support in development, in acquiring some competences, skills, information, knowledge.

It is also interesting to look at the phenomenon of violence-help from the linguistic side. What is significant here is the identical morpheme (stem) MOC (power – translator's note) in both words: przeMOC-poMOC (violence-help – translator's note), although the phenomena described by these words are opposite, the morphology of the language itself would indicate a common element, although perhaps of opposite sign. This begs the question: is it the case that violence takes away power and help adds to it? We also have a similar core in the term *emPOW-ERment*, translated as "giving POWER".

Methodological note

The ethnographic material on which the analysis and interpretation of the vio-lence-help category will be carried out is borrowed from the doctoral thesis, in which the ethnographic research model is extensively discussed. In this article, I will briefly discuss the method of data presentation as well as the method of data analysis and interpretation. The presentation of the collected material will be shown through the presentation method of CAP (*creative analytical practices*), ethno-graphic research while the stage of interpretation and analysis of the material will be carried out on the basis of methods of critical HDA (*historical discourse analysis*). The description of the daily life of the learner will be presented in the form of short narratives/pictures/stories written based on the data collected and recorded in the observation log during the ethnographic research. The material will be presented in interpretations, in language in the ways in which they are read and experienced by the researcher who, in the "helping teacher role", has been involved in assessing, describing, and resolving the school situations of "problem students" from disad-vantaged backgrounds in juxtaposition with the "teacher culture" (of the school).

CAP ethnographies emerge from creative analytical practices: "[…] the process of writing and its product intersect…". (Richardson, Adams St. Pierre 2009: 462), very significantly they give: "[…] an accurate and desirable representation of the social. They create a space to discuss issues that we can't quite grasp now" (Richardson, Adams St. Pierre 2009: 461). According to Laurel Richardson, CAP ethnographies are distinguished from classical ethnography by, among other things, the crystal-lisation of data: "In traditional research, great importance is given to triangulation […]. The researcher takes advantage of various data collection techniques – inter-views, analysis of available statistics, documents, etc. – to verify their relevance. Underlying these techniques, however, is the assumption that there is an object or a specific and known point that can be triangulated. In CAP, the researcher uses various genres: literary, artistic, scientific, often blurring the boundaries between

them. According to CAP, there are more perspectives to perceive and learn about the world. Therefore, we are not triangulating but crystallising – this is what I call the postmodern deconstruction of triangulation" (Richardson, Adams St. Pierre 2009: 462), which is expressed by the fact that "the relevance of a postmodern text would not be symbolised by a triangle – a rigid, permanent and two-dimensional object – but by a crystal that combines symmetry and matter with an infinite variety of crystals, a multiplicity of dimensions, and points of view. Crystals grow and change, but they are not amorphous. It is possible to look through a crystal as through a prism, it reflects what is on the other side, other colours, patterns are created. What we see depends on the angle at which we look, the angle of the light reflection. In the CAP texts we move from plane geometry to a theory of light in which light can be a wave and a particle" (Richardson, Adams St. Pierre 2009: 462). Four criteria help with evaluating CAP ethnography:

1. Substantive content. Does the article contribute to a better understanding of social reality? Does the author demonstrate a particular theoretical perspective? Does the article appear "true", i.e. is it a plausible representation of the cultural, social, individual or collective meaning of "reality"?
2. Aesthetic value. Is the article satisfying in an aesthetic manner? Does the text have an artistic form or does it constitute a whole? Is it not boring?
3. Reflexivity. How did the author's subjectivity affect both the creation of the text and the text itself? Does the author follow ethical standards of knowing and talking about the subjects?
4. Impact. Does the article affect me intellectually or emotionally? Does it result in creating new questions and a desire to write? Does it inspire me to use new research techniques or to take action? (Richardson, Adams St. Pierre 2009: 464–465).

According to Ruth Wodak, Historical Discourse Analysis remains faithful to the general assumptions of Critical Discourse Analysis, which places it within the framework of Critical Theory. It is characterised by theoretical triangulation, which, according to Wodak, in HDA research is implemented through the concept of a four-level context. In this case we have the following levels of context: "[…] the immediate linguistic, textual context (co-text); the inter-textual and inter-discursive relationships between utterances, texts, speech genres, discourses; the extra-linguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frameworks of particular situational contexts (Middle Range Theories); the broader social, political and historical context of discursive actions (Grand Theories)" (Wodak 2008: 193). Violetta Kopińska describes the various stages of the analysis as follows. "The initial level of contextual analysis, the so-called 'internal' level, is most indicative of the interdisciplinarity of discourse analysis […]. The second level of analysis provides a triangulation of researchers and/or methods, theories and/or data […] at this stage the focus shifts from individual 'texts' or parts of texts (units of analysis) to a group of these 'texts' […] it is […] about the search for connections with other texts (intertextuality)"

(Kopińska 2017: 187). Intertextuality allows reconstructing discourse that enables the search for a relationship between other discourses – interdiscursivity. According to Kopińska, using triangulation of researchers, methods, theories or data makes it possible to "launch" new areas that may come from other scientific disciplines. The third and fourth level of context means interpreting the discourse in a socio-political-historical and theoretical context, which involves drawing on theories from various scientific disciplines.

In the following text, using one Irish primary school as an example, I will show what the daily standard work of teachers with so-called "problem pupils" from lower social groups looks like.

I will add that the collected research material will be confronted in the last part of the text with Antonina Gurycka's theory of educational errors, Herbert Blumer's concept of "nonsymbolic-symbolic" interactionism in order to show the "reproduction methodologies" and forms of the work of teachers as "sowers of violence" and students as "victims of the system".

Disciplining "infants"

Let us take a look at what dominates the activities of 4–5 year olds at school. The first thing that catches the eye and ears are the teacher's commands, spoken in a strongly raised voice: "Sit down! Everyone in their place. Move the chair to the desk. Feet together, flat on the floor. Place your hands evenly on the table. We work hard and in silence". The class is divided into several 4-person desks, with various educational games being carried out at each desk. When desks are swapped we have a moment of chaos, student bodies can't stand being seated. "Luckily" the teacher is there. She stops the running/playing children. She seats them firmly in place and loudly, with an angry face, asks the question: "What are the rules? What are the rules?". The frightened children remain silent and only after a moment say, "No running". In summary, it can be stated that the teacher spends most of the time disciplining pupils in various ways in order to correct their behaviour. Teaching constitutes a marginal issue here.

Working in the first grade class (5–6 year olds) differs little from the zero grades, with the children sitting in pairs at tables, between which they move after doing a task. The difference consists only in the amount of more material to absorb. In this case, the bodies are already after two years of training, fidgeting mercilessly, but will generally sit at the desks from task to task. The teacher's interventions are directed more towards getting the student to work on tasks. The problem is that at this stage of education, sitting relatively still in the correct posture is not enough. You still have to not only actively participate in the classroom work, but also achieve concrete, i.e. satisfactory, results. Pupils under my care as a support teacher (included in the support programme) are often far from what you would expect. For this reason,

the teacher often shouts at them, with an indignant, disappointed, or simply angry face, that they have either done too little or wrong. I have stood up for them on several occasions, sometimes looking meaningfully or nodding with disbelief on my face, with the message: "What do you think you're doing?". Sometimes I would defend them verbally, asking for more time, or I would sit down and help with the tasks myself. The teacher was clearly annoyed by my comments and interjections. Eventually, she came up with the idea that I should regularly be in the corridor for most of the lesson, posting students' work on the walls.

Distinguished lady from New Zealand

A lady playing the piano, a very elegant and neat teacher (straight as a ruler, serious, and relentlessly consistent). That year she taught a class of third graders (8–9 year olds). At this point I have to mention that in this school the teacher teaches one class all year round, teaching all subjects from 8.30 am to 1 pm for the younger classes, and until 2 pm for the fifth and sixth grades. After a year there is a rotation and the teacher gets a different class, e.g. the teacher teaches 4-year-old infants, then after a year he or she gets 12-year-old sixth graders – and so every year teaches a different class. Homework in the younger grades is always given at the beginning of class in all subjects, in a specially designated notebook. After the class and its completion, it must be signed by the parent and brought to the teacher for review the following day.

Basically, nothing out of the ordinary happened, just two students forgot to do their homework and that was it. The teacher is angry, and she does not hide it. She first makes the students stand up and publicly humiliates them in front of their peers (several epithets concerning their laziness and intellectual capacity in the context of coping with their homework): "You see, they haven't done their home-work again. What should I do with them?". The question is by no means rhetorical. And we know that hitting is not allowed (a little haggling by the hair, by the ear, or tugging, a ruler or even tearing and throwing a notebook – this is not an option, as the pupil cannot be touched), so the question is very much on point. There must be punishment. After a while, the lady calls me out and reinforces the stigma and tension with the statement: "Well, Adam, they didn't do their homework again". And she waits for me to scold them. She then suggests that she will immediately send a pupil to ask the Principal into the classroom. The tension is rising. The children start to get scared, they have tears in their eyes. When the Principal enters the class-room – they start crying. Sadistic building of tension through the various stages of humiliation until the climax when the Principal comes in. A masterpiece – not a single blow, resulting in two battered kids.

After a Mass to prepare the sixth grade for Confirmation, the teacher, horribly disgusted, reports on the outrageous behaviour of Craig, Dylan, and Tegan. The

entire staff room falls silent and listens. The teacher, with a lot of indignation and surprise in her voice, says: They were moving all the time, they couldn't sit still, they behaved like wild animals. She imitates these "wild movements", mocking the lack of control and composure. Constantly stating that she doesn't understand it. Well, how can that be. To my remark that it's simply a different body culture or boredom and over-saturation with the subject of the confirmation itself, she doesn't seem to understand what I'm saying. Interestingly, reinforcements were pulled for the rehearsal in the church: all possible teachers. An allocation of the most suspicious individuals was made. And this didn't help at all. The lads did not disappoint, they destroyed the Mass. And the lady walks around the room and doesn't understand why.

The situation I described above is a typical situation showing the distance/gap between the teacher (in our school mainly recruited from the well-educated and well-off middle class, from outside the neighbourhood where the school was located and on a "fat" full-time budget) and the pupils, who are typical residents of the neighbourhood, i.e. the children of unemployed or working class parents, often employed on junk contracts. Certain student behaviours did not fit into the class cognitive horizon of the teachers, brought up in completely different worlds. Sometimes I got the impression that the only contact with the student's world was when teachers drove their cars through the neighbourhoods they inhabited on their way to school.

Roisin's petrification

Roisin, whenever she was sent out of class to do maths exercises with me (along with a group of four other sixth graders), sat reasonably still. When I asked her if she would do some assignments with us, she replied every time for four months that she wouldn't, because what was the point. However, she always wanted to sit with us, as she preferred this to sitting in a classroom. I had a kind of *deal* with her: she doesn't bother us, and I don't send her back to class.

Why am I writing about her? Probably because there was something about her that I can't forget and probably also because she embodies the fruitlessness of my efforts. During the few months we have known each other, I have not been able to get through to her in any way. In fact, I basically didn't manage to talk to her at all. I failed to engage her in any form of cooperation or even conversation (apart from simply sitting next to us). I can't be sure, but I believe that over these few months of daily meetings she said maybe a total of 10–20 words.

More than once, I have wondered: What has happened here? Eight years of primary school and such a wall, such a concrete wall. An overwhelming feeling that it is too late – something has long since been done. Something I didn't take part in, but the likes of me did, the ones she doesn't trust. How did they lose her trust? What did they do to her? Why is she silent, constantly silent, distinctively silent,

sadly silent? Where does she wander with her unseeing eyes? There was nothing I could do but agree with her that she would be with us. Sit right next to us, although at the same time as if in another, distant world. Just waiting… It wasn't until later that I found out what kind of daily punishment she and John share.

John and Conor

John has always sought confrontation. Bashing and humiliating weaker colleagues was the standard. Disrupting lessons, regularly "beating" nerds listening to the teacher, or verbal taunts towards the teacher. If only the teachers had a disadvantage (e.g. obesity, being single), they stood no chance against John. Because I was gentle with the students (zero aggressive), as a guy John gave me the nickname "faggot". John's real challenge was a high-profile fight with a leader of another sixth grade named Craig, and of course provoking a teacher. I pacified the uninteresting clash between John and Craig after the first few blows, which saddened the audience (almost all the students were there). Far more interesting was the attack on me. John was an extremely intelligent beast and had planned everything. Due to the fact that I am much bigger than he is, he called for the help of two buddies and so they got to me. They started by trying to hit me with kicked basketballs. I replied to the attack, so they gave up. After a moment, they came up with the idea of "knocking me on the head" with backpacks. I think they had already reached my end, because I overpowered John quite violently, undercutting him, and once he was lying on his stomach, I twisted his arm and pinned him to the ground with my knee. His colleagues were gone before I knew it. John quickly calmed down, so I let him go. He threatened me a bit that I would be fired for this behaviour and went home.

   Conor. He was probably the best example of how the body can fail to adapt to school training. Skinny, small and extremely offensive. Whenever something bad happened at school, the first thing they always did was to check where Conor was. Our paths have crossed twice. The first time I saw Conor jumping on the only black classmate in the school. He pinned him to the ground and began to beat him. Just for sport. I stood up, grabbed him by his sweatshirt and pulled him off his victim. He squirmed a little, calmed down after a while and with wild satisfaction showed a slight redness on his neck, allegedly caused by my intervention. He claimed that the zip of his sweatshirt scratched his neck, so he will tell the Principal that I hit him, and of course they will suspend me.

   The second situation was more serious. The teacher asked me to stay alone with the students in the classroom for two minutes and she went to the toilet. Conor, who has always been good at making the most of opportunities, came up with the idea of a little battle in the classroom. He used the hated Irish language dictionaries, little hand-held "bricks", as weapons. The teacher's return to the classroom has not cooled Conor's enthusiasm. Instead, it automatically made Conor the main perpetrator of

the event. I don't even know when the text messages were sent. After a while there was support from the neighbouring class, then the Counsellor joined in and shortly afterwards the Principal. The teacher shouted first, followed by the Counsellor's scream which was indescribable (such things have to be seen with your own eyes to be believed). I was shocked that a creature of 150 cm in height and a petite stature could scream like that. The Principal, on the other hand, did not shout. In a calm, emotionally washed out, straight forward voice, she informed the pupil about the possible consequences (it was usually sufficient to exercise her main prerogative of calling the parents to the school). During the break, I "caught" the Counsellor. She was eating her breakfast with stoic calm, less than a few minutes after the described incident. I had to comment that what they did to Conor was pure verbal violence. She looked at me like I was a moron, banged on for several minutes about how bad my approach to students was, accused me of trying to befriend them or treat them like colleagues. She then recalled a maxim that she follows in her work, and which ensures that she is successful: "No smile before Christmas" – Adam. That's it!

I came into physical contact with a student three times: separated John and Craig, overpowered John, and pulled Conor. Three interventions cost me three conversations with the Principal. During the first one it was interesting to hear a comment about physical contact, I heard that in school we do not recommend any touching of students. If they are fighting each other, we get in between them and that's it, (this was incidentally the reason I separated John and Craig, because two teachers were afraid to push in and separate the two bullies, you could get hit in the face). To make sure I got the message right, the Principal pointed to the two maintenance workers painting the fence, saying that sometimes they may curse, kick the fence, if they lose their temper and the job doesn't get done. Much higher standards are required of us, the teachers. If I can't live up to them, I can always paint fences where I can afford to be out of control. This very statement was quite significant to me, screaming at a student did not come across as a lack of self-control, it was simply a "didactic" measure. The second talk was also very informative. I was prohibited to have any contact with Conor. Conor was also banned from attending the extra-curricular activities I was running. I was told not to enter into any relation with him on the school grounds, and preferably to avoid him in general. The Principal said outright that Conor had parents reacting very harshly to any of their son's problems at school. Parents who give credence to their son's words, (a few months earlier this led to the parents forcing a two-week suspension of a P.E. teacher who allegedly offended Conor in class – later a student who witnessed the incident testified that Conor was lying). In terms of John, I was told that due to the "pathological" nature of the family we would wait (the suggestion was made that John's father drinks and likes to hit him) until the issue dies down. John won't say anything to his parents because he would get a hit by his father. That's all. After several reprimands from the Principal, a pattern began to emerge of the school's relationship with pupils depending on the type of parents. The amount of violence

towards a child that teachers allow themselves is recalibrated according to the "power" of the parents. Pupils from a "weak", "vulnerable" family, with problems (alcohol, divorce, problems with the law), economically or culturally poor, get hit more. At school, almost no one is able to defend them, and at home they additionally get a "beating" from their parents. Parents getting involved or standing up for their child or being able to harm the school (teachers) in any way, or even having the competence to enter into an argument or dispute with the school, ensure that their children receive better/different treatment.

Allocation of undesirable entities – class cleansing

It is worth looking at how to clear the classroom of disruptive students. In this case we have several mechanisms that are working well. They constitute a part of the teaching process: whether in the form of activities to correct differences or as part of a system of penalties and rewards. Based on my own observations, I can detail the following punishments: removing one from the seat in the class to another seat, removing from the class to another class (very often sixth-graders were relegated to classes of four-year-olds because it was an extra dimension of punishment – uncomfortable chairs and always a comment that the intellectual level was more suited to groups of just those 4–5-year-olds), removing from school (suspension), transferring to another school. Didactic removal from the classroom has always taken the form of various extra-curricular activities, for example, sports, art (painting a mural in the school courtyard), anything related to outreach programmes (cookery club, yoga, maths classes, etc.). Once a class had been "cleansed" of suspicious elements, it appeared to be safe to work with.

Golden Principles[1]

Here I would like to recall the Golden Principles of the school as a kind of essence of the school's discourse. This is an extremely interesting form of persuasion (colonisation) towards/to the values distributed in the school. There are seven golden principles, and I will list them one by one: (1) Be Gentle, (2) Be Kind and Helpful, (3) Be Honest, (4) Be Friendly, (5) Work Hard (6) Listen to Others, (7) Look After Property. Children (pupils) following these principles and applying them without

---

[1]   I am unfamiliar with the origins of the Positive Behaviour Code, which constitutes the school's *Mission Statement*, with the Golden Principles at its heart. It is important that, when enrolling a child in school, the parent must sign an agreement/declaration that he/she is aware of the principles in force at the school, declares that he/she will help "implement them and agrees to accept the penalties that his/her child will suffer if the rules are not followed.

exception were rewarded with the award of two stars per day. For every twenty stars received, a small prize was awarded. When they reached a level of eighty stars, they were awarded a Bronze Certificate. A Silver one at 160, and Gold at 240 stars. Certificates and awards were regularly given during school assemblies. Children who struggled to follow the principles were given an initial warning and reminded about following the principles. If there was no improvement, they received a yellow card, then a red card, for which they consequently lost one star. Similarly, they could lose the other one. At each stage, students were reminded to make the right choices and were always given the chance to improve. If, on a given day, a pupil lost both stars and, at the same time, the behaviour did not improve, he or she was moved to a different desk in the class during the lesson. If this did not help, the pupil could be moved to another class and the there was a need to inform the parents (only at this level). For regular non-compliance, a pupil could be suspended either in or out of school, with the obligation to complete work set by the teacher.

The Gentle Phantasm

I would like to briefly examine one of the principles. Classrooms, walls in corridors, and school staircases are full of pictures of a baby cuddling a fluffy puppy with a large title "Be Gentle" or a picture of a well-cared for, clean, gentle hand touching the palm of a newborn's hand. Be sensitive, be gentle, be sterile clean. Each morning, the Principal additionally uses the megaphone to announce the main rule for that week. If we juxtapose this with the perpetually unwashed, tough, rough-edged neighbourhood boys, a kind of semiotic distance is created. All the more so when one additionally realises that being a tough guy in the neighbourhood from which the school's students were recruited was an adaptively necessary way of behaving. In such an environment, sensitivity simply stands for weakness. Paradoxically, urging students to be "soft" may be socially dangerous for them. One can imagine such a gentle teenager being let out in the evening (to refer to the Gdańsk environment) in Nowy Port or Orunia Dolna. Thus, resistance constitutes not only a fight for one's habitus dignity, but also for one's health or life.

The case of John and Roisin

John was a terribly handsome "rascal", one of those that breaks women's hearts, tall, athletic, the best footballer in the school, in his class – the undisputed leader and of course also one of the "worst" students. Roisin was the opposite of John: obese, unattractive, kept to herself. Interestingly, they have always stuck together on one issue, and that is their stubborn resistance to everything the school required of them. Accordingly, of the pupils in the entire sixth grade, they received one common

punishment, which boiled down to the fact that every morning, as soon as classes started, they set off through the school corridors with a set of rubbish bags and, one by one, emptied all the rubbish bins throughout the school (in classrooms, toilets, corridors, etc.), then, passing through the school yard, where they were seen by all the pupils, they dumped the rubbish in the main rubbish bin. To this day, I can't forget a situation when one of the schoolteachers came to class as a substitute. John started disrupting the class as standard, and the teacher pacified him with a few questions along the lines of: "Tell the class what you do with the various pieces of rubbish you collect every day around the school? Do you need to segregate them and how?". John was no longer disrupting the class, he remained silent, with his head lowered. At the same time, two pupils selected from the same class as the "best" students, Grainne and Sinead, handled autistic children on a daily basis after several days of training. Two professional paths. Two life projects. Selected by teachers. Regular training, providing experience as well as acceptance of one's potential future profession. Interestingly, in the case of our "school waste collector" we have a manufactured "socially secure" Ericksonian sense of inferiority, secured by the trained legitimisation of their inferior lives, profession. The issue of taming a difficult (unpleasant) "job" is very interesting here. Both working with rubbish and working with an autistic child takes a fair amount of getting used to. Rubbish smells, it can stain, it generally arouses disgust and rather the shame associated with doing the job of a waste collector. But after a few days, weeks, people start to get used to it. Similarly, time is required to get used to working with children with autism spectrum disorders. A range of often psychotic, aggressive behaviours (scratching, pinching, hitting, biting, etc.), various stereotypes, non-standard play, lack of eye contact, inability to interact, etc. require both time and experience to accept, to be able to behave appropriately during such situations.

Analysis and interpretation of the research
in the context of the violence-help phenomenon

I will start by juxtaposing the results of my research with Gurycka's study concerning educational errors. Summarising her research, the author points to several issues worth citing. Firstly, the dominance of the errors of aggression, rigorism, as well as halting behaviour and indifference: "Indeed, it is worrying to find repeatedly in […] studies, conducted after all on various populations, that in the course of their teaching and educational activities teachers mainly commit errors such as aggression, rigorism, and halting activity (a total of 75% of all errors!)." (Gurycka 1990: 183). Secondly, Gurycka suggests that the occurrence of acute errors is not accidental: "Sometimes the syndrome of the most common errors: aggression, rigorism, halting student activity is perhaps simply a "way" of making one's own actions effective. By attacking and controlling, external effects are achieved more

quickly: peace, order, subordination, etc." (Gurycka 1990: 184). Therefore, in this case we are dealing with aggression and rigour not as a "work accident", not as a situation in which the teacher has made an educational error (resulting from a difficult situation), but as an axis of the teacher's methodology for working with more difficult young people and children. As a way of working, in the difficult task of disciplining the class, which provides, as Gurycka puts it, achieving calmness, order in the classroom with compliant students, enabling the planned lesson to be fulfilled. This is an extremely valuable insight from Gurycka, especially when we juxtapose it with my research findings, indicating a certain methodical approach of teachers to disciplining students: regurgitation used verbal aggression, shouting, rigorism.

According to Gurycka, an educational error constitutes "[…] such disruptive behaviour of the educator which has an adverse effect on the immediate functioning and/or development of the learner…". (Gurycka 1990: 31). In contrast, the optimal form of interaction is the model of mutual functioning: "[…] the educator, guided by a specific intention (the educational goal), tries to include the educator in his or her line of activity, but, respecting the subjective properties of the educator, who also produces his or her own line of activity, strives for a common programme of action" (Gurycka 1990: 25). The author refers to this structure as joint action, adding that only when it is established, "[…] it is permissible to assume that both interaction partners can achieve control over the course of the interaction and thus feel responsible for it, which guarantees their joint activity, a sense of commitment to the tasks and a better, among other things due to this, level of their performance" (Gurycka 1990: 25). At such a view of appropriate interaction, the role of the educator is to prevent the interaction from being disrupted or ultimately broken. There are educational errors when a teacher (more broadly an educator) "provides experiences of faulty social functioning, takes away self-confidence, or teaches passivity" (Gurycka 1990: 8). If one were to apply what has been said above to the research material, what we have here is a situation where a teacher, in response to a pupil's difficult behaviour (fighting, damaging school property) or as a punishment (e.g. for lack of homework) or for motivational-disciplinary purposes (lack of the required attention in class, lack of adequate results), deliberately, methodically breaks down the interaction between oneself and the pupil (by shouting, humiliating words, calling in the help of a counsellor or the principal in order to "pin the pupil harder"). These forms of restoring order, of disciplining, deliberately broke, disrupted the interaction in order to break up difficult behaviour, to call people to order, or to achieve set goals (e.g. meeting the core curriculum).

Educational errors are mainly located in the interaction between the educator and the learner. Whereas one of the main features of this interaction is the dominant position of the educator. That is because, on the one hand, we have the educator, who "is the author of his actions, solves the problems that arise, generally makes the decisions concerning the pupil. The educator selects the objectives and means

of action […]". (Gurycka 1990: 12). In addition, the educator "strengthens, beyond the rules of the role, the conviction of own superiority over the pupil, which is prompted by representing oneself as the one who knows more than the pupil, who is more mature than the pupil, and who is called upon to exert impact and thus to draw the pupil into the orbit of own actions, intentions, and goals" (Gurycka 1990: 12). And on the other side of the interaction we have the learner who, in the name of an own sense of agency, also wishes to pursue "an own line of activity. […] The coercive power generally wielded by the educator causes […] the child to become passive, compliant, and his subjective orientation to be disrupted. […] when the coercive power of the educator increases, there is a growing sense of enslavement in the child, which must arouse resistance and a desire for liberation (reactance). The stronger the subjective orientation of the educator formed through previous experience, the greater the resistance will be" (Gurycka 1990: 13). Hence, we are dealing with a situation of immanent conflict set in this interaction. And according to Gurycka, educational errors are born against this background.

According to Gurycka, the consequences of educational errors are disturbed and/or broken interaction, a pejorative evaluation of the educational situation by the pupil, the generalisation of a pejorative evaluation, halting, disruption of development or giving it an unfavourable direction, undesirable changes, and disturbances in his personality.

As we remember, Michael Foucault begins his work *Discipline and Punish* with an interesting question: Why has the execution that was an indispensable part of punishment disappeared, and what has replaced it? My question is almost identical: Now that physical punishment has disappeared from schools, what came into its place? This question can be rephrased as follows: How do contemporary teachers deal with discipline and implementing the *curriculum* in the context of cultural difference? When I think of managing cultural difference, I am referring to the ways in which students from so-called disadvantaged backgrounds (economically and culturally), i.e. simply from lower social groups, are processed ("chipped stone"). In our context, one could ask how the first part of the violence-help category is implemented? The concept of non-symbolic interaction, which we borrow from Blumer, will be helpful in solving this problem. According to Blumer, we have two levels (two forms) of social interaction in human society, namely: "non-symbolic interaction" and "symbolic interaction". Thus: (…) Non-symbolic interaction occurs when an individual directly responds to another person's action without interpreting it. For example, reflex responses, as in the case of a boxer who automatically raises his hand to counter a punch, or when we immediately and unreflexively respond to each other's messages expressed by body language or expression and tone of voice (…). Symbolic interaction involves the interpretation of the action of both parties. Typical reactions at the symbolic level take place when they seek to understand each other's actions" (Blumer 2007: 10–12).

If, in difficult situations, symbolic interaction fails or is ineffective, the teacher uses non-symbolic interaction. Instead of persuasion, we have hurtful name-calling, reinforced by shouting, with no time to interpret, to think through an appropriate defence or resistance strategy. That is, an effect similar to a blow, after which the body froze, as if shrinking into itself. The child was terrified, scared, and crying. Let us add the fact that the child was beaten by the person who was a source of authority, defining what was right and wrong. All these behaviours are found today in a situation in which, for disciplinary purposes ("upbringing"), the teacher screams, shouts (often using a limited code) to the student. In this case, it is not just about the strength of the voice, but about the position the teacher takes, his face, his more aggressive facial expressions (an angry face, an angry look symbolising attack, aggression, normally always preceding a physical attack). It is interesting to note that the main source of this violence is women (feminisation of the school), and the victims are mainly boys.

Conclusion

The juxtaposition of the phenomenon of violence-help with Gurycka's theory of educational errors, Blumer's non-symbolic interactionism, and the material from own research, shows a certain tendency in the work of schools and teachers. Here we have the methodologies of reproduction, where the element of violence clearly comes to the fore, that are dominant at school. Teachers adopt children and adolescents to the discourse of the school (to society) "by force", "violating" cultural difference, using violent (verbal, physical violence) and elaborate disciplinary methodologies.

I would like to conclude by asking the question: to what extent are the phenomena described in my research universal? The interpretive matrix described above was developed in Poland, the research was conducted in Ireland, while the logic of these tensions seems to be more universal and is probably appropriate to the construction of modern (Foucault) and capitalist societies (with strong stratification). Therefore, the school observed in one city in Ireland constitutes only a terrain for observing the mechanism of „non-symbolic" interactions securing the field for "symbolic" pedagogical actions, which may be a structural feature of public education in a situation of endemic social inequalities.

Literature

Blumer H., 2007, *Interakcjonizm symboliczny: perspektywa i metoda*, trans. G. Woroniecka, Kraków: Nomos.

Bourdieu P., Passeron J.C., 2006, *Reprodukcja: elementy teorii systemu nauczania*, trans. E. Neyman, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Foucault M., 1993, *Nadzorować i karać: narodziny więzienia*, trans. T. Komendant, Warsaw: Aletheia.

Gurycka A., 1990, *Błąd w wychowaniu*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Szkolne i Pedagogiczne.

Jabłoński A., 2015, *Irlandzkie programy edukacyjne zapobiegające wykluczeniu*, "Forum Oświatowe", No. 27 (1).

Jabłoński A., 2020, *Zarządzanie niepowodzeniami edukacyjnymi w XXI wieku. School Completion Programme – irlandzki, edukacyjny program pomocowy* [in:] *Edukacja XXI wieku. Strategie zarządzania i kierunki rozwoju*, ed. T. Krawczyńska-Zaucha, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Księgarnia Akademicka.

Kopińska V., 2017, *Koncepcja czteropoziomowego kontekstu Ruth Wodak jako wyraz interdyscyplinarności w analizie dyskursu*, "Edukacja", No. 2 (12).

Richardson L., Adams St. Pierre E., 2009, *Pisanie jako metoda badawcza* [in:] *Metody badań terenowych*, eds. N. Denzin, Y.S. Lincoln, vol. 2, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

Szkudlarek T., 2009, *Wiedza i wolność w pedagogice amerykańskiego postmodernizmu*, Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls.

Szkudlarek T., Śliwerski B., 2010, *Wyzwania pedagogiki krytycznej i antypedagogiki*, Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls.

Wodak R., 2008, *Dyskurs populistyczny: retoryka wykluczenia a gatunki języka pisanego* [in:] *Krytyczna analiza dyskursu. Interdyscyplinarne podejście do komunikacji społecznej*, eds. A. Duszak, N. Fairclough, Kraków: Universitas.

Summary

Violence-help as a pedagogical category. About the violent role of the teacher.

The research described in the article was carried out in a primary school in one of the cities in Ireland. In this school, the author worked as a support teacher who was a representative of one of the educational support programmes. It shows how schoolteachers to deal with students from disadvantaged social environments (reproducing methodologies) in the context of the phenomenon of violence-help. The conclusion constitutes an attempt to evaluate these methodologies used when working with pupils.

Keywords

Violence-help, methods of reproduction, educational failures, the role of the teacher

18 maj vok.

Theology

Mirosław Patalon
ORCID: 0000-0003-4914-1106
Pomeranian University of Słupsk

Do we need new translations of classic source texts?

Introduction and outline of the research problem

Man is immersed in language. It is primarily through language that human identity as well as the awareness of individual distinctiveness and its relationship to the environment are shaped. Language enables intentional action by defining its motivations, goals and methods. We grow out of language, in it we interpret all experiences. Thus, language also determines social reality. The sole experience, which is, after all, also inherent in other entities, does not enable the kind of view of reality provided only by naming things, interpreting them, and being open to the interpretation of other *homo loquens* (McLaren 1991: 43).

After all, language is not static; coupled to social structures, it undergoes constant transformation, on the one hand, under the influence of changes in culture, and on the other, being a factor inspiring these changes (Kuhn 1970: 172–175). Symbols that have an impact on people, including signs of language, are linked to their specific environment. This means that they do not have a timeless and uniform power of influence due to the transformation and sometimes even loss of their relevance (Tillich 1994: 137–147). Language – like all empirically verified reality – is temporal and contingent (Rorty 1979: 267).

The above considerations are of great relevance in the field of translation studies, particularly in relation to texts that shape the foundations of culture. In the case of Western civilisation, these are undoubtedly the ancient Greek, Hebrew, Aramaic, Latin, as well as Arabic texts. This article methodologically falls within the field of hermeneutical research, is contributory in nature and, using the example of the *Ecclesiastes*, postulates the need for continuous revision of translations of these works and for new translations into modern languages (Patalon 2017: 73–81). The problem outlined here is of particular important for works of religious provenance,

because religions have a strong tendency to petrify their sacred texts. Some formulations, mainly because of their liturgical use, are a kind of memorial whose violation is undesirable. This was also philosophically and theologically justified by showing constancy as a virtue, deriving it from the idea of the immutability of God.

In the past, such an approach was common not only for individual phrases, but also for entire sets of source texts. An example of this is the *Vulgate*, meaning the translation of the *Old* and *New Testaments* from the original languages into Latin created at the turn of the fourth and fifth centuries by Jerome of Stridon, which was regarded by the Catholic Church as the only authorised translation of the *Scripture* for almost the entire following millennium. This only changed after the Reformation, which resulted in many translations of this source text into national languages, particularly in the 16th century. In Poland, the publication of the *Gdańsk Bible* in 1632 was followed by a long period in which almost no new translations of the *Scriptures* into Polish were produced until the mid-20th century (the exception being the translation of the *Tanakh* by Rabbi Izaak Cylkow).

In the Islamic tradition, it is still believed that only the original Arabic text constitutes the basis for interpreting Muhammad's ideas and for this reason translations into other languages are not authorised as interpretations. Therefore, a reliable Muslim theologian reads the *Quran* in Arabic. Similarly, a Jewish scribe reads the *Torah* in Hebrew to individually reach the heart of the ideas contained therein. Such a methodological approach is in principle in accordance with the principle that has prevailed for many centuries in European science that studying requires knowledge of the original languages, otherwise we are reliant on other people's interpretations (Rummel 1985: 49–51). How, in this light, can we explain the fact that today, so few scholars of various disciplines are able to get directly to the foundations of philosophy and the detailed disciplines of science derived from it in the original languages? Are those performing the studies today universally reliant on the translations of ancient works awaiting them, and therefore on the paths of thought and interpretation established by this? And yet every translation is entangled not only culturally in a neutral sense, but also ideologically (Blumczyński 2006: 110–111). Is it then possible, and to what extent, to have the freedom of thought that is, after all, so crucial in science? The problem becomes even more complicated if we take into account the fact that even within a single language, changes sometimes occur so dynamically that individual words lose their previous meaning so profoundly that a recipient interacting with a once relatively correct translation is nowadays misled (Patalon 2023: 94). Therefore, we call, firstly, for a return to knowledge of the classical languages by reinstating their teaching at secondary school level and, secondly, for continuous work on revising the once recognised translations of the source texts of European culture and making new translations.

Vanity of vanities as an exemplification of the problem

There are numerous examples of the petrification of concepts referred to above. These include the famous phrase "vanity of vanity" from the *Ecclesiastes*. I wrote more extensively about this in *Kohelet taoista* (Patalon 2017: 42–81), revealing the philosophical underpinnings of the attachment to this category perpetuated for centuries in Polish writing. Perhaps the most famous thought of Kohelet (הבל הבלים אמר קהלת הבל הבלים הכל הבל) in the *Warsaw Bible* is translated as follows: "Marność nad marnościami, mówi Kaznodzieja, marność nad marnościami, wszystko marność". Almost all historical and modern translations include the concept of vanity, which is expressed by the Hebrew word הבל (*hebel*). In ancient Hebrew, it meant movement of air, upward lift, smoke, vapour, fleeting odour, mist (Weeks 2012: 105–118). It occurs in such a context many times in the *Tanakh*, such as: "Gdy będziesz krzyczeć, nie wybawią cię twoje ohydne bożki! Wiatr je wszystkie uniesie, zabierze powiew" (Is 57,13a) and: "Tylko tchnieniem są synowie ludzcy, synowie mężów zaś zawodni, na wadze podnoszą się w górę, wszyscy oni lżejsi są niż tchnienie" (Ps 62,10). Due to the connotation of transience and ephemerality, the word *hebel* was also used to denote the emptiness of idols and the breath of creation. Here are some selected fragments of the *Old Testament* passages in translation of the *Warsaw Bible* where this word occurs: "Za wszystkie grzechy Baaszy i za grzechy Eli, jego syna, które popełnili i którymi przywiedli do grzechu Izraela, pobudzając do gniewu Pana, Boga Izraela, swoim b a ł w o c h w a l s t w e m" (1 Kings 16,13); "Uprzykrzyło mi się życie, nie chcę żyć dłużej.Zaniechaj mnie, bo moje dni są tylko t c h n i e n i e m!" (Job 7,16); "Nienawidzisz tych, którzy czczą m a r n e b a ł w a n y,   Ja jednak ufam Panu" (Ps 31,7); "Zaprawdę, człowiek p r z e m i j a jak cień, Zaprawdę, na próżno się miota. Gromadzi, a nie wie, kto to zabierze" (Ps 39,7); "Karami za winę karcisz człowieka i niweczysz jak mól urok jego. Zaprawdę, tylko t c h n i e n i e m jest każdy człowiek. Sela" (Ps 39,12); "Człowiek podobny jest do t c h n i e n i a, dni jego są jak cień, co mija" (Ps 144,4); "Zmienny jest wdzięk i z w i e w n a jest uroda, lecz bogobojna żona jest godna chwały" (Proverbs 31,30).

Despite the relatively wide range of meanings of the word הבל (*hebel*), the vast majority of translations of the *Ecclesiastes* stick faithfully to the traditional Polish translation of the word *marność* [*vanity* – translator's note]. The text from Koh 1:2 in selected translations is as follows:

Leopolitan Bible (1561): "Marność nad marnościami, rzekł Ecclesyastes: marność nad marnościami, a wszystkie rzeczy marność";

Brest Bible (1563): "Próżność nad próżnościami, powiedział kaznodzieja, próżność nad próżnościami, a wszystko próżność";

Nieświeska Bible (1572): "Próżność nad próżnościami, rzekł Koheleth, próżność nad próżnościami, wszystko próżność";

Jakub Wujek Bible (1599): "Marność nad marnościami, rzekł Ekklesiastes: marność nad marnościami, i wszystko marność";

Gdańsk Bible (1632): "Marność nad marnościami, powiedział kaznodzieja, marność nad marnościami, i wszystko marność";

Izaac Cylkow's translation (1904): "O, marność nad marnościami! rzekł Kohelet; o, marność nad marnościami! Wszystko marność!";

Milenium Bible (1965): "Marność nad marnościami, powiada Kohelet, marność nad marnościami – wszystko marność";

Warsaw Bible (1975): "Marność nad marnościami, mówi Kaznodzieja, marność nad marnościami, wszystko marność";

Poznań Bible (1975): "Marność nad marnościami, mówi Kohelet, marność nad marnościami! Wszystko jest marnością!";

Warsaw-Praga Bible (1997): "Marność, marność, wołał Kohelet. Marność, marność, wszystko marność";

Pardes Lauder translation (2007): "Ulotność daremna, daremna ulotność, mówi Kohelet. Wszystko daremne";

Paulist Bible (2008): "Marność nad marnościami, mówi Kohelet, marność nad marnościami! Wszystko marność!";

Ecumenical Bible (Didactic Books, 2008): "Ulotne, jakże ulotne – mówi Kohelet – ulotne, jakże ulotne, wszystko jest takie ulotne".

Czesław Miłosz, who translated the *Ecclesiastes* from *the Septuagint* (first published in "Tygodnik Powszechny" 1977, No. 11), also chose to adhere to this translation tradition, translating the sentence in question as follows: "Marność nad marnościami, rzekł kaznodzieja, marność nad marnościami, wszystko marność". After all, the initial version of his translation, rendered the *hebel* as a *vain smoke*, but the traditional *vanity* eventually prevailed (Miłosz 1998: 91–95). In this context, what is immensely interesting are the conclusions of the eminent scholar of the *Ecclesiastes*, Father Tadeusz Brzegowy, who states:

> […] the Vulgate interpretation in force in the Latin Church for many centuries has accustomed us to the meaning of *vanitas*. But even St. Jerome, the author of this translation, pointed out in his commentary that all Greek translations older than the Septuagint rendered the Hebrew *hebel* with the term *atmos*, which presupposes the meaning 'volatilising vapour, quickly dispelling smoke'. Whereas the Latin noun *vanitas* has a wide range of meanings: vanity, nothingness, lack of reality and truth, vain appearance, futility, falsehood, error, ineffectiveness, breath, subtle wind, idle talk, gossip, falsehood, lack of truth, and so on. It is worth noting both the abstract and concrete dimensions of this Latin term. In the abstract, it essentially expresses the absence of an attribute, and in the concrete, the breath of the wind. The Polish-language word "marność" (vanity – translator's note) is, of course, much narrower and more unambiguous. The term 'absurdity', on the other hand, essentially philosophical in nature, is already quite narrow and unambiguous. This is why these translations do not reflect the Hebrew *hebel*, which is almost always a metaphor (a lexicalized metaphor) and in which it sounds like a lack of constancy rather than a lack of dignity or value (Brzegowy 1999: 100–101).

Could it be, then, that the centuries-long tradition of translating the Hebrew *hebel* into Polish *marność* (excluding *the Ecumenical Bible* and the Pardes Lauder translation) is the result of the significance and influence that the *Vulgate* has had and continues to have on Polish biblical translation? On the one hand, probably yes, as the links of Polish culture with the Christian tradition and the Catholic Church cannot be overestimated; on the other hand, the fact of the changing meaning of the Polish word *marność* over time is important here. Today it is associated with aimlessness, pointlessness, nonsense, futility, worthlessness, veneration, barrenness, patheticness, impermanence, inconstancy, nothingness[1] and with fruitlessness, infertility, ineffectiveness, uselessness, uselessness, superfluousness, mediocrity, miserliness, paltriness, shallowness, shoddiness, and triviality[2]. And yet, as late as in the 19ᵗʰ century, Adam Mickiewicz still used the term in a different sense, when he wrote of a woman as a "puch marny" (vane fluff – translator's note). This does not mean, after all, that the poet thinks of her as being of inferior quality to a man, but emphasises her spirituality (weathering), her transience and beauty, which are impossible to control rationally. Mara (from the adjective "marność" – translator's note) is, after all, a dream phantom, a ghost, and the concept of spirituality no longer has a pejorative meaning. The philosophical and theological perception in the European tradition of constancy and mutability also plays a great role here. The former is associated with virtue and God, while the latter is associated with earthly transience, the body and the fragility of nature. All it takes is to recall one of the most popular Christian refrains in Poland and in the world: Świat się zmienia, góry, rzeki – tylko nie nasz Pan (The world is changing, mountains, rivers – but not our Lord – translator's note).

Therefore, let us make an attempt for an original translation from the original into Polish of the initial chapter of the *Ecclesiastes*. The left side of the table below presents a literal translation, keeping the syntax as identical to the original as possible while conforming to the stylistic rules of the Polish language, while the right-hand side shows a dynamic translation, which is intended by the author to reflect the existentialist character of the text.

1. Słowa Koheleta, syna Dawida, króla w Jerozolimie.	1. Oto sprawy Człowieka – mędrca i rzecznika ludu Jerozolimy.
2. Dym i opary, powiedział Kohelet. Para i zapachy, wszystko jest mgłą.	2. Odkrył on, że wszystko przemija i jak mgła ustępuje.
3. Jaki pożytek ma człowiek z ciężkiej swojej pracy, którą się trudzi pod słońcem?	3. Pytał więc, co dobrego wynika z wszelkich działań, które ludzie podejmują w swoim życiu?

---

[1] https://www.synonimy.pl/synonim/marno%C5%9B%C4%87/ (accessed on: 21.09.2023).

[2] https://synonim.net/synonim/marno%C5%9B%C4%87#google_vignette (accessed on: 21.09.2023).

4. Pokolenie przeszło i pokolenie przychodzi, a ziemia ciągle stoi.

5. I wzeszło słońce, i zaszło słońce, i do miejsca swojego wschodzenia wciąż zmierza.

6. Idzie na południe i odwraca się na północ, tak krążąc wiatr postępuje i po swoich rewirach wiatr znów wraca.

7. Wszystkie rzeki idą do morza, a jednak morze nie napełnia się w miejscu, w którym wchodzą weń rzeki wciąż tam idące.

8. Wszystkie sprawy męczą, nie wypowie tego człowiek; nie nasycisz oka patrzeniem i nie napełnisz ucha słuchaniem.

9. Co było, to będzie, co się stało, to się stanie i nie ma niczego nowego pod słońcem.

10. Jest rzecz, o której można powiedzieć: spójrz, oto coś nowego? To już się stało w światach, które były przed nami.

11. Nie ma wspomnienia o pierwszych i też o ostatnich nie będzie, którzy dopiero nastaną. Nie będzie pamięci o nich u tych, którzy przyjdą na końcu.

12. Ja, Kohelet, byłem królem nad Izraelem w Jerozolimie.

13. I oddałem swoje serce poszukiwaniom i zgłębianiu w mądrości tego wszystkiego, co dzieje się pod niebem. To problem pochłaniający; nałożył go Bóg na synów ludzkich, by z nim obcowali.

14. Widziałem wszystkie dzieła, które się dzieją pod słońcem, a oto są one jak dym i męczą ducha.

15. Tego, co zniekształcone, nie da się naprawić, a tego, czego brakuje, nie da się dołączyć.

---

4. Na ziemi, która długo trwa, jedno pokolenie przychodzi, a drugie szybko odchodzi.

5. Podobnie słońce – wschodzi i zachodzi, wciąż krąży i zmierza do miejsca swojego wstawania.

6. I wiatr podobnie – to na południe, to na północ wieje, wciąż krąży swoimi drogami, by znów wrócić na miejsce poprzednie.

7. A i z rzekami tak samo – do morza wpływają, a jednak ono nie wzbiera w tym miejscu, mimo że rzeki tam płyną i płyną.

8. Wszystko kiedyś powszednieje, choć można by o tym jeszcze długo mówić; oko i ucho bowiem wciąż wypatrują i wyczekują tego, co nowe.

9. Co było wczoraj, będzie i jutro, co się stało, powtórzy się znowu; słońce wciąż te same sprawy rozjaśnia.

10. Ktoś powie: spójrz, oto dzieje się coś zupełnie nowego. Ale przecież to już było wcześniej i w dawniejszych czasach się zdarzyło.

11. Rozmyła się pamięć o tych, którzy kiedyś istnieli; tak będzie i z tymi, którzy żyć dopiero będą. W świadomości następnych poprzednicy w końcu znikają.

12. Reprezentowałem lud Jerozolimy i przewodziłem mu.

13. Postanowiłem zatem, że oddam się poszukiwaniom i zgłębianiu istoty życia, choć zadanie to wyczerpuje tych, na których Bóg je nałożył.

14. Przyglądałem się wszystkim sprawom człowieka i widzę, że dotkliwie przemija ich sens.

15. Nie przywrócisz kształtu temu, co zdeformowane i nie włączysz do organizmu tego, czego nie ma.

16. Rozważałem w swoim sercu i powiedziałem: Oto pomnożyłem i dodałem mądrości względem wszystkich, którzy przede mną byli w Jerozolimie i serce moje ujrzało obfitość mądrości i wiedzy.	16. Zastanawiałem się nad tym i stwierdziłem, że nikt przede mną w Jerozolimie nie zgłębiał tego tak wnikliwie i nikt inny nie zebrał tyle mądrości i wiedzy, jaka stała się moim udziałem.
17. I czy oddam swoje serce poznaniu mądrości i poznaniu rozpusty i głupoty – wiedziałem, że i to jest sprawą ducha.	17. Poznanie wszystkiego – zarówno mądrości, jak i dzikości oraz szaleństwa jest bowiem dopiero poznaniem pełnym.
18. Ale w obfitej mądrości dużo jest gniewu, a zbieranie wiedzy mnoży ból.	18. Jednak obfitości mądrości towarzyszy irytacja, a gromadzenie wiedzy powoduje cierpienie.

Summary

The *Ecclesiastes* was written between the turn of the 4th century BC and the middle of the 3rd century BC. Historians are in dispute as to where it was written. This could have been the area of present-day Israel, Alexandria in Egypt (where the Jewish diaspora was quite numerous), or Phoenicia. All of these possible locations (although the latter most so, Zeno of Citium was, after all, a Phoenician) explain the Stoic influence in the content and style of the book (Bartholomew 2009: 50). It is also possible that the author (or authors) of this text travelled and spent a lot of time in Alexandria or Phoenicia. For us, what is important is the tension evident in the book between a monistic and dualistic ontology as well as the portrayal of a processual reality. This probably constitutes the most important characteristic factor of the *Ecclesiastes*, definitely distinguishing it from other parts of the *Tanakh*.

The translator of the text can either sustain this rather delicate feature or lose it. The Hebrew term הבל (*hebel*) is one of the most important elements of this characterisation and therefore translating it with the use of the Polish term *marność* in contemporary culture and language significantly weakens it. Therefore, new translations of this ancient book are needed, as it is – just like the entire *Bible* – an essential part of the foundations of Western culture. Moreover, new translations of all its other important components are needed to make them comprehensible to a modern audience. That is because knowing the roots of a culture significantly deepens a person's conscious and responsible life.

Literature

Bartholomew C.G., 2009, *Ecclesiastes*, Grand Rapids: Baker Academic.

Blumczyński P., 2006, *Przekład poprawny politycznie. Zarys wpływów ideologicznych w wybranych współczesnych przekładach Nowego Testamentu na język angielski*, "Theologica Wratislaviensia", No. 1.

Brzegowy T., 1999, *Jakiż pożytek odniesie człowiek z całego swego trudu?* [in:] *Wprowadzenie w myśl i wezwanie ksiąg biblijnych*, vol. 6: *Przysłowia, Hiob, Kohelet, Syrach, Księga Mądrości*, ed. J. Frankowski, Warsaw: Akademia Teologii Katolickiej.

Kuhn Th., 1970, *The structure of scientific revolutions*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McLaren P., 1991, *Język, struktura społeczna i tworzenie podmiotowości* [in:] *Nieobecne dyskursy*, part 1, ed. Z. Kwieciński, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika.

Miłosz Cz., 1998, *Księgi Pięciu Megilot*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie.

Patalon M., 2017, *Kohelet Taoista. Przyczynek do dialogu międzykulturowego*, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek.

Patalon M., 2023, *Przekłady religijnych tekstów źródłowych a edukacja międzykulturowa*, "Edukacja Międzykulturowa", No. 3 (22), doi: https://doi.org/10.15804/em.2023.03.06.

Rorty R., 1979, *Philosophy and the mirror of nature*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rummel E., 1985, *Erasmus as a translator of the classics*, Toronto-Buffalo-London: University of Toronto Press.

Weeks S., 2012, *Ecclesiastes and scepticism*, New York: T&T Clark International.

Tillich P., 1994, *Pytanie o nieuwarunkowane*, Kraków: Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy Znak.

Summary

Do we need new translations of classic source texts?

The article raises the issue of the variability of the meaning of linguistic formulations in relation to the phenomenon of petrification of symbolic religious texts. Methodologically, it falls within the field of hermeneutical research, it is of a contributing nature and, using the example of the *Ecclesiastes*, it postulates the need to constantly verify the translations of these works and make new translations into modern languages.

Keywords

language, culture, translation, *Ecclesiastes*, fluidity, stability