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Image schemas revisited: The academic teaching context

KAMILA TUREWICZ

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Abstract

The paper addresses issues from the area of the interface between theoretical linguistic courses and their possible practical implementation for university language didactics. Specifically, it illustrates didactically implementable procedure of introducing students into the embodiment premise, fundamental for Cognitive Linguists' views on language, and follow-up analyses of language expressions, which show the extent to which configurations of image schemas organizing human cognitive functioning can be discovered in semantic structures of the expressions. Image schemas-based analyses allow one to uncover differences in usage of reflexive morphemes Polish *się* 'self' and English *-self*; assumed equivalents: English *wash* and Polish *myć* / *umyć* 'wash'; and subtle differences in distribution of semantically related English lexemes *see, look(at)* and *watch*.

Key words

cognitive semantics, embodiment, image schemas, linguistic courses, university didactics

Powrót do schematów wyobrażeniowych: kontekst nauczania akademickiego

Abstrakt

Artykuł niniejszy obejmuje problematykę z obszaru przenikania się teorii językoznawczych i ich możliwej implementacji w dydaktyce akademickiej kształcenia językowego. Jako przykład działania dydaktycznego osadzonego w obszarze wspólnym dla teoretycznego i praktycznego wymiaru kursów językoznawstwa proponuję procedurę wprowadzenia studentów do zasady ucieleśnienia języka, jako fundamentalnego założenia Językoznawstwa Kognitywnego, i analizę struktur semantycznych wybranych wyrażeń, wykorzystujących schematy wyobrażeniowe „odkryte" w trakcie warsztatu. Analizy te pozwalają ustalić źródło różnic między morfemami zwrotnymi a polskim i angielskim, oraz zdefiniować subtelne różnice semantyczne między podobnymi czasownikami *see*, *look at* i *watch*.

Słowa kluczowe

semantyka kognitywna, ucieleśnienie, schematy wyobrażeniowe, językoznawstwo, dydaktyka akademicka

1. Introduction

1.1. Theoretical context

The present paper stems from my long-term interests in the academic didactics area, where theories of language offer research outcomes that have a potential to explain grammatical phenomena to a remarkable degree. Specifically, since Turewicz (1986) I have been applying Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987 [1983], 1991, 2008) analytic tools to various aspects of English, seeking possible explanations for its grammatical patterns (Turewicz, 1986, 1994, 1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2010b, 2016, 2016a), which reflect construals that appear to be conceptually different from their assumed Polish

counterparts. What differentiates the present paper from my earlier works is that the perspective on language structure assumed here is that of *image schemas*, as postulated and defined by Johnson (1987, 2005), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff and Johnson (1999).

The argumentation presented in the paper does not contribute to the theoretical discussion on the ontological status of image schemas, which can be found, for example, in Hampe (2005). Rather, it dwells on the question of the extent to which image schemas, as pre-intellectual cognitive structures, are inherent or skeletal elements in language expressions of various degrees of complexity, 'around which' specific conceptual material is organized. Nevertheless, should the argumentation and sample analyses postulated in this paper be found valid, Zlatev's (2005)[1] criticism concerning image schemas / semantic structure interface would be weakened.

[1] In his contribution to Hampe and Grady (2005), Zlatev maintains that the notion of image schema is too polysemous to satisfy the criterion of scientific term. Instead, he argues: "I will explicate and explore some of the evidence for the hypothesis that linguistic meaning is grounded in mimetic schemas" as "an alternative (and arguably better) account of what image schemas were designed to do: explain the possibility for linguistic meaning to arise". It is not my aim here to enter theoretical discussion, however, Zaltev's definition of what mimetic schemas are, especially in the point referring to consciousness (ii), implies that it is possible to objectively define the difference between image schemas and mimetic schemas: "A particular bodily act of cognition or communication is an act of bodily mimesis if and only if: (i) it involves a cross-modal mapping between proprioception (kinaesthetic experience) and exteroception (normally dominated by vision), unless proprioception is compromised (cross-modality). (ii) it consists of a bodily motion that is, or can be, under conscious control (volition). (iii) the body (part) and its motion correspond "either iconically or indexically" to some action, object or event, but at the same time are differentiated from it by the subject (representation). (iv) the subject intends the act to stand for some action, object, or event for an addressee (communicative sign function)" (Zlatev 2005: 315). Relevant as the issue may be for cognitive linguistics theoreticians, I do not find it crucial in the context of postulated analyses. Indeed, I disagree with the statement that "The presented analysis also has implications for the nature of image schemas of the more abstract type, e.g., CONTAINMENT, that are similar to those suggested by Dewell (this volume): Rather than being prior to and independent of language as claimed by, e.g., Dodge and Lakoff (this volume), they are largely constituted by language itself" (Zlatev 2005: 3014-315). The statement

The understanding of the very term *image schema* assumed for the procedure and sample analyses presented below is that advocated by Lakoff and Johnson's original presentations, as reflected in quotations from Mark Johnson's text "The philosophical significance of image schemas" (Johnson 2005:15-33).

> George Lakoff and I (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987) coined the term "image schema" primarily to emphasize the bodily, sensory motor nature of various structures of our conceptualization and reasoning. We wanted to stress that image schemas are not archetypes of some allegedly pure form-making capacity (as Kant had held), nor are they merely abstract knowledge structures (such as Schank and Abelson's (1977) notion of a "script"). Instead, image schemas are the recurring patterns of our sensory-motor experience by means of which we can make sense of that experience and reason about it, and that can also be recruited to structure abstract concepts and to carry out inferences about abstract domains of thought.
>
> Three important aspects of image schemas can now be emphasized. First, image schemas are an important part of what makes it possible for our bodily experiences to have meaning for us. The meaning is that of the recurring structures and patterns of our sensory-motor experience. As such, it typically operates beneath the level of our conscious awareness, although it also plays a role in our discrimination of the contours of our bodily orientation and experience. Meaning structures of this sort are part of what Lakoff and I (1999) call the "Cognitive Unconscious" (Johnson 2005: 22).

Accordingly, as far as theoretical stance is concerned, I follow the conception of image schemas as representational structures of sensory motor experience, part of unconscious rather than conscious cognitive functioning. As such, image schemas can

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evidently disagrees with Johnson's (2005:21) position defined as "Because we must constantly *interact* with containers of all shapes and sizes, we naturally learn the "logic" of containment (for the CONTAINER schema)" (emphasis mine). As I see it, the "logic" of containment that is learned via interactions with containers allows very young children to successfully manipulate mugs before the language period.

both organize human everyday cognitive functioning and provide grounds for the formation of language structure and, thus, can be traced within both lexis and grammar.

1.2. Linguistic education context

Implementing Cognitive Linguistics into academic didactics is by no means easy, at least in the context of the Polish educational system. To begin with, students of foreign languages base their understanding of what language and grammar are on pre-university educational experience. Typically, in view of their limited formal knowledge of the grammatical system of Polish, the term *grammar* evokes prescriptive rules of the foreign language they have been learning, in this case English. Next, courses in linguistics included in university curricula of philology provide an opportunity to discover *grammar* as an object of linguistic research, except that the courses are founded on the definition of language as a mental system independent of bodily experience (de Saussure, Chomsky) on the one hand, and the descriptive tools, grammatical categories' terms, inherited from Greek – Alexandrian School tradition (the system of eight word-classes, comprising correlates of modern grammatical categories: noun, verb, participle, (definite) article, pronoun, preposition, adverb, and conjunction, declination and conjugation systems and principles of sentence structure analysis and description), on the other one (Chisholm 1911).

Considering the above, regardless of how insightful language structure analyses based on cognitive linguistics may be, the conceptualization of language as a cognitive system rooted in sensory-motor experience, postulated within cognitive linguistics, may be too hard to understand, making cognitive linguistics analyses of specific language structures hardly comprehensible. Consequently, I believe it crucial for a student encountering both theoretical aspects of cognitive linguistics and analyses of cases rooted in its methodologies to truly comprehend what it means that *language, semantic structure has its sensory*

basis, derives from basic sensory experiences: seeing, hearing, touching, which also underline human non-linguistic cognitive functioning.

In what follows I present a procedure and sample analyses that aim at discerning by the students the nature of embodiment premise, illustrated by the synergy between pre-intellectual cognitive functioning, on the one hand, and semantic structures of selected language expressions, on the other one: (i) reflexive morphemes Polish *się* 'self' and English *-self*; (ii) English *wash* and Polish *myć* / *umyć* 'wash' (iii) semantically related English lexemes *see, look(at)* and *watch*.

2. From what we experience to what we say

2.1. The workshop

In Turewicz (2016a) I postulate a workshop during which students / participants discover image schemas that are inherent in such everyday activities as drinking coffee or tea. During the first phase of the workshop, physical gestures involved in performing and accomplishing the activity are identified. Next, during a follow-up discussion, image schemas that cognitively organize the gestures are discerned. The discoveries and discussion lead to postulating semantic analyses of predicates, in which reference to image schemas allows one to grasp subtle similarities and differences that obtain among them.

Thus, an everyday activity such as drinking tea or coffee can be defined in terms of a sequence of the following gestures:

I reach out for the mug/cup
Raise it to my lips
Take a sip
Put it back
Reach out for the mug/cup
Raise it to my lips
Take a sip
Put it back

Reach out for the mug/cup
Raise it to my lips
Take a sip
Put it back
And so on…
(Turewicz 2016a:17)

The follow-up discussion has led the workshop participants to the conclusion that such movements or gestures are neither planned nor designed, people simply *know exactly what to do to achieve intended effects without conscious planning*: reaching out for the mug / cup is not preceded by a "decision" how to stretch one's arm for the hand to reach the location of the container with the beverage in it from the perspective of the person's actual position. Nevertheless, should the stretching arm movement (incorporated in the reaching out movement) be a matter of a mere chance, presumably it would result in hitting the mug against some surface and breaking it while performing. Consequently, successful reaching for coffee or tea in a *container*, such as a mug or a cup, need not be consciously planned but the gesture of reaching for the mug / cup appears to require "some *cognitive though pre-intellectual effort* consisting in identification of the *path* that the arm has to follow to the *goal* from the actual *source* position" (Turewicz 2016a:17). In other words, to succeed in performing the gesture involves prior identification of the position of the mug / container – the $goal_1$, the actual position of the person – the $source_1$ and the route that the stretching arm has to follow to reach the goal – the $path_1$, to be represented henceforth as $(\text{source} - \text{path} - \text{goal})_1$.

Similarly, once the mug / cup is in one's hand, it has to cover the distance between its initial location to the lips, hence another gesture involving the source-path-goal trajectory is performed, except that the source, the path and the goal are different: the location of the mug / cup – $source_2$, the route from that location to the lips – $path_2$, the lips – $goal_2$. Because this gesture consists in bringing mug / cup along $path_2$ to the lips – $goal_2$,

(source – path- goal)$_2$ other questions discussed during the workshop are: (i) What directs our cognitive behavior – the movements – so that we know *how to handle an empty mug / cup and how to handle it when full* once we have reached it? (ii) What makes it possible for us *to estimate the physical effort enabling successful grasping and handling of the mug/cup* at subsequent stages of drinking?

Agreeably, successful *raise of the mug / cup to one's lips* requires cognitive mastery in handling / manipulating a *container* (a mug / a cup) along the (source – path – goal)$_2$ route combined with *up-down* orientation and use adequate physical effort to guarantee maintaining *equilibrium / balance* when the full container 'travels' to the lips. Simultaneously, the gesture requires proper 'estimation' of the *force* with which the arm muscles tighten to overcome some *barrier* – the weight of the mug / cup, and the relaxing position of any part of human body, here the arm, in 'no action' state, to accomplish the (source – path – goal)$_2$ gesture directed upwards.

Next, once the (source – path – goal)$_2$ route of the mug / cup is accomplished, the very 'taking a sip' gesture is *also* cognitively organized by source – path – goal pattern: the beverage from the center of the mug / cup (*source$_3$* / *container$_1$*) 'follows' a particular route (*path$_3$*) to get precisely to the inside of the mouth (*goal$_3$* and *container$_2$*). Simultaneously, this gesture involves cognitively estimated adequate physical effort *(force)* to maintain *equilibrium / balance* so that the tea or coffee, regardless of its weight *(barrier),* gets precisely into the mouth / human body (*goal$_3$* and *container$_2$*). Accordingly, the activity of 'taking a sip' is cognitively organized by a *configuration* of cognitive patterns: source – path- goal, container, force-barrier and equilibrium.

Finally, the 'putting the mug / cup back' gesture is also organized by source-path goal schema, where the *goal$_4$* is the initial position of the mug / container, the *source$_4$* correlates with the lips and the *path$_4$* is the route from the lips to the initial position of the mug / cup. Importantly, because some of the

beverage has been absorbed by *goal*$_3$, i.e., *container*$_2$ – the mouth / body, the weight of the mug / cup has changed, which requires adjusting the force needed to handle the *container*$_1$ – barrier, and maintain balance during the (source – path – goal)$_4$ gesture.

2.2. Discussion and theoretical issues

In view of the argumentation above, the following image schemas have been identified as organizing subsequent gestures involved in the activity of drinking coffee: force-barrier (the action of arm muscles), source-path goal, up-down (the trajectory the arm/hand 'travels'), container (for the identification of the object to be manipulated: the mug/cup and the human body), full-empty, equilibrium / balance (for safe manipulation of a 'full →empty' container). There may be more cognitive patterns involved in organizing the activity of drinking coffee or tea, e.g. *mass* for the beverage, nevertheless, as they are not directly relevant for the present argumentation, I will focus on those which appear to be crucial for cognitively correct organization of the movements.

Undoubtedly, to accomplish drinking one's coffee or tea, the gestures enumerated above are repeated a number of times, and each time the movements are performed in an established order: (i) reaching out for the mug → (ii) raising the mug to the lips → (iii) taking a sip of the beverage → (iv) putting the mug back, whereas each of the gestures – (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) – is organized by a *configuration* of image schemas as characterized above. In other words, an accomplished *activity of drinking* coffee / tea involves *repeating* again and again a *sequence of similar gestures* (i)→(ii)→(iii)→(iv), each of them based on a *configuration of image schemas*, which brings us to the concepts of *iteration* ("the process of doing something again and again" – CALD 2008: 767) and *cycle*[2] ("a group of events which happen in a particular

[2] Johnson (1987: 119) defines it as follows: "Most fundamentally, a cycle is a temporal circle. The cycle begins with some initial state, proceeds through

order" (CALD 2008: 347)), inherent in the structure of the concept *iteration*. In view of Johnson's words "Many complex image schemas are built up from the basic ones through processes of combination, superimposition, and further elaboration or specification" (Johnson 2005: 21), the *iteration* and *cycle* are complex image schemas.

Considering the fact that both *iteration* and *cycle* are identified as image schemas (Hampe 2005:2), the activity of drinking tea / coffee appears to be organized by a *configuration* of complex image schemas: iteration, cycle, which themselves are configurations of more basic schemas: source-path-goal, container, up-down, force-barrier, equilibrium. As may have been realized, to accomplish each cycle, the person performing the physical gestures has to spend some energy, because without energy no movement is possible. Hence, a reasonable question is 'Why do people customarily drink their coffee or tea (or more reasonably, eat breakfast) as 'first thing in the morning' if the activity requires *spending* some energy? Again, speculative[3] as it may be, the reasonable answer is that people *invest* some energy to drink coffee or tea or simply eat breakfast to get *more* energy to begin the day.

According to the above mode of reasoning, the gestures within each cycle, incorporate *energy transfer*: investing energy from phase (i) of the cycle through phase (ii) to absorbing energy with accomplishment of phase (iii), to spending some energy to accomplish phase (iv), which results in absorbing *more energy than invested*. Hence, the formula (i)→(ii)→(iii)→(iv), while representing a cycle in configuration of image schemas organized by iteration image schema (which organizes the activity of drinking coffee / tea) *itself* represents *energy transfer* resulting in

a sequence of connected events, and ends where it began, to start anew the recurring cyclic pattern."

[3] The word *speculative* here is used in the sense it applies to linguistic / philosophical tradition of Modists, whose postulates of *modi essendi, modi intelligendi* and *modi significandi* were speculative to the extent they were rooted in pure reasoning, with no chance for objective / scientific support (Bursill-Hall 1972).

enriching the original source$_1$ which becomes the beneficiary as goal$_3$. In this fashion, within each cycle (i) – (iv), the accomplishment of phases (i) – (iii) *correlates* the performer of respective gestures – *source$_1$* with the beneficiary / recipient of their effect – *goal$_3$*. More conveniently, the *cognitive behavior* involved in drinking coffee or tea can be described as follows: some energy from the *source$_1$* e.g. a human body, is directed (→) to *goal$_1$* which correlates (/) with *source$_2$*, from which *energy* is transmitted (→) to *goal$_2$* which correlates (/) with *source$_1$* (the human body) causing some kind of *change* (+) in source$_1$, to be represented by modified and simplified formula:

$$\text{source}_1 \rightarrow \text{goal}_1 / \text{source}_2 \rightarrow \text{goal}_2 / \text{source}_1 +$$

The correlation between source of emitted energy to perform an activity - performer (source$_1$) and the recipient of the effect of the activity accomplishment (goal$_2$ / source$_1$+) evokes the concept of *reflexivity*. Indeed, in view of Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1990: 990) definition of the adjective *reflexive* as "1 a: directed or turned back on itself", I argue that within cycle the sequence of gestures represented by the simplified formula *source$_1$→goal$_1$/ source$_2$→goal$_2$/ source$_1$+* reflects *reflexivity* image schema.

To the extent the reasoning presented above is logical, the *reflexivity* image schema, as a configuration of image schemas which represent 'recurring patterns of our sensory motor experience' is *embodied*. Simultaneously, it is a *cognitive schema* as 'it also plays a role in our discrimination of the contours of our bodily orientation and experience', during such activities as drinking coffee or tea, which are founded on *meaning structures* defined by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) as the "Cognitive Unconscious".

Importantly, the *reflexivity* image schema characterized above in terms of a configuration of image schemas is fully compatible with the definition of the concept *reflexivity* in logic and mathematics, defined as "(logic and mathematics) a relation

such that it holds between an element and itself" (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/reflexivity, accessed 19.08.2024). The question that remains to be addressed is: Is the reflexivity image schema as discussed above inherent in language / semantic structure?

2.3. Image schemas in semantic structure

As I argue in Turewicz (2016a: 20-23), the characterization of the reflexivity image schema matches also dictionary definitions of the adjective *reflexive*: "*adj* describes words that show that the person who does the action is also the person who is affected by it" (*Cambridge Advanced Learner Dictionary* 2008: 1194, CALD henceforth) and "1 a: directed or turned on itself" (*Webster Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* 1990: 990, WNNCD henceforth). The study questions addressed and discussed in that work were: (i) To what extent reflexivity schema organizes semantic structure in reflexive pronouns in Polish and English? (ii) Can, on more general grounds, image schemas analysis account for subtle differences among 'similar'[4] language expressions in English? (iii) Can an analysis implementing image-schema theory contribute to better understanding of similarities and differences between meanings / semantic structures of language expressions intra and inter linguistically? In what follows I revise those analyses and extend the study to new cases.

2.3.1. Reflexive morphemes

Presumably, most typical examples of language expressions categorized as related to the notion of reflexivity in Polish and English are the reflexive pronoun *się* 'self' in Polish and its assumed

[4] The very term 'similar ' is vague, nevertheless I decided to use it to 'grasp' a perspective of a learner of English as a foreign language, (typically) educated on the basis of a bi-lingual dictionary, who strives to find out which word in my own language is a true equivalent of the English word in focus.

English equivalent, the derivational suffix -*self*. The Polish pronoun *się* is characterized by *Słownik poprawnej polszczyzny PWN* (1981: 686) [The Dictionary of Correct Polish PWN] as follows

> Zaimek *się* **1**. Tworzy stronę zwrotną czasowników wskazując, że sprawca tej czynności jest jednocześnie jej odbiorcą
> [The pronoun *się* **1**. is used to form reflexive voice of verbs pointing to the performer as simultaneously its recipient/beneficiary]

In view of the dictionary definition referred to above, the reflexivity image schema represented in the formula $source_1 \rightarrow goal_1 / source_2 \rightarrow goal_2 / source_1+$ evidently grasps the essential facet of semantic structure of the Polish reflexive pronoun *się*: the correlation that holds between performer and recipient is reflected in the correlation between $source_1$ and $goal_2/source_1+$.

As far as the English dependent morpheme -*self* is concerned, neither of the dictionaries (CALD 2008, WNNCD 1990) is very helpful as regards its meaning / semantic structure; both focus on its syntactic distribution. Similarly, other sources offer morphological definitions of the form -*self* as a suffix which, when attached to a personal pronoun, e.g. *myself*, points to identity of the object and the subject of the sentence as the requirement for the occurrence of the *reflexive pronoun* (http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2013/02/grammar). Also, pedagogy-oriented grammar books, such as *Longmans Advanced Learner's Grammar* (2008), offer syntax based characterization of -*self*, which foreground the *identity of the subject and the object* of sentences with the morpheme. Again, the comparison of the definitions allows one to argue that the formula $source_1 \rightarrow goal_1 / source_2 \rightarrow goal_2 / source_1+$ is inherent in the semantic structure of the dependent morpheme, where the $source_1$ and $goal_2/source_1+$ are morphologically encoded in the form of respective reflexive pronoun: *myself*, *yourself*, *themselves* etc.

Accordingly, the image schematic analyses of functional and syntactic definitions of the Polish reflexive pronoun *się* and the English suffix *-self* allow to discern what the reflexive voice predicates share, which is the *reflexivity image schema*. Nonetheless, because *się* is an independent morpheme whereas *-self* is a dependent one, the *reflexivity image schema* operates in the languages at different levels of semantic / grammatical organization: in the case of *się* the source$_1$ and goal$_2$/source$_1$+ is defined syntactically (the subject), whereas in the case of *-self* the source$_1$ and goal$_2$ /source$_1$+ is defined morphologically in the stems of reflexive pronouns.

2.3.2. Verbs

2.3.2.1. Wash – myć /umyć

Another pair of examples that are interesting in the context of learning English as a foreign language are the English verb *wash* and its assumed Polish equivalent *myć*. The words are viewed as equivalents by bilingual dictionaries, however, their distributions in respective language systems differ. The point in focus is awkwardness of English **wash myself* contrasted with grammaticality of Polish *myć się* 'wash myself'. The cross-linguistic *discrepancy* is related to the level of language systems on which reflexivity image schema (source$_1$→goal$_1$/source$_2$→ goal$_2$/source$_1$+) organizes conceptual content of language expressions. Namely, *wash*, unlike *umyć*,[5] is defined as either *transitive* or *intransitive* verb. The intransitive use of the verb requires no direct object, which implies that the only *recipient / affected element* of the activity is the performer encoded in the subject. Accordingly, the intransitive usage of the English verb

[5] In view of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 2008) definitions of perfective / imperfective processes, English *wash* and Polish *myć* differ in that the former is a perfective verb whereas the latter is not. Therefore, I view it more appropriate to pair as equivalents *wash* and *umyć* – the perfective infinitive of *myć*.

wash points to *reflexive image schema* in the semantic construal with the verb. Simultaneously, the fact that its assumed Polish equivalent is a transitive verb excludes the presence of a reflexivity image schema in the semantic structure of *umyć*. In other words, the simple verb form *wash* (intransitive) incorporates the information that the beneficiary of the washing is the performer at *lexical level (as an intransitive verb)*, whereas the absence of the reflexivity schema in Polish *umyć – transitive verb* leaves the beneficiary / recipient unspecified and the reflexive *–się* does the job identifying the intransitive correlation between the performer and the recipient on *syntactic level*.

2.3.2.2. See, look (at), watch

From the perspective of a learner of English as a foreign language, English words *see, look (at), watch* may be troublesome because, on the one hand, they refer to the activity of visual perception, whereas, on the other one, their distribution and usage imply differences among them that are semantically relevant. In what follows, I offer analyses of their semantic structures implementing the theory of image schemas.

See

CALD (2003:1129) defines the verb *see* first of all in the sense 'use eyes': "[I or T] to be aware of what is around you by using your eyes". Interpreted from the perspective of sensory motor behavior, the definition implies that the language expression *see* encodes a situation of *letting* visual information into the mind (be aware) by *keeping one's eyes opened* (using your eyes). To the extent the sensory - motor behavior interpretation of the dictionary definition is legitimate, the semantic structure of *see* can be analyzed in terms of a configuration of image schemas: *container, blockage, force – barrier, end of path.* Namely, in the configuration of image schemas defining the semantic structure of the verb, (i) the mind functions as a *container* to which visual information has access when the eyelids are raised; (ii) when

closed, the eyes function as a *blockage* for the mind/*container*, because no information can get into the mind; (iii) for the eyes to be opened (the information has free access to the mind), the eyelid muscles behave according to the *force – barrier* image schema; (iv) the flow of information is 'absorbed' in the mind (like beverage is 'absorbed' in the body), hence the mind / container is also construed as the 'end of path' for the flow of information by the *end of path* schema.

I would argue that in the configuration of image schemas organizing semantic structure of the verb, the source-path-goal schema may not be *salient*, because for the cognitive activity of seeing any point / location in the visually accessible surroundings can be such a source, from which the information travels along a path to the goal / at the end of path – the eyes / mind. It should be borne in mind, however, that the end of path schema is a part of the source-path-goal schema, hence, evidently, the end of path schema presupposes the source-path-goal in the configuration, which need not be active in the act of seeing and, by the same token, redundant for characterization of the semantic structure of *see*.

Look (at)

The verb is defined by CALD (2008:845) as follows: "[…] direct your eyes in order to *see*" (emphasis mine), hence, the definition of *look (at)* incorporates that of *see*. Accordingly, the configuration of image schemas incorporated in the semantic structure of *see* is shared by the two lexemes. Simultaneously, the definition hints upon the difference between semantic structures of the two predicates in its 'direct your eyes in order […]" part. In terms of image schematic analysis, this part of the definition of *look (at*) points to the source-path-goal image schema in its semantic structure (direct … to). The goal here correlates with a fragment of reality, object or scene, towards which opened eyes are directed.

Evidently, the fact of directing one's eyes at some point involves investing some energy in the movement of the head by

the intentionally acting human body, aiming to obtain information. Thus, the source-path-goal image schema defines a path of fictive motion[6] between the source – the mind with eyes opened, and the goal – the object(s) that the seeing is intentionally directed at. Next, because in *look at* the goal of intentional directing the eyes is an object the agent wants to see, i.e. receive backward information about, the object becomes the source of the backward information flow according to the source-path-goal image schema, whose goal correlates with the source of the intentional directing the eyes. Accordingly, the semantic structure of *look (at)* incorporates a configuration of *source-path-goal* image schemas: from the mind to the object of interest for the agent – $(\text{source-path-goal})_1$ and from the object to the eyes / mind – $(\text{source-path-goal})_2$, in which source_1 correlates with goal_2 enriched by the absorbed information, hence represented as source_1+. The configuration represented formally as $\textit{source}_1 \rightarrow \textit{goal}_1 / \textit{source}_2 \rightarrow \textit{goal}_2 / \textit{source}_1+$ points to reflexivity image schema as the factor organizing semantic structure of the predicate; the reflexivity image schema inherent in the semantic structure of *look (at)* accounts for the difference between the verb and *see*. Simultaneously, the predicates share such image schemas as container, removal of restraint, force-barrier, up-down (eye lids movement).

Watch

CALD (2008:2638) defines the meaning of *watch* as: "to **look at** something for a period of time, especially something that is changing or moving". Following the path of reasoning postulated so far, let us assume that the configuration of image schemas organizing the meaning of *watch* incorporates that of *look (at)*, which, in turn, incorporates the configuration of image schemas defining *see*. Thus, the following image schemas appear to organize the semantic structure of *watch*: container, removal of restraint, force-barrier, up-down, end of path and reflexivity

[6] Here I implement the term postulated by Langacker (1987, 2008).

image schema: *source*$_1$→*goal*$_1$/*source*$_2$→*goal*$_2$/*source*$_1$+. There remains to identify the difference between the meaning of *look (at)* and *watch*. CALD definitions we base our analyses on imply that the values of *goal*$_1$/*source*$_2$ of *source*$_1$→*goal*$_1$/*source*$_2$→ *goal*$_2$/*source*$_1$+ are different in the semantic structures for *look (at)* and *watch*. Precisely, in the case of *watch* the goal is *something that is changing or moving*. Bodily experience of change in one's location as well as the ability to register a change in the location of moving objects lead to the formation of image schemas *moving object* / *motion* / *change*, therefore, the part of the definition *something that is changing or moving* points to these image schemas in the semantic structure of *watch*. The combination of *moving object* / *motion* / *change* with reflexivity image schema implies changing value of *goal*$_1$/*source*$_2$ in *source*$_1$→ *goal*$_1$/*source*$_2$→*goal*$_2$/*source*$_1$+ hence multiple links between the mind and the moving object, which points to activation of *iteration* image schema in the configuration organizing semantic structure of *watch.* In other words, because motion and change are inseparable from the experience of passage of time, in the case of *watch* the link between the brain / mind container and the goal defined as moving object are defined by iteration and reflexivity image schemas, which implies that the predicate has a temporal dimension in its semantic structure.[7]

In view of the above reanalysis of semantic structures of the three verbs: *see*, *look(at)* and *watch*, the predicates share the configuration of image schemas defining the semantic structure of *see*. The difference between *see,* on the one hand, and *look (at*) and *watch*, on the other one, is motivated by the presence of reflexivity image schema in the meaning / semantic structures of the latter ones (*look (at)* and *watch*). Moreover, the difference between *watch* and *look (at)* can be explained with reference to the iteration image schema defining the multiple *goals*$_1$/*sources*$_2$ of the reflexivity image schema *source*$_1$→*goal*$_1$/

[7] Here I refer to Lanagcker's definition of perfective profile.

source$_2$→*goal*$_2$/*source*$_1$+; which contribute to the semantic structure of *watch* a temporal dimension.

A more insightful analyses of semantic structures of *see*, *look(at)* and *watch*, would uncover other image schemas in the configurations organizing meanings of the three words. Nevertheless, despite possible limitations, the analyses allow to account for a number of nuances of usage. For example, the analyses offer tacit explanation why *look* does not allow 'extending in time' complements, while *watch* is incompatible with momentary objects of no temporal extension, as illustrated by the sentences below.

**We looked at the film for a few minutes.*
**All of the sudden the policeman watched the woman.*

3. Conclusions

The paper addresses issues from the area where university didactics should overlap with linguistic theories. Specifically, I have tried to offer a solution to the problem of difficulties that students of philology may experience during courses in cognitive linguistics, related to its unorthodox conception of language as rooted in sensory-motor experience. The idea of the workshop agrees with Jonhson's (2005: 21) statement that through "[…] informal phenomenological analysis of the structural dimensions of our sensory-motor experience, most of the basic image schemas will show themselves." Simultaneously, in spite of the fact that my intention here has not been to contribute to the theoretical discussion on image schemas in "unconscious cognition" and language, the outcome of the workshop has implications for such a debate in illustrating cases of implementing the theory to *explanatory* analyses of language expressions at different levels of its organization. To the extent the workshop can successfully introduce students into the idea of embodiment of language and the analyses convincingly illustrate the

synergy between thus identified image schemas and semantic structure, the aim of the paper has been achieved.

Obviously, the analyses are preliminary in that the identification of image schemas organizing semantic structure of a predicate needs more precise characterization of the structure of the *configuration* the image schemas belong to. Presumably, Langacker's (1987, 2008) concept of *point of access* to a *matrix of domains*, evoked for the characterization of semantic poles of symbolic structures, could inspire research into the impact that *configuration* of image schemas may have on the meanings encoded by 'similar' lexemes: *see*, *look(at)*, *watch*. By the same token, differences in configurations of image schemas may reflect crucial differences among languages at all levels of the language structure, as illustrated by pairs: *się* and *-self*, *myć* / *umyć* and *wash*. Indeed, the analyses may encourage research into the extent to which image schemas can be implemented to specific *grammatical* phenomena within a language and between languages, especially in view of Langacker's works (1986, 2008), in which the proponent of Cognitive Grammar argues and demonstrates that image schemas are important facets in definitions of semantic poles of grammatical categories. What I find challenging is the possible implementation of image schema theory analyses to lexicography, mono- and bilingual / multilingual dictionaries, and the area of translation. Should image schemas prove to be the level of cognitive structure shared by different semantic systems, different languages, the type of analysis could contribute to better understanding of what languages share and how they differ, and thus more successful communication among people using different languages but united in fundamental cognitive processes.

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Kamila Turewicz
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-3758-6426
Akademia Piotrkowska
Zakład Neofilolofii
ul. J. Słowackiego 114/118
97-300 Piotrków Trybunalski
Poland
kamila.turewicz@apt.edu.pl