

Influence of contemporary Neo-Aristotelianism on education and personal development methods

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Abstract

The article presents a critique of contemporary culture formulated by Alasdair MacIntyre, who claims that contemporary culture is dominated by the precepts of a philosophical school called emotivism. In the article, this critique is related to coaching – a popular personal and professional development method, which as the article demonstrates is also based upon emotivism. Further, the article presents an alternative to the emotivist line of thought contained in the Neo-Aristotelian philosophy represented by Alasdair MacIntyre and John Finnis, who prove that rational reflection on basic human values and goods is possible. In Finnis's thought, the analysis of practical rationality plays a key role, whereas in MacIntyre's thought it is the category of the goods internal to practices. In the article, the consequences of their theories for personal development are highlighted, the area referred to in this context being university education.

Key words

coaching, internal goods, personal development, practical rationality, university

Influence du néo-aristotélisme sur l'éducation et les méthodes de l'épanouissement personnel

Résumé

L'article présente la critique de la culture moderne formulée par Alasdair MacIntyre selon laquelle notre culture a été dominée par les principes d'un mouvement philosophique appelé émotivisme. D'après ce mouvement, la réflexion rationnelle sur le bien de l'homme est impossible. La critique a été appliquée à une des méthodes d'épanouissement personnel et professionnel – le *coaching*. On démontre que cette méthode s'appuie aussi sur les principes émotivistes. La philosophie néo-aristotélicienne, représentée par Alasdair MacIntyre et John Finnis, est présentée comme une alternative à ce mode de penser. Ces philosophes démontrent que la réflexion rationnelle sur les valeurs fondamentales et les biens de l'homme est possible. Chez Finnis, c'est l'analyse de la rationalité pratique qui joue le rôle principal ; chez MacIntyre, c'est la catégorie des biens internes par rapport aux pratiques. L'article présente les conséquences de ces théories pour les méthodes du développement personnel et dans la conclusion, celles-ci sont mises en rapport avec l'éducation universitaire.

Mots-clés

biens internes. coaching, épanouissement personnel, rationalité pratique, université

Wpływ współczesnego neoarystotelizmu na edukację i metody rozwoju osobistego. Wybrane zagadnienia

Abstrakt

Artykuł przedstawia krytykę współczesnej kultury dokonaną przez Alasdaira MacIntyre'a, która opiera się na twierdzeniu, że nasza kultura została zdominowana przez założenia emotywizmu – nurtu filo-

zoficznego głoszącego, że racjonalny namysł nad dobrem człowieka jest niemożliwy. W artykule krytyka ta została odniesiona od popularnej metody rozwoju osobistego i zawodowego jaką jest coaching – poprzez pokazanie, że ona również opiera się na założeniach emotywizmu. Jako alternatywę dla tego sposobu myślenia przedstawiam filozofię neoarystotelizmu reprezentowaną przez Alasdaira MacIntyre’a i Johna Finnis’a. Filozofowie ci dowodzą, że racjonalny namysł nad podstawowymi wartościami i dobrami człowieka jest możliwy. U Finnis’a kluczową rolę pełni w tym kontekście analiza racjonalności praktycznej, natomiast u MacIntyre’a – kategoria dóbr wewnętrznych wobec praktyk. W artykule pokazuję konsekwencje tych teorii dla metod rozwoju osobistego, a w podsumowaniu odnoszę je również w sposób skrótowy do edukacji uniwersyteckiej.

Słowa kluczowe

coaching, dobra wewnętrzne, racjonalność praktyczna, rozwój osobisty, uniwersytet

1. Introduction

In contemporary philosophy there appears to be an area of dispute between two schools, which in the broadest sense can be termed modern and postmodern. However, in the 20th century, another school returned to favour – a school one might call premodern.¹ Currently, we are observing an attempt to renew and update Aristotelian thought, which is perceived as offering the chance to solve problems which still remain unsolved from the perspective of modern philosophy. In this spirit, two contemporary philosophers, John Finnis and Alasdair MacIntyre, take their inspiration from the Aristotelian tradition.

The paradigm we accept in philosophy affects our perception, not only in terms of ontology, epistemology or ethics, but

¹ In his book *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* Alasdair MacIntyre presents his view of the history of philosophy in which these three main schools (although differently named) clash with each other.

also in relation to education and the way we perceive human development. In my article I analyse how the views of the two aforementioned representatives of Neo-Aristotelianism influence perception of so-called human personal development.

2. Emotivism as a sign of the cultural crisis

Alasdair MacIntyre perceives his own philosophy as an answer to the crisis or deadlock in contemporary culture and philosophy, for which he blames emotivism, an ethical school originating in the first half of the 20th century. Emotivism rests on the assumption that all our practical judgements – considering actions and particularly morality – have a source neither in facts, nor in any objective rules, but in our preferences, feelings and emotions. As a result, it is impossible – according to this viewpoint – to have a rational debate on human good and the value of the goals humanity sets itself, because only things which have common standards and criteria can be discussed.

Traditionally, such a criterion was rationality with its starting point pertaining to certain views of the world, values and human nature, as well as arguments on the basis of which these views were formulated. However, at some stage, philosophy denied the possibility of obtaining a rational conclusion from the facts (views on the world and on the human being) about obligation (judgements considering the good and the right things to do). It was found, rather, that neither good, morality, nor obligations could be discussed based upon the rational reasoning which exists in science and in the various fields of knowledge that relate to the world and the human being. On the other hand, it was obvious that judgements considering good, morality and obligation were widespread among people and that they must derive from some kind of source. According to emotivism, the source is the sphere of feelings and emotions, which as such is not the subject of rational discussions. As the emotivists claim, therefore, there is no point entering into discussion with someone's feelings, since they

are simply felt by a human being, just as it is pointless to discuss someone's vision of good or morality, because the status of such convictions is the same as the status of the emotions.

Though criticized on philosophical grounds and rejected in its primary form described above, emotivism has taken firm hold in contemporary culture and our perception of morality (MacIntyre 2007: 23). However, MacIntyre advances the thesis that "emotivism entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations" (MacIntyre 2007: 23), which results from the impossibility of the rational justification of the aims of our actions. That, in turn, makes it impossible to live by the rule – expressed most clearly by Kant, but known much earlier – not to treat one's neighbour only as a means to an end, that is, not to treat people as an object. If emotivism was a true theory, therefore, it would be impossible to distinguish if we were manipulating someone or not.

MacIntyre enlists three characters who embody, in his opinion, the emotivist perspective of human action and morality. He claims that they are also an expression of the aspirations shared by many people in today's culture, and that they are considered estimable because of their way of life and the way of reaching their goals. The first character is the aesthete described by Kierkegaard – a person deprived of lofty ideals and bored with life. The aesthete tries to overcome boredom with various pleasures and satisfy his desires – which can be done both by doing good to other people for fun and by ignoring their good. According to MacIntyre, this attitude is the common state of rich people, but can also apply to poor people, who obviously live a life different from the rich, but share the same aspirations (MacIntyre 2007: 24-25).

The second and the third characters, according to MacIntyre, embody the "obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations" (MacIntyre 2007: 25). The therapist represents the obliteration of this distinction in the personal sphere, whereas it is the

manager in the social sphere. The therapist treats the aims of his² action as given, defined in advance, and so focuses on the technique and the efficient transformation of a neurotic person into a well-adapted member of society. The manager, likewise, does not reflect on the rightness of his aims, as these are fixed in advance and it is his task to find the most efficient means to reach them. Neither the manager nor the therapist engage in moral debates. They restrict their field of action (and they are perceived as people who do so) to the sphere of possible rational consent, that is to the domain of facts, means and measurable effectiveness (MacIntyre 2007: 30). To put it simply, the manager's task in this context is not to realize lofty ideals or to dwell on what aims can benefit mankind. His task is to reach particular measurable results expressed, for example, in the number of sold services, products, or generated income.

The consequence of such a state of affairs is, according to MacIntyre, a lack of methods in contemporary culture and philosophy, which could be used to conduct moral debates in a rational manner. Each dispute on what should be done is doomed to be inconclusive because there are no objective criteria, independent of the adopted paradigms, which would allow us to rationally judge both the aims of the actions and the principles we should be governed by.³

3. The consequences of emotivism for personal development methods

What does the state of culture, as described by MacIntyre, have to do with human development and so-called personal development? *After Virtue*, containing his critique of the state of culture, was published in 1981. I would like to advance the thesis that emotivism, in the shape described by MacIntyre, is still reflected in our culture today, even though the example of

² For stylistic reasons, I use the pronoun *he* etc. instead of *he/she* etc.

³ MacIntyre develops his concept of incommensurable traditions of moral enquiry in his books *Whose justice? Which Rationality?* (2007) and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (1990).

a therapist seems to be vaguely described. It is also somewhat unclear why a therapist should represent emotivism according to MacIntyre. We can, however, point to another character of our times who – in my opinion – is the essence of emotivism and represents this approach in human development. It is the coach.

I use the name coach to represent a person specialized in the – recently popular – method of personal and professional development called coaching.⁴ This method consists of a regular course of individual meetings between a coach and a client, which aims at defining the client's needs and resources, in order to help him crystallize his developmental goals, and then, to support him in discovering in himself the motivation to achieve them. It is assumed that a coach does not need to be an expert in the field he is conducting his coaching. This is because his role is not to give advice and hints but – by asking the proper questions – to support the client's process of self-reflection and increase of self-awareness. It is acknowledged that the client is the source of the necessary resources, which means that he has everything he needs to realize his goals. The coach is there only to bring the resources to the surface, to help the client to become aware of them and to help him in the process of planning how to use them. Interestingly, the conclusion of these guidelines is that the coach does not have to be an expert in finance, for example, to be the coach of a CFO in a company or an organization. However, he must have certain interpersonal competence, know the principles of coaching and have skills to use certain psychological tools.

From the perspective of this article, there are two particularly interesting principles of coaching for the coach to follow. The first principle says that it is the client who defines the goal he wants to reach, while the coach is by no means allowed to in-

⁴ A great many studies and handbooks of this method in its various types have been published recently. They can thus differ in their detailed characteristics and guidelines. In this article I am presenting the most popular guidelines of coaching. I am basing these, among others, on the following books: John Whitmore (2009) and Pamela McLean (2012).

terfere in the goal his client has chosen. Of course, influenced by the coach's questions and the whole coaching process, the client might come to the conclusion that he would like to change or modify his goal, however the coach himself must not impose or suggest anything, or even express his view on the goal chosen. The second coaching principle says that the coach does not judge. He should not only avoid exerting influence on the client's choice of a goal but also keep his judgments and opinions to himself throughout the whole process – he does not comment on the client's resources, action methods, behavior, adopted plan, etc. Metaphorically speaking, a good coach is "transparent" – he should, therefore, be least visible in the process of the client's reflection on his action. The coach should "appear" only to ask or make something more precise. Speaking metaphorically yet again, a coach is like a mirror – he does not bring himself into the coaching process, neither his judgments nor his values, but he allows the client to look at himself in order to see what are his (the client's) needs and values.

I think that it is already clear, looking at these assumptions, that they strongly correspond with the assumptions of emotivist culture. The definition of the coach corresponds also with MacIntyre's descriptions of the therapist and the manager. The character of the coach is part of emotivist culture because the coach is focused on the means, technique and measurable results of his action, whereas the aim of his work is set in advance by the client. It is not important in his work if the aim realized by the client should be in accordance with a particular concept of good or other objective principles, because it is assumed that neither such concepts nor such principles exist. Their choice is purely arbitrary, depending perhaps on emotions or preferences, but it is certainly not a result of rational inquiry (an inquiry which gives the opportunity to discuss and to draw conclusions).

The state of affairs described above – concerning the four aforementioned characters – is caused by the decline of the

modern project founding morality only on the basis of reason, which is described in *After Virtue*. The question however is: Is a different state of affairs at all desired or even possible? Is there an alternative to emotivist culture? Neo-Aristotelians give a positive answer to this question, but they do not look for the sources of the alternative in modern philosophy. They call for a return to the paradigm of philosophical and ethical inquiries initiated by Aristotle and continued by the Aristotelians in antiquity and the Middle Ages.

In the following section of this article I shall present a number of assumptions which demonstrate that a different attitude towards personal development is possible. I shall also briefly characterize this attitude.

4. Practical rationality

Firstly, in order to present any alternative to emotivist culture, it has to be proved that the main assumption of this culture is false, i.e. that – contrary to what emotivism proclaims – it is possible to rationally reflect on objective values which tell us what is good and what the good aims of human actions could be like. The justification of this thesis was delivered in Aristotle's theory of practical reasoning which was described in detail and originally interpreted by John Finnis. Therefore I shall now focus on its description.

Aristotle claimed that – aside from theoretical reasoning which is aimed at cognition of reality – a human being also conducts practical reasoning which is aimed at action. In theoretical reasoning, i.e. in scientific (but also common-sense) reflection, in proving certain positions or in arguing for some theses, we must adopt certain non-provable assumptions upon which we can base our line of thought – i.e. certain axioms.⁵ Practical reflection is a similar case. It answers the question: "What

⁵ The basic assumption (axiom) is a condition of every logical argumentation, although it is not always expressed directly. An example of an axiom is the law of non-contradiction.

should I do?" Of course, during our everyday practical reasoning we do not need to analyze in detail and directly express each single premise – in practice we actually adopt most of them by default and sometimes even unconsciously.

John Finnis argues that a solid reconstruction of each single step of such reasoning may lead us to identify certain principles, assumptions which are non-provable but which must be adopted if our actions are to make any sense. Finnis (2011: 59-74) states that these first non-provable principles of practical reasoning are at the same time basic goods (or basic values) and the final goals of human actions. What are thus the basic goods, i.e. the first principles of practical reasoning and what are their features? How can we characterize them? According to Finnis, we can find this out by asking "Why does a man perform a certain activity?". By asking about the final cause of various human actions, we reach several different answers beyond which one cannot further reasonably ask: "Why?"

If we consider for example the action of typing on the computer, we could point out that the final cause of this action is to write an academic article. Having done so, we can further ask about the final cause: Why does someone write an academic article? Various answers can be given. Maybe the author wants to find a solution to a scientific problem and therefore is writing an article about it. Still asking about the final cause, we would have to answer that it is curiosity about knowledge – the author wants to know how things work. This answer is, in Finnis's view, satisfying, because everyone would intuitively understand such a cause as a final explanation and a motivation for human action. In this way, therefore, we have identified the first of the basic goods – it is knowledge, desire to know for the sake of cognition itself. We can also see here the first feature of basic goods – they are aims with no further aim. If typing on a computer or writing an academic article needs an explanation, some justification – for nobody undertakes these actions "just like that", without further reason –

then cognition and knowledge are explanations which do not require any further justification (although they do not exclude the possibility of further justification, as we shall see in the following paragraphs).

There is another possible answer to the question why someone is writing an academic article – e.g. because he wants to earn money. Receiving such an answer we can reasonably ask why someone wants to earn money. Again the answers may vary and lead us to different basic goods. Someone may want to earn money to support his family and himself – and in that case earning one's living is a good which does not require any further justification. After all, it does not make sense to ask why someone wants to support oneself. We reach here the second characteristic feature of basic goods: they are obvious and need no other explanation. One may ask how it is that people want to earn their living, but in the order of practical reasoning the will to preserve life is obvious and does not require any justification – life is a basic and obvious good.

Here is another possible answer to the question about the final cause of earning money through writing an academic article: because the author promised someone, e.g. his or her thesis supervisor, to write it. Such an explanation is also credible and does not require further explanation because it involves the will of maintaining good relations with other people, that is maintaining peace and harmony between people. This basic good is best realized in friendship.

The other basic goods are: aesthetic experience, play, religion and practical reasonableness (Finnis 2011: 85-90). Finnis perceives religion in this context as an attitude towards one's place in the universe, towards the question about the origin of order (or chaos) in the world. As for practical reasonableness, Finnis means by this the possibility of setting one's goals, plans, independent and free decision making – in other words: respect for freedom, autonomy and authenticity.

In the context of personal development it is worth mentioning two other features of basic goods. Firstly, basic goods are

aims which are realized; they are goods in which one participates but which can never be fully reached or achieved to the end. It is impossible to reach a state of knowing everything, neither is it possible to realize friendship to the end and not to need it anymore. Secondly, these goods are aspects of human fulfillment, self-realization and development. In other words, they are aspects of human happiness – thanks to involvement in realization of these goods, human life becomes meaningful, happy and fulfilled. At the same time, thanks to participation in those goods, a human being develops and strives after perfection.

Finnis states that the list he gives does not have to be complete. He admits that he could have omitted some goods or that the listed goods can be joined or distinguished. Some years after his book was published, he used this loophole, and together with his colleagues he modified the list of the basic goods, under the influence of critique and discussions. In the article *Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends* he distinguished:

1. Life itself—its maintenance and transmission and health [...]
2. knowledge and esthetic experience [...]
3. some degree of excellence in work and play [...]
4. living at peace with others, neighborliness, friendship [...]
5. harmony opposed to [...] inner disturbance [...]
6. peace of conscience and consistency between one's self and its expression [...]
7. peace with God, or the gods, or some nontheistic but more-than-human source of meaning and value.

(Finnis, Grisez, Boyle 1987: 106-108)

Regardless of which of Finnis's lists of basic goods we adopt, his concept of practical reasoning provides a convincing argument that it is possible to rationally discuss the goods and aims of human actions. They are not – as in emotivist culture – merely arbitrary and emotional preferences which cannot be rationally justified. This theory, therefore, gives the basis for

a rational justification of, for example, the superiority of one lifestyle over another (for instance: the superiority of a life realizing the value of knowledge, art or friendship, over the life of a rich aesthete as described by MacIntyre).

5. Goods internal to practices

MacIntyre's theory of goods internal to practices treats these ideas from another point of view, the question of goods as the aims of human actions. In order to explain this, we shall begin with a definition of what these practices are in the theory. MacIntyre (2007: 187) states:

By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.

Practice is thus a name for things in which a human being engages and which are governed by their own laws and rules. In MacIntyre's definition, neither the game of noughts and crosses nor throwing a ball is a practice. In turn, chess and football are practices – just like arts, sciences, games, politics in its Aristotelian sense, and establishing and maintaining a family. It is worth noticing that Finnis's and MacIntyre's theories approach one another in this respect, because the practices MacIntyre enlists are geared towards realization of the individual basic goods enlisted by Finnis, such as knowledge, aesthetic experiences (arts), religion, play, and friendship.

Through participation in certain practices one can realize both goods: internal and external to the practice (MacIntyre 2007: 187-189). Internal goods are to be identified and recognized only by participating in a practice. For example, the in-

ternal good of chess would be the joy experienced as a result of an interesting, exciting game; the internal good of an academic activity would be the truth towards which this activity aims and the satisfaction achieved when it is searched for and discovered; again in the case of painting the internal good would be, among others, the beauty and the joy of creation. It is thus impossible to fully understand and appreciate a certain value without participating in the practice which realizes this value. For example, one cannot appreciate the pleasure of a game of chess without knowing the rules of this game, without accepting its principles and the aims of the game, but also without having at least some skill to play chess. The greater is our competence in a domain, the more satisfaction we can derive from the possibility of participation in its practice – in this case it can be, for example, inventing chess strategies. The same thing is observed in other practices: science, arts and so on.

However, through the participation in a practice it is also possible to realize goods external to the practice. A game of chess or a scientific inquiry may bring not only the satisfaction of the game or scientific discoveries, but also such goods as fame, money or prestige. They are external to the practice because they can also be obtained by means other than the ones needed to realize internal goods. Money and fame might be obtained by scientific discoveries, chess victories and one's sacrifice and passion in these fields, but they can also be obtained by plagiarizing or by cheating during a tournament. Nevertheless, it is impossible to obtain the goods internal to a practice when we act at variance with the rules of this practice. A person who is cheating or is acting at variance with a practice, is not motivated by internal goods and the satisfaction of their realization, but rather by external factors, which results in devaluation of this practice and contributes to its destruction.

Human activity is based upon these practices, and subsequent generations join these practices. Throughout our life we encounter people and communities that participate in certain

practices and we decide to join some of them. Upon our arrival, the practice has already developed its patterns of perfection, its standards and criteria of good participation in this practice. In order to join it and to participate in it, realizing its internal goods, we must accept these standards and adapt to them (MacIntyre 2007: 190). It seems also that there are practices which allow us to extend and transform their standards, rules and criteria, yet it is possible only from the inside of the practice. For instance, within a scientific discipline, like physics, the standards and the criteria of correctly formulated theories changes but in order to introduce such a change one must first of all “enter” this practice, get to know its current standards, rules and criteria, gain experience in their functioning and only then can one aptly judge which elements contribute to the practice’s development and to the realization of its goals, and which elements should be rejected or replaced. On the other hand, certain rules and goals of the practice remain unchanged – it is hard to imagine a game of chess which does not aim at the victory of one of the players, or a scientific activity which does not aim at knowing the world better. If we reject these fundamental rules and goals, it will be pointless to call those practices a game of chess or science.

MacIntyre interestingly expressed this rule by quoting the following words of St. Augustine:

We are guided in a twofold way, by authority and by reason. In time authority comes first; in matter, reason. So it follows that authority opens the door to those who desire to learn the great and hidden good. And whoever enters by it [...] will at length learn how preeminently possessed of reason are those things which were the object of his pursuit before he saw their reason, and what that reason itself is which now that he has become firm and capable in the cradle of authority, he now follows and understands.

(MacIntyre 2009: 27)

It is impossible to rationally get to know, understand or develop the standards of a practice if we do not accept its principles

at the beginning. Such a perspective on the practice coincides with Aristotle's *techne* – craft, in a broad sense, understood as a practice which has its own rules and standards. MacIntyre also referred to this notion (1990: 61-62), modifying it slightly for the sake of his theory.

MacIntyre (2007: 191) also points out that the realization of goods internal to a practice requires the cardinal virtues: prudence, courage, temperance and justice. They are required to develop the practice and keep it alive. At the same time we cannot diminish the virtues only to one practice – there might exist a good chess player who is malicious in private. The virtues must be examined in the context of life in its entirety, which covers all the practices of this person (MacIntyre 2007: 273-275).

6. The consequences of Neo-Aristotelianism for human development methods

The assumptions of Neo-Aristotelianism described above, represented by MacIntyre and Finnis, have specific consequences for perceiving human development and its methods. Even if it is impossible – on the basis of solely philosophical assumptions – to show that development methods grounded on emotivist guidelines are ineffective (all in all, it is hard to deny their effectiveness since it is the main or even the only object of their interest), then it can certainly be proved that they are incomplete. Namely, they omit some important aspects of human good and human fulfillment. Let us thus look – using the example of coaching – at which aspects of this method are incomplete and how it can be completed and improved in the spirit of Neo-Aristotelianism.

Firstly, since it is possible to rationally search for universal goods (thus goods are not purely arbitrary), it can be assumed that not every goal a client wishes to reach within coaching is worth reaching. It appears that a person in charge of the development of others should, therefore, reflect on the basic

goods in order to establish, together with his or her client, what kind of goal would be a true good, and not merely an ostensible one (or merely external to practice, as MacIntyre would put it). Therefore, it seems that a coach who focuses on helping his client to reach goals such as fame, prestige or money and omits the question of the basic goods, acts unethically, according to MacIntyre's reasoning.

Secondly, since human life consists of participation in certain practices and the acquisition of goods internal to these practices, the development offered by the coach within coaching will always be insufficient. Human development is a development within existing practices, and full development within a practice is possible only with the assistance of a master – an experienced person and a specialist in the practice. Only such a person knows the guidelines, goals, standards and criteria of the practice, only such a person knows its complexities and arcane details, and only such a person can successfully familiarize a novice with all of these things. Questioning which is the main coaching tool, may obviously help the client to make an important decision, to activate his motivation or to develop his self-awareness. However, only using these coaching tools, the coach is not able to develop the specific knowledge or skill which is always set within a concrete practice – be it academic inquiry or playing football. A coach, having no expertise in the given field himself, cannot introduce the client to it.

Thirdly, the master introducing a novice into a practice, unlike the coach, cannot act without judging nor without sharing his own experiences. The master, being already a participant of the practice and having experience within it, sees better its strong points. He also gains experience, verifies it and can pass it on. The novice in turn, as St. Augustine said, must first acknowledge the authority of the master who is familiarizing him with the practice, so that he can act within the practice on his own and judge its elements, standards, criteria etc. Whereas in coaching, it is against its principles to pass judgement, to advise and to share experience.

Fourthly, the master should have particular moral and intellectual virtues which the novice can follow as an example of how to act to reach the goods internal to the practice and how to keep the practice alive. These virtues are essential for the practice to cultivate its traditions, standards and to reach its goals. The lack of such virtues may result in focusing on external goods which are always destructive for the practice. That element is absent in coaching since the coach is not a role model of good practices for his client. As stated above, he is rather like a mirror in which the client can see himself from a different perspective. Following this metaphor, we could say that the client does not look at the coach in order to follow his example. The coach is not a role model of the right conduct for his client. The client looks at himself.

The above presented remarks on coaching do not suggest that the method in question is ineffective or that it should be abandoned. Substantiating such statements is not the aim of this article. Moreover, in many contexts coaching tools also seem appropriate from the perspective of the attitude towards education and development presented above (e.g. asking the right questions to stimulate someone's reflection and motivation). The presented remarks show, however, that the coaching method is insufficient and thus when used in the spirit of emotivism may sometimes lead to destruction of the communities which participate in certain practices rather than their maintenance.

7. Postscript: University education

Finally it is worth noting that one of the practices described by MacIntyre is academic inquiry. This provokes reflection on the relation of the issues presented concerning the methods of human development to university education. It seems from the deliberations above that emotivist culture along with the developmental methods based upon this culture's philosophical guidelines, can endanger academic practice and the academic

community. Rejecting practical rationality and its concept of basic goods or goods internal to the practices may lead to the obliteration of a distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative human relations within this practice. It may also lead to the rejection of the need to cultivate the moral virtues which protect the practice from disintegration – these virtues also enable the practice to become part of a broader concept of a good life as a unity. Such are the potential dangers resulting from the domination of emotivist culture at university.

An alternative facilitation and preservation of the practice of academic inquiry at university can be developmental methods based upon Neo-Aristotelian guidelines. The university needs what might be termed masters – people who, on the one hand, have wisdom and knowledge, thus intellectual virtues and academic competence, and have the proper experience and proficiency in this practice (i.e. academic inquiry). On the other hand, they should also be people who have competence to correctly and effectively introduce novices into the world of this practice – in which case some coaching tools can be of use. Masters should not treat science and teaching like an object, rather they should reflect on the basic goods and the internal goods which are realized by their practice. They should also be aware of the importance of their task and their mission, which places university practices among other practices leading to a good and fulfilled life. Moreover, masters should possess the right moral virtues, ones which would be a guiding light for novices and which would save the practice of academic inquiry from the crisis caused by an excessive focus on goods external to practices.

A method of education and development, adapted to the needs of the practice of academic inquiry, based upon the master-pupil relation, and meeting Neo-Aristotelian guidelines, is tutoring.⁶

⁶ I present the philosophical guidelines and sources of tutoring understood in this way in *Tutoring: Teoria, praktyka, studia przypadków* (Fingas 2015: 37-61).

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