Eight and a half theses on utopia

SZYMON WRÓBEL

Abstract

This text constitutes an intellectual exercise of sorts whereby the author is expected to assume a certain position on the issue of utopia and, consequently, adopts a new way to see the concept of "utopia". Instead of offering a historical account of the concept, the author has decided to articulate the principal theses underlying it, which so far have often been veiled in unnecessary erudition and "over-burdened" with excessive details about the genealogy of the concept. The author proposes eight theses concerning utopia and falsifies them successively. However, the task of the article is not purely destructive and polemical, for every falsification makes it possible to formulate a positive thesis on utopia as an instrument of thought. Therefore, the article is not a purely analytical or sophistic exercise, nor is it intended as an empty intellectual game. The study bears the title of "Eight and a half theses on utopia", mainly because the author regards the last thesis as unfinished and conflicted within.

Key words

Osiem i pół tezy o utopii

Abstrakt

Artykuł stanowi swoiste ćwiczenie intelektualne, w ramach którego autor stawia przed sobą zadanie ustosunkowania się do zagadnienia utopii i w rezultacie przyjmuje pewien sposób rozumienia pojęcia „utopii". Autor podjął decyzję, by nie przedstawiać zarysu historii pojęcia utopii, w zamian za to sformułować główne tezy dotyczące utopii, które dotychczasowy stan badań przesłaniał erudycyjnością oraz zbyt dużym ładunkiem wiadomości na temat genealogii konceptu. Autor stawia osiem tez na temat utopii, które następnie dezawuuje. Jednakże zadanie, jakiego się podejmuje nie jest czysto destruktywnej i polemicznej natury, bowiem każda falsyfikacja pozwala autorowi sformułować tezę pozytywną dotyczącą utopii jako narzędzia myślowego. Zatem artykuł nie jest czysto analitycznym lub sofistycznym ćwiczeniem, ani też nie jest pustą zabawą intelektualną. Studium zatytułowane jest „Osiem i pół tezy na temat utopii" głównie z tego względu, że ostatnia teza wysunięta przez autora wydaje mu się niedokończona oraz sprzeczna wewnętrznie.

Słowa kluczowe

alienacja, chimera, pragnienie, wiedza, gatunek literacki, mesjanizm, metoda, praktyka, realna utopia, solidarność, opowiadanie

In its long history, utopia, as a concept, has served a variety of purposes. It suffices to mention entertainment, escape from reality, materialization of desire to be elsewhere, journey in fantasy and fantasy in journey, expression of human hope, comfort in the times of no hope; yet, it also served as a warning against totalitarian cataclysm and the emergence of ambiguous political regimes leading to the establishment of ultimate rationality. In what follows I will reflect on utopia as a tool of social thought.

It is a gaffe, perhaps, to question the notion of utopia at the time when it has become synonymous with the dream of a return of human solidarity, and equally so to present to the reader a long philosophical argument about our ignorance in this regard. However, I need to commit this gaffe. Is there any justification or excuse for making such a blunder? I can think

of but one. When questioning the notion of utopia, I will not be asking what utopia is or is not, but above all, how it works in our imagination and whether or not it is still able to fire our ability to think. In fact, the question: How does utopia liaise and cooperate with thinking? – is a question of what it is in solidarity with. Regrettably, in most cases, I will be talking about the kinds of solidarity utopia denies itself, i.e. about what it is not in solidarity with.

Richard Rorty, many years ago, in voicing his praise of solidarity and expressing reprimand or condemnation of philosophy in the well-known book *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (1989), limited the notion of solidarity to purely human subjects. Today, one may wonder whether the notion of solidarity should perhaps extend to non-human subjects or in-human subjects such as places, animals, tools, mutilated nature, nameless victims of history, cities or even streets. It is, therefore, imperative to ask: what and who is utopia in solidarity with? Allow me from the onset to entertain the following answer: utopia is in solidarity with thinking imagination and places which are, perhaps, difficult to imagine, nevertheless real.

Today, political imagination remains in a state of immobilization or discontinuity. Many years ago Samuel Beckett became an apologist of dead imagination, when he wrote: "No trace anywhere of life, you say, pah, no difficulty there, imagination not dead yet, yes, dead, good, imagination dead, imagine" (Beckett 1965). Imagination is dead, because it does not allow us to conjure up any other politics or history. In turn, Martin Heidegger, when interpreting the subject of transcendental imagination in Kant's thought, wrote: "The transcendental power of imagination is homeless" (Heidegger 1997). Imagination is homeless and so are utopia and solidarity. And it is only this homelessness which gives us hope and an opportunity for both utopia and thinking. Only that which is homeless is not yet defrauded.

Again, Beckett in *The Unnamable* writes: "[…] there could be no things but nameless things, no names but thingless names"

(Beckett 1951). There is no thing, only unnamable things, and there are no names, only thingless names – all because there is no transcendental principle that would associate names, places, and things. It is homelessness, and not belonging, which is the principle of utopia.

What I am attempting here is a kind of an intellectual exercise, in the course of which I will come to a stance on "utopia", the first step being the redefinition of its very notion. In this endeavour, allow me to proceed slowly but systematically, in order to falsify and reject consecutive hypotheses concerning utopia which I have myself come across in my studies on this concept. I do hope such an approach permits little analytical and sophistic style. The title of this short study – "Eight and a half theses on utopia" – presages eight discernible theses and one that seems to me yet incomplete or, perhaps, permanently fractured and conflicted within.

1. Firstly, utopia is not a chimera, by which I mean that it is not a fantasy, nor a mere image or picture. The meaning of utopia in popular discourse as an irrelevant fantasy or a malevolent nightmare leading to totalitarianism is of course false (Gray 2007). This anti-utopian understanding of the notion equates utopia with a blueprint producing violence and terror, which gives rise to the politics of quiescent subordination to the dictates of capitalist markets. Nor is utopia a phantasm, not even in the noble sense, notably such as is used in psychoanalysis.

The term "phantasm" often refers to the state of dissatisfaction and hallucinatory reaction to this state. What we really need is indeed not a phantasm but an "idea" of utopia (a concept, *Vorstellung),* which provides our desires with material coordinates, i.e. which provides a script, according to which a subject can achieve fulfilment not as a postulate but also as a "citizen" or a "subject" of particular place and time (Žižek 2008).

Hence, the "idea" constitutes here the possibility of rewriting and retranslating the symbolic dimension of our dreams into

the material dimension. I claim that the phantasm of utopia has proved to be too weak for such a translation to be made. We need not so much a utopia conceived as an "image" – detached from its symbolic and the material component – but a real utopia which would map out the material conditions or rations sufficient for the installation of utopian architecture in the material world.

Let me repeat: utopia is not a chimera as is often erroneously claimed. It is only in everyday speech that we may, not without good reason, identify some utopias with "chimeras". This said, concrete utopias certainly do not belong here. Utopian imagination, and in particular its tendency to include in one project the entirety of social otherness, involves presenting people in the way they should be instead of what they really are. In other words, utopias are "chimeric" in so far as they stem from the desire for logical, consistent, transparent society and the belief that social life can be freely transformed and rationalized. Well, it is simply beyond possible.

What we call a "real utopia" is not a representation of our longing for a perfect society or complete rationality, nor is it a satire on existing society. "Real utopia" is an incentive for inventing "other spaces", "other forms of life", "other forms of community organization" and putting them into action by incorporating "conceptual realities" into real and material political order.

2. Secondly, utopia is not a desire. Ruth Levitas claims, for example, that the core of utopia is the desire for being otherwise, individually and collectively, subjectively and objectively. Its expressions explore and bring to debate the potential contents and contexts of human flourishing. Utopia, in a sense, is the expression of the desire for a better way of being or living, and as such it is entwined in human culture (Levitas 2013).

Of course, the definition of utopia in terms of desire is analytic rather than descriptive but this is not the point I am trying to make. Here, I have serious doubts concerning not so much the combination of utopia and desire but the very con-

cept of desire. Desire is neither a "need" nor a "pursuit". According to Hegel, Freud and Lacan, desire is always mediated. The prerequisite for desire to emerge is the request or demand made to the Other to recognize and fulfil the need for recognition (*Anerkennung*[1]).

Just as necessity is part of the biological order (continuity), so is request part of the language order (discontinuity), whereas desire mediates between the two. Above all, desire needs to break away from the will of conservative Freudian death drive, which it – by default– wants to preserve and reiterate. Ego drives are self-preservative, and as such they are at the service of the death drive. Thus, the main task of utopian thought is to go beyond the domination of death drive and to leave the kingdom of idle repetition.

Speaking of utopia in the context of human desire we should not ask: "What perverse request does utopia address to us?" – for if we knew the answer to this question, we could not think of it in a more "in-depth" manner. What we need to know is what utopia wants from us and what it wants us to do. It makes little sense to ask which of our frustrated desires utopia wants to phantasmatically materialize, since such a question is always at the service of self-defence. In short, I suggest replacing the language of desire by the language of will. It is the will, and not desire, that speaks through utopia.

3. Thirdly, utopia is not a story about some non-existent place. Utopia is not a story, because every story becomes a mythical speech. It is said that there is no *logos* without *mythos* (Nancy 1986). Let us bear in mind that myth and utopia are their own opposites. While myth involves the paralysis of time and space, utopia involves dismantling it. Utopia operates with fragmentary sentences and its speech moves between stuttering and exalted pattern, whereas myth entails a seductive language of melodic and coherent narrative.

---

[1] Hegel's concept of *Annerkenung* can be first found in the Iena period of the years 1802-1806.

The language of utopia is by no means metaphorical; it is metonymic. It has nothing to do with the sedative, hypnotic and dreamy language of prenatal paradise. Above all, however, the language of utopia is the language of anxiety. Anxiety anticipates an unknown future.

Lyman Tower Sargent construes utopia as a non-existent society described in considerable detail and normally located in time and space (Sargent 2000). Russell Jacoby makes a distinction between "iconoclastic utopias" which express the dream of a better life but resist its precise definition and which articulate "a longing that cannot be uttered", and "blueprint utopias" which "map out the future in inches and minutes" (Jacoby 2005: 113, xiv). Miguel Abensour differentiates between "heuristic utopias", which are best understood as exploratory hypotheses, and "systematic utopias" intended as literal plans (Abensour 2000).

Regretfully, the above distinctions provide little to no help in the effort to apprehend the "place of utopia", i.e. the position that it occupies in our speech. Yet, we need to understand the strange relationship among three elements – the "subject of speaking", its place in utopia and its own speech. In utopia, the act of speaking is the very place where speech is liberated from the constraints of communication.

Utopias are necessarily the product of the conditions and concerns of the society generating them, which makes irrelevant the question whether they are placed elsewhere or in the future, since what they cater to is substantially always the present. Yet, it is this relation to the present of political utopia that concerns me most.

For if Utopia is not to be a mere fiction, it must be devised as a real place. Michel Foucault had this premonition when he wrote: "First there are the Utopias. Utopias are sites (*emplacements*) with no real place. They are sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of Society" (Foucault 1998). After utopias there come heterotopias. Heterotopias are real places (*lieux*) determined by their social and political organization which resemble counter-sites (*contre-*

emplaceents). Heterotopias are the effectively enacted Utopias; they are not "abstractions" subject to "imaginary order", but instead, they do have a "real agenda" and are, therefore, a sort of "effectively played utopia". Heterotopias are reversed and realised abstractions. Let me draw a general conclusion: heterotopias are simply real utopias.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau ([1761] 1997) depicts heterotopia in *The New Heloise*. The Clarens community presented by Rousseau lives "invented tradition" and "naturalized culture". The protagonists, Wolmar and Julie, celebrate a bountiful grape harvest and live in the eternal feast day. In a choir singing in unison, there are no leaders – everyone is equal, everyone sings on their own, but in one voice, which enables them to forget about their loneliness. Utopia is played out "univocally" and "unanimously".

4. For this reason, fourthly, utopia is not merely a literary genre. Some commentators strive to restrict utopia yet further to a largely self-conscious literary genre, typically beginning with Thomas More. Although in principle, descriptive definitions make possible a separation between utopian and non-utopian texts in terms of content and literary form, in practice, such a division is not that simple.

The Polish writer Bruno Schulz suggested that story-telling is itself a utopian practice, and that a narrative is in itself an intrinsically utopian expression (1998: 271-272). Utopia, however, is not a literary genre in the sense that a novel is, nor is it a short story, a fairy tale, an epic, a legend or a satire. If utopia was to be "building a city with words" – to use Plato's expression – it would be at its best an impotent linguistic project, a mirage of hypothetical life. What we need is something more than just an "impotent linguistic project". The true sense of utopia, however, is the challenging of the very opposition between the project and its execution, between a dream or an idea and their embodiments. We need a new rule for the arrangement of places that allow for another presence of brave speech (*parrhesia*).

What Bronisław Baczko, in his fascinating book *Lumières de l'utopie* (1978), called a "utopian pact" is the linking of words, action and place. The "utopian pact" is an attempt to reorganize speech through place and place through speech. Our key word literally translates to "not-place" (Greek *ou-τόπος*), but it may well stand for "good-place" (Greek *ευ-τόπος*), if not in fact "best-place" or "best-state" imaginable, which in More's rendering eclipses that of Plato's. In short, utopia is an attempt to use space potentiality in the most effective way. This is nothing but a search for a situation in which the potential and action are one, and the virtual and the real become one.

It seems possible to conclude that the best political community, even if conceivable, is set nowhere else but in human imagination and is a derivative product of knowledge. In this interpretation, utopia does not represent reality but nonetheless it comes into existence upon being conceived and founded in the text. It is this liaison of the foundational text and both geographic and ontological reality of a given space-spot that constitutes "the utopian pact".

5. Fifth, utopia is not and may not be rendered as a sociological or philosophical method. Utopia is not a method to study "social facts" or "society" in its real, imaginary or symbolic sense. I question, in a polemical discussion with Ruth Levitas, her claim that utopia is allegedly better understood as a method than as a goal. For Levitas, utopia is a method elaborated as the Imaginary Reconstitution of Society. The method entails construction of integrated accounts of possible or impossible social systems as a kind of speculative sociology (Levitas 2010, 2013).

Levitas argues that the Imaginary Reconstitution of Society is not the invention of a method for social analysis, social science or social reconstruction. It only identifies processes that are already involved in utopian speculation, in utopian scholarship and in transformative politics, and also in social theory. There are certainly several advantages of thinking of utopia in terms of a method. For one, it is holistic – unlike political phi-

losophy and political theory, which have been more open to normative approaches than sociology. Here, holism finds its expression at the level of concrete social institutions and processes. Nonetheless, utopia falls short of being a method in any known sense of the term. Utopia is rather a coalesced utterance and action, a kind of intervention, a kind of "act", which contradicts a method.

However it is defined – regardless of its disguise of a "heuristic method" as opposed to "algorithmic method", a "humanistic method" based on meaning as opposed to "explanatory method" based on causality, interpreting as opposed to determining – a method must always assume a certain "order research", of "inspecting", "investigation", "determination", "verification" or "falsification". From René Descartes's *Discours de la méthode* (2004 [1637]) through Gadamer's *Wahrheit und Methode* (2004 [1960]) up to the times of the "third scientific culture" pronounced by John Brockman in his milestone work *Culture: Leading Scientists Explore Societies, Art, Power, and Technology* published in 2011, where the author breaks the opposition of science and the humanities (Eagleton 2003), we are constantly being encouraged to enter into a dispute about the method. However, in the post-theoretical culture of ours, the lure of the dispute over the method must be replaced with a dispute about the proper practice of the potentials in our lives. It is not a method that we should now obsessively seek for but ways we can do, live and dwell without a method.

6. Would, therefore, utopia be a way of practising an alternative life, a life that we have been denied? There is a huge temptation to recognize in "utopia" the attempt not just to imagine but to make the world differently. Within utopian studies, the focus has primarily been on intentional communities which create alternative enclaves, although some clearly intend the prefiguration or instantiation of a transformed world.

André Gorz, for example, argued that "[…] it is the function of utopias, in the sense the term has assumed in the work of Ernst Bloch or Paul Ricoeur, to provide us with the distance

from the existing state of affairs which allows us to judge what we *are* doing in the light of what we *could* or *should* do" (1999: 113). A practice, however, necessitates someone or something to be practiced. Practice cannot be simulated, as it cannot have no object to practice.

In a sense, utopia imposes a new concept of practice. This new concept of practice cannot be perceived as a *habitus*, as a collection of internalized and repetitive subconscious identifications (internalisations) of power structures. Practice is not the opposite of theory and reflections. Neither can practice depend on pure repetition of behavioural dispositions or subordination allowing to accept external authority. Practice is not a simple set of habits, which, as Pierre Bourdieu indicates, "can be collectively orchestrated" without being the product of "the organizing action of a conductor" (Bourdieu 1977). Utopian practice is rather insatiable imagination for new forms of action, a practice similar to drifting, oscillating in tune with the spirit and rhythm of time and place. Utopian practice is always a situational practice, a practice of the present tense. Utopian practice is, finally, a kind of continuous falling and falling apart, merging and dissolving; an activity, which is forced to constantly search for the principle of its unity. Utopian practice is paradoxical, in the sense that it simultaneously liberates itself from its manner and is in continuous search for it.

What would, therefore, the utopian practice be? Utopia is a protest against the practices of life of the "last man" (Fukuyama 1992) who is engaged in lifeless rituals of everyday life such as arranging flowers or sipping tea. Utopia is a practice of avoiding the desire to become a snob.

7. Utopia, in our seventh thesis, is not knowledge or even an order of knowledge. Perhaps the power of utopia stems from the fact that it also exposes the power of truth against the existing order of knowledge. Theodor W. Adorno presents us with the "utopia of knowledge" embodying the will to reach sensuality without resorting to a conceptual framework, without the

help of concepts (Adorno 1966/1973). Fredric Jameson addresses utopia in terms of the "dialectics of identity and difference" being the source of dynamics which eventually turns any given utopia into a "program" or "impulse" in three distinct areas – those of the body, time and community (Jameson 2005). We also have Ernst Bloch's approach, wherein utopia is cast as "the principle of hope" embracing all life domains to such an extent that "being" either becomes utopia or blends with it (Bloch 2000 [1918]). All of these ideas on utopia express the same conviction: utopia is not knowledge, it does not belong to the "knowledge society", nor does it belong within proliferation of knowledge.

Utopia, in point of fact, is a kind of non-knowledge. Giorgio Agamben aptly reminds us of the etymology of the Latin verb *ignoscere*, which in fact means "to forgive", and not, as it is often confused, "not to know" (*ignorare*). To articulate a zone of non-knowledge – or better, of a-knowledge (*ignoscenza*) – means in this sense not simply to let something be, but to leave something outside of being, to render it unsaveable (Agamben 2004).

Utopian thinking goes back to the idea of scepticism in the classical, not modern sense of the term. The ancient sceptic is not limited to opposing aphasia and speaking, silence and the voice, but let us say, it changes the language mode from judging to announcing or reporting, a mode of pure presentation, in which there is no more place for indicative mood. In *Life and the views of the famous philosophers* by Diogenes Laertios (2013), we find the formula *ou mallon*, translated as "not rather" or "not rather than". *Ou mallon* is a Greek term by which sceptics express their characteristic feeling: *epoche*, the state of suspension. Utopia demands from the subject of thinking constant suspension of the temptation to judge. Utopia is a permanent state of emergency, but only in the sense that it permanently suspends judgement.

8. Utopia – and this is our eighth thesis – is not a disguised or explicit messianism. Utopia is not waiting for the messianic

banquet of the righteous on the Last Day. Utopia is not the anticipation of the Messiah, for utopia cannot condemn itself to passive inactivity.

Here, I depart from Walter Benjamin (1986) and Giorgio Agamben (2004). Even though according to the rabbinic tradition, the righteous at the end of the world are never dead at all – on the contrary, as representatives of the remnant (*resto*; also "rest", "remainder") of Israel/Humanity, they are still alive at the moment of the Messiah's coming – the stake of non-messianistic utopia is not the salvation of the world, but finding for each event, each organic and inorganic being a proper place to be.

In utopia, there nothing is left without a place. That is why the architecture and geography are the privileged disciplines in utopian thinking. A world where even a single life is left without its place is not a world of utopia. Utopia is not messianism, for utopia reminds us that in the world, the problem is neither truth nor justice, but the place. The world, in the light of utopia, does not require salvation or uttering some categorical truth, instead, it requires the order of things, in which everything is in its appropriate place.

In fact, the notion of time for utopian thinking may appear as important as the notion of place and space. Sometimes, utopia thinks a seemingly finite time. What does it mean? It means that utopia avoids thinking in terms of circular time, in which things constantly recur in the cycle securing the "immortality of the track" as well as in terms of the absolute end of all things, which presupposes the ultimate destruction or restoration (salvation) of everything. Utopian time is the end of time understood as a constantly escaping horizon of all events. Here, the only time frame is the present. Perhaps, utopia carries the hope of a time constantly renewed in the present, a time that finds its "place" in the present; in the fountain of all time. The apparent finality of time stems from our false conviction that everything is lost in the present, while in fact, everything is postponed in the present. The present is the guarantee of infinite time.

8½. Is, therefore, our "eighth and a half" (almost "ninth") thesis, in which we claim that utopia is another name for alienation (*Verfremdung*), for building a strangeness to any notion of history and geography, the way of constructing anxiety to what we are now? The assumed postulate of non-identification with oneself? A dismantling of all false unities? A step beyond the phantasm of peace, unity and synthesis? Does utopia need to remain that of "non-identity" as long as the world creates the conditions for further alienation?

Maybe we should be asking exactly the opposite: Does utopia seek the conditions of its destruction and no longer allows for alienation of anything of this world? Will utopia, regardless of all its provisional names, always remain a great movement of raising dust in the wind and in time? Will utopia remain a dismantling of history and geography rather than its apparent assembly? Finally, is utopia simply another name for Revolution?

Myself, I would not hesitate to admit that "there is no alternative to utopia". Paraphrasing Ernst Bloch, the promise of happiness, the expectation of a kingdom to come, and our hope for dreams come true, though all unthinkable, are formally admissible and, in fact, compulsory; we must persist and categorically request utopia. Utopia is real – it manifests human will and as such it is a kind of "protean investments" and "political practice". Perhaps utopia today is an attempt to take a stand against time and space. Utopia is the art of positioning and the art of resistance.

Today, when talking about the relationship of utopia with solidarity, it would seem appropriate to emphasize the solidarity of a dwelling place with its resident subject rather than the mere solidarity between people, i.e., purely human beings. Martin Heidegger in the classic text *Building. Dwelling. Thinking* claims that "Bauen originally means to dwell. Where the word bauen still speaks in its original sense it also says how far the nature of dwelling reaches. That is, bauen, buan, bhu, beo are our word bin in the versions: ich bin, I am, du bist, you are, the imperative form bis, be". Heidegger adds that

space never confronts man. Space is neither an external object nor inner experience. Particular locations tend to open up by the sheer fact that man dwells in them. In other words, the locations are determined by the things and people occupying them. They are not the naked geometrical and homogeneous space that science tells us about. Things which, as locations, allow a site Heidegger calls buildings (Heidegger 1971).

The crisis of solidarity is above all a crisis of dwelling. The crisis of utopia is a crisis of solidarity in dwelling and things occupying a dwelling place. Home no longer protects or makes a living for either its dwellers or newcomers. Houses are neither shelters nor hostels. Spaces do not allow pure flows. We are no longer able to dwell because we have lost the power of building. We are unable to travel, since we have lost faith in other dwelling places. Instead of the freedom of dwelling and traveling, we choose, guided by fear, the inability to separate and being alone. This separation does not allow us either to dwell or to travel. It prevents both the ethics of hospitality and the ethics of solidarity with dwelling places.

References

Abensour, Miguel (2000). *L'Utopie de Thomas More à Walter Benjamin.* Paris: Sens & Tonka.

Adorno, Theodor W. (1973 [1966]). *Negative Dialectics.* Trans. E. B. Ashton. New York: Seabury Press.

Agamben, Giorgio (2004). *The Open: Man and Animal.* Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Baczko, Bronisław (1978). *Lumières de l'utopie.* Paris: Payot.

Beckett, Samuel (1965). *Imagination Dead Imagine.* The Sunday Times.

Beckett, Samuel (1951). *Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable.* New York: Grove Press.

Benjamin, Walter (1986). "Theological-political fragment". In: Walter Benjamin. *Reflections.* Ed. Peter Demetz. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. New York: Schocken.

Bloch, Ernst (2000 [1918]). *The Spirit of Utopia*. Trans. Anthony Nassar. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre (2011). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brockman, Max, ed. (2011). *Culture: Leading Scientists Explore Societies, Art, Power, and Technology*. New York: Harper Perennial.

Descartes, René (2004). *A Discourse on Method: Meditations and Principles*. Trans. John Veitch. London: Orion Publishing Group.

Eagleton, Terry (2003). *After Theory*. New York: Basic Books.

Foucault, Michel (1998). *Different Spaces*. Trans. R. Hurley. In: James D. Faubion. *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984*. Volume 2. New York: The New Press.

Fukuyama Francis (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. Free Press.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg (2004). *Truth and Method*. Trans. J. Weinsheimer, D. G. Marshall. New York: Crossroad.

Gorz, André (1999). *Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Wage-Based Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gray, John (2007). *Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia*. London: Allen Lane.

Heidegger, Martin (1971). *Building. Dwelling. Thinking*. In: *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper Colophon Books.

Heidegger, Martin (1997). *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Trans. Richard Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Jacoby, Russell (2005). *Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-utopian Age*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jameson, Fredric (2005). *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions*. London – New York: Verso.

Laertius, Diogenes (2013). *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. With introduction by Tiziano Dorandi (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levitas, Ruth (2010). *The Concept of Utopia*. Oxford: Peter Lang.

Levitas, Ruth (2013). *Utopia as Method: The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire – London: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.

More, Thomas (1967 [1516]). *Utopia*. Trans. John P. Dolan. In: James J. Greene, John P. Dolan (eds). *The Essential Thomas More*. New York: New American Library.

Nancy, Jean-Luc (1986). *The Inoperative Community.* Trans. Peter Connor, L. Garbus, M. Holland, S. Sawhney. Minneapolis – Oxford: University of Minnesota Press.

Rorty, Richard (1989). *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1997). *The Collected Writings of Rousseau: Julie, or the New Heloise.* Ed. Roger D. Masters, Christopher Kelly. Published for Dartmouth College by University Press of New England.

Sargent, Lyman Tower, Schaer Roland, Claeys Gregory (eds.) (2000). *Utopia: The Search for the Ideal Society in the Western World.* New York: The New York Public Library; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schulz, Bruno (1998). *The Republic of Dreams.* In: J. Ficowski (ed.). *The Collected Works of Bruno Schulz.* London: Picador.

Žižek, Slavoj (2008). *The Plague of Fantasies.* London: Verso.

Szymon Wróbel
Wydział Artes Liberales
Uniwersytet Warszawski
ul. Nowy Świat 69
00-046 Warszawa
Poland
wrobelsz@gmail.com