


ETNOGRAFIA

PRAKTYKI, TEORIE, DOŚWIADCZENIA



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perspectivism
in the study
of indigenous
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Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego
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TARZYCJUSZ BULIŃSKI

Uniwersytet Gdański

Słowo wstępne

Z przyjemnością oddaję do rąk Czytelników wyjątkowy numer *Etnografii*. Jego unikatowość wynika z dwóch kwestii. Po pierwsze, jest nią oryginalna treść. Główna część numeru (*Animism and Perspectivism in the Study of Indigenous Peoples*) zawiera prace młodych polskich antropolożek i antropologów, którzy bezpośrednio odnoszą się do jednego z prężniejszych nurtów współczesnej antropologii związanej z koncepcjami animizmu i perspektywizmu (lub szerzej – nurtu symbolicznej ekonomii odmienności w etnologii Amazonii). Jest to pierwsza w Polsce zbiorowa publikacja na ten temat. Autorzy przedstawiają wyniki swoich badań terenowych prowadzonych wśród ludów tubylczych Amazonii, Andów i Azji Środkowej. Teksty wyróżniają się dwoma cechami: są szczegółowymi, pogłębionymi etnografiami oraz prezentują zbliżone podejście teoretyczne – wszystkie wykorzystują lub reinterpretują ustalenia koncepcji animizmu jako schematu ontologicznego (Phillippe Descola), perspektywizmu indiańskiego (Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Tânia Stolze Lima, Aparecida Vilaça) oraz koncepcji drapieżności oswajającej (Carlos Fausto). Idee te znalazły nie tylko grono twórczych kontynuatorów w obrębie etnologii Amazonii (Eduardo Kohn), ale także z sukcesem zostały zaadaptowane do badań poza kontekstem amazońskim, wśród ludów syberyjskich (Rane Willerslev) czy mongolskich (Morten A. Pedersen). Wreszcie trzeba wspomnieć o ich ważnym miejscu w obrębie tzw. zwrotu ontologicznego (*ontological turn*) w humanistyce (Martin Holbraad), gdzie podejmowane są starania przemodelowania założeń ontologicznych i epistemologicznych rozpowszechnionych w kręgu kultur euroamerykańskich. Już samo powyższe wyliczenie pokazuje, w jak szeroki i bogaty nurt badawczy włączają się prace polskich autorów.

Po drugie, numer 6 *Etnografii* wyróżnia się na tle wcześniejszych numerów czasopisma pod względem stopnia jego umiędzynarodowienia. Jest to numer złożony w większości z artykułów anglojęzycznych i hiszpańskojęzycznych. Teksty zostały zrecenzowane przez naukowców z różnych stron świata, którzy są specjalistami w zakresie badanych ludów i podejmowanych tematów badawczych (z Brazylii, Argentyny, USA, Szwecji, Wielkiej Brytanii, Francji, Danii, Rosji, Czech i Uzbekistanu). Ponadto tekst wprowadzający do głównej części numeru napisała Anne-Christine Taylor, współczesny autorytet w dziedzinie etnologii Amazonii, honorowa dyrektor badań w Le Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) we Francji i jedna z kluczowych postaci nurtu „symbolicznej ekonomii odmienności”. Wszystko to pokazuje, że niniejszy tom czasopisma włącza się do obiegu światowej antropologii związanej z badaniami ludów tubylczych.

Numer 6 *Etnografii* składa się z trzech części. Pierwsza z nich (*Animism and Perspectivism in the Study of Indigenous Peoples*) to wspomniany powyżej główny blok tematyczny tomu. Otwiera go tekst autorstwa Anne-Christine Taylor (*Seeing, speaking and acting in Amazonian worlds. New takes on animism and perspectivism*), który zawiera wyjątkową syntezę istoty nurtu badań amazonistycznych związanych z animizmem i perspektywizmem. Taylor zawarła na kilku stronach oryginalne, wyjaśnione w prosty sposób, ujęcie istoty tego skomplikowanego i złożonego nurtu badawczego. W dalszej części swego tekstu przedstawiła artykuły polskich badaczy zawarte w głównym bloku tematycznym tomu, dlatego też Czytelnika zainteresowanego ich szczegółową prezentacją odsyłam do jej artykułu.

Blok ten zawiera dwa typy tekstów. Artykuły pierwszego rodzaju prezentują kontekst historyczny i teoretyczny perspektywizmu. Jest to szczegółowy opis dokonań swego rodzaju ojca chrzestnego współczesnej koncepcji animizmu, A. Irvinga Hallowella oraz jego badań wśród Odżibwejów autorstwa Michała Żerkowskiego (*A. Irving Hallowell's research on the Ojibwe animism*) oraz analiza koncepcji natury i kultury Phillippe'a Descoli, Eduardo Viveirosa de Castro i Terence'a Turnera autorstwa Adama Pisarka (*Negotiating a human. Viveiros de Castro - Descola - Turner*).

Artykuły drugiego rodzaju prezentują wyniki antropologicznych badań terenowych. Filip Rogalski (*Everyday enacting of agents through bodily simulation, voicing, and familiarization of artifacts among the Arabela, Peruvian Amazonia*) podejmuje fascynujący wątek „odgrywania” form cielesnych ludzi i nie-ludzi w życiu codziennym Arabela. Paweł Chyc (*Otro lado. An inquiry into the conceptual topology of animism among the Moré of the Bolivian Amazon*) przedstawia wyobrażenia rzeczywistości „po drugiej stronie” zasiedlanej przez nie-ludzkie byty. Z kolei Anna Przytomska-La Civita (*La relación de depredación entre humanos y no-humanos en la ontología de los q'ero de la cordillera de Vilcanota, Perú*) przygląda się relacjom ludzi i nie-ludzi (gór) wśród Indian Keczua przebiegającym w rytmie wzajemności i drapieżności. Sylwia Pietrowiak (*Bride kidnapping in Northern Kyrgyzstan*

as the initial stage of subjectivity-forming process) prezentuje oryginalną interpretację małżeństw przez porwanie jako etapu procesu budowania podmiotowości kobiety w społeczeństwie kirgizkim. I wreszcie Zbigniew Szmyt (*Post-socialist animism: personhood, necro-personas and public past in Inner Asia*) pokazuje użyteczność koncepcji animizmu do analizy postsocjalistycznej rzeczywistości wśród Mongołów i Buriatów. Blok tematyczny kończy tekst mojego i Mariusza Kairskiego autorstwa prezentujący historię i dorobek polskich badań antropologicznych w Amazonii (*A brief history of Amazonian research in Polish anthropology*).

Część druga tomu (*Articles*) obejmuje trzy polskojęzyczne teksty antropolożek, wprawdzie niezwiązane bezpośrednio z głównym tematem numeru, ale poruszające pokrewną problematykę. W pierwszym z nich (*Jedzenie regionalne, lokalne czy „swoje” – tożsamościowy wymiar praktyk jedzeniowych na Podlasiu*) Joanna Mroczkowska kreśli obraz powiązań między ludźmi, praktykami jedzeniowymi i przestrzenią jako trzema czynnikami współkształtującymi tożsamość ludzi żyjących na obszarach wiejskich Podlasia. Tym samym pośrednio nawiązuje do formatywnej wagi wzorów produkcji i konsumpcji jedzenia znanej z tematyki amazonistycznej. W drugim artykule (*Stereotypizując fryzurę. Wyobrażenia na temat włosów w doświadczeniach osób noszących dredy w Polsce*) Karolina Dziubata opisuje symbolikę i wyobrażenia dotyczące dredów w Polsce, jakie stają się udziałem zarówno osób noszących taką fryzurę, jak i ich społecznego otoczenia. Pokazuje w ten sposób związek pomiędzy praktykami formowania ciała a sposobami myślenia o świecie. Trzeci tekst autorstwa Michaliny Janaszak (*Strażnik, badacz, popularyzator? Problemy tożsamościowe muzealników w dobie przemian zachodzących w muzealnictwie*) podejmuje ważny wątek zmian zachodzących we współczesnym muzealnictwie ujmowanych z perspektywy osób je tworzących – samych muzealników i wyzwań tożsamościowych, jakie napotykają.

Ostatnia część tomu (*Reviews*) zawiera recenzję książki Tomasz Rakowskiego o referującej wyniki badań w Mongolii pt. *Przepływy, współdziałania, kręgi możliwego. Antropologia powodzenia* z 2019 roku autorstwa Justyny Szymańskiej (*Od tradycyjnych pasterzy do transrelacyjnych społeczności. Mongolska sztuka nieformalnego*).

ANIMISM AND PERSPECTIVISM
IN THE STUDY
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

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Seeing, speaking and acting in Amazonian worlds. New takes on animism and perspectivism

When I was a graduate anthropology student in the 1970s in Paris, and during my formative years as a specialist in Lowland South American ethnology, we in Western Europe were aware of the significant contribution of Polish scholars (or scholars of Polish extraction) to Americanist studies; the names of specialists such as Maria Rowstorowski, Jan Szemiński, Mariusz Ziółkowski and others were familiar to us. However, the work of Polish scientists within the field of Americanism seemed to focus largely on the Andean and Mesoamerican areas, with a strong focus on ethnohistory and pre-Columbian archaeology; so far as we knew, the South American Lowlands remained outside their purview. This situation changed in the 1990's: suddenly, a trickle of Polish amazonianists, already engaged in fieldwork in various parts of the Lowlands, began appearing in the doctoral programs of French, British and American universities and more broadly at international conferences where recent trends in research were being discussed. What was striking about these young scholars was the sophistication of their approach, the breadth of their anthropological culture – they seemed to have read all the relevant literature – and their firm grasp of the theoretical issues involved in Amazonianist ethnology. In fact, in many ways they were ahead of the game: their early work immediately made strikingly original and significant additions to the emerging paradigm eventually labeled 'animism' and/or 'perspectivism'. To our (admittedly complacent) eyes, it was as if these budding specialists had just been waiting for the crystallization of this paradigm to jump in fully armed and join the international discussion it generated. I have no idea how this change of focus in Polish Americanist studies came about, how this

nascent tradition of research was fostered, in what institutional contexts and by whom. I wish I knew more about the history of anthropology in Poland to account for it, though I imagine that the reception of Lévi-Straussian structuralism played an important part in it. What does seem clear is that the questions being explored in Amazonianist anthropology during the last decades – questions that eventually fed into the so-called ‘ontological turn’ – struck a chord in the Polish anthropological community.

The papers collected in this issue are evidence that this chord is still strongly resonating, and that the tradition of research initially associated with Amazonianist anthropology has taken root and prospered within the Polish academic world. Each one of these contributions has something fresh and important to say about some aspect of animism/perspectivism; taken together, they draw a useful and up-to-date panorama of the debates over animism, illuminating the complexity of the issues involved in these discussions.

But first, a brief reminder of what we are talking about. As it is used nowadays, the term ‘animism’ (sometimes labeled as ‘the new animism’, to distinguish it from its former usage based on E.B. Tylor’s classic definition) refers to a feature common to many cultures across the world: the tendency to attribute personhood – modeled on humans’ perception of their selfhood – to a large array of beings that we ‘Moderns’ would identify as natural, i.e., non-human (animals, plants, stones, artefacts...) or supernatural (gods, spirits, the dead...). In short, the categorization of things as ‘persons’ is much more inclusive in animist contexts than it is in our ‘naturalist’ world. As Descola has pointed out, any person from whatever cultural background is capable of making animist inferences on occasion: for example, when we talk to our pet, or to our computer (usually to berate it), we are behaving in animist mode. But it is only when this kind of inference is generalized and systematized to the extent that it shapes the practices and conceptualizations involved in large parts of a given cultural configuration that we can properly speak of animism. The fascination of animism lies in the fact that, if taken seriously, that is to say as a statement about the *facticity* of the world (rather than as a case of erroneous causal reasoning or a set of irrational beliefs, as it was in the Tylorian approach and still is in cognitivist theories of religion), it flies in the face of the entrenched division between Nature and Culture upon which the Moderns’ world has come to be built; and it does so at a time when we are all becoming increasingly worried about the state of our relations to and with Nature, both as a reality and as a concept. Given this context, it is not surprising that animism has captured the Western imagination and become a focal point of anthropological theorizing. It so happens that the rise of animism as a major topic of analysis coincided with the publication of a spate of remarkably fine-grained and analytically acute ethnographies produced from the 1970’s on by a new generation of Amazonianists. As a result of this coincidence, Amazonia soon came to be seen as a privileged laboratory for devising new – and generalizable – ways of accounting for animistic forms of ‘worlding’.

The picture of animism that emerged from these studies exhibits a series of interrelated features. Predation plays a salient role in it, as a general model of relations to Others and as a motor for acting in and on the world. Linked to this is a dynamic often referred to (following Erikson) as 'constitutive alterity', whereby the production of selfhood and reproduction of the social world require capturing elements from the outside world, valued by virtue of their otherness: live enemies (to be eaten or otherwise ritually slain), wives, children and pets to be adopted, trophies (shrunk or mummified heads, teeth, bones...), proper names, ritual songs or speeches, etc. Once captured through predation, such elements of alterity then undergo a process of incorporation, theorized notably by C. Fausto under the label 'familiarization', whereby they are progressively 'digested' and turned into kin, or used in one way or another to produce internal values, including life itself. This process is in turn connected to a construal of kinship as the making of congeneric bodies: humans, i.e., members of the 'species' or collective of reference, have to be made into the likeness of the bodies around them, through feeding and caring as well as through mutual speech and gaze. Failing these measures, the (potential) person may be claimed by another collective, such as the dead, or become an animal.

Perspectivism adds a further twist to this configuration. The term refers to the theorization by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro of another feature commonly found in animist configurations: the attribution to kinds of being of distinctive, non-equivalent ways of perceiving elements of reality and in particular other species. Thus, where 'we' as humans see peccaries, these same peccaries may see us in the shape of jaguars; jaguars, in turn, while they see themselves and their congeners as humans, may see ('real') humans as prey, in the shape of peccaries, and see blood as manioc beer. In other words, each set of beings will have a different perspective on the given real according to the specific nature of its body, more accurately according to the ethogram associated with a species' form of bodiliness. This is what led Viveiros de Castro to speak of 'multinaturalism' as a defining feature of animism: since each class of being sees and lives in a particular *Umwelt*, natures are multiple, while culture is single or homogeneous, insofar as it constitutes the unvarying bundle of capacities and dispositions inherent to the personhood of all existants occupying (at least virtually) the deictic position of 'I'. Perspective inferences may be highly generalized and systematized in some societies (such as the Juruna studied by Tânia Stolze Lima, the initial inspiration for Viveiros de Castro's theorization of perspectivism), much more limited in others (for example, restricted to interactions between the living and the dead); but it is, according to Viveiros de Castro, always present in animist configurations, if only in latent form. However, given that forms of perspectivism can also be found in cultures that cannot easily be labeled 'animist', short of voiding the concept of its classificatory value (for example, in the Mesoamerican area, as well as in Inner Asia, as Z. Szymt's article demonstrates), and, conversely, that some clearly animistic groups exhibit no obvious traces of perspectival reasoning,

the exact nature of the connection between perspectivism and animism – is it necessary or contingent? – is still hotly debated.

M. Żerkowski's article on Hallowell's seminal study of Ojibwe ontology provides a useful entry to the discussion of animism. While Hallowell's work is duly acknowledged as a source of inspiration for the authors involved in the study of this topic, Żerkowski rightly claims that his ideas have not received the critical attention they deserve. Żerkowski's careful contextualization and assessment of Hallowell's production brings to light the significance of his intuition that 'behind' Ojibwe ontology there lies a deeper level of cognitive operations linked to forms of perception that filter the Ojibwe's grasp on reality. He called this level the 'behavioral environment', and Żerkowski's discussion of this notion immediately makes clear its proximity to Descola's treatment of the 'ontological filters' at work in the four modes of identification he distinguishes. The two anthropologists both postulate the existence of a framework that mediates relations to the phenomenal world and that lies upriver from the cosmologies or 'ontologies' of a given collective. The difference between the two models is that, while Hallowell's culturalist grounding kept him from formalizing his notion of the 'behavioral environment' and deploying it for comparative purposes, Descola used the structuralist tool-box to turn it into a 'structure', as such endowed with comparative potential and generalizable features.

A. Pisarek's article provides a lucid overview of the debates on this matter and more generally on the central issues involved in the discussion of animism. Focusing on the way three major figures of americanist anthropology – Viveiros de Castro, Descola and T. Turner – deal with Amazonians' 'confusion' of nature and culture and their idiosyncratic view of humanity as a deictic position, he carefully pinpoints the areas of convergence and dissension between the models developed by these three authors, all rooted in Lévi-Straussian structuralism (strongly inflected by Marxism, in Turner's case). He shows how Viveiros de Castro explodes our naturalist constitution simply by inverting the valence of the terms set up in the central opposition between Nature and Culture, and then by methodically exploring the consequences and implications of this reversal. In so doing, he elaborates what amounts to a metaphysics of the Amazonian world, albeit an ethnographically highly informed one. Descola, for his part, relativizes both our naturalism and Amazonian animism by replacing them within a broader framework including two other modes of identification, respectively called totemism and analogism, each one of these modes conceived as transformations (in the structuralist sense) of each other. It is worthwhile noting that Descola's fourfold scheme is not in any sense a typology of past and present social configurations; indeed, he is at pains to point out that no real 'society' strictly corresponds to his categories, and that actual cultural configurations are usually hybrid, 'animist' in some fields, 'analogist' or 'totemist' in others. In classic structuralist fashion, his models referring to forms of identification are purely heuristic devices aimed at elucidating the underlying logic at work in the 'ontologies' of this or that group, and his general fourfold classification must itself be seen

as a model of these models. Though also inspired by Lévi-Strauss's thought, Turner's approach is quite different (and more Aristotelian than Kantian): in his view, Amazonian cosmologies (and more specifically that of the Kayapo) are a reflexive take on an evolving lived world in which all beings join in, each one engaged in the process of transforming nature and capable of some order of reflexivity, so that humans' actions and reflexivity replicate at a different scale a property common to all living things. In short, culture is essentially a 'supernature'. At the end of his paper, Pisarek comes out in favor of Turner's theorization, on the grounds that it has a greater capacity to deal with ongoing change and a greater potential for 'decolonizing' anthropology, whereas both Viveiros de Castro and Descola's models are too static and remain too closely bound to Western forms of categorization. To which the latter authors might well respond that Turner's perspective is both markedly anthropocentric and reliant on a typically Western construal of history, therefore itself characteristically 'naturalist'.... In any case, Pisarek's acute, well informed contribution will give the reader a valuable insight into the complexities of the issues involved in the discussions over Amazonian animism and the best ways of making sense of it.

The preceding comments may have given readers the impression that Amerindian perspectivism is a highly cerebral affair, a formalized explication of indigenous metaphysics that come to the fore primarily in ritual contexts, or else through the objectivation emerging from conversations with the ethnographer about the meaning of mythical narratives and ritual performances. The importance of F. Rogalski's article is to show how perspectivism actually works at the ground level, by giving a particular 'spin' to ordinary, routine behaviour. With characteristic ethnographic flair, he describes how the Arabela playfully enact and verbally label minor behavioral quirks observed in other persons: thus, a man will say 'I'm doing Nuria' when putting on oversized boots, in reference to a young girl named Nuria wearing too large boots on a previous occasion; or 'X is doing so-and-so', when referring to the way a person wears a cap, eats or talks in a certain way. This joking behaviour is constant among the Arabela, prompting the ethnographer to analyze in careful detail its linguistic and pragmatic dimensions, as well as the fields of practice most often selected as sources for the behaviour being indexed by this form of parody. He goes on to show how it illustrates culturally honed attention to the distinctive 'ethogram' of other subjects: persons are singularized not by their 'psychological' or personality traits but rather by virtue of the aptitudes and dispositions determined by the kind of bodies they inhabit. Further, by enacting such 'etho-traits' the Arabela are constantly engaged in 'familiarizing' and ultimately incorporating elements of alterity to produce their selfhood as well as the collective they belong to. P. Chyc's paper on the Bolivian Moré offers another valuable illustration of the 'groundedness' of perspectivism in the everyday life of an animistic society, by focusing on the stories Amazonian people commonly tell each other about odd encounters experienced while going about their ordinary tasks, such as hunting, visiting or traveling. Typically, the reported event occurs while the story's protagonist

is alone and comes upon a being whose strangeness is indexed by an anomaly in the pragmatics of the encounter: it is seen but not heard (or vice-versa), or it behaves in an unexpected way (a deer or a peccary standing still and staring at the hunter instead of fleeing). Such creatures are said by the Moré to be 'of the other side'. Chyc goes on to analyze the properties of the 'other side', stressing its sameness to the normally perceived world while highlighting the entirely different perspective on it experienced by those who inhabit it permanently or accidentally. Given the specular relation between the two realities, he rightly points out that boundaries between this side and the 'other side' – limits such as skin and bark, the surface of water, the fringe of forest around a clearing... – play a vital but understudied role in the deployment of a perspectivist world, and he argues for the relevance of topology as a heuristic tool for illuminating the recursive, endlessly reversible contrast of visible appearance and invisible 'interiority' that plays such a pivotal role in animism. A. Przytomska-La Civita, for her part, takes up the thread of predation as it is conceptualized among the Andean Q'eros of south-central Peru. She demonstrates how in this cultural context predation becomes either a kind of forced reciprocity, when people transgress (through neglect or by committing incest) their obligation to constantly engage in the web of reciprocal exchange (*ayni*) that holds the world's beings together, or else a unilateral (i.e., non-reversible) aggression and subtraction of the substances that should flow between all the 'persons' that make up the Andean universe. Her contribution helps to show how the notion of predation is inflected by its embeddedness in an 'analogist' cosmos such as that of the Q'eros: while in Amazonia predation is the basic, unmarked form of relating to Others and reciprocity only obtains between congeners or persons assimilated to close kin, in the Andes reciprocity is the governing principle and predation only comes in when reciprocity, the matrix of relations between all beings including non-humans, breaks down and must be substituted by negatively valued forms of mutual sustainment.

S. Pietrowiak and Z. Szmyt's contributions deal with Inner Asian cultures and show how the conceptual apparatus elaborated to account for the dynamics of Amazonian sociality can be used to illuminate processes at work in these quite different ethnographic contexts. In this respect they follow a trend that is equally visible in Western European anthropology: while a few decades back Melanesia was the 'significant other' of Amazonia in comparative terms, to the extent that specialists of these areas jointly produced an imaginary theoretical continent dubbed 'Melazonia', this role has shifted to Inner and North Asia, and contemporary specialists of this part of the world commonly draw on Amazonianist literature to make sense of their ethnographic material. The fact that shamanic practices play a salient role in both regions provided an obvious common ground for comparative exercises, but now the use of Amazonianist concepts by Inner Asia scholars extends well beyond the domain of shamanism. Thus, Pietrowiak relies on Fausto's work on familiarization to illuminate the practice of bride kidnapping in north-eastern Kyrgyzstan and the transformation of women that it brings about, a trajectory of change that resonates with the process of incorporating pets

in Amazonia. By detailing the major role played by the female affines of the groom and bride in the performance of marriage, she shows how women move in their life course from the position of insider as infertile child to that of captured, fertile outsider in her husband's family and then on to the respected position of 'tamer' of other captured brides; interestingly, she notes that the offspring of the two sets of female 'tamers' involved in a marriage by kidnapping are in the position of potential spouses for each other. Szmyt, by contrast, focuses on relations between the living and the dead, in the wake of the post-communist resurgence of 'necropersons' as active presences. The three fascinating cases he discusses show how these non-(live)humans come into being and are called on to intervene in contemporary life, as major actors in the production of new historical narratives sustaining the re-emergence of previously suppressed or 'invisibilized' identities. Though Szmyt does not explicitly relate his findings to Amazonian models and to the discussion of animism or perspectivism, his analysis does connect strongly with Amazonianist analyses of the relations with the dead, the politics of memory and the regimes of historicity characteristic of indigenous Lowland groups. His paper thus sets up a particularly rich ground for further comparative work on the Amazonia-Inner Asia axis.

At a time when the Polish academic world is facing a fraught situation, and when anthropology departments in particular are struggling to maintain their integrity, it is to be hoped that the quality of these contributions, beyond illustrating a thriving local tradition of Americanist-inspired studies, will help draw attention to the signal contribution of Polish scholars to the discipline of anthropology at its cutting edge, and contribute to the preservation of the intellectual and institutional environment in which their work emerged and flourished.

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A. Irving Hallowell's research on the Ojibwe animism

Introduction

In contemporary research on animism, few works have proved as influential as Alfred Irving Hallowell's essay published in 1960 in a volume honoring Paul Radin (Diamond 1960).¹ Several decades after writing about the behavior, worldview, and ontology of the Ojibwe,² Hallowell came to be dubbed the forefather of the anthropological approach to what Graham Harvey (2005) has termed the "new animism". However, the sixty-year-old text based on research completed eighty years ago tends to be just mentioned (e.g., Viveiros de Castro 1998; Bird-David 1999; Willerslev 2007; Costa, Fausto 2010; Descola 2013; Kohn 2015; Holbraad, Pedersen 2017) rather than extensively discussed (e.g., Ingold 2000), and the biography-, history-, fieldwork-, methodology-, and theory-related context that influenced its creation is almost always ignored. The paper is an attempt to present Hallowell's biographical profile and to situate his achievements within

¹ This important collection of essays was first assembled in 1957 as a *Festschrift* celebrating Radin's seventy-fifth birthday, but it was not published until after his death. It should be emphasized that Hallowell's (1960a) paper *Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View*, so widely read today, contains significant excerpts from his own text entitled *Ojibwa Metaphysics of Being and the Perception of Persons* (Hallowell 1958).

² This exoethnonym is commonly used today to refer to the people (endoethnonym: *Anishinaabe*, pl. *Anishinaabeg*) speaking the Ojibwe language (endoglossonym: *Anishinaabemowin*), which belongs to the Algonquian language family. The name "Ojibwe" is sometimes anglicized as "Ojibwa" or "Ojibway". Excluding quotations, in the article, I use the Ojibwe orthography presented in John D. Nichols's and Earl Nyholm's (1995) dictionary.

the history of cultural anthropology. It also aims to review Hallowell's ethnographic material and to discuss ideas presented in his seminal essay – the ideas with their own genealogies resulting from the aforementioned elaborate context in which they originated.

Biographical and intellectual context

“I was born in 1892 here in Philadelphia and have lived here all my life” (as cited in Stocking 2004: 198), said Alfred Irving “Pete” Hallowell in a 1950 interview. His parents (mother – a former schoolteacher, father – a supervisor in a shipyard) were Baptists. Hallowell, a rebellious teenager, graduated from manual training high school in 1911 – as he said, he had chosen that school because “it was a new building and they had a swell mandolin club” (as cited in Brown 1992: xiv) – and entered the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania. However, by the time he graduated in 1914, he had abandoned all plans for a business career and soon began attending courses in sociology, while earning his living as a social worker. The experience gained during his work proved to be formative; visits to Polish, Italian, and African-American households made him familiar with cultural differences and taught him how to conduct interviews (Hallowell 1972: 51–52).

At that time Hallowell began to discover psychoanalysis. He met Franz Boas's students – Alexander Goldenweiser, who lectured psychoanalytic theory at the Pennsylvania School of Social Work, and Frank G. Speck, who was a member of the same fraternity as Hallowell, and whose courses Hallowell decided to attend.³ Hallowell's interest, which so far had focused on sociology, begun to drift towards cultural anthropology. In 1922–1923, having obtained (with Speck's help) the Harrison Fellowship, Hallowell took a semester of Boas's courses at Columbia University. It was at that time that he started attending weekly meetings held privately by Goldenweiser and a group of students, including Ruth Benedict and Melville Herskovits (Hallowell 1972: 52; Stocking 2004: 203–204).

Years later Hallowell (1972: 53) would recall:

With my interests ranging over broad social problems, it may seem paradoxical that the people in whom I became most interested were the American Indians. But these were the primitive, aboriginal people of America – and they were Frank Speck's pets. At this time, he was engaged in “salvage anthropology” among the Indians of the eastern United States. Speck's self-involvement with the study

³ It is worth noting that Speck and Goldenweiser were almost each other's antitheses in terms of biography and professional work. Not only did the former not belong to the social circle of *Kleindeutschland* (German American community of New York City and neighboring area), but he also gained recognition for being an outstanding field researcher. The latter was, to quote William Y. Adams (2016: 214), “[a] polished, urban sophisticate with no taste for «rouging it,» he did as little fieldwork as he could get away with. (...) Boas considered him one of his brightest students.”

people and their problems was perhaps greater than that of other anthropologists of the period. He was always extolling the sovereign virtues of the Indians and proclaiming the intrinsic values of their culture. (...) Speck was about as detached from American culture as one could be. He would not, for instance, buy a car, and he never read newspapers. In a sense, he was also detached from the university and its affairs. I never remember his serving on a committee; his thoughts and energies were entirely devoted to his research among Indians. And I imitated my mentor for a long while.

Hallowell's first short field research took place among the bilingual (French and Algonquian-speaking) Abenaki from the banks of Saint-François River. Although he collected some material during this trip and those that followed, his Ph.D. dissertation from 1924, a monograph on bear ceremonialism, was of comparative, Frazerian nature. Published in 1926, the dissertation, along with its concluding, Boasian-style hypothesis "that a bear cult was one of the characteristic features of an ancient Boreal culture, Old World in origin and closely associated with the pursuit of the reindeer" (Hallowell 1926: 161), proved interesting to the associates of the Kulturkreis school, Soviet ethnography, and comparative study of religions (Hallowell 1972: 55). Hallowell's monograph also included remarks adumbrating his future works on culturally constituted worldviews and psychologically studied individual behaviors expressed, among other ways, in the context of animistic thinking. In this particular aspect, his dissertation turned out to be a transition from the Boasian program to future interpretations, both related to and transcending the postulates and methodology of the culture and personality school (Darnell 1977). Years later, Hallowell (1966: 12, as cited in Darnell 1977: 28) recapitulated his ideas of the time:

Not only bear ceremonialism is boreal in its scope. What we have to consider is a generalized conception of the nature of the animal world in relation to man. At the root of this relationship there appears to lie a generalized belief that animals by their essential nature are not so different from human beings and that animals are *sent* to hunters by controlling "spirit masters." This is a conception common among the peoples of Eurasia and America. My conclusion is that bear ceremonialism was only an introduction to a much wider range of problems. Man and animals instead of being separate categories of being are deeply rooted in a world of nature that is unified. Perhaps the approach of ethnoscience or ethnosemantics can help us here.

As early as the late 1920s, his interest in the relationship between kinship patterns and social behavior led Hallowell to focus on the ethnography of the Cree, and ultimately - on the ethnography of the Ojibwe.⁴ In 1930, having obtained a grant from the Social Science Research Council, he made his first trip to the Lake

⁴ The most recent anthropological work on the Cree and the Ojibwe (Skinner 1911) that he may have read at that time had been published in the same year as he graduated from high school.

Winnipeg region, where among the Ojibwe (known as *Saulteaux*)⁵ of Berens River, he met his most important collaborator, guide, translator, and eventually friend – William Berens (Hallowell 1992: 6).

However, for Hallowell, the 1930s were not only the period of fieldwork crucial to the development of his theory, but also the time marked by the emergence of psychological anthropology, to which he finally contributed with a panoply of topics, including the concept of the self, perception and cognition, acculturation and related personality changes, mental health,⁶ projective techniques, behavioral evolution, etc. (Bourguignon 2018: 17). At the beginning of the decade, he met Edward Sapir (a close friend of Speck) – the person who would later be considered not only “the founder of culture and personality studies” (La Barre 1980: 264) and one of the most notable representatives of American structuralism (Hymes, Fought 1981), but also a prominent figure in the institutional world of nascent American psychological anthropology. When Sapir became the chairman of the Division of Anthropology and Psychology of the National Research Council, he invited Hallowell to join the newly formed Committee on Personality in Relation to Culture, whose members included Ruth Benedict, as well as the most influential figures in psychiatry and psychoanalysis (both Freudian and neo-Freudian): Adolf Meyer, Abraham Arden Brill, and Harry Stack Sullivan (Hallowell 1972: 56). Hallowell became the chairman of one of the two subcommittees, which was entrusted with the task of drafting a “handbook of psychological leads for ethnological fieldwork” (as cited in Darnell 1986: 175). The resulting text included one of the most relativist statements by Hallowell (1956 [1937]: 355), i.e., the claim “that the very existence of varying culture patterns carries with it the psychological implication that the individuals of these societies actually live in different orders of reality.” However, Hallowell was referring to a reality understood “ethno-metaphysically” and practically, not phenomenally. Human mental response to the physical phenomena and objects of the world external to him/her is therefore culturally dependent in the sense that it concerns perception (understood as the organization, identification, and interpretation of sensory

⁵ It should be noted that the Ojibwe, who live near Lake Winnipeg and its rivers, and who are locally called “*Saulteaux*” (Steinberg 1981), are often referred to as “Northern Ojibwa” in Hallowell’s works, but should not be confused with the proper Northern Ojibwe “that live along the upper courses of the rivers that flow generally northeast into Hudson and James bays, from Island Lake, Manitoba, to Ogoki, Ontario” (Rogers, Taylor 1981: 231). Hallowell himself wrote: “Their early association with the Sault is the source of an Indian name for them – *People of the Falls or Rapids* – from which was derived the name given them by the French – *Saulteurs*. This name has persisted in anglicized form in parts of Canada down to the present time, alongside their alternative self-designation, *Anishinabek*. *Outchibouec* is an equally early designation which later took the English form *Ojibwa*. (...) *Chippewa* is actually a corrupted form of Ojibwa, but has received wide currency in the United States after having been officially adopted by the Bureau of American Ethnology” (Hallowell 1992: 5–6).

⁶ The answer to the question of whether Hallowell’s (1955b [1940], 1955d [1938]) research interests in fear, anxiety, and aggression in the Ojibwe culture and personality were related to his tragic family history (Hallowell’s adopted son, William Kern Hallowell, was a notorious felon and the murderer of two policemen, as well as his own stepmother, Hallowell’s ex-wife Dorothy Kern), can only be speculative (Stocking 2004: 221–232).

data) and cognition. "Consequently, the objects of the external world *as meaningfully defined* in a traditional ideology constitute the reality to which the individuals habituated to a particular system of beliefs actually respond" (Hallowell 1956 [1937]: 356). In practical terms (related to acting in the world), "[t]he physical objects of the environment only enter the reality-order of the human population as a function of specific culture patterns" (Hallowell 1956 [1937]: 356). However, Hallowell only referred to the relativity of classification (e.g., a culturally conditioned perception or lack of perception of specific objects as useful, valuable, etc.) and to some extent foreshadowed James J. Gibson's (1966) concept of affordance. It should be added that at this stage, Hallowell spoke of "reality-orders" rather than "world views", and the "traditional ideologies" mentioned above were later replaced by "metaphysics of being" or "ontologies".

As a Guggenheim Fellowship holder in the academic year 1940-1941, Hallowell wrote a monograph on Ojibwe conjuring, in which he stated: "Neither animism in its classical formulation nor animatism is the unequivocal foundation of Saulteaux belief" (Hallowell 1971 [1942]: 7). The monograph was dedicated to William Berens, and Hallowell himself concluded its introduction with the remark that "even at best our comprehension of the belief system of a primitive people remains on the intellectual level. We never learn to feel and act as they do. Consequently we never fully penetrate their behavioral world. We never *wear* their culturally tinted spectacles; the best we can do is to try them on" (Hallowell 1971 [1942]: 3).

As a person involved neither with the government nor with military activities, Hallowell spent the early years of World War II in Philadelphia, working as a chairman of the University of Pennsylvania Department of Anthropology. Freshly divorced, having his parents as dependents, he was invited by Herskovits to work at Northwestern University. He took the position but returned to the University of Pennsylvania in spring 1947, where he taught until his retirement in 1963 (Stocking 2004: 211-212).

The post-war period in Hallowell's academic writing was defined by the universalism of the evolutionary approach, which he had postulated as early as 1949 in his presidential address to the American Anthropological Association (Hallowell 1950). In the late 1970s, Jerome H. Barkow (1978: 99) referred to it with one of his characteristic remarks stating that had the anthropologists listened carefully to Hallowell's speech, "they would not have had to wait for biologists to invent sociobiology." Even if Barkow's statement was marked with some rhetorical exaggeration, Hallowell's address to the AAA, as well as his subsequent texts (e.g., Hallowell 1960b, 1965, 1976 [1963]), drew attention to the pressing need for research not only on the evolution of human morphology, or changes in material products of human activity, but also on the evolution of human mind and social behavior, in which personality, society, and culture will not be subject to separate types of analysis, and will not be treated as independent variables. According to the interdisciplinarily inclined Hallowell (1960b: 313-318), for the evolution-oriented researchers of *homo sapiens'* behavior, it was necessary to reach for new data provided by paleontology, primatology, and psychoanalysis

(today we would probably replace the last one with a different set of psychological theories), but also for a precise, anthropologically defined concept of culture.⁷ In his later semiautobiographical remarks, Hallowell (1972: 59) stated that “investigations in psychology and culture inevitably led to a general consideration of the psychological dimension of human evolution”. He continued, embedding the phenomenology of culturally constituted worldviews in the broader field of evolutionary explanatory approach: “Man is an animal who has been able to survive by making cultural adaptations in which his own imaginative interpretations of the world have been fed back into his personal adjustment to it” (Hallowell 1972: 60).⁸

After Hallowell’s death in 1974, one of his most prominent students and the founder of the anthropology department (and also an influential center for psychological anthropology) at the University of California, San Diego, Melford E. Spiro (1976: 610), shared the following thought, so typical of his anti-relativistic stance:

[I]n his teaching and writing, Hallowell focused his vision on one big thing – the nature of man. Hence, although much of his teaching was concerned with the ethnography of American Indians, his approach to the uniquely Indian was based on and informed by a conception of the generically human; and the latter conception projected a vision of what anthropology could be, a vision that most of his students found exciting and captivating.

Fieldwork among the Ojibwe

Eventually, between 1930 and 1940, Hallowell conducted seven summer field studies (each sojourn lasted between one and eight weeks) on the patrilineal Berens River Ojibwe (communities: Berens River, Little Grand Rapids, Pauingassi, Poplar Hill, and Pikangikum), who were “able to maintain a high degree of cultural conservatism” (Hallowell 1955e: 119). Their population stood at over 900 people, and their economy was still based almost entirely on hunting and fishing supplemented by plant gathering (Hallowell 1955e; Steinberg 1981: 247–248; Brown 1987: 17, 1989: 218, 1992: xi). In his reflective essay, *On Being an Anthropologist*, written towards the end of his life, Hallowell (1972: 58) admitted: “I deeply identified myself with the Berens River Ojibwa. To the small number of white people in the area I paid practically no attention.”

⁷ He himself proposed the term “«protoculture» as a means of identifying the necessary, but not sufficient, conditions which appear to be the evolutionary prerequisites of the fully developed phase of cultural adaptation as represented in *Homo sapiens*” (Hallowell 1976 [1963]: 291).

⁸ This idea was already outlined in his 1949 speech, in which he stated that human “adjustment is not a simple function of organic structure but of personal experience and behavioral environment as well” (Hallowell 1950: 165).

On July 1, 1930, while cruising through Lake Winnipeg aboard S.S. Keenora steamboat on his way to Norway House and the Cree reserve, near the mouth of the Berens River, Hallowell met Chief William Berens.⁹ Born in 1865 – after the death of his father, Chief Jacob Berens¹⁰ – William became the leader of the local Ojibwe community in 1917 and held this position until his death in 1947 (Brown 1989: 205; Brown, Gray 2009a: 9). In mid-August 1930, while returning from the Cree reserve, Hallowell visited the Berens River community again. As a result of a weeklong stay and many hours spent talking to Berens, Hallowell (1992: 8) decided to visit the Ojibwe living east of Lake Winnipeg: “I was particularly impressed by the fact that there were still un-Christianized Indians 250 miles up the river in the Pikangikum band. I knew of no other Algonquian group where this was the case.” Berens offered to help, although the last time he had been in the Pikangikum area was in 1888 (Berens, Hallowell 2009: 54, 94–95). Eventually, they both went to Lake Pikangikum in the summer of 1932:

In many respects it was an excursion into the living past. When I tried to engage Indian canoemen at the mouth of the river to make the trip, I ran into difficulty because practically none of the Indians in this locality had any knowledge whatever of the country to the east for more than 100 miles at most. (...) After we left what my friend Chief Berens called “civilization” at the mouth of the river, I also discovered that we had entered a more primitive world of temporal orientation. (...) The inland Indians were still living in birchbark-covered dwellings and except for their clothing, utensils, and canvas canoes, one could easily imagine oneself in an encampment of a century or more before. (...) Evidence of the importance of fish at this season was everywhere. Nets were in the water or being mended continually. (...) Berries were being picked by the women and children. As for the men, they were relatively idle but some, as at Island Lake, were to be seen making snowshoe frames or canoe paddles. There was frequent dancing on specially prepared ground, sometimes within a cagelike superstructure such as that used for the *Wabanowiwin*, although the Grand Medicine Lodge (*Midewiwin*) had died out. (...) Although it is true that aboriginal culture as a fully rounded

⁹ The name of the river, and consequently, the name of Hallowell's collaborator, comes from the name of the governor of the Hudson's Bay Company in the second decade of the 19th century, Joseph Berens Jr. (Hallowell 1992: 6). William Berens's family belonged to the Moose clan. His paternal great-grandfather was Yellow Legs (*Ozaawashkogaad*), whose son's (William's grandfather's) indigenous name was *Makwa* (Bear). William's father, in turn, “an Indian of the «new order»” (Hallowell 1992: 13), was the first to take the last name Berens and to be baptized, nominally becoming a Methodist; he learned English and started working for the Hudson's Bay Company on a casual basis. After signing the Lake Winnipeg Treaty 5 in 1875, Jacob Berens became the first “chief” of the Berens River Ojibwe. At this point, it is worth noting Hallowell's (1992: 12–13) observation that “[i]n the native system, a personal name was derived from a dream of the namer – an old man in the «grandfather» category. With the name were transferred «blessings» which the namer had received from other than human persons.”

¹⁰ William's mother, Marry (née McKay), as a person of Algonquian and Scottish descent (her Scottish-born father was the manager of the Hudson's Bay Company post), was perceived by the Ojibwe as “white” (Brown 1989: 209–210; Hallowell 1992: 13).

and comprehensive scheme of life had disappeared, a continuity with the past was obvious, along with a persistence of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behavior which had their roots in an aboriginal sociocultural system. This interpretation was thrown into sharper relief when I returned to the mouth of the river (Hallowell 1992: 8–10).

For Berens himself, the trip to the east was also a journey in time, because there “was the kind of life he once had led. Like the Indians in these inland bands, he too had seen the Midewiwin, only at a much earlier period than they had. As a child, he remembered his grandfather in the Midewiwin when it was last given at the mouth of the Berens River just before the latter’s death. (...) On the other hand, from childhood he was raised as a member of a Christian household” (Hallowell 1992: 14). Undoubtedly, the uniqueness of Berens’s biography and character, combined with his position as a political leader and an entrepreneur, proved to be the key to the success of Hallowell’s ethnographic venture, and the latter’s openness and curiosity,¹¹ thanks to Berens, could be understood and appreciated. In 1994, Percy Earl Berens, the eldest of William’s living sons, stressed that “[t]here was *very high mutual respect* between the two of them, and because Hallowell would write them down and *understand* them” (Brown, Gray 2009b: xxiii).

To this day the main dichotomy organizing the Ojibwe oral narratives is the division into *aadizookaanag* (sg. *aadizookaan*) and *dibaaJimowinan* (sg. *dibaaJimowin*). The former are sacred stories, traditionally told only on late autumn and winter evenings (this involved a ritual prohibition on passing them on at other times of the year), regarding the activities of powerful nonhuman beings (these entities are polysemous with the *aadizookaanag* stories and are treated as persons).¹² The latter are secular stories, anecdotes from everyday life, which tell of people’s personal experiences, and in which “other-than-human persons”

¹¹ For example, Hallowell is famous for his interest in ceremonies of *Midewiwin*, that is Grand Medicine Society, due to which the people at Little Grand Rapids and Pauingassi call him by the nickname *Midewigima*, i.e., “*Mide* master” (Brown, Gray 2009b: xxii). One of William Berens’s sons, Gordon (who, as a young man, on two occasions accompanied Hallowell on his trip to Little Grand Rapids), when asked years later whether Hallowell had danced in the ceremonies he had attended, replied: “Oh, he was in it! ... he was crazy dancing at the Indian dance. He can do it too. He could do it good. Just as good as the Indians did. Oh, he sure enjoyed that” (Brown, Gray 2009b: xxii).

¹² “A striking fact furnishes a direct linguistic cue to the attitude of the Ojibwa towards these personages. When they use the term *ātiso’kanak*, they are not referring to what I have called a «body of narratives.» The term refers to what we would call the characters in these stories; to the Ojibwa they are living «persons» of an other-than-human class. As William Jones said many years ago, «Myths are thought of as conscious beings, with powers of thought and action.» A synonym for this class of persons is «our grandfathers.» The *ātiso’kanak*, or «our grandfathers,» are never «talked about» casually by the Ojibwa. But when the myths are narrated on long winter nights, the occasion is a kind of invocation: «Our grandfathers» like it and often come to listen to what is being said” (Hallowell 1960a: 27; see also Smith 2012: 52, 82). “Certain stories were reserved for the very coldest portions of winter when it was thought to be less likely that potentially mischievous or negatively inclined «persons» would choose to travel from the Atisokanak World to the Now-World of the story teller” (Boatman 1992: 13).

such as *wiindigoo* (an anthropomorphic cannibal monster), *binesi* (a Thunderbird), etc., may appear (Hallowell 1960a: 26–27). However, during his conversations with Hallowell, Berens was inclined to transgress cultural taboos, thus becoming an invaluable source of information. Living at the crossroads of two worlds, he was able to transcend the limitations imposed by both the traditional Ojibwe culture and the Christian culture of the modern West. This does not mean, however, that he did not have close contact with both of the cultures (Brown 1989: 207–208). As a Christian, he never took the blessing received in his dream from the *memegwesiwag* (bank-dwelling dwarfs), which would have enabled him to receive medicine from them, and become a curer (*mina'o*) as his great-grandfather Yellow Legs once did (Hallowell 1955j [1954]: 97–99). On the other hand, the devotion to the Ojibwe culture and immersion in its ontological categories resulted in such incidents as the one during the joint trip with Hallowell, when a presence of a toad in the tent was interpreted by Berens as a punishment for breaking the taboo by telling the *aadizookaanag* in the summer, that is, out of season, according to the ritual rules (Hallowell 1955d [1938]: 253–254).

From the point of view of the methodology of psychologically oriented ethnographic research, the following question arose quite early: “From what sources were psychological data, apart from ethnological data, to be derived?” (Hallowell 1972: 57). The answer was not uncontroversial – the projective tests and in particular – the Rorschach test. Developed by Herman Rorschach in Switzerland in 1921 (Tibon-Czopp, Weiner 2016: 3) the inkblot test was supposed to determine personality traits and mental disorders. Psychological anthropologists perceived it as a promise of a field-functional, culturally unbiased, scientifically reliable and verifiable tool, providing access to basic data on the mental states of informants. Although pinning hopes on these tests eventually proved ineffective (Lilienfeld et al. 2000), Hallowell was one of the first cultural anthropologists to have used the Rorschach projective technique in a non-Western society.¹³ Margaret Mead (1932, 1949) was the only person to have applied it earlier. She did so in her research on the Manus people of the Admiralty Islands and the Arapesh people of New Guinea at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, albeit not always successfully. Significantly, the research on the children of Manus Island ethnographically refuted Jean Piaget’s (1928, 1966 [1930], 1971 [1929]) recapitulationist hypothesis that postulated the universality of spontaneous animistic thinking in children, which was considered to be characteristic of the preoperational stage of cognitive development.¹⁴

¹³ He first heard about the test from Benedict during Sapir’s committee meeting (Stocking 2004: 209).

¹⁴ It should be noted that today, evolutionarily informed cognitive anthropology is dominated by the view that while the prevalence of animistic (and anthropomorphic) cultural representations is related to universal cognitive dispositions, intuitive ontology, which delivers psychological, biological, and physical expectations about the surrounding reality (and which is present even in the early stages of human cognitive development), as presented by numerous empirical psychological studies, is not determined by animistic or anthropomorphic assumptions. However, “[p]rojections of intuitive intentional psychology make use of the richest domain of inferences

Hallowell first applied the Rorschach test during the fieldwork among the Berens River Ojibwe in 1937. On his return from the trip, he met Bruno Klopfer, Carl Gustav Jung's student who pioneered projective techniques and was most known for his work on the inkblot test. Following Mead, Hallowell (1955g [1939]) criticized the recapitulation theory and the concept of child animism in the 1939 article (originally entitled *The Child, the Savage and Human Experience*), at the very end of which he reached for his own ethnographic material on the children of the Berens River. Eventually, Hallowell gained recognition in the "Rorschach movement" in American anthropology, as he produced a series of articles on the personality distinctions observed in the Ojibwe populations with different levels of acculturation,¹⁵ and on the possibilities of anthropological research using the inkblot test (Hallowell 1941, 1945, 1946, 1955a [1951], 1955h, 1955j [1942], 1955k [1950]). Moreover, he organized a Rorschach training seminar for cultural anthropologists, and after World War II, he became the president of the Society for Projective Techniques (Stocking 2004: 209).

Hallowell (1955c) made his last field trip in the summer of 1946, at the end of his second year at Northwestern University (and a year before William Berens's death). This time, however, he did not visit the Berens River community but, accompanied by a team of students, went to the Ojibwe reservation of Lac du Flambeau, in Wisconsin, where a series of projective tests were also conducted. The cultural and psychological realities of this Ojibwe group put Hallowell's previous field experience in a new light. Years later, he admitted:

Here I found myself in the position of being an authority for these highly acculturated Ojibwa on the really old-fashioned Ojibwa "up north."

It was the gradual realization of this broader acculturation problem that led me in the end to attempt to interpret and expound the world view of the most conservative Ojibwa (...). This became an excursion into ethnoscience - or ethno-semantics, if you will - for I became aware of how sharply different the Ojibwa

available to human minds, whilst violating central aspects of intuitive ontology. Anthropomorphism, then, is «natural» and widespread mainly because it is counter-intuitive" (Boyer 1996: 95). This view turns out to be close to Mead's (1932: 186-187) own intuition: "It may, however, be argued that the human mind possesses a tendency towards animistic thought, and also a tendency towards non-animistic practical observations of cause and effect relationships." Finally, it is worth noting that among contemporary cognitively oriented researchers there are voices skeptical about the concept of three intuitive ontological domains as a universal feature of human (and not only Western) cognition (Ojalehto mays, Seligman, Medin 2020).

¹⁵ One of Hallowell's most controversial ideas was the concept of the "atomistic" character of the Ojibwe modal personality structure. It was based on projective testing, among other things, and was partly related to Speck's hypothesis assuming the aboriginality of family- or individually-owned hunting territories among the Northern Algonquian peoples (Hickerson 1967). The problem of the impact of acculturation on personality was described by Hallowell (1955k [1950]: 366) in psychoanalytic terms: "At Flambeau it is a striking fact that the protocols of adults are so much like those of the children. (...) Thus the Flambeau Indian represents what is, in effect, a *regressive version* of the personality structure of the Northern Ojibwa. So far as I have been able to analyze the situation, it does not seem to me that there is any positive resolution of this psychological impasse in sight."

world was from our own and of the necessity for testing the meaningfulness of familiar conceptual dichotomies, such as natural-supernatural, for example (Hallowell 1972: 58).

Ojibwe epistemology and ontology: the concepts of the behavioral environment and the person

In 1954, Hallowell (1955i [1954]: 109) stated that an individual Ojibwe “is not an «animist» in the classical sense”, by which he meant that the Ojibwe beliefs are not related to Edward B. Tylor’s (1871: I, 258) “doctrine of universal vitality”, nor do their beliefs fall within the framework of a conventionally defined religion, i.e., one characterized in the Tylorian way in terms of spirituality, supernaturalism, and worship (Hallowell 1992: 81). As a result, Hallowell reached for the concept of worldview, using Robert Redfield’s (1952: 30) anthropological explication, according to which a worldview is an “outlook upon the universe that is characteristic of a people”¹⁶:

“World view” differs from culture, ethos, mode of thought, and national character. It is the picture the members of a society have of the properties and characters upon their stage of action. (...) “world view” attends especially to the way a man, in a particular society, sees himself in relation to all else. It is the properties of existence as distinguished from and related to the self. It is, in short, a man’s idea of the universe. It is that organization of ideas which answers to a man the questions: Where am I? Among what do I move? What are my relations to these things? (...) Self is the axis of world view (Redfield 1952: 30).

Importantly, Redfield (1952: 30) continues that “[o]utside of self, every man separates other human beings one from another, accords the property of self to them too, and looks upon other human beings as significantly different from all else that is not human”, although “to primitive man the distinction between persons and things is not sharply made: all objects, not only man, are regarded somewhat as if they were persons” (Redfield 1952: 34). Leaving aside the significance of the last remark, it should be noted that, on the theoretical level, Redfield does not distinguish the worldview from the ontology understood as a set of assumptions about the fundamental categories of being, which constitute an inventory of the entities perceived as existing in the world. Perhaps this is why in Hallowell’s 1960 essay *Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View*, the term “ontology” appears only once and is not defined – contrary to what the title might suggest. Instead, on two occasions Hallowell (1960a: 21, 43) mentions the culturally constituted “metaphysics of being”, the elements of which shape the worldview and are the key to understanding it. Moreover, the aspects of thus conceptualized

¹⁶ In this case, Redfield was more inspired by Bronislaw Malinowski than by Boas (Hiebert 2008: 18).

ethnoontology of the group members (or “ethno-metaphysics” as he called it) permeate “the content of their cognitive processes: perceiving, remembering, imagining, conceiving, judging, and reasoning” (Hallowell 1960a: 43).

It was possible for Hallowell to understand the local ontology of the Ojibwe because he adopted in his research methodology an approach that would later be called “emic”, and because he used concepts that enabled him to work with their worldview analytically. One of such concepts was the “behavioral environment” (Hallowell 1955f [1954], 1955h, 1955i [1954]), which in a modernist fashion embedded Hallowellian discussion on ontology within epistemology.

Hallowell took a step towards phenomenological ecology (Schwartz 2018: 186) or ecological psychology by assuming that the human awareness of self (“self” as a concept is distinguished here from the psychoanalytic term “ego”),¹⁷ and the awareness of empirical objects of the outside world that differ from the self, emerge from maturation, socialization, and personal experience – and for this reason both are inevitably products of culture. He used the term “behavioral environment” – a concept borrowed from the Gestalt psychology of Kurt Koffka (1936), who had proposed an explanatory division into the geographical and behavioral environment. The geographical environment is the physical environment surrounding a person. Behavioral environment, although not fully independent from the geographical one (Gestalt psychology is not mentalistic – a common critique from partisans of behaviorism), is the environment that is perceived, and as such, it constitutes a direct cause of one’s behavior. In other words, the behavioral environment is “a mediating link between geographical environment and behaviour, between stimulus and response” (Koffka 1936: 32).¹⁸

According to Hallowell, the behavioral environment is formed by culture, which provides basic cognitive orientations (self-orientation, object orientation, spatiotemporal orientation, motivational orientation, and normative orientation) important in the psychological adjustment of an individual to the surrounding world, and enabling him or her to act effectively in it. Instead of perceiving human as an entity living in a social or cultural environment, Hallowell (1955i [1954]: 87) stated that the environment in which human functions is a “culturally constituted behavioral environment”. Thus, when it comes to reacting to the surrounding world, it always means reacting to the environment that is perceived. At this point, it is worth recalling the problem of perception – which has already been mentioned in the discussion of the *Psychological Leads for Ethnological Field Workers* handbook – and emphasizing that what is meant by the culturally shaped perception of the environment is not the cultural determination of sensations (sense

¹⁷ In Hallowell’s (1955i [1954]: 80) view, “[t]he term «self,» in short, does seem to connote a concept that remains closer to the phenomenological facts that reflect man’s self-awareness as a generic psychological attribute. It retains the reflexive connotation that is indicated when we say that a human individual becomes an object to himself, that he identifies himself as an object among other objects in his world, that he can conceive himself not only as a whole but in terms of different parts, that he can converse with himself, and so on.”

¹⁸ Koffka’s idea has its ethological equivalent in Jakob von Uexküll’s (1926) concepts of *Umwelt* and *Umgebung*, of which Hallowell was fully aware.

data), but the immediate organization, identification, and interpretation of sensations in order to form mental representations. This is the foundation of the problem of perception seen as an active process and as the occurrence of perceptual sets, which are to be treated as “readinesses” (Allport 1955: 65) to perceive specific features of a stimulus. According to Margaret D. Vernon (1955: 186), this kind of schemata operate in perception in two ways: “(a) They produce a condition of expectation in which the observer is not merely on the *qui vive*, but also knows what to look for – what particular sensory data to select from the incoming flood, (b) He then knows how to deal with these data – how to classify, understand, and name them, and draw from them the inferences that give the meaning to the percepts.”

While perceptual content may be influenced by factors such as physiological needs, expectations of rewards and punishments, personal values, assigned value of an object, personality, or the emotionally disturbing nature of a stimulus (Allport 1955: 309–319), the influence of purely cultural determinants has also been empirically demonstrated (Hudson 1960; Deregowski et al. 1972; Deregowski 1993). A good example of how, in addition to motivations, emotions, and past experiences, “cultural variables are inevitably constituents of human perception” (Hallowell 1951: 166) is an anecdote repeatedly told by Hallowell (1951: 181, 1955d [1938]: 254–255, 1955h: 41–42, 1992: 61) about an Ojibwe party who found some fresh tracks not far from the shore of Birch Island, which they interpreted as prints left by the Giant Frog. Since this entity is a dangerous figure within the Ojibwe behavioral environment, perceiving the tracks as having been left by the creature forced the entire group “to depart at once, although they had expected to camp there for the night” (Hallowell 1955h: 41).

In his analyses, Hallowell aptly raised the issue of the influence of individual personality factors on perception; the case of Adam (Samuel) Bigmouth (Brown 2018), one of Hallowell’s consultants, being an example (Hallowell 1951: 181–186, 1955d [1938]: 257–259). During one spring hunt, Adam saw a stick being thrown at him and heard a series of different kinds of sounds, which he automatically interpreted as being caused (cracking branches and ice on a frozen lake) or emitted (loud yell) by a *wiindigoo*, a cannibalistic monster. According to Hallowell (1951: 184), it was particularly interesting that Bigmouth “himself was responsible for the perceptual structuralization of *this particular situation*. Another Indian in the same objective situation and belonging to the same cultural group may, or may not, have perceived *wiindigo*.” The factors that determined Adam’s experience were largely individual and idiosyncratic. His father, Northern Barred Owl (*Ochiibaamaansiins*), was an influential medicine man who claimed to have killed *wiindigoog* (plural of *wiindigoo*) in the past. Adam knew many stories about horrible cannibals and was interested in them. As a child, he saw a *wiindigoo* and told his father about it. Although he also became a conjurer and a medicine man, Adam never earned a reputation that would match that of his father. Furthermore, Adam’s results in the Rorschach test were extraordinary – unlike others, he gave one whole and quick answer to each card, but at the same time his “whole

answers" (the so-called "whole response" relates to the overall view of the image and may indicate the intellectual and leadership abilities of the testee) "were not particularly good ones" (Hallowell 1951: 185). Thus, Hallowell (1951: 185) reasoned that the behavioral environment of an individual is not simply the result of cultural determinism; it links the individual's personal situation to "culturally constituted factors in perception".

Ontologically, Adam Bigmouth's encounter with *wiindigoo* is instructive in the sense that it illustrates a situation in which the Ojibwe self "is not oriented to a behavioral environment in which a distinction between human beings and supernatural beings is stressed. The fundamental differentiation of primary concern to the self is how other selves rank in order of power" (Hallowell 1955f [1954]: 181). To Hallowell, the key to understanding the ontology and worldview of the Ojibwe is, consequently, the concept of the person, although from an ethnoscientific perspective it should be considered a covert category (Berlin et al. 1968) just like the "self", which was identified with the "person" by Hallowell (1955f [1954]: 172) at some point: "Although there is no single term in Ojibwa speech that can be satisfactorily rendered into English as «self,» nevertheless, by means of personal and possessive pronouns, the use of kinship terms, and so on, the Ojibwa Indian constantly identifies himself as a person."

On the one hand, Hallowell does not refer to the Maussian tradition¹⁹ that historicizes the "self", and on the other hand, he rejects those psychological positions that tend to define "person" as "human being", or, as Howard C. Warren's (1934: 197) dictionary states, "a human organism regarded as having distinctive characteristics and social relations". The reason lies in the very ontology of the Ojibwe, where the category of "person" includes both humans (*anishinaabeg*) and non-humans, for whom Hallowell reserved the term "other-than-human persons". The importance of this distinctive categorial perspective is visible in the way the kinship term "grandfather" is used: "It is not only applied to human persons but to spiritual beings who are persons of a category other than human. In fact, when the collective plural «our grandfathers» is used, the reference is primarily to persons of this latter class" (Hallowell 1960a: 21–22).²⁰ The already mentioned *wiindigoog* are also an example of the inclusiveness of the "person" category. They cannot be considered spiritual beings in the Western sense,²¹ and the Ojibwe ontology classifies them either as giants wandering through the woods in winter and spring, as creatures created by a sorcerer "out of a dream", or as people transformed into cannibals by sorcery (Hallowell 1955d [1938]: 256). Hallowell (1958: 81, 1960a: 23), calling for a review of the culturally constituted notion of "social relations", came close to Hans Kelsen's (1943: 24–48) understanding of animism as a personalistic

¹⁹ Marcel Mauss's (1985) famous essay, which Hallowell knew, was not translated into English until 1979.

²⁰ There is no unambiguous equivalent for the noun "grandfather" in the Ojibwe language because a personal prefix ("my", "your", "his/her") always goes with the dependent word stem *-mishoomis-* (Nichols, Nyholm 1995). Hallowell uses the collective plural "our grandfathers" to mean *aadizookaanag*, which is not a kinship term in the classical sense.

²¹ This problem refigures Istvan Praet's (2009) "Monster" concept.

interpretation of nature, as well as to David Krech's and Richard S. Crutchfield's (1948: 9–11) psychological concept of social "person objects" (which don't have to be human, whose "psychological presence" is as important as a physical one, and which – as the perceived loci of causality, power, and reciprocal reactivity – are endowed with mobility, capriciousness, and sensitivity). Historically, the impact of these ideas on the Hallowellian theory of the person cannot be overestimated.

Hallowell set the discussion on the problem of personhood in the context of linguistic anthropology, which at the time was marked by analyses based on a set of assumptions that Sapir's student, Harry Hoijer (1954), called the "Sapir-Whorf hypothesis". Hallowell drew attention to the interplay of perception and cognition with the obligatory grammatical categories of the Ojibwe language. From the linguistic point of view, numerous nouns describing plants and abiotic objects in *Anishinaabemowin* and other Algonquian languages can be classified as animate. Hallowell (1960a: 24), however, was far from embracing linguistic determinism and emphasized that "[m]ore important than the linguistic classification of objects is the kind of vital functions attributed to them in the belief system and the conditions under which these functions are observed or tested in experience." In his opinion, this can explain "the fact that what we view as material, inanimate objects – such as shells and stones – are placed in an «animate» category along with «persons» which have no physical existence in our world view" (Hallowell 1960a: 24). For example, to assign shells called *miigisag* to the linguistic category of "inanimate" would be, according to Hallowell (1960a: 24), inconsistent with the context of the Ojibwe worldview and ceremonial practices, because of the role these shells played in the *Midewiwin* (Grand Medicine Society).

Hallowell (1955g [1939]: 28, 1955i [1954]: 109, 1958: 65, 1960a: 24) repeatedly quoted an anecdote about a conversation he had with one of his consultants. Elderly Alex ("Alec") Keeper, aka *Giiwiich* (Hallowell's second most important interlocutor after William Berens), when asked if all stones are alive, answered: "Some are" (Hallowell 2010: 44). As early as in the 1930s, this experience made Hallowell aware of the trap of excessive generalizations about animism. In the 1960 article, he stated: "The Ojibwa do not perceive stones, in general, as animate, any more than we do. The crucial test is experience. Is there any personal testimony available?" (Hallowell 1960a: 25). And further: "If, then, stones are not only grammatically animate, but, in particular cases, have been observed to manifest animate properties, such as movement in space and opening of a mouth, why should they not on occasion be conceived as possessing animate properties of a «higher» order?" (Hallowell 1960a: 25–26).

In the culturally constituted Ojibwe worldview, the notion of the impersonal course of nature, as well as the division between natural and supernatural, makes no sense, and therefore the claim that the Ojibwe personify natural objects is groundless (Hallowell 1960a: 28–30). Thus, to Hallowell, the idea that personification is the result of socialization (Bird-David 1999: S78) would have been difficult to accept. What can be said is that the Ojibwe social relationships

“are correlative with their more comprehensive categorization of «persons»” (Hallowell 1960a: 23), and that the latter is related to culturally formed cognitive orientation and the presence of a specific psychological set.

Sometimes entities belonging to the “other-than-human persons” class who are *aadizookaanag* (beings present in sacred seasonal narratives, with which, as we recall, they are polysemous) or *bawaaganag* (dream visitors bestowing blessings), or entities that are also encountered in everyday life, such as the sun and the moon (*giizis*), are not anthropomorphic by nature (anthropomorphism is understood here as human appearance). Thus Hallowell (1960a: 30) asked: “What constant attributes do unify the concept of «person»? What is the essential meaningful core of the concept of person in Ojibwa thinking?” He offered the answer in a series of anecdotes. What is revealed in their light is an image of a person’s constitutive traits that includes: cognitive abilities, autonomy, and teleology of action (related to the self), the ability to metamorphose (related to the body and the possessed power), and, in certain cases, incorporation into an independent sociofamilial order, the structure of which is represented by the social reality of the Ojibwe themselves (this trait concerns, for example, the world of Thunderbirds).

The person’s external form can be transformed but his or her soul, or the spirit within (*ojichaagwan*), constituting the core of the self is “uniform, constant, visually imperceptible and vital” (Hallowell 1955f [1954]: 177). External manifestations do not define “categorical differences in the core of being” (Hallowell 1960a: 35). Moreover, in special circumstances, not only the exteriority of being may change, but so may (at least to some extent) the perspectival perception of the surrounding world. Both of these issues are well illustrated in the sacred story mentioned by Hallowell (1960a: 32–33, 1992: 66) about a man who went to the land above the earth inhabited by the Thunderbirds (*binesiwag*), following his murdered wife, who was in fact an immortal Thunderbird transformed into a woman. In the celestial world “[h]e finds himself brother-in-law to beings who are the «masters» of the duck hawks, sparrow hawks, and other species of this category of birds he has known on earth. He cannot relish the food eaten, since what the Thunder Birds call «beaver» are to him like the frogs and snakes on this earth (a genuinely naturalistic touch since the sparrow hawk, for example, feeds on batrachians and reptiles)” (Hallowell 1960a: 33). This example is not only ontological, but truly cosmological. In its light, it is not difficult to guess why both Phillippe Descola (2013) and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (1998, 2015) referred to Hallowell’s article: the former’s vision of animism based on an ontological model of subjects’ similar “interiorities” and different “physicalities”, and the latter’s perspectivism based on the concepts of “multinaturalism” and ontologically shifting subjective viewpoints are both complementary to the given example and may constitute a theoretical formulation of its specific aspects.

One of the distinctive attributes of a “person” in both the “other-than-human” and “human” (e.g., sorcerer) categories is the ability to physically metamorphose. Having quoted Stith Thompson (1946: 258) stating that the transformation belongs

to the repertoire of folk tales all over the world – although “[m]any of such motifs are frankly fictitious, but a large number represent persistent beliefs and living tradition” – Hallowell (1960a: 35) emphasized that in the case of the Ojibwe, one deals with the latter situation. A living or deceased human being under certain circumstances can take the form of an animal, but not every animal can take the form of a human, because only some animals belong to the class “other-than-human persons” and only “persons” are capable of metamorphosis (Hallowell 1992: 67). Additionally, the Ojibwe “believe that a human being consists of a vital part, or *soul*, which, under certain circumstances may become detached from the body, so that it is not necessary to assume that the body part, in all cases, literally undergoes transformation into an animal form” (Hallowell 1960a: 38). Therefore, the body of a dangerous sorcerer may remain in a wigwam, but his soul in the eyes of another person may take the form of a bear, the soul of the deceased child may reveal itself to her grandfather in the form of a little bird, etc. (Hallowell 1960a: 38).

The ability to metamorphose, according to Hallowell (1960a: 39), unites people and other-than-human persons in a single behavioral environment, but what separates them is the power that is determined by the very ability to transform. Since the obtained and retained power is gradable and of varied types, within the Ojibwe worldview – or, more precisely, in the Ojibwe “power-control belief system” (Black 1977a) – there is an ontological hierarchy of power, at the top of which there are the other-than-human persons of the *aadizookaanag* category. People occupy lower positions and are not equal to one another. They can search for means of increasing their power among other-than-human persons such as the *aadizookaanag* or the “masters” of animal species.

The contact with powerful other-than-human persons is possible during conjuring, when they can be heard outside the ceremonial lodge, or in a dream, when they are both heard and seen. Significantly, the experiences gained in a dream are not ontologically different from those experienced in reality, and thus dreams are an integral part of the Ojibwe biography. The *bawaaganag* (sg. *bawaagan*) – visitors to a sleeping person – address him or her as “grandchild”. People may “receive important revelations that are the source of assistance to them in the daily round of life, and, besides this, of «blessings» that enable them to exercise exceptional powers of various kinds” (Hallowell 1960a: 41). The details of such dreams are taboo, as is telling the *aadizookaanag* out of season. All beings belonging to the “person” category are a part of the same axiological and moral system: “This is why moral obligations can arise between the Ojibwa and «our grandfathers,» as in the case of hunters and the «owners» of animal species” (Hallowell 1992: 67). Moreover, “it is assumed by any Ojibwa individual that, with the cooperation of both human and other-than-human persons, it is possible to achieve a good life” (Hallowell 1963: 293), i.e., *bimaadiziwin*, “life in the fullest sense, life in the sense of longevity, health and freedom from misfortune” (Hallowell 1960a: 45; see also Gross 2014: 205–224).

According to Hallowell (1960a: 43), the category of “person” is a key aspect of the Ojibwe ontology, one that guarantees the psychological coherence of their worldview, and “permeates the content of their cognitive processes”. Consequently, the existence of the persons themselves is inextricably linked with the Ojibwe notion of causality: “*Who* did it, *who* is responsible, is always the crucial question to be answered” (Hallowell 1960a: 45). The culturally structured cognitive set inevitably leads to a search for explanations in personalistic terms, and may concern such diverse problems as cosmogony (explained by the activity of trickster *Wiisakejaak*), illness (explained by the activity of a sorcerer or one’s own wrongful act in the past), or even the case of the 1940 forest fire, which was explained by the acculturated Ojibwe as the result of a diversion carried out by a German spy (Hallowell 1958: 80, 1960a: 45). Answering the question of what a person is, Hallowell (1960a: 43) wrote:

Speaking as an Ojibwa, one might say: all other “persons” – human or other than human – are structured the same as I am. There is a vital part which is enduring and an outward appearance that may be transformed under certain conditions. All other “persons,” too, have such attributes as self-awareness and understanding. I can talk with them. Like myself, they have personal identity, autonomy, and volition. I cannot always predict exactly how they will act, although most of the time their behavior meets my expectations. In relation to myself, other “persons” vary in power. Many of them have more power than I have, but some have less. They may be friendly and help me when I need them but, at the same time, I have to be prepared for hostile acts, too. I must be cautious in my relations with other “persons” because appearances may be deceptive.

Mary B. Black (1977b: 91), aka Mary Black Rogers, who conducted her own fieldwork among the Ojibwe of Minnesota and Ontario in the 1960s and 1970s, pointed out that “[i]ndividuals of both groups of Ojibwa displayed the typical tendency to speak only for themselves and of the things they had known through experience. The experience of each individual being different, and also private, they explicitly anticipated that others’ accounts would differ from their own, even on factual and cognitive matters.” In her opinion, the Ojibwe categories are unstable and “empirically antitaxonomic” (Black 1977b: 99).

Black (1977b: 101) emphasized the importance of power attributed to certain beings when classifying them (power itself is understood as the ability to change the external form, to appear in someone’s dream or vision, and to control events concerning both the world and people). There is a general agreement that certain beings are more powerful than others, but it is also assumed that appearances can be dramatically unreliable: “A poor forlorn Indian dressed in rags might have great power; a smiling, amiable woman, or a pleasant old man, might be a sorcerer”, as Hallowell (1960a: 40) wrote.

Although ontological categorizations of the Ojibwe mark their presence already at the level of perception, the cultural structuring of the outlook on the world

concerns the conceptual analysis of past events to the same extent. Such a reflection may be influenced by the ideology of power, as well as the idea of the deceptiveness of appearances that result in uncertainty with regard to the power balance in a given situation. As Black (1977b: 103) suggested: "For the essence (the only stable aspect) of the objects one is encountering at a given moment is often *not expected to be known until some later moment* – sometimes after a considerable period of time. It is quite satisfactory, and the better part of caution, to leave the matter ambiguous until then." The constituent of the behavioral environment presented in this way, Black (1977b: 104) named a "«wait-and-see» component" – once a dead pelican was found and a storm came a person knew that he had met a Thunderbird, it is known that an old man had heard the *wiindigoo* because he died the following spring, it becomes obvious that someone had seen a sorcerer turned into a bear because that someone got sick and died, someone's fishing trip didn't go well, so probably *memegwesiwaag* had been involved (Black 1977b: 102-103).

Black (1977b: 92), who saw Hallowell as "among many other things, an early ethnoscientist", took it upon herself to organize the Ojibwe folk taxonomy, which was presented in Hallowell's writings solely in anecdotal form. Her own cognitively oriented field research problematized the categorization proposed by Hallowell. In light of that research, not only the taxonomic subclass of "other-than-human persons" (unsurprisingly), but also the "persons" class itself is not ethnographically obvious.

The animate participle *bemaadiziwaad*, which Black (1969: 175, 1977a: 143) translated as "those who are living", "those who continue in the state of being alive" (or even "those who have power"), is a head-term in the Ojibwe taxonomy on living things.²² Within this taxonomic set, the animate noun *anishinaabeg* means "Ojibwe", but also "Indigenous people" when it is juxtaposed with the words signifying non-Indigenous people. However, semantically it can also function as "«people» or «human beings» when contrasted with «large animals,» «small animals,» «insects,» «birds,» etc." (Black 1969: 175). The crucial issue here is that the word *bemaadiziwaad* is also used contextually – sometimes it only refers to people, sometimes it refers to all living things. The question Black (1969: 178) raised is whether the Ojibwe speakers "do in fact hold a concept of *people* distinct from that of «Indians» and from that of «living things.»" The answer involves taking the context into account. That is why one of Black's bilingual interlocutors, when asked about the kinds of people there are, replied by enumerating representatives of successive racially classified human groups, using the animate noun *inini*, which means "man". In a later conversation, however, the same consultant changed the word *inini* to *bemaadizid* (singular of *bemaadiziwaad*), which he translated into English "person", adding that "[t]his was a better word since it did not specify man, woman, or child, but covered them all" (Black 1969: 180).

²² The most powerful representatives of the *bemaadiziwaad* category are known as "*bemaaji'iwe-magak*, «those who bring life into something» (and naturally they can also take life out of someone, *onisaan*)" (Matthews, Roulette 2018: 183).

Considering the above, it would be a mistake to extend the meaning of *bemaadizid* as a “person” (which should be read as contextually appropriate when *bemaadizid* is used to name a human or other being because of its specific characteristics) to the category *bemaadiziwaad* understood as “all living things”. Consequently, the mere introduction of the classificatory term “person” may raise reasonable doubts. According to Black (1977b: 95–96), such a measure can only be structurally explained as a result of Hallowell’s taxonomic needs:

One of his continuing arguments was that the Ojibwa do not necessarily share our Western dichotomies of natural and supernatural, human and other-than-human, dreams and waking experience – dichotomies that we sometimes mistakenly extend to our ethnographic descriptions. If the Ojibwa recognize a class of beings who are not “human beings” but are closer to human beings than to other classes of the animate world, this calls for the union of the “human beings” class and the entities who are close to human beings. Hallowell therefore introduced a superordinate class “persons,” allowing this unlabeled group of entities to be simply “other-than-human persons,” that is, all members of the “person” class that are not “human beings.” This makes complete sense, taxonomically, with the inferred category validated by its presumed possession of common attributes that distinguish it from other classes of “living things.” (Black 1969a [Black 1969] validates an unlabeled category in similar manner. My analysis, however, did not support the introduction of a class such as Hallowell’s “persons.”)

Thus we see how far Hallowell went in following the structural requisites of ethnoscience, albeit embedded and almost disguised in his reports and lacking methodological specification.

Conclusions: Hallowell and the “new animism”

At the beginning of the 21st century, Graham Harvey (2005) coined, or rather recast (Bouissac 1989; see also Bird-David 1999: 579), the term “new animism” to describe a new anthropological understanding of animism that derived from a set of ethnography-based interpretations that were not rooted in Edward B. Tylor’s (1871) approach. According to Harvey (2005: xi), “[a]nimists are people who recognize that the world is full of persons, only some of whom are human, and that life is always lived in relationship with others”, and therefore the new explanations are to emphasize the issue of “relationality: the notion that personhood is not the possession of a certain sort of non-relational, interior property (e.g. being self-conscious, or having a spirit or mind), but is instead constituted by interactions between beings. That is, rather than think in terms of individuality or selfhood, animist ontologies view persons as constituted by the shifting interactions of continuously negotiable relational acts” (Harvey 2019: 80). This approach is close to the theses of Nurit Bird-David (1999) but not to the ones formulated by Hallowell, who focused on the notions of selfhood and *ojichaagwan*

present in Ojibwe thought. In addition, according to Hallowell (1963: 273, 281), indeed “from the Ojibwa point of view, «social interaction» with persons of the other-than-human class is not metaphorical”, but at the same time there are “two basic categories of «social» relationship that are implicit in the Ojibwa world view: (a) interpersonal relations between human beings and other-than-human persons; (b) interpersonal relations between human beings.” There are some similarities between these two types of relationships that stem from the fact that all persons belong to the same moral system, but there are also certain differences.

Regardless of these issues, Harvey (2005: 3, 17–20) considered Hallowell the foundational figure of the “new animism” theory, and with these words he concluded the first edition of his influential book:

We have never been separate, unique or alone and it is time to stop deluding ourselves. Human cultures are not surrounded by “nature” or “resources”, but by “a world full of cacophonous agencies”, i.e. many other vociferous persons. We are at home and our relations are all around us. The liberatory “good life” begins with the respectful acknowledgement of the presence of persons, human and other than-human, who make up the community of life. It continues with yet more respect and relating (Harvey 2005: 212).

It should be noted here that Harvey’s “new animism” is not only a proposal in the field of history of ideas, or even an attempt to describe the nature of animism more accurately – it is a moral and ideological project that ought to be treated as such.

By the time the collection of essays *Culture and Experience* was published in 1955, Hallowell’s position in post-war American anthropology started losing prominence. His work, highly regarded primarily among the “Algonquianists who may be considered in one way or another «Hallowellian»” (Stocking 2004: 243), was eventually noticed by non-American scholars. It is thanks to them that Hallowell’s concepts still have their place within the framework of world anthropology, and their “fingerprints” can be seen, for example, in Bird-David’s (1999, 2018) notions of “superpersons” and “relatives”, in Descola’s (1996, 2013) typology of ontological combinations, or in Viveiros de Castro’s (1998, 2004) formulation of an ethnotheory of exchangeable subjective perspectives and predator-prey power dynamics. In recent decades, the essay *Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View* has become the subject of the greatest, if not sole, interest, despite the specific problems associated with its reception. Tim Ingold’s (2000: 89–110) analysis of Hallowell’s essay may serve as a good example, as both the analysis itself and the conclusions drawn from it should be considered deceptive. In his text, Ingold (2000: 103–104) wrote, for instance, that the Ojibwe self is relational in Bird-David’s terms and is processual in nature. He contrasted the Western and the Ojibwe models of the person, postulating that both center on different notions of the self. In doing so, Ingold referred to Hallowell, taking the latter’s claims out of context: “Any inner-outer dichotomy, with the human skin as a boundary, is psychologically

irrelevant" (Hallowell 1955i [1954]: 88, as cited in Ingold 2000: 103). These words, however, come from the paper *The Self and Its Behavioral Environment* and concern two key psychological concepts present in the title, which (in contrast to Ingold's dichotomous and speculative schema) allow to address the universal problem of human cognitive organization and experience. The lack of contextualization of the phenomenological aspect of Hallowell's analyses with the broader theoretical and methodological scope to which these analyses belong is probably the biggest wrongdoing on the part of his current interpreters.

Hallowell was a complex figure and his concepts are equally elaborate – not because of the style in which they are presented (which is remarkably intelligible), but because of their paradigmatic setting and its consequences. Leaving aside Hallowell's interest in the cultural definition of the person (which predated the emergence of interpretive anthropology), a large part of his work allows us to see him as a pioneer of sociobiology (and thus indirectly of evolutionary psychology) and of ethnoscience (and indirectly of cognitive anthropology); a representative of the theory of cultural evolution and a supporter of the psychodynamic approach in cultural research, who despite applying psychoanalytic concepts and methods was usually inclined to distance himself from Freudian orthodoxy. This scientific profile makes Hallowell an ambiguous figure, and the "tension in Hallowell's work between cultural relativism and evolutionary universalism" suggested by George W. Stocking Jr. (2004: 246) is, without doubt, one of the most interesting aspects of his legacy.

Two years before his death, Hallowell (1972: 60) wrote: "Reliable knowledge of reality in any scientific sense need not be assumed to be a necessary condition for either biological adaptation or cultural adjustment to the actualities of human existence. Man is an animal who has been able to survive by making cultural adaptations in which his own imaginative interpretations of the world have been fed back into his personal adjustment to it." This striking statement deserves special praise since such an idea – theorizing a situation where the goal of the evolutionary processes is not so much to increase cognitive competence in order to discover objective truths about the world but to perceive the world in a way that brings the greatest adaptive benefits – has only just begun to gain a major foothold (Tooby, Cosmides 2001; Hoffman 2019).

The terms "person" and "other-than-human person" are still the most popular of Hallowellian concepts, although researchers and commentators using and abusing them are not always fully aware of their ethnographic origins and the theoretical context in which they should be understood. No less important are the terms "behavioral environment" and "behavioral evolution" (to Hallowell they were part of the same anthropological project) that are still waiting for both recognition and re-introduction into the mainstream of cultural anthropology. Perhaps those who will put them back in the academic spotlight will be evolutionarily and cognitively oriented anthropologists.

Today the anthropological theory of the "new animism" comprises a variety of concepts including Bird-David's (1999) relational epistemology, Descola's

(1992, 1996) animic system, Hornborg's (2006) "relational" ontology, Ingold's (2000, 2006) animic ontology, Kohn's (2013) ecology of selves, and Viveiros de Castro's (1998, 2004, 2015) perspectivism. What has been a powerful force of intellectual inspiration for their authors and what can still be considered one of the markers of their conventional identity is the Hallowellian concept of the person, which, paradoxically, should be seen as a product of anthropological heuristics. Most probably the "new animism", at least the anthropological one, is also a product of heuristics – but a metatheoretical one.

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SUMMARY

A. Irving Hallowell's research on the Ojibwe animism

Alfred Irving Hallowell (1892–1974), a seasoned researcher of the Ojibwe culture, is known today primarily as a precursor of the anthropological theory of the “new animism”. A student of Franz Boas and a friend of Edward Sapir, he was not only a prominent figure of the culture and personality school, but also proved to be one of the most interesting psychological anthropologists of the 20th century. His works on the Ojibwe indigenous taxonomy prefigured the achievements of ethnoscience, and those on the evolution of human behavior adumbrated the development of sociobiology. Conducted in the 1930s, Hallowell's fieldwork among the Berens River Ojibwe resulted in numerous academic papers, one of which – the 1960 *Ojibwa Ontology, Behavior, and World View* – years later became particularly influential in anthropological research on animism. This article presents Hallowell's intellectual biography and discusses his research on the Ojibwe culture along with the concepts he used or developed, concepts that for many researchers became the key to unlocking new conceptualizations of the problem of animism.

Keywords: animism, behavioral environment, Ojibwe, ontology, person, psychological anthropology

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Negotiating a human. Viveiros de Castro – Descola – Turner

Structuralism and the start of negotiations

The wordplay in the title of Claude Lévi-Strauss' *The Savage Mind* is well known. *La Pensée Sauvage* refers to both the “savage” mind and the “wild pansy”. Few people, however, pay attention to the idea expressed by the cover of the original edition of this volume. On the frontpage there is a flower, whereas on the back cover there is a wolverine (Lévi-Strauss 1962). As Terry S. Turner pointed out, it was a way the main message of the book was coded: “The human mind, in its natural state, is constituted by the relation between the sensuous forms of the natural world and the natural mental faculties of perception and association” (Turner 2009: 10). The pages in-between with text written by Lévi-Strauss are, in his opinion, content created by subjective consciousness that functions within a sphere called “culture”. However, structural analysis leads him to see a certain paradox – people who create representations that are supposed to confirm their distinctness from nature are not successful at all. Their constructs finally turn out to be merely epiphenomena of nature. The pansy, the text and the wolverine are of the same world.

In this perspective, structuralism appears as a set of procedures designed to show not how people differ from nature, but that these divisions are not as obvious and unambiguous as we think they are. To be exact, in *Elementary Structures of Kinship*, Lévi-Strauss still treated the dichotomy of nature/culture universally

(Lévi-Strauss 1969: 489–490), but since *The Savage Mind*, he has paid more attention to its fluidity (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 128). He also recognized that, since our minds are nature thinking about itself, we must share many of other beings' qualities. For Turner, that was when structuralism opened up the possibility of "a more radical theoretical exploration of the sharing of mind or spirit by humans with animals and other natural entities" (Turner 2009: 13). In this respect, the author of *The View from Afar* (Lévi-Strauss 1985) was perhaps most direct in his essay *Jean-Jacques Rousseau Founder of the Sciences of the Man* (Lévi-Strauss 1983). Claude Lévi-Strauss manifested his anti-humanistic attitude by pointing out and evaluating two cultural models of the human being's relation to the surrounding world. In the first one, he depicted humans as beings functioning between nature and culture. He linked the second one with classification systems, by means of which humans have been radically separated from the world of nature. Criticising the anthropocentric attitude characteristic of Euro-Atlantic cultures, Lévi-Strauss pointed to "the myth of the exclusive dignity of human nature, which subjected nature itself to a first mutilation" (Lévi-Strauss 1983: 41). In his view, this mutilation is indirectly connected with the crystallization of the modern meaning of the term "nature" and the domain of phenomena considered as natural, universal and separated from the social world. The emergence of further criteria distinguishing between humans and other beings ultimately served, according to this approach, to depreciate certain human groups as well. The culturally stable vision of humanity went hand in hand with justifications for the separation of one's own people from strangers. While former were considered to be people, latter were not (Viveiros de Castro 2013; Pacukiewicz, Pisarek 2017: 248).

In this introduction I wished to present a part of the intellectual backdrop of the debate on how a given culture constructs worlds inhabited by various "intentional beings", and how it developed within the contemporary cultural anthropology. Interestingly, this debate is particularly lively within the community of scholars focusing on South American indigenous people. It is probably, at least in part, due to the impact of Lévi-Strauss' work and heritage. Above all, however, it should be ascribed to a number of insights into the relational forms between indigenous people and the natural world (Descola 1994; Århem 1996; Lima 1996; Bird-David 1999).

The aim of this article, however, is not searching for sources of such reflection, but trying to reconstruct three anthropological models related to it. Each among these models concerns manners and effects of negotiating what is human. Each is based on specific assumptions about the nature of the relationship between nature and culture. I intend to compare these models and describe their potential for expanding the field of anthropological research. I would also like to take a look at how they relate to the domains of what is human and what is cultural in Western knowledge discourses.

I will focus on the concepts developed by three anthropologists: Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Phillipe Descola and Terry S. Turner. They all conducted research among Amerindians, each in his investigations referred to the structural

imagination of Claude Lévi-Strauss, and each considered similar theoretical and methodological problems. Their discussion has become one of the most important debates in cultural anthropology of the 21st century. I will also use the framework developed by Terry S. Turner, to outline the limitations of this discussion.

Negotiating perspectives

To understand how Viveiros de Castro interprets Euro-Atlantic ways of thinking about what is human and what is cultural, it is necessary to explore his understanding of perspectivism. This is the central point of reference for the criticism of Western, inter-species distinctions, one that Viveiros de Castro uses to dismantle the concept of “nature” (Viveiros de Castro 2013, 2014: 55–56).

The “perspectival quality” of Amerindian thought – characteristic of many groups living in South America – consists in the deeply internalised assumption that “the world is inhabited by different sorts of subjects or persons, human and nonhuman, which apprehend reality from distinct points of view” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 469). Let us develop this general statement by reconstructing Viveiros de Castro’s argument. First of all, he pointed out that for us the situation is simple: people see themselves as human beings. Using the same logic, an animal, looking at another animal, also sees an animal. Accordingly, spirits are spirits to each other.

However, if we look at the perspectival approach to the world, we find that predators (such as jaguars) and ghosts perceive humans as prey animals. On the other hand, prey animals look at people and see ghosts or predators. Moreover, animals see themselves as human beings. They have their human homes and customs. Their food is not blood but, for example, manioc beer. Feathers are not something natural for them, but decorations.¹ Their life in a group is ruled by the same laws that govern human societies. Viveiros de Castro summarises this way of thinking as follows:

In sum, animals are people, or see themselves as persons. Such a notion is virtually always associated with the idea that the manifest form of each species is a mere envelope (a ‘clothing’) which conceals an internal human form, usually only visible to the eyes of the particular species or to certain trans-specific beings such as shamans. This internal form is the ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ of the animal: an intentionality or subjectivity formally identical to human consciousness, materializable, let us say, in a human bodily schema concealed behind an animal mask (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 470–471).

¹ A schema explaining the complex relationships between beings and their points of view can be found in César E. Giraldo Herrer (2018: 26).

Interestingly, similar systems of organizing and conceptualizing the world of humans and animals can be found all over the world, especially among hunter-gatherer people. They rarely encompass all living organisms. We must, therefore, assume that Viveiros de Castro applies a far-reaching generalisation, which is supposed to reveal a principle that organizes human – nonhuman relations and which is an alternative to that prevalent in the West. Thus, our style of thinking is confronted with one that are radically different. At the same time, we should note that the analyses conducted by the Brazilian anthropologist are always based on ethnographic data – his own and other anthropologists' (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 49–63).

To explain what it is like to be human according to the perspectival interpretation, Viveiros de Castro refers to specific native mythological narratives. He points out that in many of the cosmogonical stories quoted by groups such as the Araweté, there is no distinction between humans and animals. All beings communicate with each other and belong to one category (Viveiros de Castro 2014: 156). But most importantly, in mythical stories, the process of separating human and animal spheres follows the logic opposite to the one constituting the backdrop of the theory of evolution. It is not humans who distinguish themselves from other species in time. In his article "Cosmological deixis and Amerindian perspectivism" Viveiros de Castro wrote: "The original common condition of both humans and animals is not animality but rather humanity" (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 472).

Thus, we begin to sketch the definition of the scope of what is human in perspectivism. The starting point for thinking about the social world is the common condition of all living beings. Therefore, the Amerindian perspective as deeply ecological – it extends the limits of what is human onto the worlds that we, in Europe, have excluded from its scope. It becomes a contemporary "ecosophy" (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1976).

However, it is not the final conclusion of the Brazilian anthropologist. Viveiros de Castro is interested in the general human condition in the thought systems he studies, which leads us, unexpectedly, to semiotics and to relationships between various Amerindian groups and their ethnographers. When the former said to the latter that they were humans, they did not think of themselves as a species, and more broadly – they did not think of themselves as belonging to any objectified category. Rather, they used the pronoun "we" to describe themselves. Only with time (in their relationships with ethnographers) ethnonyms became a way of defining one's own group. Previously, however, they were usually used to talk about others – those who were objectified.

The above example indicates that the question of being human may refer not only to the species and the associated reified category, but also to the field of deictic expressions. Therefore, subjectivity, which in perspectivism becomes the main determinant of humanity, should be seen as pertaining to semiotics. Viveiros de Castro's view on this is well illustrated in an excerpt from his lectures entitled *Cosmological Perspectivism in Amazonia and Elsewhere*:

“Subject” is the semiotic position correlated with the capacity to say “I” in a (...) virtual cosmological discourse. “Object,” by the same token, is that which is “talked” about. As will become clear in the following lectures, I am relying essentially on [Émile] Benveniste’s seminal work on “subjectivity in language” as expressed in the pronominal set. I use “person” as a synonym of “subject,” when wishing to mark the fact that persons are “objects” capable of acting as “subjects.” This notion of “person” is equally pronominal and can also be derived from Benveniste. My metaphors come, therefore, from semiosis, not production or desire (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 71).

Where in this concept, emerging at the intersection of indigenous discourses and scientific concepts (Kleczkowska 2018: 111) should we locate animals? They are accounted for in a distributive manner, which means that each species of living beings is treated as a separate entity class. However, they do not belong in any hierarchical order. For it is not possible to speak of “animality” as opposed to “humanity” in a situation, where a given language (as in the case in many Amerindian cultures) does not provide any collective expression that embraces this diversity as homogeneity at another level. Such an image of the world (although, for Viveiros de Castro, it is not about representation but, above all, about “embodied” dispositions), makes it necessary for us to rethink the opposition of nature and culture.

The former cannot be treated as an animal domain, just as culture ceases to be an exclusive domain of humanity (as we see it). No kind of creatures can be assigned to the superior, objectified category of nature. Humans and non-humans (in the Western sense) constitute a complex mosaic of entities defined solely in contextual terms. The human is one of many. This diversity and equivalence of intentional organisms makes each of them a potential subject. This is how humanity is understood from perspectivist viewpoints. It is directly connected with cultural order. This is where we encounter the most significant, non-intuitive, reversal of meanings. For if “*culture is the subject’s nature*” and “it is the form in which every subject experiences its own nature” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 477), the culture in question is seen in a different way than in the Western tradition of the imaginary order. It does not mean that Amerindians think of animals as human beings. The manoeuvrability of the relationship between different classes of existence is more important – to ascribe humanity to a being means to recognize that what a given animal is for another animal is the same as what a human being is for another human being, i.e. “the logical equivalence of the reflexive *relations*” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 477).

In perspectivism, talking about culture and nature is no longer unambiguous. The meanings underlying these concepts have been shaken by the establishment of relations between perspectival views and non-European cosmologies. This is an opportunity to develop a new model of the world: one in which there are many natures and one culture. Viveiros de Castro would like, first of all, to reverse the order established within the framework defined as cultural relativism.

It is the nature that takes on the character of a distributor, while the culture becomes an attribute associated with the deictic way of thinking about subjectivity. Such turn violates the anthropocentric point of view, because it challenges one of the central Western notions of the “physical continuity” and “metaphysical discontinuity” between humans and animals. In the semiotic approach proposed by perspectivism, the opposite is true:

(...) if Culture is the Subject's nature, then Nature is the form of the Other as body, that is, as the object for a subject. Culture takes the self-referential form of the pronoun 'I'; nature is the form of the non-person or the object, indicated by the impersonal pronoun 'it' (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 479).

Negotiating nature

Phillipe Descola proposes a different, though related, way of reconfiguring our thinking about human/animal relations. Successor to Claude Lévi-Strauss and Françoise Héritier in the Collège de France (the Chair of Anthropology of Nature), he based his concept on a reformulation of the object of anthropological research and the model of relations between living beings and the surrounding reality. For Descola every phenomenon can be actualised in different ways because of our ability to create relation of correspondence and opposition between selected qualities of everything we perceive. He builds upon some of Lévi-Strauss' ideas. When we read fragments of *The Raw and the Cooked*, the convergences are, actually, quite significant:

At the beginning of this introduction I explained that I had tried to transcend the contrast between the tangible and the intangible by operating from the outset at the sign level. The function of signs is, precisely, to express the one by means of the other. Even when very restricted in number, they lend themselves to rigorously organized combinations which can translate even the finer shades of the whole range of sense experience. We can thus hope to reach a plane where logical properties, as attributes of things, will be manifested as directly as flavors or perfumes; perfumes are unmistakably identifiable, yet we know that they result from combinations of elements which, if subjected to a different selection and organization, would have created awareness of a different perfume. Our task, then, is to use the concept of the sign in such a way as to introduce these secondary qualities into the operations of truth (Lévi-Strauss 1996: 14).

Descola seems to treat this concept in a radical way. Challenging the tradition of Boyle and Locke (Descola 2014: 272), he recognizes that in Hume's work we can find views which abolish the division into primary and secondary qualities. It is not Descola's idea to find one single plane of all phenomena, but he proposes to consider their multidimensionality as a distinctive feature (Descola 2014; Lloyd 2007).

Another important category necessary to understand shifts introduced by Descola is “worlding”, which he understands as a process of stabilization of certain features of “what happens to us” (Descola 2014: 272) and “of piecing together what is perceived in our environment” (Descola 2014: 272–273). This process depends both on the cognitive apparatus and the motor abilities of individual beings. Descola applied the *Umwelt* category, introduced by Jakob von Uexküll, to define perspective, stating that the relevant characteristics of a given environment can only be recognised and used from the position of a given biological form (Kull 2001). The way we move, reproduce or acquire food influences the way in which we experience the world of particular species and individuals.

However, Descola is not only interested in confirming these findings, but uses them as a basic model of the relationship between a human and the world around him or her. The world, therefore, appears primarily as a significant number of potential features and relations.

Material and immaterial objects of our environment are not in the heavens of eternal ideas, ready to be grasped thanks to our predispositions, nor are they merely social constructs giving shape and meaning to raw matter; they are only bundles of features, some of which we detect and some of which we ignore (Descola 2014: 273).

How does this process work? It is probably not spontaneous, nor is it deprived of regularity. According to Descola, it depends heavily on “ontological filters” which stabilize environmental affordances (Gibson 1977). Therefore, differences between human communities occur not only at the level of differently organized institutions, economic systems, values and models – these are only the results of more basic patterns organizing our lives within the world.

Thus “worlding” takes place within specific ontological regimes. Anthropology is to examine these regimes and ask questions about how human worlds are constituted at the cognitive and sensory-motor level. However, we are not dealing here with any universal matrix. An ontological filter is created as a result of interaction with the surrounding organisms – it is a way to coordinate human and nonhuman behaviours which, as soon as they stabilize, can be passed on intergenerationally as a cognitive schema.

This model of relations between individual beings – including the level at which affiliations connecting selected qualities of the world are constituted – is then used by Descola to undermine the dualism of nature and culture and to replace it with a dialectic view (Descola, Toro 2016). Like Bruno Latour, Descola recognizes that the opposition prevalent in Western discourses is based on an ethnocentric assumption that people can differ, but there is only one nature. This prevents us from examining the actual diversity of relations between humans and other beings living in the world, and from seeing the levels at which selected elements of the lived world combine as things and organisms identical to each other and existing in relation to other things and organisms equally separated from each other.

Only analysis of ontological regimes will enable exploration of various forms of interdependence between the order of nature and culture. It will also reveal the complexity of these relations and allow them to be conceptualized in a different way. For Descola, the basic distinction is an awareness of the difference between material processes and mental states, which is characteristic of every human collective. However, he emphatically distanced himself from the old, western opposition of body and mind. Rather, he recognises that this European dichotomy is one of many possible variations of the universal way in which the human species perceives the world. As I understand it, it is equivalent to the difference that Viveiros de Castro reduced to the “he” - “I/you” relationship, which then undergoes a series of reconfigurations.

Such frame allows Descola to build a schema containing four basic ontologies. Each of them is a model created through far-reaching generalization but derived from comparative research among groups living in different parts of the globe at different times. Each of them points to a different way of organizing relations between humans and nonhumans, and at the same time, reveals a specific type of tension between differently understood natures and cultures.

The first ontology Descola mentioned is “Animism”. It relates mainly to the Indians of South America, the indigenous peoples of Siberia and Southeast Asia. It is a system in which humans and nonhumans, constituting a common category of conscious beings, live within bilateral social relations (friendship, exchange, hostility, seduction). Animals are also imagined as individuals who lead lives in their own communities, organized similarly to human communities. The domain of social life is thus extended to include a number of nonhuman communities.

“Totemism” - the second *modus* - is linked with the cosmologies of Australian Aborigines. However, it is understood differently than in the classic work by Lévi-Strauss (Lévi-Strauss 1963). Within this ontology, different beings share common physical, behavioural, and ethical attributes, beyond the species’ boundaries. Thus, totem names are not biological taxa, but rather abstract qualities that identify all people and nonhumans belonging to a given totemic group (Brandenstein 1982; Descola 2006). For Descola, “totemism” is not only a classification system, but rather a regime alternative to “animism”. What distinguishes this regime is a different distribution of features which we tend to unambiguously associate with the order of nature and culture. Among the Australian Aborigines they permeate differently constructed classes of existence.

“Analogism” - the third ontology - is based on the conviction that the world is made up of entities characterized by various forms and substances. They are extremely fragmented, but often form complex networks of dependencies - for example, one that takes on the form of the Great Chain of Being (Descola 2013: 145). This, however, is only a consequence of imagining the world as a whole composed of an infinite number of separate elements. Descola claims that “Analogism can be seen as a hermeneutic dream of completeness” (Descola 2013: 145) and adds that tracing analogies, relations and entanglements arises from the need to seek continuity in a system devoid of such continuity.

“Naturalism” is the last of the four ontologies. It is related to the regimes governing Western modernity. Within this framework, people have established and objectified the sphere of nature, understood as a domain of determinism and order. Its opposite was the social space fully controlled by people – originators of signs, norms and values. Today, we are still witnessing the oscillation of scientific discourse, and often colloquial discourse, between the poles marked out by these two views, enabling both extremely constructivist and extremely naturalistic forms of interpreting the world around us.

Descola’s aim is to break down such dichotomies and interpretation patterns. As Latour noticed, he does it primarily by shifting nature from a “resource” to a “theme” (Latour 2009: 1.) Thus “naturalism” becomes an ontology that can be challenged through revealing its historical sources and relativizing the hidden ways in which it creates order in the world.

Negotiating culture

Terry S. Turner was very sceptical about these concepts. First of all, he pointed out upon a closer look at Amerindian ways of thinking about nature and people, it becomes obvious that they do not form a homogeneous philosophical system, nor a single, coherent cosmology. Turner, of course, realized that Viveiros de Castro and Descola used models based on various data, but he also pointed out that omitting discrepancies and contradictions that occur within or between selected societies makes it impossible to draw conclusions about one single vision of the world and of culture. He also emphasized that views expressed in Amazonian cultures should not be taken out of their context – unless, instead of understanding them, we wish to engage in a kind of philosophical exercise.

Given his critique, it is interesting to see whether Turner offers another framework, granting an original outlook on similar research problems. He does, indeed, and I will now use it to show limitations of two models described above.

First of all, Turner develops structuralist ideas presented by Viveiros de Castro and Descola, but gives them a different direction. He is in favour of a perspective centred around the distributive concept of culture, focusing on contextually embedded analyses, allowing to demonstrate the specificity of humans’ relation to the surrounding world within individual human-nonhuman groups. He is very cautious when making generalisations, and wherever possible, he refers to his own research among the Kayapo Indians. This is not, in my opinion, merely a precaution, but a strategy, whereby he resets the research area and reformulates Lévi-Strauss’ concept of structure. For Turner, it is a “series or group of internal transformations in the face of the process of development of existence” (Turner 2009: 37) – modifications based on transformation and construction of symbols, bodies and spiritual identities.

In other words, Turner recognized that in order to explore how culture, nature and subject are understood, one has to take a closer look at one or more groups

and see how complex gradation of mediation between different levels of human and nonhuman organisation takes place within them. Otherwise, even conceptual acrobatics won't lead us beyond the early structuralist concept of nature-culture relationship. This framework allows us to see that, irrespective of our efforts, the binary opposition of mutually exclusive classification categories, defined by the presence or absence of certain features, assigned to the selected entities, remains intact. Perspectivism and the scheme of four ontologies constitute attempts to go beyond this dichotomy, but in fact, they perpetuate it. Thus, they do not provide any insight into the perception of the world by representatives of non-Western cultures. Turner pointed out that both "nature" and "culture" are abstract concepts that can be used at different levels of generalization. They appear as abstractions but may also serve to define the character of specific communities and natural species (Turner 2009: 28).

So where should we start? Turner believes that we should revisit the ethnographic details provided by Viveiros de Castro and Descola. This will allow us to understand what "nature of culture" and the domain of nature can be for selected groups of South American Indians. The task is much more modest, as far as the scope of research is concerned, but not at all easier in terms of its objectives.

Turner noted that myths analysed by Viveiros de Castro indicate the importance of proto-cultural features of animals. They can use bow and arrow and make bonfires to cook meals. These skills, however, express a certain transitional state, since the essence of a fully developed culture is not so much to possess these qualities, as to have "the reflexive ability to produce the process of producing them, as a generalized and infinitely replicable form of activity" (Turner 2009: 20). It is "a reflexive process of meta-objectification, in an abstracted and generalized form: that is, of the process of objectification itself" (Turner 2009: 20).

Thus, culture does not exclude nature in this Amazon interpretation, nor is it equal to it – it serves rather to transform, preserve and reproduce it by creating subsequent meta-forms of earlier processes used in its processing. The cultural order is associated primarily with the ongoing transformations of nature. At the basic level, these transformations can be introduced by both humans and animals, plants and inanimate beings.

The Kayapo actually recognize that other beings have their own forms of home or language. Turner explains they can also see that these forms are completely different from the ones developed in human communities. The Kayapo do not recognize that they identify themselves in relation to other animals as humans identify themselves in relation to humans. Rather, they think that all living beings undergo a similar process, through which they shape and try to maintain the unity of "form" and "being": "orientation, forms of consciousness and energetic force that drives these processes constitute what we, and the indigenous peoples of Amazonia, call their spirits" (Turner 2009: 37). People and animals participate in this process in the same way. It occurs as the bodies grow, age and die. When we eat, drink, hunt, breed. This is the first level of transformation of the surrounding order and, at the same time, of its objectivization, accessible to all beings.

Turner emphasized that according to Kayapo, no one is born human right away, just as no one is born as a jaguar or an anteater. A human foetus is simply an animal, and so is an infant. However, as a child, it goes through successive stages of life, during which “natural” forms are transformed into hybrid ones. The Kayapo are beings connected with their social identities, perspectives and positions (such as maturity, adulthood, old age – manifesting themselves not only in the biological form of bodies, but also in ornaments, hairstyles, gestures). The physiological body is thus complemented by the “social body”. After death, however, the human is transformed into an animal again.

So, what is the difference between a human and an animal in this case? On the most basic level, there is none. Both undergo the same process of formation of a living creature having a soul. But humans, in addition, are able to carry out complex, multi-level transformations of all the “natural” elements that they use and that surround them.

In order to understand this process, one more point needs to be clarified. What is “nature” according to the Kayapo? In short, it is all that exists and lasts regardless of human activity. When a human being acts, culture appears, understood as

a “super-nature” (...) a qualitatively distinct order of existence contrasted to “nature” in a mutually exclusive binary contrast (...). The essence of this cultural increment is the application of natural transformational processes (such as fire) to themselves (as in the use of fire to make fire), thus generalizing and replicating what in nature remain relatively isolated processes (Turner 2009: 36).

This is how the indigenous people in the groups described by Turner see the differences between humans, animals, plants and objects. Structurally inspired analysis can demonstrate both a common ground and the dynamic emergence of differences between these orders.

Endless negotiations

Each of the models presented above allows us to extend the field of anthropological research, and each of them gives us the opportunity to have a fresh look at the terms used in the anthropological discourse. Each of them negotiates the scope of what is human, cultural and natural. But the way in which these negotiations proceed, and their goals differ significantly. In the last part of this article I will try to present a synthetic picture of each of these three strategies, used for rethinking the relationship between the human and the world. This picture will come to light when I place these strategies within Turner’s framework and use it as a tool to detect and demonstrate transformational structures upon which they are based. Introduction of the perspectivist model into the discourse of Western humanities came with clearly defined goals. Viveiros de Castro wanted

to dismantle the concept of “nature”. He considered it to be decolonization practice, based on the introduction of a subversive concept within the reified structures of philosophical discourse (Viveiros de Castro 2014: 92). He wished to lay bare the ontological categories, through which we think about our relationship with nature. How did he propose to do it? At the most basic level, of course, he presented perspectivism as an alternative to the Western way of conceptualizing the world. Perspectivism, however, is not a local ontology, which Viveiros de Castro described as an interesting peculiarity. It is rather a compact theoretical construct, built through re-evaluation of categories characteristic for Western discourses of knowledge.

The first attempt to challenge the reified order is the inversion of concepts of nature and culture. The one that was used as an attributive category is here included in the distributive one. Hence the multiplicity of natures, but only one culture. Viveiros de Castro shifted these concepts on a scale ranging from the abstract to the specific. He used classical anthropological differentiation to make the first strategic shift, creating a multinaturalistic perspective – non-intuitive, but thinkable, since it is only a variant within a structural system of transformations. The opposition is intact, but its poles are reversed.

However, this was not the end of the transformation, because Viveiros de Castro introduced the second opposition, whose aim was to strengthen the first one between the deictically and categorically conceptualized spheres of social order. Due to this shift, he was able to maintain a dualistic order, while introducing within it a new dynamic, allowing for shifts along the human/nonhuman axis and, above all, the redefinition of these categories. He also introduced a new type of relational subject that goes far beyond the “human”. Combining it with the order of culture, he strengthened its attributive character and extended its reach onto the sphere of all living beings. Nature, on the other hand, acquired the character of objectified, differentiated and distinguishable wholes, thus taking the place of culture in the structural model.

According to Viveiros de Castro, human/nonhuman and culture/nature thus form the basic matrix, built upon two principles of transformation – generality/specificity and deixis/categorisation. Such a scheme and its related interpretative ideas allow us to extend the scope of anthropological research and give us more freedom to explore different types of relationships between humans and other beings. However, they also allow us to describe only a few possible variants of these relationships. In the end, perhaps, this proposal should be treated as an attempt to transform the Western myth of the human (Viveiros de Castro, Danowski 2017: 6) by introducing additional transformation axes, and by extending its subject area.

Viveiros de Castro’s next move was to blur the line between the *emic* and the *etic* (Pike 1967; Harris 1976). On the one hand, we are dealing with a theoretical proposal deeply rooted in the analysis of specific cosmologies. It gives us an insight into the local ways of perceiving social and natural realities that are far removed from Western thinking styles. On the other hand, however, the Brazilian

anthropologist reduces them to modified notions, grounded in the humanist tradition. He clearly stated that his project was speculative and conducted within the scope of philosophical discourse. Thus, we see that perspectivism, although often presented as an indigenous construct, is a theory practiced only outside its original context, far from being a reconstruction of an *emic* vision of the world. This specific characteristics of perspectivism requires clarification. It was achieved by the combination of two incompatible orders. In Viveiros de Castro's work, *etic* gains meaning through *emic* and the distinction between *etic* and *emic* turns out to be unnecessary. Paradoxically, it upholds a sharp opposition between Western and non-Western knowledge systems, while the argument occurs only within the former, using concepts that are central for these systems.

Such understanding of perspectivism presents it as a decontextualized hybrid, drawing its strength from the game of equivocation. Significantly, for Viveiros de Castro this is not a simple logical error, which a good intercultural translation should avoid, but a well-developed intellectual strategy for the multifaceted transformation of Western imagination structures (Viveiros de Castro 2014: 87). The Brazilian anthropologist's goal is to trigger the practice of an anthropology built on the basis of non-Western imaginary constructs but using the already developed conceptual framework.

However, dissolution of the nature/culture opposition and transformation of the field with which this opposition is associated, involves two concessions. The first concerns the need to reduce the history of specific collectives, within which specific, dynamic and variable forms of world structuring are created, to atemporal structural models. The second, related concession involves the synchronous character of these models, which results from their positioning as unambiguously external to anthropological discourse. In order to generate subversive force within the discourse, they must be considered as radically foreign. As a result, one sharp opposition is replaced by another, contrasting the cosmologies of the Moderns and the Natives. It turns out that the division into the sphere of nature and culture and the human and nonhuman is relativized in Viveiros de Castro's work precisely by maintaining tension between the Western and the non-Western. One matrix used to produce the difference is replaced by another, equally durable.

Descola formulated his goals in a different way and used different strategies. First of all, he relativized the categories that have so far been essentialized. At the same time, he established a new point of reference – a universally accepted vision of the world, which enabled the description of structural relations between ontologies – a “relativistic universalism” (Descola 2013: 305) – one that will operate on the level of analysis and anthropological interpretation of the relations of continuity and discontinuity, identity and difference, similarities and differences established by people between the entities among which they live. Above all, however, it aimed to provide a distanced view of one of the central dogmas of Western thinking – a clear division into the sphere of nature and that of society (Descola 1996: 82.)

Viveiros de Castro placed recognition of equivocation as the driving force of radical change in his decolonization work. Descola, on the other hand, established an implicit “fifth ontology” (Kapferer 2014: 394) to describe various variants of relations between the previously separated spheres. It involved modified concept of the subject, which does not need to be transcendental, separated from the world and making it meaningful. It is enough that such subject recognizes other subjects. Culture ceases to be the subject’s attribute and the ability to distinguish intentional beings from inanimate matter behaving ruled by the laws of physics, becomes the subject’s virtue. In this way Descola built his framework on the *etic* level – upon categories developed within the Western knowledge systems that enable comprehensible interpretation of the solutions characteristic of other cultural contexts. In this way, he made it possible to distinguish, describe and compare many ontologies, which are primarily meant to be *emic* models, though within comprehensible frames achieved by means of *etic* categories. In fact, this arrangement of the relationship between *emic* and *etic* allows us to show tension between nature and culture and between human and non-human, as a series of categorization decisions based on the relationship between the distributive and attributive understanding of the natural and cultural spheres. Perhaps contrary to Descola’s intentions, the multi-quality world he described in his ontologies is reduced to a few classification strategies. In this way, however, the anthropologist is able to de-objectify, contextualize and typologize the Western distinction between nature and culture. These categories, however, become equivalent to the foundations of the “fifth ontology”: the relational subject and the relational world. Due to such a combination, it is possible to dismantle the ontological difference between humans and nonhumans imprinted in modern thinking. At the same time, however, such construct is a matrix superimposed on what is external and diverse, providing the basis for establishing basic criteria of difference, which, when objectified, form basic points of reference for the creation of the difference between pre-modern collectives and their ontologies and the Western thought system.

Among the scholars presented in this article, Turner appears to be a conservative, although he attempted a similar exercise. However, he abided by the framework of anthropological work delineated by Foucault, without trying to transform it in any way. For the French philosopher and historian anthropology was the discipline that undogmatically broadened meanings, casted doubt on and delivered a critique of the discursive figure of the “human”. By reaching out to border areas, anthropology creates an opportunity to forge relationships with various non-European intellectual, social and material forms in which human life functions are locked away (Foucault 2006: 335–346; Pacukiewicz 2015: 107; Pisarek 2018: 295). In constant, two-way translation between entangled *emic* and *etic* viewpoints, researchers are able to form understandable, yet unobvious intellectual constructs with the potential to transcend the foundations on which such constructs were built.

Turner does not attempt to reformulate the basic notional grid used by structuralists. He delivers a translation that shows one of the many ways in which we understand the problem we describe with the reiterated categories of nature and culture. This allows him to demonstrate the incoherence, diversity and transformations of views that emerge within the cultures under study. By maintaining a reflexive relationship between the *emic* and the *etic*, and still keeping an eye on the transitions between these orders, he is able to explain how the processes of creating attributive understanding, but in a variant far removed from our imaginations, can be studied within the framework of a distributive understanding of culture. By preserving the categories that lay foundations to our discourse, he diagnoses the character of their approximate equivalents in other systems of thought – he examines the relations between the human, nature and culture, understood in a different way. He also uses the structuralist toolbox to create a model of diachronic structural transformations, which reveal the dynamic character of these relationships within one of the researched collectives.

By composing his models within the distributive field of culture, Turner does not reduce the complexity of problems arising alongside ethnographic experience, and thus avoids furthering the Great Divide between the Modern and the rest of the world. At the same time, he shows something that Viveiros de Castro and Descola are missing – that the ontologies they described are static and synchronous constructs, which reduce complex processes of mythopractice and those through which the world is being structured. Instead of a timeless difference (which turns out to be the condition underlying the proposal of both the Brazilian and the French anthropologist – a condition enabling negotiation of what is human), Turner notices that these negotiations take place within each collective on many levels, in many situations and moments connected, for example, with the life of an individual. He also shows that such negotiations have no end, as they are always the result of an encounter between structure and events. This makes them unfinished, just like Lévi-Strauss' myths.

Conclusions

In the article I compared three models that constitute attempts of extending the field of anthropological research beyond the domains of what is human and what is cultural. I have presented the possibilities, but also the limitations involved in the proposals related to the most recent resurrection of structuralist thought. I also put forward a diagnosis that the attempt to de-essentialise the categories of nature within these models was based, to a large extent, on the redefinition of the category of the subject and the broadening of the sphere of beings that can take on the position of a subject. This, in turn, destabilised the category of culture, which – in its attributive character – served to strengthen the position of the human as distinguished from the world.

The first of the presented strategies additionally depends on using equivocation as a tool to more freely manipulate the orders that, so far, have been stable. This makes it possible to inscribe a perspectival position into anthropology, which in turn facilitates the creation of non-intuitive constructs relativizing nature and shifting it into the sphere of distributors' diversity. The human, culture and subjectivity, on the other hand, can be intertwined and reduced to an attributive category that characterises a wide range of entities. For Viveiros de Castro, differences between collectives remain an implicit point of reference – so far conceptualized by means of a distributive understanding of culture, but within the decolonization project – reduced to the opposition between modern and nonmodern cosmologies.

Descola tries to develop a specific meta-ontology in order to adopt various ontological regimes for the purposes of comparative analysis. According to him, these regimes are responsible for specific forms of nature and culture. Descola also deals with the attributive and essentialist understanding of these categories. His strategy is to create a distance – to find a new “third degree code” (Lévi-Strauss 1996: 20) – the myth of mythology which allows us to compare previously incomparable levels of reality construction processes. At the same time, however, he accepts an atemporal ontological difference as a model of otherness, which makes it difficult to track complex transformation games that are more visible from the perspective of research into distributively and historically distinct cultures².

The third strategy – the one used by Turner – consists in using a certain fixed onto-epistemology to analyse other onto-epistemologies (I reconstructed this standpoint and used it as a framework in a new context in the last part of this article). He is aware of embedding culture in a single tradition and applying- as a form of creating distinction – a distributive understanding of culture, thus remaining sensitive to differences that cannot be reduced to a homogenous differentiating instance, such as ontology or cosmology. Paradoxically, it is in this variant that the unfamiliar models of constructing and transforming relations between the “human”, “nature” and “culture”, are reduced to the smallest extent.

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² It should be noted that this difference derives from Descola's reconstruction of the historical process of the constitution of “nature” in the Western systems of thought (Descola 2013: 57–88).

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SUMMARY

Negotiating a human. Viveiros de Castro – Descola – Turner

The article offers an analysis of selected anthropological models transforming the semantic scope of what in the Western discourses of knowledge used to be considered the domain of human being. The text presents concepts developed by three anthropologists: Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Phillippe Descola and Terry S. Turner. Each conducted research among the indigenous people of South America, each invoked the structural imagination of Claude Lévi-Strauss and considered similar theoretical and methodological problems. The models developed by these Amazonianists will be examined based on the methods they use to expand the field of anthropological research and to reconfigure its conceptual framework. The aim of this article is to determine potential benefits and limitations resulting from applying these models in the study of culture.

Keywords: animism, perspectivism, structuralism, posthumanism, ontological turn

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Everyday enacting of agents through bodily simulation, voicing, and familiarization of artifacts among the Arabela (Peruvian Amazonia)

A particular habit caught my attention during my fieldwork among Arabela of the Peruvian Amazon – they consistently announced things they were about to do or commented on things others were doing. Moreover, such utterances were often aligned with witty references to other people’s peculiar behaviors or verbal expressions. The following is an example of such a humorous announcement of one’s action.

On a chilly and humid morning Nuria, the eight-year old niece of my hosts, came to our house to return the shotgun her father borrowed from me the day before. She came wearing her father’s rubber boots (way too big for her), because she probably did not want to touch the cold, wet grass.¹ Nuria left the shotgun and went back home. Later that same morning Elena (my host and Nuria’s aunt) asked her son Levi to go and offer a share of that morning’s catch of fish to her mother (who lived with Nuria and her family). The boy took the fish from his mother, but before descending from the house (Arabela houses are built on platforms), he sat on the floor, and said (laughing): *voy hacer Nuria* (“I am going to do Nuria”) and put on a pair of large boots belonging to his father or one of his elder brothers; then he went away.

¹ At the time of my fieldwork (2005–2006 and 2008–2009), very few Arabela children owned rubber boots. In the community of Flor de Coco, I remember only one small boy who did – his mother lived and worked in Iquitos and occasionally send money or parcels for her son. All personal names have been changed.

Thus to perform an unusual, conspicuous action, the boy evoked an other (his cousin), and presented what he was about to do as typical of that other's way of being. To a reader (and to the young ethnographer I was then) acquainted with contemporary Amazonian anthropology, Levi's joke strikes a familiar chord, bringing forth the Amazonian notions of body, agency, and conviviality. In my paper I will start with Nuria's rubber boots and explore how Levi's speech act and other similar Arabela ways of managing particular actions and engaging with human and nonhuman environment reverberate with the Amazonian indigenous ontologies.

Contemporary Amazonian ethnology depicts an indigenous world of intense human/nonhuman interactions that often shape social relations according to different schemes of predation, gift or exchange (Descola 2013: 309–312). In these ontologies, a human shaman communicates with spiritual masters of animals of plants (Murphy 1958: 13–17; Guss 1989: 130), a woman needs to contain vampiric inclinations of her manioc offspring (Descola 1994) and a newborn's father who breaks the *couvade* rules by going hunting, risks being kidnapped by peccaries and turned into one of their kind (Fausto 2001: 313). Nonhuman or other-than-human persons are crucial protagonists of ideologies concerning principal areas of human existence and are also made present in ritual contexts (notably with the help of psychoactive substances, themselves endowed with personhood and independent agency [Déléage 2005]). There is also a more general orientation towards the environment that favors perception of the presence and action of nonhuman persons. Amazonian peoples have a tendency to interpret events and phenomena affecting them and occurring in their environment as the effects of action of nonhuman persons: from features of landscape, and meteorological phenomena, to abundance (or absence) of game animals or uncanny sounds of the forest (see for instance: Surrallés, García Hierro, eds., 2005).

Another conceptual tool of regional ethnology (and a complementary aspect of Amazonian ontologies) is a particular notion of the body, which has been one of the privileged ways of access to the understanding of Amazonian socialities (Seeger et al. 1979; Londoño Sulkin 2017), taking prominent place in the conceptions of animism (as "physicality" [Descola 2013]), perspectivism (Viveiros de Castro 1998; Lima 1999), and the aesthetics of everyday (good) life (Overing 1989; Overing, Passes, eds., 2000; Belaunde 2001; Overing 2003). The Amazonian body is the principal factor of singularity of different collectives of human and nonhuman persons – as a multitude of beings in the world lead or potentially may lead a personal existence (have intentionality, agency, communicative capacity, etc.) and establish or may establish social relations with each other, the body is what accounts for different affects and ways of being characteristic to their collectives/communities. And it is also a body in continuous fabrication and transformation (Vilaça 2005), which constitutes a challenge and an opportunity – on the one hand, it allows for creating consubstantial communities of persons (through physical proximity, commensality, and exchange of bodily fluids through sexuality [Gow 1991]) and for developing resistant and efficient bodies through incorporation of attractive or useful

nonhuman characteristics and dispositions (Santos-Granero 2012); on the other, it requires a constant prudence in inevitable corporeal engagements with beings of the environment, as these may trigger transformation into a nonhuman other, synonymous with being captured by an alien community and incorporated into it (Vilaça 2002; Opas 2005; Fausto 2007). In this paper, I would like to demonstrate how that tendency to enact distant personhoods and agencies and manage bundles of transferable affects that constitute the human and nonhuman bodies resurfaces in the most minute everyday human to human engagements within a community.

Arabela live in two villages (Buenavista and Flor de Coco) on the eponymous tributary of the Curaray river, itself a major tributary of the Napo River. They are descendants of a handful of survivors from the Rubber Boom period, descendants of one of the Zaparoan-speaking groups, inhabiting the vast region between Pastaza and Napo (Villarejo 1953: 164–170; Rogalski 2016b). In the 1950's, they settled permanently on the riverbank of the Arabela River and joined the regional social and political system of Mestizo and Kechwa communities. Today the larger of the two villages – Buenavista – is an important regional centre, having two-level schooling and a well-equipped medical post. Arabela subsist on slash-and-burn horticulture, hunting, fishing and raise chickens and sometimes pigs. To earn money, those Arabela who are not employed as teachers or nurses live on extracting natural resources (timber, fish and game meat) and seasonal labor for oil companies. The first language of communication is Spanish and only few persons are fluent in Arabela (some people speak also Kechwa).

Enacting Others through behaviour

With this theoretical and geographical background in mind, I would like to return to the example of Levi, who presented the wearing of oversized boots as Nuria's typical (and emblematic) behaviour. From that moment (but, in this case, for a moment only – see other examples *infra*) “to do Nuria” became synonymous with wearing oversized boots. Levi, through his comment and action, endowed his cousin with a distinctive body and made wearing oversized boots into one of the elements of her “ethogram” (Descola 2013: 113). That unit of behaviour – easily identifiable and distinctive (because susceptible to singling out Nuria's particular way of being) may metaphorically be dubbed as an “etheme”, by analogy to the linguistic notion of phoneme. By the same token, the behaviour also became available to Levi and his “micro-community”, which was constituted of other witnesses of Nuria's behaviour and his enactment of her (these were Levi's parents, younger and older brothers, and the ethnographer). From then on, they could potentially detach the behaviour from Nuria's body and use it for their own sake and purpose (just as Levi did).²

² Although it was the only reference to “doing Nuria” I could observe, other examples show that such a reference to her could have been reused by Levi or by others.

Arabela often perform such operations of making other individuals' behaviors into bodies and then use the elements of those bodies. When the extracted and adopted behaviour is not obvious, they make it explicit by giving additional explanations. For example Levi's older brother, Adan, while resting in a hammock, grabbed a copy of *Selecciones* (a Spanish version of *Reader's Digest*) that somebody had left on the floor and enacted their younger brother Emil saying: *Voy hacer Emil - voy mirar puro dibujitos* ("I am going to do Emil - I am going to look at the pictures only"). Then he started leafing through the magazine without reading it (it is likely that he could not read). Whereas Emil's father, before going to the bushes to defecate, grabbed a machete and said: *Voy hacer Emil - él no sabe ir al baño sin machete* ("I am going to do Emil - he does not know how to go to the toilet without a machete").

Sometimes Arabela apply the same operation to personal types, or members of other human or nonhuman collectives typically associated with some behaviors or dispositions. Thus, a youngster enthusiastically said: *Voy hacer tomalón* ("I am going to do drunkard", a personal type), and then went to serve himself a bowl of manioc beer (instead of waiting for a woman to serve it to him). His brother once asked: *Quién tiene lanza? Para hacer cashiquiori* ("Who's got a spear? To do cashiquiori"), pretending that he would go out hunting with a spear, like the eponymous enemy group of ancient Arabela (see Rogalski 2016b). On another occasion, his father Artemio, cleaning fish that fell into his net the night before, said to his wife, who worked with him and who spotted a half-rotten fish: *Ponle aparte, para hacer mi gallinazo* ("Put it aside to do my vulture") - announcing his intention of eating it.³

The last example, where the Arabela man enacted a nonhuman, shows a continuity (grounded in the same set of practices) between adopting behaviors of other people (wearing oversized boots) and of nonhumans (eating rotten fish), which in a more direct way links the practice of "doing someone" to less casual, more objectified and often ritualized practices aiming at (more or less permanent) acquisition of characteristics typical of animals or plants. Among Arabela, as in other parts of Amazonia, these may be objectified in dietary or behavioral rules and other *secretos*, "secrets". To give but one example, older women advise young mothers to put a pinch of powdered armadillo claw on a newborn's navel to transfer that animal's strength to the baby. I argue that the same logic, the same processes, and the same modes of engaging with the environment, underlie the above practices and ideas, only that here they operate on a micro-level of everyday interactions within one, cosmologically homogeneous, human collective and between closely related, "cosmologically identical" people.

³ Such half-rotten fish are called *mayaco* in regional Spanish. One can identify them by white gills and a limp flesh. Although today Arabela despise such fish, a few times I was told that their ancestors used to eat such fish - roasted and mashed with hot pepper. It is possible that for the ancient Arabela it was a legitimate meal and that Artemio - whose parents were "true" (*legítimo*) Arabela and grew up before Arabela established a permanent contact with the Peruvian society - had a whim to eat it.

As for the humans, Arabela enacted mostly children and older men – those in the prime of life (heads of important households and fathers to young men and women), as well as those in decrepit old age (divorced or widowers). In general, women are not enacted – with the exceptions of old Julia (enacted in her supposed habit of not bathing, see *infra*) and a woman-type (voiced as enunciator of an interjection *ay no!*, see *infra*) – probably because the enactors seem to be mostly men (women often detect traces of other bodies in other people, but rarely enact others for their own sake).⁴ The dead people may also be enacted – I learned that when my companions, during a hunting trip upriver, one afternoon recalled that I was “doing Adolfo”, a man from Buenavista, who died many years before: they referred to the fact that I walked barefoot carrying my boots under my arm.⁵

It should be evident from the cited examples, that announcing one’s action as taking over an Other’s behaviour might be a kind of joking avoidance.⁶ It is because conspicuous actions and behaviors – that become objectified, attached to another person’s body and used by the subject – often break the Arabela rules of civility (which is particularly evident in the case of youngster grabbing unrestrainedly a bowl of manioc beer). By making a witty comment and joking at the expense of the presumed source of that behaviour, the subject diverts other people’s attention from his own engagement in the uncivil behaviour. Had Levi not announced that he would “do his cousin” and put on the oversized boots right away, he instead might have become the target of a teasing remark by his parents or brothers. It might have looked like the comment directed one day at a young man nicknamed *Soldado* (“Soldier”) – he came from somewhere in the Amazon river and lived for some time in Flor de Coco, staying at our house (according to a rumor he was a defector from the army, hence his nickname). That morning he was about to go out of the house and he started to put long trousers over his shorts. Observing him and seeing that, Levi exclaimed: *Ua! Soldado está haciendo Murayari!* (“Whou! Soldado is doing Murayari!”), and laughed at him.

Here, Murayari is an old man, who used to live in Flor de Coco (where the event took place) and was Levi’s parents’ brother-in-law (sister’s husband to his father and sister’s husband’s father to his mother). Levi presented wearing trousers over shorts as an element of that man’s ethogram. His comment is a typical example of observational remarks through which Arabela detect presence

⁴ It should be noted, that the examples presented here are gender-biased, because I observed most of them during everyday life in my principal host household, composed of a couple with six sons (their two older daughters were already married and lived separately).

⁵ The boots belonged to an Arabela man, who received them as part of personal equipment when he worked for an oil company. I borrowed them from him when we met on our way upriver, because my own boots somehow disappeared a few days before. Unfortunately, when we went to the forest, I soon had to take them off, because walking in them – too small and steel-capped – rapidly became an ordeal.

⁶ My use of the notion of joking avoidance should not be confused with that of Rupert Stasch (2002). In his paper about the Korowai joking avoidance he used that term to describe an interpersonal relation that combined joking and avoidance: by calling each other humorous nicknames, two Korowai avoid using each other’s names. Arabela, by making *joking* comments about other people, *avoid* being joked at by witnesses (see *infra*).

of other beings' characteristic behaviors in the people around them. It is worth noting that such remarks have a double objectifying character. First, in the content of the utterance, the target's existence in that moment (Soldado's projects, his reasons to put trousers, places he was about to go to), becomes reduced to a gesture (and at the same time the target is dispossessed of it by identifying its source as a distant Other). It is easy to see here a repetition of the Amazonian scheme of mythical speciation – the process whereby undifferentiated primordial beings following some catastrophic events received the bodies they now have humans, animals, and plants that exist today (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 471–472, 2007: 158). This process also consists in a sort of petrification of beings into bodies with objectified and predictable behaviors. From a being freely developing his or her actions, not so much unconscious of his body, as simply bodiless, Soldado suddenly became embodied. The difference between the mythical embodiment and Soldado's is that the “embodifying” remark is targeted at two beings at the same time – the person whom the Arabela subject is observing (Soldado), and the absent body, that is presumably the source of the objectified gesture (Murayari). It is not Soldado who – here and now, and from now on – comes to being as a distinct body; he becomes embodied as a copy of another body (Murayari's).

One might ask whether there is a “mythical” origin of the body that wears trousers on shorts. Was there a primordial event, recorded in collective memory, transmitted in narratives, where Murayari dressed that way? I have never heard such a narrative (but I have also never had an opportunity to ask about it). I am sure though that on the many occasions when I witnessed Arabela “doing someone” – either in the first or third person (“I am going to do Nuria”, “Soldado is doing Murayari”) – they never gave any narrative of origin. Declaration that one was “doing someone” was always made in a mode of shared knowledge, at most accompanied by additional explanation precisely identifying the affect or etheme in question.⁷ Most probably that knowledge is acquired through participation in similar interactions and does not need to be accompanied by a narrative of origin. (I don't know if Levi ever saw Murayari don trousers on shorts. It is possible that his only knowledge of that particularity of his body came from participation in similar interactions – maybe he himself was once the butt of the joke?).

Second objectification of a body-attributing comment is related to its pragmatic or conversational features, because the target is referred to and not talked to and therefore is not allotted a conversational slot for response. The effect is all the more powerful as the attribution of the body is expressed in an exclamative mode of surprise, marked by the opening interjection (*Ua!*). Other such attributions that I observed were also introduced by interjections of surprise. Following Oswald Ducrot, I argue that the knowledge expressed in the exclamative mode (the identification of Soldado with long trousers worn on shorts, and the identification

⁷ See *supra*: “I am going to do Emil – I am going to look at the pictures only” and “I am going to do Emil – he does not know how to go to the toilet without a machete”.

of long trousers on shorts with Murayari) is presented as a result of direct perception of the speaker, not mediated through speaker's intellectual, conscious reflection (Ducrot 1984: 186).

While *hacer alguien* explicitly preserves the difference between the doer and the ethogram's owner – one is only “doing” the other – other linguistic forms make this identification stronger, by simply substituting the name of latter to the name of the former. A mother once exclaimed: *Ua! Murayari!*, when spotted one of her sons eating undercooked grilled fish (its blood was still visible along the spine),⁸ and called another son “Julio Jaime”, when noticed that he ate only the pieces of meat (*presas*) from his plate, without touching manioc nor broth. (Julio Jaime was an old man, about the same age as Murayari; he lived in Flor de Coco and was *kumpa*, ceremonial friend, to Levi's parents.) This practice of name substitution links *hacer alguien*, as its transformation, to the Arabela onomastics, which is a subject I cannot develop here. On the other hand, the schema *hacer alguien* may be employed in negative sense, as an exhortation urging the addressee not to “do” or stop “doing” someone. For instance, the youngsters of Flor de Coco, when waiting for someone (a hunting trip companion) for too long, might call him from their canoe: *No haga Sapó!* (“Don't do Sapó!”), where Sapó (“toad”) is a nickname of a man reputed to be an incorrigible slowcoach.

A comment is due here: as instances of joking avoidance and teasing, those interactions point to the Arabela structure of joking relationships, and tend to involve people in a particular relationship to each other (open-ended relations of potential affines, cross-cousins or locals vs. outsiders – see for instance De Vienne 2012). I argue though that the Arabela other-enactions, albeit funny, may be better understood in relation to the Amazonian notions of body and agency, than as an illustration of a particular (general or local) theory of humor and joking practice. Although some other-enactions are purely humorous (and hence, for instance, might be linked to contexts of communal work or manioc beer drinking parties), they are, more often than not, tightly nested into people's everyday actions and utterances. The example of rubber boots is particularly telling – Levi's comment (*Voy hacer Nuria*) seems to be more about Levi, rubber boots and the people around him, than about his relationship with Nuria. Other examples, from a perspective of “joking relations”, are far too complex to extract from them a particular, “joking” relationship. For instance, the comment about trousers worn on shorts may be tied to the relation between Levi and Soldado (beyond any doubt an open-ended relation), as well as to the relation between Levi's parents (particularly his father) and Murayari (Levi's father's ZH). Besides, there are other more typical joking interactions, which are based on teasing, and Arabela would not necessarily point to other-enactions as examples of joking/laughing at someone (*hacer broma/hacer reír a alguien*). Therefore, although there is some hint of teasing both in utterances of the *Voy hacer alguien*

⁸ The reader might notice that from Artemio's vulture, we moved here to another vertex of the Lévi-Straussian culinary triangle.

and *Fulano está haciendo alguien* types (as well as in the interactions discussed further), this paper is not intended as a paper about joking, but about acting, speaking, and naming things and people.⁹

Enacting Others through voicing

We saw up until now that Arabela are sensitive to behavioral idiosyncrasies of their relatives and neighbors. Now I wish to show that by the same token they also pay close attention to how people speak and what expressions they use. Here, they also exploit Others' vocal and verbal idiosyncrasies for various purposes.

In July 2009 I accompanied (and partly organized) a hunting trip upstream on the river Arabela. Its participants were: an old, experienced hunter Romario, knowing camping spots and hunting trails, his wife Julia, two teenagers (parallel cousins, MZS, grand-children of the woman, DS, one of them was also a paternal nephew of the man, BS), and me. In the afternoon of the third day of our trip we arrived at an old logging camp (set by a man from Buenavista) that consisted of a few shelters (*tambo*) and a house (*casa*).¹⁰ Romario, having chosen one of the shelters for himself and his wife, was about to put their luggage on the floor (bags containing mostly bedclothes and a mosquito net). Consulting Julia where she would like them to have their bed, he asked: *Dónde vamos mandar? – di Porojua* (literally: “where are we going to throw? – says Porojua”).

To understand Romario's utterance and its context, we should note that *mandar*, “to throw”, is not the verb Arabela commonly use to refer to making the bed. It is neither the standard expression (which is *tender la cama*), nor is it figurative, so his question was conspicuous and opaque and required us (me for sure, but I think that, actually, all of us present) to pay attention to what he was about to do and to look for clues. But, as we were still processing Romario's question and attributing its idiosyncrasy to him, after a short while he presented what he had just said as voicing a man nicknamed Porojua. (Porojua is an Arabela word for “worm, caterpillar”. The motive for that nickname is the man's reputedly insatiable appetite for tobacco. He is an old Arabela man, whose Spanish is sometimes difficult to understand, as it is influenced by the phonology of the Arabela, Porojua's first language. What adds an interesting twist to that interaction is that he is also Julia's former husband – it was Julia who left him for Romario.) Thus, this kind of “reverse voicing” involves a process of reframing – an utterance (wording but also prosody) is first framed as originating from the speaker (Romario), but then, *après-coup*, it becomes reframed as voicing another utterer.

Arabela very often use this kind of reverse voicing, where they first utter an expression which stands out of the ordinary discourse, let it reverberate among the people present, and then assign the extravagant part of their discourse

⁹ For a description of typical patterns of Arabela joking/teasing see Rogalski 2016a and 2016b.

¹⁰ Both *tambos* and houses are built on platforms and covered with roofs thatched with palm leaves. They differ in size and type of construction.

to a different utterer, with the reporting clause, framing it as voicing another utterer (see: Holt 2009: 194–195). Most often, they employ this conversational move to produce interjections. For example, old Julio Jaime, in circumstances where a vivid reaction from his part was justifiable, used to say: *Ay no! – dice la mujer*. In that move, first he took a stance towards a state of affairs (Du Bois 2007), with an interjection indexical to feminine gender of the speaker (more precisely, to the speaker being a *mestizo* or *ribereño* woman from the Peruvian Amazonian region); that way, Julio Jaime not only showed his emotional engagement to the context, but also revealed, as it were, a body characteristic to another gender. After a short while, lowering his voice, he completed his move with the quotation segment assigning his foregoing utterance to a generic woman, and repositioning himself, taking a new stance this time towards mestizo women (Du Bois 2014). (Other quoted interjections I recorded were for instance: *Dios mío! – dice Lucho* [“O my god! says Lucho”], or mildly vulgar *La chucha!* voiced through Rodrigo: *La chucha! – dice Rodrigo*. These interjections seem not to be enregistered voices, using the concept of Asif Agha, indexing stereotypic social personae, but indexically refer to individual persons, of Lucho and Rodrigo, respectively [Agha 2005: 39]).

Arabela employ reverse voicing for the purposes ranging from joking avoidance (in lieu of euphemisms) to teasing. When Romario voiced Porojua, he evidently did it with the purpose of avoidance. He was not alone with his wife – her grandsons and I were present – and his utterance concerned an object related to their conjugal intimacy – their bed. By playfully mocking Porojua (pointing to his characteristic way of speaking) he diverted the attention of the people present from his action (and his dialogue with his wife), to a third subjectivity. Whereas the construction *Ay no! – dice la mujer* had a teasing character. The feminine interjection coming from a man would certainly provoke people to produce a teasing remark projecting on him a feminine identity.¹¹ Nevertheless, just before the rules of turn-taking (Sacks et al. 1974) would give the audience the space for a suitable teasing comment (or, in more technical terms, just before the transition-relevance place is established [Clayman 2013]), Julio Jaime anticipated their reaction and evoked the Other, whom he presumably just voiced. In both cases (joking avoidance and teasing), we may note an interesting transformation, where the speaker transitions from the position of a subject corporeally engaged in the world (Romario consulting his wife, Julio Jaime reacting to a situation), to the position of a meta-subject, making a meta-linguistic or meta-pragmatic (Agha 2006) comment on a virtual third subject embedded in the world (Porojua setting up a bed, a woman vividly positioning herself as disturbed by a state of affairs [Du Bois 2007]).

If we put ourselves into the bystanders’ position (bystanders who, in the end, become reframed as actual addressees), we realize that those interactions may have

¹¹ It might have been a rhetorical question *Mujer ya!?*, “Woman!?” , although I could not attest it in that particular context. For the construction < X ya?! > see *infra*.

a real effect on their mental representation of the voiced figure (Porojua). While the speaker proves his/her ability to discern characteristic elements of other people's idiolects and vocal habits, through reverse voicing he guides hearers' attention and exposes them to a particular perceptual and mental experience. The speaking subject – speaking to no one in particular (as Julio Jaime) or to an addressee (as Romario to his wife) – is outwardly unaware of the presence of the bystanders. He lets his speech divert from transparency and become salient index of his idiosyncrasy. He allows the bystanders to take notice of that transformation and “absorb” it, but just before they could stabilize it and attach it to some body-figure, which they could project on the speaker, he introduces an Other. Let's imagine the whole process in slow-motion: the bystanders first receive an observational input to build a new representation of the subject they watch and listen to. That input is epistemologically strong, because the bystanders observe the subject who is presumably not aware of their presence and attention. They are not bothered by requirements of an interaction in which they play an active part; they lower their guard. But then, just before the completion of the process of representation building, the subject suddenly substitutes the Other for himself. As a result, the observational input that had built up becomes attached to the evoked Other and feeds into that Other's image. Afterwards, the people who are present – at least the ethnographer – end up being persuaded that Porojua actually says *mandar* for spreading the bedmat, and women exclaim *Ay no!* (I will come back to that example later).

But what about the second effect of that move? What about the representation of the speaking subject? I argue that he acquires a sort of complex identity. In the beginning, the speaking subject is just a being in the world among others – a man fixing a shelter for himself and his wife or sitting and drinking manioc beer with other people. His movements and words are coterminous with each other and with his identity. He is just another object inside the environment of the bystanders. Then, he suddenly starts to detach from that environment and becomes a salient figure sticking out from the background of interactions (Julio Jaime delivers the interjection, Romario says the word *mandar*). Becoming something different, he attracts bystanders' attention. His movements and words still are coterminous, but do not correspond to his identity. Finally, at a third moment, he suddenly transcends the situation, and adopts an overarching point of view (saying the framing clause “says X”). As the whole process is relatively rapid, we could probably say that through a process of cumulative inclusion he occupies both positions: that of a being in the world becoming Other – some of his other-enacting (a part of the interjection *Ay no!*, a part of *mandar*) “sticks” to him – and that of a disembodied commenter. Would it be too far-fetched to see in that figure of a complex agent (cumulating the roles of doer and commenter) a variant of the shamanic complex enunciator cumulating contradictory roles (as the Kuna shaman analyzed by Carlo Severi)?¹²

¹² Cf. Carlo Severi's description of a singing Kuna shaman: “The shaman becomes then a novel sort of enunciator, constituted by a long series of connotations, including both the evil and the therapeutic spirits. The reflexive use of parallelism, which characterizes the chanter that

Familiarizing predation – transformation of objects into pet-subjects

Until now, in the description of the relation between the Arabela speaker and his or her addressees or targets, I spoke of “objectification” both on a symbolic level (stabilizing their existence in bodies) and a conversational level (in the case of Soldado – speaking of him in third person, leaving him no space to retort). Levi thus objectified Nuria, Soldado, and Murayari; Romario objectified Porojua. The flaw of such an interpretation is that it uses the Western category of object for the ethnographic context where the very existence of objects is problematic (Viveiros de Castro 2004). In this section, I will propose a more suitable description of that relation, grounded in local Amazonian ontologies and relationalities, using the categories of familiarizing predation and mastery/ownership. These categories have a long tradition in the Amazonian ethnology, and their origins might be traced back to studies focusing on pet keeping and adoption (Erikson 1986, 1987; and Menget 1988 respectively, see: Allard 2019). They were fully identified and developed by Carlos Fausto (as “familiarizing predation” and “mastery” [Fausto 1999, 2008]) and have become an important source of inspiration for scholars working in Amazonia (see for instance Costa 2017). Briefly speaking, the notion of familiarizing predation – developed by Fausto (1999) in his analysis of warfare and shamanism – describes a process whereby vital elements coming from an exterior (acquired through warfare, shamanism or hunting) become contained, tamed and put at the service of the subject (a person or a group). These may be captive enemies incorporated into the local group, shamanic powers acquired and controlled by the shaman or infant wild animals, captured during hunting, fed and raised as pets. Notions of ownership and/or mastery, which describe an asymmetrical relation between the masters and their pets/captives, are correlates of familiarizing predation.

I argue that a model of familiarizing predation and a relation of mastery/ownership might also apply to what happens between Levi and Nuria, Levi and Soldado, or Romario and Porojua. First, the predatory component of that model can account for the agonistic dimension of Arabela joking at the expense of someone. Second, the idea of familiarization – acquiring something and taming it to put it to use by the subject – seems suitable to grasp the utility of acquired alien behaviors or voices. It is evident that Nuria’s etheme of walking in oversized boots enables Levi to walk dry footed to his grandmother’s house, and Porojua’s particular way of talking about spreading the bed enables Romario to make reference to it in a context where it may otherwise be embarrassing to him. Third, the notion of capture, to which familiarizing predation is tributary, can also

we have seen in the Mu Igala, who starts to sing about himself singing, is only the first (and, despite appearances, crucial) step in the same process that here becomes spectacular of accumulating contradictory identities of the image of the enunciator. The shaman then becomes a complex enunciator, a figure capable of lending his voice to different invisible beings” (Severi 2002: 36).

grasp the perceptual and cognitive ability to discern other people's idiosyncrasies of gestural or verbal expression. Instead of a lay anthropological theory of perception (using notions of discernment, recognition of patterns or similarities, etc.) we could then use a notion developed on the ground of the Amazonian ethnology.¹³ Besides, there is yet another set of enactments of other bodies/subjects, where the scheme of familiarizing predation and mastery/ownership is particularly evident. Here the other subject or body is enacted not as a co-agent (source of ethemes or vocal productions) but as a co-object of the speaker's action.

For some months of the 2008 in Flor de Coco there lived a group of *mestizo* construction workers, hired by an oil company to construct a medical post (as part of the compensation package for the firm's operations in the area). Over the weeks, Arabela established bonds of friendship with the workers. Upon leaving the village, one of the workers, named Angel (diminutive: Angelito), left his blue sweatshirt to Artemio. One morning, sometime after the workers left, Artemio, choosing the clothing he would wear that day, picked up that sweatshirt and said: *Voy a mudar mi Angelito*, "I am going to wear my Angelito" (and laughed).¹⁴

Artemio's comment was partly a practice of joking avoidance. It seems to me that upon deciding to put on his sweatshirt, Artemio felt that it would be a conspicuous act that would call for evoking an other. It is very probable that for Artemio, the sweatshirt – as a gift from Angelito and as his former clothing – was imbued with its previous owner's subjectivity (a common phenomenon in the Amazonia, see for instance Santos-Granero 2012: 198). Through his speech act, Artemio performed a double operation of subjectivation and familiarization. First, he subjectified the sweatshirt which – by referring to an item of clothing with the name of its former owner – became a "pet-person", so to speak, under the control of Artemio. Second, he put the construction worker into the asymmetrical relation owner-owned, humorously transferring his material and palpable mastery over a piece of clothing to his relation to (now absent) Angel. That second operation occurred specifically by coupling Angel's name with the first person possessive pronoun "my" – it is important to note that the Arabela parents often refer to their children precisely in that way (Artemio commonly referred to his sons as "my so-and-so"), and in Amazonia the relation of owner-owned often designates the relation parent-child and almost always the relation between parents and adoptive children (Fausto 2008: 333). Hence Angelito – through his sweatshirt – became, as it were, Artemio's adoptive child.¹⁵

¹³ A discursive and pragmatic dimension of the notion of mastery has already been underlined by Andrea-Luz Gutierrez Choquevilca in her analysis of ritual songs of Quechua Runa of the Upper Pastaza, where she observed a "coincidence between acts of musical nomination *shutiyachina* and the control acquired over designated entities" (Gutierrez Choquevilca 2016: 27 – translation from Spanish by the author).

¹⁴ In Amazonian Spanish the verb *mudar* – that in standard Spanish refers to changing the clothes (take off one shirt and put on another) – is often used to the very action of putting an item of clothing.

¹⁵ This example may have political connotations, indexing disparities in access to wealth (clothing). Nevertheless, "wearing others" also involves situations where people comment

Just as “doing” and voicing Others, the comic evoking of persons to refer to artifacts was a common element of the local poetics of everyday life. The grounds for such identification of artifacts with people were multiple (all pertaining to metonymy). First – the actual and singular relation of ownership as in the identification of one particular sweatshirt with its previous owner. Second – the association of a class of artifacts with a person (or a class of persons) singularly related to one item of that class (as in an identification of any baseball cap with a man who presumably always wears a cap – see *infra*). Third – the association of objects with persons derived from symmetrical association of persons with objects expressed in their nicknames. For example, just as Melania was nicknamed *Mecha*, “wick”, on the ground of phonological similarity, her nephews, when they were about to replace a wick in a kerosene lamp, used to say: *Vamos a cambiar su Melania* (“We are going to change its Melania”).¹⁶

What is important here is that although those comments focus on artifacts, we also may be dealing with an imputation of ethograms. It is evident in the example where a baseball cap is associated with a man from Buenavista village: a man left his baseball cap on a bench; another man noticed that and said to him: *Acá está tu Roger* (“Here is your Roger”), referring to the cap with a name of a man who (presumably) always wore a baseball cap. Since clothing is an intrinsic part of Amazonian notions of the body, relating the baseball cap to Roger is a way of constructing his body. This example is also very instructive, because it allows us to highlight the process whereby an imputation of a body occurs. First of all, Roger definitely was not the only Arabela man who wore a baseball cap. Today the association of Roger with his baseball cap (and with baseball caps in general) is evident to me and when I evoke his image in my mind, he is wearing that cap. I also remember that when I heard the man in question addressing the cap’s owner *Acá está tu Roger*, I immediately grasped that association. As if the speaker made explicit something I had known but wasn’t aware of. But at the same time, it was the only time during my fieldwork when the association of Roger with his cap came up. Thus, it makes me wonder what mental image of Roger I would have, had I not witnessed the Arabela man making that association in that specific interactional context. This auto-ethnographic introspection and reflection points to the processes involved in the process of body-recognition/body-imputation. If those interactional events effectively lead to the formation of associations

on similarities of their clothing with analogous items owned by their relatives. For instance, a boy putting on his own red T-shirt said to another: *Voy a mudar mi Eusebio*, and clarified, that Eusebio’s T-shirt has black sleeves. (I may attest that Eusebio often wore that T-shirt during my stay among Arabela). See also the example of a baseball cap – *infra*.

¹⁶ Note that in the last example a pet-person (“its Melania”) is not pet to a human, but to another artifact. Actually, it is the operation of subjectivation of the lamp (see *infra* for another example of transforming a lamp into a subject). Apart from clothing, the objects that were subject to that operation included a fishing spear and body parts. The elements included in that category brings to mind the notion of inalienable possessions, frequent in the Amerindian languages – Kockelman 2009. The (in)alienability of the Arabela nouns has not been the subject of linguistic study yet. Usually, the Arabela nouns are not marked when non-possessed, but a few are – for instance “heart” and “bone”.

between people and particular ways of being, we may ask what pragmatic and conversational properties make them effective. Here, it may be a combination of some observable substrate (I assume that Roger does often wear a baseball cap) and a pragmatic effect. When referring to a cap with the name of Roger in a context of a joking interaction, the speaker takes that association simultaneously as sufficiently evident for him and his addressee as to be comprehensible (presupposition of a common ground), and sufficiently surprising as to fuel the comic effect. It is always a revelation of some secret knowledge about somebody. Maybe that is what contributes to the establishment of a particular mental image. (An image which is not only associating Roger with his cap, but also placing him in a relation of a “pet” towards the cap’s owner).

By the way, although the association involved in the above example seems to operate only on the cap and the mentioned Roger – Roger becomes a man with a cap, and a cap becomes his owner’s Roger – the speech act may also have another effect on the cap’s owner, which would emerge afterwards. After collecting the abandoned cap, did its owner feel comfortable putting it on? Or did he feel that he was becoming Roger against his will?

Introducing the notion of familiarizing predation as a model to account for the other-enacting practices, discussed here, opens up a question if all cases of enaction of other persons/bodies follow the same scheme of relation. Although this problem goes beyond the scope of this paper, I will just signal two examples that in my view correspond to other schemes. (I am using the analytic distinction between relational schemes of predation, gift, and exchange made by Philippe Descola [Descola 2013: 309–321]). The first is a comment made by Levi (with whom readers are already familiar): while watching his older brother refilling a completely used-up lamp with kerosene, he said: *Ay me alegre! – va a decir el lamparín* (“Oh, I’m so happy – the lamp is going to say”). The boy did not capture lamp’s voice for his own sake, but instead lent the lamp his own voice. His speech act makes explicit and completes a nurturing subjectivation of the artifact, implicit in the care provided to it by the older boy. Levi’s brother carefully removes the lid, slowly pours the kerosene so as not to spill it, all the time paying close attention to his movements, etc. (All that in the context of scarcity, where kerosene is sometimes lacking; when there is no kerosene, people just go to bed at dusk, skipping relaxing conversations, visiting, and storytelling altogether.) Hence, in this case, we may be dealing with a scheme of caring (familiarizing gift), rather than familiarizing predation.¹⁷

Another event, symmetrical to this “gift of voice”, might be dubbed a “gift of etheme”. It was a comment made by a young man while contemplating a baby

¹⁷ Guilherme Heurich (2018: 55), in his article on voicing speech among Araweté, addressed the problem of ambiguity inherent in voicing other figures and argued that Amerindian speech acts do not stress the speaker’s individual intentionality, because for Araweté every speech act is reciprocal. Although his interpretation may hold for Araweté, I argue that “reciprocity” (related to the scheme of exchange in the model developed by Descola) is merely one possible relational scheme in relations between the speaker and the voiced figure.

boy (his nephew, BS) sleeping late in the morning.¹⁸ He said: *Está durmiendo hombre grande, se ha ido linternear* ("The big man is sleeping, he's been out hunting with flashlight"). Through this comment the baby boy receives the affect of 'sleeping late in the morning', which is part of the ethogram of Arabela hunters. And my fieldwork confirms the observational ground of that operation – a night hunt (where the hunters went downstream, illuminating the river banks in search for glowing eyes of animals, especially the paca, *Cuniculus paca*, the most prized night prey) was one of the very few reasons authorizing Arabela men to sleep at this hour, while others were up and active. Again, it was humorous but not intended to mock the baby. It was the subjectivation of the baby through prefiguration of his being a hunter in the future. (This may be considered to be yet another example of an inculcation of affects to small children in view of their future gendered roles. The main difference is that it does not underline preconditions for those roles – as in the old days, when the Arabela fathers gave their sons little stones found in hunted alligators' stomachs to swallow, in order to promote their resistance to hunger – but accessory, incidental elements related to them.)

Other-enacting formulas

The linguistic expressions Arabela use for enacting Others – whether through reference to ethograms, voicing, or referring to artifacts with personal names – amount to a limited set of more or less characteristic and specific general constructions. The expression *hacer X*, apart from announcements <Voy hacer X>, appears also in a constative version <X está haciendo Y> (in the past tense: <X estaba haciendo Y>) or in an exhortative <No haga X!> ("Don't do X!"). Two other structures couple the name of the enacted other with the adverbs *ya* ("already") and *así* ("thus", "this way") in the form of a rhetorical question. They are symmetrical and serve to mark a difference (hence, presupposing similarity) between the addressee or the speaker, respectively, and the enacted Other. For instance, when Romario announced his intention to go upriver for a hunting trip, his adult niece Luisa half-mockingly asked him to bring her some *ungurahui* palm fruits (*Oenocarpus batahua*). *Para qué?* ("What for?") – he asked. *Para comer* ("To eat") – she responded. *Pinsha ya!?* – exclaimed he, with a mock indignation, identifying her with a toucan (*Ramphastos* spp.) on the grounds of a presumably excessive appetite for the *ungurahui* fruit (which are, by the way, commonly consumed by Arabela). For the second construction: Artemio, finishing a copious breakfast after getting a particularly abundant catch of fish, vigorously pushed his plate away and exclaimed with a mock irritation: *Qué vale peje, lobo así?!* ("What is the fish worth? Am I an otter?!", *Pteronura brasiliensis*).

¹⁸ The parents let the boy sleep longer, because he stayed awake during the night (as a result of a *cutipa* caused by a paca, nocturnal rodent, eaten by his mother). They left their bed on the floor, rolling up the mosquito net.

The voicing formulas are the most uniform – they all instantiate constructions <[utterance], *dice X*> and, seldom, <*como dice X*, [utterance]>. Whereas other-enactions that refer to artifacts with personal names share the general pattern that the personal reference is always placed at the end (and is preceded by a possessive pronoun) (see: *Voy a mudar mi Angelito*, *Acá está tu Roger*, *Vamos a cambiar su Melinda*).

On the whole, all those constructions – some more than others – constitute a rather limited set of general patterns to generate other-enacting formulas. While formulas of the type <*Voy hacer X*> have low formal specificity (apart from the joking-avoidance context of their use, their sole singularity consist in coupling the verb *hacer* with a personal name), others are highly specific, as e.g. the construction <*X así para [do something]!?*>. Of those I recorded three instances, which were: *Catalán así, para comer pescado!?*, *Maquisapa así, para tomar en pate!?*, and *Abuelo así, para cargar aguaje!?*, linking, respectively, kingfisher bird (*Chloroceryle* spp. or *Megaceryle torquata*) with eating fish, spider-monkey (*Ateles* spp.) with drinking from old Arabela gourds (instead of steel or plastic bowls), and an old man (person-type) with collecting peach palm fruits (*Mauritia flexuosa*), always following a pattern of the rhetorical question: “Am I so-and-so, to do something!?”.

The last series of other-enacting formulas offers an insight into their historical stability, because the utterance *Maquisapa así, para tomar en pate!?* comes from an old woman’s narrative about her brother – now about sixty – who, as a child, used it to jokingly refuse drinking from gourds (although I do not know if the boy said it in Spanish or in Arabela). That particular construction, therefore, might have been in use for half a century. As for a possible continuity with more ancient Arabela practices, the only thing I could establish was through a query of the Arabela dictionary compiled by Rolland Rich, from the Summer Institute of Linguistics (Rich 1999), where I found a group of verbs composed of a term relating to an entity and the morpheme /-shi-, which connotes the idea of “behaving like”. For instance, the verb **maajishiniu**, according to Rich, means “to do woman’s work [by a man]” (since **maaji** means “woman”), whereas among the meanings of the verb **mueyashiniu** (**mueya**, “child”), he includes “to bother someone asking for things” and “to behave like a child”. Similar relation links the verb **nososhiniu**, and the term **nosuna** (an unidentified tree, with edible fruit): **nososhiniu** means, according to Rich, “to urinate on someone as a prank (like the **nosuna** fruit that suddenly falls from the tree)”.¹⁹ The morpheme /-shi-/ also encompasses the idea of “pretending” or feigning, since **numueejushiniu**, apart from “becoming deaf” (**numeeju**), refers also to “being disobedient” (pretending to be deaf). We should note, though, that the same morpheme also refers to definite changes, where there is no idea of pretending: **jiyasoshiniu** means “to

¹⁹ References to behaviors or characteristic ways of being may also be present in: **puecujuashiniu**, “to hiccup” (if it might be related to **pecujua**, a kind of woodpecker), **shiriojuashiniu**, “to have stye” (an infection of the eyelid – if it may be related to **shiriojua**, a kind of cacique bird), **sarucuashiniu**, “to have goosebumps” (**sarucua** means “bat”) and **cohuanashiniu**, “to chicken out in front of the enemy”, where we may find the name of a tree **cohua** (unidentified), whose leaves, according to Rich, were burned to chase off mosquitoes (Rich 1999).

become old" (from *jiyaso*, "grand-father") and *mashajashiniu*, means to atteint the young-adult age (**mashaja**, "youngster").

It is important to stress the formulaic character of those expressions and the effect of repetition and parallelism produced by their frequent use in the flow of everyday life. This is due to a relatively limited number of constructions that serve to generate a multitude of other-enacting utterances, and an announcement *Voy hacer Fernando!*, exclaimed by someone one day, will thus be parallel to (or dialogically resonate with) *No haga Manuel!* uttered some days before, and will prepare ground for a *Vamos a hacer Rodrigo!* uttered sometime in the future (Du Bois 2014). Moreover, some of those formulas are very often repeated – like for instance *Voy hacer Julia*, which was for some time used every couple of days by the youngsters of one of the household where I lived (to announce that they would not bathe that evening).²⁰ Other structures – like *Catalán así, para comer pescado* – are used more seldom, but instantiate linguistic constructions so specific, that it is doubtful that Arabela would not objectify them as particular forms of discourse.

In the formulas of enacting the other and in their use, we may hear a distant but audible echo of the formulaicity of Amazonian discourse, as explored, for instance, by Pedro de Niemeyer Cesarino in his analysis of shamanic discourse (Cesarino 2008, 2015), recovering the concept of formula elaborated by Milman Parry and Albert Lord (Lord 1960) in their studies of oral poetry. In the strict sense, the formula of Parry and Lord, understood as "a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given essential idea" (Parry cited in Lord, cited in Cesarino, 2015: 21; Cesarino, 2008: 155), does not cover other-enacting expressions, because they do not form part of a formally delimited oral text with distinctive metrical features. On the other hand, we may treat the flow of Arabela's everyday conversations as a joint text produced by multiple speakers over weeks, months or years, and thus, instead of metrical conditions, consider situational and pragmatic settings. Just as formal properties of discourses of Marubo shamans, according to Cesarino, convey particular knowledge about beings of the world (and give the shaman the possibility to act upon them), the other-enacting formulas of Arabela, jointly, through parallelisms and repetitions, express a general idea that beings of the world (human and nonhuman) may have particular ways of behaving and talking, which may be adopted by others to perform certain actions and reach certain goals.

It is noteworthy that Arabela – through their practices – maintain those formulas in a state of certain exteriority in relation to other parts of their language. They combine parallelism and repetition with constant inventiveness. In fact, with time other-enacting formulas become "worn out" and have to be transformed (though a sort of "recursive displacement" [Keane 1997: 129ss]) or replaced. For example, during my fieldwork the formula *hacer Educo*, which announced voracious eating – where *Educo* is a diminutive of *Eduardo*, a man mocked because of his

²⁰ Julia was an old woman. An association of old people with not bathing is reported also by Buell Quain for Trumai, where „a favorite insult [...] was to tell someone he was old, and by implication that he no longer bathed or was able to fornicate" (Quain, Murphy 1955: 61).

insatiable appetite (there were rumors that his appetite was so overwhelming, that after finishing his meal he picked pieces of meat from his young daughters' plates) – has been substituted by a new formula: *hacer educueada*, where *educueada* is a neologism created through verbalization and nominalization of the expression *hacer Educo* (*hacer Educo* → *educuear* [not attested] → *hacer educueada*, do “educu-ering”). But it is also a peculiar kind of invention, because Arabela never indicate authors of those expressions, nor relate them to their initial use. Every use of *hacer Educo* is a repetition of its former occurrence, but every act of *hacer Educo* is new and exceptional.

We may note that the above transformation confirms that the other-enacting is not a simple imitation of the other but an objectification of a way of being. In fact, there is a strong analogy here with the notion of “becoming-jaguar”, developed by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro in his analysis of the famous repartee by Cunhambebe, a Tupinambá chief, to Hans Staden, who was captive among the Tupinambá (Staden 2008 [1557]). During a cannibalistic banquet, which he witnessed, Staden disgusted at Cunhambebe offering him a piece of killed enemy, asked rhetorically, how could he eat human flesh, since even animals do not eat their own species, to which Cunhambebe succinctly retorted *Jauára ichê*, “I am a jaguar” (or literally, “jaguar me” [Viveiros de Castro 1986: 626]). According to Viveiros de Castro, the “Cunhambebe’s equation”, do not “concern either an imaginary ‘turning into a jaguar’ or a mere ‘acting like’ a jaguar – jaguars do not cook. But perhaps it refers to a jaguar-becoming, where ‘jaguar’ is a quality of the *act*, not of the *subject*” (Viveiros de Castro 1992: 271 – original emphasis). Interestingly, both cases – an Arabela saying *vamos hacer Educo* (or *educueada*), and Cunhambebe saying *Jauára ichê* – refer to an extraordinary act of eating, and also in both cases, the constatation of other-becoming is made in a similar, humorous vein.

Interestingly, the exteriority in relation to “plain” language, the salience of those formulas, corresponds to the idea that the behaviors they denote, or the speech acts they voice are exterior in relation to the speaker-subject and his or her body. The linguistic expression *hacer Julia* stands out from the announcement *Voy hacer Julia!* uttered by a young man, just like the action it denotes (the action of not going to bathe that particular evening) departs from the speaker’s default way of being (i.e. bathing every evening, just like any other proper human being). Also, just as the expression *hacer Julia* does not have an author (a person who coined that expression), the etheme it denotes does not have a unique owner (a person who extracted and used that part of Julia’s body), and may be used by every member of the collective (household, kin group, etc.).

Arabela bodies and the morality of living together

A closer look at the kinds of behaviour Arabela objectify in their practices of enacting others, shows that they constitute a coherent ensemble, covering a limited range of bodily functions or domains of practice. The most frequent

are references to eating: consuming raw or rotten food, having excessive appetite for certain kinds of food (meat, palm fruits), eating voraciously/drinking thirstily. Idiosyncrasies related to clothing are next in line: oversized boots, trousers worn over shorts, walking barefoot (while carrying boots under one's arm), always wearing a baseball cap, wearing other person's clothing (previously worn by others or gifts). Less common are references to other body functions, ways of being and activities. (Table 1 summarizes the enacted beings and corresponding behaviors and speech acts.)

The attention paid to those aspects of existence corresponds to the Amazonian perspectival registers of difference, where bodily ethogram indexes the place of a being in the socio-cosmos (see for instance Vilaça 2005). It also brings to mind many Amazonian myths and anecdotes of encounters between humans and a nonhumans appearing in a human form, where – as Philippe Descola observed – there is always some detail that alerts the human protagonist to the animal nature of people with whom he or she is dealing: “a dish of rotting meat politely served reveals vulture-people, an oviparous birth indicates snake-people, and a cannibalistic appetite points to jaguar-people” (Descola 2013: 135). We could almost imagine a narrative where Artemio's predilection for rotten fish (see *supra*), assumed in its entirety by himself, and not through the captured and familiarized body of a vulture, would reveal his complete belonging to the “tribe/species” of vultures.

But the Amazonian human body, as many ethnographers observed, also incorporates rules of moral behaviour towards one's kin (Gow 1991; Opas 2005). That aspect is also present in the Arabela practices of enacting others, although it is not so explicit as the stress on bodily functions and movements. Unlike Wauja, who in similar register use names as “moralizing signs”, linking people with general rules of living together (denouncing, for instance, giving something and later taking a part of it back [Ball 2015: 347–349]) – in this respect, Arabela only criticized marital jealousy by referring to overprotective and over-controlling husbands with a name of a man reputed to be jealous. Nevertheless, an implicit Arabela morality of living together becomes visible when we analyze speech acts that Arabela voice through other enunciators. For instance, they often treated that way interjections (*La chucha!* – *dice Rodrigo, Dios mío!* – *dice Lucho*), as if strong expressions of (negative) emotions violated the harmony of being together. Arabela also voiced other enunciators to formulate requests, especially requests for sharing food. For instance, the older brothers of little Eusebio (two-year-old boy), when they asked each other to share a fish roasted by one of them, used the expression *ibalada*, produced once by Eusebio and being transformation of *igual*, meaning “together” (as in: *comer igual*, “eat together”). (One of them would just ask *Ibalada?* and join his brother at the hearth.) Similarly, a wife would voice another enunciator to urge her husband to join her in her bed (see *infra*). Other enunciators were used for rejecting offers. (For instance, on several occasions Andres rejected someone's offers to join him and do something together, saying: *No quiero, di gringo*, with exaggerated pronunciation of “r” in *quiero* and *gringo*,

probably in reference to my own rhotacism.) The utterance *Dónde vamos a mandar? – dice Porojua*, as I interpreted it before, also points to a notion of shame. Just like in other examples, voicing of another enunciator goes hand in hand with the use of humorous euphemisms, e.g. when a man, talking about a menstruating woman, said: *estaba con su periódico, dice Pancho*, “she had her periodical, says Pancho” (where *periódico*, “periodical, magazine”, is a humorous euphemism for *período*, “menstrual period”, on the ground of paronymy between those words).

enacted Other	etheme/affect
body functions - eating	
old man	eating raw fish (undercooked)
vulture	eating rotten fish
man	eating voraciously a big amount of food
man (drunkard)	drinking thirstily manioc beer
old man	eating only meat, without broth and manioc (hence, eating too much meat)
bird - kingfisher, otter	eating (too much) fish
toucan	eating (too much of) <i>ungurahui</i> palm fruits
tapir	eating (too much of) <i>aguaje</i> palm fruits
jaguar	eating tapir meat (excessive appetite)
spider-monkey	drinking manioc beer from a gourd (instead of a manufactured bowl)
body functions - cleaning	
old woman	going to sleep without taking the evening bath
body functions - defecating	
boy	going to defecate with a machete
body form	
man	having big feet
clothing	
girl	wearing oversized boots
old man	wearing trousers over shorts
dead man	walking barefoot through the forest (carrying boots under one's arm)
man	wearing a baseball cap
man	wearing a T-shirt (gift from the man)
man	wearing a sweatshirt (gift from the man)
ways of being, habits, activities	
man	being slow, having the others waiting
man	talking to oneself
boy	skimming a magazine without reading
old man	collecting peach palm fruits from forest

enacted Other	etheme/affect
ancient enemy group	hunting with spear
morality of living together	
man, women	exclamations – expressions of negative attitudes
boy	requests (asking for a share in food)
white man (ethnographer)	rejecting an offer
old man	referring to marital intimacy
old man	referring to female physiology

Towards an Arabela economy of affects

It was late evening and the members of my household were already under their mosquito nets. All but Adan, who installed the mosquito net for his wife Nadia and their baby boy, and then laid down in a hammock. After some minutes, she called him from under their mosquito net: *Adan, ahí vas a dormir? No vas a venir a la cama, di Tamani?* (“Adan, are you going to sleep there? aren’t you coming to bed, says Tamani?”). Nadia’s utterance, apart from being yet another example of oblique formulation of an embarrassing request, is interesting because of the identity of the voiced enunciator. Who was Tamani, voiced by Nadia? Tamani is one of the common family names among the Quechua from the Napo river. I met once a man with this family name, who visited the Arabela communities, but I had never heard any comments or other mentions of him. Some three or four years earlier, during my first stay among Arabela, I heard children playfully calling each other that name, but later I found no other references to it. The expression *venir a la cama* is not conspicuous neither in itself, neither Nadia pronounced it a way that might have sounded peculiar. In this case, it was the situation that made it salient – Nadia was asking her husband to join her in her bed, and other people (her in-laws) could hear her. Given my inability to link Tamani to any singular, real person, it seems to me, that Nadia’s utterance was, in fact, an enaction of a sort of a “wildcard” enunciator, to whom one can assign any verbal expression. (Note the similarity between Nadia’s utterance and *Dónde vamos a mandar? dice Porojua*, both indexing marital intimacy in the presence of by-standers.)

On another occasion, I observed the analogous use of the name Tamani in the context of “doing” others. It was when Nadia’s husband, Adan, setting off for a hunting trip upriver, ordered his younger cousin to operate the engine of the boat, saying: *Juan, tú vas hacer Tamani* (“Juan, you are going to do Tamani”). Again, since steering a boat is not a conspicuous or unusual activity among Arabela, Tamani was rather a “wildcard” agent/body, enacted to conceal or mitigate the directive issued by Adan.

The case of “wildcard” enunciators and doers provides a strong argument for not conceptualizing these practices as mere quoting or mimicking, but as active

voicing and enacting. Quoting and mimicking imply a previous event where the quoted or mimicked person actually produced words of behaviors in question, which is not (not always) the case among Arabela. But the overall picture is even more interesting, and *hacer Tamani* seems not to be the “zero-degree” of enacting the other. It seems that the animated figure not only need not refer to a real being, but it may even remain unidentified. Another example of announcing voracious eating provides a hint for such a scenario.

As I wrote earlier, the young sons of my hosts used to enact other persons to enthusiastically announce or invite each other to have a big meal – expressing a strong appetite and an anticipation of a great pleasure. In such cases, they referred to their uncle Educo (diminutive of Eduardo), saying that they “would do Educo” (*Vamos hacer Educo!*), or later – as that expression “wore out” and lost part of its salience – that they would do *eduqueada* (see *supra*). But during my stay, they also invented an interesting alternative to that enaction: in the same situations where they used to “do Educo”, they started to “do *kwaiau*” (thus Adan, for instance, would invite his brothers to eat with him, saying: *Vamos hacer kwaiau!*). *Kwaiau* was an ideophone, which I only recorded in reference to voracious eating and only in this context of those announcements/invitations. I have never encountered it in myths or other narratives. Moreover, I am pretty certain that it was invented by Adan and his brothers (and it was not intelligible to other Arabela).

At first glance, there is no third figure being animated here and bearing some part of the responsibility for the “uncivil” behaviour of the youngsters. But, through the situational parallelism, *Vamos hacer kwaiau!* corresponds to *Vamos hacer Educo!* It seems that somehow a salient (“fresh”) ideophone bears sufficient “charge of alterity” to introduce another person/body into the interaction. How is that possible? What kind of person or body would it be?

Ideophones and their use have already attracted attention of anthropologists and linguists working in Amazonia. Various scholars stress their particular status within language and point to Amazonian peoples’ predilection for their use in ritual and everyday speech. They are seen as pertaining to a particular place in language and discourse, where speakers depart from referential and conventional use of language and use it for a more direct engagement with the reality. In this context, some authors use the notion of transformation or becoming, e.g. Janis Nuckolls, who argued, writing about the Runa from the Ecuadorian Amazonia, that through the use of ideophones “[t]he speaking self of the speech event communicates by imitating and thereby becoming the force that creates a movement, sound, or rhythm” (Nuckolls 2010: 31). Similar observations have been made in relation to Amazonian musicality: Bernd Brabec de Mori and Anthony Seeger observed, for instance, that “much ritual music in Lowland South America is said to be received from, or directed to [...] nonhuman beings” and when the Amazonian peoples sing a bird’s song “they [...] refer to the bird’s person-entity as the song’s source. Consequently, by singing, they become the bird” (Brabec de Mori, Seeger 2013: 271–272, 274). Andrea-Luz Gutierrez Choquevilca offered a precise, pragmatic description of that transformation of the speaker in her

analysis of the ritual discourse of the Quechua Runa of the Upper Pastaza. She showed that the transformation of the voice of the ritual speaker through the use of onomatopoeias, shouts, and whistles, plays a role analogous to a “mask”, but in the field of sound: it has “the power to show the invisible face of invisible actors of ritual interactions” (Gutierrez Choquevilca 2016: 20 – translated from Spanish by the author; see also Gutierrez Choquevilca 2010, 2012).

Inspired by those analyses and starting from the example of eating “with” Educo or “with” *kwaiaiu*, we may advance a general model of the Arabela engagements with the world. In its logical beginning we should place an affect – here: an affect combining appetite, pleasure, engagement, voracity, etc. of a subject towards the food. I cannot say how that affect emerges in the subject (in Adan), but the subject becomes aware of its presence and of the fact that it does not correspond to the body of “real” people (i.e. Arabela). It may be experienced as an intrusion of an alien subjectivity (that is similar to what happens with newborns affected by animals eaten by their mothers – they start to behave in a strange way, which is diagnosed as the *cutipa* of that animal). Becoming aware of that affect would be tantamount to capturing it as an exteriority. As a second step, the subject needs to identify the affect’s identity. There are (at least) two ways to do it. The first is to find a body to which the affect may be attached (Educo). The other is to capture the affect in itself through an ideophone (*kwaiaiu*). In the latter case, the affect is not attached to a pre-existing body, but is treated as a separate body, and the ideophone is the voice of that body (captured by a human), not an arbitrary name imposed by a human on it. (It is a “sononym”, just like the names of birds derived from ideophones capturing their voices [Gutierrez Choquevilca 2012: 75]). That is why, when Adan says *Vamos hacer kwaiaiu!* he does not invite his interlocutors to perform an action referred to with a word *kwaiaiu*, but to “do” a person/body that says “*kwaiaiu*”. (As a side remark, we may note that the formal equivalence between announcements/invitations *Vamos hacer kwaiaiu!* and *Vamos hacer Educo!* – both are used in homologous situations – shows that the meaning of enaction of other persons [Educo] cannot be reduced to joking at the expense of other people, for why would Adan be making fun of *Kwaiaiu?*).

In this interpretation, an affect is something that emerges in the subject, to his or her surprise. I will perhaps be able to explain it more clearly using the example of Levi putting oversized boots to “do Nuria”. I argue that it is not that Levi first saw Nuria in her oversized boots, and then wanted to do the same, but to avoid being mocked, decided to announce his action as a mere “doing” Nuria (as if thinking: “I want to put on oversized boots, as Nuria did, but I don’t want to be mocked, so I will say that I am going to ‘do’ Nuria”). It seems that the process was different, i.e. that Levi experienced the intention of putting on the boots not as something originating from him, but as something occurring to him, coming from an exteriority, which he experienced as his body. Note that, similarly to Levi’s surprise at seeing Soldado putting on trousers over his shorts, here as well, the whole experience surprised the subject – it was expressed through the laugh with which the Arabela speakers made their announcements.

So far, I have used the notion of familiarizing predation to account for the acts, where the subject enacted other persons/bodies for his or her own sake (Adan – to eat rampantly, Levi – to go in his father’s boots, etc.). The subject captures an affect that she sees emerging from her and familiarizes it as an element coming from an external body. But this scheme applies also to another pragmatic variant: where the subject reveals an affect in an unaware and unwary Other (*Ua! Soldado está haciendo Murayari!*). Here, the subject captures a disturbing, alien affect that is emerging in the body of another human and identifies it as part of another (although more distant) human. In both configurations (*Voy hacer Educo!*, *Ua! Soldado está haciendo Murayari!*) the theatre of predation and familiarization is located primarily inside the speaker’s perception. Just as *Voy hacer Educo* was not about Educo, *Soldado está haciendo Murayari* is neither about Soldado nor Murayari. Instead, it is about the relation between the speaker and his or her own emerging affects. The difference is that in the first situation the speaker has to capture an affect that is emerging within her own body (a strong urge to eat), and in the second, she captures an affect that is emerging from another body (long trousers “putting themselves” on shorts). Both cases bring a restoration of harmony, as an alien affect, non-identified and hence potentially leading to dangerous transformations, becomes identified (captured) and brought back under control of the subject (tamed).

This model has also an implicit assumption that sensible qualities of the beings of the world are perceived by the Arabela subject as external intrusions. Such understanding is not uncommon in indigenous Amazonia. The stress on perception as a process of being affected is widely present and reported or implicit in the practices described in ethnographies. Among the most classic examples we may cite the Yanomami rituals, where men, before going to war, make the images of Other beings “descend into their chests”, bringing them dispositions useful for fighting enemies (Albert 1985: 156–157), or the *arutam* quests of the Aents peoples (Descola 1993). Most often, though – as in those two examples – the affects that people seek to incorporate are integrated into identified, stable wholes (in the Yanomami and Aents cases, these are animals and ancestors, respectively). The Arabela case stresses the potentially independent mode of existence of affects that only in a second move are stabilized and associated with identified persons/bodies. The Arabela affects – ‘wearing oversized boots’, ‘putting trousers over shorts’, or ‘eating raw fish’ – are separate beings, similar to shamanic darts, flying through the world (see for instance Chaumeil 1983). Every Arabela can always be traversed by those and other affects. The point of everyday life is to capture them and then familiarize them through a double operation of associating them with a person/body (‘trousers over shorts’ → Murayari, ‘oversized boots’ → Nuria), and then safely using them without incurring the risk of becoming an unidentified Other.²¹

²¹ The practices discussed here undoubtedly show that Arabela are very sensitive to movements and forms of behaviour. In her ethnography of Runa of Ecuadorian Amazonia, Francesca Mezzenzana – to account for a similar sensibility – proposes to introduce a third dimension

It is evident that in this model the dynamics of the predative familiarization of affects starts outside the Arabela subject, who is acting in response to an external stimulus, provoked – as it were – by the affect resurfacing in the subject (boots in Levi) or in another person (trousers/shorts in Soldado). In this, it corresponds to other domains of the Arabela relationality, where more generally, actions of the Arabela subject are predominantly understood through the scheme of provocation (see Rogalski 2016b).

The reader will notice that in this section I have departed from my first intuition to use the model of familiarizing predation to account for what happens between persons/bodies (Levi and Nuria, Artemio and vulture). Now, it is no more about Levi who captured Nuria (and used her to safely wear rubber boots) or Artemio who captured a vulture (and enjoyed rotten fish). Here the act of familiarizing predation occurs between Levi and the affect that “affected” him: it is not Nuria that gets familiarized, but the affect. Everything that concerns Levi’s relation to Nuria (a real person, his cousin, living a few houses away) is a corollary of a more primary interaction between Levi and his affect. It was wildcard Tamani and then Kwaiau – faceless but audible – who took this analysis away from the domain of interpersonal relations to the realm of bodies and affects. At the same time, it is difficult not to see a kind of predatory malice in Romario’s *Dónde vamos a mandar? – dice Porojua*, targeted at his wife’s former husband. It is thus possible that the scheme of familiarizing predation operates in multiple dimensions, both at a person-to-person and person-to-affect levels.

Closing remarks

In this article I attempted to show how the Arabela use of language in certain situations corresponds to more general ways of engaging with the human and nonhuman environment outside and within the community, and how a common Amazonian notion of transmission of characteristics between humans and nonhumans (present, for instance, in couvade rules or hunting magic) also constitutes a matrix for thinking about ephemeral, half-serious relations between human members of one community. As such, it is another attempt to “anchor” the symbolic economy of alterity (mostly its body-related aspects and the notion of familiarizing predation) within the discourse and in the everyday (see Oakdale 2007). In doing

of Amazonian engagement with the world – other than subjectivity and body – which is a community of ‘forms’ or shared patterns and movements (Mezzenzana 2015, 2018). Although I cannot discuss at length Mezzenzana’s perspicacious and rich ethnography, I argue that, at least in the Arabela case, the classic notion of Amazonian body as a bundle of affects and ways of living (Viveiros de Castro 1998) is sufficient to account for this sensibility. We only have to admit an openness of the inventory of Amazonian bodies and that phenomena conceptualized as bodies may not correspond to identifiable and stable objects. Such is the case of the body, which contains the affect *kwaiau*, that Adan and his brothers brought to life. It is a body that does not have external, substantial, material existence, nor even visual form – it is just a bundle of one affect endowed with a voice (and hence also a name *kwaiau*).

so, it highlights aspects that might not have received enough focus in syntheses centered on the symbolic. We saw, for instance, that Arabela are very attentive to the presence in the others' bodies not only of nonhumans, but also of other humans, members of their own community. This paper also emphasizes a feature of the Amazonian body that is sometimes obscured within syntheses that focus on labile and malleable bodies, understood as wholes. The affects and dispositions bundled together into the Amazonian body do not constitute a uniform totality, but always preserve their independence. They are detachable and transferable. Moreover, the affects of Tamani and Kwaiiau show that the inventory of Arabela bodies is open and thus phenomena conceptualized as bodies do not necessarily need to correspond to identifiable and stable external objects. A body containing the affect *kwaiau*, enacted by Adan and his brothers, does not have an external, substantial, material existence, nor visual form. It is just a strand of one bundle; it is one affect endowed with a voice (and hence also a name *kwaiau*).

As for the voicing of each other, it stresses a notion of voice as a constitutive part of every person's embodied identity. As Arabela stress subtle differences in prosody or individual word choices, it is evident that, for them, language is a highly particularized medium, corresponding to particular bodies. It is interesting to note that the practices of enacting others reverberate with the conception of language inherent in Amerindian perspectivism. Since, as Viveiros de Castro observed (1998), in the multi-natural, perspectival worlds, different beings perceive the world in analogous manner and use vocabularies composed of the same words (both jaguars and humans designate some elements of their environment as "beer", or, as Arabela recount, both humans and peccaries engage in a collective practice of fishing in streams, that they call **jiuushiniu**), the meaning of those words always indexes the speaker's embodied perspective (jaguar's "beer" is the blood of his prey, human "beer" is a fermented beverage from manioc, while **jiuushiniu**, which for the humans designates damming up a stream and rapidly throwing the water away to collect fish caught in the mud, for peccaries it means digging in the stream bed with their snouts in search for snails). Therefore, in a perspectivist world interpretation of utterances always comes along the observation of the speaking subject – to what exactly she refers? What is she going to do? This perspectival attitude towards language is also present in the Arabela other-enacting: when Levi says "*Voy hacer Nuria*", it is not immediately clear what *hacer Nuria* will mean for him. People need to pay attention to his subsequent actions, relate them to their memory of Nuria and discern what aspect of the girl's ethogram he is going to adopt.

The Arabela voicing of others clearly points toward the Bakhtinian notion of dialogicality (Bakhtin 1984). But their sensibility to and use of other voices is linked to their sensibility to movements; dialogical relationships – so present in their voicing others – are also evident in their enacting of others in actions and movements (although it is always accompanied by a linguistic clue – the label

<hacer X>), pointing to a broader, multimodal dialogicality.²² On the other hand, the notion of dialogicality seems insufficient to encompass the other-enacting through artifacts (items of clothing). Although the utterance *Voy mudar mi angelito* [+ putting on Angelito's sweatshirt] might seem to be commutable to **Voy hacer Angelito* [+ putting on Angelito's sweatshirt], I have never found labels <hacer X> used in context of putting on clothes.

Another aspect to be emphasized is that in the practices of doing, voicing (and "wearing") Others, there are no references to a positive Arabela ethos, one that they would promote among children or "adopted" newcomers. Sensitive to appearances, movements and voices as they are, Arabela seem not to have any particular positive representation of how a true Arabela human should move, speak and look. The Arabela way of being emerges implicitly as that which is imperceptible, which passes unnoticed. At the same time, enacting others enables the Arabela subjects to depart from the usual, transparent ways of being, while still supporting the common (Amazonian) assumption that the local group forms a uniform community of humans sharing similar bodies. On the one hand, it gives people the means to scoff those among them who depart from established manners of behaving, and on the other, it allows skilled "enactors" to circumvent these norms.

I would also like to stress the fact that the resulting human world of bodies-ethograms is strictly bound to a poetics of everyday interactions. I have hardly ever witnessed other situations, were idiosyncrasies expressed in doing, voicing, and wearing others were explicitly thematized. I have never heard my hosts talking about or explaining the particularities of Murayari's behaviour (and linking them, for instance, to his community of origin or other inherent characteristic). It seems that even children, who use those identifications with dexterity, learn them mostly by hearing their elders uttering them. This further confirms that this particular social ontology is rooted in everyday interactions.

The poetics of everyday interactions contributes to training people in discerning minor details of each other's movements, voices, and clothes. Through enacting others, Arabela socialize the difference that inevitably appears in every human community and may be especially disturbing in Amazonia, where the community is understood as a collective of persons sharing similar bodies. If someone starts to behave in a strange way, parodying him or her may be a means to cope with this idiosyncrasy. But the practices presented here relate to bodies not only on a symbolic or semiotic level – as they point to the body, recognize bodily idiosyncrasies, elaborate on them. It is evident that they allow for an active exploitation of new habits and for their inclusion into a "working" body of a collective – an Arabela community, a kin-group or a household. In that sense, "doing" Emil, Nuria, or Murayari, are also acts of the Amazonian production

²² Already present in the Bakhtin's definition of dialogic relationships: "... we remind the reader that dialogic relationships in the broad sense are also possible among different intelligent phenomena, provided that these phenomena are expressed in some *semiotic material*" (Bakhtin 1984: 184–185 – original emphasis; see Agha 2005: 39).

of the human body, once again, taken from a major ritual level to a minor domain of everyday interactions. At the same time, given the formal resemblances between the practices of enacting others and ritual configurations – for instance the complex enunciator involved in voicing others – it seems that when we move from the ritual to the everyday, the ritual moves with us.

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SUMMARY

Everyday enacting of agents through bodily simulation, voicing, and familiarization of artifacts among the Arabela (Peruvian Amazonia)

The Arabela – a group of Zaparoan origin from the Peruvian Amazonia – often claim to adopt other (human and nonhuman) persons' ways of performing actions, referring to things and expressing emotions. They do it through a variety of speech acts – from announcements of their own actions, to third-person comments about other people's actions, to exclamations – and to accomplish various interactional ends (from avoidance

to teasing). This paper shows that these different forms of enacting of others actualize a society consisting of human and nonhuman persons with different bodily ethograms, where relations between bodies and affects follow a scheme of familiarizing predation. Also, a specific concept of the Arabela agent emerges from this analysis, where the Other is individualized as a static ethogram of gestures and voices, while the speaking or acting subject has to prove his/her ability to singularize Others, using their presumably typical verbal expressions and actions. The ultimate goal of this paper is to stimulate reflection on the links between everyday interactions and ontologies in Amazonia.

Keywords: Amazonian ethnology, animism, perspectivism, familiarizing predation, reported speech, eponymy, ideophones

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Otro lado. An inquiry into the conceptual topology of animism among the Moré (Itene) of the Bolivian Amazonia

The *-pajé* [shaman] category may also be compared to the famous Tupinambá *tobajara*, a term meaning ‘the one from the other side’, applied to both enemies and brothers-in-law (Fausto 2012: 201).

This essay is an ethnographic exposition of animism as documented during my fieldwork in Amazonia among the Moré.¹ In its most fundamental formulation animism is an “attribution by humans to non-humans of an interiority identical to their own” (Descola 2013: 129). The classical anthropological notion of animism was restored and conceptualised in a new way by the French anthropologist Philippe Descola based on his ethnographic work among the Achuar (Descola 1992, 1996).² This “new” animism is now well documented in Amazonian ethnography and has been theorized mainly as an ontology (Costa, Fausto 2010; Brightman et al. 2012). It has been explored through different ethnographic examples: shamanism, hunting, warfare, mythological corpus, cannibalism, ritual practice, narratives, as well as songs. My aim in this paper is simply to present

¹ The text is based on the ethnographic material collected during a project financed by a grant awarded by the National Science Centre, Poland – “Tradition from the Native Point of View. The present and the past in the discourse and practices of the Moré Indians of the Bolivian Amazon” (2015/17/N/HS3/00078). I would like to thank Daniela Peluso, Filip Rogalski and Kacper Świerk for valuable comments on the very first draft of this paper.

² To separate this new understanding of animism from the early, 19th c. anthropological speculations about the evolution of religion some scholars prefer to call it “new animism” (Harvey 2006, cf. Domańska 2014), although in Amazonian literature it is labelled simply “animism”.

specific ethnographic material relevant to the renewed debate about animism in Amazonia.

I will focus mainly on stories (*cuentos*) and expressions that the Moré used in ordinary discourse and that suggest an interesting topological³ quality of animism, which in my view may also be interpreted as an aspect of ethnographically recognized Amerindian perspectivism (Århem 1993, 1996; Viveiros de Castro 1998; Lima 1999) although not necessarily within ontological turn framework (Viveiros de Castro 2015).

Some theoretical considerations

I will not develop here the theoretical aspects of my own understanding of animism (and perspectivism), but I should stress some important differences in respect to the ongoing debate about animism and perspectivism in Amazonia.⁴ I intentionally avoid using the concept of ontology when referring to animism, however, not because I think animism cannot be understood as a kind of ontology. In fact, I agree it could be, especially in a way formulated by Philippe Descola (2013, 2014). I prefer not to use it because, in my opinion, focusing on ontology may generate many problems, already explored in the critiques of the ontological turn (Heywood 2012; Rival 2012; Santos-Granero 2012; Laidlaw, Heywood 2013; Graeber 2015; Candea 2017), and may distract scholars from other interesting aspects of animism. More importantly, I have many doubts concerning the basic assumption expressed by some proponents of the ontological turn (the main theoretical view in which the debate about animism/perspectivism has developed within anthropology), i.e. their rejection of epistemology (Holbrad, Pedersen 2017, cf. Viveiros de Castro 2015).⁵

Intellectually sophisticated rejection of epistemology by proponents of the ontological turn can be understood in terms of seeking a solution to the old philosophical and anthropological problem, the great dualism of idea vs. world, concept vs. thing, reframed as culture vs. ontology, etc. (Carrithers et al. 2010; Heywood 2012). In my view, this problem in anthropology (at least) can be better resolved not by rejecting epistemology, but by approaching it from the new theoretical perspectives developed mainly in cognitive science, which are indeed

³ Here, I use an analogy to the mathematical term “topology”, in the context of interchangeable (symmetric) relations of space (inside/outside, this side/other side) according to the given surface/boundary (cf. Giovanni da Col 2013).

⁴ I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to express more clearly my own stance toward the animism/perspectivism debate.

⁵ It is worthwhile to mention other coherent perspectives on animism which are not rejecting epistemology: Nurit Bird-David’s relational epistemology (1999, 2006), Rane Willerslev work (2004, 2007), Eduardo Kohn’s semiotic inspired approach (2005, 2013) and the cognition and culture approach developed by Bethany Ojalehto Mays and her team (Ojalehto et al 2015, 2017, 2020). Philippe Descola’s approach, even though it explicitly refers to ontology, also takes into account the epistemic mode of existence (2014).

highly relevant for anthropology (Bloch 2012; Boyer 2018). I wish to illustrate my claim with a short example.

Proponents of the ontological turn suggest that, when dealing with radical difference (alterity) during fieldwork, an anthropologist cannot possibly take seriously her interlocutor's statement, such as: "this animal is a person", i.e. take it as real – if she conceives it as a belief (or concept) (Viveiros de Castro 2011; Holbrad, Pedersen 2017). I believe that this problem is mostly resolved by an emerging new paradigm related to cognition, perception, and action (Frith 2007; Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016). Its main arguments state: first, what you perceive/experience is strongly affected by your prior knowledge and beliefs;⁶ secondly, perception is an action and engagement, so what you experience is also affected by your action and your body; thirdly, the whole process of perception is highly transparent for the acting agent. This last point is crucial and indicates that, typically, we perceive the world as if we perceived it directly. Finally, the whole process of perception is an ongoing process based on feedback loops.⁷ From the phenomenological point of view, we feel immersed in the world, and meaning is intrinsic to the very act of perceiving. In other words, at the very moment of engagement with reality, the embodied mind already generates predictions and expects the world to be in a specific way. Those expectations affect the experienced reality and there is no access to other, "more real" world.⁸ Indeed, this may interestingly resemble the ontological framework in anthropology.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is no epistemology here. Perception is a process that is fast and transparent but requires prior information. Knowledge, beliefs, concepts (information-bearing structures – whatever we want to call them) are mental representations and must be representations in order for them to be stored in memory. Also, they do not have to be accessible to the agent

⁶ In the Predictive Processing framework,, knowledge and belief are to some extent understood differently than in anthropology, as structures of information operating largely below the level of self-awareness, but in principle this does not exclude the role of reflective beliefs (Sperber 1997; Mercier, Sperber 2009), because they also affect perception and action (Lupyan, Clark 2015; Andersen 2017; Otten et al. 2017; Seth 2019;).

⁷ The brain continuously generates predictions and monitors those predictions for errors by comparing its own dynamic models of the environment (physical, social/cultural, and internal model of the body) with incoming information. Within Predictive Processing framework the embodied brain is not a passive receiver but to a large extent producer of the content of perception. In other words, a significant amount of perceptual information is provided by the brain itself. The loops contain: expectation formation, predictive coding, error monitoring, and back again (see Bar 2007, 2009; cf. Frith 2007; Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016;).

⁸ This is also where I see the place for a notion of ontology understood in this specific way. Ontology will refer here to whatever people experience as real. The fact that the very process of perception is transparent for the agent only strengthens the realness of sensations and sense of the direct access to the world. Nevertheless, what is (ontologically) possible to experience depends on the very process of past experiences. In Descola's terms the 'ontic mode of existence is dependent upon its epistemic mode of existence' (Descola 2014: 433–434). Of course, this is a significantly different way of understanding ontology than its classical philosophical view, but as far as I understand, it is somehow close to the way Philippe Descola is conceptualising animism as an ontology (Descola 2013, 2014). Every time I use the term 'ontological' in this article for the purpose of my own argumentation, I use it in this specific sense.

self-awareness to operate on their basis (Bloch 1998, 2012; Mercier, Sperber 2017; Boyer 2018). Therefore, I would not agree that I do not take the Moré seriously when I refer to their statements as based on structured concepts. This is also why I intentionally use the term “conceptual” about the topological quality of animism, which I wish to illustrate in this paper. I do take these statements to constitute knowledge, since they stem from the experience (mostly shamanic/hunting experience but also other forms of engagement) of the interlocutor or someone s/he knew and which they store (in personal memory) and transmit through public representations (stories, songs, artefacts, etc.). I do believe that the Moré can experience what they say they experience, see, or hear. I do believe that they experience this as part of the real world as they experience it.⁹ Actually, this article is about how they explicitly articulate this experience. I hope, this briefly sketched theoretical framework enables me to take very seriously everything that they do, say, and recall.¹⁰

In this essay I am particularly interested in a spontaneous and explicit articulation by the Moré of topologic markers such as boundaries, surface, sides and layers, as well as spatial characteristic (clear space, closed, open, reversed) or proximity markers (here, there, close, far away, etc.), and sometimes also temporal (night, day) or social and cognitive markers (alone, visible, invisible). During the preliminary analysis of my fieldwork material, I overlooked those topological idioms, but then I realized that they could have something in common with other intriguing ideas explicitly present among the Moré, namely the concept of “the other side” (*otro lado*). Before I introduce how I understand this notion in the context of the Moré ethnography, I would like to point out that inspiration for many of the ideas presented in this article stemmed from the work by Marta Krokoszyńska, focusing on social practices among the (ex)Capanahua (Krokoszyńska 2016, 2017).

Krokoszyńska, who in her PhD dissertation approached the topic from a different theoretical background and focused on slightly different aspects of Amazonian reality, has developed an interesting topology-like framework for the (ex)Capanahua ethnography (Krokoszyńska 2016). She is able to convincingly argue that topological concepts (this side/other side, inside/outside) are crucial to understanding Capanahua sociality and even the whole process of becoming (ex)Capanahua. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze in detail the different aspects where Krokoszyńska is making use of this topologic argument, but in my concluding remarks I will indicate more precisely its scope.

Topology is a recurrent theme in anthropology.¹¹ In this essay I propose to use topology as a heuristic device. By this I mean that perhaps many anthropologists

⁹ Nor do I think theirs any different (alter) experience is a kind of maladaptation, cognitive error, or hallucination. One can only call it hallucination in terms of Anil Seth’s claim that we all hallucinate when we experience reality (Seth 2017, cf. Frith 2007: 111–139).

¹⁰ For the purpose of clarity of this argument, I choose not to address the problem of how seriously we can take even our own memories, knowledge, and beliefs in general.

¹¹ The first explicit attempt to introduce topology-based approach into anthropology can probably be traced back to Edmund Leach’s *Rethinking Anthropology* ([1961]1966: 7–8). Elements

working in South American Lowland may find familiar some examples and utterances I present in this text. I believe that ‘otro lado’ characteristics that I recognize are more widespread in Amazonia and are present not only among the Moré. Topology is a heuristic device used to first identify these characteristics in ordinary narrations and to go beyond apparently obvious meaning for many of them – for example proximity markers like ‘here’ or ‘there’. It is also a device to identify the analytical importance of idioms such as surface and boundary in the Amazonian context. Furthermore, I do believe that topology has a huge potential to become a coherent theoretical approach in the study of human culture and sociality (Shields 2013; Hamberger 2018). Following this necessary theoretical clarification, let me now present ethnography.

The Moré

The Moré (Itene) are an indigenous people currently living in two small villages in the north of Bolivia where the Guaporé (Iténez) river enters the Mamoré river very close to the border with the state of Rondônia in Brazil. Before 1938, the Moré speakers on the Bolivian side of the border were monolingual. Nowadays, in a population of around two hundred Bolivian Moré descendants, around ten people from the oldest generation can communicate in their native language with different levels of fluency (Chyc 2017), but in general, a local variation of Spanish remains the only language used in daily communication. Moré language belongs to the Chapacura language family and the Bolivian Moré (Itene) are the last living survivors of the once numerous Chapacuran groups of Bolivia (Rokorona, Napeka, Kitemoka, Tapacura); together with the Brazilian Wari’ and Oro Win they are the only Chapacuran group with living speakers (Birchall et. al 2016). The first detailed linguistic study of the Moré language in the late 1990s identified a Moré dialect on the Brazilian side called *Kaw Tayo*¹² (Kujubim, see Duran 2000). The new linguistic data¹³ and my ongoing ethnohistorical study also strongly suggest that, historically, Moré speaking groups have been living on both sides of the Guaporé river (Snethlage 2016; Chyc 2017). Descendants of the Moré speaking groups on the Brazilian side now live mainly in the Ricardo Franco indigenous community on the Guaporé river and call themselves Kujubim. They now only speak Portuguese (Sanchez 2019).

of topological framework appear in works of major anthropologists, such as Gregory Bateson, Claude Levi-Strauss, Roy Wagner and Marilyn Strathern (cf. Da Col 2013). In the Amazonian context it was explicitly applied by Klaus Hamberger (2012, 2019) in general, and by David Rodgers in his analysis of shamanism among the Ikpeng (2013).

¹² This is the Moré word which means “people who eat tayo-fish”. All Moré words in this paper will be underlined.

¹³ Currently, I collaborate with the linguist Joshua Birchall on documenting the Moré language (*Salvaguarda do Patrimônio Linguístico e Cultural de Povos Indígenas Transfronteiriços e de Recente Contato na Região Amazônica* [PRODOC 914BRZ4019] Subprojeto: Moré-Kujubim).

Before 1938, the Moré had mostly hostile relations with other inhabitants of the area. Hostility was reciprocal – the Moré were being attacked by non-indigenous enemies, or the Moré themselves attacked Bolivians and Brazilian citizens on the Mamoré and Guaporé rivers. Between 1930–1937, there were a few attempts to establish peaceful relations with the Moré (Leigue Castedo 1957; Snethlage 2016). In 1938, as the Bolivian national project of “pacification” was being implemented the Moré had already been decimated by multiple epidemics. This could be one of the reasons why they decided to establish peaceful relations with the pacification team lead by a Bolivian indigenist and pedagogue, Luis Leigue Castedo. From 1938, he established the so-called *Núcleo Indígenal Moré* and settled there around one hundred survivors of the Bolivian Moré (Leigue Castedo 1957). During his stay among them, between 1938–1962, he introduced the Moré, among others, to the Spanish language and the Catholic Church teachings (Guiteras Mombiola 2019). Moreover, during that time, around one hundred Moré were living among dozens of *Mestizo* people (*karafo*) who worked for Luis Leigue Castedo in *Núcleo Indígenal Moré*. Proximity and a great number of those *mestizo* bodies were, according to the Moré, one of the reasons why, nowadays People (*gente*) do not speak Moré and do not live like the Moré once used to live.

I wish to introduce the ‘otro lado’ in the same way it was first made available to me – namely, through “just another hunting story”. It was by analyzing such a story that I realized that the *otro lado* idiom was also explicitly present in other utterances and narratives.

The other side *or* just another hunting story

I will start with a short story that Tuke¹⁴ (one of my Moré friends, then twenty-eight), who was generously hosting me in his family home during my stay, told me in 2016. We were sitting on a bench in front of his house in the small village of Monte Azul, discussing some recent rumors and laughing. A few days before, Tuke heard me asking his cousin a question about what it was like to go hunting. Apart from logistical and technical issues, I was asking some rather naïve questions, such as: “Do you think animals have souls?” or “Do animals have owners?” My Moré interlocutor simply replied, “Who knows?”¹⁵ or “I don’t know, I don’t think so.”¹⁶ At the time when I originally asked such questions, Tuke responded with silence. I felt disappointed.

However, this particular evening, a few days after that interview, I already forgot my frustration with not being able to so easily gain crucial information about animism, and I was simply enjoying Tuke’s company. In such ordinary

¹⁴ I use pseudonyms for my interlocutors. *Tuke* is a Moré word which means “brazil nut” (*la castaña*). For the Moré, it is a very important wild fruit, both symbolically and (especially now) also economically.

¹⁵ ‘¿Quién sabe?’ Original quotations of short sentences in Spanish will appear in footnotes.

¹⁶ ‘no sé...no creo...’

and peaceful moment, Tuke suddenly said: "I will tell you something."¹⁷ He began to tell me a story that was rather typical of hunting stories I had heard before, with one small exception, which I will reveal at the story's conclusion. He told me how, a few weeks earlier, together with his cousin and brother-in-law, they had decided to go hunting. They were hunting by night (a usual practice of the Moré hunters nowadays). Walking through the forest at some distance from each other, they remained within an earshot, even though they could not see each other. Of course, they were smoking tobacco because of the mosquitos (so they claimed).¹⁸ In the horizontal arrangement, Tuke was on the left end of the hunting *trio*, while his cousin was in the middle and his brother-in-law was on the right.

Tuke told me that at a certain point, for a few minutes, he suddenly found himself alone in the forest, unable to hear the presence of his companions.¹⁹ He explained his predicament by saying: "It was because my cousin went closer [to the right] to my brother-in-law to get some tobacco and make his cigarette".²⁰ Then, Tuke realized that something was moving in front of him in the bushes. Using a flashlight, he decided to illuminate the bushes, yet at first glance he could not see anything. Then he suddenly saw it standing before him! It was a white-lipped peccary (*Tayassu pecari*).

Tuke remarked that the peccary was unusually big, alone, and stood in place directly in front of him, looking straight at him.²¹ Then, Tuke explained that he thought: "I will shoot him to see if he is from *this* or *the other side*"!²²

As I was listening to his story, the underlying meaning of his words was not yet apparent to me, because I did not pay particular attention to his phrasing at that moment. Later, Tuke described how he was pointing his gun at the peccary and trying to take a shot, but that his gun would not work. With this, he started calling out to his cousin, but nobody answered him. Meanwhile, the peccary was still there constantly staring at Tuke and slowly moving closer to him and making sounds by exhaling loudly (*fhrrr, fhrrr*). Finally, Tuke could shoot and, according to him, he shot the animal, but the peccary did not die, nor did the bullets make him turn and run. Tuke tried to shoot again but the gun, once more, did not work. Then finally, Tuke was able to hear his cousin calling out for him. For a split second, he quickly turned his head in the direction from where his cousin's voice came, and when he looked back, the peccary had vanished. As an explanation for this unusual occurrence of the peccary, Tuke concluded: "This critter was from

¹⁷ 'Te voy a contar algo...'

¹⁸ Of course, the use of tobacco in Amazonia is embedded in a strong symbolic context. I will not develop it here as I focus on other aspects of the story.

¹⁹ Please note that in this situation 'alone' means that he not only could not see, but also did not hear his companions, even though he knew that they were still there, somewhere close.

²⁰ 'Fue porque mi primo se acercó a mi cuñado pa' pedirle un poco de tabaco y hacer su cigarrillo.'

²¹ I wish to point out another strange characteristic of the peccary, which was not mentioned here, namely its solitary presence. White-lipped peccary live in groups, and it is very strange to see them alone. Tuke did not mention sound or odour of other peccaries, which in normal circumstances should take place. I would like to thank Kacper Świerk for pointing this out to me.

²² 'Le voy a disparar pa' ver si es del éste o del otro lado.'

the other side. I shot him, but he did not die. There was not even any blood over there. But I was not scared. Did not scare me – that’s why I was able to come back home”.²³ That was it. No further explanation.

Apart from the clear absence of explicit statements about spirits or animal soul in Tuke’s hunting story, indeed, many features of this story are familiar for South American lowland anthropologists. These types of strange encounters in the forest are well known ethnographic illustrations of animism in Amazonia (Lima 1999; Viveiros de Castro 2012; Descola 2013). On another occasion, I asked Tuke why, in his opinion, this animal did not run away. He simply replied, “because this critter was from the other side”.²⁴ When I asked what it meant to him, he just responded “it was a demon” (*fue demonio*).

Misunderstandings, doubts, and strange encounters in Amazonia

Let us try to look more closely at the meaning of ‘*otro lado*’ in the context of Tuke’s hunting story. I will start with an observation that the story was spontaneously told by him and he decided how to put his experience and ideas into words. Why, when telling me this story, did he decide to emphasize that there was something amiss with the animal? Did he expect that the peccary should behave as an ordinary (animal) peccary?

Someone could argue that he decided to stress this because of me – because I (a white – *gringo* – foreigner) was present there, listening to this story, Tuke could have been trying to adjust his narrative to fit my expectations (whatever he assumed them to be). Potentially, he could have emphasized that the peccary’s behaviour was not typical because I would not automatically surmise this (due to my lack of knowledge about peccaries). Perhaps, if he were telling the story to someone else, it would have been told differently. In other words, it was simply a coincidence that he used phrase “the other side”? In my opinion, however, it was not the case. In subsequent years, following my preliminary fieldwork, I heard more hunting stories that were similar to Tuke’s and were also told spontaneously and addressed to people other than me, who were familiar with hunting. In those stories, again, the expression *otro lado* appears in the same context and seems to be used as a marker of the strange behaviour of an animal or, in other words, its demonic provenience. Yet, before I will consider other ethnographic examples of the use of the “*otro lado*” idiom, I would like to reflect on another possible scenario.

Could it be that I simply misunderstood or overinterpreted Tuke’s story? Of course, ‘*otro lado*’ literally means ‘the other side’ and is sometimes used by the Moré in this literal sense to address someone or something foreign or distant. In the local context, where the Guaporé river divides Bolivian and Brazilian

²³ ‘*Este bicho fue del otro lado. Le di un tiro, pero él no murió. Ni siquiera había sangre por allí. Pero yo no tenía miedo. No me asustó, por eso pude volver a casa.*’

²⁴ ‘*porque este bicho fue del otro lado.*’

territories, the expression '*otro lado*' sometimes refers literally to the other side of the river. In that context, people from 'the other side' will simply imply Brazilians. Certainly, this expression can sometimes be used more literally and at other times more metaphorically.

For this reason, it can be argued that perhaps Tuke just literally wanted to express that this animal was from far away. However, this too would not be a satisfactory explanation. Peccaries are common to the Amazonian ecosystem and the Moré hunters are profoundly familiar with their 'habitus', and expertly know how to hunt them. Indeed, this is precisely the point – Tuke knows exactly what a peccary's habits are, and for this reason, he can recognize its unusual behaviour. His expertise allows him to identify this particular peccary as being from 'the other side'. Finally, to fully exhaust other possible interpretations of '*otro lado*', it is also worth examining if Tuke's 'the other side' literally refers to the other side of something. In this case, I ask if it may refer to the 'other side' of something real in terms of experience? Indeed, such a question makes sense both anthropologically and ethnographically.

I realized that the '*otro lado*' expression appeared not only in specific hunting stories, but also in a different kind of stories which contemporary Moré interpret as encounters with "diabolic things" (*cosas diabólicas*).²⁵ For example, nowadays, some people tell stories about strange encounters which they (or someone they knew) experienced. Usually, such stories are about walking *alone* in the forest and hearing something or even seeing something which many of my interlocutors describe simply as 'things from the other side' (*cosas del otro lado*). Particularly, this refers to situations when sound is perceived without the visual presence of an object. Such sound could be the sound of a running horse or of a wooden wagon used to transport rubber (*la goma*) and Brazil nuts (*la castaña*) in "times of Leigue",²⁶ or a motorbike (which is a common means of transport among contemporary Moré) in the middle of the forest. Among such explanations, I have also heard a story about a phantom boat traveling along the Guaporé river, which then disappeared in the old *Puerto Moré*.²⁷

Other Moré hunters also tell hunting stories very similar to Tuke's story, where the encountered animals behave strangely or *emerge* as seen in human form by a hidden *solitary* hunter. Quite often, hunting stories about strange encounters also concern the aquatic world and refer to bizarre fish, dolphins, or anaconda (*sicuri*). Less frequently, I heard stories about children kidnaped by forest 'spirits' (*bulto, diablo, demonio*) and one story about a Moré woman, now deceased, who according to many Moré had been kidnaped by a 'spirit' (*bulto, demonio*) and then returned home after a month. These types of 'spirits' are also described as beings

²⁵ Analyzing such a „Christian vocabulary“ is beyond the scope of this paper but I see here interesting similarities between the Moré and the Wari' in respect of experiencing Christianity (see. Vilaça 2015a, 2015b, 2016).

²⁶ Between 1938 and 1963, the Moré were settled in the *Núcleo Indígenal Moré* governed by a Bolivian teacher and indigenist Luis Leigue Castedo (1957), see above.

²⁷ This is the Spanish name of first place where Leigue Castedo started building *Núcleo Indígenal Moré* in 1938.

from the other side (*otro lado*). I have also heard several stories about the deceased Moré who have been seen shortly after their death by the living Moré who were walking *alone*. All these stories are from the present times and concern people alive at the time of the fieldwork.

Considering these examples and the fact that the Moré explicitly mentioned '*otro lado*', one would expect that there is a coherent idea of what this 'other side' is. However, people do not explicitly speak about the characteristic of 'the other side'. They are rather concerned about *effects that seem to occur* on this side (their side, so to speak) *as a result* of encounters with the other side. Those effects are likely to be sickness or death, which take place on this side. It is very common for them to consider this 'other side' as being invisible²⁸ to people in normal circumstances. The Moré understand normal circumstances to be when one is healthy and not solitary.²⁹ Please note that virtually all examples mentioned above occurred when the perceiver was alone.

Beside the fact that there is no coherent theory about 'the other side', we can still find out some of its specific character and characteristics of the boundaries between different sides. Alongside mythological corpus which goes beyond the scope of this article, fragments of this conceptualization of 'the other side' are present in different and sometimes apparently not connected stories which are told by the elderly Moré people.

The elder people's stories

In addition to the already mentioned examples, I would like to introduce several stories told by the elderly Moré (*los sabios*). They usually told the stories (*los cuentos*) in Spanish about shamans (*brujos*) who only a few decades ago were able to cross to the other side and communicate with beings who lived there. Those beings are very often described as presenting themselves in a human form (sometimes with strange, peculiar characteristics) living there like the Moré used to live and speaking the Moré language. For example, from the shamans the Moré know that following death, the deceased go to 'the other side' and there to a place called Namatuke,³⁰ which is located underwater or sometimes described as hidden deep in the forest (not accessible or even visible to the living Moré in normal circumstances). From the point of view of the deceased, they live there like the Moré used to live in the past (on this side). The deceased in Namatuke have longhouses and kinship relations, they fish and hunt, and speak in the Moré language.

²⁸ It seems to me that imperceptibility is very important here. I will return to this aspect in conclusion.

²⁹ "Normal circumstances" can be expressed also by the opposition: joy/sadness (*alegría/estar triste*), peaceful/scared (*tranquilo/asustado*), pleased/complaining (*contento/quejado*), etc.

³⁰ Namatuke literally means "the place of Brazil nuts" or sometimes is translated as "a place where Brazil nuts are born".

Those stories may, in general, appear quite familiar to many Amazonianists, but I would like to focus on the specific aspects of the stories, which in my opinion reveal some of the characteristics of ‘the other side’. The following is one of the shortest examples of such a story:

Example 1 [Otro_lado/ ite_20170503_pch_RTW_namatuke]³¹

[RTW]³² Three of us went by motor [short pause] until there [short pause and gesticulation] where the namatuke stream [short pause] to see if there is more *Morese*³³ [short pause] but they were deceased [*finado*], well [short pause]

[HCh] They were dead [short pause]

[RTW] what I was saying, well [short pause] deceased [*finado*] [short pause] **but it did not give us** [let in]. **The stream, it did not give us** [short pause] **it was closed** [short pause and gesticulation] **it was closed** [*no nos dio el arroyo, no nos dio, se cerró, se cerró*].

[Long pause]

[PCh] Was nobody there?

[RTW] There was nobody, nobody! The river ended, we continued there to a stream, **beyond that** the water ended and we went overland **to see** [short pause] **we only heard the parrots**,³⁴ **which they were raising** [short pause] **but we did not see** the post [short pause] we wanted to get to the post where the Komarek³⁵ arrived. **We could not get in** [short pause and gesticulation] **there was a big bush** [*motacusal*]! Let’s say and the small stream, but it goes out to the Iténez river.

[Longer pause]

[PCh] And when was that?

[RTW] That was more or less 39 [1939].

[PCh] 39?

[RTW] Yes, Leigue was there, already [short pause] He sent us to see if there is more *Morese* [short pause] but they were the deceased [*finado*], they were already devils!

[HCh] They were already dead, already [short pause]

[RTW] But they lived **in this area** [*en esta zona*] [short pause] **in this life**, better say [short pause] that is why Leigue sent us to get more *Morese*, but it was not possible, **nor did we find them**, we just went [short pause and gesticulation] **to see** [short pause] **the stream we saw**, ends the stream, ends, **there was a dense thicket**

³¹ In the annex published at the end of this paper, the reader will find original Spanish transcriptions of the interviews. All translations are my own.

³² The initials of my interlocutors are in square brackets.

³³ Nowadays “*Morese*” is an ethnonym which the Moré use when talking about themselves in Spanish.

³⁴ Historically the Moré were using parrots as pets to raise alarm if someone was coming to the long house (*maloca*) (Snethlage 2016).

³⁵ Komarek was a Czech farmer who lived close to the Moré territory between 1920s–1930s. In a longer version of the story, there is another part where the storytellers describe Komarek’s earlier travel to the Namatuke. There, he met the deceased Moré, but he did not know that they were already dead.

[*motacusal*]! **But the parrots sounded**, we went further, there was their first long-house [short pause and gesticulation] there were the pillars [*horcones*], pillars no more [short pause] the main pillar was high [short pause and gesticulation] but **beyond** they made more longhouses [short pause] more longhouses, **but we did not get there, it was closed, it was closed, closed** [short pause] **we could not!** Huuuu..., we had to go back [short pause and gesticulation] What we wanted was **to see** the port, the devil's barracks [short pause] but **everything was closed** [long pause] END.

Sometimes, when telling such stories, some of my interlocutors interchangeably used expressions 'the other side' (*otro lado*) and 'the other life' (*otra vida*) but, interestingly, I have not recalled them using the expression 'the other world'. Perhaps, following this observation, we could assume that for the Moré there is no impassable distinction between separated worlds, but rather the 'otro lado' idiom evokes the crack of reality into different layers and a concept of a different life on this and the other side of the boundary? I prefer to think of those sides as experienced realities (each generated by a particular body or point of view), without considering – for now – if we are dealing here with one world or many different worlds in the framework of ontological turn.

The concept of 'the other life' (*otra vida*) requires a separate article and recalls the idea that is common in Amazonia (and elsewhere), namely, that life in some form continues after death. For the purposes of this article, I only wish to emphasize that, in my understanding, the Moré do not consider 'the other life' as something which is exclusively reserved for dead people. Beings from 'the other life' can, for instance, be the 'demons' (*demonios*) mentioned earlier. They can also be aquatic beings living underwater. Deceased Moré from the *Namatuke* are also sometimes described as beings from 'the other life', but more often they are just described as beings from 'the other side'. I would not claim that they are separate concepts but rather 'uses' of handy vocabulary, as they both are Spanish expressions that describe the existence of somehow divided (cracked³⁶) reality that is possible to experience. Perhaps, the concept of 'the other life' can also be somehow connected to the Christian discourse about reality introduced to the Moré by Luis Leigue Castedo in the 1940s–1950s, which is another interesting topic, certainly worth a separate study.

'The other side' idiom seems to indicate fragmentation of the reality at least in terms of differences in the experience from the perceiver's point of view. In other words, the reality appears to be fragmented or divided into 'sides' where 'the other side' is out of experiential reach of the agent (at least in a particular situation). The level of access to the other side seems to be, in a way, gradual

³⁶ Perhaps it is worth mentioning that the word 'shaman' in Moré is *ikat*. I always wondered what exactly *ikat* means in Moré language. The underlying meaning of this word was always difficult to grasp from conversations with the Moré, because for them *ikat* simply means a shaman (*brujo*). It was interesting to find out that in Wari' language the word [*jicat*] seems to mean divide, crack, break (Kern 1996: 59 cf. Everett, Kern 1997: 378).

depending on the state of the perceiver. For ordinary people in normal circumstances (healthy and accompanied), the other side is usually closed (and invisible). Considering the first story quoted above, we see that the reality is described as separated by the rim of the dense thicket/bush (*motacusal*) or by the surface of the water (river). The water and the forest were “closed”. The dense thicket and the water surface are rims of the reality that were closed, so can be considered as boundaries in this particular place and time, concealing the other side. Indeed, the surface of the water can be perceived by the Moré as the *boundary* between this and the other side. I would like to illustrate this observation with another short example.

Example 2 [Otro_lado/ ite_20140822_pch_RTW_ekuyuri]

[RTW] There was one, the biggest shaman [*brujo*], Ricardo’s father [short pause] he *E’kuyuri*, this one [short pause and gesticulation] that one came here from *komi pikuñ* [name of the stream in Moré] to the “eighteen” [name of the stream in Spanish]. They had their little house like that on the *pampa*, no more. From there the full stream went up [incomprehensible] and it had a little bridge like that [gesticulation], two sticks, no more and because it was not very wide [short pause and gesticulation] to this [short pause] the stream of *pikuñ*, the man crossed, crossed [short pause] halfway across the bridge [short pause and gesticulation] that was where the dolphin jumped. Taaa! eee! He dumped him **into the water and took him away**, that man [short pause] that shaman. **Beyond there**, he already told him that he was a shaman, so!

“Aaaa it’s you! [short pause] we thought it was the other people.”

“No, it’s me,” he says.

“Let’s go to the house.”

They took him to the house, many girls [there], but they were dolphins [short pause] [incomprehensible] [short pause] there he took *chicha* [short pause] ate *chivé*³⁷ [long pause].

[Pch] *E’kuyuri*?

[RTW] *E’kuyuri*, the father of the deceased Ricardo. “**There it goes**. [gesticulation] This is the way...eeeeeu, you will go **out there**, where you took off” [short pause] he said “there is the way” [short pause] **and there the shaman came out** [short pause and gesticulation] **he took the road and went well there where he fell into the water**. He crosses **over there** to home **over there** [short pause] hmm, they thought to take him, but they could not [short pause] **he learned a lot**.

END.

³⁷ *Chivé* is a beverage typical of eastern Bolivia. It is prepared from cassava (*manioc*) flour. The beverage is made by mixing cassava flour (previously dried) with water and sugar. The Moré also use the term *chivé* to designate pure dried cassava flour, which they sprinkle over fish, for example.

In my opinion, *the surface* of the water is presented here as a permeable boundary or the interface between two sides (cf. Conklin 2001: 227–228). Two things are especially interesting in this example. First, the reality below the water surface is very much the same as in the village on the ordinary Moré side. After crossing the surface, E'kuyuri can breathe and talk with dolphins in their human form. They offer him typical human food, namely *chicha* and *chivé*. This can suggest that the other side is almost the same as this side. Crossing the boundary between the sides for an ordinary human can even be imperceptible. Perhaps because of this similarity, the whole transition between sides is possible for this particular body (agent). On the other hand, the similarity (of the other side) itself may be an effect of the agent body's perspective, which transforms or creates a whole experienced reality. Either the reality is transforming, or the agent's body is under the process of metamorphosis – the Moré seem to highlight that the whole process could be, at first glance, imperceptible and that both sides have many things in common (in other words, they are symmetrical in a topological sense).

Second, the lack of specific differences between the sides is highlighted by quite extensive use of proximity markers such as “here/there”. It seems like the distance (or rather the deictic character of proximity markers) itself is a (required) marker of alterity. The dangerous sameness of ‘the other side’ conceals the crucial point that reality is different when the boundary (surface) is crossed. Therefore, there must be some way to highlight this difference between the apparently indistinguishable sides (in terms of experienced realities). *Here*, it is not the same as *there*. It is interesting that the proximity markers are perspective dependent (deictic) and, as we know from the ethnographic examples in Amazonia, the body is the source of perspective (Viveiros de Castro 1998).

Maybe it is the reality that is transforming, or rather – the point of view, but when speaking Spanish, the Moré are likely to conceptualize this transformation in *spatial* and sometimes *temporal* terms. Concerning the temporal aspect, it is worth adding that the Moré elders also tell various versions of the stories about nocturnal people from the other side. These are sometimes presented as stories about a mythical person (*Kanawan*) and sometimes about a local group of Moré (*Wariptok*) who are still living in the forest, but in a reversed temporal space. They sleep during the day (from the Moré perspective) and are active during the night. Quite often, they are considered as the nocturnal Moré people, sometimes also described as the deceased Moré.

Finally, I would like to focus on the boundaries separating different sides. The boundaries for the experienced reality are potentially present not only in the water surface or the wall of the bush/dense thicket located deep in the forest, but the rim between the forest and a cleared space of a village or a garden can also be easily expressed as a possible boundary of this/other side.³⁸ Of course,

³⁸ Also, according to some myths (and stories), the surface of a stone or ground itself can be considered as another boundary for the sides (Angenot de Lima 2002: 737). The crucial importance of the boundary between the village and the forest understood as other sides was also examined in detail by Marta Krokoszzyńska in her work about (ex)Capanahua (Krokoszzyńska 2016).

entering the forest does not mean that one is automatically entering the other side. The crossing of the rim (between the forest and a cleared space of a village or a garden) is *potentially* the boundary of the other side, in part because of the particularities of one's emotional (or bodily) state upon entering the forest. If, for example, someone is entering the forest under normal circumstances (healthy and not alone), it is less probable that she or he will be in danger of entering 'the other side'. Also, the temporal dimension is important here, because the Moré interpret nighttime as more conducive to encounters with beings from 'the other side' (cf. Vilaça 2010: 101). For now, we could just state that the Moré conceptualize different sides of given boundary, which are sometimes possible to transit because of an individual's particular *spatial* or *temporal* orientation and their *emotional* (bodily) state.

Considering the boundary created by open cleared space of a village or a garden and the dense thicket of the forest, it is worth mentioning an interesting observation made by Luis Leigue Suárez, the son of Luis Leigue Castedo. During one of my interviews with him, he recalled memories from his youth among the Moré. In the 1940s–1950s, he used to go hunting with the Moré and observed that, quite often, they stopped before entering the forest on the edge of the cleared space. Then, he recalled that some were singing a song (chant) or sometimes just taking a deep breath before they entered the forest (Chyc, ite_20170804_Leigue-Suarez).

Another observation made in the 1960s by the French anthropologist Jacques Meunier during his stay among the Moré also seems to highlight the Moré's interest in the surfaces and boundaries of space (and their constant jokes they share all the time also nowadays).

How I wish I had their eyes! And this ability to give mythological dimensions to the slightest event... Once, they surprise a webbed lizard running on the surface of the water. It looks like mounted on water skis. At the end of the race, the animal loses its balance and spreads in a dense bush. They comment on the affair in Spanish: the lizard, they call it "Jesus Christ" and the dense thicket, the leaves of which open and retract, they call it among themselves, "close your mouth". This immediately gives: "Jesus Christ fell into the arms of damned close your mouth". The younger giggle and the old one rejoices. Experts in scatology, born rhetoricians, will exploit all the possibilities of the figure ... It is up to the one who will be the grittiest. Nevertheless, after 20 years of catechism, the Moré Indians are funny parishioners!³⁹

(Meunier 1982: 128, translated from French by the author)

It is also quite interesting that many traditional hunting practices (especially involving birds and smaller animals) developed by the Moré are based on the use of hiding platforms (*chapapa*) and hiding shelters. The Moré hunters, hidden behind the surface of a shelter or on the platform, could observe animals without

³⁹ The original French version is available in the annex.

being seen themselves. Many of these practices were documented by Emil Heinrich Snethlage (2016) and Stig Rydén (1958). In my opinion, all these examples show that surfaces are boundaries between different objects/persons in space and play a specific role in the Moré's conceptualization of the experienced reality. It is worth highlighting here that such surfaces are particularly associated with the problem of invisibility for the other side. The surface (of water, forest, ground, etc.) is the only visible part of the other side and at the same time – a boundary. I will go back to those implications in the concluding remarks. The last example shows that the Moré seem to highlight the spatial conceptualization even if they do not explicitly use the term '*otro lado*'.

Example 3 [Otro_lado/ ite_20140816_pch_RTW_alma]

(...)

[PCh] Do shamans need something to talk with a dead person? Do they need to drink something or do something?

[RTW] They ask him, better say, the shaman, they **take him there** ... so he can drink *chicha*. Drink *chicha* and drink this...alcohol, awirante⁴⁰ [*aguardiente*] let's say. [incomprehensible] Tobacco, **the shamans bring from there**, [short pause] well.

[HCh] with this they work [shamans]

[longer pause]

[PCh] But, the ancestors do they knew alcohol before?

[RTW] The devils had it, so...[*chicha/aguardiente* – alcohol, tobacco]. The shamans **from there bring it here**. So that the people can approve [incomprehensible] a bottle brings, and they invite them, to the neighbors to the companions, but they do not bring enough, a bottle no more. But those are from the devils ... [short pause] **not from here** [short pause] the awirante that one.

END.

Of course, the adverbs of place, like “there” or “here” can be used to simply mark the distance, but they can also be interpreted as topological markers of different sides of experienced reality. In the story mentioned above, the distance itself highlights the otherness and, at the same time, the power of products from “there”. It was already reported that the Moré are sensitive to spatial orientation in terms of proximity and distance. For example, according to the work of the Brazilian linguist Celso Ferrarezi Junior, the native classification of animals in the Moré language (as well as hunting practice related to them) is deeply oriented by the criterion of what he calls the “geographical location”. Based on linguistic categorization, he identifies three main spatial spheres of crucial importance for the Moré classification of fauna and hunting practice. They are, respectively: tree canopy, solid ground, and water. These spheres form a kind

⁴⁰ This is a neologism in the Moré language. Derived from Spanish word *aguardiente*, which in local Spanish means: high alcoholic beverage that is obtained by distillation of wine or other substances through fermentation.

of spatial topography (or *ecozonas*) where all animals living in a particular sphere are considered to be relatives, which according to Ferrarezi Junior, linguistically locates them in the same classificatory units. Such association of animals as members of one family is based not on the morphological criteria, but the spatial (or geographical) ones. The animals live at a close distance, so they must be related (Ferrarezi Junior 1997: 94-107).

Similarly, we can look at the properties of the state of 'being alone' in terms of being prone to cross on the 'other side'. In my opinion, the Moré conceptualize 'loneliness' (*la soledad*) also as a form of spatial orientation, in terms of physical distance from their kin (cf. Vilaça 2002), where physical separation also means lack of visual or audible communication. It is noteworthy that virtually all strange encounters with 'the other side' take place when a person is alone. As we know, being alone in the Amazonian rainforest is very commonly presented in ethnographies as something (ontologically) dangerous (Viveiros de Castro 1998; Peluso 2004; Opas 2005; Santos-Granero 2012). It is likely that for the Moré, crossing to (or experiencing) 'the other side' is related to being alone (in the forest or on the water) with the inability to recognize that something is wrong with your body (or perception). Like other Amazonian people, the Moré interpret fear as a change in the bodily state that can cause sickness and even death. If you are scared because of a strange encounter, you may start to see the encountered animal as possessing human characteristics (literally, not as an ordinary animal), which is a sign that you have just started to transform and perceive those strange non-human beings as they see themselves (mainly as humans), as it is presented in the perspectivist framework (Viveiros de Castro 1998).

In the proposed topology framework, you can see them as human beings precisely because you are *there* (*yi ma*) not *here* (*yi ka*). According to the Moré elders, only shamans can control the processes of transformation caused by the distance, separation, loneliness, simply the result of being *there*. This means precise control of the body states (on *this* side of the reality), simply not to get sick *here*. Shamans can see beings *there* in their human form and communicate with them. They can return from *there* because they know how to socially navigate such situations. In contrast, for ordinary people like Tuke, such encounters are very dangerous, because they may never return from the other side and die *here*, on this side. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that Tuke was incidentally alone and at night when the strange peccary presented itself. Because Tuke was, at that moment, alone, no one would assure him that he had not crossed the thin border between the sides. Nevertheless, such 'philosophical' elaborations are not expressed *explicitly* by the Moré, they are rather 'hidden' in statements like the following conclusion, told by Tuke at the end of his hunting story: "*This critter was from the other side. I shot him, but he didn't die. There was not even any blood over there. But I was not scared. He didn't scare me – that's why I was able to come back home*".

Concluding remarks

In his seminal paper “Amerindian perspectivism in Amazonia and elsewhere” Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2012: 140) observed:

This spiritual world is sometimes tellingly referred to as “the other side” an expression that can be found among cultures as different as the Trio of Surinam, the Piro of Peruvian Amazonia, and the Kwakiutl and Tsimshian of the Northwest Coast (...).

As I was trying to demonstrate, this list could be extended to include the Chapacuran Moré from the Bolivian Amazonia. In this essay, I focus on the spatial aspect of the chronically unstable reality,⁴¹ which appears to be of special interest for the Moré. They seem to devote particular attention to the surfaces and perceptual boundaries between objects/bodies in space. Those surface/boundaries open the possibility that a particular surface divides the experienced reality into this and the other side. Such fragmentation into sides is quite topological because divided parts are symmetrical. The reality on the other side is very much like on this site. The inhabitants of the other side live there in human form and it is possible to communicate with them (at least for the shamans). Ordinary people may not even recognize that they have crossed this invisible boundary between the sides.

In the conclusion, I would like to point out some implications of these topological aspects of animism and its possible connections with other recurrent themes in Amazonian cosmologies. These could set the direction for a further elaboration of the ideas of *‘otro lado’* (and more broadly, the topology frame for the animism-perspectivism ethnographic material), which I only had a chance to briefly discuss here.

The stories presented in this article contain many characteristics of animism and perspectivism already known from other Amazonian examples, but among the Moré, they are verbalized explicitly as topological (spatial) concepts. What is not always explicitly verbalized in the narratives are (among others) the issues of visibility and invisibility. Nevertheless, it is possible to infer that in many situations those aspects are interconnected and crucial. The other side is invisible to the people in normal circumstances. This relative invisibility is, in my opinion, due to at least two reasons.

First, it is a feature of the very nature of our normal perception. In ordinary circumstances, we cannot see through a solid body/object surface. This obvious fact is not without importance also for the Moré. Moreover, for them, this is a crucial feature of our normal (healthy human person) cognition that the solid surface (of a body, object, sphere, etc.) is a boundary for our perception. Because they use this quality for the purposes of hunting (e.g., the shield trap mentioned above), we can infer that also other potential non-human persons (e.g., animals and birds) share this common limit of perception.

⁴¹ To paraphrase the famous and pertinent observation by Aparecida Vilaça (2005), concerning the Amerindian conceptions of “chronically unstable bodies”.

Secondly, the other side must be invisible because it is ontologically indistinguishable from another topological structure – basically, from the inside/outside symmetry. To further explain this, let me once again refer to the notion of the surface.

The other side in the normal circumstances is invisible at first glance. The very concept of ‘the other side’ can be derived from this quality – it is something behind the visible surface that is hidden from direct view. This logic makes the notion of the (visible) surface a crucial idiom in the Moré animism (and I think more generally in Amazonia, as indicated for a different purpose for example in Gow 1989, 1999; Lagrou 1998, 2018). Virtually every surface could be a boundary that, potentially, can divide the sides.⁴² For the Moré, the surface/boundary can be, for example, the rim of water, of a dense thicket, or the surface of a stone. Nevertheless, it can be the visible surface of a tree, the ground, earth surface, or a visible surface of any given body/form (animal, human, bird, or spirit).

We have known for decades now that the body plays a central role in Amazonian socio-cosmologies. In his seminal paper, Viveiros de Castro proposed that the body in Amazonia should be understood more broadly as “bundles of affects and sites of perspectives” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 481). The body (of every form or shape) always has its *visible surface* that visually *constitutes its form or shape* (notions already familiar in Amazonian cosmologies, reviewed in [Praet 2009]). Thus, what we can perceive is only the visible surface of the body shape through which we cannot see *inside* the body. Therefore, the bundles of affects associated with any particular body are indeed crucial, because only through this feature we can identify a type of subject (the inside) with which we are dealing.

Now becomes possible to think of the other side as “the inside” of any given container for which the archetype will be the Amazonian idiom of the body. The skin will be its surface (a boundary between the sides) and, at the same time, the main visible part of the body. This logic leads us to flag another crucial notion, namely the concept of a container that seems to be a recurrent theme in Amazonian cosmologies, but somehow still remains outside the mainstream of ethnographic theory (cf. Krokoszyńska 2015, 2016, 2017). The inside/outside distinction also can be elaborated further in the context of Descola’s reformulation of animism. This topological aspect of animism is already present in Descola’s observation that the main mechanism of animistic ontology is operating according to the interiorities and the exteriorities of a given body (Descola 2015).

The opacity of the inside (but also of the other side) hints at another important theme in Amazonia – the problem of appearances (Rivière 1994). The typical Amazonian case, a *specific-body* in the forest looks like e.g., a particular animal,

⁴² It is not necessary to look for an explicit verbalization of ‘the other side’ in Amazonian ethnography (although I believe there is much more to it than the short list mentioned at the beginning of this concluding section). The other side conceptualization is closely linked with the notion of invisibility and appearances, which are a very common idioms in many Amazonian ethnographies. As I try to show in this section, the implications of ‘*otro lado*’ topological framework are already present in other typical Amazonian themes.

but it is only the appearance. In fact, specific-body results to be a different *somebody*. The hunting story with which I started draws attention to exactly this point. On the one hand, we could say, that the “true nature” of this body comes from its opaque inside – therefore, from the other side. On the other hand, there is also another, reverse aspect of this topology. *Somebody* who is not yet specific (exactly “visible”) because of being hidden behind the surface, can sometimes appear on this side as a *specific-body*. So, the problem of appearances can be seen (at least in the Moré ethnographic context) also as the problem of nonspecific *somebody* coming from the other side, appearing on this side (as *specific-body*). I will try to illustrate this briefly with one example. Carlo Severi (2004: 816) observed:

in many American Indian shamanistic traditions, a number of central concepts, usually translated as ‘soul’, ‘shadow’, ‘double’, and so on, possess no definite meaning, and are always surrounded by a halo of uncertainty. The semantic content of these concepts is never fully understood, or positively represented by people.

As for many indigenous cosmologies in Amazonia (or elsewhere), also in the Moré ethnographic context, we could find a native notion which somehow resembles an anthropological concept of spirit (Praet 2009). For a very good anthropological reason (Spiro 1966), it is always better for us to use a native term for this notion, which in the Moré case will be *imwikuti*. This is a general term that appears in reference to beings from the other side when stories are told in the Moré language. Interestingly, this term is used mostly in situations when a protagonist or perceiver cannot see a being itself (because of water surface, dense thicket, or night). Therefore, as Severi observed, it is quite difficult to obtain a concrete description of those beings, no matter if the story is told in the native or the Spanish language. When telling a story in Spanish, the Moré will use the term such as *demonio*, *diablo*, *cosas diabólicas* (a demon, devil, devil’s things), which are similarly fuzzy in terms of *specific-body* form. Nevertheless, when such a being emerges on this side (possible to perceive), it always appears in a specific form (human-like or animal); it is only in such instances, that the storyteller can evoke a concrete native name for the being or a concrete general name for the specific species of animal. Therefore, when referring to this visible (on this side) form of being, quite many characteristics can be offered. Especially peculiar characteristics (as big ears, too much hair, or unusual behaviour). Thus, what was already noted for a different purpose (Severi 1993, 2004: 816; Rogalski 2016, 2017), those “spirits” from indigenous narratives are almost always fuzzy (unspecific) beings (or concepts) until they appear (‘on this side’) for a concrete (usually lonely) perceiver as some *specific-body* form (usually human or animal).⁴³

⁴³ For the purpose of my argument, I am focused on visual modality here. Nevertheless, the process of “appearing” in experienced reality can be extended to other modalities, such as hearing, smelling, and so on. Francesca’s Mezzenzana’s (2018) analysis of experiencing *Supai* among the Runa through smelling is an excellent ethnographic example, although it is framed in a different theoretical perspective. In my opinion, her thesis about the importance of the process

What is even more interesting for me, very often the Moré hunters refer to their 'normal' game using terms such as "critter" (*un bicho*), "beast" (*una fiera*), "creature" (*una creatura*) or "something" (*algo*) until this *some-body* appears visible as *specific-body*. For example, until the peccary resurfaces out of the dense thicket or fish emerge through the water surface, they would typically say "there is critter over there" (*hay un bicho allá*), "there is something here" (*hay algo aquí*), or "it is coming this beast" (*ya sale esta fiera*).

I would like to conclude by making the final observation related to the notion of the boundary (surface). The main characteristic of the surface is that it is a boundary but as such is never perfect. In my opinion, it is crucial, that there must be a boundary, but at the same time, it is important, that it is possible to cross it. The problem of thus understood boundaries in Amazonia has not been fully addressed but can be explored through the idiom of the body. Penetrable versus not penetrable (not closed enough⁴⁴/totally closed) bodies appear to be a key concern for the Amazonian socio-cosmologies. Nevertheless, I hope that this sketch of a chronically unstable reality among the Moré can contribute to revisiting the notion of surface/boundaries in Amazonian ethnography, especially in the context of topology framework outlined above.

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of learning to experience *Supai* (through smell or dream) is valid also in the context of visual modality discussed here.

⁴⁴ I intentionally avoid here the term "open" because it seems that normal state of body in Amazonia is to maintain its boundaries (stay closed). Exchange of substance should be made intentionally and in adequate conditions (for example Vilaça 2002, 2005). Nevertheless, not closed enough boundaries are a chronic problem of the Amazonian socio-cosmology (Vilaça 2005, cf. Krokoszyńska 2017).

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The Anex

The original transcription of stories (in Spanish):

Example 1 [Otro_lado/ ite_20170503_pch_RTW_namatuke]

[RTW] Tres fuimos a motor [la pausa corta] hasta allá [la pausa corta y gesticulación] donde emboca el arroyo de *namatuke* [la pausa corta] pa' ver si hay más Morese [la pausa corta] pero eran finao [finado], pues [la pausa corta]

[HCh] Eran muertos [la pausa corta]

[RTW] lo que yo le decía, pues [la pausa corta] finao [finado] [la pausa corta] pero a nosotros **no nos dio el arroyo, no nos dio** [la pausa corta], **se cerró**[la pausa corta y gesticulación], **se cerró** [la pausa larga]

[PCh] no había nadie?

[RTW] No había nadie, nadie! Termino el rio, seguimos allí a un arroyito, más allá termino el agua y nos fuimos por tierra **pa' ver** [la pausa corta] **solamente se oía las parabas, que criaban ellos** [la pausa corta] **pero no vimos** con el puesto [la pausa corta] queríamos llegar al puesto donde llegó el Komarek. **¡No pudimos llegar** [la pausa corta y gesticulación] un **motacusal grande!** Digamo y el arroyito chiquitito, pero emboca al Iténez.

[PCh] Y cuando fue esto?

[RTW] Eso fue, mas o menos 39 [1939]

[PCh] 39?

[RTW] Si, ya estaba Leigue, ya [la pausa corta] Él nos mandó pa' ver si hay mas Morese [la pausa corta] pero eran los finao [finado] ;eran diablos ya!

[HCh] Ya estaban muerto, ya [la pausa corta]

[RTW] **Pero vivían en esta zona** [la pausa corta] **en esta vida**, mejor dicho [la pausa corta] por eso Leigue nos mandó pa' sacar Morese, pero no se podía, ni los hallamos tampoco, nos fuimos no más [la pausa corta y gesticulación] **a ver** [la pausa corta] **la arroyo nos vimos**, termino la arroyo, termino, **¡allí un motacusal!** Pero sonían las parabas, fuimos más allá, allí había su primera casa de ellos [la pausa corta y gesticulación] habían los horcones, horconcito así no más [la pausa corta y gesticulación] lo principal era alto [la pausa corta y gesticulación] pero más allá hicieron más casas [la pausa corta] más casas, pero no llegamos allí, **se cerró, se cerró, se cerró** [la pausa corta] ;no pudimos! HUUU, tuvimos que regresarnos [la pausa corta y gesticulación] Lo que queríamos era ver lo puerto, la barraca de los diablos [la pausa corta] **pero se cerró todo** [la pausa larga]

END

Example 2 [Otro_lado/ ite_20140822_pch_RTW_ekuyuri]

[RTW] Había uno, el más brujo, el padre del Ricardo [la pausa corta] él *E'kuyuri* ese [la pausa corta y gesticulación] ese venía acá de *komi pikuñ* [nombre de arroyo en moré] al dieciocho [nombre de arroyo en español]. Tenían su casita así en la pampa no más. De allí subió el arroyo lleno [incomprensible] y tenía un puentecito así, dos palitos no más y cómo no era ancho [la pausa corta] a este [la pausa corta]

al arroyo de pikuñ, cruzó el hombre, cruzó [la pausa corta] a medio puente [la pausa corta y gesticulación] **allí lo brincó un bufeo** ¡Taaa eee! **Lo tumbó al agua y se lo llevó, ese hombre** [la pausa corta] **ese brujo**. Ya **más allá**, ya le conversó que era brujo, no!

“¡Aaaas vos! [la pausa corta] nosotros pensábamos otra gente”

“No, soy yo” le dice

“Ya, vamos a la casa”

Lo llevaron a la casa, puro peladas, muchachas, eran bufeos [la pausa corta] [incomprensible] allá tomó chicha [la pausa corta] comió chive [la pausa larga] [PCh] *E'kuyuri* ?

[RTW] *E'kuyuri*, el padre del finado Ricardo. “Allí se va. [gesticulación] Por este el camino eeeeu, **va salir por allá**, donde te largaste” [la pausa corta] le dijo” allí sale el camino” [la pausa corta] y allí salió el brujo [la pausa corta y gesticulación] tomó el camino y **salió bien a donde cayó al agua**. Cruzo allí a casa allá cerquita [la pausa corta] hmm, pensaron llevarlo, pero no pudieron [la pausa corta] aprendió harto

END

Example 3 [Otro_lado/ ite_20140816_pch_RTW_alma]

(...)

[PCh] ¿Los brujos necesitan algo para hablar con los muertos? ¿Tienen que tomar algo o hacer algo?

[RTW] Ellos le preguntan, más bien lo brujo, **lo llevan allá** [la pausa corta] pa que tome chicha. Toma chicha y tome este...alcohol, *awirante* [aguardiente] digamos. [incomprensible] Tabaco, **de allá** traen los brujos, pues.

[HCh] con eso ellos trabajan [los brujos]

[la pausa larga]

[PCh] Pero los antiguos conocían alcohol antes?

[RTW] Los diablos lo tenían pues [chicha/aguardiente – alcohol, tabaco]. Los brujos **de allí** traen **pa' acá**. Pa' que aprueben la gente [incomprensible] una botella trae y los invitan, a los vecinos a los compañeros, pero no traen harto, una botella no más. **Pero son de los diablos** [la pausa corta] **no es de aquí** [la pausa corta] la *awirante* ese

(...)

Jacques Meunier (1982: 128) (the original transcription in French)

Comme j'aimerais avoir leurs yeux! Et cette faculté de donner au moindre événement des dimensions mythologiques... Une fois, ils surprennent un lézard palmé qui court à la surface de l'eau. on le dirait monté sur des skis nautiques. En fin de course, l'animal perd l'équilibre et se répand dans un buisson. Ils commentent l'affaire en espagnol: le lézard, ils le surnomment «Jésus-Christ» et l'arbuste dont les feuilles s'ouvrent et se rétractent, ils l'appellent entre eux, «ferme-toi putain». Ce qui donne aussitôt: «Jésus-Christ est tombé dans les bras de ferme-toi putain.»

Les jeunes gloussent et les vieux jubile. Experts Es scatologie, rhétoriciens nés, ils exploiteront toutes les possibilités de la figure... C'est à celui qui sera le plus graveleux. N'empêche, après 20 ans de catéchisme, les Indiens morés sont de drôles de paroissiens!

SUMMARY

Otro lado. An inquiry into the conceptual topology of animism among the Moré (Itene) of the Bolivian Amazonia

This paper is based on ethnographic fieldwork among the Moré (Itene) who, together with Wari' and Oro Win, are the descendants of the last Chapacura speaking groups in Amazonia. I analyze, hunting story and elderly people stories (*los cuentos*) where the Moré explicitly conceptualize the notion of "the other side" as the realm of reality inhabited by non-human persons (the Dead, Spirits, Mothers of game, etc.). I focus on some topological aspects of Moré animism, such as conception of surface, boundary, space-time, distance markers, inside/outside distinctions. In conclusion I sketch some possible directions for further research in this topological framework for animism. I hope this paper can contribute to the renewed debate about animism in Amazonia and more broadly to the ontological turn in anthropology.

Keywords: animism, perspectivism, ontology, topology, Amazonia


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La relación de depredación entre humanos y no-humanos en la ontología de los q'ero de la cordillera de Vilcanota, Perú

Durante mis estudios etnográficos en los Andes peruanos he escuchado repetidas veces a los quechuas decir: – *Hay que alimentar a la Madre Tierra, si no, ella se alimentará de nosotros.* – La realidad social de los q'ero de la cordillera de Vilcanota está formada no solamente por los humanos (*runakuna*) sino también por otras personas no-humanas. Los *apus* (montañas), *pachamamas* (espacios-tiempos) y *machulas* (muertos) también forman parte de las comunidades indígenas y correlativamente el bienestar de ambas partes depende de la red de relaciones mutuas (Allen 2002, 2016; de la Cadena 2015; Salas Carreño 2019). La economía y la forma de vida de los andinos están estrechamente relacionadas con las personas no-humanas y reguladas por las normas sociales y prácticas rituales. Según los quechuahablantes todos los elementos del mundo – desde las poderosas montañas hasta las humildes piedras – están animados, aunque pueden variar en su agencia y tipos de las relaciones que establecen. Inge Bolin (1998: 43) escribe que los andinos no separan lo natural de lo espiritual, dado que todos los elementos de la naturaleza viven, sienten, comen y respiran. Sin embargo, según los q'ero estos seres son similares a las personas humanas y se definen por características tales como intencionalidad, voluntad propia, pensamientos, deseos, emociones o personalidad. Por lo tanto, no es de extrañar que no haya palabra “naturaleza” en lengua quechua. A pesar de que las personas no-humanas en los Andes están directamente relacionadas con lo que en la ontología naturalista se conceptualiza como “naturaleza” o “medio ambiente” (montañas, plantas, animales, etc.) o “seres sobrenaturales” (muertos, fantasmas, demonios, etc.).

Los q'ero son una comunidad quechuahablante que habita la cordillera de Vilcanota en el sureste de Perú. Su territorio está dividido en 5 anexos (comunidades) – Marcachea, Totorani, Hatun Q'ero, Quico y Hapu – que se encuentran en dos provincias del departamento de Cusco: Paucartambo y Quispicanchi. Los miembros de esta etnia se dedican a la agricultura, pastoreo y tejeduría: cultivan papa y maíz, crían alpacas, llamas y ovejas, tejen para uso propio y para la venta. Algunos se dedican al comercio local vendiendo sus productos en los pueblos cercanos. El clima de la cordillera de Vilcanota está determinado por dos estaciones: seca y lluviosa; y tres pisos ecológicos entre 1800 y 5000 m s. n. m. – *puna* (alta montaña), *qeshwa* (zona intermedia) y *junga* (ceja de selva). Los q'eros es una comunidad endógama en la cual la familia se estructura sobre una base conyugal de residencia patrilocal cercana y sobre la filiación patrilineal, aunque cabe señalar que en el pasado existió un sistema de filiación ambilineal (Nuñez del Prado Castro 2005: 210-211).



Mapa: Territorio Q'ero (fuente: <https://worldconsciouspact.org>)

No mucho tiempo atrás, los q'ero eran un pueblo geográficamente aislado y relativamente poco influenciado por la cultura mestiza. Su aislamiento cultural fue interrumpido en los años 50. Como resultado de la expedición liderada por Oscar Núñez del Prado Castro de la Universidad Nacional de San Antonio Abad del Cusco en 1955. Desde entonces la comunidad q'ero aparece en la conciencia de los habitantes del Cusco y del Perú. Los investigadores miembros de aquella expedición encontraron una comunidad bajo el poder del sistema de haciendas, pero conservadora de una forma de vida poco intacta e influenciada por la época colonial. Prestaron una atención particular a cuestiones como: estructuras de parentesco, tradición oral, cantos, tejeduría o el control vertical de pisos ecológicos. Sin embargo, durante los últimos 25 años, se observa una creciente migración de los q'ero hacia las aglomeraciones urbanas y sus cercanías (Cusco, Ocongate, Paucartambo) lo cual conduce a cambios socioculturales significativos.

La anatomía de relaciones y dependencias entre humanos y no-humanos se manifiesta en diferentes tipos de prácticas cotidianas y rituales: agricultura y pastoreo, movilidad, alimentación, cantos rituales, prácticas chamánicas y medicinales. Esta simple declaración mencionada en el inicio, expresada en el contexto de los rituales agrícolas, oculta dos modelos principales de relación que constituyen el núcleo de la ontología q'ero: **intercambio** y **depredación**. Curiosamente, ambos esquemas pueden expresarse a través de la locución idiomática "alimentar" (en quechua: *mijuy*). Esto implica que las relaciones entre seres personales tienen por finalidad alimentarse mutuamente a través de prácticas recíprocas (intercambio) o alimentarse del otro (depredación). En los trabajos anteriores sobre ontología q'ero, hemos analizado el modo de intercambio en el contexto del ritual *haywakuy* y las prácticas chamánicas (Przytomska 2017, 2019). En el presente ensayo queremos centrarnos en el modo de depredación. Este tipo de relación toma las formas de seducción, relaciones sexuales, canibalismo y secuestro. Las modalidades de depredación que observamos entre los q'ero, las hemos agrupado en tres esquemas que constituyen el eje de nuestra narración y a la vez representan los orígenes o las causas de surgimiento de dichas relaciones. Son: el olvido, la ruptura y la otredad. El análisis se basa en el material etnográfico recolectado durante los trabajos de campo realizados en tres de las cinco comunidades q'ero (Hatun Q'ero, Marcachea, Quico) en los años 2013–2017.¹

¹ La primera etapa de investigación se realizó entre los años 2013 y 2014. Dirijo mi sincero agradecimiento al jefe de Centro de Estudios Andinos de la Universidad de Varsovia, Mariusz Ziolkowski, quien ha hecho posible mi estadía e investigación en el Perú. La segunda parte de la investigación se llevó a cabo entre los años 2015–2017 como parte del proyecto (2014/15/N/HS3/01694), financiado por el Centro Nacional de la Ciencia en Cracovia, titulado "Ontología andina desde el enfoque antropológico. El estudio del concepto indígena de las relaciones «humano-naturaleza» en una comunidad quechua de los q'ero, Perú".

Concepto de personas no-humanas y modos de relación en los Andes peruanos

El objetivo de este artículo es contribuir al debate antropológico sobre las relaciones entre humanos y no-humanos en los Andes. El punto de partida para mi análisis de la ontología q'ero es el proyecto de reflexión teórica llamado "giro ontológico". Este enfoque surgió a través de estudios etnográficos realizados por el antropólogo francés Philippe Descola entre los achuar de la Amazonía peruana y el antropólogo brasileño Eduardo Viveiros de Castro entre los araweté de la Amazonía brasileña. Estos representantes del giro ontológico, inspirados indudablemente por los trabajos de Kay Århem (1990) y Alfred I. Hallowell (1967)² – enunciaron el animismo y perspectivismo como ontologías amerindias.

Los representantes del abordaje ontológico se enfocan especialmente en la reconceptualización de la oposición naturaleza-cultura y en los estudios de las relaciones entre humanos y no-humanos. El filósofo Graham Harvey (2005: xi) declaró: el mundo está lleno de personas, pero solo algunas de ellas son humanas. Efectivamente, una de las características principales del concepto de personas no-humanas en ontologías no naturalistas es la semejanza con el humano (Descola 2013). El universo y sus habitantes, tanto humanos como no-humanos, están ordenados de acuerdo con un esquema sociocéntrico compuesto por categorías y patrones (modos) de relaciones. Las investigaciones etnográficas entre comunidades no europeas han demostrado que en las ontologías amerindias los no-humanos (animales, plantas, espíritus, muertos, etc.), igual como humanos, son dotadas de agencia, pensamiento lógico y reflexivo, intencionalidad y llevan una vida similar a la humana.

El giro ontológico, que tiene su origen en los estudios amazónicos, se difundió a las investigaciones de los pueblos indígenas en otras partes del mundo y con el tiempo, fue más allá de las culturas originarias. Desde entonces, se han desarrollado muchos trabajos que comenzaron a analizar la agencia de los seres no-humanos en diferentes contextos culturales. Estos últimos años, el abordaje ontológico encontró sus seguidores entre los investigadores de las comunidades andinas: M. de la Cadena (2015), C. Allen (2016), F. Pazzarelli & V. Lema (2018), J.J. Rivera Andía (2019), M. Sax (2011), G. Salas Carreño (2019). Sus trabajos se concentran en la agencia y subjetividad de los no-humanos (principalmente *apus* y *pachamamas*) y las consecuencias políticas en el contexto interétnico e intercultural del Perú. Mi trabajo toma una dirección un poco diferente, enfocándose en

² En los años sesenta, el antropólogo estadounidense Hallowell (1967) introdujo el término „personas no humanas” (*non human persons*) para describir este tipo de seres personales que existen en las ontologías no europeas. El antropólogo sueco Kay Århem (1990: 120–121), en el contexto de los makuna colombianos, escribía sobre “cualidades perspectivas” o “el mundo perspectiva”, diciendo también que “diferentes clases de seres vivientes son «gente» vestida con distintas «pieles»” lo que, más tarde, Descola utilizó para reformular el concepto del animismo.

el análisis más detallado de diferentes modos de relación que pueden observarse en la cordillera de Vilcanota.

Curiosamente, los representantes del giro ontológico aún no han desarrollado una definición única y común de la ontología, lo que enfatiza la diversidad de encarnaciones de la antropología ontológica (Bertelsen, Bendixsen 2016: 6). Una de las variantes del giro ontológico –con la cual me siento identificada– se define como un experimento metodológico y teórico (Henare et al. 2006; Holbraad, Pedersen 2017). Uno de los postulados del retorno ontológico es tratar al mundo indígena – en su sentido ontológico – seriamente, lo que permite el despliegue de conceptualizaciones indígenas para obviar imposiciones etnocéntricas. El giro ontológico es una respuesta crítica a la antropología posmoderna que se ha desarrollado desde la década de los 80. La perspectiva ontológica, representada por investigadores como T. Ingold, B. Latour, E. Viveiros de Castro, M. Holbraad, M. Pedersen y muchos otros, rompe con la corriente interpretativa en la cual los fenómenos culturales fueron conceptualizados como representaciones, lecturas o interpretaciones. Por lo tanto, es una transición de los estudios de diferentes epistemologías a los estudios de diferentes ontologías. Uno de los objetivos principales de este movimiento teórico es cambiar el aparato conceptual en lo que respecta, entre otras cosas, al cuestionamiento de las nociones que – si bien son apropiadas para las comunidades europeas – se utilizan para el análisis de la ontología no europea (p.ej. cultura-naturaleza, alma-cuerpo, sagrado-profano). Por lo tanto, en lugar de aplicar conceptos analíticos, que provienen de otro contexto cultural, a los datos etnográficos, el antropólogo debería experimentar con los datos etnográficos de manera que éstos cambien el repertorio conceptual de investigador (Holbraad 2012). Esto revela la naturaleza ética y política de este proyecto que nos lleva a distanciarnos de la herencia del intelectualismo neocolonial. La segunda premisa del retorno ontológico es el cambio de paradigma que consiste en la transición desde el estudio de representaciones (culturas) hasta la investigación de ontologías, o diferentes formas de estar en el mundo (Carrithers et al. 2010: 153). Un elemento clave de la antropología ontológica es que el concepto es real y la realidad es conceptual. Esto significa que el mundo que tenía múltiples representaciones culturales ha sido reemplazado por un multiverso (ontologías-mundos). Los representantes de esta variante subrayan que en la perspectiva ontológica la diferencia entre el objeto y su significado ha sido abolida. En otras palabras, la diferencia entre un enfoque epistemológico y un enfoque ontológico es como la diferencia entre “pensar de manera diferente acerca de las cosas” y “tener diferentes cosas para pensar” (Henare et al. 2006). La tercera premisa del retorno ontológico es cambiar el alcance del análisis que consiste en un experimento filosófico-antropológico cuyo objetivo es transgredir nuestra ontología mediante la experimentación con datos etnográficos con el fin de repensar nuestro mundo basándose en las ontologías de los pueblos que el antropólogo está estudiando. Por lo tanto, no se trata sólo de conocer el “punto de vista indígena”, sino que se extiende esta tarea a una reflexión antropológica que conduce al descubrimiento de significados ontológicos profundos que pueden

ampliar nuestro conocimiento del hombre y del mundo. Una de las demandas del giro ontológico es tomar en serio las ontologías no europeas lo que nos permita experimentar más con estos datos para reconstruir las ontologías estudiadas. Por consiguiente, tomarlo en serio significa tratar literalmente lo que dice el otro y no tratarlo como una metáfora o buscar explicaciones “lógicas”. Esto obliga ir más allá del mundo del investigador para entender mejor el mundo del Otro.

Con las propuestas del giro ontológico, en este trabajo intentamos reconstruir el mundo de los *q'ero*, el que co-crean, basado en el seguimiento y análisis de las relaciones que establecen con otros seres que habitan su mundo. Como acabamos de mencionar, el enfoque del giro ontológico requiere tomar en serio los conceptos no-europeos. Por lo tanto, además de investigar el mundo de los humanos, nos sumergimos en la ontología de los no-humanos, dado que la ontología de los *q'eros* nos obliga a tratar a seres como *pachamama*, *apus* u otros como entidades equivalentes que co-crean el mundo social de la cordillera de Vilcanota. Tratarlos como personas reales, más que como representaciones culturales de la naturaleza, sirve para analizar en profundidad esta compleja realidad de relaciones sociales.

En el análisis de relaciones entre humanos y no-humanos en la ontología *q'ero*, nos inspiramos y dialogamos también con los modos de relación formulados por Philippe Descola (1992, 2013). Este antropólogo francés, en sus trabajos, enfatiza que las prácticas y comportamientos observados dentro de una comunidad específica revelan regularidades, continuidades y ciertos grados de automatismo que forman la base de modelos (a menudo) inconscientes de relaciones sociales que unen y estabilizan diversos elementos de la realidad. Descola concluye que, basándose en patrones de prácticas que determinan una amplia gama de relaciones, se puede encontrar la matriz original (modelo) de cada ontología. Descola (2013: 309–335) distingue 6 tipos básicos de relaciones que parecen jugar un papel dominante en diferentes culturas: **intercambio**, **depredación**, **don**, **producción**, **protección** y **transmisión**. Estos modos de relación pueden ser divididos en dos grupos. El primer grupo (intercambio, depredación, don) se caracteriza por relaciones potencialmente reversibles entre entidades similares, correspondientes a esquemas que aseguran el movimiento de algo valioso (alma, sustancia vital, etc.) que circula entre los seres del mismo estatus ontológico. Tratamos aquí con un balance tridimensional: positivo (don), negativo (depredación) o igual (intercambio). El segundo grupo (producción, protección y transmisión) se caracteriza por relaciones unívocas que se basan en los vínculos entre seres ontológicamente desiguales.

Volvamos ahora a la cordillera de Vilcanota para debatir el orden social y ethos cultural de los *q'ero* que nos permita comprender mejor sus relaciones con los no-humanos. A modo de introducción, nos gustaría mencionar el término *allin kawsay* que en quechua significa ‘buena vida’ – es una aspiración realista que se refiere a comportamientos específicos establecidos por un conjunto de patrones culturales. La salud y las enfermedades son percibidas entre los *q'ero* de manera holística y están estrechamente relacionadas con el concepto de equilibrio del individuo y su entorno (entendido como un universo subjetivo o el espacio-tiempo)

(por ejemplo: Bacigalupo 1995; Knipper 2006, Salomon 1991: 14) conformado por familia, comunidad, casa, animales de cría, tierras de cultivo, pero también por otros seres que habitan el mismo espacio. Si, según los q'ero, *allin kawsay* consiste en mantener el equilibrio y el bienestar individual y colectivo, esto significa que los conceptos de salud y de enfermedad en la ontología andina son mucho más amplios que en la ontología naturalista (occidental). Estar sano y tener buena vida se expresa principalmente en los términos de trabajo: "estar listo y dispuesto a trabajar". Según los q'ero, las personas sanas son trabajadoras y ágiles, en cambio las personas enfermas son perezosas, esquivan el trabajo o no pueden hacerlo. Se debe trabajar en paz y paciencia, de lo contrario puede afectar negativamente a los cultivos. Marisol de la Cadena (2015: 285) cita un comentario de Mariano Turpo de Pacchanta (Distrito de Ocongate), un activista indio que dijo que uno de los elementos de una buena vida en los Andes es "un trabajo feliz". Esta actitud es verdaderamente admirable dado que el trabajo de las comunidades andinas está plagado de dificultades y enorme esfuerzo físico. La persona trabajadora acumula propiedades en forma de tierras y animales, lo que muestra su estatus social. Estas dos condiciones – ser trabajador y tener recursos materiales – están interrelacionadas con el sistema de reciprocidad e intercambio llamado *ayni*, dado que una persona con muchos recursos puede permitirse participar en una amplia red de intercambio. En quechua, una persona rica se conoce como *apu* y una persona pobre es *q'ala* (calvo, desnudo). A su vez, una persona que posee bienes materiales, pero no participa en el sistema de *ayni*, se llama *wakcha* (huérfano) (Isbell 1974: 111, 138). La vida en la comunidad andina tiene por base la convivencia y la interacción social. Esta dinámica social difiere de los valores occidentales basados en el individualismo y el egoísmo donde las relaciones económicas y el desarrollo se basan en la acumulación de bienes y la competencia. Las comunidades andinas ponen más énfasis en compartir e intercambiar que en acumular. Idealmente, esto significa que las comunidades andinas ahorran y acumulan bienes para asegurar su futuro y compartir el exceso con otros, lo que proporciona el mantenimiento de relaciones armoniosas y solidaridad comunitaria y a la vez forma parte de *allin kawsay* (buena vida).

Ayni es uno de los principios sociales más importantes en torno a los cuales está organizada la vida de los q'ero. Se reduce a la lógica: dar para recibir y en el quechua significa: retorno, compensación y reciprocidad. En el contexto de comunidad, *ayni* se manifiesta como el sistema de trabajo recíproco, ayuda comunal y la red de obligaciones sociales. Se revela también en diversos contextos de la vida cotidiana y ritual, como el intercambio de alimentos y otros productos, las funciones políticas, la organización de fiestas colectivas y las prácticas rituales asociadas con las personas no-humanas. Este sistema social de reciprocidad tiene como objetivo garantizar que cada individuo participe en la circulación de bienes y beneficios. Los q'ero tienen 3 tipos de trabajo mutuo, tanto privado como público, simétrico y asimétrico: *ayni*, *mink'a* ('faena') y el sistema de cargos. En cualquier caso, la obligación de cada comunero es participar en el sistema de trabajo mutuo. De lo contrario, puede causar una ruptura en las relaciones con

toda la comunidad, dado que la prosperidad y el orden social dependen de este sistema.³ El *ayni* se revela también en otras actividades diarias informales que son de naturaleza asimétrica, porque no son correspondidas por la misma persona o por igual. De todos modos, lo que fue entregado, tarde o temprano volverá al donante. Incluso, si no ha sido correspondido directamente por el beneficiado, el don será compensado por otro miembro de la comunidad. Esta versión informal del *ayni* se manifiesta al establecer relaciones de afinidad (matrimonios y compadrazgos) a través de las cuales se distribuye lo que algunos tienen en exceso (tierras de cultivo o animales) o se proporciona el acceso a los pisos ecológicos (*puna, qeshwa, yunga*). Cabe destacar que, además de la dimensión material del sistema de reciprocidad del que cada individuo y familia se benefician, el *ayni* es también una forma de generar vínculos, intimidad y humanidad.

Como escribe Enrique Mayer (1974: 38), el *ayni* es como un cordón umbilical que sirve para alimentar a las personas conectadas a través de él. Como parte de este sistema recíproco, los *q'ero* mantienen también relaciones con seres personales no-humanos, por ejemplo con los *apus* (montañas), *pachamamas* (espacio-tiempo) o *machulas* (muertos), dado que el bienestar de las comunidades depende –además de trabajo colectivo y ayuda mutua– de las relaciones con no-humanos. La literatura relativa al sistema de reciprocidad (*ayni*) entre los pueblos andinos y *apus* o *pachamamas* es bastante amplia (p.ej. Taussing 1980; Condori, Gow 1982; Bastien 1985; Gose 1986; Allen 1997, 2002; Bolin 1998; Greenway 1998; Sax 2011; Alderman 2015; de la Cadena 2015). Por ejemplo, Catherine Allen (1997: 76) escribe que:

todas las categorías de seres, en todos los niveles, participan en esta circulación cósmica. Las personas mantienen una relación interactiva de reciprocidad, no sólo consigo mismas, sino también con sus animales, sus hogares, sus tierras de cultivo, su tierra y lugares sagrados en el paisaje [traducción propia].

Como último aspecto de la introducción, debemos abordar – al menos brevemente – el concepto de corporalidad. Según los andinos, el cuerpo humano es una especie de sistema hidráulico a través del cual circulan sustancias corporales (Bastien 1985: 7). Los *q'ero* enumeran seis sustancias básicas que se pueden dividir en visibles: grasa (*wira*), sangre (*yawar*); y el semen (*wawsa*) para los hombres; e invisible: alma (*animu*) y fuerza vital (*samay*). Todos los elementos que componen el cuerpo humano – tanto visibles (*wira, yawar, wawsa*) e invisibles (*animu* y *samay*) – no son estables, es decir, pueden ser aumentados, reducidos, perdidos o recuperados. Algunos de estos elementos también están sujetos a intercambio, que es necesario para la reproducción de personas (sangre y semen) o recursos (*samay*). En este sentido, la persona en ontología andina es inestable y permeable (Przytomska-La Civita 2020). El *animu* (el doble) es una sustancia individual y personal que determina el carácter y personalidad de la persona, en cambio el *samay*

³ El incumplimiento de estas obligaciones también lleva a la marginalización del individuo y su eliminación de la lista de comuneros legítimos lo que implica no tomar en cuenta su voz en los asuntos importantes de la aldea.

es una sustancia vital colectiva que circula y tiene que ser intercambiada entre diferentes elementos del mundo. La circulación de esta sustancia es necesaria para la sobrevivencia y equilibrio de todos los seres personales. La circulación de sustancias vitales (*samay*) entre las personas humanas y no-humanas implica que dichos seres forman una realidad social entendida como una red de constantes relaciones y dependencias mutuas. Los seres no-humanos que tienen el mayor impacto en la vida de los q'ero son los *apus* y las *pachamamas*. Las relaciones que se establecen con estos seres tienen un carácter ritualizado. Estos rituales pueden tomar el carácter de ceremonias formales e informales, individuales o colectivas (p.ej. *samincha*, *haywakuy*, cantos rituales) y están diseñados para proporcionar rendimientos fértiles, salud para la familia y los animales o éxito en otras áreas de la vida cotidiana. A través de estos rituales los q'ero piden por la salud, la fertilidad para animales, buenas cosechas, etc. y, en cambio, alimentan a los *apus*, *pachamamas* o *machulas* a través de los rituales de ofrendas. El *ayni* entre humanos y no-humanos en los q'ero no es más que el modo de intercambio formulado por Descola. El *ayni* andino representa una relación simétrica en la que cada transferencia acordada requiere algo a cambio, independientemente de si su valor igual al del artículo recibido y si se trata de un reembolso inmediato o diferido. El saldo de transmisión entre las dos entidades tiene que llevar al equilibrio. Como mencionamos anteriormente, el *ayni* se expresa a través del acto de alimentación mutua. En consecuencia, el propósito de todas las prácticas es intercambiar sustancias que toman diferentes formas, pero se reducen a un solo factor – *samay*, la sustancia vital que circula en el mundo. El sistema de *ayni* es un mecanismo de distribución de esta sustancia – que tiene que estar en movimiento continuo – de una manera sostenible. Esto nos conduce a la conclusión de que en la ontología andina la vida es **un flujo continuo de sustancias**.

Ayni es una estrategia ontológica con la cual el mundo y todos sus componentes siguen reproduciéndose. Pero ¿qué sucede cuando se rompe esta regla y se detiene el flujo constante de la sustancia? Según los q'ero, romper dicha relación de intercambio, a consecuencia del abandono de *ayni*, puede asociarse con una reacción negativa o depredadora de los no-humanos, lo que hemos observado en varios contextos y versiones. En este lugar nos referiremos nuevamente a Descola (2013: 309–335) según quien el modo de depredación (que puede llamarse robo o apropiación) es una asimetría negativa – opuesta al don – donde el sujeto X (depredador) toma algo valioso (puede ser su vida, su cuerpo o energía vital) del sujeto Y (víctima) sin ofrecer nada a cambio. Sin embargo, esto no se debe al deseo de herir o dañar a alguien, sino al imperativo interno y a las limitaciones del sistema. Éste es un ejemplo de destrucción productiva, necesaria para la supervivencia de un individuo y no tiene relación con la crueldad desinteresada o con un deseo perverso de matar al otro, sino, todo el contrario, transforma a la víctima en el objeto de mayor importancia. En el contexto amazónico, la depredación, estrictamente conectada con el parentesco y consanguinidad, es ante todo una estrategia para integrar la otredad, tanto humana como no-humana, para adoptar o convertir a esos seres en parientes: el sujeto debe tomar posesión de

otro ser y asimilarlo en sí mismo a través de guerras, secuestros de mujeres, canibalismo real o simbólico. Mientras que en las culturas amazónicas este modelo de relaciones ha sido ampliamente discutido y presentado en muchos ejemplos etnográficos (por ejemplo: Vilaça 1992; Viveiros de Castro 1993, 1996; Descola 1996; Fausto 2007), en el caso de las culturas andinas es un tema prácticamente ausente. Veremos que, en el contexto andino, la depredación se refiere a la absorción de una sustancia vital la que se manifiesta a través de la estrategia de alimentarse del Otro, aunque no constituye un modo ontológico primordial, sino un modo sustitutivo que se revela cuando el sistema de intercambio fuera infringido.

Aquellos que han entrado en el olvido

Para los q'ero las relaciones con los *apus* y *pachamamas* son de mucha importancia, dado que están estrictamente relacionados con la agricultura y el pastoreo. En la ontología q'ero los *apus* son dueños de los animales (salvajes y domésticos) y minerales y, a su vez, las *pachamamas* son las dueñas de cultivos. La figura del "dueño" es conocida en todo el continente americano y en el contexto amazónico personifica una especie de hipóstasis de especies animales (por ejemplo: Bonilla, Lima 1995; Viveiros de Castro 1998; Tola 2012, 2016). En cambio, en el contexto andino, los animales y los cultivos constituyen los recursos de los no-humanos que en mismo tiempo son objeto de intercambio con los humanos lo que es crucial para el bienestar de las comunidades andinas. Cuando la gente olvida de sus deberes rituales –como resultado de la aculturación, la conversión religiosa, el descuido u otras razones– se hace expuesta a las reacciones negativas de los no-humanos y consecuencias dramáticas: desde choques de rayos, la infertilidad de animales, las malas cosechas o enfermedades y muerte. Gabriel Martínez (1983: 87) señala dos caras de los *apus*, alegando que pueden ser amistosos u hostiles al hombre, pero que su comportamiento depende de la actitud inicial del hombre. Es necesario añadir que en este caso el humano representa el disparador que infringe el orden de las cosas y de esta manera desencadena el mecanismo depredador. Por ejemplo, la persona que mata a un animal salvaje sin permiso del *apu* al que ése pertenece, está expuesta a su ira y su castigo:

– En Qompipampa, allí había un animal salvaje; era de allí. Así un comunero dijo: – ¡Captúrenlo, agárrenlo! – y fueron [a] degollar ese animal salvaje. Fue Casimiro Espinosa, ese que ha dado orden. (...) Habían traído la vaca salvaje. Entonces, no era propiedad de ellos. Era ganado de Qompipampa. Era un encanto ese animal. En Qompipampa estaba lleno de animales encantados. (...) Degollaron la vaca, y después se llaman entre los *apus*. En la noche los *apus* se comunican. Entonces la gente duerme en la cueva, cueva de piedra. Dicen que así cuando estaban durmiendo antes de preparar la cena y cuando estaban durmiendo, se estaban comunicando los *apus*, de mayor a menor; así diciendo: – Ese ganado que se llamaba Runtupuku [‘cáscara de huevo’], ¿quién ha degollado, quién se le

ha llevado Runtupuku? – Otro dice: – ¿Cuál de nuestro ganado no hay? Habían degollado el ganado blanco como cáscara de huevo. (...) ¿Quién lo ha llevado, adónde? – Los apus dicen: – Hay que buscarlo. Ahora mismo vamos a buscarlo. – Inmediatamente, al que habían agarrado era el presidente [*kamachikuq*]. Al mismo rato el apu lo ha comido. (...) el presidente murió en la cueva. Se lo ha comido el apu Qompipampa, el dueño de la vaca.

La historia contada por Agosto de Marcachea describe la trágica consecuencia de romper el orden establecido entre humanos y no-humanos: la apropiación indebida por parte de los humanos de una vaca perteneciente al *apu* Qompipampa. Ocurren eventos similares cuando los seres humanos matan animales salvajes, p.ej. pumas, vicuñas o tarucas. Cabe destacar que en realidad la venganza de los no-humanos es una reacción al comportamiento humano que revela una actitud depredadora (no recíproca).

Los *apus* son también dueños de minerales preciosos. El oro fluye a través de las venas de la tierra y es como la sangre para los *runakuna*. Por esta razón nadie puede levantar el oro sin permiso. Los comuneros de Quico cuentan la historia de Mallki que tuvo lugar en los años noventa. Mallki – un hombre de la ciudad, muy ambicioso y rico – oyó hablar de una leyenda sobre el oro ubicado en las cercanías del *apu* Osanaku, en las tierras q'ero. Mallki – muy bien preparado y abastecido – partió a la montaña. Sin embargo, durante su aventura sucedió algo inesperado. Los q'ero relatan que al acercarse a un lugar llamado Qollpayoq (lugar de oro), Mallki desapareció y nunca ha regresado. Nadie sabía lo que le había pasado. Según los comuneros, cuando alguien se acerca a Qollpayoq, de repente estalla una tormenta. Los depósitos de oro están protegidos por las serpientes venenosas (probablemente *Tachymenis peruviana*) – los guardianes del oro.⁴ Otro comunero de Quico contó una historia parecida acerca de un helicóptero que había caído cerca del *apu* Mama Juana:

– Dicen que en ese helicóptero traían mucho oro, más o menos 80 kg. De Puerto Maldonado lo traían. (...) Y neblina, mucho tapa y montaña es grande, alta. Y se chocan acá. Y ese accidente fue causado por los *apus*. No quería que lleven ese oro. Cuando alguien quiere robar su oro, eso hacen, mucha lluvia, neblina, mucho viento. (...) 5 o 6 personas murieron. Y después no encontraron nada, ni una chispa de oro. Los *apus* lo ocultan. El oro es como sangre para los *apus*. (...) Es malo buscar oro, es muy encantado, pertenece a la tierra. Uno no puede levantar el oro gratis, tienes que dar un despacho o sacrificar un animal. Si no podemos morir, ellos son muy enamorados de los oros. Es difícil para recogerlo.

⁴ Los q'ero explican que, los senderos incas corrían a través de sus tierras, conectando las montañas con la selva, desde donde se extraía el oro y se lo transportaba hasta Cusco. Cuando una llama o mula sucumbían a lo largo del camino, los arrieros escondían el oro cerca del sendero y, según la leyenda, algunos de estos tesoros siguen ocultos en las tierras q'ero hasta hoy día.

Los andinos llaman a los *apus* “los que organizan” (*kamachiq* – ‘el que organiza’) la vida social y la naturaleza (Ricard Lanata 2007: 54). Sin embargo, los acontecimientos descritos anteriormente muestran que la agresión de los seres no-humanos constituye un mecanismo de recompensa. La pérdida de un recurso en particular (animal, oro) se compensa en forma de vida humana, razón por la cual los *q’ero* dicen: “el *apu* se lo comió”.

La cara depredadora de los *apus* o *pachamamas* se revela también cuando las personas, como resultado del olvido u omisión, rompen los lazos de reciprocidad establecidos anteriormente. Los no-humanos que forman parte de la *pacha* (comunidad local), quienes no fueron alimentados, se convierten en el peligro para la comunidad. Este fue el caso del *apu* Ankashchaki que se convirtió en un ser depredador, puesto que los aldeanos dejaron de realizar los rituales de ofrenda (*haywakuy*). El cerro hambriento secuestraba o, como dicen los *q’ero*, comía los animales y niños:

El *apu* se abre y rapta a una criatura o mujer. Comentan que dentro de *apus* hay ciudades; allí se lo llevan a los niños y otros. Como que tuviera una puerta con su llave; y se cierra, de una vez lo cierra. *Paqos* comentaban que allí [al pie de Ankashchaki] hay una piedra gigante antigua, sobre esa piedra la *wawa* [niño] bailaba; y después de repente desaparece... Ankashchaki era muy bravo.

Los *q’ero* relatan que Ankashchaki, en forma de un hombre mayor y blanco, engañaba y secuestraba a los niños a quienes ofrecía dulces. Apenas los niños se acercaban a él o a la piedra en la que dejaba los regalos, desaparecían sin dejar rastro. Según los relatos, adentro de las montañas, conectadas con el mundo humano a través de entradas ocultas (*punku*), hay ciudades con ricos recursos (productos, tiendas, animales). La historia subraya que en el pasado el *apu* Ankashchaki fue descuidado por los comuneros, por lo que se convirtió en un depredador. Después de la intervención del *altomesayoj* (chamán), quien llevó a cabo una serie de rituales de ofrendas (*haywakuy*), el cerro dejó de amenazar a la gente, lo cual nos indica que la relación depredadora es reversible. Esto significa que en este sistema ontológico la relación de intercambio y depredación puede estar sujeta a un proceso de reversión o reposición, dado que en ciertas circunstancias pueden reemplazarse entre sí.

Las *pachamamas* (‘tierras’), como los *apus*, también tienen su rostro depredador. He oído muchas veces entre los *q’ero* que “la *pachamama* se alimenta de la gente”, lo que demuestra que la depredación de *pachamamas* también se manifiesta en términos de alimentación (*mijuy*). Generalmente, esto sucede en dos contextos diferentes: (1) cuando las personas han dejado de hacer ofrendas rituales (intercambio) o (2) cuando atraviesan las tierras hambrientas – desconocidas y alejadas – que no tienen establecidos los vínculos de reciprocidad con ninguna comunidad. Según los *q’ero* el hecho de alimentarse del cuerpo humano puede tener una dimensión física (secuestro; absorbiendo al hombre bajo la tierra) o “espiritual” – el robo de su *animu*. En el primer caso, una persona es literalmente arrastrada al interior de la

pachamama. Según María Apaza, que vivió varios meses en *ukhu pacha* ('el mundo de abajo'), hay dentro de la tierra ciudades donde viven personas de baja estatura (enanos). El segundo caso – el secuestro del sustrato "espiritual" – provoca una enfermedad llamada *hallpa hap'isqa*, causada por el robo del *animu*. Para curar *hallpa hap'isqa* es necesario realizar una ofrenda ritual (*haywakuy*) que consiste en "alimentar" al ser no-humano y persuadirlo para que devuelva el *animu* de su víctima.

Como podemos observar, el patrón del proceso de reversión se repite nuevamente. En el contexto de la *pachamama*, como tierra animada, la descripción etnográfica presentada anteriormente nos invita a reflexionar acerca del concepto de movilidad en la ontología q'ero. Como mencionamos, las tierras olvidadas – las que no mantienen lazos de intercambio con los humanos – son depredadoras. Esto nos hace entender que la movilidad en el contexto andino se asocia con los conceptos de Otredad y depredación, dado que el acto de desplazarse significa: abandonar el espacio de familiaridad marcado por las relaciones de intercambio y entrar al espacio desconocido cargado potencialmente de depredación u Otredad. En otras palabras, el acto de desplazarse requiere exponerse a los encuentros con seres desconocidos que no pertenecen a la misma *pacha* ni al mismo sistema de intercambio de recursos y sustancias. Por lo tanto, la falta de relaciones de reciprocidad significa la depredación potencial. Por esta razón, los q'ero realizan el ritual de *phukuy* (soplo ritual) que permite a los viajeros comunicarse con los seres desconocidos a quienes encuentren en su camino. El objetivo de este ritual, que consiste en enviar el *samay* mediante hojas de coca (*k'intu*), es saludar a los *apus* y *pachamamas*, pedirles permiso y alimentarlos con energía vital. Es una manera de domar la Otredad y transformar la depredación en intercambio.

Otro ejemplo que representa el esquema de olvido son las sirenas andinas que viven en el mundo subacuático (ríos, lagos, lagunas o cascadas). Según los q'ero son dueños de agua y peces, pero también se destacan por sus habilidades musicales. En tiempos antiguos los q'ero mantenían las relaciones de intercambio con estos seres acuáticos, realizando rituales de reciprocidad y cantando *sirina tak'i* ('canción de sirena'). Por su parte, los chamanes realizaban el ritual llamado *sirinakuy* ('convertirse en sirena'), entrando en el mundo subacuático y casándose con sirenas con el propósito de aumentar sus poderes mágicos. Ricard Lanata (2007: 397) describe el ritual de *sirinakuy* realizado por Leonardo Chullo:

Sobre las orillas del lago Laramani, yo recojo gran cantidad de flores (...). Echo flores al lago, las siembro a todos los vientos en el lago, y en acto seguido, me desvisto completamente, (...) y entro resueltamente al lago, y entonces me baño. Ahí me hago sirina, para ser más poderoso, y [las sirina] me bautizan (...). En este lago, me veo como en un espejo, veo un reflejo que se parece a mi rostro, como si se tratase de otra persona, que hablaría en mi lugar, así es como me siento, (...) me siento totalmente transformado. (...) Pero si tú quieres acercarte a este lago, si tú quieres llegar a la orilla, tienes que ofrecer un despacho, ahí, en el borde del agua, tienes que hacer libaciones, rociar los alrededores, de esta manera yo

entro en este lago. Y en el momento de salir del lago, me pongo ropa nueva (...). Solamente después de haber entrado al lago, y justamente por eso, es que yo obtengo mis poderes...

Según los q'ero, en los viejos tiempos, los chamanes podían llamar a las sirenas tocando música, utilizándola como una forma de comunicación. Tocando la flauta y cantando *sirina tak'i*, los chamanes sacaban provecho de los seres acuáticos que los llevaban al mundo subacuático y les ofrecían sus tesoros. Por otro lado, la música es el dominio de sirenas. Los q'ero comparten el concepto de que las sirenas son músicos perfectos que cantan y tocan la guitarra, el charango y la flauta y de esta manera hechizan a sus víctimas. Asimismo, cuando los andinos dejan los instrumentos musicales en la orilla del río por la noche, las sirenas se convierten en personas, tocan estos instrumentos y los sintonizan.

Esta capacidad de transformar los tonos que ofrece la naturaleza, y producir las variaciones que deleitarán a los seres humanos puede ser otorgada por la sirena. La recibirán los instrumentos que, tras un ritual riguroso, se depositan por la noche al borde de un puquio o manantial, donde se sabe que concurren o habitan las sirenas. La quena, el pincullo o las "tijeras" de los danzantes entre otros instrumentos, se dejan "dormir" en la orilla, evitando la curiosidad de observar a quienes les proporcionan la virtud de ser sonoros y fortalecer la destreza de los músicos. Si se siguen las reglas mencionadas, el favor de las deidades solo tendrá consecuencias benéficas (Tomoeda 2005: 158-159).

El autor habla de un "ritual riguroso" que no es más que una ofrenda (*haywakuy*) mediante la cual se alimenta a las sirenas con productos agrícolas y hojas de coca por su trabajo de afinación. Otras historias andinas muestran el papel de las sirenas como cuidadoras de los depósitos de agua donde ofrecen peces a la gente o multiplican sus animales a cambio de regalos (Gutiérrez 2012: 24-26).

Los testimonios mencionados revelan la naturaleza positiva de las sirenas, mostrándolas como dueñas de los peces, aguas y habilidades musicales. Sin embargo, en la cordillera de Vilcanota estos seres acuáticos tienen muy mala fama, dado que, como resultado del abandonado ritual y olvido de las canciones, las sirenas – hasta ahora amistosas – se han convertido en seres peligrosos para el hombre. Los q'ero cuentan que estos seres acuáticos suelen transformarse en personas – amante, expareja o un guapo desconocido – y seducir a su víctima para tener relaciones sexuales con él(ella). La mayoría de las veces, por la mañana, la sirena desaparece, sin dejar rastro:

Dicen que aparecen como chicas hermosas u hombres guapos y cantan maravilloso. Echan encantos, cantan cuando sale el sol o por las noches. Dicen que antes, durante el *puqllay* ('carnaval'), los sirinas venían y bailaban. (...) Salían de las cascadas y bailaban por la noche y (...) cantaban un tipo de canción, pero diferente, así, hechizaban y se llevaban a chicos y chicas. Y cuando pasaban la

noche se embarazaban. (...) A los hombres un tumor aparece en las piernas y sale como si fuera un gusano. Félix Machaca de Marcachea un día estaba en su chacra. Y se le acercó una mujer. Desde entonces ha caído enfermo y ha muerto después de 8 meses.

Los q'ero narran que las sirenas que fueron olvidadas buscan compañía. Por esta razón seducen a los humanos con su belleza, canto hermoso y ofreciéndoles tesoros del mundo submarino. En la comunidad de Marcachea, escuché el testimonio de José quien una vez vio una tienda a la vera del río. Allí encontró a una hermosa joven cantando. El joven se acercó a la chica, preguntándole qué estaba haciendo allí y de dónde venía la tienda que nunca antes había existido. La desconocida le dio algunos dulces y lo invitó a la tienda alegando que tenía muchas otras cosas que ofrecerle. Sin embargo, José supuso que la chica fuera en realidad una sirena. Se apresuró a su casa y cuando regresó al día siguiente, la tienda y la joven habían desaparecido. Un hombre que cae en el encanto de la sirena y va a su mundo subacuático permanecerá allí para siempre. Estas narraciones representan, igual como sucede en caso de las *pachamamas* o los *apus* – los motivos de secuestro.

La historia que sigue, nos presenta otro motivo – la seducción y las relaciones sexuales entre humanos y no-humanos que podemos encontrar en diferentes ontologías amerindias. En noviembre de 2010, en Marcachea tuvieron lugar acontecimientos muy trágicos. Marcela, hermana del jefe de la comunidad (Mario), era una mujer casada y con dos hijos. Una vez, conoció a un apuesto joven con quien pasó la noche mientras su esposo estaba ausente. La mujer se enfermó, poco a poco iba perdiendo fuerzas y su barriga comenzó a crecer, lo que sugería que había quedado embarazada. Unos meses más tarde, la mujer dio a luz. En el parto participaron dos hombres: Mario (su hermano) y Florentino (chaman y obstetra). Mario dijo que de la barriga de la mujer salió un ser deformado que se parecía a un pez en lugar de un niño. Florentino dijo que la mujer había parido una masa de carne: mitad humana, mitad pez. Los hombres mataron a ese no-humano, lo arrojaron al fuego, enterrando sus restos lejos de la comunidad para evitar el peligro. La mujer murió después del parto. Según los testigos, Marcela confesó haber tenido relaciones sexuales con un extraño que en realidad no era un humano sino un ser depredador. Después de tener relaciones sexuales con una sirena, la gente cae enferma y luego muere. Las mujeres creen que están embarazadas, dado que su vientre va agrandando. Sin embargo, no se trata de un embarazo, sino de un “ser parasitario” llamado *saqra* que se alimenta del cuerpo humano. En cambio, los hombres presentan otros síntomas: un quiste o un tumor. Otro caso ocurrió en Hatun Q'ero. Una vez, un hombre pasó la noche con una *sirena* pensando que era una mujer. El resultado de ese romance fue una enfermedad que se manifestó por la pérdida de peso y terminó con la muerte del hombre. Esta enfermedad letal se llama “secada”: – *La sirina te come, por eso te flaqueas* – dice uno de los comuneros y agrega que las sirenas son invisibles, se sientan en la nuca de la persona, “*amarran su boca y por eso no puede hablar*” y se alimentan de sustancias corporales de su víctima.

Las sirenas actúan de manera parecida que los *apus* y las *pachamamas*. En consecuencia de seducción y relaciones sexuales, se alimentan de los humanos de forma parasitaria (visible o invisible). En otros casos, las sirenas secuestran y atrapan a las personas en el mundo subacuático, lo que significa la desaparición física de la persona. Cabe destacar que en las ontologías amerindias la sexualidad, en el contexto de relaciones con no-humanos, es generalmente considerada como una forma de establecer los lazos, en este caso de depredación (en otros casos puede servir también para establecer la relación de intercambio).

Considerando el esquema de olvido en el contexto de relaciones con *pachamamas*, *apus* y sirenas andinas, cabe destacar que estos seres forman un grupo de personas con las cuales los humanos establecen y mantienen las relaciones de intercambio. Esos seres desempeñan un papel muy importante en el sistema de un flujo continuo de sustancias, dado que son dueños de los recursos importantes para los *runakuna* (animales, cultivos, agua, minerales). En el momento de la ruptura del imperativo de reciprocidad, la relación existente se transforma en un modo de depredación revelando las características del sistema ontológico: el flujo de sustancias tiene que continuar. Cabe señalar que, aunque la depredación no es el esquema ontológico principal, existe como un modo sustitutivo, dado que reemplaza la relación de intercambio en el momento en que ha sido perturbada. Además, el modo de depredación nos revela una información importante: los no-humanos no son autosuficientes, necesitan otros seres para sobrevivir, al igual que los *runakuna*.

Aquellos que han fallecido, pero viven entre los vivos

El *kukuchi* representa el esquema de ruptura del orden social y depredación interna, dado que se trata de un humano que se transforma en agresor. Según los *q'ero*, *kukuchi* es un difunto condenado cuyo proceso de muerte no ha llegado a su fin. Esta anomalía es causada por la ruptura del tabú cultural: el incesto. Los *q'ero* dicen que después de la muerte, el alma de la persona que cometió el incesto – en vez de dirigirse al interior de los *apus* (montañas) – regresa al mundo de los vivos donde recupera su cuerpo. Convertido en *kukuchi*, comienza su vagabundeo por las montañas, en una suspensión ontológica: no es ni humano ni difunto. Los *q'ero* comentan que, después de la muerte, *kukuchi* sale de la tumba en busca de alimento que es la carne humana. En Hatun Q'ero escuché la siguiente historia:

– Estaba haciendo chacra en Hatun Q'ero. Todos, ¿no? Más o menos eran 3 de la tarde. Y había una mujer embarazada que bajaba desde una montaña con sus llamas. Y había ahí una pequeña quebrada y ella estaba mirando cómo estamos sembrando la papa. Y entra la mujer a la quebrada y una llama *suri* entra por detrás y cuando entra a la quebrada no salía, no salía. Nada. Y cuando no salió ya como una hora, y ya era hora de descanso y, decimos, este, ya llegó su día, como estaba embarazada. Y se fueron dos personas para que miren. Y dicen que cuando

llegaron el *kukuchi* ya se había comido a la mujer. Dicen que estaba comiendo al bebe. Esa alpaca que entró por detrás de la mujer era *kukuchi*. (...) Entró como alpaca, pero ellos vieron el *kukuchi* comiendo al bebe. Vieron un hombre vestido con la ropa de difunto.

Como nos indica este testimonio, el estado oncológico de *kukuchi* puede ser modificado. El condenado puede transformarse en animales para ocultar su identidad o para recorrer largas distancias. Esta historia muestra que los comuneros no observan directamente el proceso de transformación, sin embargo, al ver – en lugar de una alpaca – a un hombre que consume la carne humana, sacan la conclusión de que el animal era en realidad un *kukuchi*. Esta historia indica también que el condenado puede ser reconocido por la vestimenta del difunto. Los q'ero afirman que al *kukuchi* se lo puede reconocer también por la ropa manchada o por la piel en la etapa inicial de descomposición. Señalan también que el condenado arrastra cadenas detrás suyo o puede tener la forma de un esqueleto. Por lo tanto, a *kukuchi* no le gusta mostrar su rostro, temiendo ser reconocido. A menudo usa un sombrero, una capucha o camina con la cabeza agachada. El lugar que habita *kukuchi* indica su exclusión y estado no-humano. El condenado deambula por la montaña alta donde sufre de frío, hambre y molestias. Vive en lugares alejados, salvajes y despoblados. Otro elemento que indica el estado no-humano y depredador de los *kukuchi* es su alimentación de la carne humana. Cuando a veces son tratados con comida humana, se niegan y dicen que no tienen hambre, lo que termina siendo un comportamiento inusual. Este es un elemento muy importante, porque la comida constituye a menudo un determinante de identidad, estado económico o género (López García 2001), pero en este caso también del estado ontológico – no-humano.

Esta otra historia sobre los sucesos en Hatun Q'ero también se refiere a la transformación del condenado en animales y a las acciones emprendidas para neutralizarlo:

- Había un caso en Hatun Q'ero... se murió un hombre y cuando llevaban su cadáver al cementerio se paró. Y toda la gente se asustó, luego volvió a morir. (...) después de haber muerto volvió a salir de la tumba. Una vez se acercó a una persona... (...) a un viejito y le dijo: - Yo estaba con mi hermana por eso no puedo morir, el *apu* no me recibe, si yo bebería el agua helada de Wamanlipa volvería a vivir. Pero me quemaron los ojos y solo no puedo ir. (...) - Luego apareció en Marcachea (...) Entonces la gente se enteró de esto y se fue a ver su tumba y vieron que una parte de la tumba se había hundido y que no había cuerpo. Otro día alguien vio que una mariposita entraba y salía. Esta vez encontraron cuerpo, y vieron que se volteó, pero estaba intacto. Luego le cortaron la cabeza. La sangre corrió como de vivo. Tenían que enterrar la cabeza en otra montaña y el cuerpo enterraron en el mismo lugar. Para que no se junte más.

Los q'ero cortan la cabeza al difunto, de donde fluye la sangre como si éste viviese. Este detalle indica que, en realidad, esas personas no están tratando con el cuerpo de un fallecido, sino con el de un *kukuchi* cuyo proceso de muerte no ha terminado. Prestemos atención a un pequeño detalle de la historia anterior, en la cual los eventos anormales ocurren durante el entierro del difunto. Este hecho nos hace entender que la transformación del difunto en *kukuchi* sucede muy rápido, dado que los síntomas de transformación en condenado estaban visibles durante el funeral. Por esta razón, los andinos vigilan a los muertos toda la noche. Por un lado, el velorio es una manera de despedirse del difunto, pero a la vez una forma de evitar el peligro. Los q'ero hablan de dos formas de matar al *kukuchi*: hay que quemarlo o cortarle la cabeza, que luego debería ser enterrada en otro lugar para no poder regresar al cuerpo y volver a la vida. Otra historia que tuvo lugar en Quico Chico nos cuenta sobre una mujer que se convirtió en *kukuchi* en consecuencia de una brujería y del incesto. La historia ilustra las razones de su transformación, las reacciones de los aldeanos y la forma en que la mujer fue asesinada:

- Persona muere, la enterramos y después de 2-3 meses sale. *Kukuchi* es, sale con su cuerpo y está caminando por las montañas. Y la gente normal lo ve, como está entrando [a la tumba] o está haciendo su tejido o está peinando su cabello. Yo vi uno de Quico Chico, Berta Champi. Salió de su sepultura, era condenada. (...) Cuando entra hay que cortar y quemar la cabeza. Para que no salga, ¿no? A veces hacen sexo con su yerno, o hijo, o madre, padre. (...) Sexo con hijo es más grande pecado que matar a alguien... Después de 3 meses cortamos la cabeza de esa mujer que ha hecho sexo con su yerno. La cortamos con una hacha y sangre así, chuuuuu. Vivo, era vivo. (...) Después quería comer a los niños ya. Apareció diciendo: *sálvame, hice esto, tuve sexo con mi yerno*. Era vecina de Benito. Son brujos ellos. Entonces su cabeza llevaron a la montaña Pumachunta (...) para quemar... pero se les escapó la cabeza, fuuuu, la energía la jala para su cuerpo hasta mitad de camino. Después: - Carajo, esa puta se me ha escapado, ¡carajo! - El viento fuerte, neblina ha bajado... La energía es muy fuerte. Recién la agarran entre 5 o 6 personas abajo. Y de vuelta arriba, solo la enterraron, no quería quemarse, no agarraba ni gasolina ni alcohol, nada. Ni pelo, ni piel se quemó. Los ojos eran normales, como de vivo. Toda la comunidad hicimos *despachos* [*haywakuy*], y no volvió, como la enterramos en dos partes diferentes.

Esta citación describe eventos extraordinarios: los comuneros cortan la cabeza de la cual fluye la sangre viva; la cabeza cortada cobra vida y se escapa; a pesar de verter alcohol sobre su cuerpo, no quiere prender fuego. Los q'ero queman o descuartizan el cuerpo de *kukuchi* para que quede inofensivo. Todos estos eventos extraordinarios fueron causados por el hecho de que Berta era una bruja. Más adelante en la historia se explica la relación entre el incesto y los actos de brujería que a veces se realizan para enriquecerse.

- A veces pasa por los animales... Cuando quieres animales muchos y rápido... ellos hacen sexo entre familiares. Entonces eso hizo Berta. Pero nadie puede saber eso. Ni su hija, ni su marido. Y vienen animales, uff, rápido. Y no es una vez, cada vez tienen que hacer esto. Es energía negativa, brujería es pues. Ese animal no es para tu vida, no es para tu bien, después tú mueres y todos animales después de 5-6 meses mueren también. Eso no es verdadero, es encantado. En 2 años aparecen 100 alpacas, 100 lamas, 100 ovejas. Así, normal, imposible. ¿De dónde vienen? Entonces la gente sabe, siempre hay chismes. O pelean y avisan. Nunca hay tranquilidad, puede ser 1 año de tranquilidad y cuando saben tú animal ya cae ya, enferman y se mueren. También hacen eso por la plata, o por trabajo. Pero es por momento. Después se cae, dinero, fertilidad, chacras, todo. Después siempre ya cayendo, ya problemas entran poco a poco.

Este fragmento explica que, en el caso de Berta de Quico, el acto de incesto fue utilizado para actividades mágicas - la multiplicación o reproducción de los animales. La ruptura de los tabúes está conectada aquí con prácticas mágicas que rompen el orden del mundo andino. La reproducción animal no es el resultado de la reciprocidad, sino el efecto de acciones mágicas. Estas anomalías conducen a otra transgresión anormal en la que desaparece el límite entre la muerte y la vida (Fourtané 2015: 162). Después de la muerte, la persona que rompió un tabú debe sufrir las consecuencias y queda también excluida del orden social humano después de su muerte lo que atestigua la fuerza de ese tabú en la cultura andina.

Aquí podemos hacernos una pregunta: ¿el acto de comer la carne humana significa canibalismo? El incesto en el contexto de la brujería realizada con un objetivo económico significa la ruptura o el rechazo del intercambio. Si los miembros de una familia aumentan sus rebaños a través de las prácticas de incesto, eso significa que perturban el orden social: no solamente el tabú cultural (relaciones sexuales con los familiares), sino también un sistema establecido que involucra el intercambio entre diferentes grupos de seres (humanos y no-humanos). Suponiendo: si los rituales que hacen aumentar los rebaños de animales debilitan de alguna manera los recursos del resto de la comunidad, o incluso de la *pacha*, esto puede significar que esa persona, aún antes de morir, es un depredador que se alimenta del cuerpo colectivo de la comunidad. Esto explicaría por qué esta persona después de la muerte se convierte en un ser no humano que se alimenta de la carne humana (depredador interno - caníbal). Ricard Lanata (2007: 126), para explicar el fenómeno de *kukuchi* en el contexto de incesto (relaciones con familiares que perturban el intercambio), utiliza el concepto de canibalismo simbólico definido por Lévi-Strauss en otro contexto cultural (sociedades exógamas). Miremos esto en detalle. Para empezar, en el caso de los q'ero se trata de las relaciones de incesto esporádicas, usadas para la brujería, y no de relaciones permanentes que podrían perturbar el intercambio de mujeres. Luego, hay que subrayar que el *kukuchi* no puede ser visto como un caníbal, porque según los q'ero el condenado ya no pertenece a la colectividad humana. A mi entender, la citación siguiente disipa por completo las dudas acerca de la cuestión de canibalismo. Esta actitud

radical hacia el *kukuchi* y el acto de incesto nos revela un punto de vista muy importante sobre el concepto de persona y el concepto de deshumanización:

(...) se emborrachan mucho y violan [a] sus hijas o nietas, hasta con su madre. Y es gran pecado, por eso cuando la gente se entera, le agarran y le matan, le quemán. Ellos igual se vuelven *kukuchis*. Entonces hay que otra vez matar a este *kukuchi*. Ellos ya saben que será *kukuchi* entonces lo matan no más.

Los q'ero señalan que el que fue atrapado en un incesto, es sentenciado a muerte: – Cuando la gente se entera, lo atrapan y lo matan. – Esto se debe a que, a los ojos de los q'ero, esta persona (aunque viva) ya no es completamente humana, se ha convertido en vida en un depredador y después de su muerte se convertirá en un *kukuchi*. Los actos de incesto y brujería dan testimonio de la deshumanización y depredación, tan peligrosa para la comunidad. Por lo tanto, en algunos casos, los andinos deciden eliminar a esa persona. Entre los q'ero hay dos formas de luchar contra un depredador: debes domesticarlo o deshacerte de él; de lo contrario, se alimentará de ti y de la comunidad.

Aquellos que han venido de afuera

El *pishtaco*,⁵ llamado vampiro andino, es un ser que manifiesta el esquema de alteridad y depredación externa, dado que personifica a los extraños – blancos o mestizos. Los q'ero cuentan que los *pishtacos* matan a los indígenas, degollando o cortando la cabeza para chupar su grasa (*wira*) o sangre (*yawar*). Atacan con cuchillos o jeringas por la noche o en lugares deshabitados y alejados. Las sustancias robadas se utilizan para la producción de medicamentos, velas, jabón, campanas, combustible, electricidad o la construcción de puentes e iglesias (Blaisdell, Vindal 2014: 11). Los q'ero afirman también que la grasa humana se utiliza con fines rituales o para brujería.

Entre los q'ero, el miedo a los *pishtacos* sigue presente, principalmente entre las generaciones más antiguas, que tienen relativamente poca interacción con el mundo exterior. Durante mi investigación etnográfica, pude descubrirlo personalmente. Algunas personas mayores no querían hablar conmigo y cuando trataba de entablar contacto con ellas se escapaban o no reaccionaban. Como ejemplo puede servir Juana –una adorable anciana de 70 años– que no reaccionaba a mis preguntas, evitaba contacto visual o a veces sólo lanzaba respuestas lacónicas: “no sé nada”; “habla con otra persona”; “tengo que irme”. Después de un tiempo, el hijo de Juana me explicó que la razón de ese extraño comportamiento era el miedo al *pishtaco*. Mayormente, quienes son sospechosos de ser vampiros andinos, son los

⁵ El término *pishtaco* proviene de la palabra quechua *pishtay* y significa ‘escalpar’ o ‘cortarse la cabeza’. Estas imágenes se encuentran en Perú (quechua) y Bolivia (aymara). Dependiendo de la región, también pueden encontrarse otros nombres como: *kharisiri*, *lik'ichiri*, *ñakaq*, sacaojos o degollador.

foráneos: médicos, exploradores, turistas, alpinistas, antropólogos, aquellos que aparecen en las tierras de los q'ero. En el pueblo de Marcachea registré un relato sobre un hombre que fue visto varias veces entre marzo y abril de 2016 en las cercanías del pueblo: – “Tenía un sombrero y ropa de la ciudad. Pasaba por nuestras tierras con un machete, tenía 5 caballos. Dormía en las cuevas. Cazaba a los indios, y luego en caballos transportaba la grasa humana a Cusco”. – Francisco de Qollpacucho (Hatun Q'ero) comentó que había cometido un error al enviar a su esposa enferma al hospital donde ésta murió. Afirmó que: “los indios mueren en los hospitales, los matan” y su grasa se utiliza para fines desconocidos. Vale la pena mencionar que entre los hombres jóvenes que a menudo viajan a ciudades y pueblos cercanos en cuestiones comerciales y relacionadas con el empleo remunerado, el miedo al *pishtaco* disminuye.

Algunos investigadores consideran que la representación del *pishtaco* se remonta a la época precolombina (Morote 1952; Ansión, Sifuentes 1989). En los tiempos incaicos eran especialistas que suministraban grasa, sangre y carne de origen humano y animal a los templos, que se utilizaban con fines rituales. El *pishtaco* era entonces el ayudante de sacerdotes que se ocupaba de los asesinatos rituales y seccionamiento del cuerpo de la víctima. Los sacrificios humanos y degollaciones como ritos religiosos son prácticas muy antiguas, lo que lleva a la conclusión de que la figura del degollador puede tener raíces en tiempos precoloniales (Ossio 1973; Ansión 1989; Millones 1990; de Pribyl 2010). Otros investigadores especulan que este concepto surgió en el siglo XVI como resultado de la violencia colonial (Ansión, Szemiński 1982: 212; Bastien 1985; Ansión, Sifuentes 1989: 69–70). En el siglo XX, los *pishtacos* fueron identificados con los blancos que trabajaban para las ONGs y con los representantes de las autoridades estatales. Estos conceptos fueron analizados también en el contexto de la violencia durante la guerra civil que tuvo lugar en el Perú en los años 80 y de las acciones terroríficas del Sendero Luminoso (Vergara Figueroa 2009). Actualmente, a quienes se acusa de “chupar grasa”, son los mestizos: sacerdotes, policías, ingenieros, geólogos, médicos, soldados, así como los arqueólogos o antropólogos. Los estudios etnográficos recientes (p.ej. Rivière 1991; Crandon Malamud 1993; Fernández Juárez 2008) demuestran que el concepto del *pishtaco* – en el contexto de la situación histórica y sociopolítica – constituye una expresión de miedo a la modernidad y antipatía hacia los blancos, la visión del “indio” (Canessa 2000), la representación del Otro, la experiencia de la alteridad y la enfermedad como resultado de la somatización del miedo y manifestación de problemas emocionales y sociales (Theidon 2004). Esto muestra que los investigadores tratan el concepto de *pishtaco* en términos simbólicos o lo localizan en el contexto de trastornos psicósomáticos.

La investigación dirigida a la ontología y los términos indígenas nos permite ampliar la imagen y enriquecer las interpretaciones anteriores. Partiendo de los conceptos q'ero, demuestro que la alteridad es un tipo de depredación externa. Para analizar el concepto de *pishtaco*, en esta parte me refiero brevemente al concepto de enfermedad y cuerpo (individual y colectivo). Como mencionamos, el bienestar de los q'ero está estrechamente relacionado con el *ayni* (reciprocidad)

y con el equilibrio de todos los elementos del cuerpo del individuo. La ruptura de estas reglas conduce a la enfermedad o muerte. Hay que señalar aquí que los contactos con extraños que no se comportan de acuerdo con *allin kawsay* (ethos cultural) pueden conducir a la enfermedad. Como señalan los q'ero, la transición a un modelo de comportamiento no q'ero (interiorización de la Otredad) significa el estado de deshumanización. Resulta significativo, que los ataques de *pishtacos* están relacionados con la movilidad a lugares desconocidos o habitados por poblaciones no andinas, p.ej. en las ciudades. Los ataques de *pishtacos* también pueden ocurrir en montañas en lugares alejados, p. ej. pastoreando animales fuera de las tierras de la comunidad. Los lugares indómitos –aquellos con los que el hombre no ha establecido ninguna relación de intercambio – pueden ser habitados por seres depredadores, no-humanos. Cualquier cosa que no sea familiarizada a través de *ayni* significa potencial peligro para integridad de la persona y su universo.

En esta parte tratamos de responder la pregunta: ¿por qué el *pishtaco*, como la personificación de alteridad, se alimenta de la grasa humana? La grasa (*wira*) – uno de los sustratos corporales – representa un potencial económico, dado que proporciona fuerza física (*kallpa*) que permite el sustento de la familia, comunidad y *pacha*. También existe una estrecha relación entre la grasa y salud. Vale la pena señalar que, por regla general, los *pishtacos* atacan a los adultos – como los eslabones más fuertes en la cadena de producción y reproducción – dado que tienen más grasa que los niños (personas incompletas) y los ancianos (enfermos, débiles). Por añadidura, los q'ero creen que debido a su dieta natural la grasa de los andinos es mejor que los mestizos. El trabajo físico, que demuestra el bienestar, es un valor de mucha importancia, razón por la cual la pérdida de grasa, enfermedad o ruptura del ciclo de producción y lazos de *ayni* son signos altamente peligrosos. Además, la grasa tiene una función ritual importante. La grasa animal (de llama o alpaca) forma un elemento de la ofrenda para los *apus* y *pachamamas*, constituye el alimento más valioso para no-humanos. La falta de grasa en las ofrendas debilita sus poderes (Kato 2015). Como ya hemos mencionado bienestar de una *pacha* (micro-mundo, comunidad), formado por los hombres y otros no-humanos, está asociada con el intercambio de las sustancias (alimentación mutua). La interrupción de la red de intercambio conduce a la enfermedad tanto del individuo (enfermedad), familia o aldea (infértiles, desgracias, etc.) y de la *pacha* misma (sequías, plagas, etc.). Esto significa que, entre el cuerpo del individuo y su entorno (*pacha*), hay una analogía que se revela no sólo en el contexto de la estructura, sino también en el contexto de los procesos internos. *Pacha*, compuesta por los humanos y no-humanos, es una estructura cerrada e interconectada.

Dirijamos nuestra atención al hecho de que todas las representaciones de *pishtacos* están relacionadas con el acto de extraer sustancias del cuerpo individual o colectivo. El terrateniente se estaba beneficiando del trabajo de los andinos, que eran la mano de obra gratuita o barata, que nunca ha sido devuelta (ruptura de *ayni*). Como otro ejemplo puede servir la relación entre los nativos y la biomedicina. En los q'ero, he oído y he presenciado el miedo a los médicos y el hospital, dado que los q'ero creen que la extracción de sangre es un acto directo de robar

el alma, que se encuentra en la sangre. Otro ejemplo constituye los investigadores, geólogos e ingenieros que están asociados con la minería. Para los q'eros la extracción de minerales – la sangre y la grasa de la tierra que corren en sus venas – es sinónimo de derrota del valor reproductivo y poder vital de la *pacha* lo que significa, en consecuencia, la debilitación de la comunidad, dado que la tierra enferma o debilitada no puede alimentar (dar cultivos) a las personas que viven alrededor. Por este motivo, el Otro (ingeniero, geólogo, etc.) es un representante de la relación depredadora que debilita la tierra, sin dejar nada a cambio, rompiendo la regla de *ayni* y la cadena de la circulación de las sustancias vitales en un micro-mundo (la aldea). Este acto material y literal de explotación (saqueo) se asocia con la acción contra el principio de *ayni* y conduce a la perturbación del bienestar local.

Desde la perspectiva q'ero, hay una relación entre la violencia y explotación de la tierra y enfermedad del individuo. Traté de demostrar que la clave para entender el fenómeno de *pishtaco* es el concepto de cuerpo (individual y colectivo). El acto de “chupar” la grasa tiene una dimensión literal – a través de la explotación de la tierra el potencial procreativo de la *pacha* se debilita y, en consecuencia, se debilita también el potencial vital de las personas que la habitan. El concepto de *pishtaco* representa un depredador externo que perturba el bienestar de las personas, de manera directa (depredación individual), como en el caso de un médico, sacerdote, antropólogo o hacendado, o indirecta (depredación colectiva), como en el caso de un geólogo o un ingeniero que explotan los recursos de la tierra.

Conclusiones

El presente artículo muestra tres modelos de depredación en la ontología q'ero. El primer modelo, representado por el esquema de olvido, es causado por la ruptura de los lazos de intercambio entre los humanos y no-humanos (*apus*, *pachamamas*, sirenas). La depredación de los no-humanos significa allí un mecanismo sustitutivo y esta forzada por el propio sistema basado en el flujo de las sustancias. Este modelo representa la depredación en una estructura cerrada, dado que los depredadores pertenecen al territorio definido por las fronteras de una *pacha* (micro-mundo). El sistema social establecido de tal manera, del que también forman parte los no-humanos, se basa en que todos los elementos del mundo participan en el intercambio continuo de bienes y sustancias, lo que permite que tanto los individuos como todo el sistema en su conjunto permanezcan. La interrupción del ciclo de intercambio obliga a los seres a suministrarse sustancias vitales a través de los actos de agresión. El segundo modelo representa también la depredación interna, pero se limita a la agresión de los mismos humanos quienes, como resultado del rechazo de *ayni* y de la deshumanización, se convierten en los *kukuchis* – condenados. Este ejemplo ilustra de una manera contundente que el concepto de la persona (*runa*) no es un estado estable y dado de una vez por todas. En la ontología q'ero, ser *runa* (humano) significa comportarse de acuerdo

con las reglas de *allin kawsay*, el incumplimiento de las mismas puede conducir a enfermedades, la expulsión de la comunidad e incluso la muerte. A su vez, en el tercer caso de depredación que observamos en la cordillera de Vilcanota – representado por el esquema de alteridad– es la figura del *pishtaco* que lo personifica. El Otro – que no se comporta como un *runa* y no sigue las reglas de intercambio– es el encargado de la depredación que se revela en la forma de extracción de las sustancias vitales del cuerpo individual (sangre, grasa) o colectivo (minerales). Esto conduce a la debilidad o enfermedad de la *pacha* y de todos los seres que la habitan.

Nuestro análisis nos lleva a la conclusión de que en la ontología q'ero se pueden identificar tres tipos de depredación:

- 1) interna (dentro de la misma *pacha*) entre diferentes colectivos de seres (humanos y no- humanos),
- 2) interna (dentro de la misma *pacha*) entre el mismo colectivo de seres (humanos),
- 3) externa (relacionada con otra *pacha*) que representa un agresor que viene de afuera (no-humanos).

El mundo andino está compuesto por micro-mundos (*pachas*) autosuficientes basados en la circulación de sustancias (relación de intercambio). En cada sistema ontológico existen las rupturas que en caso de los q'ero toman forma de la depredación interna y externa. Estos modelos depredadores para algunos (humanos) pueden significar la destrucción, pero la supervivencia para los otros (no-humanos). En este contexto la depredación significa un contrapeso y una especie de salida de evacuación –porque si por alguna razón el sistema basado en *ayni* no funciona – entonces cambia y se convierte para ser sostenible.

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SUMMARY

The relation of predation between humans and non-humans in the ontology of the Q'eros from the Vilcanota mountain range, Peru

The anatomy of human and non-human (apus, pachamamas, the dead etc.) relations and dependencies manifests itself in different types of daily practices and rituals (agriculture and herding, mobility, alimentation, ritual songs, shamanic and medicinal practices) and reveals ontological schemes of exchange and predation. Interestingly, both schemes can be expressed through the idiomatic expression of “feeding”. This implies that the purpose of relationships between personal beings is to feed each other through reciprocal practices (exchange) or feed on others (predation). In this paper, we analyze the scheme of predation among the Q'eros, which takes the forms of seduction, sexual intercourse, cannibalism and kidnapping. Different types of predation were grouped into three modalities (oblivion, breaking the taboo and otherness) that constitute the axis of the narrative and, at the same time, represent the origins or causes of these relations.

Keywords: predation, ontology, Q'eros, Quechua, Andes, non-humans

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Bride kidnapping in Northern Kyrgyzstan as the initial stage of subjectivity-forming process

On the 5th of August 2008, in the village of *Kajnar*^{1,2} in northern Kyrgyzstan, I was present at the marriage ceremony of B. (30) and M. (20) – a young woman who was kidnapped to be married. She had never seen her husband before, and he had only seen her photograph. The bride had been selected by his family and friends.

In this article, I present an anthropological interpretation of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan using the concept of ‘person-making’. I show that marriage through bride kidnapping is a stage in the social process of building female subjectivity and reproducing families in Kyrgyzstan. In this way, I go beyond the interpretative approaches that are most frequently applied to this phenomenon and that focus on the kidnapped bride and situate the description of bride kidnapping in the context of violence, tradition, ethnic identity and male domination in the Kyrgyz society.

In the following text, I describe the actions of individual social actors both during the kidnapping and after the marriage ceremony, during the ensuing family life. The resulting image is interpreted based on categories of predation and familiarization of the Other, i.e., elements of anthropological concepts derived from the analysis of phenomena related to Amazonian indigenous peoples (see

¹ Kyrg. Кайнар.

² All terms in Kyrgyz language are marked in cursive, in line with the ISO 9:1995 international standard of transliteration from Cyrillic to Latin script (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_9). Original Kyrgyz spelling is provided in footnotes. The same transliteration method is used in bibliography for source texts in Russian.

Fausto 2000: 933–956). Although this method seems to work by analogy only, it allows me to broaden my interpretative possibilities, while I study the phenomenon in question.

In this alternative way, I demonstrate that marriage through bride kidnapping constitutes the first stage of an emerging social subjectivity of a woman, a process that involves a circle of relatives from both families.

The field – *Kara-buura*³ region in the Kyrgyz north-west

Kirgizstan (the Kyrgyz Republic) is a country in Central Asia, a former Soviet republic, which became independent and emerged as a nation state following the breakdown of the USSR in 1991. The country, which is still partly within the Russian sphere of influence, is the second poorest and the most unstable state in the region (Kochanek 2017: 120–124).

Marriage by bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan is called *kyz ala kačuu* (*кыз ала качуу*) which can be translated as “capture the girl and escape”. The word *ala* denotes lack of consent, conflict, lack of integrity, illegitimacy, but also a trick played on someone. *Kačuu* is a term used for avoidance (of a blow) or escape, while *kyz* – means a girl, young woman, daughter.⁴ *Ala kačuu* is one of the forms of marriage and does not always involve lack of consent on the part of the bride.

Sometimes, the couple agree to proceed with a ‘mock kidnapping’. However, the pattern of action remains similar. On the other hand, the marriage that takes place as a result of an agreement between young people and their families involves numerous lengthy rituals, such as exchanging gifts or visits, and ends with the ceremonial bringing of the bride to her future husband’s house (Pietrowiak 2014: 295).

I started my field research on modern marriages in Kyrgyzstan in 2006 and continued it in 2008, 2009 and 2014. It spanned about 4 months in total. I was staying with a Kyrgyz family in the *Amanbaevo* village, in the so-called “big house” inhabited by the oldest female member of the family, along with her son, her son’s wife and children within a sizeable village of six thousand inhabitants.⁵ The destination of all my fieldtrips were the *Kara-buura* areas in the Talas region in north-west Kyrgyzstan, near the border with Kazakhstan. I spent most time with women: with my hostess (a senior in the family) and her four daughters-in-law. One of them lived with her mother-in-law, the others in their own separate houses, where I sometimes spent a few days, sometimes also accompanying them on visits to their relatives in neighboring villages. Apart from participant observation of daily life in my field site, I also conducted interviews and informal conversations with the family of my hosts and with their wide circle of friends and neighbors in various parts of the village. The key event during my fieldwork

³ Kyrg. Кара-Буура.

⁴ This word may also be used to describe a relationship.

⁵ Data from July 2008 obtained from the *Kara-buura* district office.

was a wedding preceded by bride kidnapping, which I witnessed in a village of *Kajnar*. Although it was a very difficult moment for me personally, it was also a turning point for my research. I spent three days observing the wedding-related activities, starting from the moment when the bride was brought to the house until the departure of the participants of the event. Everything that happened during the wedding became a springboard for my reflection on everyday life practices, transforming my understanding of my previous observations and the meaning of poignant stories of kidnappings I was told. For this reason, this particular wedding, although it is, of course, not the only source of my data, became the starting point for my analysis of the stories of Kyrgyz women.

The official languages in Kyrgyzstan are Kyrgyz and Russian. In the field, I used Russian, which is widely spoken in large cities and in the north. However, I have learned the basic expressions related to kinship and affinity in the Kyrgyz language, which I use in this text. Some of the customs associated with bride kidnapping for marriage are specific to this region. The empirical material presented in the text is entirely derived from research described above.

Relevant literature

Bride kidnapping as one of the forms of marriage is practiced in Kyrgyzstan and neighboring republics, but the number of such cases in Kyrgyzstan is the highest (Werner 2009: 315, 328; Sörnmo 2013: 29). Bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan became the focus of research for Russell L. Kleinbach, Professor of Sociology at the University of Philadelphia, who has authored most studies on the subject, based on his research there since 1999, the results of which have been systematically published. According to his data, about half of Kyrgyz marriages proceed by bride kidnapping, two thirds of them without the bride's consent (Kleinbach, Salimjanova 2007; Antoniskis 2013).

In 2017, the OBWE⁶ estimated that every year, twelve thousand young women are kidnapped and forced into marriage, 20% of them are raped, and that such brides are more likely to become victims of domestic violence and have restricted opportunities to pursue education and employment. The report also stated that the practice resulted in more frequent cases of early marriage among the children born to such couples, polygamy and bride kidnapping in subsequent generations. In 2013, the Kyrgyz government increased the penalty for bride kidnapping to maximum 10 years in prison, but according to NGOs, the number of cases being reported has not increased, and only rare cases where offenders were prosecuted (HRW 2018: 19).

Bride kidnapping is always a sensitive matter, it constitutes a violation of the kidnapped person, and therefore, most researchers who describe this

⁶ *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE* - an international organization deemed regional in line with Chapter 8 of the UN Charter.

phenomenon focus precisely on the aspect of women's incapacitation (Amsler, Kleinbach 1999; Handrahan 2000, 2004; Kleinbach et al. 2005; Kleinbach, Babaiarova 2013). There are drastic descriptions of kidnapping or rapes of women forced to marry a complete stranger, based on research that has been carried out through questionnaires and interviews both in villages and big cities. Scholars presented statistics showing an increasing number of such cases (Amsler, Kleinbach 1999; Kleinbach 2003; Kleinbach et al. 2005). Russell L. Kleinbach and Lilly Salimjanova wrote a special article on the Kyrgyz customary *adat* law set in the context of bride kidnapping and its tradition in the past, arguing that the current form of bride kidnapping is neither in accordance with customary law, nor is supported by tradition (Kleinbach, Salimjanova 2007; Werner 2009: 315). Kleinbach also implemented an educational program targeting mainly Kyrgyz rural communities (in 2008/2009 implemented in seven provinces, and in 2008/2009 in the town of Karakul) to raise awareness of the negative consequences of bride kidnapping (Kleinbach, Babaiarova 2013). Some authors suggested that the practice constitutes a way to manifest cultural, ethnic and national identity (Handrahan 2004; Werner 2009). Joanna Mroczkowska (2010), in addition to the previously discussed aspects of this phenomenon, also highlighted the collective character of such kidnapping. In October 2016, an interdisciplinary Central Eurasia Studies Society conference focused on research related to the custom of bride kidnapping in post-Soviet Eurasia. An edited volume reflecting that discussion and suggestions for areas that require further research is the most recent scientific English-language publication related to bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan (Werner et al. 2018).

Bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan was also mentioned by Abramzon in *Kyrgyzy i ich ètnogenetičeskie i istoriko-kul'turnye swâzi*, with a note that such cases were rare and caused a series of disagreements involving whole groups of relatives on both sides and leading to serious consequences (Abramzon 1971: 230).⁷ Fiel'strup provides similar descriptions in his book *Iz obrâdovoj žizni kirgizov načala XX veka* (From the ritual life of the Kyrgyz at the beginning of the 20th century) and points out that apart from paying the full kalym, the abduction of the future bride

⁷ An ethnographer Jan Witort who described his contemporary (end of the 19th c.) Kyrgyz customs noted that capturing someone's daughter resulted in fighting between the families, endless raids, looting and court proceedings (Witort 1994: 157).

In *Kök-Saj* village in a north-western region, I was shown a spot in the mountains with a sharp-edged rock bearing an inscription in Kyrgyz painted in red letters. „Олжобайды керген таш” – *Olžobajdy kergen taš*. *Olžobaj* – is a name, and the inscription can be translated as „The stone where *Olžobaj* was stretched”. The visitors attach pieces of cloth to the small gnarly trees that grow by the rock. There is a legend associated with the rock, about a *žigit* who fell in love with a warrior's daughter. He asked for her hand in marriage, and when he was refused, he abducted his bride. In revenge, the warriors led by the girl's father attacked and killed him and then run a flock of sheep over his body, stretched his skin over the rock which until today stands on the spot to commemorate the event. Aigine Cultural Research Center, in its publication *Mazar Worship in Kyrgyzstan: Rituals and Practitioners in Talas* describes this place as a *mazar* (a holy place of worship) and quotes a slightly different version of the story (Aitpaeva 2007: 54–55).

also resulted in a fine imposed on the abductors – 9 “heads” of cattle (Fiel'strup 2002: 16–17).

Current practices differ from the ones described by Abramzon or Fiel'strup, and families that are involved usually avoid conflict, favoring an alliance. Marriages tend to create strong ties and gift exchanges between people related to each other as *kuda*⁸ (Kuchumkulova 2007: 122; Light 2015: 59; Ismailbekova 2017: 82–83) – i.e. through marriages between their children or relatives (Ūdahin 1965a: 437). Ismailbekova pointed out that „Of all kinship relations, this one is considered the most respected and due the most support” (Ismailbekova 2017: 83).

Borbieva offered very interesting insights, describing bride kidnapping as a ritual practice that minimized tensions caused by different understanding of love and marriage by different generations, and a powerful force for social change. She sees bride kidnapping as enabling people to start and/or maintain effective social relations and satisfy both conservative and modern interests (Borbieva 2012: 154). For couples, kidnapping is an attractive option which, like elopement, allows young people to get married even if their elders do not approve of their choice of partner or to avoid an unwanted arranged marriage that is being imposed on them (Borbieva 2012: 159).

The custom of bride kidnapping has been brought to public attention by Petr Lom's documentary film, *Bride Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan*, which presents several stories of young women who have been abducted and forced into marriage (Lom 2004). Although the filmmakers were criticized for violating ethical standards, their ethnographic documentary is a valuable source of information.

Marriage through bride kidnapping: how and who

During the marriage ceremony following bride kidnapping, relatives play a strategic role, especially the women affines from both families. Their actions are crucial, and they translate into the concept of social reproduction that I wish to present. Some other, unrelated people also play a role: groom's male friends⁹ and people from his neighborhood. The Kyrgyz themselves also highlight the important role of the couple's parents, who must give their consent for the marriage. Even though everything is done with their consent, their actions during the wedding are not emphasized in any way.

Before I describe the marriage ceremony, I wish to outline the events that precede the decision to kidnap the bride. If it is not ‘mock’ kidnapping (when both future spouses agree to this form of marriage), the matchmaking is done

⁸ Куда (Kurg.).

⁹ It is noteworthy that groom's friends are not just common acquaintances. In Kirgizstan, important ties are forged through common experiences (e.g. between classmates, fellow students, colleagues at work) – i.e. *quasi-tribal* relationships (Wierzbicki, Załęski 2008: 17). Such long-term relationships are maintained even after e.g. graduation and are not limited to social gatherings, even though such gatherings tend to happen on a regular basis.

by members of the families concerned, particularly women (*èžè, èžè¹⁰, ène¹¹, žeņe¹², аpче, ène¹³*), brothers' wives (*žeņeler¹⁴*) or other women from closer or more distant family who joined the family through marriage. Aksana Ismailbekova also wrote about the great role of women in arranging marriages (deciding who to marry) in Kyrgyz patrilineal societies. Detailed knowledge of the genealogy that women often have is important (Ismailbekova 2014: 378). "Kyrgyz practice rules of exogamy, which specify the ranges and categories of relatives who are forbidden to marry members of their own lineage (*uruu*) within the village or anyone who shares a common patrilineal ancestor within seven generations" (Ismailbekova 2017: 82).

Quite often, the bride has never seen her future husband. The bridegroom may also get to know his "bride" only on the marriage day. However, there are situations when the bride and groom know each other or have seen the other person, and the decision to kidnap the bride is guided by mutual affection or solely made on the man's initiative. Although each of these scenarios is possible, among the women I know, the most common situation involved them being kidnapped by rejected or shunned suitors. When choosing a wife, the woman's character, reputation and the status and wealth of her family are all taken into account, while beauty is considered to be of secondary importance (interview conducted by the author 2008). This, of course, concerns cases where matchmaking is done not by the persons directly affected, but by their relatives. It is also important for the bride to be approved by the groom's parents, and especially by his mother.

Men/Friends – kidnapping

A. (39 years old): *On 29 December that year, I was coming back from work. I walked past the car in which A [current husband] was sitting, as it later turned out. If only I had known that he was in that car, I would not have passed by. They dragged me into the car and drove me to my husband's house* (Talas region: S.P. 2008).

Kidnapping scenarios are similar – although descriptions may vary, their main structure remains the same (Borbieva 2012: 146; Pietrowiak 2014: 296). The young woman is usually captured by men: friends, distant family members or the groom's

¹⁰ Эжэ, эже (Kyrg.) – among other meanings, the mother's younger sister (but also a step-mother, older sister, the father's brother's daughter if older than ego, step-sister older than ego, it is also a form of address for a girl or a woman that is at most 5 years older than ego; Israilova-Har'ehuzen, A'gafova 1999: 11), also тай эже.

¹¹ Эне (Kyrg.) – the father's older brother's wife (Israilova-Har'ehuzen, A'gafova 1999: 10).

¹² Жеңе (Kyrg.) – among others, father's older or younger brother's wife.

¹³ Апче, энэ (Kyrg.) – mainly an older sister (Israilova-Har'ehuzen, A'gafova 1999: 9), апче – father's sister (interview led by the author).

¹⁴ *Žeņeler* – plural. More about *žeņeler* in section 1.5 of this article.

neighbors.¹⁵ They are young or middle-aged men, and their friendly relationship with the groom obliges them to participate and help in the bride kidnapping and during the marriage celebrations. The groom himself is present during the kidnapping but does not actively participate in it – he is just there, in the car. The abductors or other people involved in bride kidnapping (family members or the groom's friends) first observe the woman. The aim of this observation is not only to learn about her daily habits, but also about her plans, so as to kidnap her at the right moment, when she is away from her family. Often, in order to kidnap the young woman, people trick her with assistance from her own women affines (women married into her family and sometimes, from her friends who are somehow connected with the groom's family. The victim is dragged into the car, and nobody heeds her screams and crying, even though there may be witnesses. No one, except her family, can help her. Nobody cares about a woman's crying, because, in public opinion, the kidnapped woman should cry, even during the 'mock' kidnapping (Borbieva 2012: 146; Pietrowiak 2014: 297; Ismailbekova 2017: 82).

Women/Affines – persuasion

The kidnapped bride is transferred to the groom's house and entrusted to the women from his family, who – behind a special curtain – dress her in a wedding dress, put a scarf on her head (a married woman's attribute) and try to persuade her to stay in the house to which she was brought. The young woman usually resists, takes off her head scarf and cries. The women who are with her often comfort her by stroking her hair, speaking softly, and tell her about their own kidnapping, how they did not want to stay, and now have children and are happy. However, they are firm and there are many of them, so they have not only physical but also psychological advantage over the future bride.

One of the means of persuasion is the presence of an elderly woman (Abdulaeva et al. 2004), who elicits humble attitude from the young person. In Kyrgyz communities, elderly people are particularly respected, their opinion is important and should not be contradicted. If the kidnapped bride wants to leave despite the persuasion, the old woman holding bread will stand or lie down on the threshold of the house. In the article "Mothers-in-Low on the Doorstep" based on Natan Light's research, Birgit Fenzel claims that this is done by the future mother-in-law (Fenzel 2009: 92–94). By stepping over the threshold and the elderly person, the young woman would violate the norms of respect for the elderly and the groom's family would curse her (Lom 2004; Fenzel 2009: 94; Pritchard 2009), wishing her never to experience happiness in her personal life. Such a curse

¹⁵ Also, mothers can initiate the practice of kidnapping brides if their sons do not get married in time. Ismailbekova described the case of a mother who used a trick to bring fiancée home for her son. "This case study shows a strong woman taking a leading role in the decision-making process and being responsible for providing her son with a wife" (Ismailbekova 2014: 380–381).

can be quite effective, as the young woman who has left the abductors' house will have acquired bad opinion. If she spent the night in the groom's house, her reputation becomes dubious, because of the possibility that the young couple had sexual intercourse.¹⁶ If she continues to live in the village, where everyone knows everyone, she will not be a good candidate for a wife (Amsler, Kleinbach 1999: 9; Kleinbach et al. 2004: 197; Fenzel 2009: 94; Portisch 2009; Mroczkowska 2018). One of the women in the village of Amanbaevo had been kidnapped in this way and things progressed quickly, a goat was killed, blessings bestowed and some *ženeler* arrived and according to the custom, stayed all night. However, during the wedding night, the couple did not have sex. In the morning, the young woman left the groom's house and returned to her family home. The groom's family suffered material and moral losses. The bride brought shame on her family. At the time of the interview (2008) she still lived with her mother as a 37-year-old unmarried woman. Her would-be husband married another woman, who had also also been kidnapped. They have four children.

The situation is always ambiguous, and it is never certain whether the kidnapped woman will stay. I have heard of the case where a family that had acquired all their daughters-in-law through bride kidnapping did not allow a young woman from their family to stay in the abductors' house. The woman was finally abducted by another family and stayed there, so she did not suffer any negative consequences. However, I do not know what motivated the family in question and have no detailed knowledge of the incident. The second kidnapping, as my interlocutor suggested, could have been done by agreement between the two families. Also, in *Kajnar*, one of the groom's relatives was abducted one year before, but the family refused the marriage and took the bride home because, I was told, the incident occurred shortly after her grandmother died. One of her *ženje* commented on that situation: S. (35 years old): *She did wrong, the boy was tall, just like she is, she won't find another one like him* (Talas region: 2008).

When a family decides to kidnap and bring a woman home, they must persevere. In Lom's documentary, one of the women tell the captured bride: We cannot let you go home (Lom 2004). They also run a risk. In fact, they often do not know the young woman, they do not know how she will behave, and if she won't stay, she will also bring shame on their family. *"We are ashamed that she is gone"* (Lom 2004), says one of the family members of the would-be bridegroom.

In Lom's documentary, two out of the several girls who were captured did not stay at the groom's house. Both later said they were very happy they did not. One of them was picked up by her parents who took her home, but she stated that if they had asked or ordered her to stay, she would have complied (Lom 2004).

The choice of the bride is very important and is not always connected with the fact that the groom likes the girl or not – both families have to face

¹⁶ Most of the research done on bride kidnapping consider sex during the wedding night to be rape (Amsler, Kleinbach 1999; Handrahan 2004: 255; Mroczkowska 2010, 2018). The latter author adds that the topic is rarely and unwillingly discussed, since it „seems not to fit in with the way people talk about bride capture” (Mroczkowska 2010: 280).

the consequences of their decisions. The time when the kidnapped woman is waiting for her parents to arrive is the most uncertain for both sides, and the decision they take becomes a turning point in the captured woman's life.

Parents – decision

When brought to the groom's house, the kidnapped woman is expected to write a letter to her parents, usually only providing information about her whereabouts, as she should not write anything about the kidnapping. The note is handed over to the groom's family members to be delivered in person to the addressees. The parents of the kidnapped bride are brought to the groom's house by the messengers to see for themselves what is happening there. It is up to them to decide whether the young woman should stay in the abductors' home, and the parental decision is the main – if not the only – ground for the woman's decision. Taking her back home may incur the family's potentially bad opinion, and is usually viewed negatively by their friends, relatives and neighbors.

While waiting for the bride's parents, and actually rushing to complete the task before their arrival, the groom's family slaughters a young goat, whose meat and entrails will be divided and used in different ways. The first and very important action involves an elderly woman blessing (*ôpkô karuu*)¹⁷ the young couple with still "hot" respiratory organs of the slaughtered animal. The woman cannot be the groom's relative, she may, e.g. be a neighbor. The bride and groom are to sit on their heels, back to back, while the old woman touches their heads, necks and backs¹⁸ with blood stained lungs, saying (sometimes the activity itself is enough): *May your love be as hot as the lungs of this goat, may you enjoy good health, have many children.* An old woman in *Kajnar* said: *May you be happy. May you have cattle in front of you and children behind you.* In *Kajnar*, the virgin supported by three men was forced to crouch down. After the blessing, the groom said *I accept*. One of the men said: *say I "accept"*, but she didn't say it. The old woman touched the groom's hand with the lungs. Then, M. – still crying – was led into the room where she was staying at all times during the three days of the described events.¹⁹

When the bride's parents arrive, or more specifically, when they agree that she should stay, the groom bows three times to his future in-laws. There follow negotiations about the conditions for the wedding, i.e. the amount of *kalyñ*²⁰ and some-

¹⁷ Өпкө каруу (Kyrg.) – Өпкө: lungs (Ûdahin 1965b: 98); каруу: beating (Ûdahin 1965a: 312).

¹⁸ A large, transparent, plastic sheet is thrown over the couple to protect them from being stained with blood, but at one of the weddings, where the bride was kidnapped with her consent, the bride and groom also stretched out their fingers, so that the woman could touch them directly with the meat.

¹⁹ During the wedding and a few days after it, the bride stays in a part of the room separated by a special curtain (e.g. Borbieva 2012: 145), *kôshôgô*, kirg. Көшөгө.

²⁰ Калың (Kyrg.), калым – *kalyñ* (Ros.) – material goods to be transferred to the wife's parents by the groom's parents. The matrimonial payment as a total of material or symbolic values, exchanged between the parties or transferred unilaterally, is the result of a corporate

times about further education opportunities for the young woman, provided the parents give their consent for her to stay. The ceremonial transfer of the *kalyn* usually takes place within the first year after the wedding and is the main event in shaping the relationship between the two parents of the newlyweds. The *kalyn* can include both cash and animals, but money should be considered as an animal equivalent. Equally solemn is the handover of the dowry (*sep*²¹) by the wife's family (two to five years after the marriage) (Light 2015: 68–69).

As compensation, bride's parents also receive some money (approximately 10% of the *kalyn*, which is not included in the *kalyn*'s value) – *ačuu basar*²² and the meat of the slaughtered goat. The meat includes ribs – called *kesik*²³ (meaning „cut”, „a piece” but also doomed, persecuted) – I was told that it was *something to exchange for a woman whom God created out of Adam's rib*. The word *kesik* does not solely denote this particular kind of meat, but refers to all ritual leftovers from a feast, for the guests to take home (Light 2015: 63–65).

Once the negotiations are finished, the parents say goodbye to their daughter and leave. They will not be present during marriage celebrations. The meat they received from the groom's family will be eaten by them and their relatives and neighbors. Once it is certain that the young woman is going to stay in the groom's house, she becomes a *kelin*²⁴ – daughter-in-law and is bound by all customary rules of respectful behaviour towards her husband's family.

A. (23 years old): *They stole me from the city. I left work and went home (...) they were sitting [in the driveway], a lot of them, my husband, his friends (...) They stole me there. Then I cried, screamed, "I don't want to get married". (...) My mother came, my brother came, they agreed, I didn't agree, my mother agreed, and so I got married* (Talas region: S.P. 2014).

and relatives-oriented organization of society (Szynekiewicz 1978: 275–277). Zbigniew Jasiewicz pointed out that *kalym* cannot be treated as a sale purchase transaction. It not only secures the woman's fate or strengthens her social standing, but also provides an opportunity to gain prestige (Jasiewicz 2004: 118). As Abašyn argues, the evidence that *kalym* (in Central Asia) has been wrongly understood as “brideprice” is provided by the fact that all the gifts the groom's family gives to the bride's family reflect the value of the dowry that the bride brings into her husband's house. Some scholars have concluded that the dowry is at least equivalent to *kalym* (Abašyn 2003).

Nathan Light (after of John Comaroff) uses the term *bridewealth* „to indicate wealth transferred from the kin of the husband to those of the wife. It might be better described as a 'bride gift' because neither the value nor the time of giving are set through negotiations” (Light 2015: 73). However, the negotiations are mentioned by Ismailbekova (2014: 182).

Kalyn also means a dense (e.g., forest) forest, thick, deep (Ūdahin 1965a: 334). Therefore, it always seems to refer to something abundant.

²¹ Сеп (Kirg.).

²² Ачуу басар (Kyrg.) – the Kyrgyz translate it as “quenching the anger”, ачуу meaning: anger, something that causes pain (also bitter, sour).

²³ Кесик (Kyrg.).

²⁴ Келин (Kyrg.) – when she is young everyone calls her *kelin*. The word signifies the bride, daughter-in-law and a young woman. When she gets older, she will be called *kelin* only by her in-laws and other senior members of the family.

Žeñeler – the Others at the marriage feast

Žeñe – the Kyrgyz word for one's older brother's, cousin's or other older relative's wife – on the day of marriage, everybody awaits for the bride's *žeñeler* specifically.

In *Kajnar*, *žeñeler* could not come on the same day when the kidnapping took place – they arrived the day after the kidnapping. The women came to the ceremony without their husbands and were hosted all night. They were greeted by the elders, but most of the time they stayed in the room where the bride/the couple were. At the beginning, the women introduced themselves to the elders (including the groom's mother), defining exactly their relationship to the bride and then sat down in the hierarchical order, according to their husband's age and status. Later, they received gifts from the family, mainly fabrics. From the moment they had arrived, all activities were focused on them. The women were hosted with great respect, offered the best seats, served copious amounts of food and alcohol, showered with gifts, entertained all night – the hosts made sure that, at all times, they had enough food, drink and a dance partner. Various contests were held, which the *žeñeler* could win, receiving prizes in the form of fabrics, carpets, tableware etc.

The reception and hosting of women was mainly done by women who were the *žeñeler* for the groom (i.e. women married into his family) – they served the food, poured the tea, brought in more dishes, offered presents – and by young married men, the groom's friends and neighbors (they may have been the abductors), who entertained the guests with conversation, dancing, singing and made sure that alcohol was drunk after every toast. The other guests: the elders and relatives of the groom were celebrating separately in other rooms, keeping an eye on the whole party.

After several hours, new important guests arrived: the so-called “replacement” parents²⁵ chosen by the groom's family or by the groom himself for his bride. They were close family friends, neighbors, and were the same age as the bride's parents. As „replacement” parents, they were to help her settle in the new environment. They acted as witnesses at the marriage ceremony. After the food and drinks were served, the *nike*²⁶ marriage took place in the presence of a Muslim priest – a mullah. In a separate room, in the presence of a few witnesses, the mullah read out the prayer, following which all those present (during *nike* in *Kajnar* those in attendance were the “replacement” parents, one of the sisters-in-law, two teenage girls who accompanied the bride and myself) took a sip of water from the same cup. Then the wedding bed was prepared. This was done by the women from the groom's family in the presence of the bride's *žeñeler*, who also gave the bride advice to help her go through her wedding night. Later, the bride and groom were left alone to consummate the marriage. The others continued to celebrate.

²⁵ Өкүл ага, өкүл апа/эне (Кург.) – literally: other father, other mother. Ismailbekova uses the term „representative parents” and points out that this function is associated with prestige, authority and respect (Ismailbekova 2017: 84).

²⁶ Нике (Кург.).

S. (35 years old): *On the wedding night, husband said that we have to do it quickly, because everyone was expecting it* (Talas region: S.P. 2008).

S. (36 years old): *He was persuading me for a long time, everyone was waiting to see the sheet. I knew about it and finally I gave up. I was in a lot of pain ... After that, I did not sleep with my husband for 9 months. He didn't push, he said, as long as I don't want to, he won't force me. This is how we lived together for 9 months* (Talas region: S.P. 2008).

In the morning, the husband should leave the wedding bed, for it to be inspected by the women of his family in the presence of the bride's *ženeler*. There should be traces of blood on the sheet, as evidence of the young woman's innocence. In *Kajnar*, the sheet was washed and hung in a visible place. After the examination, everyone joined in a feast, there were some more toasts, this time in the company of the elders, who were also present while the bride's *ženeler* received their gifts. The women were again offered gifts and money for ensuring *the young woman was a virgin*. In the end, the *ženeler* said goodbye to the young wife. Before they left, they placed a large stone to pin down the young *kelin's* dress while she was sitting down, which was a symbol of the girl's permanent residence in the groom's place.²⁷

This marks the end of the marriage ceremony. Everyone returns to their homes and the young *kelin* stays in the new place, starting a new life. Later, the wedding feast can be celebrated, although it is not necessary, and often it takes place even several months after the marriage day. Both families attend such wedding feast, but even without it, from the first night, the couple is considered to be married and signing relevant official documents is a mere formality that nobody even mentions.

Marriage by bride kidnapping as transformation

Below, I present an interpretation of marriage by bride kidnapping as the first stage in the social process of 'new-person-making'. I have reached these conclusions inspired by Claude Lévi-Strauss' (2009) structural analysis – approaching the rite of passage as a myth, isolating mythemes from the actions happening during the bride kidnapping and marriage and assigning them to social actors. In this way, I have identified oppositions and their pairs. The result of such analysis revealed a significant similarity to Carlos Fausto's considerations in his "Of enemies and pets: warfare and shamanism in Amazonia" (Fausto 2000: 933–956). Fausto's arguments allowed me to identify more clearly the emerging oppositions and to look at his model in a universal way, as a tool for describing different social practices. For the purposes of my interpretation, I will therefore use the analogies derived from texts about the indigenous peoples of the Amazon

²⁷ Таштын түшкөн жери оор (Kirg.) Let the stone lie where it has fallen.

(Fausto 2000; Buliński 2011). I will look at the phenomenon in question using the category of a 'subject' (understood as a person equipped with the ability to influence other people; agency) and the types of relations the subject establishes with other subjects from the outside world (e.g. animals, animal rulers, ghosts, Whites). In the Amazon, such subjectivity can be acquired through predation (seizure and complete transformation of the Other's subjectivity, e.g. as a result of a hunt and through transformation of an animal into meat) or familiarization (incomplete transformation of the Other's subjectivity, e.g. transformation of wild animals into domesticated animals; pets).

If we apply these categories to the analysis of marriage following bride kidnapping, we see that everything that happens during the marriage ceremony, from the kidnapping and to the departure of the *ženeler*, constitute specific actions aimed at transforming an Other into someone who enters the circle of relatives, and thus becomes part of a family as a community. The marriage, customarily perceived as a change of social roles, is nothing more than the rite affecting transformation from one status to another. In this case, the transformation involves a *kyz* (the young woman) turning into a *žene*.²⁸ It is emphatically not a mere change of roles, but a general **transformation**.

The transformation starts with the kidnapping. The bride capture is strategically designed and has little to do with romantic elopement. The act itself is carried out by men unrelated to the groom. They are his friends and for them, it is a matter of honour. However, the kidnapping itself is quite dramatic and is an aggressive act resembling a hunt.²⁹ The unsuspecting woman is tracked, caught and dragged to the car by force. The kidnapped woman resists, defends herself and screams, but men overpower her, so as to take her to her future husband's house against her will.

There she is placed in the care of women, who will attend to her directly most of the time. They force her to put on a headscarf and to sit down³⁰ – i.e. to accept that she is to become a *kelin*. The women are many, and when one cannot manage, she calls others to help her. The important thing is that these women are not related to the groom either. His mother, sisters or cousins are not present during these activities. All these tasks are handled by the groom's *ženeler* – women married into his family – i.e. wives of older brothers, distant and closer cousins. Although the women often forcibly put the scarf on the young woman's head,

²⁸ Brothers' wives are *абысындар* (pl. *abysyndar*) for each other. The wives of the brothers are termed *abysyn*; the younger members of the patriline would address their brothers' wives "*žene*". These both terms, are used as both labels and address terms (Ismailbekova 2017: 71–72). The bride will also be called *kelin* – daughter-in-law. Out of all other relational terms for a woman married into a family I chose *žene*, exactly because I wish to highlight that it is all about transforming the bride into the same kind of person as the other women who married into the family.

²⁹ This does not mean that a woman is the "prey", but that the relationship to her position is the same as that of predator towards its prey.

³⁰ The expression „she sat down” means that the girl stayed in the abductors' house as a wife and a daughter-in-law.

against her will, I call their actions 'pro-social', because they aim to make her one of them – a *žene* that is part of their family.

Finally, there are the bride's *ženeler*, whose presence is prominent during the marriage ceremony.³¹ They too, as married into the family, put indirect pressure on the bride, they come to attend the bride's wedding night, and they are hosted by the groom's *ženeler*, who personally offer gifts to the women who arrive, and serve them food and drink. When bride's *ženeler* arrive, they are greeted by the groom's *ženeler*.

In *Kajnar*, apart from them, those present included groom's other friends and the abductors. They were the ones who feasted at the table with the *ženeler* and, like them, they came to the marriage ceremony without their spouses. The whole process was a bit like seduction. The men entertained the women at the table, made sure they eat the food, sang to them and encouraged them to sing, danced with them, kept close and tried to get them drunk. However, all the time they addressed them as "*žene*", thus honoring the rules of honorific etiquette.

All this happens in the presence of the bride and because of her. Bedding for the wedding night is prepared by the groom's *ženeler*, while the bride's *ženeler* talk to her about the wedding night. After the wedding night, all of the *ženeler* are present during the inspection of the sheet, and the groom's *ženeler* hand over the money to the bride's *ženeler*, rewarding them for her sexual innocence and virginity preserved until the wedding day. Finally, the bride's *ženeler* pin down her dress with a stone. In this way, they finally say goodbye to her. From now on, she becomes for them a different category of a person. Until now, she was only the sister of their husbands, but because she got married herself, she became their potential co-mother-in-law³² or matchmaker,³³ since their children will be able to marry.³⁴

I called the whole process of transforming the Other into someone who will become one of the new family's affines – "familiarization". Just as bride kidnapping resembles a hunt, all the acts aimed at preparing the young woman to live with a new group resemble domestication of a wild animal.³⁵ Women dress, caress, comb and comfort her. However, they do not let her go and they act consistently and firmly. In this way, the young woman turns from "prey" into a member of the community. The familiarization is mainly done by women who, like her,

³¹ Sometimes, for example, when the distance between the new home and the family home is very long, *žene* do not come.

³² The son's wife's mother (for the matchmaker).

³³ The daughter's husband's mother (for a co-parent-in-law).

³⁴ Kinship is here considered to derive from the male line – from the father (patrilinear). Children born to sisters or siblings will not be considered as related by kinship, as they belong to two different families. Kinship and membership in the same family will only occur between brothers' children – as the children's fathers will have the same father.

³⁵ A comparison to taming can be found in the rough words of men in Butts's film "Kidnapped Brides", according to which the girl is like a foal, she knows nothing about life. "Of course, when she gets married, she'll cry and fight and resist. But when she's been broken and harnessed, she'll become obedient like a good horse and then she'll be happy" (Butts 2009).

have been transformed, have become family members. Just as I have dubbed female actions 'pro-social', the aggressive male action – kidnapping is 'anti-social'. I put these words in inverted commas, because I realize that all activities undertaken by members of the community are social activities, but I divide them into those characterized by aggressive/destructive forms and those that socialize/transform somebody into an active and adaptable member of the community. Both forms of action lead to the same goal – “obtaining” a new family member. This is a group effort by both genders and under no circumstances we can say that everything that happens in connection with bride kidnapping is purely led by men and that only men are responsible for it. Indeed, it is mostly men who carry out the act of kidnapping, but it is only part of the whole process of creating new social ties, which starts with the rite of passage – the marriage ceremony. However, before the bride is kidnapped, it is women – the *ženeler* – who most often become people searching for candidates for wives for their husband's family members. To summarize, it is men who perform “predatory” actions outside (home) towards the Other individual (*kyz*). The Other is being “familiarized” by the women inside (house). In this way, the *kyz* becomes a familiar Other – part of the community (one of the familiar Others – *žene*). As a *žene*, she will then go beyond the sphere of the interior, in order to find a new *žene* and use the men to obtain her from the outside.




DIAGRAM 1³⁶: A woman's transformation cycle

³⁶ All diagrams by the author.

If we approach the rite of passage, i.e. the marriage ceremony, as a myth that has its message, the whole process of “obtaining” a new affine can be presented using the diagram depicting the cycle of a woman’s transformation process (Diagram 1). Through actions of both women and men: from being THE OTHER to being an affine – THE FAMILIAR OTHER.

During the marriage ceremony, women and men act both individually and collectively, and these actions stand in opposition to each other (Diagram 2): men kidnap a woman and slaughter a goat, and these actions are undoubtedly associated with aggression and I describe them as predation. At the same time, they are necessary for the transformation to take place and lead to a change in the existing social structure. This is achieved through the actions of women who make sacrifices (Diagram 3). In both cases, the sacrificial „object” are handed over to women to make what was anti-social into social.

The structural correlation between the goat and the bride is evident in several respects. The purpose of killing the goat is, firstly, to make it an instrument of blessing (the old woman blesses the couple with the animal’s lungs), so that its blood can contribute to the couple’s fertility, and secondly, to consume it.³⁷ Nathan Light suggests that this ritual should be associated with purification and bringing the *kelin* into the home safely and purely. The ritual is combined with another one that he observed in the same region (*Kara-buura*). The salt ritual involved a small bowl of salt and ash mixed, passed around the woman’s head, just before she was taken into the house for the first time – which was explained as a purification (Nathan Light, private correspondence). As mentioned above, when touching the young couple, the old woman pronounced: *May you have cattle in front of you and children behind you*. This is an expression of the wish for fertility not only in terms of offspring, but also the prosperity in the form of abundant cattle.

Women make food from raw meat. They wash the blood off the pieces, process them and serve them as food. Thirdly, for the goat to become a gift – to give its meat (ribs) to the woman’s parents. This was clearly emphasized through the analogy to the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib. Just as the goat is transformed into a fertility tool, the young woman from the outside is transformed into a family member – also a fertility tool. Her defloration and her blood on the sheet denote the first attempt to fertilize and thus to maintain the family.

³⁷ This ritual is also mentioned by Fiel’strup, noting that the lungs were later thrown to the dogs and the goat meat given to the poor (Fiel’strup 2002: 28–29). Throwing out the lungs used for the blessing may indicate the cleansing function of the ritual, but the author himself also links it with fertility. Interestingly, he also states that in Chuy Kirgiz, after a woman gave birth, the placenta was also thrown to dogs, so that in the future she would have as many children as there are puppies in a litter (Fiel’strup 2002: 44–45).

MEN (collective action)	WOMEN (collective action)
ANTI-SOCIAL ACTION	PRO-SOCIAL ACTION
YOUNG WOMAN'S CAPTURE	YOUNG WOMAN'S TAMING
KILLING THE GOAT	PREPARING THE MEAL
MAN (individual action)	WOMAN (individual action)
DEFLORATION	BLESSING

DIAGRAM 2: Oppositions




DIAGRAM 3: Transformation

YOUNG WOMAN - **offering/prey** (as the captured person, during a hunt - kidnapping)
 GOAT - **offering** (as sacrifice - blessing and food offering and meal)




DIAGRAM 4: Offering

Structurally, it appears that the goat and the young woman are the same offering (Diagram 4) and the former is an extension of the latter. When the woman is kidnapped and brought to the groom, the goat is killed and its blood is used to mark the young couple. Through the blood of the goat, which is a blessing aimed at ensuring fertility, an exchange of sacrifice takes place. The goat's ribs are given to the bride's parents (instead of returning the daughter), and the bride becomes the offering (the parents order her to stay) and is marked with her own

blood through defloration, which is also the first attempt at fertilization. Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss in their *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function* wrote that the one who makes an offering is the one who awaits the return from the deed (Hubert, Mauss 2005). In this case, the expected 'return' is fertility.

Goat meat is not just offered in exchange for the young woman, because animals, as Light notes, have a ritualistic value – they develop and maintain social ties. Animals as gifts, especially when given as meat, are an expression of appreciation for the person who receives the gift. Pieces of meat, other food and drinks served in the specific contexts of the feast evoke common positive feelings and maintain human bonds (Light 2015: 52–55). The first offering of goat meat is, therefore, the initiation of mutual bonds and further exchanges. The material substance of animals gains in value when it circulates and is used as part of symbolic rituals (Light 2015: 68).

Žeņe – the Other inside the family

Žeņe is not any kind of sister-in-law, but one who is a person specifically linked to seniority, and therefore needs to be shown respect. It is, therefore, not insignificant that it is *žeņeler* who are invited to the marriage celebrations and that they are women of reproductive age, i.e. relatively young. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is significant that they are not related to the family of the bride, nor to the bride herself. They are the Others, but through the ongoing 'process of being' within the family they are part of it, **they are like the bride**, whose 'process of being' within the new family begins on the day of the marriage ceremony.

The day when she gets married is a turning point in a woman's life. I deliberately avoid mentioning the groom here, as the most significant changes, manifested to be visible to the community, affect the young woman. First of all, her loss of virginity is publicly noted. Secondly, since she gets married, she is referred to as a *kelin*, is expected to wear a headscarf and dress in a way that will not offend her in-laws. Her place of residence shifts to a new home. The newly wed husband is still called *žigit*,³⁸ no one mentions his sexual life, he does not change his attire nor residence. The bride is an absolute stranger, she is the new *kelin*, and so she holds the lowest possible status within the groom's family. She does not have her things, she may not know anybody in that family, but needs to show respect to everyone. When her *žeņeler* say goodbye, she starts a new life as a *kelin* among her husband's *žeņeler*, as one of the *abysyndar* – sister-in-law. The young *kelin* is also a *žeņe* and when her husband's younger sister or cousin gets married, she may be asked to represent the family during the marriage. If her husband's family kidnaps a bride, she and the other *abysyndar* will have to take care of the new *kelin* and host her *žeņeler* during the marriage ceremony.

³⁸ ЖИГИТ (Кург.) – signifies a young, brave and agentive man and the groom, the meaning is always positive.

During my stay in *Kajnar* I have spent some time with such women. One of them was the groom's sister-in-law (his *žene*), who was also kidnapped a few years ago. My host's sister-in-law told me about this, laughing: *She also cried as much as M, and now she would not dream of leaving this house even if they pulled her with a tractor.* The other woman answered by pointing to the first one: *She was the one who kidnapped me.* My interlocutors often referred to the perpetrators of the bride kidnapping as "them" – having in mind the particular family, and not a single person,³⁹ or by saying "we kidnapped her" – when referring to a daughter-in-law or sister-in-law.

The *ženelerler* present during the marriage ceremony are key people, precisely because they are invited to attend. All the activities during the wedding reception seem to be focused around the *žene* guests. They are offered attention and respect, although in everyday life their status at ceremonies is diametrically different from the one they enjoy on the day of their affine's marriage. At all family and social events everyone is assigned a specific place, depending on age, social position and gender. The most important seats are always occupied by men and elderly people, while young married women sit in less honorable spots, far from the "front of the table". Even if they are guests themselves, they serve other guests. In this one case, i.e. during the marriage ceremony, young women guests – *ženeler*, not only arrive without their husbands, but they are also seated in the most important places (according to the status and the age of their husbands). However, everything is still in line with the accepted norms.

In *Kajnar*, the older family members feasted in other rooms. The head of the killed animal (i.e. the greatest honour)⁴⁰ was offered to the most important man of the groom's family. The family elders visited the bride and groom's room only rarely, and only for the most important moments of celebration. The bride's closest family generally arrived only to tell the bride that she was to stay, and to settle financial matters with the groom's family.

Here, I do not wish to ignore the priority role played by the parents in the matrimonial affairs of their children – as mentioned by Borbieva (2012: 144) and Mroczkowska (2018: 288–291) – but I want to highlight what is actually happening around the captured bride and to describe those aspects that I have observed during my research, but have not found in other studies. The groom's family also came for only a few specific moments during the whole event and they were always far removed from most of what was happening in the bride's presence. The most active part was played by the people who were not directly related to either the bride or the groom.

What happens during the marriage day, and even before it, involves otherness. The bride is often selected by the groom's women affines, she is kidnapped by his friends, and the blessing is bestowed by an unrelated elderly woman. The marriage feast during the night is hosted by the groom's affines and those

³⁹ Men tend to say that it was them who kidnapped wives.

⁴⁰ This is the case in the Talas Region. The etiquette for carcass cutting and meat division for individual guests varies in different regions.

being hosted are the bride's affines. The groom's friends entertain the bride's affines. The groom's friends/neighbors, who are not related to the groom's family, are chosen as 'replacement' parents to witness the Muslim marriage ceremony.

The bride becomes the focus of Otherness. The marriage triggers her transformation into a *žene*, the process of being in a new social system. From that day on, she will be one of the *abysyndar* – sisters-in-law, she will also be a *kelin* and a *žene*.⁴¹ For some people, she will be a *kыз* – a "girl", until the end of her life. The transformation from a *kыз* into a *žene* goes much deeper than just an alteration of the social role. *Žene* appear at the marriage ceremony and during the feast in a two-fold way – first as the female affines (Others) of the groom, and secondly, as the female affines of the bride. The otherness we see here involves three levels: women married into the family (on both sides) and the young woman as an individual Other. The Others as women unrelated to the families have a central role to play during the marriage ceremony: the bride's *ženeler* transfer her to the new family through the groom's *ženeler*, who make her "their own Other" (through familiarization, she becomes like them). The women married into the family, although they work for the family's benefit, do not belong to the family and their otherness will be maintained through customs, even though it will undergo changes with age and subsequent stages of life. Such otherness, however, is a transition from duality – individual (the captured Other)/collective (women married into the family) – to unity (our/own Others). This happens through the transformation that starts on the day of marriage and continues throughout the woman's life. She will remain the Other for a long time, and this status can only change if she outlives all the members of her husband's family born before the day of her marriage. Her status involves a process – it will become higher as the woman gets older and "gains" respect. Her otherness will diminish with time and age. Once again, I wish to return to the diagram representing the cycle of the woman's transformation process: women married into the family, who are not from the family and so are "from the outside" – **the familiar others** – look for potential wives for their husband's family. The men "from the outside", unrelated to the groom, kidnap the young woman and hand her over to the women who are "inside" – they are part of the community for whose benefit they act. They are married, they wear headscarves and by their actions they persuade the young woman to become like them – **the familiar other**. Through disempowerment and familiarization, they constitute a "new person" – the Other "just like us".

⁴¹ It is worthwhile to think of these roles as positions in relationships.




DIAGRAM 5: Familiarizing

Maintaining otherness

The term *kelin* comes from the verb *kelüü*⁴² (to come and enter), because usually young brides move from their birth families to their husbands' families (Ismailbekova 2014: 383).

Kelin, above all, must show respect (Ismailbekova 2014: 379, 2017: 83). A visible manifestation of respect towards one's in-laws is conveyed by proper dress and behaviour. She should bow to her mother-in-law and her husband's older family members (Ismailbekova 2014: 379). The bowing is sometimes a simple nod, but more often she has to bow low – making a movement that takes enough time and is expressive enough for everyone to see. "Grooms' mothers are instrumental in making sure that their daughters-in-law behave appropriately in this patrilineal context" (Ismailbekova 2014: 379).

S. 35 years old: *For ten years, I bowed low to my mother-in-law, at the waist – as a sign of respect – every time I saw her, and she greeted me and wished me happiness and a long life. Now I only bow to her when I don't see her for a few days* (Talas region: S.P. 2008).

Kelin, if she has been kidnapped, quite suddenly starts living with a man she often does not know, in a completely new house, among strangers. She rarely sees her parents. During the day she mainly stays with her husband's other sisters-in-law or his younger sisters, doing house chores. As long as she lives with her

⁴² Келүү (Kirg.).

in-laws she is obedient to them, in the same way she has been obedient to her parents before. She performs her mother-in-law's most duties, but for a long time she keeps a distance from her husband's parents, especially from her father-in-law, with whom she is not even allowed to sit at the same table. She should not shake his hand, look into his eyes or talk to him.⁴³ A similar interdiction relates to her husband's older brothers. Everybody knows what is expected of a *kelin*. The bride is also not allowed to sit with her back to them, sit with her leg outstretched speak loudly or sharply, walk bareheaded or barefoot (Ismailbekova 2014: 379).

In the first stage of marriage, or rather in the early stage of life within the new family arrangement, the main point is to visibly show respect for one's in-laws. It is important for a young *kelin* "to know how to behave" in any given situation; she needs to be present, helpful and, at the same time, invisible, by which she provides the opportunity for others, namely her in-laws, to whom she needs to show respect – to be visible. One of the women said about her daughter-in-law: *My daughter-in-law lives with us. She is a good wife and a good daughter-in-law. My husband also likes her; how she cooks and works. And she helps me even more to please him* (Talas region: S.P. 2008).

During the marriage feast, the bride does not prepare meals, she does not pour tea, she sits in the most honored place, surrounded by her *ženeler*, and is served by her husband's *ženeler*. When she becomes a *kelin*, it is her duty to prepare meals and serve them to guests (Pritchard 2009: 85). Often, the obligation to help also passes on to the older *kelin*, who are at a different stage of their life in the family as they are "gaining" respect. The new *kelin* has obligations not only towards her in-laws but also towards her husband's older brothers, whom she is expected to treat in a similar way as she approaches their father. If an older brother is holding a party, the wives of his younger brothers – *kelin* are obliged to help his wife. She is the hostess, she sits at the corner of the table and pours tea, while the younger *kelin* work in the kitchen. The daughter-in-law shows her respect to her in-laws by wearing appropriate *kelin* clothes. Above all, she should wear a scarf on her head, the most important attribute of a married woman. She should also wear a skirt or a dress. Wearing trousers (without a skirt) violates accepted standards of attire appropriate for a young married woman.⁴⁴ The *kelin*'s status at home is the lowest. She cannot address her husband's family members by their first names, but calls his parents *apa*⁴⁵ (mother) and *ata*⁴⁶ (father), his older sisters *ëže*⁴⁷ (older sister), his younger sisters *kyz* (girl), his older brothers *ake*⁴⁸

⁴³ These customs have been present among the Kyrgyz people for a long time; similar prescriptive norms and interdictions are described in „Kyrgyzy. Ètnogenetičeskie i ètnokul'urnye processy w drevnosti i srednowiekov'e w Central'noj Azii" (Moldlobaev, Pirimbaewa 1996: 89).

⁴⁴ The most common clothes consist of cotton, knitted or suede sets of matching trousers and knee-length tunic (usually in various shades of red, pink and purple).

⁴⁵ Ана (kir.) – mother, a form of address used for an older relative.

⁴⁶ Ата (Kyrg.) – father, ancestor.

⁴⁷ Эже (Kyrg.) – older sister, form of address for a woman older than ego.

⁴⁸ Аке (Kyrg.) – older brother (also father) another form *ara* (Kyrg.) – older brother, pal, friend, uncle, older relative.

(older brother), his younger brothers *bala*⁴⁹ (boy).⁵⁰ As it is also not allowed to say the names of family members in their absence, when speaking about them, she must find an expression which, without saying the name, will indicate the appropriate person (Ismailbekova 2014: 378–379). Restrictions related to family members go even further. She may not address by name those members of her husband's family who were born before she married into the family. Even if a child is born the day before the new *kelin's* marriage, she will always address them *kыз* or *bala*. A young married woman is expected to have a child as soon as possible, preferably within a year of getting married. If the couple does not produce a child after one year, they will increasingly experience social pressure to do so. The issue is discussed not only by the immediate family, but by the whole community. One woman told me that if a *kelin* does not bear a child within two or three years after her marriage, her husband has the right to send her away. Another woman mentioned the difficulties she experienced: *For two years I could not get pregnant, I was treated in the hospital and his [husband's] family were against me. They urged him to send me home, but he did not listen to them.*

The respect shown by a *kelin* as the Other in the husband's lineage has a two-fold meaning. First, it "reminds" everybody of her status – even though she is part of the family, she does not belong to the family. Secondly, and as a consequence, due to the fact that she is a 'familiar Other', she can host and effect transformation of the new *kelin* in her husband's family.

In addition to the labor provided for the benefit of the family members, it is good if the *kelin* is also actively involved in social events related to the life cycle. As a *žeңe*, she has a social responsibility to carry the dowry of her daughters from the countryside to the groom's family and to welcome other young brides to the village during their wedding. She will be the first to tell the families of newly brought brides that their daughters are virgins and who will see the potential grooms first. For social tasks and active involvement, she will receive money and various gifts (Ismailbekova 2015: 384).

Transformation and gaining respect

Family and social life in a Kyrgyz village is perceived through the lens of respect.⁵¹ A woman develops her position within a family to whom she shows respect – in her old age she is respected if she herself was hardworking, raised children and got them married. When I collected women's stories,⁵² their sparingly told

⁴⁹ Бала (Kyrg.) – child, infant, boy, son, grandson.

⁵⁰ The forms of address used within the family are age-related. Younger siblings address the older siblings by using terms for older brother, older sister (like *kelin*), sometimes adding their first name. older siblings call the younger siblings by their first names.

⁵¹ Mroczkowska identified two categories: shame and respect (Mroczkowska 2010), while in her 2018 publication she claimed that "the Kyrgyz world is mainly described using the categories of tradition, respect, honour and shame" (Mroczkowska 2018: 272).

⁵² The following diagrams are based on the stories of 20 women.

life stories focused on education, dreams, marriage and present life. All these stages of life were subordinated to the family, which I called the **centre**. The centre is a household linked to family and lineage, and a given person acts to benefit it. In her article "Constructing the authority of women through custom: Bulak village" Ismailbekova described case studies illustrating how women gain authority (or when Kyrgyz family ideals are violated) by meeting all the norms of Kyrgyz family ideology and creatively negotiating strategies within the patriarchal system (Ismailbekova 2015).

During a woman's life, the centre to which she has to submit, or in which she ultimately becomes the one who is subordinating, changes three times. At first, she lives with her parents, obeys them and shows them respect. Later, when she pursues education or finds work without being married, she is still subordinate to the will of her parents and their home is her centre. When she gets married, her husband's family home becomes her centre. She works for the household's benefit and is supported by the income generated by it. She needs to be even more obedient than in her parents' house. As a young *kelin*, she is subject to a wider scope of norms,⁵³ and she needs to behave accordingly. The norms are primarily focused on showing respect to the in-laws, who are the most prominent representatives of the centre, as well as decision-makers. When the woman gives birth to her first child, she usually moves with her husband to a separate home and starts to run a separate household. She will remain subordinate towards the husband's family (the centre - the "big house") for many years and the degree of her subordination will be inversely proportional to the respect that she has "gained" (becoming a centre for others: her children and later her daughters-in-law).

Ismailbekova comes to another noteworthy conclusion - that the status of a young wife depends on how well she is doing in her parents-in-law's home, and that the husband's status depends on his wife's socialization in rural social life (Ismailbekova 2014: 385).

⁵³ The new *kelin's* status is the lowest within the family, and she is expected to show respect to all family members. In her own family, she used to follow mainly the rules of age seniority, which are for her a natural part of everyday life. When she starts living in the new place, she needs to familiarize herself with the new rules.




DIAGRAM 6: Subordinating to the center/becoming the center

A little girl (*kyz*) is subordinated to the centre and obeys her parents' will. Later on, when as a young woman she gets married, she becomes a daughter-in-law (*kelin*) – she loses her status as a subject, assistance and obedience towards the new centre are more affirmative than in the household where she grew up. As time passes, if she shows respect to others, bears children, she will become responsible for her household and will gain the status of an *aâl*.⁵⁴ Her position slowly changes and at the right moment, she will have her own *kelin*, who will show her respect. She will become a *kempir*,⁵⁵ a well-respected old woman sitting in the best spot, to whom daughters-in-law bow and for whom they do most chores, while family members and the community at large ask her opinion (Diagram 6 and 7).

kyz → *kelin* → *aâl* → *kempir*

DIAGRAM 7: The stages of life

⁵⁴ Аял (Kyrg.) – woman, wife, spouse.

⁵⁵ Кемпир (Kyrg.) – old woman.

Ismailbekova presents a similar model, revealing a more complex image of the role of women in Kyrgyz society than the one present in the general discourse of national patriarchy. The authority and power of women are realized through their successive roles as bride – *kelin*, mother – *apa* and mother-in-law – *kajnene*.⁵⁶ However, the construction of authority is not easy. It is a rather complex process involving many factors, such as Kyrgyz family ideals, age, reciprocity and the individual's ability to engage effectively in “patriarchal negotiations” (Ismailbekova 2015).

Conclusions

In this article I have presented a model of marriage by bride kidnapping, based on the analysis of descriptions and ethnographic observations I made during my fieldwork, focusing on the actions of specific individuals. This model revealed that the main social actors during the marriage ceremony are unrelated to the newlyweds: they are friends and neighbors of the groom, and the bride's and groom's affinal kin. The kidnapping and marriage, as well as a number of activities that precede it, show that the act of kidnapping is part of a social process and collective activities of the whole community that is involved in it. The marriage, the offering of meat from an animal slaughtered and used for blessing is also the beginning of bonds and sustained exchanges and relationships between families.

In my analysis I focused on the dynamic relationships between otherness and familiarization, which involves the making of a familiar Other (just like the other familiar Others). These relations consist in the appropriation of the Other's subjectivity, whereby the Other must be disempowered and then familiarized in order to be used in the process of making new subjectivities. These subjectivities are created on three levels:

1. The transformation of the Other into the familiar Other, who with time will acquire new subjectivity.
2. Fertilization, giving birth and raising offspring.
3. Acquisition and creation of new subjectivities by the familiar Other through participation in marriages by bride kidnapping.

I have presented this process through the cycle of a woman's transformation by identifying the actions by groups of people: the predatory/anti-social actions of men and the familiarizing/socializing actions of women. The activities involved in the act of bride kidnapping mark the beginning of the process, which will later be perpetuated by the kidnapped bride herself. Both types of action: *predatory* and *familiarizing* are performed in collaboration, with oppositions leading from duality to unity. The term “familiarizing predation”, used by Fausto (2000), fully illustrates this collaboration (Diagram 7).

⁵⁶ Кайнене (Kirg.).




Diagram 7: Constitution of new subjectivities by familiarizing predation

In the next stage of her life in her husband's family home, the woman continues to acquire subjectivity and to procure new ones. The final conclusion is that the custom of bride kidnapping triggers the constitution of a new subjectivity – a 'new person'. This process, in turn, is a way of social reproduction of families, which takes place through the acquisition, familiarization and constitution of subjectivity resulting from collective agency of all the family members.

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SUMMARY

Bride kidnapping in Northern Kyrgyzstan as the initial stage of subjectivity-forming process

Kyz ala kachuu (Kyrgyz: *кыз ала качуу*) translated as “to take a young woman and run away” is a form of women kidnapping for marriage purposes in Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Republic). This term applies to either of the performed actions: kidnapping with permission from the future wife, and without her consent. In this article, I propose an anthropological interpretation of bride kidnapping, using the concept of ‘person-making’. In my analysis, I go beyond the act of kidnapping itself, which I present as part of a wider social process. Drawing on my fieldwork in Northern Kyrgyzstan, I show that marriage through kidnapping is the first stage in the social process of building female subjectivity and the way of reproduction of Kyrgyz families. The reproduction takes place through the acquisition, familiarization, and constitution of subjectivity resulting from the collective agency of all the family members.

Keywords: *Kyz ala kachuu*, bride kidnapping, family, social roles, Kyrgyz Republic, post-Soviet states

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Postsocialist animism: personhood, necro-personas and public past in Inner Asia

In Soviet times, animism was described as a relic of a primitive socio-economic formation. It was the direct consequence of Lewis Morgan's influence on Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin's thought. The only acceptable place for animism in the socialist society was an ethnographic museum. Theory of social evolution assumed a hierarchy between the former and present stadiums of human development. In Siberia and Mongolia, this hierarchy was not only operating in time, but also in space and inter-ethnic relations. Socialist city and state farm were spaces of modernity, from which superstitions were forced out either in space (to the outskirts of civilisation) or in time – i.e. relegated to the past, associated with former social formations. Any animistic phenomenon was treated as opposed to modernity (Vakhtin 2006: 49; Peshkov 2012: 172; Sundström 2012). For most authors, Siberian animism, along with other forms of native ontologies and spiritual practices, was identified with shamanism (Sundström 2012: 355–362; Hamayon 2013: 284).¹

Animism emerged into the public sphere out of the blue, right after disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the socialist state-led modernisation. Along with ethnic renaissance and nation-building process, animism was involved in the transformation of the Soviet world. It was not only about shamans' engagement in ethnic mobilisation, but also about the increasing use of an animist perspective to undermine modern state monopoly for the past, resulting in the formation of native regimes of historicity. This is crucial for ethnic institutions for which a newly defined, pre-socialist past becomes a source

¹ According to our records, the animist practices go far beyond shamanism.

of moral authority for the postsocialist present (Humphrey 1992: 378). However, shamanic practices and animistic perspectives are also used by local communities to overcome the trauma of mass repression or to secure their land rights.

One major theoretical issue that has dominated this particular field of inquiry for many years was the authenticity of the so-called neo-shamanic practices. So far, very little attention has been paid to the practical and pragmatic dimensions of postsocialist animism.² The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between animist ontology, shamanic practices, and bottom-up public past in postsocialist Inner Asia.³ This study's specific purpose is to shed some light on the local conceptions of personhood, nonhuman agency, and their role in structuring native visions of the past. The paper is based on a case study of three unique manifestations of the public past in three regions of Inner Asia: (1) Negotiations between families and the spirits of their ancestors – victims of communist purges (Mongolia), (2) Powerful necropersona that allows local communities to gain political subjectivity and undermine conventional post-Soviet historical narratives (Altai), (3) Return of the undead lama Itigilov that caused Buddhist revival in the region (Buryatia). All these cases can only be properly understood if we take into account the local concepts of personhood.⁴

Selected examples seem to support Morten Pedersen's thesis on the generally totemic and hierarchical nature of southern North Asian societies, where inter-human perspectivism dominates, and people enter relations primarily with their ancestors' spirits (Pedersen 2001: 422–423). It is noteworthy that in the communities where I worked, people constantly interacted with nonhuman agents: animals, land masters spirits (*gazryn ezen*), and river hosts (*lusan*). Elements of extra-human perspectivism were also present. Hunters in the Tunka Valley (South Buryatia) told me that bears were previously humans, and that it was dangerous for a hunter to kill more than 40 bears in his lifetime, because after death such a hunter would reincarnate as a bear. On the other hand, some Tuvans maintain social relations with nonhumans, which in Descola's classification (1996: 88) makes them animists. For example, there is a custom to put a straw in an empty vodka bottle because 'an ant might come, he will also want to drink and should be kindly returned home.' However, the cases discussed in this article focus on relationships with posthuman persons, because they play an essential role in creating local historical narratives. Below I present some evidence that, in contemporary Inner Asia, we deal not only with a combination of animistic and totemic features (Willerslev, Ulturgasheva 2012: 50), but also with constant switching and mixing of these two ontologies and naturalism.

² I use the term postsocialist animism because the groups discussed in the text have undergone intensive Soviet-style modernist socialisation. For them, therefore, animism is one of the few available ways of interaction with the world.

³ In this paper, instead of 'public history', I use of the term 'public past' to distinguish indigenous techniques of ordering and representing the past from Western historiography and the institutional forms of commemoration built upon it.

⁴ This paper is the result of the research project No. 2017/25/B/HS3/00675 called *Kinship and Sedentarization in Inner Asian Urban Areas of Hailar, Ulan-Ude and Ulaanbaatar* funded by the Polish National Science Center.

Personhood and the generic notion of the past

According to the classical approach, concepts of personhood in Inner Asia were described using the term 'soul.' Usually, scholars wrote about three souls inhabiting the human body. Numerous authors have discussed this issue (Okladnikov 1937: 860; Mikhailov 1987: 39–62; Kisel' 2009: 13–14), and various approaches have been put forward to conceptualize it, but the term 'soul' tends to be confusing. The concept has been borrowed from Christian and Platonic vocabularies and does not fit any of the three local designations. Anthropologists often deal with different, multi-dimensional forms of subjectivity that go beyond the European concept of the soul (cf. Pedersen, Willerslev 2012: 467–471). The terminology introduced by Russian researchers has undoubtedly modified the original ideas.

It is also hard to overestimate the influence of Buddhism, Orthodoxy, Soviet atheistic modernism, and, finally, the free-market economy on local forms of being in the world. These new worldviews provided significantly different ontologies that have been syncretically internalised by individuals. Acquired worldviews are expressed in practices. They are no longer abstract knowledge, and certainly not a defined ontology, i.e. a theory of what exists and how it exists. That is why conflicts between initially different visions of the world and personality are rare. For instance, during my fieldwork in Tunka Valley in Buryatia, I heard diverse claims. Some people stated that they had one soul, others that they had three, yet others did not know how many souls they had, or indeed, had no opinion on this subject. Once, when I got lost in the forest, I accidentally came across a Buryat cemetery. My host began the purification ritual immediately after I returned home. He thought I could have brought 'something dangerous'. A devout Buddhist named Volodya, holding a lit sprig of juniper, said something about the evil spirits lurking in the cemetery. I asked him:

According to Buddha's teachings, is it not so that after 49 days of being in the *bardo* state [an intermediate state between death and rebirth], the mind has to be reborn in one of the six spheres of existence, following the tendencies accumulated over previous lives?

Volodya's shook his smoothly shaved head, thought for a while and answered:

- Yes, it is reborn [he says], but it is not always successful. Sometimes something goes wrong; someone dies not his own death and then wanders around, comes to his relatives and tries to draw them and take them with him. We call these ghosts *booholdoj*. There are a lot of them in cemeteries, that is why we do not go there.

- In that case, the mind is not reborn, or is it reborn as a ghost? - I tried to integrate these strange words with my previous canonical Buddhist model of the world.

- Reborn or not, ghosts are dangerous. Some say that a man has many souls, and one of them lives in the graveyard after their death. The lamas have recently

hung up the information that there is no *booholdoj*, and all that is just superstition. And whom shall I believe? Everything is intertwined and mixed up: Buddhism, shamanism, and Orthodox beliefs (...) And yet, it is better not to go to the cemetery. After all, does it really matter what kind of ghost will haunt you?

Initially, I interpreted this ambivalence as a manifestation of religious syncretism, and on the other hand as a result of the post-Soviet crisis of ethnic culture. However, at some point it occurred to me that this is what anthropologists call 'culture' in practice – at least until a descriptive cultural model is taught at school.

Animist models and images of the soul, as Katherine Swancutt and Mireille Mazard noted, are often created as a result of a kind of reflexive feedback loop, whereby abstract anthropological ideas about practice and beliefs are acquired and recirculated by researched natives (Mazard, Swancutt 2016: 1–6). It is only when research participants gain this defamiliarised self-image and begin to use anthropological concepts that their statements and practices become consistent. One may conclude that everything is fluid, relative, and complicated, but we shall not dwell on trivialities. It is, therefore, necessary to introduce a working model of local ideas about personhood.

According to Aryuna Suvorova, Buryat shamanists believe that a human being consists of several invisible entities: (1) *sülde* – vitality, life force, (2) *amin* – soul-breath (3) *hünehen* – soul-shadow. At the time of death, a person first loses his or her life force *sülde*, then the breath – *amin*, and at the very end, *hünehen* leaves the body. This third component of subjectivity is sometimes described as body-like and material but subtle, stealthy, and noiseless. After death, *sülde* becomes the guardian spirit of the family or is reborn, *amin* remains with the bones of the deceased, and *hünehen* slowly expires like a candle or goes to the realm of the dead where it is transformed into the predatory wandering spirit – *booholdoj*. Sometimes *sülde* can leave a person who is still alive. It causes his or her to lose strength, and ultimately leads to death. The southern Buryats claim that after death, *sülde* stays with the corpse, *amin* is reborn, and *hünehen* becomes a wind spirit (*hij*) and keeps watch over the relatives (Suvorova 2012: 162–163).

A similar concept of three-fold complex personhood has been noted among the Mongols. *Ami* is the energy associated with the breath, and it just evaporates after death. The *süüder* (lit. shadow) has a human form, and after death, wanders for some time on the Earth until it sinks into the ground or burns out. Immortal and material *süins* can leave the body in a dream and travel around the world.⁵ Shamans can talk to the *süins* of the dead people. With the help of *süins*, the shaman can also communicate with higher deities (Tulisow 2007: 31–33).

Caroline Humphrey observed a similar concept of spiritual components (*ami*, *süld*, *sumus*) among the Daurs of the Inner Mongolian Barga region (Humphrey, Onon 1996: 2013). Nikolai Baskakov writes about four components of the soul

⁵ During my fieldwork in the Tunka Valley, I noticed that loss of soul is a common diagnosis in Buryat medicine, offered by both lamas and shamans. The similar situation among Mongolian Darkhats was observed by Morten Pedersen (2011: 1–5).

(*süne*) among Siberian Turks: *tyn* (breath), *qut* (vital force), *djula* (twin), and *sür* (image) – a visible ghost of the *djula* that has temporarily left the body. After death, these components diverge and transform into various visible and invisible, ephemeral, and permanent forms (Baskakov 1973: 108–113).

An ethnographer and religious expert Taras Mikhailov argued that in Buryat shamanism human being has an invisible but material soul – *hünehen* or *sünes*. *Hünehen* has the character traits of the person with whom it is associated. It can leave the body, wander the Earth, visit the spirit world, and then return to the body. Bulagats of Cisbaikalia believe in the existence of three souls inhabiting the human body: (1) the good one that has access to the celestial deities *Tengeri* and cares about the host, (2) the medium one that is sometimes stolen by evil spirits, which brings a person to death, and (3) the evil one that always stays in the body and guards its bones after death. The latter afterwards becomes a *booholdoj* (Mihailov 1987: 39). A similar tripartite division can be found among Tuvans, who refer to the right, middle, and lousy soul using the Mongolian terms: *sain*, *dund*, and *muu süns* (Kisel' 2009: 13).

In another version, recorded among the Buryats in Alar district, the first soul after death faces Erlen-khan – the lord of the underworld, and is judged, the second becomes *booholdoj*, and the third is reborn in a new body (Mihailov 2004: 366–367). The specific concept of personality is closely connected with the collective, ancestral dimension of pre-modern Buryat society. At the same time, this concept has been adapted to Buddhist beliefs, sparking new syncretic doctrines, e.g., on ancestral karma. The traditional kinship system influenced perception of reincarnation. Many Buryats believe that ancestors are reborn in the family, hence the custom of tagging the hands and other parts of the corpse's body. Birthmarks in the same places are then sought in newborns, and are believed to be a sign that the ancestor has been reborn as a specific child (Belyaeva 2009: 242–243).⁶

Rebecca Empson, who carried out her research in northeastern Mongolia, also highlights the kinship dimension of personality. Despite biological explanation for human reproduction being taught in schools, at the level of symbolic communication people still believe that the creation of the child's body is the result of a combination of paternal bone (*jasan töröl*) and maternal blood (*cusan töröl*). The ancestors are believed to be reborn within their clan (Empson 2011: 114–115).

Working with the material collected in Mongolia, Oyungerel Tangad, instead of souls, prefers to talk about numerous 'life forces' that make up a human being: *ami* (vitality), *süns* (spirit, intellectual part of life forces), *süld* (individual and ancestral vitality), *bujan* (grace, merit, wealth), *zaja* (fortune, destiny), *hišig* (prosperity). *Ami* is the life force that determines the personality of beings. The person who lost *ami* – dies. The state and lineage group also have *ami*; it can be strengthened with the sacrificial offering – *tahilga* (bur. *tajlgan*). The spirits of illustrious and powerful ancestors become ongons – the guardians of the family (Tangad 2013: 90–111).

⁶ In 2009, during my stay in Ulan-Ude, I lived with a family in which the son was considered to be a reincarnation of his paternal grandfather, and the daughter a reincarnation of her grandmother. The children had the same names as their grandparents.

In her discussion of Tangad Oyungerel analysis Katarzyna Golik noted that the list should also include the Buddhist concept of *hijmori* (tib. *lungta*) – ‘wind horse’, soul-life energy, as well as luck and fate (Golik 2013: 216). These examples do not exhaust the diversity of personhood concepts. Native terminology contains many other terms that can be translated as ‘soul’, ‘mind’, or ‘spirit’. Yuriin Bayansan uses the term ‘soul’ to refer to the Mongolian concept of *setgel*, which is linked to the related terms *ojun uhan*, *bodol*, and which in other contexts could be translated as ‘mind’, ‘consciousness’ or ‘intellect’ (Bayansan 2005: 1–5).

It thus can be concluded that the concept of human personality in Inner Asia is complex, multilayered; it is a temporary aggregate consisting of the body and several different, less visible basic elements, which after death separate from the body. Thus, death is a process of decomposition into different types of matter and energy that transition to a different place and begin to function independently. One element stays with the corpse, posing a threat to the living. The other is reborn within the clan, and yet another one joins the community of ancestral spirits. Therefore, after death, a person can be worshipped with other ancestors, give us advice, and protect our family. He or she can also become a dangerous spirit guarding the bones of the deceased or be reborn as our son or daughter.

The anthropological model of a comprehensive personality explains the taboo related to visiting burial sites, even though people worship ancestors and believe in reincarnation. People do not worship their ancestors in graveyards but in sites devoted to ancestral worship. *Ongons* – ancestral spirits that take care of the family and provide vital energy, in return require regular attention, remembering and sacrifice. Neglected *ongons* can get angry and start tormenting their descendants. Male patrilineage members make ancestor offerings, but more significant rituals should be carried out by a shaman. He also performs rituals to appease the neglected spirits of their ancestors.

During postsocialist transformation, these practices became popular. The end of aggressive atheisation enabled shamans to return to the public sphere, which provided people with more access channels to their ancestors. At the same time, pauperisation, illness, alcoholism, and other ‘plagues’ accompanying this quite violent transformation were explained as the result of the wrath of ancestral spirits, who were often neglected in the communist period – no sacrifices were made to them, and many of them have been forgotten. Caroline Humphrey noted that shamanic practices stimulate a renewal of genealogical lines, relationships between members of kinship groups dispersed between the city and the province. Rituals of ancestors’ worship are also practices that situate the past in the patrilineal family’s structures. Shamans urge people to reconstruct the names of their ancestors and relatives, as well as to discover their family’s history (Humphrey 2002: 205–211). The genealogical lines and stories about ancestors provide a framework for collective memory and perception of the past. As in other kinship-oriented societies, an agnate who is not called forth in public gradually falls into oblivion and eventually disappears from genealogy (cf. Carsten 1995).

Through genealogical narratives and rituals, the community that creates its boundaries by kinship ties forms a usable past.

French historian François Hartog, inspired by the work of Marshall Sahlins, writes about various regimes of historicity. The term in his understanding denotes how specific cultures perceive, express, use, and deal with the past. Hartog noted that in traditional societies, the past is often depicted through myth. Due to the global hegemony of Western historiography, local regimes of historicity take on a political dimension and create alternative forms of representation of the past that undermine Western dominance (Hartog 2005: 8). Neil Whitehead wrote in a similar vein about 'indigenous historicities', emphasising their particular understanding of time, knowledge, and being that make the past meaningful (Whitehead 2003: xi). In Inner Asia, alternative regimes of historicity are used by post-Soviet ethnic minorities to process their political and cultural emancipation. Sahlins himself wrote about mythopraxis, which he defined as organisation of historical action as the projection of mythical relations (Sahlins 1985: 53). In this paper, I consider mythopraxis as one of the leading genres of native regimes of historicity.

The idiosyncratic character of Inner Asian native regimes of historicity is due to the fact that 'history-tellers' may not only include living people but also the spirits of the deceased. Ancestors demand respect and remembering from their descendants, causing illness and misfortune as a punishment. However, they can also communicate their will to the shaman, or may appear in a person's dreams and convey their wishes. They can also enter the shaman's body during the rite and speak with their voice to the gathered relatives. In Soviet times, some ancestors have not been spoken of for years and were forgotten not only due to the internal practices of genealogical selection, but passed into oblivion after having been repressed by the State. They must be remain the proverbial 'dust', because their remains had been previously buried in anonymous mass graves.

Shadows of forgotten ancestors

In May 2006, during a short-term visit to the Buryat villages of Khentei and Dornod provinces, my attention was caught by the meticulousness with which many people studied their genealogy. Many of them were writing details down in individual notebooks and drawing pedigree charts. At the time, I considered it to be another expression of traditionalism of the Buryat diaspora in Mongolia, which, in isolation, has preserved its native culture better than the community's ethnic core in Siberia. When an old Buryat man had been showing me a carefully completed family tree for two hours, I considered it to be primarily a revival of those elements of ethnic culture that did not enter the canon of socialist culture and were stigmatised as 'relics of feudalism' or 'superstition'. Admittedly, my interlocutors, when I asked about repressions, often told me that many Buryats

did not know their ancestors well because, under Choibalsan,⁷ most men were deported or shot and buried in unknown graves. However, I saw genealogy as an innocent form of memory organisation. I did not suspect the vital role it plays in overcoming socialist history and the trauma of political repression. Instead, I focused on the incredible proliferation of shamans in the region, especially in the Bayan Uul and Kharkhiraa in Dornod province. In almost every family, there was a man who had become a shaman. Even the son of the lama who hosted us during our stay was a shaman. In Kharkhiraa, on the famous shaman Tsedendamba's initiative, a whole centre was built with a shamanic and Buddhist temple and a complex wooden structure for the shamans' initiation. Every year, several dozen people participate in initiation rites called *šanar*. The number of shamans in the area is increasing because the spirits choose more and more people to be shamans. People's current problems are interpreted as a result of ignoring this calling, rejecting the shamanic gift (*udha, ug*). The long-term fieldwork by Manduhai Buyandelger revealed that shamanic boom is associated with both political transformation and the repression of the 1930s (Manduhai 2013).

The collapse of communism in Mongolia and chaotic privatisation have led to many rural and pastoral communities' rapid impoverishment. People began to live profoundly precarious lives, uncertain about their future in a free-market system. In towns like Bayan Uul in the Dornod province, Buryat communities were also uncertain of their past, as many men were exterminated in 1937-1939. On the one hand, the State pursued the policy of forgetting and erasing memories of repression from public spaces. On the other, fearing further repressions, the survivors were hiding their identity and often did not pass on their memories of repression to next generations. Shamans who could come out of hiding with the advent of democratisation, began to play a significant role in this uncertainty management.⁸ They blamed the angered spirits of ancestors for economic and existential failures that plagued communities during the transformation.

These spirits are divided into two categories: *ongon* – the spirits of ancestors who have not been fed nor have received sacrifices for years; and vampiric *üheer* – the spirits of people murdered during repressions and buried without rites that come to their descendants to hurt them. While an *ongon* is usually the spirit of a shaman or a mighty ancestor, anyone who has not passed through the appropriate funeral rites may become an *üheer*. Unlike ordinary ancestral spirits, *üheer* has no memory and no identity; it is unable to tell its story and cannot be appeased. It can be driven out for some time, with the help of a lama reciting Buddhist texts and prayers, but will return after some time. A person killed by the *üheer* becomes such a spirit. There is a shamanic ritual called *üheer haaah*, during which the spirit is lured into a leather bag and then left at a crossroads. Some try to confuse harmful spirits by moving to Ulaanbaatar, so that the spirits cannot find them. An innovative method is to change one's genealogy by

⁷ Khorloogiin Choibalsan (1985–1952) – Stalinist leader of Mongolia.

⁸ Since copying with uncertainty is one of the basic functions of shamans, it can be said that they have adapted their practices to new social conditions.

changing the data in the ID card and adopting the mother's patrilineage and her maiden name, following which the ghosts cease to be related to their victim, which makes access to the victims more difficult (Swancutt 2008: 846–860).⁹

Unfortunately, the spirit usually returns stronger and even more dangerous. The only sure way to get rid of an *ücheer* is to transform it into an *ongon* – a full-fledged ancestor spirit. To be able to perform the ritual shaman must first explain the story of such a spirit. To this end, the shaman conducts conversations and gathers memories, not only among the living but also among the ancestors' spirits, who, by sharing their experiences and remarks, allow to gradually reconstruct the past and reveal the identity of the *üheer* that has been haunting the family. By sacrificing rams to ancestral spirits, families receive memories and stories of the past in return. Spirits are not omniscient, but just like people they have their memories, their point of view and feelings (Manduhai 2013: 10–17).

Spirits, just like the people who are still alive, can only provide partial, subjective, and uncertain knowledge. Sometimes they lie and impersonate ancestors, so that people include them in their genealogy and make sacrifices to them (Swancutt 2008: 856). The reconstruction of genealogy is a meticulous, collective work involving the memory of the living and the spirits, through which people try to access the history that had been repressed and condemned to oblivion by the State. Spirits have sparked a growing interest in the family past, and the community's past, since the causes of present failures began to be seen as situated in the past, especially that related to repression and the period of oblivion. Stories told by spirits through the shaman's mouth create an interpretative framework for reconstructing the past and explaining the present. This process is very different from official historiography or public history generated by government institutions.

To pacify the ancestor's spirit it is necessary to identify it, place it in a precise genealogical order, as only then the shaman can make the sacrifices adequately. With the ongoing reconstruction of genealogy and family histories, ancestral spirits regain their identity and have the opportunity to share their experiences. The reconstruction of history begins with restoration of genealogy. Complementing the family tree involves revealing the identity of all ancestors, as well as finding a place where one can encounter the *ongon* and make offerings to it, determining the specific addresses of the spirit – *huudal buudal*, places where a person was born, died, was buried, as well as places where the spirit drinks water, plays, and strolls. Without these data, it is difficult for a shaman to come into direct contact with the spirit. Recalling ancestral spirits, their place in the genealogical structure, social position, and their biography is therefore combined with spatial practices, identification, and refuelling memories of the ancestral territories in which the ancestors lived and in which their spirits live. In the case of shaman spirits, one should also consider what title such spirits possess and which deity

⁹ This is similar to the practice I have observed in the field, where the spirit of the disease was transferred onto a dummy that is given the name and the clothes of the sick person, while the patient is now using a new name.

or mighty *Tengri* – the spirit of the celestial court (*Burhan Garval*) they serve. Their social status needs to be clarified. Without this, the ancestor's spirit is incomplete. The spirits regain their personality and can speak and tell a story through the shaman's mouth only when their descendants remember them, know their name, and offer them sacrifices. Before talking to the assembled people, the spirit, entering the shaman, demand that they introduce themselves, present their family identity, genealogy, place of origin, and the clan's battle-call. This is another level at which spirits stimulate the reconstruction of family stories (Manduhai 2013: 45–46).

The spirits of people murdered and buried without witnesses became forgotten ghosts. They have no identity and cannot speak, but they return, cause people to commit suicide, bring disease, death, insanity, alcoholism, and failure. Transforming a harmful *üheer* into an ancestral spirit requires its identification and knowledge of the cause, date and place of a person's death. Without finding the grave, which is often a site of mass execution, compelling metamorphosis, regaining subjectivity by the spirit is not possible (Manduhai 2013: 80–84). Therefore, spirits restore family and family memory and demand the disclosure of details, chronology, and toponymy of crimes committed by the State. *Ongons* are a spiritual form of family memory, while *üheers* illustrate total oblivion. Unable to enter a new reincarnation cycle or become an ancestor spirit, desperate and forgotten *üheers* demand attention; they want to restore their historicity and subjectivity. The transformation of *üheer* into *ongon* is a form of memory work (of both living and dead) and a form of reconstruction of history, achieved by explaining and locating the details of the crimes committed by the State eight decades ago.¹⁰

Local struggles with the communist past occur not only in cooperation with the spirits of ancestors. Many Inner Asian communities are trying to reassert temporal connections broken by Soviet modernisation, and while doing so, they seek assistance of posthuman persons.

The Altai princess

In 1993, on the Ukok plateau at the border between Mongolia and the Republic of Altai, an archaeological expedition from Novosibirsk dug up a burial mound, where they discovered a sarcophagus. Inside it, preserved in permafrost layer, rested the mummy of a young woman born 2500 years ago. The discovery sparked worldwide interest, and the mummy was transferred to Novosibirsk and later to the Moscow Science and Research Laboratory within the Museum of Lenin, where the body recovered from the ice was preserved using the method developed to preserve the corpse of the revolutionary leader.

¹⁰ A similar process of transformation (but achieved through Buddhist rituals) of anonymous bodies of mass execution victims into the ancestral guardian spirits was described by Anne Guillou in Cambodia (2014).

Shortly after discovering the burial site, the local population started referring to the recovered body as the Altai princess, the goddess – the foremother of all Altaians, and the White Lady (Alt. *Ak Kadyn*). Soon she became identified with *Ochi-Bala* – a heroine of an Altai epic who protects the entrance to the underworld, preventing evil entities from coming out onto the surface. Minor seismic tremors felt during the exhumation of the body were interpreted as a warning from the princess, whose peace has been disturbed. Altai shamans, consulting with Altai khans' spirits, announced that the princess demands to be once again placed in her grave and never again taken from the Altai. Violation of the princess' will was feared to cause terrible consequences. At the same time, there were protests, aiming to halt archaeological works in the region. In 1998, the authorities decided to prohibit excavations throughout the Altai Republic for ten years (Halemba 2008: 284–295).

All the while, the princess's body, despite the Altaians' demands, was studied at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk. In 2003, a strong earthquake occurred in the Altai Republic, which was interpreted as a sign of the princess's anger. Nearly two thousand buildings were destroyed, and the village of Beltir was levelled completely. The earthquake was felt within a 1000 km radius from its epicentre and reached as far as Novosibirsk. The documentary film by Aliona Zharovska *Revenge of the Altai princess* (2006) presented the position of opponents of the archaeological excavations. Altaians were appalled by the fact that archaeologists thawed the permafrost in the tomb using boiling water. Koke Talkybaeva lamented: 'When I think about them pouring hot water on her, I am unable to calm down for the entire night. She was crying so much, and no one could help her in that terrible moment.' Rumours have it that the hot water destroyed the princess's beautiful face. Local historian Akai Kynyiev stated the following:

Let the archaeologists dig up their mothers and bring them here – place them on a table before me. Then I will say – okay, now go and dig (...) If we were savages not caring for history and not familiar with our ancestors, we would have dug up these kurgans long ago, extracted the gold, and melted it. However, we have not done so, and we protect those kurgans. Our shamans have foretold that if this burial site is not restored to its original state, there will be natural disasters, cataclysms in Altai, and these cataclysms will spread all over the Earth.

Shaman Kurtunak Unutov added to the historians' words: 'These misfortunes in Altai will never end, and it will only get worse. It is necessary to see the princess return as quickly as possible.' The elderly Klavdia Samtakova stated: 'They took that girl away to Novosibirsk – they study her, show her to the whole world – naked! This is why the spirit of the princess is so outraged.' In the opinion of certain Altaians, the signs of the princess's wrath could be felt nationwide. Several days after her removal from the kurgan, a coup d'état occurred in Moscow, and after the first public exhibition of the Ak Kadyn's body, the war in Chechnya began.

The film was harshly criticized by the Novosibirsk archaeologists, who considered the Altaians' claims to be ridiculous. In their opinion, anthropological and genetic studies have shown that the mummy in the kurgan, characteristic of the Pazyryk culture, is representative of the European race and in no way can be considered an ancestor to the Altaians – representatives of the Mongoloid race. Additionally, it is impossible to deem her a princess – judging by the grave's furnishings, the woman belonged to a slightly lower social class. Archaeologists pointed out that during Soviet times they have dug up many mummies, and no one ever interfered (Kazarina, Voroncov 2007).

As a result of the Altai people's mass protests in 2014, a new wing of the museum was built in the Altai Republic's capital, and the sarcophagus with princess Ak Kadyn's mummy was transported to Gorno-Altaysk. This compromise did not satisfy everyone. The shamans continued to demand that the princess should be returned to the tomb on the Ukok plateau. Following the flood in 2014, the Altai Council of Elders decided to bury the princess once again. However, the museum refused to release her 'biological remains', because legally, they belonged to the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk, and the decision to re-bury the remains was the sole discretion of the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation.

Between 2012–2014, shamans performed offering rituals for Ak Kadyn on the Ukok Plateau and in the museum, asking the princess to calm down and prevent more disasters. Shaman Klara Kypchakova contacts the princess through dreams and relates messages from her. She has warned that if her body is not buried again, global disasters will begin in 2014. During the rituals, Ak Kadyn also speaks through shamans' mouths – she gives people two years to restore her body to the Ukok Plateau's grave. The current War in Ukraine and the economic sanctions against Russia were also interpreted as signs of Ak Kadyn's anger (Doronin 2016: 78–79). In 2015, a determined shaman and president of the Spiritual Centre of Turks, Akai Kine, filed a lawsuit against the museum, demanding the burial of the princess Ak Kadyn, sacred to the Altaians. The court dismissed the case, which was then appealed (Belov 2016).

After returning to Altai, the princess began to inform the shamans about her biography and detailed stories of the wars led by the Altai people. Princess can be asked questions. The auxiliary spirits of some shamans also provided additional explanations and information about the princess's life, her army, and the history of the Altaians. Then, the shamans met and reconstructed the past by exchanging these narratives. The princess's messages, supreme deity Altai Kudai and origin spirits transmitted during shamanic trances are recorded by special scribes (alt. *bičikči*) and distributed on the Internet (Doronin 2016: 85–88). In this way, the Altaians' shamanic history, an alternative to conventional historiography, has been created.

The two forms of the understanding of history and heritage, represented by Russian archaeologists and native activists are highlighted by the dispute about the ownership of the past, i.e. who has the right to give it meaning, and make

decisions concerning archaeological artefacts. We are dealing here with competing ideas on the status of archaeological findings as (1) the world cultural heritage of humanity, (2) national heritage (3) the heritage of an ethnic group (cf. Gillman 2010: 141–195). It is noteworthy that similar types of conflicts regarding archaeological findings and funerary equipment have been taking place for years between Native American organisations and government institutions in the USA (Vincent 2005: 33–44). It is significant, in this particular case, that the Russian archaeologists persistently deny the Altai people's right to decide the fate of burial sites found on their territory. They recognise the right to heritage only within limits set by scientific knowledge. Opposing the Altai claims, the archaeologists have attempted to protect the privileged status and the authority of their discipline, which archaeology enjoyed during the Soviet period (Reeves, Plets 2015: 210–211). Undermining the archaeologists' authority may be considered an attempt to decolonise the practice of archaeology, which throughout the decades have used archaeological findings to objectify the Altaians in a series of ethnogenetic reconstructions, often denying them the right to connect and identify with 'genetically diverse' archaeological cultures (Konstantinov et al. 2013: 81–91). Employing stories told by ancestral spirits and guardian spirits of places, including the embodied spirit of Ak Kadyr, ethno-national activists incorporate ancient Scythian culture into the national Altai history, thereby strengthening the political position of the Altaians as long-term inhabitants of the region. It is highly possible that, in the primary interpretive framework, the Altai people had opposed the excavations out of fear of spirits' anger, but then the Altai politicians transposed these concerns into the secondary framework – the dispute over the past and rights to the land.

Marshal Sahlins would surely call the actions of Altai activists 'mythopraxis', i.e. the introduction of myth into social practice (Sahlins 1985: 54–72). Mythopraxis opposes the Russian historical narrative's hegemony and helps the Altaians regain their subjectivity, situate themselves in history, and rebuild their ethno-national identity. The mythical practice also undermines the linear irreversibility of time, in which archaeological relics and human remains, become passive tropes of the past. Due to the animistic relation with the agency of the 'necropersona,' the Altaians create their own, non-modern history, which certainly should be considered as a decolonising practice (cf. Domańska 2017a: 53–63). The mummy, identified with the personage from the Altai mythology, has become a nodal point that shapes alternative representations of the past and the future. Altaians have nationalised the mummy, thereby creating their heritage concept as a subjective entity imbued with great power, which should remain *in situ*. It is used to negotiated identity, values, and the group's place in society. The agentive dead body becomes the subject of Altai necropolicy, in the process of which the Altaians themselves strengthen their political subjectivity.¹¹

¹¹ Similar forms of mythical practices are characteristic of post-colonial relations and contain within them a significant emancipative potential (cf. Przytomka 2015).

For the Altaians, the princess is not only a source of agency. The mummy also has agency itself and, even though dead, is alive and functions as an active agent of the public past and present. The animistic vocabulary was introduced into the public discourse and became an inherent part of local nationalism. For their part, the shamans have adapted an environmentalist vocabulary to make their point in public. In mid-April 2020, the Altai Republic remained the only region of the Russian Federation in which COVID-19 infection case had not yet been identified. One of the members of the republican parliament Erzhanat Begenov announced in the media that Altai is under the protection of the princess from the Ukok plateau (Pavlova 2020). At the same time, the shamans from the White Faith movement began mediation with the spirit of the disease, trying to negotiate the terms of saving the Altai population and all humanity.¹² One of the shamans told anthropologist Dimitri Doronin that “the forests are the lungs of the planet, and since man has cut down many forests in recent years, nature gives a sign to change his mind and punishes him the same because the virus infects the human lungs” (Doronin 2020).

The ‘corpse of contention’ in this story has an ambivalent character. On the one hand, traditionally, Altaians hold a shared belief in the danger of corpses and burial sites because of their claim that *uzut* – one of the dead person’s souls could transform into *kara neme* – a vampiric predator that can devour human vital force – *qut, süne* (Baskakov 1973: 108–113). On the other hand, the spirits of shamans, khans, and powerful ancestors support families’ life force and help living descendants who remember them and make offerings. Initially, the Altaians have been opposing the excavations because they created a threat from angry spirits. Identifying the mummy with the mythical figure of *Ochi-Bala*, which protects the sealed gates to the underworld, has raised new fears – hence the demand that the princess be returned to her tomb. The material body of a person belonging to mythology serves as the proof of the visions of the past created by shamans and spirits. The princess herself became an active narrator of the past, a vital co-creator of the native regime of historicity. As a result, the mythical figures were identified with the ancient Scythians, the Altaians gained the necessary historical depth, and archaeologists were banned from conducting excavations – they lost their monopoly on shaping local history and the right to disturb spirits. The Altaians appropriated selected elements of archaeological knowledge and incorporated them into their mythopraxis. The posthuman actant agency could be considered a distinctive feature of shamanism, were it not for the fact that another powerful necropersona in Inner Asia is a Buddhist monk.

¹² White Faith (alt. *Ak Janj*) – a syncretic religious movement which absorbed elements of Buddhism and shamanism, that emerged in the first decades of the twentieth century. It had a clearly millenarian and anti-colonial character. The leaders of the movement promoted unification of all Siberian Turks (Halemba 2006: 28–32).

The undead lama

In 2002, a Buddhist monk, whose body remained hidden for 75 years, was discovered in Buryatia. It is the most peculiar and indeed the most inspiring display of spiritual treasure found in many years. According to the official biography, in June 1927, the former Khambo-lama – leader of the Buryat Buddhists, gathered his disciples, sat in a lotus position, and declared that he would soon die. He ordered them to bury his body in a meditative position and promised that he would return in 75 years time, after which he immersed himself in meditation and ceased to breathe. His body was buried in a wooden chest in a remote place. After the war, in 1955 and 1973, subsequent Khambo-lamas would in secret uncover the sarcophagus containing the body of their predecessor and change his robes, perform rituals, and bury it again. In 2002 Khambo-lama Damba Ayusheyev found the body of lama Dashi-Dorzho Itigilov and moved it with honours to the central Ivolginsky monastery. In 2008, a special temple was built for the body, where followers may worship it during the main Buddhist holidays. According to Ayusheyev, Itigilov is still alive and is in a state of deep meditation, which is evidence of his high spiritual development. The Khambo-lama calls the undead body ‘the spiritual heritage of Buryats and evidence of the endurance of Buddhism and the Buryat culture (Jawłowski 2015: 187).

In July 2013, I had the opportunity to take part in the rites of bowing to the body during the holiday of Buddha Maitreya. Thousands of Buryats and hundreds of visitors from Russia and abroad waited for hours in the burning sun to stand for a few seconds in front of the undead body sat upon the throne. They were performing prostrations, whisper wishes and prayers. Many of them came to see with their own eyes if the body really looked as if it were alive. Since that time, the undead body has become even more popular. It has become the subject of several documentary films, scientific examinations of tissue samples have been performed, Vladimir Putin has had a face-to-face conversation with the body, and President Medvedev bowed to it. The image of the immortal Itigilov can be seen on most kitchen fridges and home altars in Buryatia. In October 2016, the *Burjaad Ünen* (Buryat Truth) newspaper reported that cameras inside the temple have registered the body moving during night hours (Alsuev 2016). During a videoconference, Khambo-lama Ayusheyev announced:

I was astonished by these images – even though somewhere deep within my spirit I allowed for such a possibility, I was nevertheless not prepared for it (...) One of the great teachers from India, Lharamba lama foretold, that Itigilov would arise from a resting place when the time comes for the arrival of a new Buddha – Maitreya (Ân 2016).

The return of lama Itigilov was connected with prior discoveries of Buddhist artefacts, such as statuettes of Buddhas from the Anin Monastery. The findings began to be interpreted as the result of the will of Itigilov, who has chosen this way to communicate to the Buryats that the time of rebirth for Buddhist

traditions has come. The undead body symbolises the endurance of Buryat spirituality and demonstrates exceptional agency. As a 'living heritage,' it gives advice and warns the inhabitants of Eastern Siberia. It communicates with them through dreams, findings, and recordings from CCTV cameras. In 2005, the newspaper "Moscow Komsomolets in Buryatia" attributed several extraordinary events to the undead lama, such as the miraculous rescue of Anatoly Chubais in an unsuccessful assassination attempt or the nomination of the ethnic Buryat – Yuri Yekhanurov for the post of the prime minister of Ukraine (Amogolonova 2012: 68).

Posthumously meditating lama is not an isolated case in Tibetan-Mongolian Buddhism. It is believed that highly realised yogis can control their body's energies during the dying process and experience 'transparent light,' rest in 'naked awareness' while maintaining consciousness in the heart centre. It is widely thought that the so-called *tukdam* meditation can be continued after death (Nydhal 2012: 193–212). Anya Bernstein pointed out that Itigilov's return fits into another tradition – finding Buddhist deposits, that had been hidden by ancient masters to save them from destruction (Bernstein 2013: 95–100). Tradition holds that the Indian master Padmasambhava, anticipating persecutions of Buddhists by the Tibetan king Lang Darma, hid some texts and relics. When the persecution ended in the twelfth century and people again turned to the teachings of the Buddha, these 'hidden treasures' (Tib. *terma*) began to be found by reincarnations of twenty-five main students of Master Padmasambhava, the so-called treasure explorers – *terton*. Finding treasures has become a way to legitimise innovation and renewal of the continuity of Buddhist teachings transmission (Androsov 2011: 358–359).

Consequently, the trauma of religious persecution and rupture with tradition is embedded in the Buddhist regime of historicity, which acquires new meanings. Bolshevik persecutions have been included in the cyclic structure of Buddha's teachings' disappearance and rebirth. By finding the incorruptible body of Itigilov, Stalinist repressions become a repetition of Buddhism's persecution initiated by the Tibetan king Langdarma in the 9th century, and the Buddhist transmission hidden during the persecution appears as soon as the adverse circumstances cease. The undead lama restores continuity to the broken bonds of history.

Similarly to the Altai princess, the undead body of Khambo-lama Itigilov has been extracted from the depths of the Earth shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union – during the liminal period which saw the lively renegotiation of a new social order and inter-ethnic relations, as well as the relations between the titular minority and the State. The Buddhist necropersona has no less agency than the shamanic one from Altai. Itigilov and Ak Kadyn perform similar social functions: they integrate and mobilise indigenous groups around the native notion of the past. The undead chthonic bodies have become powerful symbols of the vitality and authenticity of native cultures; they have made it possible to reinterpret identity and ethnicity, to step beyond the rigid framework of Soviet historiography. At the same time, the 'ancestors' excavated

from the ground have confirmed the right to land, pointing to pre-Soviet heritage, thereby becoming keystones of history, making it possible to overcome the postsocialist identity crisis.

Conclusions

During the Soviet modernisation, animist practices were marginalised and forced out of the public sphere. There was a hierarchy of knowledge in which academic cognition was strictly separated from 'religious superstition.' Since 1990, Soviet historiography has been criticised for being over-ideologised. Ethno-national historiographies have come to change this outdated paradigm, responding to the demand for new axes of social identity and new instruments of institution-building. Alongside the simultaneous proliferation of the so-called ethnic revivals and new paradigms in the humanities, i.e., subaltern studies or memory studies, the idea of historical truth has been replaced by social – including historical – justice. The Western regime of historicity has lost its privileged position and is now often included in local, hybrid, postmodern, and post-secular representations of the past. Alternatively to post-Soviet historiography and public history produced under the government's gaze, there are emerging native regimes of historicity.

In Inner Asia, we can observe the phenomenon of animistic intrusion upon modern institutions, i.e., museums, heritage, history, archaeology. Posthuman agents have been involved in mythopraxis, through which native regimes of historicity are established. The cases discussed in this paper represent three types of relationships between conventional historiography and animism: (1) a separate alternative to the official history that emerges when people work with shamans to reconstruct the past and regain the subjectivity of their murdered ancestors, (2) confrontation and appropriation when Altaians expel archaeologists, take the mummy from them and incorporate her into their mythology, (3) reframing, when history is inscribed in the Buddhist cyclical continuum that stretches back to the ninth century Tibet. All three can be considered manifestations of epistemic disobedience that calls into question the foundation of hegemonic Western historiography and creates an opportunity to empower local knowledge and native political interests (Mignolo as cited in Domańska 2017b: 45–48). Together with people who consider themselves their descendants, nonhuman actants pose a growing challenge for professional historians and institutions that implement State politics of memory.

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SUMMARY

Post-socialist animism: personhood, necro-personas and public past in Inner Asia

This paper investigates the relationship between animism and public past in post-socialist Inner Asia. The analysis was based on *three case studies* highlighting key features of the relationship between local conceptions of personhood, non-human agency, and their role in structuring native visions of the past: (1) negotiations between families and the spirits of their ancestors – victims of communist purges in Mongolia, (2) a powerful necro-persona that allows local communities to gain political subjectivity and undermine conventional post-Soviet historical narratives, and (3) the return of the undead lama Itgilov that caused Buddhist revival in Buryatia. Posthuman agents have been involved in mythopraxis, through which native regimes of historicity are established.

Keywords: personhood, animism, necro-persona, mythopraxis, public past, Inner Asia

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A brief history of Amazonian research in Polish anthropology¹

We can distinguish four distinct periods in the history of Polish anthropological (ethnological) studies of the Amazonian indigenous groups.

The first was the time of aficionados – several amateur researchers who focused on the Amazon area in the period spanning the end of the colonization era to the full-blown modernity (i.e. the 17th century up to the end of the world wars that marked the 20th century). During this long stretch of time Poles journeyed to the lowland South American areas in the Amazonian basin – most often they were military men, naturalists, engineers, quite often political immigrants, who apart from their professional endeavors were also involved in amateur observation and description of indigenous groups they met there (this was the case of e.g. Krzysztof Arciszewski, Jan Sztolcman, Tadeusz Chrostowski). Their letters, reports, journals and the very first collections of cultural artefacts they created can hardly amount to sound research data – they were indeed aficionados and not scientists. Such practices continued well after Poland regained its independence in 1918. In the interwar period (i.e. 1919–1939), the new scientific discipline called Ethnology was cultivated in five institutional centres, but in this initial period, these focused on peasant, national and ethnic cultures in Poland and in Europe. Polish researchers focusing on areas outside Europe were limited to very few scholars whose scientific careers developed outside Poland (e.g. Bronisław Malinowski, Maria A. Czaplicka). The indigenous groups inhabiting Amazonia were

¹ This text is based on excerpts from the research article: Buliński, T., Kairski, M. (2017). Polskie badania antropologiczne w Amazonii. *Etnografia. Praktyki, Teorie, Doświadczenia*, 3: 7–17.

then the topic to be explored by travel writers and not by Polish anthropology departments as such.

The second period (1945–1981) marked the beginning of Polish ethnological studies of Amazonia. These were first individual research projects carried out by individual scholars. Anna Kowalska-Lewicka turned out to be the trailblazer in this field, as during her 1947–1948 trip across South America she became the first Polish scholar to conduct short-term field research among the indigenous inhabitants of the Ucayali basin (mainly Shipibo). Along with the accompanying literature review, her study resulted in the first Polish PhD dissertation related to the Amazonian ethnology (Kowalska-Lewicka 1950). However, its anecdotal nature and the fact that the author later discontinued her research work on the Americas, limited its impact on the development on Amazonian studies within the Polish anthropology.

The scholar who made the most impactful contribution to the field was Borys Malkin, an anthropologist and entomologist, photographer, film maker and the collector of exhibits for museums in Poland and abroad. Educated within the American anthropological tradition under the supervision of Alfred L. Kroeber and Robert Lowie, he spent his entire professional career making research trips through which he explored the Amazon basin area. The main objective of those expeditions was to procure collections of indigenous material culture artefacts, entomological and herpetological exhibits, as well as to make descriptive, photographic and film records of the specific indigenous ways of life. In the period spanning 1957–1994, he managed to study 42 indigenous groups in South America and Mesoamerica, most of which, however, were the inhabitants of Amazonia. He often visited the same groups on several occasions, tracing material and social transformations over time. The collections he created, and their meticulous documentation are both absolutely unique in Poland, and outstanding internationally. They include nearly seventeen thousand objects representing material culture, c. forty thousand photographs and twenty-two documentaries (his naturalist collections comprise about one million specimens). Artefacts procured by Malkin are kept in forty museums around the world, with the biggest collections held by the Glenbow Museum in Calgary (Canada) and Museum der Kulturen in Basel (Switzerland). His contribution also consisted in shaping the first generation of Polish Amazonianist scholars by teaching them practical fieldwork skills, the principles of professional ethnological research documentation and artefact collections.

Malkin's contribution was essential for creating a template for fieldwork practice, but the theoretical framework for such research was developed by another figure – Aleksander Posern-Zieliński, an anthropologist and co-founder of the new turn of Polish Latin American studies in the 1970s (it involved an interdisciplinary group of scholars interested in the history and current issues related to indigenous groups inhabiting South America and the Latin America's state societies, see Buliński, Kairski 2013–2014). The turn, which was inspired, among others, by the work of Maria Rostworowska (María Rostworowski Tovar de Diez Canseco) and Maria Frankowska, brought about new conceptualizations of pre-Columbian

cultures (Jan Szemiński, Mariusz Ziółkowski), as well as colonial and contemporary indigenous social movements (Aleksander Posern-Zieliński, Ryszard Tomicki). It also provided a powerful impulse for the development of archeological, anthropological, political and geographical studies of the New World (for the review of specific individual contributions and topics see: Buliński, Kairski, Ziółkowski 2013–2014). However, Latin American studies focused mainly on the indigenous peasant societies inhabiting the areas that used to be part of pre-Hispanic empires, overlooking the lowland areas of South America. Early studies by Posern-Zieliński, exploring indigenous social and religious movements in the period spanning the 16th to 20th centuries were an exception – one third of his PhD dissertation was based on these studies and addressed the transformations experienced by the Amazonian peoples in Ecuador, Peru and Brazil (Posern-Zieliński 1973; when published as a monograph, the study did not include most of his Amazon-related material). It was his analysis (see e.g. Posern-Zieliński 1978, 1980) that became the key reference for the first generation of Polish anthropologists working in Amazonia, providing them with the model for establishing the theoretical framework enabling the analysis of their ethnographic and historical data.

The third period was marked by field expeditions to Amazonia (1981–1999) by the young ethnologists inspired by Aleksander Posern-Zieliński and Borys Malkin, most of whom were students at the Ethnology Department of the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. In organizing anthropological fieldtrips to work with the indigenous groups in Amazonia these graduate students followed the model of field research developed in the 1970s and 1980s, that was then standard in Poland, i.e. research conducted by groups of researchers, spanning several months and preceded by long-term review of available scientific literature, as well as practical logistic and financial preparations. The first such expedition of Polish graduate ethnologists, under the code-name “Amped 81”, was organized to the Venezuelan and Colombian Amazon in 1981 and included ethnologists (Mariusz Kairski, Janusz Jaskulski, Jerzy Stankiewicz, Marlena Antczak and Andrzej Antczak), the interpreter Iwona Stoińska-Kairska and the camera operator Cezary Jaworski. Out of this first expedition there emerged a research group led by Mariusz Kairski and Iwona Stoińska-Kairska, later joined by Marek Wołodźka (Kinga Nemere and Magdalena Krysińska-Kałużna also joined one of their expeditions). Until 1999, the group had completed numerous ethnological field expeditions to Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador.

Their fieldwork mostly focused on the E'ñepá (Panare) in the Venezuelan Amazonia (7 fieldtrips over the period 1981–1999), but they were also involved in comparative studies or the so-called urgent ethnology research among the Cofán in Colombia and Waorani in Ecuador. Their research findings were presented in Master dissertations (unpublished: Stankiewicz 1983; Kairski 1985; Jaskulski 1985), research reports commissioned by the *Centro para la Investigación y el Desarrollo de los Movimientos Sociales del Ecuador* in Quito (Kairski, Stoińska 1984, 1995; Kairski 1996) and as a series of museum collections. Their key focus was issues related to cultural ecology, contemporary cultural status of specific indigenous

groups (E'ñepá, Waorani, Cofán) and a general overview of the anthropological knowledge related to the indigenous inhabitants of South America and Mesoamerica (Kairski 1998a, 1998b). As a natural consequence, these expeditions sparked the development of research scholarships funded by Polish or international funding bodies (UCV, Caracas, CEDIME, Quito, AIDSESP, Lima). It should perhaps be mentioned that the core members of the original research group continued their research activities in the area for over two decades. In that period, Mariusz Kairski (2008–2009, 2018) and Iwona Stoińska-Kairska, focused on ethnohistory, identity, the concepts of time and space and the language of the E'ñepá in Venezuela, while Marek Wołodźko made research trips to the Bora in Peru (2009–2017). This circle of scholars constituted the first generation of the Polish anthropologists specializing in Amazonia.

The fourth period (2000–2019) has been characterized by numerous field research projects by individual scholars or small research groups, mostly involving relatively short-term, multiple visits to the field, usually spanning several months, but also included some long-term research projects involving fieldwork lasting over a year and a half. Most of the researchers belonging to this cohort have background in ethnology, having graduated from the University in Poznań, under the watchful eye of Aleksander Posern-Zieliński and Mariusz Kairski. However, among these fieldworkers there have also been scholars from Łódź, Cracow and Gdańsk. Overall, this group of eleven anthropologists constitute the second generation of Polish Amazonianists.

The first member of that cohort is Tarzycjusz Buliński, who together with Mariusz Kairski conducted research among the E'ñepá in Venezuela (2001–2009). His work focuses on the status and role of school in the life of indigenous communities, and in particular on the way in which school is included in the indigenous processes of social reproduction (Buliński, Kairski 2007; Buliński 2010–2011, 2017, 2019). Another Amazonianist scholar from this group is Kacper Świerk, who has worked among the Matsigenka of the Urubamba basin (2001–2003, 2019) and the Wampis (Huambisa) inhabiting the Santiago and Morona basin (2004–2011). His work focuses on ethnozoology and cultural transformation resulting from the involvement of the indigenous group with the wider state society, and in particular on the relationship between specific sectors of the indigenous society that have for generations been involved in the non-indigenous world and the sectors that have been minimally involved or are currently uninvolved in it (Świerk 2007a, 2013–2014, 2020). The third important member of the Amazonianist cohort is Filip Rogalski, who has conducted research among the Arabela in Peru (2003–2009), focusing on the indigenous concept of agency manifested in both physical and symbolic action, especially involving agency-related stories and the forms in which it agency is being expressed (Rogalski 2016; Rogalski at al. 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). The fourth scholar is Marta Krokoszyńska, who has conducted research in the lower Ucayali river area (2005–2018). Her research interests initially involved isolated groups and the history of ethnonyms in that region, and later developed into long-term ethnographic research among the descendants

of the Capanahua inhabiting the Tapiche river area, focusing on the perception of cultural change in the context of local theories of kinship. She then conducted research on the local conceptualization of modernity in the mestizo city of Requena and the historical study of the Polish colony located on the Ucayali (Krokoszyńska 2008, 2015, 2019; Krokoszyńska, Fleck 2016). The group also includes Paweł Chyc, who has worked in Bolivia among the Moré inhabiting the banks of the Guaporé river (2008–2019). His research focuses on the process of cultural change resulting from big and small-scale government projects which in the past were to assimilate indigenous peoples within the wider state society, and which now affirm and promote indigenous culture in its own terms and in line with indigenous people's aspirations.

The Ethnology department in Poznań was also the *alma mater* of two other scholars who used to do their fieldwork in Amazonia, but later discontinued their scientific career or changed their research interests – Alicja Pasek (1999, 2008) and Ewa Prądkyńska, who worked among the Yabarana and the Pemón in Venezuela, and Cofán in Ecuador focusing on funerary practices and conceptualization of death among the people belonging to the Caribbean language family, as well as Magdalena Ziółkowska-Kuflińska (1999), who researched the status and role of women among the the Chácobo of Bolivia.

We should also mention the Amazonianist anthropologists Monika Kujawska and Joanna Sosnowska, who for years have been working in the Tambo river area in Peru, conducting comparative research focusing on ethnobotanics and ethno-ecology of the Asháninka and the local peasant population representing the wider Peruvian society (Sosnowska, Kujawska 2014; Sosnowska et al. 2015; Kujawska 2019; Kujawska et al. 2019). The last (but certainly not least) member of the group is Aleksandra Wierucka, the scholar focusing on the Ecuadorian Huaorani and the Napo Quichua. Her research interest include identity, ethno-history and the strategies of inclusion in the non-indigenous world adopted by these groups (Wierucka 2012, 2013–2014, 2015, 2018).

The work by the second generation Polish Amazonianist scholars can be characterized by describing it three distinct aspects. First, they seem to represent a coherent theoretical perspective and research orientation. Most focus on the indigenous identity practices and social reproduction, using the insights developed within the Amazonian Studies worldwide (by scholars such as Philippe Descola, Anne-Christine Taylor, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Peter Gow, Carlos Fausto, Aparecida Vilaça and others). Their research was presented as habilitation theses (e.g. Buliński 2018), PhD dissertations (Ziółkowska-Kuflińska 2005; Świerk 2007b; Krysińska-Kałużna 2008; Pasek-Smith 2008; Rogalski 2015), including one supervised by Professor Peter Gow at the University of St Andrews (Krokoszyńska 2016).

Secondly, an important aspect of their research work is its urgent anthropology dimension, related to the determination and recognition of indigenous land rights (in many cases for groups isolating from the national society). Second-generation Polish Amazonianists have been actively involved in this work, creating a series

of reports, e.g. based on the research conducted in the Yavari Mirím river area (Chyc et al. 2009), Sierra del Divisor (Krokoszyńska et al. 2006–2007), the Kampankis mountains (Rogalski et al. 2005), the Arabela and Aushiri rivers (Rogalski, Wołodźko 2003; Krokoszyńska et al. 2009), in the Paquiría river basin (Świerk 2001a, 2002, 2004) – all of which are located in eastern Peru.

Thirdly, these scholars have also been involved in translating Amazonia-related research into Polish, the effort due to which, over the last two decades, Polish readers could become acquainted with many major works in this field. One of the significant translation projects was an anthology of the key texts related to the phenomenon of warfare among indigenous Amazonian groups (Buliński, Kairski 2006) – the volume includes translations of text by David Gross (2006), Marvin Harris (2006), Napoleon Chagnon (2006), Brian Ferguson (2006), Neil Whitehead (2006), Joanna Overing (2006), Phillipe Descola (2006), Anne-Christine Taylor (2006), Carlos Fausto (2006) and Aparecida Vilaça (2006). Relevant Polish-language translations also include work by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2000, 2013, 2017) and research reports on the isolated indigenous groups (Michael 2001, 2002).

Today, as we celebrate the 40th anniversary of the first graduate ethnological field trip to Amazonia, we can conclude that Polish anthropological research focusing on Amazonia is a dynamically developing field capable of making a contribution to the Amazonian Studies worldwide.

Transl. Katarzyna Byłtów

AMAZONIAN RESEARCH IN POLISH ANTHROPOLOGY (IN ENGLISH AND SPANISH)

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SUMMARY

A brief history of Amazonian research in Polish anthropology

In this short article we describe the history of Polish anthropological research in Amazonia, comprising four distinct periods: 1) the work of Polish Amazonia aficionados, 2) the trailblazers, 3) the first generation of Amazonianist scholars, and 4) the research conducted by the second-generation Polish Amazonianists. The text also includes an exhaustive list of research publications, dissertations and translations by Polish scholars belonging to that group.

Keywords: Amazonian research, Polish anthropology, history of anthropology

ARTICLES

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Jedzenie regionalne, lokalne czy „swoje” – tożsamościowy wymiar praktyk jedzeniowych na Podlasiu

W artykule¹ stawiam pytanie o związek jedzenia oraz praktyk jedzeniowych z tożsamością podlaskich mieszkańców wsi. W podejściu teoretycznym moje rozważania wpisują się w subdyscyplinę antropologii jedzenia, która zakłada namysł nad społecznymi i kulturowymi aspektami konsumpcji i produkcji jedzenia. W szczególności podążać będę śladami Marshalla Sahlinsa, który w ten sposób pisał o więziotwórczej roli jedzenia:

Jedzenie jest życiodajne, nieodzowne i zwyczajowo symbolizujące domowe ognisko, dom, a nawet matkę. W porównaniu z innymi materiałami jedzenie dzielone jest najchętniej i najłatwiej (...), wymiana jedzenia jest czułym barometrem relacji społecznych – jedzenie można więc wykorzystywać przedmiotowo, by nawiązać, podtrzymać bądź zaburzyć relacje (Sahlins 1972: 215–216, tu i dalej tłumaczenie własne).

¹ Tekst ten opiera się na badaniach prowadzonych przeze mnie na Podlasiu w latach 2010–2016. Metodą badań była obserwacja uczestnicząca (Clifford 2000: 42) i półstrukturyzowane wywiady prowadzone w społecznościach lokalnych na terenie Dąbrowy Białostockiej i okolicznych wsi, wśród ludności katolickiej i prawosławnej. Przytaczane w artykule cytaty pochodzą z wywiadów przeprowadzonych przeze mnie w ramach projektu NCN 172028 „Kulturowe i społeczne aspekty konsumpcji i produkcji żywności w społecznościach lokalnych w świetle najnowszych zmian geopolitycznych. Monografia etnograficzna okolic Dąbrowy Białostockiej” oraz z wywiadów nagranych przez prowadzoną przeze mnie studencką grupę badawczą w ramach zajęć Laboratorium etnograficzne „Kulturowe aspekty konsumpcji i produkcji jedzenia. Etnografia okolic Dąbrowy Białostockiej”, finansowanego przez Instytut Etnologii i Antropologii Kulturowej Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego.

Z kolei praktyki jedzeniowe rozumiem poprzez pojęcie *foodways*, które w szerokim znaczeniu odnosi się do relacji pomiędzy zachowaniami i czynnościami związanymi z jedzeniem oraz sposobami uczestnictwa w danej wspólnotcie. Jak pisał Charles Camp: „W najbardziej ogólnym znaczeniu *foodways* odnosi się do systemu wiedzy i ekspresji związanego z jedzeniem, takiego, który jest specyficzny dla danej kultury” (Camp 2003: 29). W odpowiedzi na pytanie o związek jedzenia i tożsamości, w szczególności tej dotyczącej poczucia zakorzenienia i więzi z miejscem, kluczowe będą także takie kategorie jak: „lokalny”, „regionalny”, „tutejszy”, „swój”. W literaturze przedmiotu są one często łączone z pojęciami tożsamości regionalnej, tożsamości lokalnej czy swojskiej (por. np. Waszczyńska 2014). Celowo nie posługuję się tymi rozróżnieniami. W artykule pragnę pokazać, po pierwsze, że takie poziomy tożsamości przeplatają się ze sobą. Po drugie, twierdę, że tożsamość ma dyskursywno-performatywny charakter, a jej podstawową cechą, łączącą wszystkie poziomy, jest szczególna relacja z miejscem, właściwa dla osób związanych z rolnictwem, których praca, życie i jedzenie wpisane jest w pewną przestrzeń.

By zrozumieć tak tworzącą się tożsamość, proponuję pojęcie *terroir*, które pierwotnie odnosiło się do związków przestrzeni, środowiska, gdzie warunki geograficzne wpływają na specyficzny smak lokalnych produktów (oryginalnie wina i serów). Termin ten jest ugruntowany w wielu naukach społecznych, w tym antropologii, a jego definicja ewoluowała, by obecnie „łączyć ze sobą aktorów, ich historie, formy społecznego organizowania się, a co najważniejsze ich praktyki rolnicze” (Bérard, Marchenay 2005; cyt. za Demosier 2011: 686). Tym samym więc *terroir* jest pewnym powiązaniem ludzi, przestrzeni, przyrody ożywionej i nieożywionej w taki sposób, by wytworzyć specyficzny dla danego miejsca smak. *Terroir* można więc rozumieć jako smak, który nadany jest jedzeniu poprzez właściwości gleby, warunki pogodowe, ale też specyficzne techniki pracy człowieka czy zwierząt. I właśnie taka wspólnota smaku wynikająca z lokalności jest, co pragnę pokazać w tym tekście, podstawą tożsamości *terroir*.

Zaproponowanie terminu „tożsamości *terroir*” w celu spojrzenia na tożsamość w sposób niewymuszający rozdzielania poziomów, np. regionalnego od lokalnego, jest tym bardziej przydatne, że pojęcia regionalności, lokalności, tutejszości i swojskości bywają rozmaicie, i płynnie używane przez moich rozmówców: niekiedy jako kategorie emiczne, czasem jako świadome, a nawet pragmatyczne odwołanie się do dyskursów medialnych czy instytucjonalnych. I tak na przykład kategorie te są obecnie wykorzystywane jako element strategii pozyskiwania finansowania na inwestycje lokalne, jako element miejscowych polityk czy gier wizerunkowych².

Struktura artykułu wynika z konieczności przedstawienia różnych obszarów tworzenia się tożsamości *terroir*. Po pierwsze, pokazuję, w jaki sposób kategorie

² O podobnym procesie pisali Aleksandra Kleśta-Nawrocka i Rafał Kleśta-Nawrocki, którzy pokazali, w jaki sposób konstrukt, jakim jest dziedzictwo kulinarne (w tym przypadku kuchnia mennonicka), bywa rozgrywane w gęstej sieci zależności tworzonych przez podmioty lokalne (Kleśta-Nawrocka, Kleśta-Nawrocki 2016: 157-172).

jedzenia regionalnego i lokalnego są konstruktami i jako takie kształtują tożsamość, ale też tożsamość tych społeczności kształtowana jest przez ten konstrukt. Po drugie, analizuję inne lokalnie używane kategorie służące do opisanie więzi z miejscem, ze społecznością, jak również zastanawiam się nad tym, w jaki sposób praktyki jedzeniowe postrzegane są jako zmienne w czasie. W kolejnej części przedstawiam zaś różne produkty i praktyki jedzeniowe, które są kluczowe dla tożsamości *terroir*, choć bywają przezroczyste nawet dla członków tych społeczności. Moim celem jest pokazanie, że nie tylko region, lokalność czy wieś są ważnymi punktami odniesienia określającymi tożsamość, ale przede wszystkim są to relacje ludzi, jedzenia i przestrzeni manifestujące się w pojęciu „swojego”, w szczególności zaś w poczuciu wspólnego „swojego smaku”.

Jedzenie regionalne i lokalne jako konstrukt

Prasa, literatura popularna i ogólnie media propagują określoną wizję jedzenia regionalnego czy lokalnego. Wpływa to niejako odgórnie na to, jak rozumie się jedzenie regionalne wśród mieszkańców podlaskich wsi i miasteczek. Jak zauważyła historyczka jedzenia Rachel Laudan (2001), w popularnych książkach kulinarnych, opisujących fenomen jedzenia regionalnego, podkreśla się bogactwo i różnorodność takich kuchni, a także to, że wpływają na zachowanie dobrego zdrowia. Tym samym dochodzi do pewnego (często świadomego) zamazania rzeczywistości – nie wszystkie kuchnie regionalne były bogate, różnorodne czy zdrowe. Badaczka zwróciła uwagę, że w niektórych opisach potraw czy kuchni określanych mianem regionalnych pojawiają się wzmianki o służących przygotowujących jedzenie, o podróżach, restauracjach i turystyce. Są to napomknienia, które wskazują na to, że dania, opisywane jako kuchnia „tradycyjna” czy „regionalna”, są w dużej mierze kuchnią warstw zamożnych³.

Laudan pisze, i częściowo ma to również odniesienie do polskiej kuchni, że jedzenie „regionalne” było najczęściej „skąpe i monotonne” (Laudan 2001: 42). Gloryfikujące je opisy najczęściej czerpią, w przypadku Polski, z kuchni ziemiańskiej, ewentualnie z kuchni najzamożniejszych warstw chłopstwa. Już na tym poziomie widać, że to, co uważane jest w dyskursie medialnym, potocznym, a także lokalnym za kuchnię regionalną, jest konstruktem kulturowym. „Regionalne” może odzwierciedlać bowiem często kuchnię tylko jednej (bogatszej) warstwy społecznej. Ponadto sytuację komplikuje fakt, że dochodzi do sprzężenia zwrotnego, w którym kuchnia opisywana jako regionalna wtórnie staje się inspiracją dla społeczności lokalnych, a z czasem również wyznacznikiem ich tożsamości, np. tożsamości *terroir*. Przyjmuję więc, że kuchnia regionalna jest konstruktem, wokół którego narosły liczne stereotypy.

³ Na temat tworzenia tożsamości regionalnych poprzez książki kulinarne powstał kluczowy w studiach jedzeniowych artykuł Arjuna Appaduraia (1988). W moim tekście koncentruję się jednak głównie na perspektywie oddolnej, stąd nie odwołuję się bezpośrednio do propozycji badawczych tego autora.

Według Laudan jednym z często wyrażanych sądów w dyskursie medialnym przez piewców kuchni regionalnej jest podkreślenie, że jest ona bardziej zróżnicowana i zdrowsza od tłustej i zbytkowej kuchni warstw zamożnych. Tworzenie takiego stereotypu prawdopodobnie ma długą historię. W odniesieniu do kontekstu polskiego interesujące jest to, co napisano o wydanej w 1842 roku książce Jana Milikowskiego, pt. *Nowy, wyborny i najtańszy kucharz*, mającej ukazać, jak bardzo zróżnicowana może być tania kuchnia warstw niezamożnych. W książce tej zostały zamieszczone setki przepisów na dania z ziemniaka: rozmaite jarzyny, wypiekanki, leguminy, ziemniaki używane do wyrobu piwa, wina, kawy, mydła itp. Wojciech Józef Burszta i Waldemar Kuligowski trafnie podsumowali jej przekaz, demystyfikując i dekonstruując jednocześnie rzeczony stereotyp:

Brzmi to przemyślnie, (...) ale nie zmienia to faktu, że codzienną podstawą pozostają ziemniaki – i tylko one! Ziemniaki rano, ziemniaki w południe, (...) ziemniaki w dzień powszedni, ziemniaki od święta, ziemniaki do jedzenia, ziemniaki do picia, (...) ziemniaki *ad infinitum* (Burszta, Kuligowski 2005: 118).

Przeświadczenie o tym, że kuchnia lokalna jest mało zróżnicowana i uboga w składniki wyrasta, moim zdaniem, z podobnych przekonań. W obu przypadkach konstruowana jest ona przez środowiska inne aniżeli sami rolnicy/społeczności lokalne, przez co stanowi uproszczone wyobrażenie grupy przeświadczonej o swej kulturowej wyższości na temat innej grupy. Media przedstawiające jedzenie lokalne jako zróżnicowane i zdrowe mityzują wieś jako ostoję „autentyczności”, „zdrowia” i „bliskości z naturą”, choćby i wynikającej z prostoty czy biedy. Kultura lokalna i regionalne jedzenie stają się ponownie obiektem spojrzenia „z góry”, tym razem z misją cywilizacyjną, a czasem także z protekcyjną oceną ubogiej diety opartej na ziemniaku.

Tak więc w odniesieniu do jedzenia lokalnego czy regionalnego należy uwzględnić kulturowe konteksty definiowania tych pojęć i nie nakładać nieprzystających kategorii na opisywany (europejski, polski) kontekst. Maria Fonte (2008) wyróżniła dwa sposoby definiowania jedzenia lokalnego: północnoamerykański (USA i Kanada) i europejski. W tym pierwszym rozumieniu jedzenie lokalne uwarunkowane jest „politycznymi interesami opierającymi się przemysłowemu systemowi produkcji jedzenia i ukierunkowanymi na utworzenie alternatywnej gospodarki produkcji żywności opartej na zasadach sprawiedliwości społecznej i ekologicznej równowadze” (Fonte 2008: 201). Natomiast w perspektywie europejskiej lokalne jedzenie ma na celu głównie „włączenie w rozwój ekonomiczny małych firm, gospodarstw wiejskich i niszowych gospodarstw agrykultury” (Fonte 2008: 201). Jedzenie lokalne może być więc rozumiane na wiele sposobów: często jest ono antynomią jedzenia globalnego; kojarzone jest na przykład z jedzeniem slow, a tym samym stawiane w opozycji do fast foodów (por. Egan et al. 2006). Bywa również utożsamiane z jedzeniem właściwym dla mniejszości: etnicznych czy religijnych. Wspólnym dla tych różnych sposobów rozumienia jedzenia lokalnego może być trop interpretacyjny, zgodnie z którym jedzenie

to jest zawsze odczytywane jako pewna alternatywa, coś właściwego podmiotom słabszym, mniejszym aniżeli państwo czy korporacje międzynarodowe.

Kategorie emiczne a tożsamość *terroir*

Zakładając, że zarówno jedzenie lokalne, jak i regionalne jest konstruktem, stawiam pytanie o rolę, jaką ten konstrukt odgrywa w tworzeniu tożsamości w społecznościach okolic Dąbrowy Białostockiej. Zadaję też pytanie o to, jakie funkcjonują inne kategorie emiczne dotyczące „jedzenia stąd” w społeczności lokalnej i jakiego rodzaju tożsamość współtworzą.

Swoje, regionalne, tradycyjne

Istnieje kilka sposobów emicznego użycia pojęć odnoszących się do jedzenia lokalnego, które są kluczowe dla zrozumienia roli, jaką pełni ono w tworzeniu i negocjowaniu tożsamości. Pierwszy związany jest z rozumieniem kategorii jedzenia lokalnego poprzez łączenie go w narracjach rozmówców z pojęciem jedzenia „swojego” stojącego w opozycji do jedzenia „kupowanego”. „Swoje” łączy w sobie wyobrażenia na temat regionu, tradycji, poczucia ciągłości, historii, religii, jak również idee swojskości, domowości i rodzinności.

Sposób mówienia o nim sugeruje, że jest ono pewną oczywistością wynikającą z wysoko wartościowanej w tej kulturze samowystarczalności (por. Straczuk 2006: 170). Poniższa wypowiedź może wydawać się truizmem, ale to właśnie w wypowiedzeniu tej pozornej oczywistości, kryje się ontologiczne zapewnienie co do właściwego porządku rzeczy:

Tutaj mamy swoje ogórki, pomidory z tunelu i ogórki. Buraczki, to **przecież wszystko się ma swoje** [27.07.2011, Grabowo, K47, M49]⁴.

Jednocześnie można zauważyć, że istnieje kluczowa komplementarność swojego i kupnego:

C: Tak, tak, ogródek jest.

M: Jest na swoje potrzeby, a jak nie ma, to się kupuje [27.07.2011, Chilmony, M, ok. 50, K, ok. 20 (ojciec i córka)].

⁴ Rozmowy koduję w następujący sposób: [data przeprowadzenia rozmowy, (ewentualnie) miejscowość, płeć i wiek (ewentualnie relacja) rozmówców].

„Swoje” wartościowane jest wyżej aniżeli jedzenie pochodzące ze sklepu, które nabywano tylko wówczas, gdy nie można go było wytworzyć samemu:

K: Wiecie, **swoje zawsze lepsze**. Jeszcze zależy, jak to kto przyrządzi [21.07.2011, Suchodolina, K, ok. 70, M, ok. 70].

M: No tak, troszeczkę się rozpasłem ostatnio. Ale staram się jeść rzeczy tylko swoje, nie kupowane w sklepie. Znaczący wędliny, bardzo rzadko się zdarza coś kupić [28.07.2011, M, ok. 50].

W codziennych narracjach często podkreśla się niższą rangę jedzenia kupnego – w tym przypadku ma o tym świadczyć fakt, że jest ono odrzucane przez zwierzęta:

K: [Dzikom sypie się jedzenie przez cały rok.] Ale też swojskie, nie kupowane, bo kupowanych nie jedzą dziki. (...)

M: Kolega ma sklep i się zaopatruje na giełdzie warzywnej, i mówi, że załatwi mi takich z małą szkodą dla dzików. I wyobraźcie sobie, że zwierzęta tego nie tknęła. A te zbierane z sadu na wiosce, to śladu nie ma [28.07.2011, M, ok. 50, K, ok. 45, mąż i żona].

Wybór smakowy, którego dokonuje (dzikie) zwierzę, zdaje się poświadczać wartość jedzenia „swojego”. Fakt, że dziki odmawiają jedzenia „kupnej” kukurydzy i jabłek, można zinterpretować, odwołując się do kategorii natury i kultury, zwierzęta te, pozostając po nieujarzmionej kulturą stronie rzeczywistości, tym bardziej zachowały „naturalną” zdolność rozpoznania smaków zdrowych, dobrych, „autentycznych”. Swoje jedzenie jest więc pewnym kodem kulturowym, a nawet komunikatem moralnym, poprzez który dokonuje się połączenie sposobu jedzenia (opartego na jedzeniu własnym, stąd, „swoim”) z tożsamością zakorzenioną w miejscu i społeczności, czyli tzw. tożsamością *terroir*.

Kolejnym pojęciem odnoszącym się do jedzenia lokalnego, ważnym ze względu na osadzenie w narracjach tożsamościowych *terroir*, jest kategoria „regionu” i związane z nim jedzenie regionalne, czasem określane mianem „tradycyjnego”. Jedzenie regionalne czy tradycyjne to pojęcia używane lokalnie, które należy traktować jako hasła zrozumiałe dla każdego (choć wieloznacznie), wywołujące wśród lokalnych społeczności silne skojarzenia jedzeniowe:

R: A tutaj jakieś tradycyjne potrawy w regionie są?

K: Babka ziemniaczana. Kiszka ziemniaczana. I co jeszcze? Sękacze. To tam bliżej Suwałk, ale tu u nas, no, to pisanki u nas, tu w Lipsku bardzo występują te panie, pisanki idą za granicę, wszędzie. Te panie wożą wszędzie. Rękodzieło różne, dywany, gąski weselne. (...)

Ale jak szła panna młoda za mąż albo pan młody. Chłopak albo dziewczyna, no to dzień wcześniej były takie gąski, tak ludzie na wsiach. Taka była tradycja. Jak jutro miał być ślub, to dzisiaj już gąski rozdawali w tym domu. I przylatywały dzieci, takie małe. (...) I wychodziła panna młoda i częstowała tymi gąskami. I jak

ja już chodziła, to były ciasteczka takie kruche pieczone. A wcześniej jeszcze jak nasze babcie i prababcie chodziły, to rzeczywiście to były gąski. (...) I to właśnie tutaj w Lipsku jedna pani to robi i też właśnie jej to rękodzieło, to idzie tam na tych wystawach różnych i wszystko, bo to przekazała jej teściowa, dla teściowej może babcia czy matka, i to już z dawna, i ona już wtajemniczona, i ona wie, jak to piec, bo to trzeba umieć przecież. (...) [16.11.2011, Jałowo, K, ok. 55].

Na pytanie o „tradycyjne potrawy” rozmówczynie zaczęła wymieniać jedzenie, które jej zdaniem należy do tej kategorii – a więc, po pierwsze, była to babka ziemniaczana – zapiekanka z ciasta podobnego do tego, z którego robi się placki ziemniaczane. Jest to danie uważane za codzienne, zwyczajne. Świadczyć o tym może fakt, że w prawie każdym domu zakupiona jest specjalna maszynka elektryczna do tarcia ziemniaków. Kobieta wspomina także o sękaczu i gąskach (pieczone bułeczki rozdawane przed ślubem; por. Olędzki 1961). Świadomie wpisuje je w kategorię „rękodzieła”, mówiąc o kobietach, które zajmują się prezentowaniem i sprzedają rękodzieła zawodowo lub półzawodowo. Widać więc dwuznaczność rozumienia kategorii „tradycyjne pokarmy” – są to zarówno dania spożywane na co dzień, zwykle, nieświęteczne, jak i te, które wpisywane są w oficjalne dyskursy tworzenia, podtrzymywania i odtwarzania tradycji – pokarmy związane z pewnymi rytuałami i świętami.

Pojęcie tradycji ma długą historię w naukach humanistycznych i społecznych; początkowo starano się znaleźć uniwersalną definicję. Edward Shils zaproponował na przykład: „W swoim najbardziej narzucającym się elementarnym sensie [tradycja] oznacza *traditum*: jest tym wszystkim, co jest transmitowane lub przekazywane z przeszłości do teraźniejszości” (Jasiewicz 1987: 355; cyt. za Shils 1981). Kazimierz Dobrowolski zaproponował zaś podobną definicję, „[p]rzez tradycję rozumiemy w zasadzie wszelką spuściznę, którą ustępujące generacje przekazują pokoleniom wchodzącym w życie” (Dobrowolski 1966: 76). Dla celów niniejszej analizy za bardziej przydatne uznaję jednak podejścia konstruktywistyczne. „Tradycję” traktuję więc jako powszechną, choć różnie rozumianą kategorię, której urok, tak jak pojęcie kultury (por. Kuper 2006: 4)⁵, polega na tym, że wydaje się ona zrozumiała dla każdego. Podobnie jak można stwierdzić, że każdy ma kulturę, można powiedzieć, że każdy ma swoją tradycję. Pojęcie to używane jest nie tylko, by uspołnić doświadczenie (tworzy wyobrażenie o ciągłości historycznej), ujednocila również sam odbiór komunikatu – „tradycja” wręcz uniwersalnie wartościowana jest pozytywnie. Prawie każdy również zgodziłby się co do kwestii, że tradycje należy pielęgnować/chronić/ocalić przed zapomnieniem itp. Tradycja może oznaczać wiele rzeczy, ale ludzie używający tego pojęcia będą

⁵ Pisał on dalej o użyciu takiego pojęcia jak kultura jako pewnym wytrychu: „Politycy nawołują do rewolucji kulturalnej. Najwyraźniej potrzebna jest jakaś potężna zmiana kulturowa, by rozwiązać problemy biedy, narkomanii, bezprawia i przemysłowej konkurencyjności. Mówi się o różnicach kulturowych pomiędzy płciami i pokoleniami, drużynami piłkarskimi czy też agencjami reklamowymi. Niepowodzenie fuzji dwóch przedsiębiorstw wyjaśnia się niekompatybilnością ich kultury” (Kuper 2006: 4).

mieli przekonanie, że odnoszą się do wspólnego znaczenia. Co więcej, „tradycja”, tam gdzie prowadziłam badania, jest w społeczności przedmiotem społecznego namysłu (por. Giddens 2005).

Sami Zubaida i Richard Tapper pisali, że w dyskursie na temat kuchni (podobnie jak w nacjonalistycznych/narodowych ideologiach) istnieje tendencja postrzegania procesów w kategoriach ciągłości, ujawniają się tu wyraźnie przyjęte (często nieuświadomione) założenia o ciągłości kulturowej, poszukiwanie początków (Zubaida, Tapper, red., 1994; cyt. za Holtzman 2006: 368) i esencjalizowania wspólnoty. Taką tendencję należy sobie uświadomić, jako że jest ona również podstawową funkcją pojęcia tradycji. Wybrane dania traktuje się tak, jakby w danej kulturze występowały od jej „mitycznych początków”, od zawsze łącząc ze sobą środowisko i ludzi we wspólnocie smaku i tożsamości *terroir*. Inne z kolei opisywane są w sposób tworzący dystans: podkreślając różnicę, ludzie oddzielają się od innych regionów, definiują swoją tożsamość, która ma się opierać na wyobrażonej ciągłości wzorów jedzenia:

K: Zupę grzybową czasami robię, aczkolwiek każdy weźmie po łyżce, tylko symbolicznie. Jako regionalne nie jest przyjęte, ani karp, ani zupa grzybowa.

M: Karpia nikt nie chce zabić.

K: Karpia nikt nie lubi, ale przede wszystkim nie ma tradycji jedzenia karpia na Podlasiu. Tutaj ta ryba uchodzi za niesmaczną, mulastą taką. My robimy rybę po grecku, faszerowaną, przeważnie pstrąga [21.07.2011, Ostrowie, K, ok. 50, M, ok. 22 (matka i syn)].

Samo zadanie pytania o praktyki związane z „tradycją” sprawia, że identyfikuje się się doxę, rozumianą jako niekwestionowane praktyki (Bourdieu 1972: 164). Jest to moment ujawnienia doxy, który jednocześnie ustanawia dyskursy innych współzawodniczących ortodoksji (karpia tutaj nikt nie lubi). Na przykład hasło „tradycyjne” wywołuje skojarzenia „zacofania”, a także „ekologiczności”, „zdrowia” – to są właśnie współzawodniczące ze sobą dyskursy, które w tej społeczności istnieją, a które można otworzyć „kluczem”, jakim jest pojęcie „tradycyjne”. Jednocześnie „tradycja” w odniesieniu do jedzenia jest czymś niezwykle plastycznym i elastycznym, jest ona z łatwością tworzona. Jak pisała Theresa Preston-Werner: „Wraz z tym jak kolejne pokolenia następują po sobie, dawne sposoby jedzenia (*foodways*) odpływają w niepamięć i zastępowane są przez nowe tradycje i wynalazione poczucia bliskości (*invented familiarities*)” (Preston-Werner 2009: 24).

Jedzenie wschodnie i podlaskie

Tożsamość *terroir* można analizować też z innej perspektywy, a mianowicie – perspektywy regionu jako pewnej części Polski, kraju. Lokalni mieszkańcy, definiując siebie oraz specyfikę relacji i przestrzeni, w których funkcjonują, używają takich pojęć jak „Wschód”, „Podlasie”, a nawet „Polska B”. Nie są to, moim zdaniem, dla

nich terminy emocjonalnie neutralne. Te kategorie są inne niż ogólne i bardziej neutralne pojęcia regionu i tradycji. Tożsamość *terroir* wynika również z takiego związku jedzenia i przestrzeni. Teren opisywany poprzez pojęcia podlaskości czy Wschodu jest definiowany przez zamieszkujących go ludzi również poprzez szczególną produkcję jedzenia. Poniżej przedstawiam wybrane przykłady wypowiedzi:

K: Na Boże Narodzenie na Podlasiu najważniejszą potrawą to jest kutia. Kupujemy pęczak z pszenicy, gotujemy, do tego dodaje się mak, którego Mirek [mąż rozmówczyni] nie cierpi, i wszystkie bakalie – rodzynki, orzechy, miód. Jak do zjedzenia od razu, to bardzo dobre jest [21.07.2011, Ostrowie, K, ok. 50].

M: Ogólnie ta wschodnia wieś, tutaj wschodnie strony to i to tak jest naprawdę tak ekologiczne uprawy, że głowa mała (...), tam tych hektarów nie dużo, mały, cztery–pięć, ogólnie to jest działka. Nawozów ogólnie się nie używa [23.07.2011, Harasimowicze, K, ok. 50, M, ok. 55].

Ludzie, podkreślając odmienność warunków produkcji jedzenia, używają też sformułowania, że „Podlasie to Zielone Płuca Polski, na Podlasiu jest mniej takich większych gospodarstw, są raczej takie mniejsze i takie średnie?” [23.07.2011, Harasimowicze, K, ok. 50, M, ok. 55]. Można więc powiedzieć, że takie kategorie jak podlaskość, tutejszość czy lokalność konceptualizowane są również poprzez szczególnie sposób przygotowania, ale też produkcji jedzenia (uprawy roślin czy hodowli zwierząt), odmienny od pozostałych części kraju.

Podobnie jest ze smakowymi upodobaniami, które wyjaśniane są właśnie poprzez zakorzenienie lokalne, przynależność do postrzeganej *terroir* wspólnoty smaku. Jak tłumaczyła jedna z rozmówczyń:

C: (...) Mąż nie cierpi babki ziemniaczanej, a my uwielbiamy, bo u niego nie ma tego zwyczaju absolutnie. (...)

Z: Bo to jest wschodnie danie! (...)

C: Tak, zawsze mi marnuje danie [26.07.2011, Jasionówka k., K, ok. 50, M, 50].

Pojęcie wschodniego jedzenia legitymizuje także różnice preferencji smakowych, w których, choć dostrzega się element indywidualny, to jednocześnie wpisuje się je w szersze podziały pomiędzy regionami, częściami Polski itp. W tym przypadku niechęć męża do babki ziemniaczanej jest jednocześnie podstawą do wykluczenia go z pewnej wspólnoty „mieszkańców wschodnich ziem”.

Negocjowanie kategorii i tożsamości *terroir*

To, co uważane jest za stałe, ciągle, tradycyjne, bywa także kwestionowane w opisywanej społeczności. Analiza treści internetowych umożliwia zastanowienie się nad procesem negocjowania kategorii określających związek jedzenia, człowieka

i jego miejsca (a nawet podawania w wątpliwość tej kategorii). Przykłady można znaleźć w burzliwych wymianach zdań odbywających się w blogosferze. Na cytowanym blogu kulinarnym *Smakolyk* poświęconym kuchni miejscowej toczy się wiele ciekawych dyskusji na temat tego, czym jest kuchnia lokalna, regionalna czy podlaska. Tych kwestii dotyczą najbardziej gorące debaty – liczba komentarzy rośnie zawsze, gdy zamieszczany jest przepis na danie, które przez moich rozmówców określane było jak „stąd”. Na przykład pod przepisem i opisem babki ziemniaczanej miała miejsce dynamiczna wymiana zdań, którą przytoczę w obszerniejszych fragmentach, ponieważ pokazuje ona dobitnie, w jaki sposób negocjowana i wytwarzana jest wiedza na temat tego, co uznawane jest za kuchnię regionalną. Jeden z komentujących blogerów pisał w ten sposób o „autentycznym” pochodzeniu babki ziemniaczanej:

Podczas ostatniej wizyty w Mińsku na Białorusi (restauracja Rakuskij Browar – polecam) poprosiłem kucharza o informację jaka potrawa jest najbardziej charakterystyczna dla kuchni białoruskiej, odpowiedź była taka: – nie istnieje kuchnia białoruska, jest tylko zlepek wpływów rosyjsko-litewsko-polsko-ukraińskich i tyle.

Zresztą babka ziemniaczana na Białorusi jest zapiekana w naczyniach glinianych z dodatkami (...) a nie na blasze tak jak w Polsce. Proszę sprawdzić pochodzenie babki w źródłach historycznych : otrzymamy informację że jest to potrawa pogranicza polsko-litewskiego a informacja o białoruskości tej potrawy jest błędna i powstała z powodu błędnego skojarzenia najczęstszego występowania po II wojnie babki na obecnych terenach Białorusi ukradzionych nam przez stalina w 1945 Czyli reasumując babka ziemniaczana nie jest potrawą białoruską⁶ [pisownia oryginalna tu i dalej].

Prowadząca blog odpowiedziała pojednawczo:

Być może kucharz nie był Białorusinem i nie miał pojęcia o pochodzeniu dań, które serwuje w swojej restauracji :) W „Kuchni białoruskiej” z 1984 r czytamy: „Kuchnia białoruska ma wielowiekową, bardzo bogatą historię. Jej wpływ zaznaczył się w różnym stopniu w kuchniach sąsiednich narodów: Rosjan, Ukraińców, Polaków, Litwinów i Łotyszów. (...) Szczególne miejsce w kuchni białoruskiej zajmują ziemniaki. Z masy z ziemniaków, gotowanych i surowych, w połączeniu z innymi produktami sporządza się mnóstwo samodzielnych dań: placki, oładki, BABKI, kluski, pierogi i zapiekanki.” (...) O białoruskości babki ziemniaczanej mówi też Mikołaj Rey w swoim programie kulinarnym.” Czyli reasumując jest jednak kuchnia białoruska i babka ziemniaczana jest potrawą białoruską. Pozdrawiam!

⁶ Zob. <https://isokolka.eu/blogi/154-smakolyk/7462-babka-ziemniaczana-blog> [dostęp: 19.11.2020].

Jak widać, autorka próbowała powołać się na autorytet słowa pisanego i mówionego bez odpowiedniej dozy krytycyzmu. Fakt znalezienia wzmianki o istnieniu „kuchni białoruskiej” miał potwierdzać istnienie tego zjawiska. Jednocześnie brak wiedzy szefa kuchni próbowała tłumaczyć przypuszczalną, inną aniżeli białoruska, narodowością tegoż. Tak jakby sama narodowość oznaczać miała automatycznie „wiedzę o pochodzeniu potraw”.

Daje się jednak zauważyć krytycyzm uczestnika dyskusji wobec źródeł pisanych:

W wielu książkach kucharskich istnieje przepis na babkę ziemniaczaną co nie oznacza że należą one do kuchni tych narodów w których książkach się znajdują więc to bardzo naciągany dowód (patrz: ryba po grecku albo karp po żydowsku) a powoływanie się na książkę kucharską z czasów komunistycznej Białorusi to już kulinarny faux faux!!

Jak chce się pisać o historii potraw nie tylko o potrawach wypadaloby ruszyć 4 litery z kuchni i poszperać w źródłach historycznych o pochodzeniu tematów i przedmiotów o których próbuje się opowiadać a nie po prostu powtarzać błędne stereotypy. Nie wypada to twórcy kulinarnego blogu o historii kuchni naszego regionu. Proszę nie okłamywać ludzi bo większość nie ma pojęcia o historii i za pani błędną drogą podążą w złym kierunku (szczególnie młodzież która naprawdę może pomyśleć że babka jest białoruska tak jak Hajnówka i Wilno). Wstyd....

W innym miejscu ta sama komentatorka Naomi pisze:

Co do naszej podlaskiej kuchni to cytuję wstęp do książki Andrzeja Fiedoruka-Kuchnia podlaska w rozmowach i recepturach opisana >>...Kuchnia Podlasia? Wielu westchnie, że tylko kiszka i pyzy. (...) Historycy i lokalni patrioci poszukiwać będą granic owego Podlasia. Ja zaś twierdzę, że to cudowna kuchnia tworzona przez lata w mozaice narodów, kultur i religii. W dymie z kominów wiejskich chałup, przycupniętych pod lasami, w zapachu chleba i siana. W szlacheckich dworach, mieszczkańskich kamienicach i żydowskich karczmach. Tworzona przez sąsiadów a czasami i wrogów. (...) Gdzie powiedzenie Gość w dom Bóg w dom, nie było przyczynkiem do wielodniowej pijatyki ale nabierało właściwego wymiaru...<< Dlatego chyba jej walory smakowe są tak bogate jak nasza podlaska historia :)

Wspólna kategoria „naszego”, „wschodniego” ma godzić te różne oglądy na to, czym jest narodowość kuchni oraz jaki rodzaj autorytetu jest konieczny, by taką kuchnię uprawomocnić:

Nieważnie czy to jest danie białoruskie, polskie czy też litewskie bo jest to przede wszystkim danie typowo wschodnie czyli nasze . Chociaż babkę ziemniaczaną jadłam i w Skierniewicach ale tam nazywano ją kugel. Każda gospodyni ma

swoją recepturę na babkę ziemniaczaną .Tak się składa że miałam okazję jeść babkę w wielu miejscach naszego regionu , ale dla tej ,którą piekla moja teściowa nie dorównała żadna z nich. Po rannym obrządku w gospodarstwie teściowa rozpałała płytę w kuchni i ogrzewała duchówkę przez otwarcie szybra – czy jak to się tam nazywało. Ręcznie i tylko do babki przeznaczonej tarce tarkowała ziemniaki . (...) Gdy późnym popołudniem wracaliśmy z mężem z pracy wyjmowała garnuszek z duchówki odwracała do góry dnem i ech... to był moment nie do opisania, bo jak można przekazać ten zapach, widok unoszącej się pary i sam smak ? Gdy poszłam już na swoje pieklam babkę wedle przepisu teściowej, ale to nie była już ta sama w smaku, bo pieklam ją w blaszce i w elektrycznym piekarniku (tamże).

Autorka wpisu dzieli się dłuższą opowieścią o tym, jak umiejętność przyrządzenia babki i kiszki ziemniaczanej przekazywana jest z pokolenia na pokolenie. Regionalne bywa więc legitymizowane nie tylko poprzez informacje podane w książkach kucharskich czy przekazane w blogach, ale również przez osobistą, ucieleśnioną wiedzę *metis*, wynikającą z naśladownictwa z wielokrotnego powtarzania pewnych czynności (rozumianą jako: „wiedza oraz szereg umiejętności praktycznych nabytych w toku reakcji na ciągle zmieniające się środowisko”; Scott 1998: 303). Jak widać, zarówno doznawanie przez rozmówców ‘regionalności’, jak i ‘swojskości’ jedzenia wynika też z osobistych relacji z osobami, które potrafią przyrządzić te dania.

Widzialne i niewidzialne „superfoods” a tożsamość

Jak widać z powyższych ustaleń, poszczególne kategorie potraw bądź produktów mają związek z poczuciem tożsamości *terroir* i przynależnością do miejsca. Można powiedzieć, że to układanka rozmaitych produktów tworzy kulinarną mapę „tożsamościową” tego miejsca. Tego rodzaju pokarmy, które są podstawą egzystencji, a zarazem skupiają na sobie w danej społeczności wiele znaczeń, Warren Belasco nazywa kulturowymi *super foods* (Belasco 2008: 16–17, 19–20).

Jednym z tych produktów jest właśnie ziemniak:

Wschodnia Polska, jak to mówią, ziemniakiem stoi, więc różne są z ziemniaków te potrawy robione. Ale ja sądzę, wie pan, że tutaj, ta wschodnia kuchnia była na tyle sugerowana tym, że tutaj jednak były biedniejsze regiony, niż to co na Południu, tam, na zachodzie Polski, były te rejony biedniejsze, więc tutaj, co się miało, to się gotowało, jak to się mówi. Moja babcia (...) mówiła, że (...), jak były wiosenne okresy, że no, było bardzo biednie, bo to już było tak, jak to się nazywało, przednówek. Jeszcze nie było następnych zbiorów, a stare już się kończyły. No to było bardzo ciężko, bo się gotowało na przykład zupę z lebiody. Z lebiody, tak, jak lebioda wschodziła, to się tak jak szczawiową na przykład zupę, no to wtedy, tak,

co się miało, czy jakiś ziemniaczek, czy już tego, i się lebiode. Nie jadłam tego, tyle wiem z opowiadań [29.07.2011, Harasimowicze, K, ok. 45, jej kuzynka ok. 40, jej mama ok. 70, gospodarz ok. 45].

Ziemniak w tych narracjach staje się metaforą przynależności do pewnego miejsca, ale też odwołaniem do swoich wiejskich (chłopskich) korzeni. Warzywo konotuje tu pewne wspólne doświadczenie ubóstwa i samowystarczalności, tak ważnej dla samookreślania się mieszkańców tych okolic:

Ludzie źle zrobili, że wyrzucili ziemniaki, a ziemniaki niestety są zdrowe, nie są kaloryczne, takie z wody, normalne, kiedyś dużo się jadło ziemniaków, na wsi i w ogóle, bo to było biedota, a teraz, ale ziemniak podstawa, bo w ziemniaku dużo witamin jest, potas jest (...), a teraz nie ma, bo zastąpili wszystko innymi rzeczami, ja ci powiem, po prostu z lenistwa nie chcą obierać ziemniaków. Bo to czasu brakuje, to się nie chce, to najlepiej to zasypał ryż czy makaron i spokój [27.07.2011, K, ok. 50, K, 14 (matka i córka)].

Nancy Ries, amerykańska antropolożka prowadząca badania w Rosji, pokazała, że również w tym kraju ziemniak jest czymś więcej niż tylko pokarmem, jest podstawą bytowania. Autorka uznaje kartoszkę za: „obiekt w świecie sprzężony z myśleniem zbiorowym (*social mind*) i w ten sposób będący nieredukowalnym medium myślenia o świecie i działania w nim” (Ries 2009: 182). Jej analiza pozwala dostrzec rozpad relacji pomiędzy państwem a społeczeństwem. Uprawa ziemniaka ‘osadzona’ jest nomen omen w pamięci historycznej i złożonym systemie wiedzy. Natomiast współcześnie w Rosji warzywo to wykorzystywane jest także w sposób symboliczny w narracjach dotyczących np. krytyki zachodniego konsumpcjonizmu czy tworzącej się opozycji miasto/wieś (Ries 2009). W podobnych kategoriach można interpretować przytoczone przeze mnie wypowiedzi o ziemniaku – jego spożycie staje się symbolem przynależności do wspólnoty smaku, ale także do wspólnoty osób dzielących pewne wartości – np. etos pracy (por. „teraz ludzie zrobili się zbyt leniwi, by obierać ziemniaki”). Jest więc, zarówno w przypadku Rosji, jak i Polski, wyznacznikiem dawnych oraz nowych tożsamości.

Kolejnym z lokalnych *superfoods* jest kapusta. Powszechność jej odzwierciedlają wypowiedzi, w których podkreśla się regularną konsumpcję tego warzywa, wpisanie go w codzienną ekonomię rodziny:

Kiedyś w niedzielę było zawsze coś z kapusty, tak mi się to kojarzy. To jest kapustny teren [23.07.2011, Dąbrowa Białostocka, M, ok. 55].

- Jakaś taka ulubiona potrawa?

K: Też nie mam. Nie, kapusta. (...) Pod każdą postacią. (...) Wszystko. Wszystko z kapusty [22.07.2001, Dąbrowa Białostocka, K, ok. 50].

K: O, moja córka była we Włoszech bawić dzieci. Bardzo zadowolona była. Tamta rodzina ją jak swoją przyjęła. (...) Bardzo jej się podobało. I dorobiła się. (...) – I tamto jedzenie jej smakowało?

K: Tam to te makarony, spaghetti i do tego wszystkiego butelka wina na stole. Tam to w ogóle dużo alkoholu piją. Ale przez to wszystko takie prawdziwsze jest. (...) No bo to ich kultura. I oni to wino z własnej winnicy robią i tak przyzwyczajeni. U nas to tak nie ma. Chociaż mówią, że my to dużo tych ziemniaków i tej kapusty jemy, ale to taka tradycja nie jest do końca. Bo u nas to z tej biedy wojennej to, a obecnie to już zupełnie inaczej. (...) No mają, ale to z przyzwyczajenia i dla oszczędności. Ale najchętniej to by gotowe kupowali. Nie ma jakiegoś poszanowania dla dawniejszego [17.11.2011, Brzozowo, K, ok. 70].

Chciałabym w tym miejscu podkreślić wypowiedź rozmówczynie, która spożywanie kapusty wymienia jako tradycję, ale mówi, że „taka tradycja nie jest do końca”. W przeciwieństwie do tradycji włoskiej, która miałaby wiązać się z przyjemnością, biesiadowaniem, lokalna tradycja kojarzy się raczej z biedą i brakiem wyboru.

Kapusta jest dla wielu mieszkańców okolic kolejnym produktem tak zwykłym i powszednim, że z jednej strony bywa pomijana, gdy pyta się o dania regionalne czy podlaskie itp. Do tej pory wiele rodzin na jesień zaopatruje się w kilka-kilkanaście (lub więcej) główek tego warzywa, kisząc je na różne sposoby. Kapusta jest niemal codziennie obecna w zimowym jadłospisie mieszkańców tych okolic. Choć produkt ten rzadko bywa kojarzony z typowymi „regionalnymi daniami”, łączy się go w narracjach z tym regionem i właściwym dla niego sposobem życia (wiejskim). W powyższych wypowiedziach widoczne jest, że produkt ten nabiera rangi symbolu przywiązania do tradycji. Ostatnia wypowiedź jest szczególnie znacząca, ponieważ skonfrontowane w niej zostają dwa rodzaje praktyk jedzeniowych, a zarazem dwa style życia – ten właściwy „obcym” – w tym przypadku Włochom poznanym na emigracji, którzy spożywają dużo alkoholu, i ten „swój”, znany, który charakteryzuje poszanowanie dla dawniejszego i przyzwyczajenie do oszczędności.

Przypuszczam jednak, że najważniejszym superfoodem dla lokalnych społeczności jest mięso, w szczególności mięso i produkty wieprzowe. Sposób budowania tożsamości (płciowej, lokalnej, „swojskiej”) na podstawie konsumpcji i produkcji wieprzowiny opisałam szczegółowo w innej pracy (Mroczkowska 2014a), w tym miejscu chciałabym podkreślić tylko rolę tego produktu w tworzeniu pewnej „wschodniej” i polskiej wspólnoty wyobrażonej. Poniższa wypowiedź zwraca uwagę właśnie ze względu na aspekt budowania wspólnoty ogólnokrajowej ze względu na sposób jedzenia:

– A z jakich mięs się robi wyroby? [Pytanie dotyczyło „kuchni podlaskiej” – przyp. J.M.]

K: U nas w Polsce to z wieprzowiny przeważnie [28.03.2012, Małyszówka, K, ok. 60].

Czy na przykład poniższa wypowiedź:

Zresztą ja byłam za granicą, spotykałam się z ludźmi ze Sri Lanki, Filipin, Peru. Chińczyków miałam. (...) To sami ludzie, takie same mają serca. Może inaczej jedzą. Pracowałam w Irlandii i widziałam, jak szczury jedli. No tak, ale to jest normalne. Dla nich tak. Ale no tak jak oni by nie zjedli wieprzowiny, tak my nie zjemy szczura. (...) W pakistańskiej restauracji pracowałam, i był taki z tyłu, był taki mur, i przy tym murze porobili takie domki z metalu, i wyobraź sobie, tam jak szczur wleciał, to on żywcem go zostawiał. A potem patrzę, widzę, a w piecu na takich długich drągach folią aluminiową owinięte, i oni to pieką. Ale słuchaj, dla nich to było normalne, a zresztą to wtedy był post. To jest tak, że nie mogą jeść mięsa, chyba że złapią samodzielnie.

M: (...) W każdym miejscu są inne kultury.

K: Tak że tolerancja musi być, ale Polacy chyba jeszcze tak nie mają. To znaczy bliżej Warszawy to chyba bardziej [13.11.2011, Szuszałewo, M, ok. 30, K, ok. 56 (syn i matka)].

Jak widać, sposób jedzenia mięsa i tabu żywnościowe z nim związane są jednymi z najsilniej różnicujących wyznaczników tożsamości⁷.

Tak jak pisałam, istnieje wyraźna kategoria potraw, które są wymieniane jako „pochodzące stąd”, „miejscowe” bądź „z Podlasia”. Są więc one w sposób dosyć jednoznaczny przypisane pewnemu regionowi, ale nie do końca wiadomo, z którą religią, etnicznością czy kulturą należy je identyfikować. Do takich dań należą: kiszka ziemniaczana, babka ziemniaczana, kutia, farszynki (pulpety z gotowanych ziemniaków nadziewane farszem z mięsa, smażone w panierce), przecieraki (kluski z tartych ziemniaków/mąki/jajka). Wokół tych dań – w większości ziemniaczanych – tworzą się rozmaite konflikty i negocjacje tożsamościowych granic. Ludzie zadają sobie pytania (i próbują na nie odpowiedzieć) o pochodzenie potrawy, o jej przynależność do danej grupy narodowej czy religijnej. W negocjacjach tych widoczna jest chęć zawłaszczenia symbolicznego potrawy i emocjonalne przywiązanie do niej. Widoczna jest również niepewność co do jej statusu: czy dana potrawa w kuchni innego narodu może być jednocześnie uznana za podlaską. Daje się zaobserwować silna tendencja do wyznaczania granic, tęsknoty za autentycznością i bezdylematowym posiadaniem.

W refleksji nad związkiem jedzenia i tożsamości należy odróżnić produkty, który rozpoznawane i postrzegane są przez ludzi jako „lokalne”, „stąd” lub „podlaskie”, od tych, które choć są istotnym elementem lokalnej specyfiki kulinarnej, pozostają w dużej mierze niezauważone przez samych mieszkańców tego regionu. Zaczyna się je spostrzegać dopiero w wyniku kontaktu/zderzenia z innym stylem życia, w którym dany produkt zostaje uznany za właściwy lokalnemu

⁷ Owo „u nas” jest w odniesieniu do przestrzeni rozumiane szeroko: ludzie obejmują mentalnie większą przestrzeń jako „swoją” niż na przykład w mieście. Powszechne są w opisywanej społeczności regularne wyjazdy w celach towarzyskich, rodzinnych i religijnych do miejscowości oddalonych nawet o kilkadziesiąt czy sto kilometrów.

kontekstowi. Do tej pierwszej kategorii – produktów emicjnie określanych jako właściwe dla tego miejsce lub regionu – włączane są potrawy świąteczne lub potrawy „codzienne”, lecz wyjątkowo pracochłonne. Ta druga kategoria wpisana jest zaś silnie w codzienność i prostotę zwykłego dnia.

I tak na przykład od lat, gdy jeździłam w te okolice, uderzała mnie ogromna ilość uprawianych słoneczników; ich dojrzałe kwiatostany trzymano potem na balkonie, wyłuskiwano z nich pestki, robiąc z nich zapasy na całą zimę. Konsumpcja pestek właściwa jest przestrzeni publicznej – należy bowiem pozbyć się łupinki, a to najłatwiej zrobić na podwórku. Pestki zagryza się, jadąc samochodem (i wypluwając łupinki przez okno), siedząc na ławkach pod klatką, na schodach prowadzących na stadion, w centrum miasta. Z ich konsumpcją łączy się także pewna estetyka. Łupinki widoczne są w przestrzeni miasteczka, ich skupiska są rozpoznawalnymi znakami miejsc spotkań towarzyskich. Rzucanie ich pod nogi jest nieodłącznym elementem tych praktyk. Swoisty jest sposób: najczęściej rozgryzane są między zębami a nasiono wyciskane z łupinki. Czasem – często w przypadku kobiet – dochodzi dodatkowy element: po rozgryzieniu otwiera się je palcami, zręcznie wyjmując nasionko. Gryzienie ich, wyrzucanie odbywa się w pewnej pozie zrelaksowania, swobodnego zawłaszczania i znaczenia przestrzeni, w której się osoba znajduje.

O pestkach mówi się jako o „nawyku” – rozmówcy posługują się tym pojęciem. Pestki są swoistymi „pokarmami-używkami”, mieszczą się w kategorii produktów, które „wciągają”, obok orzeszków w łupinkach, ciasteczek, chipsów itp. Popularne są także kupowane solone pestki w łupinkach z Biedronki. Jedna z moich rozmówczyń mówiła mi, że zniszczyła zęby na pestkach i dlatego przedstawiła się z konieczności na „worki łuskanych” z Biedronki. Widać więc, w jaki sposób nawyki zostają zapisane w ciałach mieszkańców i w ich przestrzeni. Stają się pewnym znakiem ich tożsamości, ale wydaje się, że znakiem czytelnym raczej dla przybysza z zewnątrz.

Temporalność smaku

W kulturze masowej funkcjonuje mitologizujące i stereotypizujące przeświadczenie, że jedzenie wiejskie funkcjonuje w niezmięnionej formie od dawna, a jego korzenie sięgają czasów odległych. Tak naprawdę, jak dowiodła tego Rachel Laudan, tradycja – w szczególności kulinarna – bywa tworzona niezwykle szybko. Badaczka pokazała to poprzez analizę wydawnictw przepisów kulinarnych z kilkudziesięciu lat, w których zupełnie nowe dania z wybranego regionu opisywane były w kolejnych wydaniach jako pradawne (Laudan 2001). Owa odwieczność nie powinna być traktowana jako fakt historyczny, a raczej jako kategoria potoczna budująca przekonanie o trwałości wzorców kulinarnych.

Podobny trend łatwo jest zauważyć również w opisywanej przeze mnie społeczności. Dania, które jeszcze kilka czy kilkanaście lat temu nie były znane, obecnie określane są jako „stare”. O melbie, cieście przygotowywanym na zimno

z biszkoptów i galaretek, autorka internetowego bloga o kuchni lokalnej (okolic Dąbrowy Białostockiej) pisze w ten sposób: „Delikatne ciasto na bazie twarożku, który sami przygotowujemy z mleka, jajek i kwaśnej śmietany lub kwaśnego mleka. (...) Bardzo stary przepis, który znalazłam w swoich zapiskach sprzed 20 lat”⁸. Jedna z osób komentujących tę wypowiedź (pochodząca również z tych okolic) odpowiada następująco, potwierdzając zakorzenienie przepisu w społeczności: „Również mam melbę w starych przepisach. Kiedyś robiłam ją często dla dzieci, z tym że na herbatnikach, które były bardziej dostępne. (...) Pani Halinko pani przepisy nie tylko robią tak zwanego smaka, ale i przywołują wspomnienia :)”.

Uwidacznia się tu pewien niezwykle aspekt kulinariów – elastyczność związanych z nimi praktyk i wiedzy, a także umiejętność szybkiego zakorzenienia się w danej społeczności i szerzej w danej przestrzeni. Melba, deser, który zyskał popularność w społeczności w latach dziewięćdziesiątych, dwadzieścia lat później opisywany jest jako znaleziony w „starych przepisach”. Ponadto „autentyczności” i mocy zakorzenienia nadaje mu fakt, że przygotowywany był przez inne kobiety w rodzinie. Przekaz międzypokoleniowy i więź ze starszymi kobietami „przebłyskująca” w przekazanych przepisach sprawia, że melba zyskuje w społeczności legitymizację „swojego” jedzenia.

Jak rozpatrywać podobne obserwacje w obliczu spostrzeżenia Rocha Sulimy: „kody kulinarne, tak jak muzyczne, należą do najbardziej trwałych wyznaczników tożsamości” (Sulima 2000, s. 152)? Moim zdaniem nie należy pochopnie odrzucać zawartej tu myśli, gdyż na pewnej płaszczyźnie nie musi ona być sprzeczna z zaobserwowaną przeze mnie zmiennością kodów kulinarnych. Postuluję, że choć w wymiarze czasowym kody są niezwykle zmienne, to na płaszczyźnie deklaracji uważane są za trwałe. Ponadto są one w tym sensie trwałym wyznacznikiem tożsamości *terroir*, jako że kody ucieleśnione (podobnie jak muzyczne) są niezwykle mocno zakorzenione w człowieku i jego środowisku. Raz pasujący i aprobowany smak niezwykle trudno jest odrzucić (pokazują to dobitnie przykłady kuchni migracyjnych, kiedy np. spożycie chleba staje się wyznacznikiem polskości, por. Rabikowska 2010).

Tożsamość jedzeniowa rolnika opiera się w dużej mierze na odwołaniach do dawniejszego, prostszego i biedniejszego sposobu życia:

M: Jak to się mówi, nasza dawna solona słonina z przyprawami najlepsza, jak to się mówi, zagrycha do jakiegoś trunku. Stąd wyciągnęli to, że jak jakaś fłaszka jest na stole, to jak słonina jest, to nie ma biedy [15.11.2011, Grabowo, M, ok. 55, K, ok. 48 (mąż i żona)].

Zarówno wspomnianie owego jedzenia, odtwarzanie go i smakowanie pełni rozmaite funkcje społeczne i jest przez różne osoby używane w celu podkreślenia specyfiki człowieka roli, etosu pracy, a nawet swoistej wyższości moralnej. W antropologii jedzenia ów sposób odwoływania się do jedzenia z przeszłości

⁸ Zob. <https://isokolka.eu/blogi/154-smakolyk/7497-melba-blog> [dostęp: 24.11.2019].

nosi miano „nostalgii jedzeniowej” (por. Holtzman 2006). Nostalgie jedzeniową można rozumieć na dwa sposoby; po pierwsze, jako powtórne doświadczenie i odtwarzanie emocjonujących chwil z przeszłości – taka perspektywa jest najczęstsza i wymiar ten jest zdecydowanie istotny dla zrozumienia tego, jak pojęcie i zjawisko „jedzenia dawnego” ustanawia konkretne relacje pomiędzy ludźmi lub jest używane, by dane relacje ustanowić. Zawiera w sobie również wiele wartości charakterystycznych dla społeczności związanych z wsią i rolnictwem (np. wynikających z zasady gościnności, gospodarności czy przywiązania do robienia zapasów itp.).

Nostalgia jedzeniowa obecna jest również w opowieściach dotyczących migracji – wtedy jedzenie/smak stają się łącznikiem z domem, tutejszością, „swojskością”:

R: A mówił, że brakuje mu polskiego jedzenia tam?

M: O Jezu, pewno [*śmiech*]. Jak zajęłam tam do nich, to od razu na pierwsze mówi: „Mamo, ugotuj tatowej zupy”, a taka tatowa zupa to już mój mąż, a jego tato to lubił, że fasola z pęczakiem gotowana, wrzucona kostka mięsa, ni bielona taka, i bez ziemniaków, i marchewka i tam jeszcze pietruszka, i tego. I to tak gotowano. To nazwał to tatową zupą, po dzisiejszy dzień tatowa zupa [*śmiech*]. A wiecie co, amerykańskie jedzenie, a tutaj to jest różnica. Ja, żeby nie polskie sklepy tam, toby z głodu umarła. (...) A tam przestraszne jedzenie, wszystkie takie nasączone, takie jakieś sztywne, bezsmakowe, no całkowicie. I teraz tak o wstręt mam do tego, że jak nie przerobię po swojemu, no to mnie tylko jedna kiełbasa smakuje tutaj w Dąbrowie [28.07.2011, Szuszałewo, K72].

Wspomnienia o jedzeniu, a zarazem odtwarzanie dawnego „swojego” jedzenia stają się więc „sposobem na zachowanie tożsamości, które obecnie postrzegane są za zagrożone przez migrację, mobilność czy miejską kulturę masową” (Belasco 2008: 27).

Podsumowanie

Powyższe ustalenia potwierdzają siłę, jaką ma jedzenie, sposób jego konsumpcji i produkcji, na tworzenie się tożsamości *terroir*. Wynika to zarówno ze wspólnotowości wpisanej w jego produkcję i konsumpcję, ale widoczne jest także w samych praktykach narracyjnych dotyczących jedzenia. Jedzenie wiąże więc ludzi z regionem, ze środowiskiem, z lokalnością, domem. Co interesujące, nie zawsze same kategorie, takie jak podlaskość czy Wschód, są kojarzone z wyróżniającymi (dla przybysza z zewnątrz) ten region potrawami. Wraz z przypisaniem pewnych potraw (takich jak kiszka ziemniaczana, babka ziemniaczana) czy produktów (ziemniak, kapusta, słonina) do sposobu jedzenia właściwego dla lokalnych mieszkańców dokonuje się także pewna społeczna, a czasem i moralna ocena tego rodzaju konsumpcji. Jedzeniu zostają przyporządkowane określone

wartości, charakterystyczne, zdaniem lokalnych mieszkańców, dla tego terenu i dla życia rolnika. Są nimi: samowystarczalność, etos pracy rąk własnych, wspólnotowość (wyrażająca się m.in. poprzez dzielenie się jedzeniem i jego wymianę w społeczności), poszanowanie dla tradycji, oszczędność, rodzinność, a nawet więź z krajem i patriotyzmu – to ostatnie staje się wyraźne szczególnie w kontekście migracyjnym (szerzej rozwijam ten wątek w [Mroczkowska 2014b]).

Anna Wieczorkiewicz pisze:

z jednej strony dania narodowe, regionalne i etniczne kreolizują się, ulegają umiędzynarodowieniu, stając się całkiem nowym produktem wrzuconym do globalnego gara; z drugiej natomiast wzorce kulinarne funkcjonują jako symbole tożsamości, jako środek praktyk integrujących grupy ludzkie o różnym charakterze. Lokalną kulturę gastronomiczną traktuje się jako emblemat ogólnie rozumianego stylu życia, nadający się do wykorzystania przy tworzeniu własnego wizerunku na światowej scenie (Wieczorkiewicz 2004: 205).

Z kolei, jak twierdził historyk żywienia Massimo Montanari, dopiero w ostatnich kilkunastu czy kilku latach jedzenie regionalne nabrało kulturowego statusu ikony, a kwestie związane z jedzeniem globalnym i regionalnym stały się w naukach społecznych palącym tematem (Montanari 2006: 83). Ta zmiana postrzegania jedzenia regionalnego wynika, jego zdaniem, z paradoksu globalizacji i jego społecznej ekspansji. W zdefragmentowanym świecie starożytnym i średniowieczu celem, jak pisze autor, było stworzenie uniwersalnego (przynajmniej dla warstw, które było na to stać) modelu konsumpcji. Obecnie zaś, we współczesnej „globalnej wiosce”, pierwszą wartością jest zróżnicowanie i wielość. Tym należy tłumaczyć globalizację, czyli silne tendencje lokalne będące drugą stroną uniwersalizmu globalizacyjnego (Montanari 2006). Lokalne jedzenie, uosobione w emicznej metaforze jedzenia „swojego”, wyraża więc „lokalne” wartości kulturowe, „wiążąc ze sobą ludzi i ziemię land/obszar/terytorium w zrównoważonych ekologicznie relacjach” (Egan et al. 2006: 31) i tworząc tożsamość *terroir*.

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ABSTRACT

Regional, local or ‘our’ food. The identity dimension of foodways in the Polish Podlachia region

This article explores the connections between identity and foodways of farmers and small-town inhabitants in Eastern Poland, showing that food may serve as a strong metaphor of identity and the way of building ties and upholding community. The main food idioms are linked with the idea of „our” food, food which is local, familiar and familial, and the notions based on the connection with a certain region (*terroir*), along with with its history, people, environment, taste qualities. These are embedded in the locality and connect ideas of food, health, relationality and moral values (work), which are key building blocks of local identity.

Keywords: foodways, Poland, countryside, community, „our” food, identity, tradition, *terroir*, Podlachia region

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Stereotypizując fryzurę. Wyobrażenia na temat włosów w doświadczeniach osób noszących dredy w Polsce

Wprowadzenie

W lutym 2020 roku na 92. ceremonii wręczenia Oscarów statuetkę Akademii Filmowej w kategorii krótkometrażowy film animowany otrzymała produkcja *Hair Love* Matthew A. Cherry'ego przedstawiająca relację między ojcem a córką, opowiedzianą przez pryzmat jej problemów z włosami¹. Miesiąc później tzw. lockdown² i społeczna kampania #zostańwdomu doprowadziła do tymczasowego zamknięcia lokali świadczących usługi wymagające bezpośredniego kontaktu z klientem, w tym salony fryzjerskie. Brak dostępu do tej usługi sprawił, że najpierw celebryci, a później także „zwykli” użytkownicy internetu zaczęli golić swoje włosy i dzielić się tym doświadczeniem w mediach społecznościowych. Dla wielu kobiet ogolona głowa stała się manifestem ciałopozytywności i podważeniem społecznie skonstruowanych kategorii męskości i kobiecości³.

Te oraz inne wydarzenia i teksty kultury⁴ sprawiły, że powróciłam do własnych zainteresowań związanych ze znaczeniem ludzkich włosów oraz do

¹ Zob. <http://www.matthewacherry.com/hair-love/> [dostęp: 25.05.2020].

² Rządowe rozporządzenia ograniczające kontakty międzyludzkie i mobilność społeczną wprowadzone w celu walki z epidemią wirusa SARS-CoV-2 wywołującego chorobę COVID-19.

³ Zob. <https://www.thecut.com/2020/04/quarantined-people-talk-about-shaving-their-heads.html> [dostęp: 27.05.2020].

⁴ M.in. film *Własnymi rękoma. Historia Madame C.J. Walker*, <http://madamcjwalker.com/about/> [dostęp: 25.05.2020]; książka Debory Feldman *Unorthodox. Jak porzuciłam świat ortodoksyjnych*

etnologicznych badań terenowych, które prowadziłam w ramach pracy magisterskiej. Ich zasadniczym celem było poznanie wyobrażenia na temat włosów z perspektywy osób noszących dredy w Polsce. Celem tego artykułu jest zaprezentowanie wyników tych badań oraz osadzenie ich w szerszym kontekście. Dlatego też jego pierwsza część stanowi przegląd badań nad dreadami. Jest to także wprowadzenie teoretyczne do części analitycznej, w której odnoszę się do kontekstu polskiego, bazując przy tym na wynikach wywiadów etnograficznych prowadzonych w ramach pracy magisterskiej. W artykule szukam odpowiedzi na pytania badawcze: jakie wyobrażenia nakładane są na osoby noszące dredy w Polsce? Skąd wynikają? Jak „dredziarze” postrzegają dotykające ich stereotypy? Co dredy oznaczają dla ich użytkowników?

Zainteresowanie włosami w naukach społecznych

Zainteresowanie dreadami wpisuje się w szerszą kategorię badań nad symboliką włosów. Według Edmunda Leacha (1958) praktyki związane z włosami są rozpowszechnionymi na całym świecie elementami zachowania rytualnego, a antropologiczne próby ich analizy mają historię sięgającą końca XIX wieku. Na semantyczną naturę włosów zwrócił uwagę już Edward Burnett Tylor, pisząc w *Cywilizacji pierwotnej* (1898) o rytualnym obcinaniu włosów, oraz holenderski etnolog George Alexander Wilken (1886) w eseju poświęconym roli fryzury w ceremoniach pogrzebowych (zob. Leach 1958: 149). Arnold Van Gennep przedstawił rolę włosów w obrzędach przejścia (1909, wyd. pol. 2006: 167–168). Włosy, nawet jeżeli nie stanowiły głównego problemu badawczego, pojawiały się także w pracach innych antropologów, m.in. Bronisława Malinowskiego (1929, wyd. pol. 1957: 273, 380–381, 386–387) czy Mary Douglas (1970, wyd. pol. 2004). W ostatnich dekadach powstało wiele publikacji dotyczących symbolicznego znaczenia ludzkich włosów (zob. Rooks 1996; Hildebeitel, Miller 1998; Banks 2000; Tarlo 2016), a także samych dreadów (Agwuele 2016).

Szeroko zakrojone zainteresowanie włosami w naukach społecznych pojawiło się na początku lat 50. XX wieku za sprawą amerykańskiego psychologa Charlesa Berga. Jego publikacja *The Unconscious Significance of Hair* (1951) stała się zarzewiem interdyscyplinarnej dyskusji na temat znaczenia ludzkich włosów. Berg stwierdził istnienie korelacji pomiędzy fryzurą a seksualnością człowieka, w której włosy są uniwersalnym i nieświadomym symbolem ludzkich genitaliów, a ich obcinanie stanowi akt symbolicznej kastracji.

Twierdzenie to wywołało gwałtowną reakcję badaczy społecznych. Leach (1958) skrytykował wiarygodność dowodów psychoanalitycznych i podważył wnioski, które Berg wyciągnął z etnograficznych opisów Malinowskiego. Antropolog zaproponował własną koncepcję (Leach 1958: 154), którą można ująć

Żydów (2020); dyskusja wokół dreadów pisarki i noblistki Olgi Tokarczuk: <https://www.newsweek.pl/kultura/olga-tokarczuk-noblistka-i-dredy-skad-taka-fryzura/nc92vjx> [dostęp: 27.11.2020].

następująco: w sytuacjach rytualnych (1) długie włosy oznaczają brak ograniczeń w sferze seksualności, (2) krótkie, częściowo ogolone lub związane włosy wyrażają ograniczoną seksualność, (3) całkowicie ogolona głowa symbolizuje celibat.

Jedenaście lat później Christopher Hallpike (1969) za pomocą przykładu ascetycznych praktyk muzułmańskich mnichów próbował obalić tezy obu naukowców. Długie włosy, splecione w dredy, żyjących w celibacie fakirów przeczyły tezom Leacha i Berga. We własnej koncepcji Hallpike (1969: 260) położył nacisk na zależność pomiędzy fryzurą a kontrolą społeczną: „długie włosy związane są z przebywaniem poza społeczeństwem, a obcięte włosy symbolizują powrót do społeczeństwa lub życie w szczególnej dyscyplinie w obrębie społeczeństwa”. Podobne stanowisko zajęła Mary Douglas (2004: 119).

W 1987 roku kanadyjski socjolog Anthony Synnott stwierdził, że określone fryzury mogą być symbolem indywidualnej i grupowej identyfikacji oraz ważnym środkiem ekspresji i komunikacji. Wyróżnił trzy strefy owłosienia o różnym znaczeniu symbolicznym: włosy na głowie, na twarzy oraz na reszcie ciała. Według jego teorii przeciwności (potrójnego przeciwieństwa) istnieją trzy opozycje, które manifestują się poprzez praktyki związane z włosami: (1) kobiety i mężczyźni mają inne fryzury, (2) przeciwstawne ideologie wyrażane są poprzez odmienne fryzury, (3) włosy na głowie są przeciwieństwem włosów na ciele (Synnott 1987: 382). Synnott zaznaczył jednak, że jego koncepcja nie jest założeniem uniwersalnym – ma na celu jedynie podkreślenie istniejących norm i tendencji oraz wynikających z nich wyobrażeń i stereotypów.

W polskiej literaturze naukowej włosom poświęcony jest m.in. artykuł *Poza społeczeństwem – w pobliżu boskości. Przyczynek do rozważań nad symboliką włosów* (Tomicki 1987), którego celem było rozszerzenie i uzupełnienie teorii Hallpike'a, a także monografia *Opowieść o włosach. Zwyczaje – rytuały – symbolika* (Banek 2010). Książce tej bliżej jednak do katalogu zwyczajów, obrzędów i wierzeń dotyczących włosów niż ich szczegółowej analizy. Warty uwagi jest również artykuł *Symbolika włosów i manipulowanie włosami w kulturze ludowej* (Targońska 1998), którego autorka analizuje zwyczaje dotyczące włosów w kontekście obrzędowości rodzinnej.

Antropologia dredów

Osoby noszące dredy można odnaleźć w wielu zakątkach na świecie. Fryzura ta jest określana w różny sposób oraz pełni różne funkcje. W zależności od miejsca i kontekstu może symbolizować religijność jednostki (Obeyesekere 1981; Olivelle 1998; Bogin 2008), polityczny manifest (Ashe 2015), żałobę (Watson 1998) lub po prostu panującą modę. Motywacje jednostek do wykonania takiej fryzury nie zawsze wiążą się z konkretną ideologią czy polityką, niemniej nie jest ona zupełnie wolna od znaczeń. Nazwa „dredy” pochodzi od angielskiego terminu *dreadlocks*, powstałego z połączenia słów *dread* (strach, bać się, straszny) oraz *lock* (pukiel włosów, kędzior). Termin ten odnosi się do splecionych, sfilcowanych bądź zaplecionych pęków włosów na głowie. Sanskryckie słowo użyte na

określenie dredów to *jaTaa*, które oznacza „nosić skręcone pęki włosów” (Ashe 2015: 36); w języku wolof (Senegal) – *ndiange*, co można przetłumaczyć na „mocne włosy” (Ashe 2015: 41–44); natomiast u Jorubuów jest to słowo *dada*, oznaczające m.in. dziecko urodzone z naturalnie spletanymi włosami, których nie można rozczesać (Agwuele 2016: 5).

Wśród antropologów symboliką spletanых włosów zajmował się m.in. Ganath Obeyesekere. W swoich notatkach terenowych ze Sri Lanki napisał, że uderzył go widok skołtunionych włosów powiewających na wietrze podczas ekstazy tańca syngaleskiej kapłanki (Obeyesekere 1981: 6). W książce *Medusa's Hair. An Essay on Personal Symbols and Religious Experience* antropolog przedstawił sposób artykułowania indywidualnych doświadczeń poprzez określone symbole kulturowe. Dokonał analizy znaczenia przypisywanego włosom-dredom przez kobiety, które w wyniku doświadczeń życiowych zostały kapłankami w syngaleskiej Kataragamie. Karunavati została opętana przez boga Huniyana, który obiecał obdarować ją siedmioma spletanymi pękami włosów, jeżeli wyrzeknie się swojej seksualności. Nandavati wyznała antropologowi, że jej włosy w ciągu tygodnia po prostu się skołtuniły i przybrały kształt podobny do węży. Za radą kapłana kobieta udała się do świątyni Kataragama, gdzie miała skonsultować swoją decyzję z bogami i zostać kapłanką. Włosy Manci Nony zaczęły kołtunić się od momentu wpadnięcia w trans podczas pracy przy maszynie do szycia. Wierząc, że jej sześć dredów było darem od boga Skandy, wyruszyła do Kataragamy. Kobiety postrzegały swoje włosy jako esencję życia, traktowały je z nabożnością i nie pozwalały na dotykanie ich przez innych ludzi. Na tej podstawie badacz stwierdził, że „kompleks doświadczeń indywidualnych jednostki krystalizuje się w symbolach publicznych” (Obeyesekere 1981: 13).

Indolog Patrick Olivelle analizował dredy w kontekście struktury i kontroli społecznej. Noszone przez hinduskich ascetów, pustelników i banitów politycznych dredy są dla niego wyrazem fizycznej separacji od społeczeństwa i cywilizowanego życia oraz symbolizują ich relacje z duchami i bóstwami. Długie i poplątane w wyniku braku higieny włosy świadczą o całkowitym zobojętnieniu na wygląd, odrzuceniu społecznych norm zachowania w kwestii własnego ciała oraz ascetycznym wycofaniu się ze społeczeństwa (Olivelle 1998: 23, 26). Fryzura miała też pełnić funkcję wyróżnika kulturowego – odróżniała wędrownych ascetów od wyznawców sikhizmu, którym wiara nakazuje regularnie myć i czesać włosy. Różnicującą funkcję dredów zauważono również wśród buddyjskich kapłanów tantrycznych, którzy w ten sposób odróżniali się od mnichów tybetańskich (Bogin 2008), a także u wojowników masajskich (Saitoi, Beckwith 1980: 126–129).

Interesujące zjawisko związane ze spletanymi włosami zaobserwował także amerykański antropolog James L. Watson. Podczas badań w Hongkongu w latach sześćdziesiątych zobaczył „długowłosego ducha” – nędzarza przebywającego w stanie permanentnej żałoby spowodowanej śmiercią ich rodzin z rąk komunistów (Watson 1998: 178). Mieszkańcy wsi San Tin, w której antropolog prowadził badania, nadawali tej fryzurze dodatkowe znaczenie, związane z wizerunkiem tzw. głodnych duchów. W południowych Chinach ciała zmarłych po kilku latach

od pogrzebienia były ekshumowane w celu ich oczyszczenia z pozostałego mięsa, włosów i paznokci, a następnie ponownie chowane. Tym, co budowało skojarzenie między ekshumowanymi szczątkami, „głodnymi duchami”, a długowłosymi nędzaczami, były dredy (Watson 1998: 188).

Globalny fenomen dredów ma swoje początki na Jamajce. W jaki sposób się tam znalazły? Według Bertrama Ashego istnieje kilka wyjaśnień. Jedno z nich mówi o zainspirowaniu się przez współczesnych rasta fotografiami zmieszczonymi niegdyś w jamajskiej prasie, które przedstawiały Afrykanów w długich dredach. Niektórzy twierdzą, że zdjęcia przedstawiały Oromów, Somalijczyków albo Masajów. Inni uważają, że byli to zwolennicy pochodzącego z plemienia Kikuju kenijskiego polityka Jomo Kenyatty, uczestników powstania Mau Mau lub hinduskich pustelników, którzy podobno przebywali na Jamajce w 1910 roku.

Według ostatniej wersji na fotografiach tych znajdowali się popiecznicy Hajle Syllasjego I, ostatniego cesarza Etiopii, który współcześnie jest jednym z głównych symboli religijnego ruchu rastafari. Co ciekawe, ani cesarz Hajle Syllasje, ani pochodzący z Jamajki Leonard Howell, znany później jako „Pierwszy Rasta”, nie mieli dredów, lecz charakterystyczne długie brody. Dredy jako wyróżnik ruchu rastafariańskiego zostały spopularyzowane w latach 50. XX wieku za sprawą organizacji Youth Black Faith, która kierowała się biblijnym oświadczeniem Nazarejczyków o nieobcinaniu swoich włosów. Zaczęły służyć identyfikacji, manifestacji solidarności i społecznej prowokacji (Ashe 2015: 37–44).

W polskim kontekście kulturowym rozważania na temat znaczenia dredów jako fryzury powstałej ze sfilcowanych włosów muszą zostać powiązane z tzw. kołtunem. W szesnastowiecznej Polsce terminem „kołtun” określano silnie splecione włosy w postaci pęku, sznurów bądź czegoś na kształt czapki powstałej w wyniku długotrwałego braku higieny ze sfilcowanych włosów posklejanych brudem i lojem (Cukierska 2014: 18). „Najmłodszy” przykład polskiego kołtuna został zaobserwowany w roku 2013 (Pruszyński et al. 2013). Nazwa zjawiska pochodzi najprawdopodobniej od słowa ‘kieltanie się’ oznaczającego kołysanie się – w tym przypadku brudnych, splecionych włosów (Brückner 1927: 248). Początkowo jednak kołtun nie był postrzegany jako efekt braku higieny osobistej. Wiązano go przede wszystkim z chorobą, chociaż i to nie było oczywiste, o czym pisze Anna Targońska (1998: 167): „Pierwotnie nie uważano go za chorobę, lecz traktowano jako jej emanację. Wychodzono z założenia, iż każdy człowiek posiada w sobie uśpioną dolegliwość, która zruszona uzewnętrzniała chorobę oraz powodowała zwijanie się włosów i tworzenie kołtuna”.

Niekiedy kołtun traktowano jako talizman, który miał chronić swojego właściciela przed chorobami czy urokiem rzuconym przez czarownicę (Gąsiorowski 2013: 3). Kołtun zapuszczano celowo, by choroba „uciekała” na zewnątrz i zamiast ciała „atakowała” włosy. Zdarzało się, że traktowano go jako osobną istotę nadprzyrodzoną posiadającą własną sprawczość. Kołtun mógł wymagać czegoś od swojego „żywiciela”, a jeśli tego nie dostał, mógł zadziałać na jego niekorzyść. Istniało również rozróżnienie na kołtun męski i żeński. Kołtun męski (samiec) przybierał kształt zwisających wokół głowy splecionych sznurów włosów. Kołtun

żeński (samica) występował pod postacią zbitej, podobnej do skorupy lub czapki masy włosów (Cukierska 2014: 23). W literaturze etnograficznej można odnaleźć opisy przedstawiające sposoby zadawania i pozbywania się kołtuna (Udziela 1891: 204; Cukierska 2014: 22).

Jednym z badaczy zajmujących się omawianym zjawiskiem był Józef Dietl, który w 1862 roku opracował genezę sfilcowanego kłębu włosów i dowiódł braku związku między jego obciążeniem a chorobami tych, którzy go nosili. Choć obcinanie kołtunów oraz zalecenie o częstym myciu głowy i czesaniu włosów poskutkowało zanikiem kołtuna, jakiś czas po apelu badacza odnotowywano jeszcze sporadyczne przypadki zapuszczania spilśnionych włosów w różnych częściach Polski. Przekonałam się o tym w 2016 roku podczas badań terenowych dotyczących praktykowania krajobrazu kulturowego na Biskupiźnie. Spotkałam tam urodzoną w 1954 roku mieszkankę Żychlewa, która opowiadała o tym, jak jej babcia cierpiała na „kotun”:

[Babcia] była 1900 rocznik. (...) Wie pani, tu za bogato nie było. (...) Babcia opowiadała, ale nie wie dlaczego, że dostała, jak miała dziesięć czy dwanaście lat kotuny. Włosy jej się... nie twierdzą, żeby nie od mycia. Ale może, no nie wiem. Bo miała anemię, wszystko. I ojca wtedy nie miała. I jak ona wyglądała... (...) I potem jak ścinali, bo już miała jako perukę i musieli ściąć, to zemdląca. (...) Najgorsza bieda u nas była w 1910 roku. (...) Włosy się, tak jak filc, sfilcowały się na głowie. (...) Z biedy to się chyba zrobiło, ja czuję. Albo choroba była? Ja wiem, że miała anemię.

Kołtun był dla kobiety tematem wstydlivym – nie chciała zbyt wiele opowiadać o trudnych warunkach bytowych swojej rodziny. Była świadoma tego, że splątanie włosów babci mogło wynikać z braku higieny, jednak nie wykluczała innych możliwości, takich jak choroba czy bieda. Podczas drugiej rozmowy, w której uczestniczyły dwie inne osoby, padło pytanie, czy „kotun” rzeczywiście jest tylko splątanymi, brudnymi włosami, czy może dolegliwością wewnętrzną. Jedna z kobiet obecnych przy spotkaniu zapytała: „Ale to na pewno na głowie? Bo ja słyszałam, że to jakby na żołądku!”. Moi rozmówcy widzieli w nim nie tylko brak higieny, ale także choroby trawiące ciało od wewnątrz, których sfilcowana masa wyrastająca z głowy była tylko zewnętrznym objawem.

Powyższe przykłady zdają się potwierdzać tezę Olivelle’a (1998: 31), według której nie ma jednego i uniwersalnego znaczenia włosów, a ten sam symbol może w tych samych bądź różnych kontekstach jednocześnie mieć więcej niż jedno znaczenie. Dotyczy to również dredów – jak dowodzi Ashe (2015: 36) – taką fryzurę nosiły „plemiona germańskie, Wikingowie, mieszkańcy wysp Pacyfiku, Aztekowie, wcześnie chrześcijanie, członkowie Baye Fall z Senegalu – pytanie nie brzmi, kto nosi dredy. Pozostaje pytanie, kto ich nie nosił?”. W każdym z tych miejsc dredy są częścią wierzeń i praktyk, mają inne znaczenie, są inaczej wykonywane i nazywane. Wyobrażenia na temat dredów rodzą niekiedy nieporozumienia komunikacyjne, a nawet konflikty, które znalazły się w centrum moich badań nad społeczno-kulturowymi aspektami noszenia dredów w Polsce.

Dredy w Polsce: muzyka, władza i płęć kulturowa

Na studiach magisterskich w Instytucie Antropologii i Etnologii UAM (wtedy jeszcze Instytutu Etnologii i Antropologii Kulturowej) interesowałam się kulturowymi praktykami dotyczącymi włosów i fryzury, a szczególnie funkcjonującymi w naszym społeczeństwie wyobrażeniami na temat dredów. W ciągu sześciu lat noszenia dredów spotykałam się ze zróżnicowanymi reakcjami i pytaniami, nie zawsze uprzejmymi, które zadawali mi zarówno bliscy, jak i przypadkowo spotkani ludzie. Dlatego też na podstawie własnych doświadczeń oraz badań przeprowadzonych w 2017 roku przygotowałam i obroniłam pracę magisterską pt. *Stereotypizując fryzurę. Społeczno-kulturowe aspekty noszenia dredów w Polsce*, na bazie której powstał ten artykuł.

Podczas badań trwających od grudnia 2016 do maja 2017 roku przeprowadziłam dziesięć wywiadów etnograficznych⁵. Próba ta jest zdecydowanie za mała, by formułować na jej podstawie ogólne wnioski, jednak pozwoliła mi na rozpoznanie zjawisk związanych z praktykowaniem dredów w Polsce. Moimi rozmówcami stały się osoby między 20. a 31. rokiem życia. Większość z nich (siedem osób) stanowili studenci (M01, M02, M03, M04) i studentki (K02, K03, K04, K06) uczący się w Poznaniu, Lesznie i Krakowie. Jedna osoba pracowała na pełen etat (K05). Jedna prowadziła własną działalność gospodarczą (K01). Spotkania odbywały się we Wschowie, w Poznaniu, Gnieźnie, Sławie, Zielonej Górze, Sęszewie i Krakowie. Pierwsze rozmowy przeprowadziłam z osobami z najbliższego środowiska. Stali się oni moimi „odźwiernymi”, którzy pomagali wskazać kolejnych potencjalnych rozmówców.

Wywiady zostały przeprowadzone w różnych przestrzeniach. Z niektórymi spotkałam się w ich domach, z innymi umawiałam się w kawiarni lub w barze, a także online. Moje pytania dotyczyły przede wszystkim motywacji, które skłoniły daną osobą do wykonania dredów. Pytałam o to, kiedy je zrobiła i z jakiego powodu. Interesowało mnie, czy była to spontaniczna decyzja, czy poprzedzały ją przygotowania, czy dredy zostały zrobione przez profesjonalistę w salonie, czy może w domu przez znajomego. Pytałam o zmiany, jakie nastąpiły po ich zrobieniu, o reakcję rodziny, przyjaciół, obcych, a także o ogólną rolę, jaką włosy odgrywają w ich życiu, czy są dla nich ważne. Interesowały mnie również doświadczenia związane z postrzeganiem dredów przez innych ludzi oraz opinie rozmówców na ten temat. Zastanawiałam się, czy stosowano wobec nich określone wyobrażenia i stereotypy, a jeżeli tak, to jaki mieli do nich stosunek.

Pomysł na zmianę fryzury moi rozmówcy podejmowali najczęściej kilka lat przed ich zrobieniem, jednak z uwagi na niepełnoletniość i nieprzychylnie opinie rodziny odkładali to wydarzenie na później. Jedna z moich rozmówczyń, 29-letnia mieszkanka Poznania, dokładnie pamięta moment, w którym postanowiła zrobić sobie dredy:

⁵ Ponadto prowadziłam notatki z nieformalnych rozmów, w których pojawiał się temat włosów i dredów, jednak nie wliczam ich w zestaw wywiadów.

Jeśli chodzi o moje dredy, to tak, decyzję podjęłam pierwszą, że chcę, jak miałam, nie wiem, naście lat, jak byłam w gimnazjum, pierwsza, druga gimnazjum, więc to potrwało jeszcze z pięć lat, zanim je zrobiłam. (...) No ja pamiętam pierwszą sytuację, kiedy chciałam dredy. Byłam na jakiejś wycieczce, widziałam pierwszy raz na żywo w Berlinie dredy i po prostu wiedziałam. (...) Jak to zobaczyłam, to się zakochałam (K01).

Rozmówczyni zarabiała też na robieniu dredów innym ludziom. Mając dziesięć lat doświadczenia, doskonale знаła tendencje i mody, które sprowadzały do niej klientów. Tych jej nie brakowało – piętrzące się zlecenia zmuszały mnie do wielokrotnej zmiany terminu spotkania. Każdego traktowała indywidualnie, starając się zrozumieć, dlaczego zdecydował się na taką fryzurę. Na tej podstawie stwierdziła, że niektórzy niewiele wiedzą o praktycznej stronie dredów. Nie są przygotowani na ból ani na to, że efekt finalny może się całkowicie różnić od tego na zdjęciu. Tłumaczyła im, że każde włosy mają inną strukturę i nie zawsze będą wyglądały tak, jak oczekiwano. Większość wtedy wychodziła i już nie wracała. Pytana o przedział wiekowy swoich klientów dreadmakerka odpowiedziała:

Jeżeli chodzi o wiek, kim są ci ludzie i czym się zajmują, to przekrój jest ogromny. Ostatnio miałam dziewięćlatka. (...) Półtora roku zapuszczał włosy, więc miał z siedem lat, jak na to wpadł, szok. No, to był najmłodszy, jakiego robiłam. A najstarszej pani się boję spytać o wiek, bo wygląda wiekowo, ale myślę, że ma około sześćdziesięciu lat. (...) To nie jest tak, że to jest przekrój dwadzieścia–dwadzieścia pięć lat (K01).

Rozmówcy już na poziomie motywacji prezentowali odmienne doświadczenia. Było to m.in. zainteresowanie muzyką, chociaż i w tej materii różnili się od siebie. Nie wszyscy bowiem interesowali się domniemanym źródłem dredów, czyli muzyką reggae. W zasadzie stanowili oni mniejszość (dwie osoby). Jedna z rozmówczyń, która stwierdziła, że za jej decyzją nie stały „absolutnie żadne jakieś rastamańskie pomysły”⁶: „byłam zakochana w Kornie⁷ i po prostu tam był Munky. (...) On miał dredy i ja musiałam po prostu, nie. Ogólnie na pewno nie Bob, na pewno nie Bob Marley” (K01).

Niektórzy, mimo że informacje o dredach czerpali z literatury i filmów poświęconych rastafari, nie utożsamiali się z jego ideologią. Jedna osoba uznała, że jako głęboko wierząca katoliczka nie może się z nim identyfikować (K02). Wśród motywacji znalazły się również względy praktyczne. Jedna z moich rozmówczyń uznała, że codzienne mycie, suszenie i układanie włosów utrudniało jej podróżowanie. Jednocześnie stwierdziła, że dredy kojarzą jej się z buntem, wolnością i powrotem do bardziej naturalnego trybu życia. Podobnie postąpił także rozmówca, który wyżej od zainteresowań muzycznych postawił wygląd i praktyczność fryzury:

⁶ Słowa użyte przez rozmówczynię.

⁷ Amerykański zespół wykonujący muzykę z gatunku nu metal.

Muzyka? Myślę, że nie aż tak. (...) Bardziej względy estetyczne. Zrobiłem dredy ze względów estetycznych, nie ideologicznych. Zrobiłem dlatego, że mi się podobały. Musiałem to zrobić, bo wiedziałem, że jak ich nie zrobię, to zetnę włosy, bo mnie denerwowała grzywka (M01).

Dredy zatem mogą, ale nie muszą wynikać z dorastania w określonych warunkach i wśród osób słuchających konkretnego gatunku muzycznego. Sama muzyka, która przyczyniła się do podjęcia decyzji o zapuszczeniu włosów bądź doczepieniu gotowych, długich dredów, była zróżnicowana lub nie miała żadnego znaczenia. Dwie osoby wprost przyznały, że nie odnoszą swojej fryzury do muzyki, światopoglądu czy określonej subkultury. Mówiły o pewnej estetyce, z którą się identyfikowały lub o względach praktycznych, które pozwalały między innymi na długie wyjazdy bez konieczności codziennego mycia włosów. Dla nich dredy były fryzurą, która przypadła im do gustu i odpowiadała na ich potrzeby.

Z doświadczeń moich rozmówców wynika, że w ich otoczeniu społecznym dredy często nie są postrzegane jako „normalna” fryzura. Podzielili się ze mną refleksjami na temat pracodawców traktujących ich włosy jako wyznacznik specyficznych światopoglądów i zachowania, który brano pod uwagę przy zatrudnieniu, a także szkół, których statuty zabraniały uczniom noszenia dredów. Najczęściej jednak to członkowie rodziny – rodzice i dziadkowie – dawali moim rozmówcom do zrozumienia, że nie odpowiada im taka fryzura u ich dzieci czy wnuków. Ci, którzy wpadli na pomysł zrobienia sobie dredów w szkole podstawowej, gimnazjum czy liceum, odłożyli te plany ze względu na brak zgody ze strony rodziców lub przez samą obawę przed ich negatywną reakcją. Osiągnięcie pełnoletniości stanowiło warunek postawiony rozmówcom przez ich rodziców. Do tego czasu każda trwała zmiana musiała być skonsultowana z rodziną, która zwykle się na nią nie zgadzała.

Tak było między innymi w przypadku rozmówczyni, która zrobiła sobie dredy w wieku dwudziestu jeden lat. Zapytana, dlaczego nie zrobiła tego wcześniej, powiedziała: „Myślę, że rodzice nie wyraziliby zgody, zanim miałam osiemnaście lat. A już tutaj nie mieli co mówić. Moja decyzja i moje też pieniądze, więc trochę inaczej” (K03). Pełnoletniość stanowi również kryterium, które należy spełnić, by umówić się na zrobienie dredów u profesjonalisty. W innym wypadku wymagają oni pisemnego oświadczenia, w którym rodzic lub opiekun zgadza się na wykonanie fryzury u swojego dziecka/podopiecznego:

Była raz taka dziewczynka u mnie. (...) Miała tylko trzy z tyłu, więc to nie był jakiś tam problem. Jakby chciała całą głowę, byłaby nieletnia i przyszła bez jakiegś tam zgody od rodziców, to bym jej nie przyjęła (K01).

Poza wiekiem barierą przed dredami jest cena zabiegu, która sięga współcześnie kilkuset złotych. Wysoki koszt usługi uniemożliwia ją młodym, niezarabiającym osobom – muszą na nią zarobić lub poprosić o finansową pomoc rodziców. Jak zauważyła rozmówczyni K01: „to rodzice płacą za dredy i decydują o tym, czy dziecko może lub nie może ich nosić”.

Problemy z dreadami pojawiają się także na poziomie instytucjonalnym. Gimnazjum, do którego chodził jeden z moich rozmówców (M01), uznawało je za wygląd niezgodny ze statutem szkoły, karany obniżeniem oceny z zachowania lub w skrajnym przypadku wydalaniem z placówki. Gdy był uczniem drugiej klasy, do gimnazjum dołączył chłopak, którego dredy wywołały spore kontrowersje:

Mówili mu, że albo ścina dredy, albo nie przyjmują go do szkoły. (...) Szkoła powoływała się na jakiś tam zapis w statucie, że uczeń musi być schludny i tak dalej. Za nieschludne uznali dredy (M01).

Chłopak nie pozbył się swoich włosów, a dyrekcja szkoły usunęła go z placówki. Choć mojego rozmówcy (M01), który w tym czasie miał kilka dreadów, nie spotkały tak daleko idące konsekwencje, on również doświadczył nieprzyjemności ze strony nauczycieli. Podczas wywiadu wspominał docinki o braku higieny czy stawianie przed nim dużo większych wymagań niż wobec pozostałych uczniów. Nie spodobało mu się takie traktowanie. Uznał, że uczniowie mają prawo ubierać się i czesać tak, jak chcą, bez narażenia na obniżenie oceny zachowania czy odebranie statusu ucznia. Postanowił dołączyć do sekcji prawnej samorządu studenckiego, gdzie podjął działania na rzecz zmiany zapisu dotyczącego wyglądu w statucie szkoły. Chodził na rady pedagogiczne, podczas których przedstawiał swój punkt widzenia nauczycielom i dyrekcji. Wysłuchiwał innych uczniów, którzy mieli obiekcje w stosunku do relacji między nimi a nauczycielami. Starania te nie przyniosły jednak żadnych rezultatów, a statut szkoły nadal ma zapis dotyczący wyglądu uczniów. Narracja rozmówcy była jedyną, która dotyczyła tak skrajnego doświadczenia związanego z dreadami w szkole. Być może wynika to z tego, że należy on do nielicznych, którzy dredy nosili już w gimnazjum. Dwie z moich rozmówczyń (K01 i K03) o posiadaniu dreadów zdecydowały w podobnym czasie, jednak zrobiły je dopiero w liceum i na studiach, gdzie nie obowiązywały tak surowe zasady dotyczące wyglądu.

Dredy mogą stanowić utrudnienie bądź ułatwienie zdobycia zatrudnienia. Jedna z moich rozmówczyń z powodu fryzury straciła pracę kelnerki w hotelowej restauracji. Po kilku miesiącach od podjęcia pracy miejsce zostało poddane rutynowej kontroli sanitarno-epidemiologicznej, po której moja rozmówczyni (K01) dostała wypowiedzenie⁸. Poszukiwania nowej pracy często kończyły się niepowodzeniem, ponieważ „właściciel nie zgadzał się na dredy”:

(...) pojechałam do jakiegoś hotelu, prawie za miastem, ale już byłam zdesperowana. Poszłam do tego hotelu i kiedy na recepcji składałam CV, też babka powiedziała, że jakbym ścięła dredy, to nie ma sprawy, bierze mnie. (...) Ale nie, stwierdziłam, że póki nie mam dzieci i zobowiązań takich konkretnych, to pierdziele, będę pracować na kasach. A na kasach chcieli wszystkich (K01).

⁸ Z narracji K01 wynikało, że inspektorom nie spodobał się fakt posiadania dreadów przez osobę przyjmującą zamówienia i wydającą jedzenie gościom hotelowym.

Doświadczenie rozmówczyni nie dowodzi jednak o uprzedzeniach wszystkich polskich pracodawców. Wśród moich rozmówców znalazły się również takie, którym udało się znaleźć zatrudnienie bez problemów. Jedna z osób starała się o pracę na stacji benzynowej:

Pamiętam, że chciałem iść do pracy na wakacje w 2012 roku. (...) Wysłałem CV, zaprosili na rozmowę i przyszedłem. Gadamy, gadamy, i nie było podczas tej rozmowy żadnego tematu o dreadach. Jakbym ich nie miał. Nie było żadnego kłopotu. (...) Bałem się, że pomyślą, że na stanowisku sprzedawcy będę odstraszać ludzi. Ale nikt, absolutnie, ani klienci, ani szefostwo nie mieli pretensji (M02).

Rozmówczyni, która sama miała dosyć nieprzyjemne doświadczenia związane z dreadami w miejscu pracy, opowiadała o klientce, która właśnie dzięki nim została zatrudniona: „zrobiła sobie dredy u mnie. Jak miała całą głowę, to poszła do DPD do pracy i babka powiedziała jej, że nie jest szarą myszką przynajmniej i dlatego ją wzięła. Bo ludzie w dreadach to takie konkret osoby, więc ją wybrała...” (K01). Z powyższego wynika, że określone wyobrażenie o osobie noszącej dredy może zarówno utrudnić, jak i ułatwić zdobycie pracy. Pracodawczyni, którą spotkała klientka mojej rozmówczyni, przez pryzmat włosów postrzegała ją jako osobę odważną, kreatywną i otwartą, co czyniło ją potencjalnie dobrą pracowniczką. Jednak niezależnie od tego, czy ma wydźwięk pozytywny, czy negatywny, stereotyp wciąż jest stereotypem i wynika z określonych wyobrażeń o świecie.

W narracjach rozmówców moją uwagę zwróciło odmienne postrzeżenie dreadów w zależności od płci osoby, która je nosi. Schemat, który powtarzał się niemal za każdym razem, to odbieranie stereotypowo rozumianej „esencji” płci, czyli kobiecości i męskości. Dredy miały sprawiać, że kobiety są mniej „kobiece”, a mężczyźni mniej „męscy”. Problem ten dotyczył przede wszystkim kobiet. Po zmianie fryzury bardzo często słyszały uwagi na temat swojej urody. Jedna z rozmówczyń przypomniała sobie, że „babcia do dzisiaj tego nie przelknęła. Cały czas mówi o ich ścięciu. Mówi, że nie wyglądam jak dziewczyna, że to nie jest takie dziewczęce” (K04). Jej odpowiedź wskazywała, że tego typu komentarze padają najczęściej ze strony rodziny – to właśnie bliscy mają największe obiekcje wobec nowego wizerunku swoich córek i wnuczek.

Antykobiece wyobrażenia o dreadach są również motorem napędzającym mowę nienawiści kierowaną w stronę moich rozmówczyń przez nieznanym:

Koleś (...) po prostu obchodził mnie dookoła, bo nie wierzył, że jestem dziewczyną. I bardzo głośno komentował. Pierwszy raz miałam taką sytuację. Bo był strasznie chamski w tym i był w szoku, że jak, laska i dredy? Nie rozumiał (K01).

Opisane wyżej sytuacje mogłyby sugerować, że skoro dredy są niekobiece, a dziewczyny je noszące mylone są z mężczyznami, to taka fryzura powinna być atrybutem męskości. Tak jednak nie jest. Moi rozmówcy wspominali: „zdarzało się, że szedłem do znajomych na imprezę i pytali mnie, co mam z tyłu. Ja mówię:

dredy. A oni, że wyglądam jak dziewczynka” (M04); „Pamiętam, że jak wtedy miałem dredy, to nie nosiłem zarostu i cały czas mnie mylili z kobietą. Stojąc w kolejce, ktoś szturchał mnie w ramię i mówił «a pani coś tam», a ja się odwracałem i mówiłem: «Jestem mężczyzną». Czasami mnie to denerwowało” (M02).

Podczas rozmów często okazywało się, że moi rozmówcy podzielają stereotypy, które używano w stosunku do nich samych. Jedna z moich rozmówczyń (K06), która rozplątała swoje dredy, powiedziała: „Ja dredy bardzo lubiłam, ale jak potem się pierwszy raz wykapałam tak naprawdę, to tak stałam pod prysznicem i tak mogłam normalnie spienić i potem rozczesać, czułam się jak kobieta z powrotem”. Tymi słowami wydawała się potwierdzać to, co wcześniej sugerowała jej mama – że dredy w istocie są niekobiece, ponieważ uniemożliwiają codzienne praktyki, takie jak mycie i układanie włosów, które rozmówczynie wiązała z poczuciem swojej kobiecej tożsamości. Z jej słów wynikało, że rozplątanie dredów „zwróciło” jej brakującą dotychczas kobiecość. Jeden z moich rozmówców miał podobne zdanie na temat dredów u kobiet, mimo że sam je nosił. Jego zdaniem dredy zabierają miejsce długich i gładkich włosów, które powinny być immanentnym atrybutem kobiety:

Jakby moja dziewczyna miała dredy, to chyba bym nie chciał, żeby miała. Bo lubię tę konsystencję włosów, że sobie pomacasz i tak dalej. A dredy są sztywne. To jest inna sprawa, dredy u kobiety (M02).

Osoby te uznały dredy za fryzurę antykobiecą, a długie i gładkie włosy za wyjątkową cechę charakteryzującą płęć żeńską. Z analogiczną opozycją zmagają się rozmówczynie amerykańskiej profesor black studies Ingrid Banks (2000). Badane przez nią kobiety musiały uporać się z wyobrazeniami na temat swoich afrykańskich włosów, które stanowiły widok społecznie niepożądany, niekobiecey i brzydki. Zależność między dredami a włosami rozczesanymi może być częściowo analizowana w podobny sposób, jak relacja między afro a włosami prostymi. Amerykańska pisarka i feministka bell hooks⁹ (1989: 382–388) określiła wełniste afro mianem „złych włosów”, których przeciwieństwo stanowią „dobre włosy” – długie, proste, gładkie i jasne. Z narracji moich rozmówczyń wynika, że w Polsce „złymi włosami” mogą być właśnie dredy, które, nawet jeżeli są długie, są też sztywne, szorstkie i wymagające zupełnie innej pielęgnacji. Z doświadczeń badanych wynika, że dredy dokonują czegoś w rodzaju „odpłciowienia” – zaprzeczają zarówno stereotypowo pojmowanej kobiecości, jak i męskości.

Stereotypy w działaniu

Część pytań, które zadawałam moim rozmówcom, dotyczyła społecznego odbioru dredów. Nie znalazłam osoby, której fryzura nie wzbudzała żadnych emocji wśród rodziny, przyjaciół czy przypadkowo spotkanych osób. Wobec wszystkich

⁹ Pseudonim artystyczny Glorii Jean Watkins.

przynajmniej raz zastosowane zostało pewne wyobrażenie i opinia wypracowana na gruncie tego wyobrażenia. Reakcje na dredy wynikały z niewiedzy i stereotypów, które obejmowały zarówno samą fryzurę, jak i osoby, które ją noszą. Wyobrażenia te funkcjonowały na wielu płaszczyznach. Dotyczyły nie tylko płci kulturowej, o której wspomniałam, lecz także higieny, społecznie konstruowanej kategorii piękna i brzydoty, poglądów politycznych oraz określonych zachowań przypisywanych różnym subkulturom.

Część stereotypów miała wydźwięk pejoratywny: „Pytano mnie na przykład o to, czy palę, bo z tym wiąże się ten wygląd, że dredy i muzyka reggae, to ludzie mnie posądza od razu o to, że muszę palić właśnie marihuanę, a ja tego nie robię” (K02). „Kiedyś tylko zaczepił mnie dziadek w Wolsztynie, taki pijaczek zapytał, czemu się oszpeciłam. Pamiętam, że... za każdym razem pytali, czy się myje dredy, jak się myje dredy” (K04). „Zdarzyło się, że któraś z nad wyraz zadbanych panien oburzała się: jak można nosić coś takiego na głowie, i to dziewczyna! Bardzo dużo osób posądzało mnie o słuchanie Boba Marleya i muzyki reggae. Uważali też, że na pewno jestem hipisem o bliskich komunizmowi poglądach politycznych” (K05). „Moja ulubiona historia, to jest jakaś taka parka takich... Wyglądali na takich spiżaczonych ludzi i kobieta odezwała się za moimi plecami: «bo się porzygam». Nie chodziło jej raczej o to, że za dużo wypięła, tylko że moje dredy są okropne” (K01). „Słyszałam na przykład, że mam gówno na głowie. No że mam robale w głowie, że nie mam szczotki w domu. No i często pytania, czy mam coś do palenia” (M03). „Coś takiego było, ale to jakieś dziecko mówiło małe, szłam ulicą i słyszałam za sobą: «Czy ta pani nie myła włosów?»” (K03). „Raz spotkałem się z taką nietolerancją. Na żuźlu. Jeden z kibiców chwycił mnie na bok i pytał, co ja mam na włosach i tak dalej. A to był kibic tego samego klubu co ja! Powiedział, że mam zdjąć barwy albo pozbyć się tych włosów” (M04).

Część doświadczeń moich rozmówców wynikała jednak z wyobrażeń o charakterze pozytywnym. Zarówno przypadkowo spotkane osoby, potencjalni pracodawcy, bliscy, jak i sami badani przyporządkowywali dredy do takich kategorii jak: otwartość, pomysłowość, kreatywność czy wolność. „Zawarłam mnóstwo znajomości przez dredy. Często nieznanymi osobami w dredach witały się ze mną na ulicy, uśmiechały. Także Ci bez dredów zagadywali, chwalili fryzurę. (...) Panie w przedszkolu były uradowane mamą w dredach i opowiadały o swoich dzieciach, które chcą lub mają dredy” (K05). „Jest jakieś takie przekonanie, że ludzie w dredach są bardziej otwarci, więc sami też się do nich otwierają. Nie jest taki sztywniak, można zagadać, na pewno jest wyluzowany” (K01). „Czasami było fajnie, jak przechodzi dresik i mówi «fajne pająki!»! Zazwyczaj jest spoko, na palcach jednej ręki mogę policzyć jakieś osoby, które tam ewidentnie źle zareagowały” (K01).

Dredy moich rozmówców odbierane były jako sygnał, że osoba je nosząca należy do pewnej grupy społecznej czy subkultury, ma określony charakter i zainteresowania. Dla wielu nowo poznanych osób byli fanami muzyki reggae, mimo że jej nie słuchali. Pytano ich o narkotyki, mimo że ich nie spożywali. Uznawano za osoby zaniedbane i brudne, mimo że dbali o higienę. Zdarzało się,

że przechodnie, klienci tego samego sklepu czy uczestnicy tego samego koncertu dotykali włosów moich rozmówców, co naruszało ich przestrzeń osobistą. Jedna z nich pamiętała, jak ciekawscy ludzie bez skrępowania sięgali po jej dredy. Z czasem zachowanie to zaczęło jej przeszkadzać do tego stopnia, że stało się jednym z powodów, przez które rozplątała włosy.

W niektórych przytoczonych fragmentach rozmów wybrzmiewała teza, że większość osób noszących dredy to „otwarte umysły” – osoby odważne, żadne przygód, uwolnione od społecznej kontroli nad wyglądem. Jest to jednak ocena subiektywna. Jedna z moich rozmówczyń zapytana o to, czy w jakiś sposób utożsamia się z istniejącymi wyobrażeniami na swój temat, przypomniała sobie czasy studiów: „Pamiętam, że jak mieliśmy wykłady, to wykładowca walił do mnie cały czas jakimiś tekstami. Oczekiwał, że będę z nim rozmawiać, że będę bezczelna, że będę do przodu strasznie, bo przecież mam dredy. Że ja powinnam rozmawiać z nim, a ja nie byłam taka” (K01).

Moi rozmówcy najczęściej starali się nie zwracać szczególnej uwagi na podobne zaczepki. Przyzwyczajali się do nich, jak i przykrych komentarzy. Nie oznacza to jednak, że ich nie dotykały. Jedna z moich rozmówczyń przyznała: „kilka razy też smutno było, jak ktoś mówił, że się nie myję, ale w sumie się nie przejmowałam, bo wiedziałam, że się myję” (K06). Oprócz wyraźnie pejoratywnych określeń osoby noszące dredy spotykały się również z pozytywnymi reakcjami, które zdecydowanie przeważały nad tymi negatywnymi. Nieznajomi zaczepiali ich, mówiąc, że mają piękne „pająki”, „baty”, „macki” czy „kluski”. Dredy stanowiły pretekst do nawiązywania nowych znajomości, które przerażały się w głębokie przyjaźnie lub stałe związki. Według jednej z moich rozmówczyń społeczny odbiór dredów wynika z ich stanu. Zadbane i czyste nie wzbudzają jej zdaniem takich reakcji, jak powyginane i nieuporządkowane.

Jednym ze stereotypów na temat dredów, które wskazali moi rozmówcy, jest przypisanie ich pochodzenia z Jamajki i powiązanie z duchowością pierwszych członków ruchu rastafari. Nie jest to oczywiście nieprawdą, jednak – jak wykazałam w pierwszej części tekstu – fryzura ta jest elementem wielu kultur i religii. Problem ten sięga jednak dużo głębiej niż sam fakt niewiedzy i prowadzi niekiedy do poważnych konfliktów. Jedna z klientek mojej rozmówczynie (K01) ścięła dredy po kilku tygodniach od zabiegu. Dziewczyna tłumaczyła, że decyzję tę podjęła po negatywnych reakcjach jej czarnoskórych znajomych w Londynie. Mieli uznać, że dziewczyna bez pochodzenia afrykańskiego nie ma prawa do noszenia dredów, że w ten sposób profanuje ich dziedzictwo kulturowe i rodzime tradycje. Mieli grozić jej obcięciem włosów. Niestety moja rozmówczynie (K01) nie знаła szczegółów wydarzenia, mnie natomiast mimo licznych prób nie udało się skontaktować z tą osobą. Wyrażeniami, które usłyszała w Polsce, były natomiast: „to nie jest twoje”, „tak nie noszą się biali”, „zdejmij to”.

Termin „przywłaszczenie kulturowe” (*cultural appropriation*) oznacza przejęcie i wykorzystywanie elementów jednej kultury przez członków innej (Young, Brunk 2012; por. Forte 2017). Od zapożyczenia, które znajdziemy w każdej niemal kulturze (Linton 1937: 405-406), przywłaszczenie kulturowe różni się tym, że

polega na zawłaszczeniu symboli i zachowań określonej grupy, dla której mają one istotne znaczenie społeczne i religijne. Wykorzystanie ich w zupełnie innym kontekście kulturowym, pozbawienie pierwotnego znaczenia symbolicznego lub jego trywializacja może być uznane przez tę grupę za akt profanacji. Zjawisko ma najczęściej charakter kolonialnej relacji władzy i dominacji – społeczność przywłaszczająca jest zwykle większością o wyższym statusie społecznym, ekonomicznym, politycznym czy militarnym od grupy, której symbole są przedmiotem kradzieży. W ten sposób włączone w popkulturę artefakty o pierwotnie odmiennym znaczeniu społecznym stanowią przejaw folkloryzmu, czyli wybiórczego traktowania elementów kultury tradycyjnej, które wykorzystywane są w celowo zaaranżowanych i kontekstowo odmiennych sytuacjach (Burszta 1969: 69–90).

Wobec powyższego próbowałam zrozumieć fenomen dredów i możliwe znaczenia nadawane dredom w innych kulturach, które starałam się zarysować w pierwszej części tekstu. Moim celem nie było opowiedzenie się po którejś ze stron konfliktu i wykazanie, która ma rację lub się myli. Interesowały mnie raczej procesy, które do tego konfliktu doprowadziły. Sam problem przywłaszczenia kulturowego jest jednak dużo bardziej złożony, związany z problematyką przemocy kolonialnej i rasizmem, a przez to wymagający odrębnych badań i analizy teoretycznej.

Podsumowanie

Rzeczywistość badanych przeze mnie osób ukazała funkcjonujące w Polsce wyobrażenia i wynikające z nich uprzedzenia wobec dredów i ich właścicieli. W artykule skoncentrowałam się na czynnikach wpływających na decyzję o ich wykonaniu, społecznych reakcjach obnażających funkcjonujące stereotypy, wynikających z nich uprzedzeniach i ich społecznych konsekwencjach, wpływie na kulturowo konstruowane ideały kobiecości i męskości oraz, częściowo, przywłaszczeniu kulturowym.

Moi rozmówcy zrobili sobie dredy z uwagi na ich wymiar praktyczny i estetyczny, choć dużą rolę w decyzjach odgrywała także muzyka, którą, wbrew powszechnej opinii, było nie tylko reggae. Dla niektórych dredy były po prostu ciekawą fryzurą, którą nosili w ramach eksperymentu. Nie wiązali z nimi żadnych ideologii, światopoglądów czy kwestii religijnych. Nie stanowiły one „symbolu publicznego” (Obeyesekere 1981: 13), w którym krystalizowałyby się osobiste czy duchowe doświadczenia jednostki, ani wyróżnika kulturowego w rozumieniu Olivelle’a czy Bogina. Podczas badań dowiedziałam się, że wielu ludzi myśli o ich noszeniu dlatego, że są po prostu modne lub ponieważ nosi je wiele gwiazd światowej sceny muzycznej (K01). Tym, co łączyło badane osoby, był fakt, że żadna z nich nie deklarowała się jako członek ruchu rastafari, zatem żadna z nich nie potwierdzała nakładanego na nich stereotypu „rastamana”.

Zgodnie z koncepcjami fasady osobistej i wrażenia wywołanego (Goffman 2010: 47–49) fryzura może być związana z określonymi wyobrażeniami

nakładanymi na jej użytkownika lub stanowić zamierzony przez niego komunikat niewerbalny. Nie oznacza to jednak, że użytkownik ten nie jest świadomy znaczenia swojego uczesania. Może on, tak jak moi rozmówcy, nosić ją z innego powodu. Osoby z ich otoczenia społecznego, nie mając świadomości lub nie zważając na powód zmiany fryzury, nakładały na moich rozmówców wyobrażenie, które – ich zdaniem – odpowiadało powierzchowności. Erving Goffman stwierdza, że nie znając danej osoby, obserwatorzy mogą czerpać wskazówki z jej zachowania i wyglądu, odnosząc do niej wcześniejsze doświadczenia z osobami podobnymi lub zastosować sprawdzone stereotypy. Wśród opisanych przez Watsona mieszkańców San Tin długie i sfilcowane włosy nędzarzy wywoływały skojarzenia z ekshumowanymi zwłokami i budzącymi strach zjawami: śmiercią, chorobami i wszelkimi zarazami, których należało się tylko wystrzegać. Gdy żebracy pojawili się w San Tin, „wszystko, co się liczyło, to unikanie wszelkiego kontaktu z nimi” (Watson 1998: 188).

Możliwe, że wyobrażenia zastosowane przez otoczenie społeczne moich rozmówców wobec ich dredów wynikało z obecności w polskiej kulturze kołtuna – wspomniany tzw. kołtun męski wyglądał tak, jak współcześnie najczęściej wyglądają dredy. Na stereotyp dredów jako fryzury powstałej z zaniedbania i braku higieny wpływają także sposoby ich wykonania oraz utrzymywania. W gimnazjum i na początku liceum, kiedy sama szukałam informacji o dredach, fora internetowe podpowiadały takie techniki jak wcieranie cukru, jajek lub popiołu, które miały powodować zlepianie i kołtunienie włosy. Ani ja, ani żadna z osób, z którymi rozmawiałam, nie stosowała takich metod. Nieprawdą jest także, że dredów nie można myć.

Czy poprzez fryzurę moi rozmówcy wyszli ze strefy kontroli społecznej, o której pisał Hallpike (1969)? Ich doświadczenie świadczy o czymś zgoła przeciwnym, nawet w sensie dosłownym – byli jeszcze bardziej kontrolowani. Jedna z badanych przez mnie osób (K01) z powodu dredów straciła posadę kelnerki w hotelowej restauracji. Inna (M04) spotkała się z groźbami ze strony kibiców tego samego klubu sportowego. Przyjaciół jednego z moich rozmówców (K02) został zatrzymany przez policję w miejscu publicznym i poddany rewizji w poszukiwaniu narkotyków. Za noszenie dredów uczeń tej samej szkoły, do której chodził jeden z badanych (M01), został z niej wydalony. Przez wzgląd na fryzurę moi rozmówcy i rozmówczynie byli poddawani ocenie zarówno przez bliskich, jak i nieznanym. Tylko jedna osoba wiązała swoje dredy z buntem, wolnością i powrotem do natury.

Opisany w artykule wachlarz reakcji na posiadanie dredów dał próbę wyobrażeń, które na ten rodzaj fryzury nakłada otoczenie społeczne uczestników badania oraz sposób ich interpretacji przez samych rozmówców. Zarówno krytyczne, jak i przyjazne nastawienie wobec noszących dredy wynika bowiem z określonych dyspozycji nabytych przez posługującego się nimi w życiu codziennym. Moi rozmówcy postrzegani byli przez swoich bliskich, pracodawców, nauczycieli czy przypadkowo spotkane osoby jako osoby celowo zaniedbujące się, buntownicze, ale również optymistyczne, rozgadane i łatwo nawiązujące

kontakty. Wyobrażenia te odbierali na różne sposoby, z większością się jednak nie zgadzali, chociaż jednocześnie stosowali je wobec innych ludzi. Najczęściej deklarowali obojętność, mówiąc, że przecież sami wiedzą najlepiej, kim są.

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SUMMARY

Stereotyping hairstyle: Hair stereotypes in the experiences of people wearing dreadlocks in Poland

The article is an anthropological analysis of the symbolism of hair and the socio-cultural meaning associated with hairstyles based on the example of dreadlocks in Poland, explored during field research conducted by the author in 2016–2017. The text presents the symbolism of dreadlocks in various cultural contexts and an analysis of hair stereotypes in the experiences of people wearing dreadlocks in Poland. This hairstyle is part of many cultures, in which it has different names and performs different functions. Depending on the place, it may symbolize the religiosity of an individual, a political manifesto, mourning or fashion. The individual motives to wear such a hairstyle are not always associated with a particular ideology or policy, but the decision to do so is not completely free from significance. The main part of the article, discussing the Polish context, has been based on interviews conducted as part of the author's M.A. thesis.

Keywords: hair, dreadlocks, stereotype, field research, gender

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Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

Strażnik, badacz, popularyzator? Problemy tożsamościowe muzealników w dobie przemian zachodzących w muzealnictwie

Muzea, ich powstawanie, rozwój, sposób funkcjonowania, a także znaczenie historyczne, społeczne i kulturowe, stanowią przedmiot zainteresowania badaczy reprezentujących różne dziedziny nauki¹. W szybko zmieniającym się świecie instytucje muzealne podlegają daleko idącym przeobrażeniom, które mogą prowadzić do prób redefinicji samego pojmowania idei muzeum. Problemy te są rozważane i dyskutowane zarówno w środowisku naukowym, jak i muzealniczym². W artykule nie zamierzam skupiać się bezpośrednio na kwestiach związanych ze wspomnianymi przemianami ani rozważać ich znaczenia w odniesieniu do funkcjonowania instytucji; są one jednak istotne dla zrozumienia kontekstu historii i części doświadczeń moich rozmówców.

Materiał, na którym opieram swój tekst, pozyskałam podczas badań jakościowych prowadzonych w związku z przygotowaniem rozprawy doktorskiej³. Jest to czternaście wywiadów częściowo ustrukturyzowanych – przeprowadzonych

¹ Między innymi historii, historii sztuki, etnologii i antropologii kulturowej, socjologii, a także pedagogiki czy nauk o zarządzaniu.

² Wspomnieć tu można chociażby I Kongres Muzealników Polskich, który odbył się w 2015 roku czy I Doroczną Konferencję Stowarzyszenia Muzealników Polskich zorganizowaną w roku 2018.

³ Temat przygotowywanej przeze mnie rozprawy doktorskiej jest związany z funkcjonowaniem muzeów w sferze społecznej; interesują mnie także muzealnicy jako grupa zawodowa. Prezentowany artykuł powstał na bazie pierwszych refleksji i spostrzeżeń, które stały się moim udziałem podczas początkowego etapu badań.

przeze mnie pomiędzy majem 2018 a listopadem 2020 roku z pracowniczkami i pracownikami wybranych wielkopolskich muzeów – w większości utrwalonych w formie nagrań i transkrybowanych, a także nieutrwalone rozmowy i obserwacje poczynione podczas pracy. Ponieważ sama jestem muzealniczką, w moich rozważaniach pojawiają się także elementy autoetnografii.

Podjęte przeze mnie badania mieszczą się w kategoriach antropologii organizacji (zob. Kostera, red., 2007; Kostera 2013), jednak w prezentowanym tu tekście nie analizuję funkcjonowania instytucji. W centrum zmian, którym podlegają instytucje, znajdują się bowiem ludzie. Zwiedzający – czy też szerzej odbiorcy muzealnej oferty – oraz pracownicy muzeów. Potrzeby pierwszej z wymienionych grup w kontekście przemian zachodzących w muzealnictwie były omawiane stosunkowo często, zwłaszcza w ostatnich latach. Stanowią one przedmiot rozważań nie tylko muzealników-praktyków, ale także muzeologów, pedagogów, animatorów czy edukatorów. Podkreśla się w nich znaczenie uczestnictwa w kulturze i – szczególnie – edukacji muzealnej, wskazując na rolę tejeż w procesie kształtowania się osobowości ludzkiej oraz w edukacji permanentnej i zdobywaniu wiedzy na temat otaczającego świata (Mörsch 2009; Hein 2010; Illeris 2010; por. Kamińska 2015).

Muzea stają się także przestrzenią integracji, rozrywki i odpoczynku⁴. Badania publiczności muzealnej są prowadzone przez wyspecjalizowane instytucje oraz niektóre muzea⁵. Zdecydowanie rzadziej poświęca się uwagę pracownikom muzeów. Tymczasem uznanie podmiotowości tej specyficznej grupy i rozpoznanie jej potencjału, potrzeb i problemów wydaje się szczególnie istotne w kontekście muzeologicznych rozważań.

Początki zawodu

Muzealnicy nie stanowią zbiorowości jednorodnej ani łatwej do sklasyfikowania. Już samo nazewnictwo może budzić wątpliwości. Rozważania nad rolą i przyszłością zawodu muzealnika wymagają zatem uściślenia terminologicznego. W perspektywie historycznej osoby zajmujące się zbiorami muzealnymi, czy to w ramach funkcjonowania osobnych instytucji muzealnych, czy też kolekcji powstających przy różnego rodzaju jednostkach naukowych, bibliotekach, archiwach itd., nazywano rozmaicie. Funkcjonowały takie określenia jak konserwator, kustosz, kurator czy wreszcie muzeolog.

Słowo „konserwator” zostało użyte m.in. w dokumencie stworzonym przez profesora Feliksa Bentkowskiego (1781–1852), sprawującego nadzór merytoryczny nad kolekcją wchodzącą w skład zbiorów Gabinetu Numizmatycznego, który działał w ramach Królewskiego Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Bentkowski opiekował się zbiorami od 1827 roku – początkowo w ramach bezpłatnej pracy społecznej, z czasem wyznaczono mu „pensję konserwatorską” (Bieliński 1907: 637).

⁴ Stąd częste odwołania do tzw. koncepcji trzeciego miejsca (Oldenburg 1989).

⁵ Przede wszystkim Narodowy Instytut Muzealnictwa i Ochrony Zbiorów.

Opracował on *Instrukcję dla konserwatora Gabinetu numizmatycznego przy Królewskim Aleksandrowskim Uniwersytecie*, którą można uznać za pierwszy akt normatywny polskiego muzealnictwa (Malinowski 1970: 22; Murawska 2015: 69). Dokument ten⁶ zawiera regulacje dotyczące sposobu funkcjonowania gabinetu, możliwości korzystania ze zbiorów, a także zasad inwentaryzacji i zakresu obowiązków „konserwatora” – merytorycznego opiekuna kolekcji.

Jak zauważa Agnieszka Murawska – muzealniczka związana z Muzeum Narodowym w Poznaniu, zajmująca się także historią muzealnictwa – początek XX wieku to czas, w którym na popularności zyskało określenie „kustosz”, odnoszące się do wykwalifikowanego pracownika odpowiedzialnego za zbiory muzealne (Murawska 2015: 70). Natomiast słowo „muzeolog”, często używane w odniesieniu do pracowników muzeów w okresie międzywojennym, po II wojnie światowej zaczęto stosować raczej z myślą o naukowcach zajmujących się muzeologią jako dziedziną nauki (Murawska 2015: 74).

Kryterium wykształcenia uznawano za szczególnie istotne już w dziewiętnastowiecznym muzealnictwie. Ideałem byłoby, gdyby pracownik muzeum miał zarówno odpowiednio ukierunkowane uniwersyteckie wykształcenie, jak i specjalistyczną wiedzę związaną z praktycznymi i teoretycznymi aspektami pracy muzealnej, dzięki czemu byłby w stanie prowadzić badania, publikować prace naukowe itd. (Malinowski 1970, za: Murawska 2015: 70). Na początku XX wieku uwagę na znaczenie wykształcenia kadry (szczególnie kierowników) w muzeach zwracał m.in. Mieczysław Treter (1883–1943), muzealnik i muzeolog. Podkreślił on, że osoba kierująca muzeum powinna mieć – oprócz zapału, energii i talentu organizacyjnego – „gruntowne wykształcenie fachowe” (Treter 1917: 29)⁷. Wysokie wymagania stawiane pracownikom można łączyć z faktem postrzegania muzeum jako instytucji naukowej (Treter 1917: 25). W takim rozumieniu placówki te – powołane do przechowywania i zabezpieczania dóbr kultury – stanowią niejako zaplecze dla działalności badawczej, co wiąże się z traktowaniem muzeów jako miejsc „elitarnych”. Było to dominujące w I połowie XX wieku podejście.

Przeobrażenia czasów powojennych, związane z polityką krzewienia kultury wśród ludu, wpłynęły na zmianę perspektywy; dobra kultury miały służyć socjalistycznemu społeczeństwu, być „czynnikiem aktywnym w życiu kulturalnym narodu” (Malinowski 1962: 5). Tym samym wzrosło znaczenie popularyzacji i oświatowej (edukacyjnej) roli instytucji kultury.

Ostatnie dekady XX wieku oraz początek obecnego stulecia to czas, w którym podkreśla się szczególnie edukacyjną funkcję muzeum, przy czym edukacja jest rozumiana jako proces kształcenia całościowego (Folga-Januszewska 2015b: 7) i wiąże się z postrzeganiem muzeum w kategoriach przestrzeni społecznej, forum, miejsca spędzania wolnego czasu, odpoczynku i rozrywki. Wszystkie te procesy dotyczą także grupy zawodowej, jaką są muzealnicy, znajdującej się w centrum

⁶ Treść dokumentu w (Bieliński 1907: 638–640).

⁷ Było to związane z popularnym w kręgach teoretyków muzealnictwa poglądem, zgodnie z którym osoba zarządzająca muzeum (dyrektor, kierownik) powinna być fachowcem znającym specyfikę praktyki muzealnej i dysponującym odpowiednim wykształceniem.

przeobrażeń. Skoro zatem redefinicji podlega rozumienie roli muzeum, to samo musi się dziać z postrzeganiem muzealników i szerzej – pracowników muzeów. Pojawia się bowiem pytanie: kim – wobec zachodzących w muzeach przemian – jest lub powinien być muzealnik? Czy ma on być specjalistą, badaczem, popularyzatorem, edukatorem? A może powinien odgrywać wszystkie te role?

Muzealnicy

Zgodnie z ustawą o muzeach z dnia 21 listopada 1996 roku (art. 32) „zawodową grupę muzealników” tworzą zatrudnieni w muzeach asystenci, adiunkci, kustosze i kustosze dyplomowani⁸. Wspomniany akt prawny niejako sankcjonuje używanie określenia „muzealnik”, będącego wcześniej – przed rokiem 1996, kiedy uchwalono ustawę – kolokwializmem (Murawska 2015: 74). Jednocześnie należy zaznaczyć, że ze względu na zachodzące we współczesnym muzealnictwie przemiany i wciąż niesprecyzowany status tzw. edukatorów muzealnych, przypisanie tychże do którejkolwiek kategorii pracowników muzealnych bywa problematyczne.

Obecnie w zależności od strategii danej instytucji rolę edukatorów (prowadzenie lekcji muzealnych, zajęć i warsztatów) pełnią pracownicy merytoryczni (asystenci, adiunkci, kustosze) lub specjaliści z zakresu edukacji. Funkcjonuje także model, który na potrzeby mojej pracy nazywam mieszanym; w tym przypadku edukacją zajmują się jedni i drudzy. Pytania o rolę edukatorów muzealnych i zajmowane przez nich w strukturze instytucji miejsce stają się, w dobie rozbudowywania muzealnego sektora edukacyjno-popularyzatorskiego i coraz dalej idącej specjalizacji, szczególnie istotne (zob. Barańska 2011: 118).

W rozumieniu wspomnianej ustawy grupę zawodową muzealników tworzą pracownicy zatrudnieni na stanowiskach, na których realizuje się zadania związane z 1) gromadzeniem i naukowym opracowywaniem zbiorów, 2) urządzeniem wystaw i udostępnianiem zbiorów do celów edukacyjnych i naukowych, 3) organizowaniem badań i ekspedycji naukowych, 4) prowadzeniem działalności edukacyjnej, artystycznej, upowszechniającej kulturę lub wydawniczej. Tychże pracowników zatrudnia się na stanowiskach kustosza dyplomowanego, kustosza, adiunkta i asystenta (art. 32 ww. ustawy).

Jednocześnie ustawa stanowi, że aby wstąpić na ścieżkę awansu zawodowego (czyli objąć najniższe z wymienionych stanowisko asystenta), należy legitymować się dyplomem ukończenia studiów pierwszego stopnia związanych z zakresem gromadzonych w muzeum zbiorów⁹. Bywa, że w muzeach tworzone są odrębne stanowiska pracy związane z edukacją, a także promocją i marketingiem.

⁸ Warto zauważyć, że planowane są zmiany w ustawie o muzeach, obejmujące m.in. kwestię rozszerzenia rozumienia pojęcia zawodowej grupy muzealników. W środowisku muzealnym zdania na ten temat są podzielone. Jednym z szeroko dyskutowanych tematów jest status pracowników pionu dyrektorsko-kierowniczego (zob. Niezabitowski 2019).

⁹ W przypadku adiunkta wymagane jest ukończenie studiów drugiego stopnia lub jednolitych magisterskich związanych z zakresem gromadzonych w muzeum zbiorów. Od kustosza dyplomowanego wymaga się stopnia doktora lub doktora sztuki w dziedzinie związanej

Wspomniane przemiany zachodzące w polskim muzealnictwie wpływają na zmianę postrzegania zawodu. Od muzealników (w rozumieniu grupy zawodowej) wymaga się bardzo dobrego przygotowania merytorycznego, ale także wszechstronności i wielozadaniowości. Nierzadko jedna osoba zajmuje się zarówno opracowywaniem zbiorów i przygotowywaniem wystaw, jak i prowadzeniem zajęć edukacyjnych dla różnych grup wiekowych.

Pojawiają się pytania: jak muzealnicy radzą sobie z tego typu wielozadaniowością? Jak postrzegają swoją rolę? Co sądzą o zmieniających się warunkach pracy, nowych wyzwaniach i rosnących wciąż oczekiwaniach, przed jakimi stają instytucje muzealne, a tym samym pracujący w nich ludzie? Jakie postawy przyjmują?

Podczas badań prowadzonych w wielkopolskich muzeach, które odbyłam na przestrzeni ostatnich kilku lat, starałam się zwracać szczególną uwagę na strukturę instytucji i praktykę ich funkcjonowania¹⁰. Miałam okazję poznać od wewnątrz muzea, w których poszczególne sektory składające się na działalność danej jednostki, takie jak pozyskiwanie i opracowywanie zbiorów, badania naukowe czy edukacja są oddzielone, a zadania im przypisane realizowane przez różne osoby, jak i te, w których nie istnieje wspomniany podział (bądź istnieje teoretycznie, praktyka natomiast odbiega od założeń). Obserwowałam także efektywnie funkcjonujące instytucje muzealne, w których pracują trzy lub dwie osoby (a nawet tylko jedna) stawiające czoła wyzwaniom związanym z popularyzacją historii i kultury oraz edukacją.

Podczas badań poznałam pracowników muzeów reprezentujących rozmaite podejścia do zawodu, o odmiennych doświadczeniach i różnorodnych poglądach. Wypowiedzi moich rozmówców były, w zależności od ich doświadczeń i cech charakteru, związane lub rozbudowane, optymistyczne i pesymistyczne¹¹. O ile pytania dotyczące instytucji i jej funkcjonowania przyjmowane były bez zdziwienia, o tyle zaskoczenie wywoływały zwykle wszelkie próby nawiązania do bardziej osobistych wątków, takich jak motywy towarzyszące wyborowi zawodu czy pytania o „tożsamość muzealnika”.

Droga do zawodu

Osoby, które znają muzea wyłącznie z perspektywy zwiedzającego, mają często dość mgliste pojęcie na temat zawodu muzealnika. Na pytanie: kim jest muzealnik i na czym polega jego praca?, odpowiadają bardzo różnie. Od zwiedzających usłyszałam, że muzealnik to ktoś, kto „przygotowuje wystawy”, ale także „pilnuje ekspozycji” (nie zajmują się tym członkowie „grupy zawodowej”, ale osoby zatrudnione na stanowiskach „opiekunów ekspozycji”). Z ust zapytanych

z zakresem gromadzonych w muzeum zbiorów. Pozostałe kryteria to dorobek zawodowy (lub, w przypadku kustosza, ukończone studia podyplomowe) i staż pracy (art. 32a ustawy z dnia 21 listopada 1996 roku o muzeach).

¹⁰ Muzea, w których prowadziłam badania, to instytucje samorządowe.

¹¹ Dla komfortu moich rozmówców nie podaję danych personalnych ani nazw instytucji.

przeze mnie osób padało często słowo „kustosz”, zwykle jednak nie miały one świadomości, że istnieją takie stanowiska jak asystent, adiunkt czy kustosz dyplomowany. Odniosłam wrażenie, że w oczach postronnych zawód muzealnika jawi się jako tyleż intrygujący (lub nudny, w zależności od nastawienia reprezentowanego przez pytaną osobę), co tajemniczy. Zaczęłam się zatem zastanawiać, jakie wyobrażenia na temat tego zawodu mieli sami muzealnicy, zanim nimi zostali. Czy praca w muzeum była ich świadomym wyborem, czy też o miejscu zatrudnienia zdecydował przypadek? Kto zostaje muzealnikiem? Jako punkt wyjścia potraktowałam własne doświadczenia, przeprowadzając autoetnograficzną refleksję¹².

Na etapie studiów magisterskich nie miałam sprecyzowanej wizji własnej przyszłości zawodowej. Praca w muzeum, którą rozpoczęłam kilka miesięcy po ukończeniu studiów, wydawała mi się atrakcyjna i wyobrażałam ją sobie jako interesującą, a nawet ekscytującą. Najważniejsza była dla mnie wówczas możliwość działania w tematyce związanej z moim wykształceniem (ukończyłam historię ze specjalnością „turystyka historyczna i animacja historii”); w muzeum mogłam je wykorzystać i jednocześnie zajmować się ciekawymi dla mnie rzeczami, byłam zatem usatysfakcjonowana. Pamiętam też, że większość moich koleżanek i kolegów ze studiów była zainteresowana pracą w instytucjach kultury (w tym w muzeach w szczególności) lub w instytucjach oświatowych (na studiach oferowano nam możliwość zdobycia przygotowania pedagogicznego). Dla porównania: studenci etnologii, z którymi miałam okazję rozmawiać, mają odmienne nastawienie, szczególnie jeśli chodzi o ewentualną pracę w muzeum, która nie wydaje im się atrakcyjna¹³.

Przeanalizowawszy własny przypadek, z tym większym zainteresowaniem podchodziłam do rozmów z innymi muzealnikami. Tylko jedna z badanych osób stwierdziła, że praca w muzeum była jej marzeniem. Pozostali rozmówcy wkroczyli na zawodową ścieżkę w wyniku zbiegu okoliczności: „Po prostu zaczęłam pracować” (kobieta, ok. 35 lat), „Nie miałam za bardzo takiego planu” (mężczyzna, ok. 40 lat). Dla trzech osób dodatkową motywację stanowiła chęć zmiany i poszukiwanie nowych wyzwań: „Nie wybrałam świadomie, po prostu podjęłam pracę. Wcześniej pracowałam w bibliotece, ale ta praca była zbyt jednostajna. Koleżanka powiedziała, że szukają i zgłosiłam się” (kobieta, ok. 60 lat). W opinii osoby, której wypowiedź przytoczyłam jako ostatnią, wielozadaniowość i związane z nią urozmaicenie stanowiło zaletę. Bardzo silna była też więź łącząca

¹² Moje doświadczenie związane z pracą w muzeum okazało się pomocne podczas badań prowadzonych wśród muzealników; znajomość realiów zawodu ułatwiała wiele kwestii i pomagała nawiązać kontakt z rozmówcami. Jednakże badanie własnego środowiska generuje także różnego rodzaju problemy, przede wszystkim natury etycznej. Wejście w rolę badaczki wiąże się z koniecznością zachowania dystansu wobec badanych zagadnień i zjawisk, ponadto istnieje pewnego rodzaju presja związana z potencjalnymi oczekiwaniami środowiska i późniejszą recepcją wyników badań (zob. Modnicka 2010).

¹³ Okazją do rozmów i obserwacji stały się dla mnie zajęcia z zakresu partycypacji społecznej w instytucjach kultury, które prowadziłam w roku akademickim 2018/2019 dla studentów etnologii na Uniwersytecie im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu.

wspomnianą osobę z „jej” instytucją, co miało swoje zalety, jak i wady, o czym szerzej w dalszej części tekstu.

Zdecydowana większość moich rozmówców deklarowała zadowolenie ze „zbiegu okoliczności”, który sprawił, że podjęli pracę w muzeum (jak wspomniana już pani pracująca wcześniej w bibliotece). W dwóch przypadkach z wypowiedzi dało się wywnioskować, że pytani akceptują sytuację, w której się znaleźli, jednak pojawiał się również element żalu i odnosiłam wrażenie – bądź zostało powiedziane wprost – że dana osoba miała inną wizję własnego życia zawodowego: „Nie, na pewno nie, nie miałem takiego marzenia nie (...), tak się złożyło, tak często bywa” (mężczyzna, ok. 40 lat).

Tożsamość i utożsamienie

Kiedy już adept muzealnictwa rozpocznie pracę, czeka go konfrontacja oczekiwań z rzeczywistością. Realia często odbiegają od wyobrażeń, a pierwsze doświadczenia niejednokrotnie determinują przyszłą postawę pracownika. Podczas moich badań rozmawiałam zarówno z osobami o stosunkowo krótkim (kilkuletnim) stażu w zawodzie, jak i z muzealnikami, którzy byli lub są związani z jedną instytucją od kilkudziesięciu lat¹⁴. Druga z wymienionych grup charakteryzowała się wysokim stopniem emocjonalnego przywiązania do „swojej” instytucji. Jej przedstawiciele nierzadko deklarują gotowość do poświęceń: „Trzeba mieć pasję. Ważna jest tu akcyjność. Ktoś nastawiony na pracę odtąd dotąd nie poradzi sobie” (kobieta, ok. 60 lat). Wśród przedstawicieli młodszego pokolenia ten element nie był szczególnie podkreślany. Ponadto młodszy muzealnicy wydają się mniej przywiązani do miejsca, częściej zmieniają pracę. Silne „przywiązanie” do muzeum może być problematyczne, szczególnie gdy pojawiają się sprzeczne wizje rozwoju danej instytucji.

Jedną z niewielu osób zajmujących się zagadnieniem tożsamości zawodowej muzealników jest etnologka Anna Nadolska-Styczyńska. Jej zainteresowanie wzbudził między innymi problem swoistego rozdzwieńku pomiędzy utożsamieniem pracownika muzeum z zawodem wyuczonym etnografa, archeologa, historyka sztuki a zawodem muzealnika. Badaczka zauważa, że „wybór tożsamościowy etnografii”, czyli przedłożenie etnografii ponad muzealnictwo, mógł się wiązać z „załamaniem etosu muzeum i zawodu muzealnika”. Brak poczucia sensowności podejmowanych działań rodzi bowiem zniechęcenie i staje się przyczyną frustracji (Nadolska-Styczyńska 2011: 60). Brak poczucia sensowności podejmowanych działań rodzi bowiem zniechęcenie i staje się przyczyną frustracji. Nadolska-Styczyńska nawiązuje w tym kontekście do słów jednego ze swych rozmówców:

¹⁴ Najkrótszy okres zatrudnienia wynosił blisko dwa lata. Troje spośród moich rozmówców posiadało kilkudziesięcioletni staż pracy w zawodzie muzealnika.

(...) w pierwszym odruchu powiedział, że jest etnografem pracującym w muzeum, ale po zastanowieniu stwierdził, że gdybym zadała to pytanie kilka lat temu, to odpowiedź byłaby inna. Bowiem dopóki czuł się potrzebny i wiedział, że to, co robi – najlepiej jak umie – ma sens, to szczerze utożsamiał się z pracą, zawodem muzealnika i instytucją, w której pracował. Obecnie uważa się za etnografa, bo ten zawód pomaga mu czuć się nadal potrzebnym (Nadolska-Styczyńska 2011: 60–61).

Troje spośród czternaściorga moich rozmówców bardziej utożsamiało się z tym, co Nadolska-Styczyńska nazwała zawodem wyuczonym, niż z zawodem muzealnika. Osoby te, proszone o określenie własnej profesji, odpowiadały „jestem archeologiem” lub „jestem historykiem sztuki”, a nie „jestem muzealnikiem”.

Teraźniejszość w zawodzie muzealnika

Ze względu na moje zainteresowanie tematem partycypacji społecznej w muzealnictwie w rozmowach z muzealnikami nawiązywałam do kwestii związanych z działalnością popularyzatorską. Upowszechnianie wartości historii, nauki i kultury to ustawowe zadania muzeum, które są realizowane w różnych formach¹⁵. W większości instytucji zetknęłam się z działaniami popularyzatorskimi, które zakładały dość ograniczony stopień partycypacji lub też spełniały kryteria tzw. *hosted projects* (zob. Simon 2010). Rzadko natomiast pojawiały się inicjatywy zakładające partnerską współpracę pomiędzy instytucją a odbiorcami.

Moi rozmówcy jednoznacznie podkreślali, że ochrona i popularyzacja dziedzictwa to równorzędne (lub niemal równorzędne) cele:

skoro ludzie płacą podatki, żeby takie miejsca istniały, to jakąś korzyść powinni z tego odnosić, więc wydaje mi się, że właśnie ta popularyzacja jest jednak bardzo istotna, właśnie szczególnie w przypadku muzeów. Co innego placówek badawczych, tam może ten nacisk jest inaczej rozłożony, ale tutaj... (mężczyzna, ok. 40 lat)

Nastawienie na działalność edukacyjno-popularyzatorską jest zatem tym, co odróżnia instytucję muzealną od typowo badawczej. Odniosłam jednak wrażenie, że część pytanych przeze mnie osób uważa pracę badawczą za nieco bardziej poważną, by nie powiedzieć prestiżową, i ceni ją wyżej (choć nie zostało to powiedziane wprost). Ponadto, podążając tym tokiem rozumowania, można powiedzieć, że popularyzacja i edukacja niejako „zabierają” czas, który można byłoby poświęcić na badania naukowe.

Wszystkie osoby, z którymi rozmawiałam, miały w swej pracy bezpośredni kontakt ze zwiedzającymi, czy to podczas oprowadzania, czy w związku

¹⁵ Art. 1 i 2 ustawy z dnia 21 listopada 1996 roku o muzeach.

z prowadzonymi przez siebie lekcjami muzealnymi bądź innego rodzaju zajęciami, które można określić jako edukacyjne. W mniejszych instytucjach często „wszyscy zajmują się wszystkim”, jednak w większych jednostkach zauważalna jest tendencja do rozgraniczania poszczególnych sfer działalności i daleko idąca specjalizacja.

Rozmawiając z pracownikami jednego z muzeów, w którym prowadzenie lekcji muzealnych zostało w całości przejęte przez dział zajmujący się edukacją, zauważyłam, że w większości byli oni zadowoleni z wprowadzonej innowacji. Zmiana ta oznaczała dla nich możliwość poświęcenia większej ilości czasu zadaniom związanym z opracowywaniem zbiorów czy tworzeniem wystaw. Dla części muzealników prowadzenie zajęć edukacyjnych (w szczególności tych skierowanych do najmłodszych odbiorców) stanowi wyzwanie, do którego nie czują się w pełni przygotowani. Ideałem wydaje się możliwość połączenia wartościowego merytorycznego przekazu z atrakcyjnym dla słuchaczy (czy też uczestników zajęć) sposobem prezentacji. Nie zawsze jednak udaje się osiągnąć taki efekt, zależy on bowiem od wielu czynników, jak chociażby indywidualne predyspozycje osoby prowadzącej zajęcia. Muzealnicy, których można określić mianem „introwertycznych”, nie widzą siebie w roli edukatorów muzealnych i chętnie godzą się na możliwość scedowania tej części pracy na „specjalistów”.

Analizując uzyskane wyniki badań, biorąc pod uwagę zarówno wypowiedzi moich rozmówców, jak i własne obserwacje, przygotowałam typologię, zgodnie z którą dokonałam klasyfikacji przedstawicieli zawodu, dzieląc ich na trzy grupy¹⁶. Pierwszą z nich nazwałam „strażnikami”. Charakteryzuje ich wysoki stopień emocjonalnego przywiązania do muzeum, w którym pracują, lub też do konkretnej kolekcji (eksponatów z działu) znajdującej się pod ich merytoryczną opieką. Przedstawiciele tej grupy nie wykazują raczej samorządnej inicjatywy w kwestiach związanych z edukacją i szeroko rozumianą popularyzacją, skupiając się na opracowywaniu zbiorów. Najmniej chętnie wchodzi oni w bezpośrednie interakcje z odbiorcami oferty muzealnej.

Druga grupa to „badacze”, dla których szczególnie istotne jest prowadzenie działalności naukowej, przy czym mam tu na myśli zarówno inicjowanie działań instytucjonalnych, które prowadzi muzeum, jak i własną pracę naukową muzealników, związaną z aktywnym uczestnictwem w tychże działaniach, pisanie prac naukowych, dokonywaniem ekspertyz itd. Trzecią grupę tworzą „popularyzatorzy”. Są to zwykle osoby niemające problemów w kontaktach interpersonalnych, dobrze radzące sobie na forum publicznym; posiadające zdolność przykuwania i utrzymywania uwagi szerokiego audytorium.

Pierwszy typ jest najbliższy stereotypowemu wyobrażeniu na temat muzealniczej profesji. Odwołując się do idei muzeum jako świątyni, można powiedzieć,

¹⁶ W pewnych przypadkach muzealników trudno zaklasyfikować zgodnie z zaprezentowaną typologią. Niektóre osoby spełniają kryteria przynależności do więcej niż jednej kategorii lub mają wybrane cechy każdej z nich. Wśród moich rozmówców najmniej liczną grupę stanowili „badacze” (dwie osoby). Proporcje pomiędzy „strażnikami” a „popularyzatorami” były natomiast wyrównane.

że ten typ mógłby pełnić funkcję kapłana. Miewa on problemy w kontaktach międzyludzkich i bywa skrajnie introwertyczny. Nierzadko „strażnicy” mają imponującą wiedzę na temat zbiorów muzealnych, nie zawsze jednak potrafią ją w przystępny sposób przekazać czy zaprezentować.

„Badacze” wydają się najbliżsi przedwojnemu ideałowi muzealnika – naukowca oraz idei muzeum rozumianego jako instytucja naukowa. Z kolei „popularyzatorzy” zwykle odnajdują się we wszelkiego rodzaju działaniach edukacyjnych i promocyjnych kojarzących się z ideą muzeum jako instytucji edukacyjnej czy przestrzeni społecznej o cechach tzw. trzeciego miejsca (Oldenburg 1989).

Perspektywy zawodu muzealnika

Przyszłość zawodu muzealnika zależy od przyszłości instytucji, jaką jest muzeum. Zauważalna na przestrzeni dwóch ostatnich dekad tendencja związana z rozbudową i poszerzaniem oferty edukacyjnej – skierowanej w szczególności do grup szkolnych – sprawiła, że obecnie prawie wszystkie muzea oferują lekcje muzealne. Stworzenie oferty lekcji stało się jednym z priorytetowych celów niemal każdego muzeum. W wywiadzie z 2013 roku Małgorzata Omilanowska, ówczesna podsekretarz stanu w MKiDN, a w latach 2014–2015 minister kultury i dziedzictwa narodowego, powiedziała, że: „W tej chwili praktycznie nie ma muzeum, które nie prowadziło by edukacji i nie miało wykształconych edukatorów, przygotowanych do ścisłej współpracy z odbiorcami z różnych grup wiekowych, z włączeniem ich aktywności twórczej”¹⁷.

Stwierdzenie to wydaje się jednak nieprecyzyjne, jako że w (dużej) części muzeów edukatorami byli i są muzealnicy, którzy nie mają osobnego przygotowania z zakresu pedagogiki, edukacji czy animacji kultury, będąc jednocześnie specjalistami z wykształceniem kierunkowym w dziedzinach związanych z charakterem zbiorów gromadzonych w danej instytucji. Ponadto należy zwrócić uwagę na fakt, że aby muzeum stało się miejscem całościowego kształcenia oraz środowiskiem służącym wszechstronnemu rozwojowi (Hein 2010; Folga-Januszewska 2015b), nie wystarczy prowadzenie tzw. edukacji muzealnej, rozumianej tradycyjnie, a realizowanej zwykle w formie lekcji czy warsztatów; proces ten wymaga daleko idących przeobrażeń i zmian strukturalnych; spojrzenia na muzeum raczej jak na przestrzeń społeczną niż instytucję. Obecnie trudno mówić o jednolitym systemie kształcenia muzealników. Jak już wspomniałam, zgodnie z obowiązującymi przepisami i wieloletnią tradycją, od muzealników oczekuje się wykształcenia kierunkowego, w zakresie związanym z tematyką zbiorów.

¹⁷ Zob. <http://muzealnictwo.com/2013/09/muzea-dzis-rozmowa-z-dr-hab-malgorzata-omilanowska-podsekretarz-stanu-w-mkidn/> [dostęp: 20.05.2020].

Kształcenie muzealnicze można odbyć w ramach studiów podyplomowych¹⁸, jednak w ich wypadku trudno mówić o jednolitych standardach programowych (szerzej na temat oferty kształcenia muzealników zob. Majewski 2018).

W ostatnich latach pojawiają się coraz liczniejsze oferty studiów licencjackich i magisterskich tworzone z myślą o osobach zainteresowanych pracą w muzeach; w przypadku niektórych z nich można mieć wątpliwości co do spełnienia kryterium ustawowego odnoszącego się do systemu tytułów zawodowych i awansu muzealników¹⁹. Przykładowo, czy kierunki „Ochrona dóbr kultury”, „Zarządzanie kulturą i mediami” lub nawet „Muzeologia” są związane z zakresem gromadzonych w muzeach zbiorów? Pośrednio tak, jednak ich absolwenci nie będą specjalistami z konkretnych dziedzin, jak historia, archeologia czy etnologia. Omilanowska stwierdziła:

Nie wierzę w skuteczność studiów muzealniczych prowadzących od matury do dyplomu magisterskiego. Jest to sposób na wychowanie człowieka dobrze orientującego się w zarządzaniu pewnym modelem muzeum. Jednak taki człowiek, jeśli nie będzie miał również sprofilowanych kompetencji merytorycznych, będzie tylko częściowo skuteczny. Nie przez przypadek studia muzealnicze w Polsce są obecnie zdominowane przez studia podyplomowe. Do zawodu muzealnika dochodzi się przez praktykę i studia podyplomowe²⁰.

Niejasne oczekiwania, presja i wysokie wymagania stawiane muzealnikom (zob. Folga-Januszewska 2015a) stają się przyczyną frustracji wśród przedstawicieli tego środowiska, czemu sprzyja stosunkowo niski prestiż społeczny zawodu – grupę tę dość mocno dotknął zachodzący na przestrzeni ostatnich lat proces dewaluowania się znaczenia wyższego wykształcenia – oraz niskie wynagrodzenie. Muzealnicy często mają poczucie, że oczekuje się od nich niemożliwego, podwyższając wciąż wymagania i nie oferując nic w zamian. Boleją także nad deprecjonowaniem znaczenia zawodu, które wiążą ze zmianami zachodzącymi w epoce multimediów. Świadectwem tej frustracji są poniższe wypowiedzi:

No to kustoszowi nie pozostaje nic innego jak tylko zdegradować się i szukać nowej pracy. W „nowoczesnym” multimedialnym muzeum, czyli takim bez prawdziwych zbiorów, można znaleźć posadę przy obsłudze widowni i skasować na starcie nie mniejsze wynagrodzenie niż w klasycznym muzeum uświęconym wiekami istnienia i tradycji (RF).

¹⁸ Studia tego rodzaju oferuje wiele polskich uczelni, m.in. UJ, UMK, UW. Wykaz kierunków studiów skierowanych do muzealników i osób związanych z muzealnictwem jest publikowany w bazach NIMOZ.

¹⁹ Grupy zawodowej muzealników dotyczą regulacje ustawowe, jednak w muzeach bywają także zatrudniane osoby, które nie spełniają ustawowych kryteriów i tym samym nie mogą tytułować się asystentem, adiunktem czy kustoszem, a jednak w praktyce wykonują typowo „muzealnicze” obowiązki.

²⁰ Zob. <http://muzealnictwo.com/2013/09/muzea-dzis-rozmowa-z-dr-hab-malgorzata-omilanowska-podsekretarz-stanu-w-mkidn/> [dostęp: 20.05.2020].

Od 18 lat pracuję w muzeum. (...) wymagania kosmiczne, a do tego konieczne studia podyplomowe i doktoraty. Dodam tylko, że wypłaty starcza na połowę miesiąca. Druga połowa to karta kredytowa, którą kiedyś przyjdzie spłacić. Za co mamy się uczyć i kupować książki? Czas powiedzieć dość!!! i zadbać o siebie i swoje rodziny (muzealnik).

Człowiek ma mieć wiedzę godną profesora, pomysły jak menedżer, najlepiej jeszcze być poliglotą, wyglądać jak gwiazdor filmowy i ubierać się jak celebryta. I wszystko to za mniej niż pomocnik murarza na przyuczeniu²¹ (wkurzony).

Internauci, których komentarze przytoczyłam, to uczestnicy bądź sympatycy protestu pracowników kultury, który odbył się w maju 2016 roku w Poznaniu. Podczas happeningu „Bal u Dziada Kultury”²² osoby zawodowo związane z sektorem kultury, w tym wielu muzealników, rozdawały przechodniom suchy chleb, usiłując zwrócić uwagę opinii publicznej m.in. na kwestię niskich wynagrodzeń oraz na inne problemy, z którymi muszą się mierzyć, nie uzyskując systemowego wsparcia. Poznański protest wpisał się w szereg akcji protestacyjnych „Dziadów Kultury” – tak nazwali się inicjatorzy i uczestnicy tychże wydarzeń zatrudnieni w muzeach, bibliotekach i innych instytucjach kultury – które odbywały się na przestrzeni ostatnich lat (od 2015 roku) w polskich miastach.

Wydaje się, że zarówno muzea, jak i muzealnicy znajdują się obecnie na rozdrożu; muzealnictwo ewoluuje wraz z ewolucją samego muzeum, tak więc przyszłość zawodu muzealnika zależeć będzie od kierunku zachodzących w instytucjach muzealnych zmian. Niezależnie od tego, czy traktujemy muzeum jako forum, templum, trzecie miejsce, instytucję badawczą, edukacyjną, czy też hybrydę łączącą w sobie wszystkie (lub tylko niektóre) z wymienionych form, nie może ono sprawnie funkcjonować bez zmotywowanych i zaangażowanych pracowników.

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²¹ Cytaty za: <http://radiopoznan.fm/informacje/pozostale/protest-pracownikow-kultury> [dostęp: 20.05.2020]. W nawiasach nazwy użytkowników forum, których wypowiedzi przytaczam.

²² Happening zorganizowano w terminie, w którym odbywała się Noc Muzeów.

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SUMMARY

Guardian? Researcher? Propagator? Identity issues affecting museum professionals in the context of changes in museology

The article discusses identity issues affecting museum professionals (museologists) facing the current changes that take place in museums. The paper is based on ethnographic research and its main purpose is to present an analysis of the evolution, current situation and future challenges faced by museum professionals. The article also explores some practical aspects and particularities of the museum profession in Poland.

Keywords: museum, museum professionals, museologists, museum anthropology

REVIEWS

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Od tradycyjnych pasterzy do transrelacyjnych społeczności. Mongolska sztuka nieformalnego

RECENZJA

Rakowski, Tomasz (2019). *Przeptywy, współdziałania, kręgi możliwego. Antropologia powodzenia. Seria „Idee i Etnografia”*. Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria.

Przeptywy współdziałania, kręgi możliwego. *Antropologia powodzenia* to druga autorska monografia w dorobku dr. hab. Tomasza Rakowskiego, po wyróżnionej Nagrodą im. ks. Józefa Tischnera książce *Łowcy, zbieracze, praktycy niemocy. Etnografia człowieka zdegradowanego* (2009). Autor jest etnologiem, antropologiem kultury, kulturoznawcą pracującym w Instytucie Etnologii i Antropologii Kulturowej Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, współpracującym także z Instytutem Kultury Polskiej Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego. Jest również praktykującym lekarzem. Wcześniejsza autorska książka przyniosła mu rozpoznawalność, także poza środowiskiem naukowym, jako eksperta od antropologicznych badań nad ubóstwem. Tomasz Rakowski w ostatnich latach jest jednak również znany jako badacz procesów animacyjnych w społecznościach lokalnych, a także praktyk etnograficznie zorientowanej animacji kultury, co przybliży w redagowanych i współredagowanych przez siebie tomach zbiorowych *Humanistyka i dominacja. Oddolne doświadczenia społeczne w perspektywie zewnętrznych rozpoznań* (2011), *Etnografia/animacja/sztuka. Nierozpoznane wymiary rozwoju kulturalnego* (2013, 2015) czy anglojęzycznej *Pretextual Ethnographies: Challenging the Phenomenological Level of Anthropological Knowledge-Making* (2018). Interesuje się również antropologią współczesnej sztuki partycypacyjnej, w tym jej wykorzystaniem w działaniach

animacyjnych, a także badaniem oddolnych procesów rozwojowych. To właśnie temu ostatniemu zagadnieniu poświęcona jest książka *Przeptywy współdziałania, kręgi możliwego. Antropologia powodzenia*. Osadzona w dalszej geograficznie rzeczywistości niż poprzednia monografia autora, jest równie ciekawa, aktualna i proponująca świeże spojrzenie na dobrze, wydawałoby się, poznane i opisane kwestie oddolnych form rozwoju i aktywności obywatelskiej.

W *Przeptywach współdziałania...* Rakowski zabiera czytelników w podróż do Bułganu, somonu (mongolskiej jednostki administracyjnej) zamieszkanego w większości przez Torgutów, zróżnicowaną grupę będącą odłamem Mongołów zachodnich. Ich życie, nieformalne praktyki przysług i współdziałania, strategie radzenia sobie i oddolnego budowania rozwoju po okresie postsocjalistycznej transformacji są głównymi tematami prowadzącymi czytelnika przez gęsty opis bułgańskiej rzeczywistości. Przede wszystkim zaś książka jest zapisem odkrywanego wielowarstwowego „faktu etnograficznego”, jakim jest torgucka nieformalność i tworzona przez nią lokalna wizja rozwoju – w relacji z państwem, innymi ludźmi, a może przede wszystkim w relacji z emicznymi ideami „możliwości” i „powodzenia”.

Książka składa się z obszernego wprowadzenia teoretycznego oraz czterech rozdziałów zestawiających teorię z wiedzą terenową. W otwierającym książkę wprowadzeniu Rakowski poświęca sporo miejsca na opisanie różnorodnych teorii i definicji pojęć, takich jak rozwój, współdziałanie, nieformalność czy obywatelskość, które w następnych rozdziałach ożywia i ilustruje przykładami ze swoich badań terenowych w zachodniej Mongolii. Jednym z ważniejszych fenomenów, które autor najpierw opisuje z perspektywy teoretycznej, a następnie obserwuje w terenie, jest „lokalna wizja rozwoju”, która wnikliwie opisana w przywoływanych przez autora przykładach Davide’a Mossa i Jamesa Fergusona niemal nigdy nie jest prostą narracją „powodzenia” lub „niepowodzenia” misji rozwojowej.

Rakowski wykorzystuje to pojęcie, aby pokazać później na empirycznym przykładzie mongolskim, że każde działanie zewnętrzne przecina się nie tylko z lokalną wiedzą i praktyką, celami miejscowych organizacji politycznych, państwowymi politykami lokalnymi oraz innymi podmiotami społecznymi i politycznymi, ale także „oporem i przechwytywaniem możliwości, jakie oferują nowe relacje ekonomiczne, nowe programy i warunki działania” (Rakowski 2018: 30). W rozdziale czwartym poświęconym lokalnym formom rozwoju, nieformalnym działaniom i wytwarzaniu państwa Rakowski pokazuje te zależności na poziomie etnograficznym na przykładzie badanej społeczności Bułganu.

Tę upraszczającą, ale wciąż żywą dychotomię „powodzenia” bądź „niepowodzenia” programów rozwojowych, stworzonych i realizowanych przez pozalokalnych aktorów – najczęściej dużych, międzynarodowych agencji – autor zastępuje pojęciem rozwoju endogennego. Tak zdefiniowany rozwój jest nie tylko procesem interakcji i łączenia różnych światów, ale wręcz „uginania się wiedzy antropologicznej i naukowej, konieczności przyswojenia sobie innej wiedzy i innej logiki oraz przyłączenia jej do tego, co wiąże się z rozwojem, z działaniami na rzecz przebudowy ekonomicznej, społecznej i kulturowej w krajach i społeczeństwach

odbierających pomoc rozwojową” (Rakowski 2018: 37). Autor zwraca przy tym uwagę na różnicę między wiedzą lokalną, która pozostaje jedynie rozpoznana, ale nie włączona w działania rozwojowe, a taką, która co prawda jest włączana w te procesy, lecz następnie sama przechwytuje narzucone odgórnie praktyki i dyskurs rozwojowy.

Ta ostatnia sytuacja często skutkuje różnymi formami lokalnego oporu, a w efekcie skategoryzowaniem projektu jako „niepowodzenia” lub działania przynoszącego bądź co bądź pozytywne (z punktu widzenia nadzorujących proces agencji), lecz niespodziewane efekty. W obu przypadkach ścieranie się oddolnych i odgórnych polityk rozwojowych jest silnie naznaczone relacjami władzy, w których oczywistą przewagę mają międzynarodowe, dobrze finansowane agencje.

Rakowski w swojej monografii zwraca jednak uwagę na sytuację, w której to lokalna wiedza i praktyki są na tyle silne, że to one nie tylko przechwytyują niejako narzucone im procesy rozwojowe i modernizacyjne, ale też wytwarzają własne, żywiołowe procesy samoorganizacji, które można nazwać właśnie „lokalnymi formami rozwoju” czy też „rodzajami rozwoju endogennego”. To właśnie je autor typuje na główne przyczyny zmian, jakim podlega społeczeństwo. Jest to więc wyraźne podkreślenie podmiotowości działań oddolnych, wyrastających z historycznych, społecznych i kulturowych idiomów danej społeczności – lokalnych, wewnętrznych logik rządzących akceptowalnymi strategiami i praktykami życia – raczej niż tych odgórnych, przybyłych z innych kontekstów. Takim przykładem jest właśnie odwiedzony przez badacza torgucki somon, funkcjonujący przez historycznie ukształtowane „idiomy współdziałania i wspólnego użytkowania dóbr” z jednej strony oraz „sztukę nieformalnego” opartego na więziach krewniaczych z drugiej. Zarysowany tak obraz jest bardzo ciekawą analizą potwierdzającą przyjętą przez autora tezę.

Po części teoretycznej w kolejnych rozdziałach autor skupia się na opisanu historycznego i społecznego kontekstu zmian zachodzących we współczesnej Mongolii. Rakowski wnikliwie analizuje wpływ nagłych i często dramatycznych dla obywateli byłego ZSRR zmian, jakimi były rozpad Związku Radzieckiego oraz następujące po nim transformacje ustrojowe i gospodarcze. W konsekwencji tych wydarzeń w Mongolii, tak jak w wielu innych byłych radzieckich republikach, pojawiło się „żywiołowe, chaotyczne działanie handlowe i biznesowe, obciążone w Mongolii znaczeniem pracy pobocznej, mniej wartościowej, a przy tym podejrzanej moralnie w kontekście historycznych zaszczości (...)” (Rakowski 2018: 99).

Dla zrozumienia opisywanego mongolskiego kontekstu istotny jest właśnie wspomniany przez autora fakt „historycznej zaszczości”, czyli żywej pamięci kulturowej społeczeństwa, które swoją tożsamość budowało na etosie ludu pasterskiego. Zmiany związane z transformacją zmusiły Torgutów do zajęcia się handlem, profesją do tej pory postrzeganą jako coś odpowiedniego raczej dla przygranicznych społeczności Chińczyków. Handel do niedawna traktowany był przez Mongołów lekko pogardliwie, a pogarda ta była podszyta uwarunkowaną historycznie, mongolską „sinofobią”, jak określa ją w książce autor.

Co ciekawe, dla czytelnika mniej obeznanego z kontekstem mongolskim, zmiany systemowe lat dziewięćdziesiątych, które przez mieszkańców europejskiej części Związku Radzieckiego są często wspomniane jako trudne, naznaczone ekonomiczną i polityczną niepewnością, w pamięci Torgutów funkcjonują w sposób dużo bardziej niejednoznaczny. Ma to związek zarówno z innym traktowaniem czasu – mniej teleologicznym, linearnym niż w tradycji europejskiej – jak i bogactwem znaczeń nadawanych nieformalnym praktykom, które w społeczeństwach zachodnich często bezkrytycznie wrzucane są do kategorii „korupcji”, „nepotyzmu” czy „nielegalnych interesów”.

W Mongolii kwestie własności (czy też raczej współwłasności) i ekonomicznego współdziałania łączą się z porządkiem społecznym i porządkiem władzy, a sfera polityczna nie jest wyraźnie oddzielona od sfery ekonomicznej, prywatnej czy postawy dbania o powodzenie własne i swojej rodziny. Jak pisze cytowany w książce David Sneath (2003: 200): „Wielokrotnie widziałem, jak uderzające było dla ludzi Zachodu to, do jakiego stopnia lokalni urzędnicy (lokalne władze) wciąż pozostawali zaangażowani w niemal każdą operację ekonomiczną”. Ta umiejętność pozwoliła młodemu i średniemu pokoleniu bułgańskich Torgutów na stworzenie skutecznych sieci handlowo-biznesowych rozciągających się z rodzinnego somonu do „Miasta” (jak nazywana jest stolica, Ułan Bator), jak i za granicę – przede wszystkim do przygranicznych Chin.

To nieformalne działanie i nieformalne przysługi są czymś więcej niż nieuregulowaną prawnie transakcją ekonomiczną – są wyjątkowym i skomplikowanym splotem wdzięczności, szczodrości, pamięci, sztuki „bycia kimś” (lub nawet „bycia sobą”), budowania teraźniejszych i przyszłych relacji i możliwości. Wejście w nieformalność to swoista gra naznaczona ryzykiem – ryzykiem przegranej i przemocy – ale także nadzieją i szansą, jakiej nie dają oficjalne, formalne drogi działania. Jak pisze autor, „sztuka nieformalnego jest sztuką nie tylko osiągnięcia celów, lecz także budowania pozycji, budowania siebie w oczach innych” (Rakowski 2018: 139).

To właśnie rozgrywane i konceptualizowane przez samych zainteresowanych ryzyko i szanse wpisane w nieformalność sprawiają, że przywołane w książce relacje tytułowych współdziałania i możliwości nadają rozszerzonemu krajobrazowi społecznemu Bułganu rys kosmologiczny. Przy całym bogactwie relacji nieformalnych nie są one bowiem, jak mogłoby się to wydawać na pierwszy rzut oka osobom przyzwyczajonym do zachodniocentrycznej dychotomii prywatnego i publicznego przeciwstawione państwu. Państwo, jak przekonuje Rakowski, jest przez Mongołów postrzegane raczej jako ożywcze źródło porządku i harmonii, a nieformalne działania oddolne nie są jego przeciwieństwem, lecz harmonijnie funkcjonującym uzupełnieniem, jako że mogą służyć wspólnemu, nadrzędnemu celowi – usprawnieniu przepływów współdziałania i poszerzeniu kręgów możliwego.

Bardzo często ten fakt jest trudny, jeśli nie wręcz niemożliwy do zrozumienia dla europejskich, lub szerzej – zachodnich organizacji rozwojowych i instytucji, które działają w Mongolii i starają się wcielać tam w życie swoje modele

polityk rozwojowych. Mongolskie praktyki bywają więc przez osoby z zewnątrz postrzegane jako nielegalne, a bywa, że wręcz mafijne powiązania, które rozumiany na modłę zachodnią rozwój hamują, a nie go usprawniają i dopasowują do lokalnych warunków. Jak bardzo jest to redukcjonistyczny i ograniczony wgląd w lokalną kulturę, przekonujemy się coraz bardziej w miarę czytania napisanej przez Rakowskiego gęstej etnografii i wnikliwej antropologicznie analizy tego zjawiska.

W swojej książce autor przedstawia przenikanie się formalnego i nieformalnego, stawiając pytanie o to, jak jeszcze można opisać antropologiczny namysł nad istotą państwa oraz splotów ludzkich i pozaludzkich relacji, przywołując zarówno starsze, jak i nowsze teorie z zakresu antropologii rozwoju, polityki czy państwa. Jego postulatem jest perspektywa „antropologii powodzenia” obejmująca tor-gucką kosmologię w wymiarze obywatelskiej (i nie tylko) aktywności, mającej siłę wchłaniania i przekształcania zewnętrznych, często narzuconych wzorców na te lokalnie zakorzenione i oswojone, znacznie trwalsze i często bardziej efektywne. Dążenie do zapewnienia sobie powodzenia – jak przekonująco opisuje Rakowski – jest równocześnie tęsknotą i pragnieniem wytworzenia (lub odtworzenia) idealnego świata społecznego czy też „dobrego”, „właściwego” życia.

Przeplatające się w *Przeptywach współdziałania, kręgach możliwego* liczne przykłady zaobserwowanych w terenie zjawisk oraz ich analiza są na tyle gęste, że czasem można zgubić się w proponowanych przez autora wątkach. Na szczęście podsumowanie w ostatnim rozdziale, ponowne, całościowe ujęcie tropów prezentowanych przez autora w miarę pisania książki, pomaga dobitnie wybrzmieć proponowanej przez badacza tezie. Omawiana monografia prezentuje świeże i nieszablonowe podejście do interpretacji zjawisk, które z pewnością zaobserwowało w Mongolii wielu badaczy. Jednak podejście do tradycyjnych idiomów działania i znaczeń nadawanych współczesnym zjawiskom przez społeczności do tej pory tradycyjnie pasterskie z perspektywy teorii rozwoju, „odtworzenia” państwa (czy też działania „jak państwo”) czy nieformalnej ekonomii, jak to zrobił Rakowski, jest inspiracją do podobnie otwartego spojrzenia na szeroko rozumianą tradycję także w innych kontekstach.

W publikacji nie brakuje inspirującego podsumowania najciekawszych teorii związanych z zagadnieniami antropologii rozwoju, antropologii nieformalności, idei społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, w tym jego percepcji i adaptacji w innych niż zachodnie kontekstach, lokalnych systemów zaufania, współdziałania czy taktyk bycia-w-świecie. Książka jest cennym źródłem także dla osób bardziej zainteresowanych kontekstem stricte mongolskim, zwłaszcza zachodzącymi ostatnio w tym kraju zmianami społecznymi oraz tym, jak nomadycznym do niedawna społecznościom udaje się płynnie przechodzić od życia w tradycyjnych pasterskich somonach do funkcjonowania w transrelacyjnych i transgranicznych społecznościach, zachowując przy tym swoje wartości, normy i tradycyjne rozumienie tego, co możliwe i korzystne.

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