SAFE HAVENS FOR GLOBAL JIHADI MOVEMENTS

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Abstract

The issue of terrorist safe havens has been dealt with since 9/11 when al-Qaeda attacked the US from its sanctuary in Afghanistan. However, until now there have been only few attempts to elaborate an analytical framework to identify areas that could transform into terrorist safe havens. Moreover, this issue is particularly important in the era when the so-called ISIS has been physically defeated, however, its ideology remains, hence there is a potential risk of its physical re-emergence in a new sanctuary. Thus, the aim of this article is to define safe havens for global jihadi movements by a set of criteria that make a certain area more attractive and vulnerable to the exploitation by jihadists. All criteria were identified after a rigorous study of the establishment of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as well as its failure to establish itself in Somalia in the 1990s. The provided toolbox consists of three categories of criteria and sub-criteria whose interplay *conditions a successful establishment of a global jihadi movement within a particular area.* A quantitative analysis of every factor will enable to identify areas that are the most vulnerable and could potentially become the jihadist sanctuaries.

Key words*: Terrorist Safe Haven, Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, Somalia*

INTRODUCTION

A "terrorist safe haven" is generally understood as a territory of a state (or within a state) that a terrorist group exploits as a base to freely perpetrate its activities, including training, planning, recruiting and sheltering terrorists. This term has been widely used especially in relation to the so-called failed states (or weak/fragile/collapsed states) where terrorists are believed to exploit non-governed areas. However, a previous research of the author concluded that there is no direct causal relation between failed states and terrorism, whereas other factors not necessarily related to state fragility or failure need to be considered as well. Therefore, the author suggested to re-define the term "safe haven for terrorists" and use it separately from "failed states". This article aims to fulfil this ambition and introduce the concept of "terrorist safe havens" as a separate category with a particular focus on so-called "safe havens for global jihadi movements". The scope of research has been narrowed to terrorist movements/groups that promote radical Islamist ideology[1] and operate on the global level (such as al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic state). The ideology of jihadi terrorists based on the hostility towards secularism and towards the West makes their ambitions and scope of operation global. "Therefore, there is an increased risk that they may implant themselves anywhere across the world.

The aim of the article is to define the terms "safe havens for global jihadi movements"[2] by a set of criteria that makes certain areas more attractive to jihadists and vulnerable to being exploited as their safe havens. Thus, it introduces the criteria that contribute to the emergence of the so-called "safe havens for global jihadi movements". They were defined as a result of the author's previous research of the nexus between state failure and the establishment of Islamist terrorist groups. The study suggested that failed states should not be uncritically depicted as safe havens for terrorists, yet, instead, a set of criteria should be observed in order to estimate the probability that a particular area could become a safe haven for a global jihadi network.

The criteria were defined after a rigorous study of al-Qaeda's attempts to establish a new safe haven in the 1990s. The documents obtained by the US, which contains the communication between al-Qaeda headquarters and members of the al-Qaeda exploratory team in Somalia, revealed that bin Laden's expectations to turn Somalia into its safe haven in early 1990s had not been met. [CTC 2007] Somalia, despite being perceived as a perfect safe haven for al-Qaeda, showed features that disabled the group to fully exploit its territory. Finally, al-Qaeda established a safe haven in Afghanistan in 1996 after Omar al-Bashir expulsed bin Laden from Sudan. This historical case study enabled the author to evaluate which factors played the crucial role in the process of creating a safe haven for an international jihadi movement. The failure of al-Qaeda to turn Somalia into its sanctuary and its subsequent establishment in

1 The radical Islamist ideology aims to conquer secular governments, purify Islam and Muslim societies from foreign elements and establish a global caliphate that would be ruled by the Sharia law.

2 In this article, the terms "safe haven" and "sanctuary" are used interchangeably.

Afghanistan will be used throughout the article to support individual factors delimited as positively or negatively influencing attractivity and exploitability of a territory for global jihadi movements. Besides, we will also give some more recent examples of the so-called Islamic state.

At the end of the article, we provide suggestions on how to apply the outlined toolbox in practice. The article aims to answer the questions: What makes an area attractive for global jihadi movements? What conditions a successful establishment of a global jihadi movement within a particular area? The findings in this study may be applicable when it comes to the contemporary situation in the Middle East. Although the so-called Islamic state has been physically defeated, its ideology has remained, and many radicals have fled. Therefore, the risk remains that the IS could re-emerge. Its re-emergence may not be limited only to Iraq and Syria, it may occur at any convenient area. This article provides a toolkit on how to detect an area convenient for global jihadi movements such as the IS. It could be used for determining which areas face the highest risk of potentially becoming its new safe haven.

1. DEFINING THE CONCEPT

Safe havens for terrorists had been present in the political and academic discourse even before the major attacks of 9/11. However, it was only when al-Qaeda, harboured in Afghanistan, attacked the American territory, that terrorist sanctuaries have become a major concern of the US counterterrorism efforts. Sanctuaries begun to be considered a critical element for the functioning of a terrorist group that make terrorism even a bigger threat. Therefore, the US post-9/11 counterterrorism policy has largely focused on denying terrorists safe havens. Accordingly, the invasion to Afghanistan was legitimized by the fact that its territory had provided al-Qaeda a sanctuary to plan the attacks. Since then, any area labelled as a terrorist sanctuary has been categorized as a threat and a potential target of counterterrorism.

1.1 Post-9/11 debates on terrorist safe havens

The attacks of 9/11 have not changed only the perception of the threat posed by terrorist safe havens, but also the perception of the term itself and its meaning. In the 1970s and 1980s, the notion of terrorist safe havens described functioning states that supported or sponsored terrorist activities. After the attacks which were planned by al-Qaeda in its sanctuary in poor and unstable Afghanistan, there has been a synonymic use of terrorist safe havens and failed states[3] in both political and academic domains.

The 9/11 Commission Report claims that “to find sanctuary, terrorist organizations fled to some of the least governed, most lawless places in the world”. (p. 366) It concluded that the US should focus on “remote regions and failing states” in its effort

3 Rotberg (2003) defines failed states as states that are unable or unwilling to fulfil their main functions stemming from the statehood. Taylor (2013) defines them as states where the government cannot maintain order, control over the territory, monopoly on the legitimate use of force and control over social and economic relations in the society.

to suppress terrorist sanctuaries. (p. 367) Similarly, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that, "the United States will work [...] to ensure effective governance over ungoverned territory, which could provide sanctuary to terrorists." (p. 22) The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review states that, "they [terrorists] exploit poorly governed areas of the world, taking sanctuary where states lack the capacity or the will to police themselves". (p. 21) The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism declared: "we will continue to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned or under-governed areas as safe havens - secure spaces that allow our enemies to plan, organize, train, and prepare for operations." (p. 16) The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism states that "al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents rely on the physical sanctuary of ungoverned or poorly governed territories, where the absence of state control permits terrorists to travel, train, and engage in plotting." (p. 9) Finally, according to the Ungoverned Areas Project launched by the US Department of Defense, "all ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas are potential safe havens, because governance gaps in such places are vulnerable to exploitation by illicit actors seeking invisibility." [Lamb 2008, p. 18] All these documents imply directly or indirectly the link between terrorist safe havens and governance deficiency or failed states.

However, the narrative that perceives terrorist sanctuaries in relation to state fragility has been facing increasing criticism. First of all, there are number of opponents of direct causality between the two phenomena. Mankhus (2007) and Patrick (2011), for instance, argue that failed states and ungoverned areas may be less attractive for terrorists than weak yet relatively functioning states that can provide them more benefits. In this context, we suggest that the relation between fragile states and the establishment of a terrorist group is not directly causal, rather, it is conditioned by other elements that may not be related to state fragility. Hence, although state fragility may contribute to the attractiveness of a territory to terrorists, there are other criteria to consider as well.

Secondly, there is an ongoing debate on the role of metropolitan areas as sanctuaries especially in functioning and stable democracies that through the openness, freedom and population density indirectly enable terrorists to communicate, recruit and plan while remaining hidden in the crowd (so-called Londonization). Yet, we argue that although terrorists in the cities in Western democratic states are able to hide and plan, they face a relatively high risk of persecution and their activities thus remain limited. Hence, although metropolitan areas enable them to conduct some partial activities, it is far from what terrorists could achieve if they enjoyed the support from powerbrokers and could operate without restrictions and fear from persecution. These are the definitional features of terrorist safe haven as understood in this article.

Another debate has emerged on whether terrorists do actually need a *physical* sanctuary if they can use cyber space as a *virtual* sanctuary for most of their activities, which makes them physically even less vulnerable. [Arsenault, Bacon 2015] Nowadays, terrorists are able to recruit, raise funds, plan and train on the internet. However, the spread of the IS and the declaration of caliphate on significant parts of Iraqi and Syrian territory proved that physical sanctuaries offer additional assets (training, acquisition of abandoned weapons, money coming from the taxes and oil sales, etc.). The IS proved that despite the terrorists' exploitation of virtual space, the issue of physical safe havens is not out-of-date, and its potential re-emergence remains a threat to international security.

1.2 Terminological and analytical approaches to terrorist safe havens

There have been several attempts to provide a definition of terrorist safe havens, their typology and a framework for analysis. However, this area remains under-researched and faces several shortcomings outlined below.

Innes (2008), one of the prominent experts on the issue of safe havens, understands a terrorist sanctuary as a "complex terrain of material, human, and cognitive dimensions". (p. 251) Korteweg (2008) defines terrorist sanctuaries as "areas in which non-state militant organizations are able to undertake activities in support of terrorist operations" (p. 60). He also refers to the definition of a sanctuary as "a secure base area within which a non-state [militant] group is able to organize the politico-military infrastructure to support its activities". (p. 64) These activities consist of finding a shelter, managing logistics, gaining access to financial resources, training, recruitment and establishing bases for operations. Campana and Ducol (2011) perceive safe havens rather as "social spaces governed in alternative ways" (p. 408). Their conceptual framework applies, in particular, to under-governed or ungoverned areas susceptible to emergence of alternative governance which may be further exploited by the terrorists. Similarly, the US government defines safe havens with reference to the deficient governance. Country Reports on Terrorism published annually by the US Department of State defines terrorist safe havens as "ungoverned, under-governed, or illgoverned physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both."

In general, terrorist safe haven is usually understood as a geographical area, social space or the territory of a state which is ungoverned or ill-governed. Governance (its deficiency) is the central element of most analysis thus making direct or indirect reference to so-called fragile states, another vague and debated concept. Linking safe havens to fragile states may be perceived as one of the main shortcomings of existing research.

When it comes to typology, Korteweg (2008) distinguished between two types of sanctuaries: host-state sanctuaries and terrorist black holes. The difference consists of the government's knowledge, attitude and activities undertaken vis-à-vis terrorists. His study is focused especially on terrorist black holes, which he perceives as ungoverned areas characterized by lawlessness and fragility conducive to terrorist presence.

This approach evokes again the confluence of state failure and terrorism. A similar approach is offered by Arsenault and Bacon (2015). Their typology distinguishes between the government's will and capacity to oust a terrorist group. The intersection of the two axis provides three types of terrorist safe havens based on the interplay between the will and capacity to eradicate terrorists: government-enabled sanctuary, government-sponsored sanctuary and contested sanctuary. [Arsenault - Bacon 2015]
Finally, there have been several attempts to provide an analytical tool that would enable politicians and analysts to define areas that are the most susceptible to becoming the next terrorist sanctuaries. Korteweg and Kittner are among the few scholars who provided a set of elements that define a terrorist sanctuary.

Korteweg (2008) defines seven elements of what he calls terrorist black holes, and by their confluence he explains why a terrorist group is present within a particular area: (1) lack of government control; (2) ethnic-religious communities; (3) legacy from prior conflict (weapons, veterans); (4) geographical characteristics; (5) economic opportunities; (6) economic underdevelopment; (7) external influences. He emphasizes the role of the government and claims that there is a zero-sum game between effective government control and terrorist presence. According to him, "terrorist black holes lie at the crossroads between transnational terrorism and state failure". (Korteweg 2008: 70)

Kittner (2007) focuses on safe havens for international *Islamist* terrorist networks. She defines them as "geographical spaces where Islamist terrorists are able to successfully establish an organizational and operational base." (p. 308) She defines four conditions that are necessary for the establishment of such a safe haven: (1) geographic features; (2) weak governance (with a direct reference to so-called failing, failed or collapsed states); (3) history of corruption and violence; (4) poverty. Similar to Korteweg, Kittner claims that these conditions cannot be taken in isolation, but it is the combination of them that offers a favourable environment for transnational Islamist terrorists.

These studies represent a significant contribution to the debate on terrorist safe havens, however, they face also certain weaknesses. First of all, they pay too much attention to governance-related issues, thus creating the confluence between failed states and terrorist sanctuaries. Secondly, Korteweg neglects the fact that there are different kinds of terrorist groups when it comes to their motivation and goals, and accordingly, they require different environment to thrive. Last but not least, none of them enables us to explain satisfactorily why al-Qaeda failed to establish a safe haven in Somalia in the 1990s, which suggests that there are more factors that should be taken into consideration when identifying terrorist safe havens.

In this article, a terrorist safe haven is understood as a *physical* area where terrorists can establish their base and perpetrate all kinds of their activities with relative safety and impunity. We suggest that rather than automatically identifying failed states as terrorist sanctuaries, a set of specific criteria that make a territory attractive to terrorists should be observed. Thus, we can avoid using the term failed state and its equivalents (weak, fragile, collapsed state). Instead, we define specific criteria that may increase the attractiveness of a territory for jihadi movements, while we acknowledge that some of the criteria may belong to the attributes of failed states.

2. PRESENTING A TOOLBOX

To overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings, we provide a set of criteria whose interplay conditions the success of an international jihadi group in exploiting a particular territory as its safe haven. At the same time, we point to the factors that may have a counter-effect in the establishment of a terrorist safe haven as they neutralize the impact of pro-establishment criteria. All the factors are divided into three main categories (ideological aspects, governance-related aspects, geographical aspects), which consist of particular criteria and sub-criteria. Stemming from the Welch's theory on the causes of conflict, the below-defined criteria play the role of *necessary conditions* when it comes to emergence of a safe haven for jihadists, while sub-criteria represent *sufficient conditions.* Sufficient conditions are not directly related to the emergence of a jihadi safe haven, yet they influence the existence of necessary conditions, hence they have an indirect impact on the establishment of a jihadi sanctuary. [Welch 1993] Together, they constitute a toolbox - a complex set of conditions whose mutual interactions influence the attractivity of a particular area for global jihadi networks.

2.1 Ideological affinity: adoption of jihadi ideology

For an area to become a safe haven for a global jihadi movement, first of all, ideological aspects need to be met. Ideology of jihadi terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (so-called *jihadi ideology*) consists of three main pillars: (1) hostility against secular governments and desire to implement the Islamic law, eventually restore a caliphate; (2) antiwesternism; (3) willingness to use force in pursuit of their goals (militarism). A society or at least a certain part of it that advocates these three pillars represents a favourable environment for the establishment of a jihadi group. Hence, the promotion or adoption of a jihadi ideology by a certain community constitutes the first precondition for a jihadi group to successfully establish a safe haven within a particular territory. The process of adoption of jihadi ideology is outlined in the figure 1 and its separate elements are explained below.

It consists of four main steps/criteria: *presence eventually importation of radical Islamist ideology*[4] + *self-identification with radical Islamist ideology* + *adoption of anti-Westernism* + *militarization.* Within this process, it may be distinguished between the *Islamist radicalization* (adoption of radical Islamist ideology based on ultra-conservatism and politization of religion) and the so-called *jihadi radicalization* understood as the adoption of *jihadi ideology* as proclaimed by al-Qaeda or the IS. Jihadi radicalization thus implies two additional criteria: *hostility against the West* and pro-

4 By radical Islamist ideology we understand especially ultra-conservative teachings of Salafism and Wahhabism based on political Islam, fundamentalism and strict interpretation of the Islamic law.

motion of *the use of indiscriminate violence*, and it constitutes an extension of Islamist radicalization.

2.1.1 Presence of radical Islamist ideologies

There are several branches of Islam, some of them embracing more strict interpretation of religious tenets and advocating political aspects of religion. Probably the most conservative interpretation of Islam is provided by Salafism[5] and Wahhabism[6] (part of the Salafi teaching), which were born within ultra-conservative communities of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These branches of Islam provide ideological base for most of the contemporary Islamist terrorist groups that try to legitimize their actions by misinterpreting the verses of the Qur'an.

On the other hand, Sufism represents a moderate and apolitical branch of Islam that strictly refuses to link religion to politics as well as the use of violence. It promotes mysticism, spiritualism and pragmatic interpretation of the Qur'an instead of the literal one. Therefore, in societies with majority Sufis, we may expect that ideas of global jihad striving for a violent restauration of the caliphate ruled by Sharia would find only little if any support. Sufism is characteristic for African societies including, for instance, the tribes in Somalia.

However, even a Sufi society may be forced by number of circumstances to gradually adopt radical Islamist thoughts. In general, it may result from two subsequent phenomena. Firstly, radical Islamist ideologies need to be *imported* from abroad, and secondly, society itself needs to be *radicalized* under certain circumstances to identify itself with these radical teachings. The import of Salafism/Wahhabism may be well portrayed by the case of Somalia with a traditionally Sufi society. The import of radical ideology occurred by several means: (1) exodus of religious preachers and students to Muslim countries with predominant Salafi/Wahhabi ideologies, their indoctrination and subsequent return to Somalia; (2) return of mujahideens fighting in the Afghan jihad in the 1980s; (3) engagement of ultraconservative states seeking to export the Islamist revolution.

During Siad Barre's regime and his repressive politics against religious organisations, many religious leaders and their sympathizers left Somalia and joined the growing Somali diaspora in the Persian Gulf states, where they got in touch with teachings of ultraconservative Salafism/Wahhabism. [ICG 2005] In addition, many young people

5 Salafism strives to return to the early Muslim practices and purify Islam from innovations and especially from Western elements that according to Salafis caused the contamination of true Islam and the deviation from the right path. (Brtnický 2008) The Salafis believe in the strict obedience to the rules of the Qur'an and the Sunna.

6 Wahhabism is an ultra-conservative ideology that manifests in severe interpretation of Islamic law. At the same time, it embraces features of military extremism. When compared to other Muslims, the Wahhabis are more susceptible to using violence not only against Westerners but also against Sufis and Shiites that radical Wahhabis do not recognize as Muslims. Wahhabis believe that they are the only true believers who should take up arms against non-believers. (Netton 2008) The ultimate goal of Wahhabis is the establishment of the global Umma that would include all the territories formerly subjugated to the Islamic rule.

went abroad to study at foreign universities especially in the Middle East, where they were influenced by political Islam and fundamentalism. Once back in Somalia, some of them formed opposition groups including one of the few Salafi groups, al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), which was founded by young Somalis who had studied in Egypt and maintained contacts with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. [Cilliers 2015] After Barre's collapse, they promoted the establishment of an Islamic government as an alternative to anarchy. Socio-economic and political situation in Somalia was dire, hence Somalis who were influenced by the conservative Islamist teachings perceived political Islam and fundamentalism as a solution to their problems. Moreover, in the early 1990s, mujahideens who were fighting in the Afghan jihad, returned home and joined these groups which influenced them in terms of ideology and militarism.[7] The indoctrinated mujahideens supported the idea of the fight against corrupt secular regimes that they believed ought to be replaced by Islamic governments.

Last but not least, Wahhabism/Salafism was imported also by other states, missionary and charity movements. The involvement of states abroad usually entails also the import of the respective state's ideology. Radical Islamist ideology may thus expand via the engagement of states supporting such ideologies.[8] Since the 1970s, the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, financed mosques, madrassas and charity organizations in Somalia and enabled educational exchange programs, which all together contributed to the spread of Wahhabi influence within the Somali society. In the 1990s, it was especially Sudan and Iran that used humanitarian aid to promote their own interests - export of the Islamic revolution to Africa. They supported Islamic and charity organizations that served them to spread the Islamist and revolutionary ideology. (Shay 2008) In addition, various Salafi missionary and charity movements from abroad have infiltrated into the traditional Sufi society, established new mosques, schools and provided services. Their adherents are more susceptible to radical and intolerant interpretation of Islam, they are thus more susceptible to being recruited by the radical Islamist or jihadi groups. [Menkhaus 2007] Hence, Salafism/Wahhabism started to penetrate the traditional Sufi society in the form of ultraconservatism and political Islam. As a result, several movements embracing Islam as an instrument in the political struggle emerged. However, the import itself is not sufficient. For radical ideologies to thrive, at least a part of the society needs to be responsive and identify itself with the ideology.

The ideological aspects were underestimated by al-Qaeda which was looking for a new potential safe haven in the early 1990s. Bin Laden considered Somalia as an option, however, a predominant Sufi population with no ambitions to fight for a global jihad

7 Foreign fighters played important role in the import of radical Islam also into the Balkans on the background of military conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. (Stojar, 2016)

8 On the other hand, if the state in question participates in the global war on terror and maintains good relations especially with the US as the leading nation in this "war", we may presume that it will not tolerate radical groups and terrorist activities on its soil. After all, it was especially the US pressure that led Omar al-Bashir to expulse bin Laden from Sudan. In general, active participation of a state in counter-terrorism decreases the attractivity of a particular area for global jihadists.

made it difficult for al-Qaeda to find support for its cause. Even the alliance with AIAI did not ensure al-Qaeda full support. Despite military assistance to AIAI, the group refused to participate in the military operations against the US and the then leader sheik Hassan Tahir suggested to opt for political tools instead. Similarly, Hassan Dahir Aweys, member of the AIAI leadership, claimed at the beginning of the 1990s that the time was not right yet for jihad proclaimed by al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda hence criticized the Somali Islamists and claimed that they were unreliable "cowards". [CTC 2007: 41-44] Moreover, Somalis refused to join al-Qaeda because it would mean loss of their clan identity which would not get along without punishment. Al-Qaeda despite providing food and money was not able to compensate the loss if someone decided to abandon their own clan. [CTC 2007: 23]

Therefore, despite the import of Salafism/Wahhabism, Somalia dealt with it (at least at the beginning) in its own specific way respecting the prevalence of moderate and apolitical Sufism. Other factors were thus required to enable the jihadi ideology to thrive. It was conditioned especially by the radicalization of the society and gradual self-identification with the basic tenets proclaimed by jihadists (including anti-Westernism and the use of force). All of them will be explored in more detail as separate criteria.

2.1.2 Self-identification with the radical Islamist ideology

Infiltration of a foreign jihadi group within a certain area is easier, if there are already some radicalized communities or even terrorist groups with similar ideology. In such a scenario, a global jihadi movement may prepare ground for its physical establishment on a certain territory by first establishing links with ideologically similar groups. These links will later facilitate the penetration and establishment of a global jihadi movement. Emergence of homegrown terrorist groups is conditioned by prior *Islamist radicalization* of a part of society understood as *self-identification with radical Islamist ideology* that promotes ultra-conservatism and political Islam (advocating religious solutions for political problems).

As mentioned above, al-Itihad al-Islamiya emerged in opposition to the secular politics of Siad Barre, who suppressed Muslim identity in the Somali society and banned religious organisations and political movements. Members of AIAI believed that the only way to free Somalia from the corrupt dictatorship is to adopt political Islam. [Gatsiounis 2012] After the collapse of Barre's regime in 1990, AIAI was one of the non-state actors that sought to fill the vacuum and impose the rule of Sharia. The movement's ideology was further influenced by the fact, that former Afghan mujahideens became members of AIAI. The group established training camps to train its members in combat tactics including terrorism, however, the Somali society was not yet prepared to accept violent jihad and, as mentioned above, even AIAI leaders refused to participate in the anti-American armed jihad of al-Qaeda. [Mantzikos 2011] Despite the fact that AIAI refused al-Qaeda's vision of global jihad, bin Laden perceived AIAI as a potential ally in the lawless Somalia. There had been already *personal contacts* between former mujahideens (AIAI members) and bin Laden, and several wealthy Saudis even financially supported AIAI to influence its ideology. In the 1990s, AIAI allegedly enabled al-Qaeda to use its bases, training camps and infrastructure to perpetrate attacks on the African continent, including the 1998 attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and Mombassa hotel bombing. [CTC 2007] AIAI together with al-Qaeda are believed also to have participated in the Black Hawk Down incident in 1993. Bin Laden even enabled the transport of hundreds of former mujahideens to assist AIAI in its fight against Ethiopia, when it intervened in Somalia in 1996 to defeat Somali extremists. [Shay 2008] AIAI was ultimately weakened after the Ethiopian intervention, however, it played an important role in terms of ideology and human resources in the emergence of other radical movements, such as the Islamic Courts Union and al-Shabaab.

Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was created on the background of anarchy and lawlessness as a non-state actor, whose prime task was to provide citizens with basic goods and services such as order, security and law. However, it promoted ultra-conservative version of Sharia, imposed strict rules and cruel punishments, which made it closer to radicals from al-Qaeda. Partially shared ideology enabled them to maintain close contacts and cooperate in some areas. For instance, ICU provided shelter to some of al-Qaeda members, including the terrorists responsible for attacks in 1998. Although ICU was defeated in 2006, it represents another important element in the process of al-Shabaab creation. It was only al-Shabaab that under specific circumstances adopted the vision of jihad as proclaimed by al-Qaeda.

Hence, although Al-Qaeda did not succeed in establishing itself in Somalia since the 1990s, it managed to use the territory for some of its activities

Figure 1: Process of adoption of jihadi ideology



Source: Elaborated by author

directly or indirectly via *local Islamist organizations*. In other words, although AIAI and ICU did not fully embrace bin Laden's vision of anti-American jihad and they did not enable al-Qaeda to make Somalia its safe haven, they did enable al-Qaeda to partially exploit the Somali territory and sow the seed of its ideology which started to germinate only later. What made al-Qaeda's ideology different from the local Islamist groups of the 1990s was the emphasis on anti-Westernism and the use of excessive violence in pursuit of its goals.

2.1.3 Presence of anti-Westernism

Anti-Westernism consists of a strong sentiment of hostility against the West. Its emergence and reinforcement can be perceived as a part (or extension) of the radicalization and it constitutes an important element in the adoption of jihadi ideology as proclaimed by al-Qaeda or the so-called Islamic state. If anti-Westernism was absent from the agenda of a jihadi group, its enemies would be different from those of al-Qaeda or IS. In that case, cooperation between the groups would be more difficult and limited.

Anti-Westernism may emerge within the Muslim society as a result of a perceived threat to its religious identity posed by the West. It may be present within ultra-conservative societies as a heritage of colonization by the Western states, but it may be also provoked by the expanding globalization and more recent involvement of the West in Muslim countries, including their support for corrupt secular regimes or military intervention and co-opting of the so-called "puppet governments". In Somalia, anti-Westernism begun to emerge first on the background of the failed US-led intervention in the 1990s. Later, it was reinforced by the co-opting of transitional governments which were created at international conferences and not from within Somalia. But still, in the first years after the collapse of Barre's regime, Somali radicalization was more nation-oriented and less anti-Western, which disabled al-Qaeda to find a favourable environment for the establishment of a safe haven on the Somali soil. The sentiment of anti-Westernism is thus an important precondition in the adoption of jihadi ideology proclaimed by al-Qaeda or the Islamic state. It makes the corresponding part of the society more vulnerable to accepting their vision, especially because of the principle of the common enemy.

2.1.4 Tradition of militarism/militarization of the society

Another pillar of jihadi ideology is the use of violence. People are susceptible to using weapons to solve their problems if the so-called culture of violence prevails or if they are "forced" by specific circumstances. This is often the case of lawless areas characterized by a power and security vacuum where communities have to rely on themselves when it comes to security and protection. The state of anarchy is characterized by self-help and constant battle between the groups striving for power. The groups and communities form their own militias to ensure safety and conquer enemies. Moreover, militarized groups may be susceptible to supporting political violence even in the form of terrorism as a last resort, if no other adequate forms of achieving their political goals are feasible. In general, if a society is militarized, it means that: (1) there is a significant number of weapons on its territory that terrorists may be interested in, and (2) people are willing to use violence in pursuit of their interests. Hence, militarism increases the risk that terrorists will find recruits as well as weapons within the respective area.

When it comes to Somalia, after Barre's collapse, Somali society has become increasingly militarized. Warlords were fighting between themselves to increase their power on the local level. In a lawless society, violence has become a tool to solve problems and people had to rely on themselves and on the clans' militias to ensure their safety and protection. Militarization of the Somali society was further reinforced after the US had dispatched its troops in the Horn of Africa in the 1990s. Sudan and Iran, which tried to export the Islamic revolution to Africa via Somalia, perceived the US-led intervention as a threat to their interests. Therefore, they provided finance, military equipment and training to Somali warlords to enable them to fight the Americans. Among those providing training to Somalis was Hizballah, Lebanon-based terrorist group. Militarization was one of the reasons that led al-Qaeda to believe that Somalia could become its new safe haven.

In the contemporary Somalia, al-Shabaab is the major militant non-state actor. It emerged at first as a militant wing of the ICU, hence, it has been a militarized Islamist movement since the beginning. At first, al-Shabaab acted more like a nationalist force that would free Somalia from foreign influences and establish the rule of Sharia, yet, it gradually adopted the idea of international jihad. Its ideology in terms of indiscriminate use of violence and anti-Westernism was reinforced especially by the 2006 military intervention of Ethiopian troops to Somalia and the establishment of provisional governments that were regarded as puppets of the West. Moreover, several al-Shabaab leaders maintained personal contacts with al-Qaeda and both groups have been cooperating in the area of indoctrination and training. This partnership enabled al-Shabaab to improve its military capabilities, while al-Qaeda gained opportunity to expand its network and reinforce its ideological influence in Somalia. In 2009 al-Shabaab pledged loyalty to al-Qaeda thus formally joining the global jihadi network. However, at that time al-Qaeda was already weakened and decentralized.

The case of Somalia suggests, that the adoption of jihadi ideology that consists of self-identification with radical Islamist ideologies (ultra-conservatism and politization of religion) as well as adoption of anti-Westernism and militarism may emerge as a result of four *sub-criteria* (sufficient conditions): a threat to Muslim identity, inadequate socio-economic conditions, a lack of government's legitimacy and presence of foreign military.

Threat to Muslim identity

In general, any threat to one's identity provokes a desire and need to protect it. The perception of such a threat may result from the penetration of foreign elements that are considered incompatible with the identity or from forced oppression. A community whose identity is threatened may try to purge itself of undesirable foreign elements, protect itself from any potential devastating influences, and ultimately, it may use force to get rid of the source of perceived "contamination" or oppression. Historically, Muslim identity was endangered by secular rulers, Western imperial ambitions and colonization, but more recently also by globalization (from the perspective of the ultra-conservative communities).

Colonization of the Muslim lands by the Western powers became one of the major drivers of fundamentalism and radical Islamist ideologies seeking to conquer the foreign rule by reinstalling Islamic principles and by establishing Islamic emirates which would be ruled by a Muslim leader in line with the Islamic law. More recently, globalization had a similar impact on traditional Muslim societies which fear that the penetration of the Western lifestyle would endanger their traditional way of life. Hence, in conservative societies, the heritage of colonization and ongoing globalization provoked the sentiments of anti-Westernism and especially anti-Americanism as the US are considered the driving force of globalization. On the background of these two phenomena, number of radical religion-based groups have emerged that sought to conquer the Western influence and protect Muslim identity.

The Muslim Brotherhood was among the first fundamentalist anti-Western Islamist groups. Its ideology developed from the ideas of two Egyptians in particular, Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). The former was irritated by the British presence in Egypt and its efforts to enforce the pro-Western oriented educational reform at the expense of Islamic teachings. To spread his ideas, al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood, which was later partially radicalized by his disciple Sayyid Qutb. Similar to al-Banna, Qutb was disillusioned especially with the American liberal lifestyle and excessive freedoms. [Brtnický 2008] He feared that the Western influence on the Egyptian society would have devastating consequences for Islamic traditions which led to his radicalization and desire to purge the Muslim society of the Western facets. For this purpose, he promoted armed jihad to vanquish the British that he perceived as oppressors, to change the secular constitution and establish the rule of Islamic law. [Davis 2007] Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood was adopted and further radicalized by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.

When it comes to Somalia, the need to protect the religious identity of Somalis emerged already during Barre's regime that suppressed religious organizations. A threat to Muslim identity contributed to the emergence of AIAI that sought to establish a state ruled by Sharia. As mentioned above, a threat to Muslim identity may be caused by secular rulers who suppress the Islamic traditions of the society as well as by the subjugation to the rule of foreign powers or by penetration of Western values and lifestyle. These trends may provoke attempts to protect Muslim identity, not excluding the use of force as the last resort. In this case, violence would be perceived by the endangered community as a legitimate tool to defend the Islamic values and identity.

Inadequate socio-economic conditions, frustration and discontent within the society

Another aspect that may provoke radicalization of the society relates to its socio-economic situation. The economic theory of radicalization claims that a lack of economic opportunities, socio-economic degradation, poverty and misery may become a source of radicalization and adoption of terrorist ideology. Number of academics claim that frustration, marginalization and socio-economic degradation of the Arab world creates a breeding ground for Islamist radicalism. [Škvrnda 2002, Sviatko 2005] Gurr, the author of the theory of economic deprivation, claims that the gap between economic ambition and opportunities to achieve them lead to frustration which may be the cause of protesting violence. Lack of economic development endangers state legitimacy, and according to him, delegitimization is a source of political violence. Poor and frustrated people may perceive the government as corrupt, ineffective and incapable to guarantee economic growth and adequate living standards. The decrease of trust and legitimacy thus increases the risk of a violent conflict. [Gurr 1970, Lutz - Lutz 2008: 17]

Stemming from these theories, it may be claimed that people who face unfavourable economic and social situation, where the state cannot guarantee them adequate living standards, security or regular income and provide opportunities for self-realization, are vulnerable to frustration and radicalization and seek alternative ways of income. Such individuals may be susceptible to supporting political violence and participating in criminal/terrorist activities in order to gain economic and political results, certain level of security and protection. [Howard 2010: 962] They may believe that terrorist organizations will succeed where the state has failed. Some of them may decide to support political violence in the form of terrorism to ensure themselves basic goods or demonstrate discontent with the prevailing situation in the state or to achieve the feeling of self-realization. [Takeyh - Gvosdev 2002: 100]

Socio-economic deprivation was characteristic for Somalia especially after Barre's collapse. Given the prevailing socio-economic conditions in Somalia of 1990s (poverty, deprivation, unemployment), bin Laden expected to find a pool of recruits in the Horn of Africa. [CTC 2007] However, he underestimated other factors, such as the prevalence of moderate Sufism, strong clan identity and the lack of anti-American sentiments, hence his expectations were not met. Yet, when al-Shabaab, a home-grown terrorist group, was increasing its power 15 years later, many recruits where motivated by the possibility to earn money and obtain food. When Transnational Federal Government was unable to pay policemen and soldiers, al-Shabaab provided its members 20 USD for a grenade attack, 30 USD for killing a soldier and 100 USD for a bomb attack. [Hansen 2013: 58] Moreover, al-Shabaab gained control over a part of food assistance which was afterwards distributed among its members and their families. This illustrates that socio-economic situation may make people more vulnerable to joining terrorist group for pragmatic reasons. However, the ideological affinity remains still important. Moreover, al-Shabaab may have been more successful in recruiting frustrated Somalis because it is a home-grown terrorist organization.

Lack of government's legitimacy

Delegitimization of the government/ruler may lead to radicalization understood as the adoption of an extreme form of political activism. [Sprinzak 1991] Delegitimization and subsequent radicalization may occur in three ways. Firstly, transformational delegitimization is specific for the states that have not successfully accomplished the process of democratization, where democracy is not consolidated enough and the power is abused for the sake of elites. Disappointment from the democratic transformation leads to the decrease in trust towards the government and regime, which may evolve into the crisis of legitimacy. Those who are not satisfied with the results of transformation are vulnerable to radicalization and they may even opt for violence in order to change the system. Secondly, radicalization may occur if some ethnic, separatist or minority group is not satisfied with the level of fulfilment of its demands and it regards the central government as illegitimate to rule over its people. Thirdly, radicalization can also arise in authoritative states, where dissatisfaction and frustration results from slow and insufficient reforms or unwillingness of the government to respond to its people's demands. People feel powerless and become susceptible to solving their situation by force, if no other tools are available.

In general, delegitimization and subsequent radicalization are related to disappointment from political and socio-economic development. Deprivation, disillusion and hopelessness are often considered to be not only reasons of decreasing loyalty towards the government, but also the sources of terrorism. [Cigánik, Jaššová 2006; Schmid 2011; Hoffman 2006: 24] If the government is incapable to reflect public opinion and protect public interests, it loses legitimacy. Stemming from Sprinzak theory, these conditions create a breeding ground for a successful implantation of radical ideologies. Frustrated and disenfranchised Muslims may identify themselves with radical jihadi ideologies that call for Islamisation (adoption of radical interpretation of Islamic law) and restoration of the glory of the Islamic world. (Klavec 2014) Ultimately, they perceive themselves as holy fighters driven by the feeling of despair and incapacity to make change without the use of violence.

Similarly, according to Moghaddam, the prerequisite for radicalization stems from structural conditions, that are perceived by a certain group as unfair. Disadvantaged individuals strive to improve their social and political situation, and with each failure, they progress to the subsequent phase of radicalization which ends by the use of force/terrorism. [Moghadam 2005]

Delegitimization relates also to the so-called puppet governments that are perceived as co-opted by foreign powers and do not reflect specificities and traditions of the respective society.[9] If the foreign powers are part of the so-called West, the radicalization may achieve the form of anti-Westernism. In Somalia, transitional governments were perceived by the radicals as illegitimate, and there were several assassination attempts aimed at the president and prime minister. In 2006, the first suicide bombings by al-Shabaab occurred in Baidoa, the provisional capital of Somalia, which almost injured the president Yusuf. [Menkhaus 2007]

In general, if the government lacks legitimacy, there is an increased risk of general discontent. If the government is non-responsive to people's demands or incapable to ensure basic goods and services, people search for alternative sources of legitimacy often provided by local or spiritual leaders, warlords, but also terrorist groups. Moreover, if the system disables a peaceful political change, disenfranchised people may eventually opt for violence. Finally, if the government is regarded as a puppet of the West that rules regardless of the local traditions, it may provoke sentiments of anti-Westernism that could be further exploited by global jihadi movements seeking an ideologically "friendly" environment.

Presence of foreign military/recent experience with military intervention

Military intervention is one of the key factors that may lead to general discontent and anti-Westernism, if the intervening state is part of the "West".[10] General public opinion would be highly hostile against foreign military presence, especially if the intervention was perceived as illegitimate, in violation of the state's sovereignty, and if the troops plundered the territory and abused their power. Such an intervention may reinforce nationalism and desire to protect the state's sovereignty even with arms. Regardless of motives, ordinary civilians may feel hostility against armed foreigners or even humiliation and may want to protect their country. This is especially the case of Western interventions into Muslim countries, given the fact that the most of the Muslim world was colonized and oppressed by Western powers in the past. Therefore, any Western intervention is portrayed as "occupation" that aims to subjugate Muslims and enforce Western-style secular rule. Presence of the Western troops may deepen sentiments of anti-Westernism and it may be further abused by radical groups to reinforce hostility towards the West. Radical Islamists depict Western involvement in Muslim states as a threat to Muslim identity. They proclaim that it needs to be countered in order to restore the glory of Islam.

This pattern of radicalization may be observed in many recent examples[11]. When it

9 This was the case of the Shia government in majority Sunni Iraq established after the 2003 intervention. The lack of legitimacy and loyalty from the Sunni perspective enabled the so-called ISIS to thrive.

10 According to Robert Pape (2005), 95% of terrorist attacks are "motivated by the presence of foreign combat troops".

11 Al-Qaeda in Iraq emerged in reaction to the American-led 2003 invasion to Iraq. Iraqi Sunnis waged guerrilla war against the US-led coalition and the so-called puppet government. Their resistance gradually began to be defined as jihad and its elements began to cooperate with Zarqawi's jihadists. Coun-

comes to Somalia, one of the key factors that influenced the AIAI's ideology was the UN intervention in 1992, which was perceived by the AIAI members as a Western attempt to get control over Somalia. The intervention as such did not meet its goals and it led to increasing anti-Americanism, which had not been present in Somali society before. Afterwards, Islamic courts radicalized not only on the background of international efforts to establish a central government in Somalia, but especially after Ethiopia sent troops to Somalia to counter Islamic extremism. ICU refused foreign military on Somali soil and declared jihad to Ethiopian troops in Somalia. It called upon all Somali Muslims and mujahideens all over the world to join the Somali jihad against "occupants". Ethiopia was perceived as an obstacle in the reunification of Somalis under the rule of the Islamic law. ICU even established military training camps where indoctrination and training were held, in other words, ideological and military preparation to fight the perceived enemies of ICU and of Islam. (Shay 2008)

Last but not least, al-Shabaab radicalized on the background of Ethiopian the intervention to Somalia in 2006. After the defeat of ICU in 2006, al-Shabaab became independent and it acted as a national Somali force fighting against lawlessness and the so-called foreign occupation and illegitimate government co-opted by the foreigners. In the Somali society, there was an increasing aversion against the invasion especially after the Ethiopian troops attacked the residential district. (Kaplan 2010) Al-Shabaab's objective to defeat and expel the Ethiopian troops enabled it to recruit new members who wanted to protect the Somalis against external threats and fight foreign troops in the so-called Somali jihad. Moreover, foreign fighters joined the ranks of al-Shabaab and influenced the movement ideologically. The intervention ultimately consolidated al-Shabaab's jihadi agenda and resulted in marginalization of moderate figures on behalf of more radical elements. Its radicalization may be observed by the introduction of the suicide-bombing strategy. [Campana, Ducol 2011] Hence, foreign interventions enabled radical ideologies to gradually spread within the Somali society and ultimately, al-Shabaab embraced al-Qaeda's vision of jihad.

To sum up, a partial exploitation of the Somali territory by jihadists from al-Qaeda was enabled due to the radicalization of the Somali society and Islamist groups. Although Islamists promoted only limited goals related to Somali territory and nation at first and they refused anti-American and anti-Western jihad, their agenda became gradually more radical under the influence of various factors. Important role was played especially by the import of Salafism/Wahhabism as well as foreign interventions and presence of foreign troops on the Somali soil, which reinforced the antipathy against foreign, especially Western, elements. Last but not least, radicalization was provoked by the refusal of provisional governments which were perceived as illegitimate and corrupt puppets of the West incapable to respect the Islamic tradition of the society. Al-Qaeda managed to exploit the Somali soil partially only after domestic radical Islamist and terrorist groups were formed and adopted the ideology

ter-US insurgency provoked by the US-led invasion to Iraq was "hijacked" by terrorists. (Williams 2007) similar to al-Qaeda's. Hence, domestic radicalization and existence of home-grown jihadi movements may be considered as being among the prerequisites for a foreign jihadi group to exploit a territory as its potential safe haven. However, despite gradual radicalization there were still other factors that disabled al-Qaeda to fully exploit the Somali territory as its safe haven.

2.2 Governance

The second category that influences the attractivity of a territory for jihadists consists of the governance related criteria: risks stemming from the power and security vacuum and relations between powerbrokers and terrorists (based on ideological affinity or corruption).

2.2.1 Power and security vacuum

When studying terrorism, the concept of power comes forward. Terrorism is a strategy that enables a weaker party to gain power (understood as capacity) to influence political decision-making and achieve its political goals. As Hoffman points out *"terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little".* [Hoffman 2006: 41] Hence, for a terrorist group it may be attractive to establish a safe haven for its activities in the so-called power vacuum with an absent or very weak state authority. Terrorists may use "ungoverned areas" to establish training camps and plan operations. Absent law enforcement and ineffective security forces enable them to operate without being accountable to a higher authority. [Piazza 2008: 471] Ungoverned areas provide also significant material benefits, especially abandoned weapons and items for illegal sale but also natural resources. Terrorists may participate in money laundering or other criminal activities to gain money. Moreover, if a terrorist group controls a part of the state territory with its population, it may enforce its own version of law and taxes which become another important source of the group's income.

Power vacuum may thus give terrorists the opportunity to fill it and replace the state. As Kittner has pointed out, terrorists may seek ungoverned areas and vacuums to avoid state interference and by stepping into the chaos they may try to establish a so-called "state-shell". [Kittner 2007: 310] A terrorist group may step into the vacuum and function as an alternative governing authority and gain legitimacy and support from the local populace through the provision of services. [Arsenault, Bacon 2015] However, there are a few if any cases where a de facto vacuum emerged. When the central government collapses, the power is disseminated into the hands of local powerbrokers and alternative governing structures that emerge to provide protection and deliver services. Hence, for terrorists to implant into the society, they usually need to interact with these alternative governing bodies.

However, a security vacuum also has its drawbacks as it may be dangerous even for the terrorists if they do not have the support among the locals who would safeguard their facilities. The benefits of power and security vacuum were overestimated by al-Qaeda in the 1990s. At that time, Somalia was a de facto lawless country with no central authority and prevailing power vacuum from the perspective of a non-existing central government. The International Crisis Group even designated Somalia as the most potential safe haven for al-Qaeda in Africa in the early 1990s. [Shay 2008: 188] In fact, even Bin Laden expected that the lack of state power and lawlessness would create suitable conditions for al-Qaeda to exploit the Somali soil for its activities. However, his expectations were not fulfilled. Al-Qaeda had to deal with several of the above-mentioned challenges (moderate and apolitical version of Islam, lack of anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism, reluctance to engage in the global jihad, strong clan loyalty) that disabled it from using the Somali territory as a safe haven. Moreover, it would cost al-Qaeda a lot of resources to protect itself against local criminals. A limited success of al-Qaeda was achieved in Ras Kamboni where Somalis perceived the group as a more effective provider of goods and services as the clans. It provided not only material benefits and military training, but also a certain level of security and order. In this case, locals made a pragmatic decision to accept al-Qaeda in exchange for basic goods and services. However, al-Qaeda did not manage to expand in other areas and its activities in Somalia depended on the collaboration with local radicals. Therefore, when a power vacuum emerges the crucial question is, who will fill it. Then it should be asked what relations there are between those who have filled the vacuum and the jihadists.

2.2.2 Powerbrokers supporting terrorism/ideologically close to radical Islamists

For a jihadi group to establish a safe haven within a certain territory, it needs to enjoy at least some level of support or acceptance from the part of society or other radical groups. However, support and acceptance should stem also from those who are in power (on the state or local level if the central authority is weak and instead the territory is fragmented and ruled by local leaders).

After al-Qaeda failed to establish itself in Somalia, it found a safe haven in Afghanistan in 1996. However, it managed to establish itself on the Afghan territory not because Afghanistan was a lawless country (from the perspective of the central government which was weak and unable to control the overall territory), but because a non-state actor, Taliban, got to power and enabled its establishment. Personal links between bin-Laden and Muhammad Umar, the leader of Taliban, were established already when both participated in the jihad against the Soviet Union. [Felbab-Brown 2013] But the most important, both movements, al-Qaeda and Taliban where ideologically close to each other. Taliban stemmed from Deobandism, a branch of Islam specific for Pakistan and the Indian subcontinent, while al-Qaeda was established on the bases of Wahhabism, the official religious doctrine of Saudi Arabia. Both promote strict interpretation of the Islamic law, ultra-conservatism, puritanism, moral renaissance of the society, purification of Islam from foreign, especially Western influence, and their sympathizers belong to Sunni Islam. [Haqqani 2005] Last but not least, both promoted the vision of a state ruled by Sharia. Due to the similar ideologies, Taliban represented a natural ally for al-Qaeda. Their symbiotic relationship was reinforced by the principle of the common enemy - the US.

The alliance between Taliban and al-Qaeda had also a strategic military significance as they realized joint exercises and operations. Al-Qaeda created a special battle unit called Brigade 005, which was integrated into the military units of Taliban and its objective was to fight against the Northern Alliance, the prime enemy of Taliban on the Afghan territory. Al-Qaeda also perpetrated a number of terrorist attacks in the name of Taliban, including the assassination of Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance. On the other hand, al-Qaeda gained access to the training camps, it was allowed to use the aviation of Afghanistan to transport its personnel and supplies. [Hellmich 2011] Hence, in general, the establishment of al-Qaeda in Taliban controlled Afghanistan was mutually beneficial for both actors. Most important of all, al-Qaeda obtained a de facto protection from Taliban and could thus exploit the Afghan soil as its safe haven.

Hence an important precondition for an international jihadi network to successfully establish itself within an area is *the support from local leaders*. This prerequisite was underestimated by al-Qaeda when it tried to change Somalia into its safe haven in the 1990s. Al-Qaeda did not succeed in building a safe haven in the Horn of Africa for several reasons, one of them being the lack of support from the part of warlords. They were interested primarily in increasing their power and defeating other warlords instead of fighting the US in the global jihad. Anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism in the early 1990s were still foreign concepts for Somalis, they were not strong enough to unify hostile clans in the fight against the so-called far enemy. Tribalism disabled al-Qaeda to create an anti-American coalition of tribes that would have adopted its vision of a global jihad. Moreover, as soon as al-Qaeda managed to gain the sympathy of one clan, the concurrent ones would automatically become hostile. [CTC 2007]

2.2.3 Corruption

Another option how to establish a safe haven on a certain area is to corrupt the elites and buy their support via financial reward. The risk that a terrorist group will buy support and protection from the local population is especially high if the population suffers from poverty. [Kittner 2007] There were a number of cases where terrorists paid powerbrokers to ensure non-interference and protection.

In addition to the above-mentioned strategic partnership between al-Qaeda and Taliban, there were also significant financial benefits stemming from this alliance to Taliban. Bin Laden paid Taliban for al-Qaeda's presence on the Afghan soil 20 million USD per year from the overall al-Qaeda's annual budget of 30 million. [Byman 2015: 22] He allegedly built a house for mullah Umar's family, while other Taliban leaders were also provided certain financial reward. [Rashid 2002] Moreover, a simple house in the Afghan-Pakistan border area that was worth 80 USD per month was rented to an al-Qaeda member for 750 USD per month. [Kittner 2007: 313] Hence, for state authorities or frustrated local population, presence of a terrorist group may become a source of income in exchange for active or at least passive support. In fact, Afghanistan under Taliban's rule became "a state sponsored by terrorism". [Williams 2007]

2.3 Geographical aspects

Geography influences the attractiveness of an area for jihadists especially in terms of borders, location and terrain. Terrorists seek such areas that would enable them free and undetected movement and provide shelter.

2.3.1 Porous borders

First of all, global jihadi groups look for areas with easy and undetected access in and out. Hence, one of the factors that increases the attractivity of an area for global jihadi networks are porous borders. Lack of control may result from the lack of government's capacity or simply the geographic conditions disabling effective control. Porous borders enable not only free movement of jihadists but they also facilitate the smuggling of weapons, mobility of financial resources as well as the spread of ideology. A highly porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan enabled uncontrolled movement of terrorists from one country to another. The border region is often referred to as Af-Pak and it proved to be highly beneficial to al-Qaeda, especially after the US invasion to Afghanistan, when most of al-Qaeda core fled to Pakistan through these porous borders.

2.3.2 Geographic location: state neighbouring to an existing safe haven

If there is a terrorist group established in the state A (a neighbour of the ideological close state B) and the border between the two states is un-controlled, there is a high probability that terrorists from the state A would exploit the state B, especially if such a state has something to offer (uncontrolled areas to establish training camps, suitable shelters to hide terrorists, pool of recruits, material benefits, etc.) Hence, a simple fact that there is a terrorist movement in some country, represents a certain risk to its neighbours. Neighbouring countries face a risk of possible extension of the group and exploitation of their territory. This may be illustrated by the spread of the so-called Islamic state from Iraq to Syria and back. In addition, Kenya, a neighbouring state of Somalia, was discussed as a potential sanctuary for al-Shabaab. (Patrick 2011)

2.3.3 Geography suitable for cover

Terrorist usually seek areas that enable them to perpetrate their illicit activities in secret and shelter their members. As Kittner [2007: 309] has pointed out, this may include rugged terrain that is inaccessible for state authorities and offers cover for training facilities and illicit activities. A shelter was provided by a complex system of tunnels in Tora Bora mountain, where bin Laden was hidings towards the end of his stay in Afghanistan. Geographic terrain that provides shelter represents one of the benefits for terrorists seeking a safe haven. However, hostile conditions of jungles, mountains or deserts may become double-edged. On one hand, terrorists may hide and conduct their activities secretly, yet on the other hand, it may be difficult for them to build the required infrastructure.

Indeed, terrorists need a certain level of infrastructure to conduct their activities. A lack of infrastructure made potential establishment of al-Qaeda in Somalia in the 1990s difficult and expensive. It required the transport of human resources and equipment to remote parts of the country with no roads or any other communication, which would be very difficult and expensive in terms of logistics. Hence, terrorists seek such areas that provide shelter and enable undetected activities, yet at the same time, there should be at least some level of infrastructure. [Patrick 2011] In the best-case scenario, there would be already training camps established that they could use for their activities. This was the case of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, where it could have used Taliban's facilities for its own benefits. On the other hand, in Somalia, there was a very poor communication infrastructure and lack of potable water, which posed a constant challenge not only for the local population but also for terrorists.

To sum up, lawless Somalia of the 1990s had several features that seemingly made it an ideal safe haven for al-Qaeda. There was no central authority that would disrupt al-Qaeda's activities, people were frustrated and seeking alternative income and protection. In addition, there were already Islamist groups that maintained contact with al-Qaeda, however they adopted anti-Western ideology and indiscriminate violence only reluctantly. Moreover, the complete lack of infrastructure increased the costs for al-Qaeda's establishment. Al-Qaeda would have to pay also for its own protection from criminals whose numbers thrived in the prevailing conditions of poverty and security vacuum. Finally, it proved to be extremely difficult to find support and allies within a tribal society where clan identity and rivalry between the clans were too deeply enrooted. Therefore, Afghanistan appeared to be a better option for al-Qaeda as its territory was under control of ideologically and otherwise affiliated Taliban. Thus, Al-Qaeda could enjoy the protection of Taliban and did not have to deal with the challenges it would have to face in Somalia.

As it was pointed out, despite the presence of the above enumerated criteria, there may be some factors that would negate their impact on the attractiveness of a territory for global jihadi movements. The table below summarizes the factors that influence both positively and negatively the attractiveness of an area for jihadists. It includes both necessary and sufficient conditions for the establishment of a safe haven for global jihad movements.

Table 1: Summary of the necessary and sufficient conditions (criteria and sub-criteria) facilitating or obstructing the establishment of a safe haven for a global jihadi movement on a certain area

Category	Conditions pro	Conditions against
Ideological aspects / adoption of jihadi ideology	*Presence of radical Islamist ideologies (Salafism/ Wahhabism)* • Import of radical ideologies • Return of citizens participating in jihad abroad • Return of students studying at radical madrassas abroad • Involvement of states supporting radical Islamist ideologies or terrorism (financing mosques, charity organizations, educational exchanges, etc.)	Dominance of Sufism - moderate apolitical Islam Active participation of the state in the global war on terror
	Self-identification with radical Islamist ideology • Personal contacts with jihadists • Threat to Muslim identity • Inadequate socio-economic conditions, frustration and discontent within the society • Lack of government's legitimacy • Presence of foreign military / recent experience with military intervention	• Opportunity of political participation, existence of civil society, syndicates and opposition that enable to address the demands to the government in a non-violent way and achieve at least partial success • Strong loyalty on the clan level (tribal identity)
	Presence of anti-Westernism • Threat to Muslim identity coming from the West • Heritage of colonization by Western states • Ultra-conservatism versus globalization • Puppet government co-opted by the West • Presence of Western military troops / recent experience with military intervention by the West	
	Tradition of militarism / militarization of the society • Experience with military interventi • Power and security vacuum	
Governance	*Power and security vacuum*	
	Powerbrokers supporting terrorism / ideologically close to radical Islamist ideologies	
	Corruption of elites	

Category	Conditions pro	Conditions against
Geographic aspects	*Porous borders*	
	State neighbouring an existing safe haven	
	Geography suitable for cover	• Capacity of the government and security forces to protect borders and territory against the penetration and infiltration of terrorists • Lack of infrastructure

Source: Elaborated by author

Individual factors interact, intersect and influence each other, therefore, when studying vulnerability of a state in terms of becoming a safe haven for a global jihadi movement, not only the criteria as such should be scrutinized, but we should observe also their mutual interactions and context in which these interactions occur. Even if one criterium seems to act in favour of the establishment of a jihadi group, the final outcome may be neutralized by another counter-factor that ultimately disables its establishment.

It is not possible to generalize and determine one factor that would be always applicable as a decisive one. Instead, we recommend to study each case individually and monitor mutual interactions between the factors to estimate their impact (positive or negative) on the potential emergence of a jihadi safe haven. We thus recommend a rigorous qualitative analysis when applying the outlined model. Quantification does not enable to observe mutual interactions between the criteria, yet we regard these interactions as crucial when defining the vulnerability of a state to becoming a jihadi safe haven. Quantification would only point out whether the criterium as such is present or not while it would disable to explain how individual factors interact and what effects they have. Therefore, we do not consider the quantitative approach as satisfying as it may lead to distorted conclusions.

CONCLUSION

The article provides a set of factors that condition a successful establishment of a safe haven for a global jihadi movement within a certain area. Criteria act as *necessary conditions* and they are grouped into three categories: adoption of a jihadi ideology consisting of Islamist and jihadi radicalization, governance related issues, and geographical aspects. Particular criteria further consist of sub-criteria - *sufficient conditions* - that influence the emergence of necessary conditions, hence they have an indirect impact on the establishment of a jihadi sanctuary. Besides, there are several specific factors that may disable the emergence of a necessary condition and, in general, they act as counter-factors that may prevent an area from becoming a sanctuary for jihadists.

The provided toolbox takes into account not only the individual criteria and sub-criteria but also their mutual interactions and context in which they exist as well as negative factors that may neutralize the effect of particular conditions. Monitoring of individual criteria/sub-criteria and their mutual interactions enables us to identify whether an area fulfils the prerequisites of a potential safe haven for global jihadi movements. Hence, a rigorous qualitative analysis based on the proposed model should enable us to define which states and areas are the most lucrative and attractive for global jihadi movements such as al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic state. However, it should be pointed out, that there is probably no ideal case that would satisfy all the criteria delimited in this article. Instead, when applying this model, we should be able to determine which territory gets the closest to the "ideal case" and hence which one faces the highest risk of becoming a safe haven for the global jihadi network.

This article contributes to the on-going debate on terrorist safe havens by providing a complex analytical tool. The application of the outlined model should explain why some areas are more sought after by global jihadists and more vulnerable to becoming their safe haven when compared to other areas. This should be borne in mind when it comes to counter-terrorism and prevention from emergence of jihadi safe havens. Particular attention should be paid to a potential re-emergence of the so-called Islamic state after it has lost its territory in Iraq and Syria.

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