A POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON NATION AND NATION-BUILDNG IN A POST-COMMUNIST STATE: THE CASE OF GEORGIA UNDER ZVIAD GAMSAKHURDIA

Zviad Abashidze

Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,
Ivane Javahishvili Tbilisi State,
1, Ilia Chavchavadze ave. Academic Building #6, 0128, Tbilisi, Georgia
zviad.abashidze@tsu.ge

Abstract

The article considers Zviad Gamsakhurdia's discourse on nationality and nation-building in post-soviet Georgia during the period October 1990 to 6th January 1992. Methodologically, the article is based on the methods of discourse analysis and trace observation. The concepts of Rogers Brubaker's "nationalising state" and Sammy Smooha's 'ethnic democracy' are used as the theoretical framework. The article concludes that a hybrid model of a nation was used by Zviad Gamsakhurdia instead of a pure ethnicity model widespread in relevant literature.

Key Words: *Nation-Building, Nationalising State, Ethnic Democracy, Zviad Gamsakhurdia*

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this article is to clarify the discourse on nationality and nation-building in Georgia from October 1990 to 6th January 1992. This represents the period of the government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia who came to power after the first multiparty elections in Georgia during the final throes of the Soviet Union. As a former prominent dissident and anti-Soviet figure, Gamsakhurdia firstly served as Head of the Supreme Soviet and later as President of the French model. Despite only serving just over one year as head of state and government, his period in power turned out to be decisively interconnected with contemporary Georgia's independent statehood and national sovereignty. For many interpreters, Gamsakhurdia was strongly attached to extreme ethnonationalism which in turn played an enormous role in the origins of ethnonational conflicts in Abkhazia and the former South Ossetia. From our point of view, such an approach requires reconsideration in that the empirical sources are telling a different reality.

We are using a top-down strategy for our research. Discourse analysis and process tracing methods are employed as the principal methods. Based on discourse analysis, Gamsakurdia's official speeches, references and interviews were researched but, at the same time, process tracing methods were also employed as coming to an understanding of Georgia and the general post-soviet period without socio-cultural and historical continuity is complicated. In fact, the path to modernisation for the majority of post-soviet societies was very different in comparison to their western counterparts, so taking into account their historical peculiarities and context would seem to be crucial for gaining insights into this subject.

1. ESSENCE OF THE POST-COMMUNIST 'NATIONALISING STATE" AND "ETHNIC DEMOCRACY"

The interpretation of the proposed case study has been based on Rogers Brubaker's "nationalising state" and Sammy Smooha's "ethnic democratic" approaches. In as far as the above two concepts are often employed to help in gaining an understanding of the nation-building process of post-socialist countries, they seem to match well with our goals.

1.1. Rogers Brubaker and the "nationalising state"

There are plenty of studies in relevant literature which focus on post-soviet nationality/national-building policies, among which the concepts of Rogers Brubaker's "nationalising state" and Sammy Smooha's "ethnic democracy" deserve distinguished places. Unlike Brubaker's approach, Smooha's concept was created in 1989 before the final collapse of socialism as an interpretation of Israeli politics. However, as it focused on gaining an understanding of the ethnic categories in policy-making processes, the approach has been widely used for the interpretation of nation-building processes in the post-communist space as well. Included in these are the cases of

Latvia and Estonia which served as examples where the democratic consolidation process had been intertwined with ethnic/national homogenisation issues.

Both approaches interpret post-communist nation-building policies with a strong presence of ethnic exclusivist colours in the public sphere but, whilst in Brubaker's case such a nation-building process has been understood as the potential hegemony of the majority over the minority, Smooha's model of ethnic democracy has been interpreted as a base for the stability of the political system as far as it recognises the equal rights of all citizens with the majority ethnic group providing an informal lead. Brubaker describes the post-communist countries as "nationalising States", in that those countries present themselves as forming, rather than as formed, nation-states, where the majority implements its ethnonational priorities. According to Brubaker, "nationalising states" are inclined to become ethnically homogenous states, where the dominant elites promote the languages, cultures, demographic situation, economic prosperity and political hegemony of state bearing nominal nations; and where we can find solid, organised and politically excluded national minorities, whose leaders claim territorial autonomies as a bulwark against potential assimilation and discrimination [Rogers Brubaker (1995):113].

Brubaker describes three factors which determine an understanding of post-communist states: Nationalising State, National Minority and External Homeland. According to him: "... national minority not as a fixed entity or a unitary group but rather in terms of the field of differentiated and competitive positions or stances adopted by different organisations, parties, movements, or individual political entrepreneurs, each seeking to "represent" the minority to its own putative members, to the host state, or to the outside world, each seeking to monopolise the legitimate representation of the group" [Rogers Brubaker (1995):109]. For Brubaker, "External Homeland" is a political, not an ethnographic category; homelands are constructed, not given. A state becomes an external national "homeland" for "its" ethnic Diaspora when political or cultural elites define ethno-national kin in other states as members of one and the same nation, claim that they "belong," in some sense, to the state, and assert that their condition must be monitored and their interests protected and promoted by the state. When the state actually does take action in the name of monitoring, promoting, or protecting the interests of its ethnonational kin abroad this supports the creation of this external national "homeland". Homeland politics takes a variety of forms, ranging from immigration and citizenship privileges for ""returning" members of the ethnic Diaspora, through various attempts to influence other states' policies towards its co-ethnics, to irredentist claims on the territory of other state" [Rogers Brubaker (1995):109-1010].

To sum up, it can be said that, for Brubaker, the principal idea of nationalising a state's ethnocultural policy is to clarify the ways in which the ethnic majority are trying to reach the dominant position over minorities that causes the trends of minorities to secede and achieve autonomy. At this moment, "external homelands" are

ready to join with their compatriots for their protection. For Brubaker, this forms the essence of the nationality discourse of post-communist space that cannot be conflict-ual in every case. [Rogers Brubaker (1995): 109].

1.2. Sammy Smooha's model of "ethnic democracy"

Sammy Smooha indicated that the lack of democratic experience in transitional countries may stimulate the rise in dominance of certain ethnic groups, and that this will possibly take the form of the "ethnic state" putting under question the very exis-tence of democracy (Sammy Smooha (2005)). According to Smooha, democracy can be multicultural or ethnic. He views Western democracies as multicultural, but for a description of other types of democracies he prefers to use the term "ethnic democra-cy" instead. Smooha writes that: "It can be called "ethnic democracy", a regime that combines a structured ethnic dominance with democratic rights for all. The identi-fication of this new kind of regime serves the need to expand and refine the types of democracy in order to better describe and understand the growing variegation of democratic and semi democratic systems in a world of states internally divided by ethnicity" [Sammy Smooha. (2005): 7].

It should be mentioned that "ethnic democracies" are different from "ethnocracies." According to Yiftachel: "An ethnocracy is a non-democratic regime which attempts to extend or preserve disproportional ethnic control over a contested multi-ethnic terri-tory. Ethnocracy develops chiefly when control over territory is challenged, and when a dominant group is powerful enough to determine unilaterally the nature of the state. Ethnocracy is thus an unstable regime, with opposite forces of expansionism and resistance in constant conflict" [Sammy Smooha (2005):19].

Smooha wonders how ethnic democracracies are different from civic democracies? According to his answer, "the fundamental deficiency is the lack of civil and political equality because the rights of the minority are inferior to the rights of the majority. The state belongs to the majority and serves it more than the minority. Being identi-fied with the majority, not with its citizens, the state also does not try hard to obtain nor does it actually enjoy the legitimacy, consent and cooperation of all the ethnic groups living in its midst" [Sammy Smooha (2005): 19].

It can be concluded that Smooha's model of "ethnic democracy" does not fully cor-respond to the criteria of civic democracy and has been characterised with more restrictions and a lack of egalitarianism, because of a recognition of the dominance of certain ethnic group over others [Sammy Smooha (2005): 19]. This provides a po-tential source of further instability.

Post-communist realities have fitted with Brubaker's views, but in certain cases it is debatable. For example, according to Taras Kuzio, every Western European state has been "nationalising" on a certain level, because they all have a number of ethno-cul-tural bases. This is why it is not an easy task to differentiate nationalising policies from nation-building [Taras Kuzio (2001): 1935-138]. Smooha also says that "policies

of cultural and ethnic homogenisation [were] the case [for] European liberal-democracies throughout the centuries, that were not really peaceful in many cases, but in last times they changed such approaches and started to build up more multicultural democracies" [Sammy Smooha (2005): 7]. However they were not always successful and welcomed. The dramatic rise of right wing populism in contemporary western democracies is the clear expression of this type of discontent.

It is possible to say the same about Smooha's "ethnic democracy" if we consider insights from the Georgian case. Natalie Sabanadze justly pointed that "the main source of Georgia's instability is the combination of its weak statehood with the regime of ethnic democracy. The model of ethnic democracy as developed by Smooha and others assumes, without making it explicit, the existence of a strong and well-functioning state when discussing the necessary preconditions for the stability, sustainability and efficiency of an ethnodemocratic regime" [Natalie Sabanadze (2005):115].

2.THE NATIONAL DISCOURSE DURING ZVIAD GAMSAKHURDIA'S GEORGIA

2.1. Historical socio-cultural context

Zviad Gamsakhurdia's nation-building policies had not been only his invention and original idea. They must be also understood according to Georgia's heritage and from its historical socio-cultural context. Georgia's post-soviet discourse on nationality has been based on strong past experiences which can be divided in the following way: a) Ancient and Middle Ages narration; b) Independent Republic of 1918-21 and c) Soviet Narration and Practice during 1921-1990.

The Ancient and Middle Ages historical experience can be understood according to Anthony Smith's "ethnic" concept, as the preface of the modern nation and national identity, which had been iconically depicted by the 10th century Georgian Hagiographer Giorgi Merchule: "Georgia consists of lands where Christian liturgy and every preach are exercised in Georgian" [Zviad Abashidze (2005): 384]. Such ideas were based on the conceptualization of political maximas promoted by the Georgian Neoplatonic School: "The First is the chief of others, but among them there does not exist the strong split. As land shares equally the Sun rays, the strength of the first is used by the secular harmonious hierarchy" [Zviad Abashidze(2005): 384].

The period from the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century generated two main approaches to modern national discourse: Liberal-Conservative and Marxist. For national renewal, the Liberal-Conservative discourse promoted the idea of the reconciliation of social stratas and the discouragement of class struggle. "Nation" was declared as a combination of past and present to the future based on long-term historical collective contributions. On the contrary, Georgian Marxists, headed by right-centre wing social-democrats, saw national liberation as a natural result of social emancipation based on class struggle, where the "nation" was mainly understood as an "ethnographic" entity [Noe Zhordania 1991; Stephen Jones. 2001].

The further strong experience of modern national discourse was intertwined with the formation of the first nation-state in Georgia from 1918-1921 which was headed by the above-mentioned right-wing Marxist social-democrats. The Republic's birth was a broader result of the First World War and more notably the dissolution of the Romanov Empire. The Republic existed only until the Bolshevik occupation of February-March of 1921 which turned out to be a fundamental obstacle for the development of a tradition of independent democratic statehood to exist in Georgian reality. The national discourse from this period could be characterised as a hybrid mixture between civic and ethnic models. According to formal-constitutional regulations, the "nation" was recognised as the base and cornerstone of legitimacy and sovereignty within the frames of a unitary-decentralised state. At the same time, in everyday understanding on societal level and practice, "nation" existed more as an ethnic community than as a civic one (Salome Dundua, Tamar Karaia, Zviad Abashidze (2017). The strongest narration and experience became the Soviet experience, where "nation" and "nationality" were broadly accepted concepts which should have been served as 'socialist in content and national in form".

The Soviet Model of State was the newest example of its time as an Empire-State model unlike that of a Nation-State. For instance, we support the idea that the "USSR fits the definition of an empire with a defined core (Moscow and the Russian SFSR) and peripheries. The core contained the imperial state and the ruling elites with the peripheries composed of state administrators. Interaction between the peripheries only took place via the core. Michael Doyle defines an empire as, "a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society."" Such a definition clearly fits the Soviet experience [Taras Kuzio (2002): 2].

Stalin's formula of "nation" described by him in his article on "Marxism and National Question" turned out to form the accepted principle for understanding nation and nationality within the Soviet Union. Stalin did not create any original approaches; he just compiled many other Marxist views according to his goals for power. In his approach, Stalin connected "nation" only with territory, economy, cultural and psychological make-up [Сталин И.Б. (1953): 22] , where the civic-political elements was fully ignored. The concept created „ethnicity" as an organic part of the soviet political project, that later turned out as the basis for later „indigenisation" (коренизация) and „merging" (сближение) policies [Ronald G. Sunny. 2001]. The best example of the manifestation of such policies was the passportisation policy according to which „nationality" (meaning „ethnicity") and „citizenship" were two different codified concepts in a citizen's passport.

Robert Sunny justly pointed out that „instead of a melting pot, Soviet Union became the incubator of new nations" [Ronald G. Sunny (2001): 240]. The same idea was probably implied by Beverly Crawford and Arend Liphart when they point out that the legacy of incomplete nations „is perhaps the most important threat to the project

of economic and political liberalism in Eastern Europe" [Taras Kuzio (2002): 8].

2.2. Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Action

Former dissident and the most prominent Georgian anti-Soviet public figure, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, came to power as a result of the first free and multiparty elections held in Georgia on 28th October 1990. From this date, Gamsakhurdia led the country firstly as head of the Supreme Soviet and secondly as President of the French model until the end of the coup d'état of 6thJanuary 1992.

Despite the short length of his Presidency, Zviad Gamsakhurdia's influence on contemporary Georgian history and politics has been crucial and decisive, that is why his career has not been appreciated unilaterally. We will concentrate our discussion on the essence of his discourse on nation and nation-building which was best expressed in his official interviews, addresses and speeches.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia's official pronouncements are quite numerous, which can be divided in a couple of ways a) Clarification of Gamsakhurdia's personal ideological attachment which demonstrates how to understand his approaches to independentism; b) His approaches to Abkhazians, Osetians and other minorities.

a) Gamsakhurdia's ideological attachment, independentism and concept of "Being Georgian"

As head of the Georgian Helsinki group, when addressing the World League for Peace, Gamsakhurdia said that "Freedom of Nation is the right to self-determination, right over its fate" [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia" #157(177), 07/09/1991]. At the same time, Gamsakhurdia strongly believed in the coercive nature of the Soviet Union, and that was why the West should support the pursuit of independence by the Republics, that was sometimes ignored in those words [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia # 49(69), 13/03/1991].

In one of his TV broadcast addresses, for Gamsakhurdia the achievement of Georgia's economic independence was a long-term process and hard to reach in a short time period. In his words, the achievement of such independence seemed to be a hard task even for Czechoslovakia and the other countries in the Warsaw Pact. "Long standing isolation, created by the Empire was the chief reason...", according to Gamsakhurdia, that Georgia of his times, requires not to reach the, but the restoration of the lost internationally recognised independence of 1918-1921 Republic" [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #1 (21) 01/01/1991].

In one of his interviews, on the question of his faith, he answered, that, "XX century is the period of national liberation. Empires will never come back and the nations who are fighting for independence will achieve it surely [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #249-250(270), 21/12/1991 წელი].

Gamsakhurdia regarded himself as a patriot, it can be possibly discussed that this is his emotional side in his use of this word, but in accordance with established ideolog-

ical platforms he considered himself as a Christian-Democrat [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia # 36 (56), 22/02/1991]. At the same time, Gamsakhurdia fully rejected that he was a Stalinist, though there was a kind of codified attachment to a Georgian identity for many Georgians during the Soviet Union, because of Stalin's Georgian origins. For Gamsakhurdia, to be a Stalinist is only an expression of a low level of education and culture, because of the dictatorship and inhumanism of Stalinism [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia # 36 (56), 22/02 1991].

Gamsakhurdia's Christian-Democratic ideological attachment was well expressed in his pre-election speech before the Supreme Soviet of Georgia. He portrayed religious heritage as an important part of the public sphere, which is why, for him, it was the responsibility of the State to help the Georgian Orthodox Church to regain its deprived property lost during Socialist times. He was standing for recognition of Orthodox Christianity as the official religion along with recognition of the rights of atheists. For Gamsakhurdia society and state should have been based on Christian social ethics and partnership in schooling and other parts of societal spheres [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #114(134) 11/05/1991].

Since Christianity and the fight for religious identity were an organic part of Georgian national history, Gamsakhurdia saw the faith of the ancestors as an indispensable part of Georgia's fight for independence, keeping its cultural identity and self-determination [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia # 84 (104), 01/05/1991].

The same idea was promoted by Gamsakhurdia in his opening words at the European Championship of Water Sports in Georgia in 1991. He expressed "his beliefs for the further celebration of Georgian and othe European nations" [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #162(182), 17 /1991 წელი].

The status of autonomy for the Achara Region was the subject of strong debates at the time, as far as it was regarded as Soviet heritage against the unity and stability of Georgia. The idea that such a political-administrative entity based on religion was deliberately created for the policy Divide et Empera was quite widespread among the Georgian public. For Gamsakhurdia, the referendum on this autonomous territory was the only legitimate way of resolving what to do with the territorial autonomy of Muslim Georgians[1]. At the same time, Gamsakhurdia was seeking the protection of not only the rights of Muslim Georgians, but also those of the Christian population living there as well [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia # 112(132), 07/06/1991].

b) Minorities and integration

In an interview with the Russian newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda", Gamsakhrdia admitted that it would have been a totally wrong view if he had accepted the policy of "Georgia for Georgians". He regarded such a view "as rumour against him and his

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[1] Achara region, in South-Western Georgia, after 16th century, mostly was part of the Ottoman Empire until the Berlin Congress of 1878, which resulted in the Islamisation of the local population. Since the Achara Region first formed part of the Russian Empire and later formed part of the Georgian Republic until the present day, it bears the Status of Autonomous Republic (Author's note).

Country disseminated specially by the central (Russian based) newspapers. In his words, ss long as his anti-Soviet agency was intertwined with the best members of Russian society, especially in publishing of most of the literature of "Samizdat" in Tbilisi, Georgia, unacceptance of non-ethnic Georgians in Georgia from his side is just a big false and injustice" [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia # 36 (56), 22/02/1991 წელი].

For Gamsakhurdia, as a continuation of a Soviet type of nationality policy, ethnic minorities on Georgian territory could have been divided into two categories: Indigenous and non-indigenous. For him, being an 'indigenous'' created the basis for further territorial autonomy but being a "non-indigenous" deserved only recognition of collective rights within the scope of non-territorial cultural autonomies instead of territorialisation of ethnicity. He declared a commitment to such an approach in his numerous speeches, interviews and addresses on both a national and international levels.

In one of his programme speeches in the Georgian Supreme Soviet, Gamsakhurdia declared the acceptance of the political rights of the Abkhazians as an indigenous people, which, in his words, should become the cornerstone of a national set up for future Georgian statehood.[2] At the same time, for him, Abkhazia was an indispensable part of Georgia and equally the homeland for both ethnic Abkhazians and ethnic Georgians. Therefore, Gamsakhurdia recognised the case of Abkhazians' rights for territorial autonomy as a decisive factor for the future Georgian Constitution [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #114(134) 11/05/1991].

The presence of historical context was a crucial factor for using the case of South Ossetia when understanding Gamsakhurdia [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia # 36 (56), 22/02/1991].

Gamsakhurdia considered the South Ossetia's Autonomous Region as a Soviet artificial creature since 1922 against Georgia. Thus, as far as Ossetian's were non-indigenous people, this excluded their historical legitimate rights to territorial autonomy unlike the Abkhazians in his view. At the same time, Gamsakhurdia recognised Ossetian's rights to autonomy only in terms of cultural-self rule within non territorial frames [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #42 (62), 02/03/1991] as long as there was no legitimate geographical term such as "South Ossetia", since it had only been a Soviet invention [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #223-4(244), 14/11/1991].

Gamsakhurdia rejected the presence of a problem for Ossetian people in general, because of their support for Georgia's independence. For him, separatists were only local communist extremists directly linked to the Kremlin. That was his position in

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[2] Regional conflict in Abkhazia and by those times South Osetia started even before Gamsakhurdias come to power. During his presidency the tensions transformed to more problematic forms that led to some armed clashes in South Ossetia. Fully armed conflict in the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic started only in 1992, when Gamsakhurdia was no longer in power, because of a coup d'état. Before the coup, Gamsakhurdia reached a peaceful agreement with ethnic Abkhazian political elites, according to which political posts would have been organised on the basis of ethnic quotas among ethnic Georgians and Abkhazians, as well as other ethnic groups there.

an interview with a Portuguese journalist [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #108(128), 30/04/1991].

Addressing the World League for Peace, as head of the Georgian Helsinki group, Gemsakhurdia was expressing his readiness for the protection of a "national minority's rights to cultural autonomy" [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #157(177), 09/07/1991].

Gamsakhurdia regarded Georgia as a "multinational country", which was going to be a better space for the development of the social and economic rights of minorities and their peaceful coexistence, than had existed during Soviet times [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #171-172(192), 03/09/1991 წელი]. In one of his speeches, he expressed his cordial gratitude to national minorities for their decisive support for Georgia's independence, "even during the strong anti-Georgian campaign among them" [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #114(134) 11/05/1991 წელი]. During his briefing with, by that time, Armenia's President Levon Ter-Petrosian, he expressed once again his readiness for protection of a minority's cultural rights. In his words, some existing problems among the minority communities were due to socio-economic issues and not ethnic ones [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #150(170), 01/07/1991]. Gamsakhurdia was hoping for the results of a referendum on an independence test for securing the future citizenship of the population of Georgia [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #71(91), 11/04/1991]. At the same time, Gamsakhurdia declared that special protective laws for national minorities were in the process of being prepared based on the constitutional heritage of 1921, which would provide a „broader frame for the regulation of minorities' issues", in his words [Newspaper "Republic of Georgia #71(91), 11/04 1991].

CONCLUSION

The concept of the "nationalising state" of Brubaker can be accepted as a productive model for the explanation of post-communist nationality and nation-building policies, but from our point of view, it requires some corrections in parts, with regards to the post-communist nation-building process as a deliberate creation of the new social hierarchy and hegemony based on ethnicity.

Certainly, ethnicity remains as a crucial factor for social interaction and the exchange of symbolic capital in Pierre Bourdieu's sense, because of its strongest roots in the historical socio-cultural context. However, as an analysis of Zviad Gamsakhurdia's policies reveals, such policies could be viewed as a hybrid model more than a pure ethnic practice . The research has demonstrated the importance of civic trends in the transformation of the national discourse that existed at the very beginning of post-communism in Georgia that were expressed in a readiness to grant citizenship and cultural autonomy to minorities, and even the territorial autonomy of certain ethnic group was regarded as historically "indigenous".

At the same time, the strong roots of the ethnicisation of society from the soviet past

should be considered as they became the social norm and even formed the dogma for intercultural and social exchange for many years. For this reason, this is why no political elite was able to ignore such a heritage and demand its radical change. In the case of radical change being proposed, political elites would lose their social legitimacy immediately. The vivid evidence of such a view could be illustrated by the Georgian experience of the exclusion of "national belongings" (that meant ethnicity instead of civic affiliation) from national passports. Much later in 1995 there was huge discontent about this fact and this continues even up to the present day in broader Georgian society. The idea of an ethnic "nation" was equally popular for ethnic Georgians as for ethnic minorities because, according to their beliefs, the existence of such a concept has been the proper tool of their national-cultural "salvation" against possible assimilation.

Not even Smooha's model of "ethnic democracy" fully explains the understanding of the initial post-communist nation-building policy of the Georgian case, because there is no clear evidence of rejection of the acceptance of the important elements of multiculturalism and liberal democracy. The acceptance of a model for non-territorial cultural autonomy for minorities and even the territorial one in certain cases provided clear evidence for this. Estonian and Latvian cases have provided different examples in this regard. For them, keeping ethnic homogeneity became the cornerstone for the creation of democratic and stable political institutions unlike Georgia.

Thus, as the above study shows, the post-communist nation-building or nationality policies shown in the Georgian case from 1990-1992 can be regarded as a model based on a hybrid understanding of "nation" rather, then on pure ethnicity, as is widely accepted in social sciences.

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