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# THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS AND ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE DE-ESCALATION OF CONFLICTS

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## **Abstract**

Once again, the Ukrainian crisis has re-emerged after the Belarus-Russia joint defence exercise near the eastern border around October/November 2021. In December 2021, almost 100,000 troops were sent by Russia towards the Ukrainian borders. In this context, the article explores all the possible dimensions of the current crisis and the responses of Kyiv. Moreover, it also assesses the role of the European Union in the empirical setback of Ukraine. To validate the arguments, the study incorporates qualitative content and discourse analysis in order to phenomenological evaluation of the speeches by governmental and European officials. The latest findings suggest that there was an ongoing dialogue between the Western alliance and Russia to escalate tensions. Moscow had shown that they don't have any intention to attack on Ukraine if the Russian interests are recently compromised. Then, there would be serious consequences.

**Key words:** *Ukraine Crisis, European Union, Russia, NATO, Conflict Management*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Ukraine has become an independent sovereign country after a long linguistic ideological struggle with the former Russian empire and the Soviet Union. Until 1991, it was under influence and part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). After the col-

lapse of the USSR, Ukraine never achieved a pattern of perfect democracy which is suffering from a weak economy and distorted foreign policy. The Ukrainian policies have been wavers between pro-Russian and pro-West or pro-European (Fisher 2014). There are a number of factors within geopolitical and geoeconomics approaches in Ukraine, which resulted as a sovereign country has never been empowered to play an influential foreign policy role in the international order. In most cases, the West and Russia both want to influence the Ukraine in order to maintain close geostrategic ties.

Likewise, Ukraine has never been a stable country between a great geopolitical strategic location of Central and Eastern Europe. Initially, a country maintained a close relationship with the Russian Federation. From time to time, the rise of Western power as the European Union (EU) resulted a very influential for the Eastern neighbourhood countries. It was resulted as many Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU, for example the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and others. Some of these countries were formerly part of the USSR. Consequently, the real dilemma started for Ukraine whether to go with the EU states or Russia. But Ukraine has dreamed about joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)<sup>1</sup> and the EU. The increasing of the Ukrainian interest towards so-called Western dreams resulted the 2014 crisis for the country due to Russian aggression. John J. Mearsheimer explained the cause of the Ukraine crisis as ‘the prevailing wisdom in the West’ which ‘can be blamed almost entirely on Russia’s aggression’ as mentioned in his article *Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault* (Mearsheimer 2014: 77).

However, once again Russian troops are to the nearby border of Ukraine and aggression is on the peak due to this, there is fear and chaos around there. In this scenario, the study conducts an empirical analysis of the Ukrainian crisis that first arose in 2014 and its re-emergence in late 2021. After all, the earlier of 2022 was the peak time of the crisis and the period of crisis converted into a ‘war’. Here ‘crisis’ is also means for worldwide economic and humanitarian crisis that has emerged by the time. Then the phenomenological method mainly used here to ‘describe, understand and interpret the meaning’ of the current crisis in Ukraine and show or point at similarities and differences with previous crises. Because the phenomenological research design provides to observe a particular situation where we can define the phenomenology of both political philosophy and political psychology of states, peoples, leaders, diplomats, and scholars (Bloor and Wood 2006: 128-129). The Ukraine crisis leads to several phenomena and a series of events. Even the word ‘crisis’ is a controversial term for Ukrainian people and scholars. This article combined such events and evaluated the re-emergence of the crisis until February 2022. It was a period of crisis which later converted into a full-scale war when Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24,

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<sup>1</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance between the EU 27, the US, Canada, Albania, Iceland, UK and Turkey.

2022. This study uses many newspapers articles and media contents, so qualitative content analyses in the context of words, texts, transcripts of speeches by leaders and diplomats (Pierce 2008: 263). The content analysis provides a scope of the widespread impact of the Ukraine crisis and its implications for the EU and Russia.

Furthermore, Central and Eastern European geopolitical landscape has been constantly changing since the post-war period and especially for the EU and Ukraine such as aspiration of territorial security and prosperous economy (NATO & EU). There is a constant change in political and security scenarios. For that, a qualitative discourse analysis is a perfect method to assess the tension in the region. By the use of this method, the study can provide better observation of the Ukrainian crisis since 2014 to now in the context of debate or discussion, language, and communications as the role in shaping the international order in international relations. The application of this analysis helps generate a rigorous, systematic, and convincing result in order to fill the literature gaps (Burnham 2008: 248). To validate the argument using above mentioned methods with study, it has been applied via primary sources of data, such as speeches and statements by governments and officials, foreign ministry presses briefs, official reports and contents from official websites. Secondary sources of data include book chapters, books, articles, magazines, reports, and issues widely discussed and reflected by think tanks and newspapers.

### **UNDERSTANDING OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS**

All the situation started with an internal Ukrainian crisis at the end of 2013. It was the time when the former President Viktor Yanukovich vetoed 'a deal for greater integration with the EU'. After that, many big events took place. The first was with anti-government protests tumbled the government and Yanukovich ran away from the country in February 2014. It was an opportunity for Russia to 'salvage of its lost influence' in Ukraine. In Ukraine, there are many of native Russian speakers and ethnic Russians and many of them were voted for former President Yanukovich in 2010. The anti-government protest barely had seen in support for the Euromaidan protest to his removal from power (Fisher 2014). In March 2014, the interesting twist came when Russian troops took control of Crimea formally, which was part of Ukraine. Before it, 'Crimeans voted to join the Russian Federation, and it was a disputed referendum over the Crimean Peninsula, as Western leaders declared. Russia punished with economic sanctions Russian President Putin mentioned that he is committed to 'protecting the rights of Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Crimea and South-east Ukraine (Herszenhorn 2014; Global Conflict Tracker 2022).

But the crisis goes beyond the Crimean so-called referendum and Russian control, along with the EU the Western countries called it "illegal and illegitimate". On 1 March 2014, the Russian Federation Council adopted a Resolution to 'the use of Russian Armed Forces on the territory of Ukraine'. According to the Council, using of 'Armed Forced' on the Ukrainian territories to normalise the socio-political situa-

tion in the country.<sup>2</sup> While ‘conflict later broke out the between Ukrainian and Russia-backed separatists. Because, in April 2014, pro-Russian separatists and rebels started controlling Eastern Ukrainian territory. Separatists backed by Russia declared the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. These Eastern Ukrainian territories also known as the Donbas. Meanwhile, Russia and Ukraine signed agreements in Minsk during 2014 and 2015. This aimed to bring forth a ceasefire. Since the conflict, more than 14,000 people have died. After that agreement, Ukraine has experienced numbers of repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement. The conflict is transforming the situation into a trench war (Chadwick 2022). On 17 July 2014, separatists broke down a Malaysian Airlines (MH17) over the Donbas by the separatists and 298 people lost their lives. Separatist forces used missile fire and believed that it was a Ukrainian military jet (Boyd-Barrett 2017).

However, Sauer considered the Ukraine crisis as ‘a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers or blocs and its architecture within post-Cold War security in Europe.’ Where the Western block kept NATO alive and it ‘deteriorated the relationship with Russia’. On several occasions, the Moscow warned and despite of the fact Ukraine was invited to be a member of the NATO (Sauer 2017). These are also one of the key reasons that Russian aggression has increased over time. Henry A. Kissinger outlined the public discussion of the Ukraine crisis as a ‘confrontation’. Ukraine issues are often posed as a showdown and it is more about the dilemma whether the country should join the East and the West. He suggested that Ukraine should not join any side and better to ‘function as a bridge between them’ (Kissinger 2014). But this is more complex than Kissinger’s remarks because there is no common consensus among pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian or (Ukrainian nationalist) leaders. A country can only be united as a strong sovereign nation if its leaders are also ideologically united. For that, the Ukrainian scholar and leaders should unite on common grounds and they need to show solidarity like Poles, which is the best implication for the Ukraine.

Sauer explored the economic dimension of the Ukraine crisis. He said that Putin’s popularity started to fall with the world economy fallout in 2008. Since then, large-scale street protests have begun in Moscow, and they wanted political change during the period 2011-2012. Then, President Putin needed to react, so it resulted in repression (Sauer 2017: 88). But Mearsheimer explained that “the West’s triple package of policies (NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion) added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite in the creation of crisis” (Mearsheimer 2014: 88). On 25 May 2014, Petro Poroshenko became the elected president of Ukraine. After that, Ukraine (along with Georgia and Moldova) signed Association Agreements (AAs) with the EU. The AA was an explicitly instrument as an alternative to accession as full membership of the EU. After the Ceasefire Agreement, second direct Russian troops inter-

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<sup>2</sup> The Federation Council’s extraordinary 347th meeting adopted a Resolution available at: <http://council.gov.ru/events/news/39851/>.

vention was ended with the capture of Debaltseve during February 2015. On 12 February 2015, Angela Merkel, François Hollande, Putin, and Poroshenko agreed on the second peace plan in Minsk. Later, Russia-Ukraine-EU trade talks did not go well, and Russia suspended (in retaliation) the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) trade preferences for Ukraine in January 2016 (Charap and Colton 2017).

### **THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS: THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE 24 FEBRUARY 2022**

The re-emergence of the current Ukraine crisis can track back to the spring 2021, when Russia began building of defence wall by then thousands of troops nearby Ukraine. The country's military build-up is a response to threats from NATO as claimed by the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. At that time, Russian troops were deployed in two armies and airborne formations toward the western region, which worried Ukraine. In the counter argument, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg described the act of Russian military deployment as "unjustified, unexplained and deeply concerning". US President Joe Biden showed concern about Russian build-up and spoke during a phone call with Putin as "called on Russia to de-escalate tensions" (Euronews 2021). It was the first time since the 2014 crisis, when Russia sent thousands of combat troops towards the Ukrainian borders. The news cited that the troops were withdrawing later on. On 1 September 2021, the "Joint Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership" was published on the strategic partnership based on commitments such as free, democratic and peace. It was mentioned about 1) deepening Strategic Defense Cooperation, 2) Supporting to Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic Aspirations (possible entry to NATO), 3) Providing Ukraine with Security Assistance worth \$ 60 million package and 4) Enacting Defense and Security Sector (with Ukraine's status as a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner) (The White House 2021). These are the main concerns of the Kremlin which made them uncomfortable. Once again in October 2021, Russia began sending troops and military equipment towards the nearby borders of Ukraine, which has been 'reigniting concerns about a potential invasion of Ukrainian territories.' The movement of Russian forces was seen in areas of the Kremlin. Putin drew a strong warning to Kyiv's Western ties that expansion of any kind of NATO military infrastructure on Ukrainian territories would be considered a "red line" for Moscow. The conflict also started between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Eastern Donbas region after 7.5 years. The US and EU started to notice the military movements during October and November. Moscow cited it as 'a massive joint military exercise with Belarus' which is also known as Zapad 2021. The publicly available satellite found the imagery of Russia's 41st Combined Arms Army, which normally stayed in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. After the Zapad 2021 exercise, Russian troops left military equipment included with control and communication canters on the training site near Ukrainian borders,

as mentioned by Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine's national security and Defense Council (Sonne et al. 2021; Global Conflict Tracker 2022).

Besides, more than 100,000 Russian troops have been placed moving towards near the Ukraine borders with armours, missiles, and other heavy weaponry in December. There are many commercial satellite imagery and social media posts available online from November and December. The US intelligent agencies assessed about the Kremlin aimed to draw up for a military operation which engaging up to 175,000 troops and it could see in upcoming weeks (Schwartz and Reinhard 2022). Recently, there has been tension between NATO and Moscow. In mid-December 2021, Russia put demand of 'a highly contentious list of security guarantees' for Kyiv's Western allies. After accepting these demands by the West, Russia would defuse the tension over Ukraine. The Russian demands included; 1) ban on Ukraine entering the NATO, 2) a limit to the deployment of military and weapons to NATO's Eastern flank of NATO and 3) an immediate effect of NATO forces returning to where they were stationed in 1997, which were before an Eastward expansion. Moscow warned that if Russian interests would ignore, then similar to the Cuban missile crisis (West) they would have to face a 'military response'. US officials said that some part of the aggressive proposal and "legal guarantees" by the Kremlin is "unacceptable". Along with the United States and other its allies also rejected the above demands and warned Russia of retaliation if Ukraine invades, as well as the Moscow also has to face economic sanctions (Roth 2021).

Henrik Larsen stated in the current crisis that "NATO integration is clearly the vital interest at stake from the Kremlin's perspective, in accordance with its long-standing obsession with guarantees of a militarily neutral Ukraine" (Larsen 2022). Russians are looking to the Eurasian Economic Union to create an environment for inclusion of Ukraine. These are just a prospect. Yet, there is no clear sign for immediate resolution of the Ukraine crisis. Meanwhile, the peace negotiations took place between the US and Moscow in Geneva in the middle of January 2022. Also, several rounds of talks have also been taking place with US allies in Kyiv and Berlin. After the Geneva talks, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated the dialogue with his Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and both "agreed that it is important for the diplomatic process to continue". Blinken has not considered it just a negotiation and, according to him, it was just "exchange of concerns and ideas" (Forgey 2022).

The Biden Administration issued a new warning to the Kremlin and announced to 'send nearly 3,000 additional troops to Poland and Romania'. Another 8,500 American troops already there on "high alert" which could be a possible deployment to Eastern Europe. The US President Biden told to the Russian President Putin "As long as he is acting aggressively, we are going to make sure we can reassure our NATO allies and Eastern Europe that we're there" (Bilefsky and Pérez-Peña 2022; Stewart and Antonov 2022). It aimed to provide a shield to Eastern European allies in order

to avoid potential invasion of Ukraine. Moscow has once again denied any kind plans to invade Ukraine.

But no specific date has been found for invasion. Even President Biden counters it as much about public speculation and the Washington is still assessing the risks. As per previous assessment by Washington, the invasion could begin before the end of the Beijing Winter Olympics (Feb. 2020). On 11 February 2022, the White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan advised its US citizen to leave Ukraine in the next 24 to 48 hours. He cited that “If a Russian attack on Ukraine proceeds, it is likely to begin with aerial bombing and missile attacks that could obviously kill civilians without regard to their nationality” (McLeary & Toosi 2022). Until writing this article, tension has remained same during negotiations between the Russian and the US and other European allies (mainly France and Germany). There has not been any formal agreement made yet. Whatever was speculated by the US intelligence and scholars became reality on 24 February 2022. When Russia attacked several Ukrainian strategic points and it has been 200 days war is still there which is a global crisis for the people across the world.

### **THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE DE-ESCALATION OF CONFLICTS**

In this discussion, the stake of Europe is important to respond. But the New York Times latest report mentioned that Europeans are divided on Russian aggression and they are dilemma that ‘how to respond various forms’ of the challenge posed by the Moscow. Since World War II, Europe allowed Russia to ‘upend the security structure’ and allow to keep the peace in the region. Once again, this is one stake for Europe whether they can allow President Putin to escalate the current tension. The crisis also caused them to break up among the EU and NATO. While former Chancellor Angela Merkel is also not in the mainstream negotiation and has a fluent Russian speaking skill, it also helped to developed ‘good working relationship with President Putin’. New Chancellor Olaf Scholz is still having not shown his prominent role in re-emergence of the crisis due busy in domestic issues management. The main stake of the EU is ‘dependent on Russian gas supplies’. Previously, President Putin used this terrain to negotiate with Europe successfully. Europe is sharing significant trade ties with Moscow. If Russia could invade then they would have to serious economic sanctions which are already facing since 2014 when the last crisis emerged (Bilefsky and Pérez-Peña 2022).

Many European mainstream leaders made serious remarks and concerns about the Ukraine crisis, and some of them showed serious solidarity with Kyiv and people of Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba cited that “Kyiv is open to dialogue and looking for a diplomatic solution, but we will not cross our red lines and no one will be able to force us cross them”. On 8 February 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Kyiv in order to discussion over the crisis with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. President Macron is one of the lead-

ing politicians paying feverishly to stabling tensions between Eastern countries and he showed optimism after the meeting. After his meeting with both President Putin and Zelenskyy, he mentioned that “calm is needed in words and actions” if not, “there is a risk of escalation”. Next, he also mentioned that both leaders confirmed that they would respect for “best means to protect Ukraine’s integrity”. President Macron also told that there is a need for time to get results and it is not possible to “resolve the crisis in few hours” and it would take “days and the weeks and the months to come that will allow us to progress”. During the media interview, President Macron and Zelenskyy cited the Minsk protocol with Ukraine and Russia, where leading mediators were Germany and France, which is only way to build peace and ‘a sustainable political solution’. Before Monday (7 February) President Macron already met with President Putin and he mentioned that “President Putin assured me of his readiness to engage in this sense and his desire to maintain stability and territorial integrity of Ukraine. There is no security for the Europeans if there is no security for Russia” (Deutsche Welle 2022).

The recent crisis is also a test for young European parliamentarians and governments in the EU and their solidarity with transatlantic alliance. Bruce Stokes suspected that it is also a litmus test and trust must be proven by its allies US and President Biden. There are many young members in the Europe’s national parliaments and those are viewed the world after the Cold War. Because ‘ten years back no one imagined that Kremlin could deploy and attack Ukraine’ mentioned by a member of the Polish Sejm Law and Justice Party. Meanwhile, a member of the Green Party of the German Bundestag stated that “the integrity of Ukraine is threatened by the acts of Russia. And Germany and the EU must stand on the side of Ukraine”. Another Green Party Bundestag member cited that “Strengthening European sovereignty is important and not against the interests of the United States for Europe to become a more reliable partner” (Stokes 2022). Most young parliamentarian expressed ‘mistrust’ and some showed their aggressive remarks ‘trigger-happy Yankees’ about the US.

The European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen said that the EU is prepared with “robust and comprehensive package of financial and economic sanctions” and other bundle of sanctions to unleash on Moscow if they do not stop aggression towards Ukraine (Reuters 2022). Peter Stano, EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Spokesperson also mentioned that the EU official has discussed diplomatic de-escalation tactics in neighbouring countries. Mr. Stano mentioned that the EU prepared and we have “vital interest to find a solution to thus current crisis through dialogue and through engagement” (Summers 2022). The EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said: “We are living, to my understanding, the most dangerous moment for security in Europe after the end of the Cold War” (Al Jazeera 2022). The EU and its allies are continuously involved in diplomatic talks with Moscow in order to de-escalate confrontation with the Kremlin. During this tension period, the EU is also assessing the potential energy crisis if the eastern border fallout. There are also risks of a surge



in gas prices and cyber security threats are also out there (Fleming & Khan 2022). In the response to potential border fallout, the EU and some of the Member states supported with little or low light-weight arms and other assistances.

The EU-Ukraine relations are deep and they are very important trading partners. Both partners adopted an Association Agreement (AA) and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The DCFTA was negotiated during 2007-2011 and installed in 2012. The EU-Ukraine signed the political provision of AA on 21 March 2014, as well as other provision also signed in Brussels on 27 June 2014. The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement entered into force on 1 November 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 2021). Ukraine is one of the priority partners for the EU and working for a stable, prosperous, and democratic environment for its citizens. The EU and its Financial Institutions allocated more than EUR 17 billion grants and loans. The EU also provides visa-free travels for the Ukrainians, which was entered into force in June 2017. In response to the COVID-19, 'the EU provided a package over EUR 190 million to support immediate needs and socio-economic recovery'. Moreover, the EU also provided EUR 1.2 billion as micro-financial assistance to revive the local business in the Ukraine. Ukraine also received vaccines through COVAX facilities, which mobilised over EUR 3 billion by the Team Europe and the EU Member States (European Commission 2022).

Now overall, the geoeconomics scenarios have been changed into the realistic geopolitical crisis in Europe as a whole. The Eurasian heartland's attention is currently on geopolitics shifting to Europe. Whatever has taken place in Europe that always affected the whole world. After the attack in Ukraine by Russia, the EU and its allied partner imposed heavy sections economic and political as well also decided to overcome the oil & gas dependency on its counterpart. This means the EU and its partner want to hit Russia's domestic economy which is almost 15 per cent of GDP contributed by the EU and its member states.

### **EVALUATION OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND ESCALATION OF THE TENSION**

The re-emergence of Ukraine crisis can mainly be understood by discussions in international relations. Where 'theories of deterrence and great power relations' can simply define that a big power always put army in front to peruse the interests of a country. There is often the best example of Indo-China border conflict that occurs since 1962 war and China always used these tactics to peruse their trade and other foreign policy goals. Because there is a huge trade deficit of India with China. China also occupied many important lands of India, for example, Aksai Chin and other nearby Indian borders. Here is a similar case between Russia and Western allies. Whenever Russia found that Ukraine is going away close to the West, they retaliate with military movement near the Ukrainian borders. Russia cannot attack any of the NATO and EU member countries, so they have Ukraine as a week-target between the powers. Ukraine has always been trapped between these powers. David Ignatius cited:

“The Ukraine confrontation has been a case study in deterrence and its limits. It’s like the Cuban missile crisis, in reverse” (Ignatius 2022). He mainly referred to the all-Ukrainian crisis as the history books, and its root cause can only be found via history of both countries (Russia-Ukraine).

A former Ukrainian member of Parliament, Hanna Hopko stressed that always trying to say that Ukraine is a failed state, Ukraine is an artificial state” (Kotsonis and Chakrabarti 2022). A similar remark made by Stanford Scholar Steven Pifer “Kremlin’s unwillingness to recognize Ukraine as a sovereign state has resulted in a major strategic failure for Russia” (Witte 2022). If we see that the Ukrainian disturbance, all these threats of invasion and Russian aggression started after the presidency of the Putin. Since the 2014 conflict, it has claimed that more than 13,000 people lost their lives in the Donbas conflict. It would be wrong if we only accused the big powers and Ukrainian citizens of being equally responsible for the crisis just because they dreamed of a secure world and economic prosperity like the EU citizen. So, do they not have right to choose their prosperous future? How has the Ukraine crisis become a complex security crisis? and are there any permanent solutions? These are important questions that everyone should ask especially by Ukrainian. These are also serious research topics. It could be also a result that the re-emergence of the crisis could be escalating the tensions peacefully. Is there any guarantee that it will not emerge in the near future? From time to time, Ukraine experienced violations of seize fire (Minsk protocol).

As Mearsheimer accused the West for the Ukraine crisis in 2014, there was the same NATO enlargement, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West supported the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine (Mearsheimer 2014: 77-78). Is anything changed in the new crisis? No, nothing has changed in the past 7-8 years. If we see the US-Ukraine and the EU-Ukraine relations, in both cases, the Western ties have been strengthened ever before with Ukraine. But Ryszard Zięba highlighted that “the Ukraine crisis is a manifestation of acute geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia for influence in Ukraine”. He also found that “Ukrainian hope for better life turned out to have crippling consequences for Ukrainians themselves”. He also agreed with Mearsheimer that the US and its European allies counter a choice in Ukraine (Zięba 2017). But there is a major question of the ‘sovereignty’ of a state and a sovereign state like Ukraine can choose any side and the decision of the people in Ukraine must be respected. If Euromaidan is a result of the EU’s soft power influence on the Ukrainian people, then Mearsheimer’s argument does not completely validate the justification of the Ukraine crisis.

Moreover, some of discussion found as the critical assessment of the European unity e.g., the EU solidarity is not similar to the previous one. Nathalie Tocci argued that there is a ‘slow-motion drama unfolding on the European continent’, but Europeans are not active. The EU has always been a best player in the case of an ‘escalating crisis unfolding between Russia and Ukraine’. There has been played ‘a star role’ in pri-

or events. In the matter of hard power, Europeans played key role in ‘the shadow of the US’. Without them, the EU has not dealt with the Ukrainian saga alone (Tocci 2022). There is a need to reorient the EU’s geostrategic towards Ukraine where it has a great stake. Because European security is once again at a similar position that was in 2014. The EU and its allies have only option to stay with effective implication of the Minsk Agreement; otherwise, Paris and Berlin can mediate something new. There are still dialogue and diplomacy missing between the EU and its allies, Ukraine between Russia. The peace-making effort itself is in crisis due to rest of the world is also not forcing the world power to involvement in dialogue and diplomacy. The ‘real’ effort is still missing in the way of peace between Russia and Ukraine so there is only peace in the chaos. Likewise, Putin is keep threatening the use of military mobilisation and the use of nuclear weapons.

## **CONCLUSION**

If we conclude the re-emergence of the Ukraine crisis, there was ongoing negotiation, aggressive counter arguments and Ukrainians are living in hope, chaos and fear before the war. But the question is that why Russia wants aggressive behaviours against the West and a Ukraine to peruse its goals? On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic already increased inflation and the EU’s and Russian economy are already facing serious consequences. The new crisis only would create more tension, fear, and chaos. Mostly, it would hit the economy more pathetically so these are other means of the crisis such as flued the price of oil and gas which also affect commodities and products worldwide. After Brexit, the United Kingdom (UK) is already facing its domestic challenges, and there is already ongoing political drama. There is not UK’s stake posed with the EU so the Western solidarity is lacking this time. Over the past five years, analysis of the Europe’s politics indicated that liberal order is already in failure mode after the rise of new populism. The new leadership is not showing active diplomacy to escalate tension. It would be a great test for the new political leaders. Europe is already facing a sovereign debt crisis, migration, and Brexit, the EU’s domestic issues with Hungary and Poland in the shadow of the global pandemic.

The EU is facing turf wars over foreign policy and lack of institutional motivation. Meanwhile, the new German government is already establishing mode. If the EU did not show solidarity, they cannot afford the consequences of the Ukraine crisis. The US, UK, Italy, Germany, and France all needed to come together to deal with the crisis. So, there could be rapid progress and they can also avoid further economic loss. The future of Ukraine all depends on these important actors in the affairs of Europe. The Europe should move beyond shuttle and phone diplomacy because it’s not helping ease the crisis. Because at the end of February (24), it already resulted in a re-emergence of crisis into reality and Russia has begun a full-fledged

war on Ukraine which was referred to as the so-called ‘Special Military Operation’ by the Moscow.

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