
**COLLABORATIVE PLATFORMS
AS ALTERNATIVE PLAYERS
OF GLOBAL POLITICS:
UKRAINE DEFENSE CONTACT GROUP
AND KYIV SECURITY COMPACT 2022**

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Abstract

In the article, the author considers the possibility of new global actors in the context of rethinking security architecture. Using G. Grevi's interolarity approach and the "thousand plateaus" concept by J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, the researcher forms a theoretical basis for the categories of the collaborative window and collaborative platform. The author offers her vision of the external and internal structure of the collaborative platform as a transnational interactive place for joint actions. Applying the case study, the researcher considers the Ukraine Defense Contact Group as a kind of prototype of a collaborative platform, while the Kyiv Security Compact is the legal basis of a collective security institution.

Key words: *Collaborative Platform, Security, Collaboration, Rammstein*

INTRODUCTION

The power redistribution in world politics, along with the deepening of interdependence between political players, is becoming one of the key dimensions of the current rethinking of global institutional design. In the book “The Interpolar World: A New Scenario”, G. Grevi [Grevi 2009] argues that the outlined changes are often separate issues, while it is worth focusing on the interaction of these two trends. T. Renard [Renard 2009] supports the opinion that within the framework of modern international politics, interdependence between states is not limited exclusively to the economic sphere, producing peculiar functional and systemic nodes. The scientist calls this phenomenon “multi-multilateralism” [Renard 2009: 35], which is characterized, firstly, by an increasing the membership of states in duplicative organizations; secondly, by deepening relations between countries thanks to their participation in cross-sectoral forums; and, third, by crossing the activities of official institutions, such as the UN, and informal forums like the G20. Indeed, a lot of national governments are facing an unprecedented combination of economic, energy, and environmental crises, with none of them able to successfully meet these challenges alone.

While top-level diplomacy is assumed to be able to perform important tasks of building confidence, setting the agenda, and linking bilateralism and minilateralism to the broader model of multilateralism, the very emergence of new players in global governance such as collaborative platforms can be seen in the context of an alternative or even replacing traditional multilateral practices. This aspect is a particularly significant issue since the emergence of alternative interactive platforms is related to the inability of existing multi-subject organizations to solve today’s crises. Therefore, the collaborative format provoked by these trends deserves close analytical attention. The collaborative platform is a hybrid of S. Huntington’s model of uni-multipolarity and G. Grevi’s interolarity. S. Huntington once defined unipolarity as a “configuration consisting of a power game between a superpower and some great ones, when important international decisions are made jointly, but the superpower has the right to “veto” [Huntington 1999: 36]. While recognizing US dominance, he ignored the influence of non-state actors and the pervasive interdependence that significantly affects the choice of policy options. In turn, G. Grevi characterizes interolarity as “multipolarity in the era of interdependence” [Grevi 2009: 5], which contributed to the interpolar configuration in the context of the security and prosperity dilemma.

Taking into account the above-mentioned models, the collaborative platform presents the category of uni-interolarity as a set of situational anti-crisis nodes - collaborative windows, the appearance of which became possible due to the problem actualization in a certain governance sector. Orientation to the solution of the acute issue for numerous global actors serves as the foundation for the collaborative platforms’ emergence aimed at the temporary fixation of multi-subject interaction until the appropriate crisis resolution. Such a transnational structure is characterized by the interdependence of involved stakeholders, several dominant players with appropriate

resources, and the consensus principle, the viability of which is motivated by the urgency of making optimal decisions. Solving a problematic issue may lead to the dissolution of the created interactive joint action platform as a separate entity, but also requires post-problem monitoring of shared results to stabilize the situation through multilateral agreements. Thus, a collaborative platform can act as a kind of autonomous entity in solving some fundamental issues, such as security (terrorism and nuclear proliferation), economy (global recession), or ecology (climate change), trying on the leading role to mobilize powerful players based on the smart specialization approach, flexible nature and quick adaptation to changing circumstances.

In the first chapters of the article, the author presents her vision of the collaborative format through familiarity with the categories “collaborative window” and “collaborative platform”, appealing to the concept of “thousand plateaus” by J. Deleuze and F. Guattari. Next, the successive stages of a common platform creation are described, by building models of the external and internal space of the collaborative platform. The author devotes the last chapter to the Rammstein collective security platform analysis and the September Kyiv Security Compact as prototypes of a potential collaborative platform. The article ends with conclusions and an outline of future research vectors.

1. THEORETICAL BASIS: A COLLABORATIVE PLATFORM AS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF A “THOUSAND PLATEAU” CONCEPT

The idea of the collaborative subject’s emergence correlates with the concept of the rhizome by J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, presented in the book “Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Book 2” (1980). The rhizome, not having a clearly defined subject and object, consists of a set of linear dimensions. Its heterogeneous nature allows any point to join another segment, corresponding to the touch points of interactive collaborative platforms. J. Kingdon once suggested that the evolution of the global governance structure “occurs not so much due to mutation or the sudden appearance of a completely new form, but to the recombination of already familiar elements” [Kingdon 1995: 131].

As to the researchers [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 18], the rhizome consists of so-called “plateaus” - sub-sets representing regions of intensities, each element of which constantly modifies its distance to other elements according to the next articulations: 1) content and 2) form of connections. The content articulation selects or removes from the streams metastable molecular units (substances), on which it imposes a statistical order of connections and sequences, while the form articulation establishes functional, compact, stable structures, constructing molar composites where they are simultaneously actualized. So, we are talking about the problematic and procedural components, serving as the internal environment basis of the collaborative structure (more on that below).

Synthesizing the concepts of J. Kingdon and D. Lobster [Kingdon 1995; Lobster 1997], I propose to resort to the collaborative window category as sub-sets of rhizomes, i.e. plateaus. Let us suppose that four relatively independent streams pass through the global governance system, namely: problem actualization, procedural, structural, and political response streams. A problem flow involves a departure from a state perceived as stable or one that satisfies a specific segment of the global community. The stability of the state begins to fluctuate due to a crisis or a violation of discrete systematic indicators.

The procedural flow embodies the players' suggestions for quick and constructive problem-solving. The policy response stream embraces the national sentiment measurement, and interest group influence, as administrative and legislative aspects. The structural flow consists of behavioral patterns that demonstrate an increased willingness to consider the potential impact of joint decisions on the macro-spheres of the global political arena. Accordingly, the problem and procedural stream synthesis (content articulation) lead to the emergence of specifically behavioral patterns set in the form of agreed conventions or action algorithms (form articulation). Although the content articulation does not lack systematic interactions, the clear agenda actualizes the relevant attempts at resolution. Instead, at the level of form articulation, "phenomena of centering, unification, totalization of actions, integration, hierarchization, or goal-setting occur" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 31]. As we can see, each of the two articulations establishes a binary relationship between its corresponding segments.

Convergence of outlined flows leads to the temporal collaborative windows opening, which provides an opportunity to combine options for solving problems between interested parties. That is, if the flows coincide in space and time, there is an opportunity to consider the actual problem, develop innovative solutions and implement them. In addition to the merging of streams, the collaboration window opening involves the trigger activation, external to the intersecting streams, in the form of a certain triggering event (for example, economic crisis, war, pandemic) or the activity of a so-called "political entrepreneur" [Ansell & Gash 2018: 8] (public statement, signing a contract, etc.), which it will continue to perform relational activities not only between members of the platform but also between different sectors and levels.

According to J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, the "rhizome connects subsets along two lines: (1) segmentary and (2) deterritorialization" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 42]. Segmentation allows for stratification of the rhizome plateau per established criteria, such as the unification of goals or final results, by which its unity can be both destroyed and restored. That is if the involved participants of the platform reach a consensus on the risks and losses distribution, the collaborative platform keeps existing. In some cases, objective or monetized allocation measures may be involved, such as access to a particular resource among stakeholders or the geographic dispersion assessment of shared reserves. Fairness can also be measured by the ratio of par-

ticipants' investment to the margin obtained. Regardless of objective indicators, it is significant to assess perceptions of fairness as beneficiaries' vision of the equal costs and benefits distribution associated with joint actions.

On the contrary, deterritorialization performs the opposite function, representing a channel of the rhizome "slippage", for example, the players' use of resources in a full/limited amount or their (non-)observance of norms of transparency or accountability. Potential determinants of deterritorialization also include the collaboration scale (the rate at which crossover occurs between the problem, the choice, and the decision-maker) and the energy burdens (time, expertise, budgets, etc.) available to stakeholders for solving specific problems during the period concerning the agreed political course.

Sub-sets along the deterritorialization line can change their nature, connecting with other plateaus and transforming according to their thresholds, which we understand as the initial parameters of participants joining the collaboration. If the a priori parameters of involvement in the collaborative process do not correspond to the further stages of scaling up cooperation, the actors could either leave the game or adjust their initial coordinates at the expense of additional resources or the existing strengths transformation. The third option involves revising the initial tasks and, accordingly, the final results towards reducing/increasing the parties' claims. For example, if a collaborative change agent is unable to attract more resources compared to other players, the percentage of potential gain should be proportionally reduced and vice versa.

The J. Deleuze's and F. Guattari's opinion, the "rhizoma avoids any orientation towards a point of culmination" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 18] or a final external goal, leaving room for potential transformation. We are talking about creating a model for solving the political global crisis under conditions of turbulence and uncertainty, which dictate qualitatively different rhythmicity of reforming, either because of the problem urgency or because of its scale and subsequent consequences. Considering "the incompatibility of the genetic axis idea as a deep structure" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 9], the rhizome reflects the situational and purposeful nature of the alternative forums and players of the modern global order. National governments are under constant pressure to manage change rather than balance. Pressure factors include technology, growing needs of citizens, limited budgets, financial crises, natural disasters, military conflicts, and pandemics. The political potential in such an environment should be based not only on general opportunities but also contain some forecasting, sometimes imposing reforms in conditions of time shortage or strong opposition.

It is worth noting that the collaborative window appearance is not necessarily accompanied by a successful partnership. The presence of a cooperation structure does not guarantee long-term interaction, since the time and spatial conditions that opened the collaborative window, and, therefore, the management structures based on them, are often not able to adapt to the collaboration dynamics itself. This means the need

for institutional fixation of the collaborative window with more stable “interaction grids” like a collaborative platform.

2. METHODOLOGICAL ASPECT: COLLABORATIVE PLATFORM AS A SITUATIONAL GLOBAL PLAYER

A collaborative window opens up a space for future interaction, while a collaborative platform captures the formation of trusting relationships between stakeholders and localizes them within a single interactive structure. Organizational approach theorists understand collaborative platforms as “structures or programs with special competencies and resources to create a common foundation for ongoing joint projects” [Thomas et al. 2014: 199]. According to C. Ciborra, the essence of the platform concept is to create “a stable structure for ensuring a more flexible management regime” [Ciborra 1996: 103] that adapts over time to new opportunities or changing conditions. A systematized view of the structure and world examples of collaborative platforms was offered by C. Ansell and A. Gash. Specifically, they labelled the platform as “a distinctive institutional framework for promoting multiple collaborations or for facilitating the adaptation of many collaborative projects over time” [Ansell & Gash 2018: 7]. Accordingly, collaborative platforms could play the role of an adaptive management player, forming or reorganizing projects with additional resources or problems. Consequently, platforms create a space to facilitate stakeholder interaction through information exchange and resources, producing standardized technological interfaces or communication forums.

At the same time, the platform may act as a strategic (for example, within the chosen political course) or tactical (for example, steps regarding a specific project or evaluation of information reasons) subject. In our case, we consider the collaborative platform as a situational needed-partnership format with the bureaucratic component minimization (documentation, approval of the charter, etc.) and a maximum focus on deeds.

The map of the rhizome, according to J. Deleuze and F. Guattari, has “multiple entrances and exits” [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 9], with the leadership phenomena or expansion due to new projects, allowing us to reconstruct the initial nature of the rhizome gradually. The subjugation of the multiplicity principle involves the crossing of unified interactive platforms (collaborative platforms) and drawing up a kind of consistency plan (planomenon) based on reasonable specialization. The latter constructs continuums of the cooperation intensity between the players involved, creating the potential for continuity of political action within different forms and substances.

Each collaborative platform undergoes modification means the external environment deterritorialization and the internal structure “reterritorialization” [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 41]. Through the external environment, we understand the material constituent component of providing certain forms of external support from players who are not directly involved in the collaborative cycle, but whose interests are affect-

ed resulting from the collaborating participants' decisions. In the case of the Russian-Ukrainian war 2022, we are talking about the support of the oil embargo by the EU countries or the provision of weapons/humanitarian aid. That is, in the broadest sense, external support varies from financial aid and training to weapons, asylum, or transit permission. But being used in the format of "imitation aid", the material constituent component aims at justifying the lack of activity on the part of some participants.

Except for the external and internal components, we have transition states in the form of associated variables and epistrates. The associated forces oppose the external environment, producing energy sources that could be transformed into "composites" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 40] (reactions of additionally involved stakeholders). By associated variables, we understand the relational component offers an explanation tool regarding who can be a potential internal or external stakeholder during a specific crisis, and how and to whom the relevant authority should be delegated. Specification helps distinguish key actors from supporting forces.


Associated variables provide an impetus for "the epistrata" [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 42] constitution intending to form new centers on the periphery of political actions. For example, in the case of a military conflict, they may include "auxiliary armed groups" [Rauta 2019: 11] being not part of regular forces but are directly embedded in the combat structure, acting with or alongside regular forces. Epistrates also include "written agreements signed by official representatives of at least two independent states with a promise to help a partner in the event of a military conflict, remain neutral or refrain from a military conflict with each other, and consult/cooperate in the event of international threats" [Leeds et al. 2002: 238]. Thus, during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, pro-Russian activists who participated in anti-Ukrainian protests, blocking roads and other measures aimed at seizing the peninsula could be considered epistrates. The auxiliary forces mobilization was carried out by such groups as "Night Wolves", led by D. Sinichkin [Salem 2014], with the involvement of the Afghan war veterans and self-defense units.

In author's opinion, epistrates may also include "affiliated forces" [Rauta 2019: 14] such as militias unofficially form part of regular forces and fight for and on behalf of states that wish to change the strategic outcome of a conflict while remaining external to it. Affiliated forces have a symbiotic, formal but legally dubious relationship with a client state that acts as an invisible hand. They record the rise of aggressive non-state actors, for whom the battlefield opens up opportunities for profit maximization, especially for mercenaries, shadowy private military, and security companies. Let us pay attention to the so-called "surrogate forces" - pro-government groups or militias, "used in the internal struggle between the government and the armed opposition" [Hughes & Tripodi 2009: 44]. Surrogates differ from the other categories mentioned above because they build relationships, not with external sponsor states that want to change the conflict outcome, but with internal government circles. For ex-

ample, in 2014, in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine, volunteer paramilitary groups were formed and funded through the Volunteer Council, a civilian group within the Ministry of Defense [Weiss 2015]. The Ukrainian Volunteer Army, the Aidar Battalion, the Azov and Donbas Battalions, the Right Sector, Dnipro-1, and the Organization of Ukrainian Citizens are some of the most famous. Studies show that there were 40 to 50 such groups [Aliev 2016]. The fact of including them in the official structures of the armed forces emphasizes their importance during serious combat operations.


Accordingly, each environment of the collaborative platform vibrates, representing a block of space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of components and leading to its coding. At the same time, any interaction code is permanently transcoded or transformed. Transcoding “allows one environment to act as a foundation for another or, on the contrary, to be built on top of another interactive platform, to disperse, or to be constituted within its boundaries” [Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 249]. That is, environments constantly communicate with each other, which allows us to talk about the intraconsistency when collaborative platforms force different points of order to resonate together - power centers (geographic, military, economic, etc.) - to achieve the set goals. The model for creating a collaborative platform is presented in graph 1.

Graph 1. A collaborative platform model



Source: Proposed by the author

Therefore, the collaborative platform emerges under the collaborative window impulse as a simultaneous crossing of flows and external triggers, activating the dynamics of the latter. The collaborative window vectors create a system context that influences the future platform components. In turn, the driving forces of the platform feedback on the initial system context, cause the collaborative window to oscillate. The collaborative platform itself is represented by a dotted line and consists of two key elements: dynamics and actions, determining its performance (graph 2).

Graph 2. The internal environment model of the collaborative platform

Source: Proposed by the author

The internal environment of the collaborative platform contains a procedural component, explaining the methods of the material component usage and the actual cooperation dynamics. One of the scenarios involves the complex chains of responsibility between players of direct interaction, or “through third parties as observers” [Borghard 2014: 29]. The second way is to give an external mediator part of the national powers to resolve the crisis issue. The procedural component also provides an opportunity to follow the dynamics of the involved players. For example, Qatar’s support for the Dawn faction in the Libyan civil war included coordination with Turkey and Sudan as a mediator [Wehrey 2014]. As such, the procedural part adds specificity by integrating the material constitutive aspect into a series of interactions between the parties.

Let us turn to the internal components of the platform. The category “dynamics” refers to organizational moments, the analysis of which should provide answers to the following questions: 1) is it even possible to form a shared room for action? 2) who exactly should be involved in a quick and optimal crisis resolution; 3) what should be the agreed problem vision as the general rules of the game; 4) what benefits can be offered to players in exchange for their resources; 5) which management model is better to choose: self-organization or appointment of a project group; 6) what should be the mechanism for coordinated results’ monitoring. At this stage, the maximum number of scenarios with multiple alternatives are prescribed for understanding both the players’ interests in collaborative project participation and the feasibility of an interactive platform launching. The dynamics category, in our opinion, may consist of the following elements (table 1):

Table 1. Characteristics of the internal collaborative platform components

Name of the element	Characteristic
<p>Antecedent:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formation of the agenda • Identification of key stakeholders • General vision of the problem • Appointment-if necessary-of joint actions coordinator 	<p>Seeking consensus among stakeholders in controversial moments. Integration of stakeholders in the discussion, with the potential benefits and risks identification, both for the participants and for the platform itself. Attracting a critical mass of participants to avoid the liquidity trap.</p>
<p>Planning:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic rules and goals of cooperation • Exchange and search for information • Appointment of expert groups • Development of alternative solutions 	<p>Determination of collaborative general principles is necessary to resolve potential conflict situations. Goals should be specific and measurable to improve subsequent monitoring of results. A coordinated algorithm of actions is important to prevent unsystematic waste of resources.</p>
<p>Implementation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formalization of relations • Assignment of roles to each of the stakeholders • Allocation of resources 	<p>The formalization of relations between participants involves formal (legal) and informal (trust) components. Ensure even distribution of tasks and roles among the key actors of the platform to create a sense of mutual responsibility and accountability. Regarding funding, we expect voluntary contributions to show a positive correlation with the staff employed within the respective budget category. However, if the share of voluntary contributions increases cumulatively, the platform will be under more pressure, so it should look for alternative employment models such as freelance or temporary staff.</p>
<p>Monitoring:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development of a strategy for evaluating the achieved results • Appointment of coordinators • Consideration of prospects for the platform preservation 	<p>Determination of accurate basic indicators of key parameters before project implementation. Creation of a monitoring program to identify successful elements of collaboration and those that require correction. Development of a multi-level platform post-effects support program.</p>

Source: Proposed by the author

After agreeing on the “dynamic” components and receiving positive answers, it is worth moving to the next category of “actions”. All internal components of the collaborative platform, namely: dynamics and actions - are in constant fluctuation, which significantly complicates the consensus, but ensures maximum adaptation to changing conditions. The actions category already focuses on specific joint procedures between the involved players, for example, 1) an algorithm for agenda determining (personnel responsible for collecting and systematizing information from participants,

prioritizing issues, etc.); 2) appointment of an expert group, the functions of which may include analytical, consulting duties or establishing relations between the participants during the negotiations; 3) legal registration of the agreements reached; 4) list of sanctions in case of non-fulfillment the obligations undertaken by the platform participant; 5) indicators of success or failure of a joint initiative; 6) sources and volume of funding or involvement of other resources (informational, personnel, technical) for the agreed solutions implementation, etc. It should be taken into account that over time, shared steps and experiences can be integrated into the platform as a cyclical element, which will create a threat to the platform's flexible nature due to, for example, treating it as a closed network, therefore, refusing to attract new powerful players. Accordingly, the developed procedures should be adjusted depending on the fluctuations of the system context.

One of the characteristic properties of collaborative platforms is modularity coordinates actions between interested parties and "at the same time reduces the degree of managerial control" [Ansell & Gash 2018: 11]. To some extent, the platform's management strives to be ecological by developing an institutional cooperation structure and appearing as an indirect consequence of joint activities. Uniform design rules, standardized collaboration interfaces, and communication protocols contribute to such consistency.

Brackets indicate the feedback of the platform with the collaborative window in the form of effects/post-effects of its functioning. The performance of the collective initiative can be related to both joint actions and results. For example, the common steps taken for the agreed platform goal are direct results of the cooperation dynamics. That is if, at the input, we talk about the predominant influence of the system context, then at the output, we pay attention to the transitional or final effects, which, in turn, generate adaptive responses (post-effects) resulting from joint actions. This chain of collective actions/effects/post-effects presents three critical levels of performance:

I. Joint actions. A collaborative platform presents a tool to stimulate actions or results that "could not be achieved by any of the participants alone" [Huxham 2003: 403]. In this context, we tend to view the joint activity as transitory or "secondary outcomes" [Thomas & Koontz 2011: 771]. Depending on the context, the platform's goals, and the relationships between the participants, joint actions may include, for example, informing participants about potential risks and benefits, adopting new regulations or memorandums of cooperation, distributing external resources among the involved players, mobilizing personnel, joint decisions monitoring, etc.

II. Effects. Effects are changes in an existing or projected state viewed as undesirable or needed to be correct. The latter may indicate an improvement in the state's position in the case of its participation in collaboration, industrial funds modernization, rearmament of allies, creation of joint regional energy networks, etc. They can be physical, environmental, social, economic, and/or political, and short- or long-term in duration.

III. Post-effects/adaptation. Shared governance is often encouraged through the ability to transform the context of a complex situation. Indeed, one of the most important consequences of collaboration can be changing the problem vector and facilitating adaptation to external circumstances. This potential for transformative change represents the basis of an adaptive response to the results of joint actions. L. Thomas claims that the success of collaborative platforms depends on so-called “architectural levers” which mean “creating an impact disproportionately greater than the initial prerequisites” [Thomas 2014: 206]. Thus, the platform creates a multiplicative effect by developing common assets, designs, and standards that can be combined, thereby facilitating the coordination and management of joint efforts. In his research, J. Borys also notes the strategic importance of “social multiplier effects (for example, due to the involvement of stakeholders in various formats of dialogue and partnership or effective communication channels) and the combination of multiple interventions” [Borys et al. 2012: 312]. In this context, the post-effects identify the number of potential stakeholders willing to join the platform in the future, the number of requests from national or international actors to help solve a similar problem, and the platform’s sustainability level by itself.

By the resilience of the platform’s results, we understand both the reliability and the stability of the adaptive collaborative responses against the background of the changing external context. So, sustainability means the ability to demonstrate and maintain effects over time. For example, if the platform’s purpose is to strengthen the European security bloc, then the desired results should be systemic enough to cause sustainable shifts in behavior, resources, and other strategic factors of the mentioned industry. Therefore, the key indicator of stability is the duration during which adaptive responses to system failures are maintained over a certain time.

Accordingly, for a comprehensive assessment of the collaborative platform performance, it is necessary to take into account three levels (actions, effects, post-effects/adaptation), creating an analytical space of chief vectors for the assessment of joint efforts. Most measurements focus on obtaining evidence from multiple sources, which may require data triangulation methodologies usage to test interpretations. Some indicators are measured by reports, websites, media, and social networks, while other indicators focus on data collected from interviews, focus groups, and field observations. However, researchers should further focus on developing appropriate measurement tools and data collection procedures applied to platform participants and observers. Moreover, close attention should be paid to the categorization of intermediate and final results. The inconsistent use of indicators, motivated by the strategic positioning of the parties or the concept ambiguity, may undermine the effectiveness of joint management systems.

3. CASE STUDIES: UKRAINE DEFENSE CONTACT GROUP AND THE SECURITY TREATY 2022

Collaborative platforms have already been recognized as a successful problem-solving strategy in issues such as humanitarian aid, agricultural innovation, regional economics, and sustainable development [Ansell & Gash 2018; Bentrup 2001]. Occupying a special niche within the management system, platforms are aimed at facilitating and regulating collective relations between the maximum number of stakeholders. Similar to the multi-stakeholder market platform Uber, the collaborative platform could play the role of a kind of “meta-space” in politics, bringing together all interested parties in a joint effort to find a solution to a local or global problem.

As a prototype of a modeled collaborative platform, one may consider current attempts to revive the security architecture through the initiative of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at the US Air Force base “Rammstein”, as well as the Kyiv Security Compact as the legal basis of a collective platform for preventive protection.

Rammstein format. Since the initiative’s launch in April, there have been five meetings of representatives of more than 50 countries regarding assistance to Ukraine in countering Russian aggression. Each gathering envisaged strengthening the Ukrainian army’s position by providing modern weapons, and technical assistance, as holding joint training. On whole, the armed forces of Ukraine received a military package from the United States worth \$675 million (HARM anti-radar missiles, 105-mm light howitzers, GMLRS shells for HIMARS, armored HMMWVs, anti-tank systems, and other equipment) [Military media 08.11.2022], as well as significant assistance from the UK, Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, and Germany. Military aid is provided by most EU countries, except for Austria and Hungary. Each meeting on a shared platform records a change in the rhetoric of key stakeholders: from “stop Russia” to “allow Ukraine to win.” In this context, it is worth paying attention to the ratio of lobbyists and the total number of interested parties to measure the homogeneity level of the collaborative platform’s transnational composition. At the same time, we should not forget about the “devil’s shift” phenomenon [Sabatier et al. 1987] with its harmful consequences both for subjects and political processes as a whole. Not the last role is played by the public opinion influence and the stable position of the participants, who consistently emphasize the protection of Ukraine’s interests. This factor, in particular, affected Germany, which became more active in fulfilling the stated promises.

It is also worth paying attention to one more indicator like the participant’s strength within the collaborative platform no less important when making joint decisions. P. Bonacich once claimed that the “subject’s influence directly depends on the degree of its connection with other political players” [Bonacich 1987: 1172] and the impact of the latter’s contacts. I.e. a participant weigh if he or she is connected to influential actors with strong and close ties. The scientist used the parameter β to represent weak and strong contacts [Bonacich 1987: 1174]. If β is negative, the participant’s in-

fluence depends on his/her contacts with dependent or autonomous subjects. When β is positive, the degree of influence increases in case of expanding contacts with independent actors. In this context, previous connections between the participants in other security platforms such as NATO or regional security forums could have a significant matter.

The number of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group is increasing due to the involvement of other players, in particular Arab countries, India and Israel, actualizing the question about the initiative's effectiveness itself. An important point of further negotiations is operational interoperability in terms of reducing the time of weapons deliveries, requiring rapid coordination of action algorithms. According to the experts' observations [Sabatier et al. 1987], the maximum effect of joint management could be achieved by setting a limit of participants at 5-6 subjects. Scaling the platform is inefficient because players may either ignore critical network issues or spend a lot of time trying to coordinate among themselves. A structural solution to this problem is the centralization of network management actions using the figure of a network broker as a nodal contact between platform participants. Today, such a role is played by Lloyd Austin, who monitors the vector of the collective arena activities.

The item concerning applying sanctions to countries that either take the position of a passive observer (the latest statement by the Bulgarian defense minister regarding the refusal to transfer heavy weapons to Ukraine) or help Russia to circumvent sanctions remains controversial. Rethinking the security format and creating constructive alternatives requires specifying the mechanisms of political influence on systematic violators, which in this way level the ways of achieving the agreed goals and negate the very fact of the platform's creation.

The prolonging of Rammstein's initiative could be a transnational platform of security guarantors for Ukraine based on the **Kyiv Security Compact** from September 13, 2022, proposed by the President's office. In particular, the document reflects an attempt to outline a group of Ukraine's partners and ways of further countering Russian aggression on a global scale. If we consider it from the perspective of the collaborative platform concept, then the creation of such an interactive collective security platform should take into account the following nuances.

Based on the smart specialization principle and the limited resource base of the partner countries, it is worth dividing the group of security guarantors by key areas of activity, according to the strength of their potential, the amount of aid already provided, interest in further cooperation, geographical location, and activity in cooperation with Russia. For example, if we proceed from the urgency of receiving help in the event of military aggression within the first 72 hours, a rational step is to check the logistical possibilities and contact the closest countries in terms of space, while simultaneously informing other - more distant - guarantors of security.

It is also worth focusing attention on the opponents of countries that actively support Russian aggression against Ukraine. Israel is a case in point in this context. For quite

a long time, Israel tried to balance Kyiv and the Kremlin, which was determined by the peculiarities of regional politics. However, Iran's delivery of Shahid-type drones (1,750 units) radically changed the situation. On October 21, a missile strike destroyed a site with components and equipment for the assembly of Iranian drones near the Dimas military airfield in Syria. After Iran transferred a batch of drones and surface-to-surface ballistic missiles to Russia, Israel provided Ukraine with intelligence on targeting Iranian UAVs and announced the transfer of an air threat alert system and modern anti-drone weapons. Analysts predict that "with the strengthening of cooperation between Moscow and Tehran, the military-strategic partnership between Kyiv and Jerusalem will only strengthen" [Kramer 2022].

The above principle of P. Bonacich can be applied to the group of Visegrad countries. The governments of Poland and Hungary have certain contradictions due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as evidenced by the words of Jarosław Kaczyński, head of the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party, regarding V. Orban's "sad" and "disappointing" position [Rankin 2022]. Radically opposing views on ensuring regional security among the allies can lead to aggravation of relations between the partners and even call into question the future existence of the alliance in its current composition. In particular, the President of Slovakia, Z. Čaputová, at a press conference on the energy crisis and regional security, also pointed out the inconsistency of the V4 position regarding military aid to Ukraine. Taking into account the "ideological closeness" [Rankin 2022] of the ruling parties of Poland and Hungary, as well as the EU's financial leverage, one can hope for a change in the scales of Hungarian attitudes specifically towards Ukraine.

Thus, different actors possess different aid potentials, from the supply of arms and humanitarian aid to diplomatic social capital. One of the important requirements in attempts to jointly solve problem situations is the ability of political actors to accurately assess the partners' goals and resources. Such a calculation makes it possible to determine the expenditure of resources necessary to ensure a reasonable probability of success, as well as the positive effects for the participants, which should justify the investment of the corresponding internal reserves. Therefore, it would be advisable to consider the option of a peculiar distribution of security guarantors by vectors, based on their strengths. The authors of the Kyiv Security Compact rightly distinguish between guarantees of military and non-military nature, such as support for sanctions, confiscation of property and funds of the aggressor, seizure of assets of individual citizens or organizations on the sanctioned list, financial assistance for the restoration of destroyed infrastructure, accommodation of refugees, etc.

The number of participants in each narrowly profiled group should not exceed 7-10 partners. The more participants involved, the more time and resources the trust-building process takes. The broader and more abstract its formulation of the shared vision of the situation, the more time is on the final results agreeing and criteria for their monitoring. It is also worth prescribing sanctions against countries that do not fulfill

their obligations (joint levers of economic, political, reputational, or other influence). The security platform of the new format will not make sense if its existence is reduced exclusively to statements, bypassing deeds.

It would be appropriate to develop indicators of the joint success, for example, the national armed forces modernization, the creation of transnational defense forces, the strengthening of the security sense among the citizens of the countries participating in the collaborative platform, the formation of observers for the targeted use of weapons, etc.

At the same time, it is worth noting that maintaining a high adaptable level of a collaborative platform, especially the requirements of legitimacy and efficiency, without a stable formal structure, seems a difficult task. It is possible to create a simultaneously stable and flexible management structure. However, it requires frequent reassessment of structural mechanisms and procedures in the light of new developments, as well as readiness to make the necessary adjustments to the initial management format. For example, as needs and expectations change, platform participants join or leave the network, so the governance format must adapt accordingly since it is the actors who directly participate in decision-making. In any case, there is a recognized need for a temporary formalized structure sustained over a defined period.

Hence, a collaborative platform represents an institutional adaptation designed to maintain the individual equilibrium of actors in changing conditions, demands, or opportunities. How well the organizations involved in it manage to adapt to integrated management and at the same time remain autonomous enough to carry out their tasks is a central problem of collaborative institutions. The longer the period of the collaborative platform's existence, the closer the interaction between the same subjects, which contributes to the cooperation prolongation. Stable networks mean that participants can develop long-term relationships with at least a narrow (selected) circle of actors to understand their strengths and weaknesses, for maximizing the results of the joint initiative. Such flexibility will allow the collaborative network to respond quickly to the changing needs and requirements of interested parties. In essence, platforms should focus on ensuring the so-called hidden stability due to symmetry in the resources and results distribution.

CONCLUSION

The format of global management is gradually acquiring a multidimensional nature, when constructive problem-solving involves the activity of key participants at different levels (world, national, regional, local), in different policy areas (water, energy, regional development, research, etc.) and various communication channels (informational, motivational, receptive, etc.). Therefore, the collaborative principle of interaction matters in identifying an algorithm of actions under the condition of more open interfaces between interested parties.

Let us take a closer look at the “uni-interpolar idea” [Tella 2015] from the given context. Being a meta-network consisting of situational anti-crisis nodes (collaborative windows), it is assumed that a temporary fixation of multi-subject interaction until the appropriate crisis resolution. Solving the problematic issue leads to the dissolution of the interactive platform as a separate actor, but requires post-problem monitoring of joint results through multilateral agreements. However, the flexibility of collaborative windows and platforms aims to quickly adapt both goals and methods of crisis resolution, depending on changing circumstances. Accordingly, the ultimate external goal also changes along with the prediction of resource base utilization of the players involved.

The proposed model of collaborative platforms can be applied to a wide range of cooperation policies, since many of the indicated components are present in solving issues of health care, crime, transport, etc. Along with positive effects, it is worth remembering some problems that accompany cross-border cooperation, namely: influence distribution, territoriality, contradictions in norms and procedures, the establishment of horizontal and vertical communication, imbalance of forces, the autonomy of involved structures, uniform accountability standards, and monitoring planned results. This article represents an attempt to model collaborative platforms and acknowledges the need for further study of this issue. The proposed model correlates with the input-output system of key players and the measurement of functionally useful effects, but it needs the embeddedness of political and social processes within collective institutional structures. Researchers should focus on the impact of collaborative platforms vis-à-vis national governments, traditional international institutions, and private players who may both support such initiatives and see alternative competitors as a threat. The very appearance of such interactive platforms can be used for a global smart specialization strategy in light of political processes.

It is worth noting that most academic works on collaborative governance tend to focus on macro-issues, but not all explore micro-issues such as the leadership required for industry interfaces or cross-cultural processes. Therefore, research into microelements of collaborative platforms that stimulate the prolongation of collaboration between stakeholders would be a valuable contribution. In this context, it would be good to emphasize the platform’s institutional dynamics for identifying and solving the stated problems.

Criteria for the accountability of platform participants regarding the implementation of approved tasks and the use of allocated capital require further development. After all, in the case of limiting the platform’s role exclusively to the functions of aggregating the subjects’ interests, the creation of a collaborative institution is pointless. Establishing cooperation standards and cyclical interactions could lead to the basic collaborative modules that can be connected to solve a similar problem situation.

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