THE RUSSIAN WAR AGAINST UKRAINE AND REMAKE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: DYNAMICS AND PROSPECTS

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Abstract

In the first decade of the 21st century, Russia once again brought the Primacy of Power in the bosom of the Liberal Order established in 1991. As a result of the 5-day aggressive war against Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the principles based on the 1975 Helsinki Act on the inviolability of borders, non-use of force, and protection of sovereignty in Europe actually lost their relevance. What about the European security system that was established in 1991 has collapsed after the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 2022. Post-Cold War European peace-keeping Organizations, (ie OSCE and Council of Europe) international law mechanisms (1975, Final Act of Helsinki, 1991 Charter of New Europe, etc.) and the European soft deterrence strategy actually were unable to prevent and deter aggressive revisionist politics of Kremlin regarding neighboring countries (usually called "Near Abroad" by Kremlin). As a result, the European region and its security architecture faced an acute crisis the analogue of which has not been seen since the end of the Cold War and which is periodically exacerbated by nuclear threats both the high risks of using tactical nuclear weapons and potential missile strikes on Ukraine's nuclear power plants which are situated in the area of battles. No matter how the outcome of the war in Ukraine ends, it has fundamentally changed the European region already, especially the geopolitical picture of the Black Sea basin, the balance of power, and the strategic culture of the acting powers, which would be a determining factor of regional security developments for the next decades. The present article discusses the peculiarities of the formation of the European security system after the end of the Cold War. Specific attention is paid to the actual issue dealing with the dilemma of which security system was important for future Europe

'OSCE First' or "NATO First Strategy"? The weaknesses of the European security architecture and its underlying causes became the basis of the biggest military-political crisis in Europe. An important aim of the paper is to present the dynamics of military and political events in the region based on the analysis of current events, as well as by observing the interests of global and regional actors acting in the region and their policies, to determine in a theoretical aspect what kind of international order emerging in the Euro-Atlantic area, how transformative will be the Ukrainian war, what kind of changes brought it in the current European order and what kind of consequences are expected for future. In the final section, the article presents possible scenarios of European security transformations

Key words: *Key Words: European Security, Russian Aggressive Revisionism, War in Ukraine, Black Sea, New Lines of Confrontation in the Euro-Atlantic Region, the Transformation of European Security Architecture*

Methodology

The systematic method (structural and functional aspects) was used in the preparation of the research, which allowed us to study the foreign policy of European states. Using the comparative-historical method, we analysed the change in the nature of relations between subjects. The method of situational analysis, which we used in the assessment of individual situations. Also, the common scientific method gave rise to the possibility of analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, concretisation, and abstraction.

RETROSPECT OF FAILED ATTEMPTS TO CREATE AN INCLUSIVE OSCE-BASED EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The formation of the present European security system starts from the adoption of the 1975 Final Act of Helsinki, which for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War appeared mutual trust and a common vision between the Western and Eastern European countries and the USSR about European security and cooperation. By the Helsinki Act, basic principles, norms, and rules of future European security were determined which were recognized by both parties. However, rapidly changing strategic environment and new confrontation phases (i.e., Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Euro-Missile Crisis, and escalation in the Middle East) new approaches for European security, its principles and norms remained only on paper until the end of the 1980s, and the situation in both global and European politics did not change fundamentally. The new foreign policy strategy of the Soviet leader Mikheil Gorbachev (New Thinking") created the prospect of ending the Cold War without military conflict. The format of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (SCSE) in Europe was recognised as the most effective mechanism for the successful completion of the process. According to the 1987 Washington Agreement, both the US and the Soviet Union agreed to reduce the arsenal of medium and long range nuclear missile arsenal, in 1991 both the NATO and Warsaw Block European countries signed an agreement on reduction of conventional arms, successfully completed the reunification of Germany, changing Communist regimes, and gaining sovereignty in the eastern European Coun-

tries, which actually was a result of Gorbachev's so-called "Policy of Non-Interference" which the Kremlin adopted at the end phase of the Cold War.

During the end days of the Cold War, by European politicians and academicians from both sides of the Iron Curtain, the CSCE also seemed the natural framework in the continued search for a peaceful order in Europe. Gorbachev saw the CSCE as an instrument to materialize his vision of a 'Common European Home" in which both Cold War alliances would be dissolved, Russia would 'return to Europe" and the CSCE would become the focal point for European cooperation (Rey, 2004) (Crump, 2019, Vol. 43, No. 2). In his famous Ten Point Plan for German reunification, announced on November 1989, FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl emphasised in his eighth point that the CSCE process should remain the "part of the heart of the pan-European architecture" (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg, 2017, p. 13). West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher perceived the CSCE as a way to transcend the Cold War divide (Crump, 2019, Vol. 43, No. 2). To honour the Western partnership with Moscow, Genscher was even ready to dissolve NATO and the Warsaw Pact, echoing Gorbachev. His various promises vis-à-vis Gorbachev and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, in early 1990 to transform the CSCE into the dominant security alliance in Europe were meant sincerely. (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg, 2017, p. 13). The French president, Francois Mitterrand, also imagined the possibility of a new security system in Europe, overcoming the Cold War divide and making Europe emancipation possible. On 31 December 1989, he offered Central and Eastern Europeans a 'Confederation for Europe" under French auspices as an alternative to eventually joining the EC. Mitterrand's project intended to include the Soviet Union but exclude the US. (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Auneslu-oma, Benno Zogg, 2017, p. 14). According to the French position, Cold war intuitions such as NATO must be replaced with European Security structures. Later, in 1994 the German and Dutch foreign ministers, Klaus Kinkel and Pieter Kooijmans, even developed the "OSCE First" initiative in order to prioritise the OSCE in decision-making on European Security. (Crump, 2019, Vol. 43, No. 2). At the first time during the uncertainty caused by the turbulent revolutionary transition years of 1989-1990, the 'Eastern Block' countries welcomed CSCE/OSCE as the structural design of a new European architecture to fill the security vacuum in the Central and East European region to avoid regional tensions and border security since Soviet troops were living, German unification was fulfilling, and Self-Identification of nations was emerging.

According to western researchers (Mary Sarotte, Christian Nünlist, Juhana Auneslu-oma, Benno Zogg), the US and the FRG used the rhetoric of strengthening the CSCE and pan-European security mostly to balance their 'NATO First' strategy, to soften Soviet (and initially also British and French) resistance against a reunified Germany. In public speeches and in meetings with their Soviet counterparts in 1990, US leaders promised that European security would become more integrative and more coop-

erative – and NATO less important (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg, 2017) (Sarotte, 2010). Thus, Gorbachev was assured in 1990 that the West would limit NATO's influence and instead strengthen the pan-European CSCE.

However, at the end of 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and the Eurasiatic geopolitical landscape drastically changed. New sovereign states appeared on the political map of the world, with their own national interests, quest of security, and specific foreign policy aspirations. The new realities significantly changed the agenda for forming European security. Moreover, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia found itself in a deep economic and political crisis. Therefore, the initiative to institutionalise the European security system was on the side of the West, but the successful fulfilment of this task was a great challenge for the Euro-Atlantic community because new the security system of the post-bipolar Europe, which would include European countries, Russia, and its post-Soviet and post-Socialist countries, had to be established by forming the institutions and norms which would be acceptable to all parties, especially for Russia because Kremlin had historical incompatibility and mistrust with Cold War institutions such as NATO. Furthermore, the conditionality of Gorbachev's and then Yeltsin's compromise policy at the end of the cold war was not to expand NATO and EU to the Eastward. But it should be noted that the agreement on the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic structures to the East was not part of any treaty or document signed at the end years of the Cold War by the parties: the US, Soviet Union, and EU. Actually, it was a tripartite 'Gentlemen Deal' and one of the so-called '9 guarantees' given by the US Secretary of State James Baker to the leadership of the Soviet Union ("not one inch eastwards') during the meeting on 9 February 1990 (NSC, 2017).

Consequently, in both, the West and Russia SCSE, which was a common European platform of cooperation established by all European countries (including Franco's Spain), were identified as an important basement to build a new, post-cold war European Security system. On 21 November 1990, at the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Paris, Western and Eastern European States and the Soviet Union signed the Charter of "New Europe" which shared the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 in matters of security. In the following years, Russia actively participated in the process of creating instruments, mechanisms, and institutions to ensure the effectiveness of the newly shaped security architecture of Europe. In the context of the OSCE, European states with Russia have formulated various so-called confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs). In November 1990 they established a Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as Regards Unusual Military Activities that is part of the procedures for their implementation and verification (quoted in Clingendael Institute, 2004, p. 12). The aim of the CSBM is to enhance security by reducing the risks of surprise attacks, improving transparency and openness as far as military affairs are concerned, and eliminating the possibility of misunderstandings or miscalculations. In 1992 the OSCE created, as its security component, a Fo-

rum for Security Cooperation (FSC). in March 1995 OSCE adopted Stability Pact for Europe and reaffirms the importance of understanding, trust, and friendly relations between European countries (Clingendael Institute, 2004, p. 12). Russia also was a part of the so-called Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation with Regard to Emergency Situations of OSCE (1989 Vienna Mechanism, 1991 Berlin Mechanism, 1991 Valletta Mechanism, Mechanisms for Risk Reduction and etc.) (OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, 2004, p. 6).

Much more than other international organisations, the OSCE can be seen as a kind of process by which member states are more or less permanently engaged in consultations (quoted in Clingendael Institute, 2004, p. 14). Such consultations and discussions are stipulated in OSCE documents for the purpose of implementation and verification of the various commitments that member states have accepted in the military and human dimension spheres and some other issue areas. These consultations and the information they generate are supposed to. This content downloaded from All use subject to have a preventive effect, as they enable states to put pressure on governments that do not respect their commitments and thus are likely to contribute towards the eruption of conflict.

One of the general procedures that the OSCE has at its disposal for the prevention of conflict is the, otherwise known as the Berlin Mechanism (Clingendael Institute, 2004, p. 14). The Berlin Mechanism, which was adopted in June 1991 at the Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council Ministers of Foreign Affairs, outlines measures that can be applied in the case of serious emergency situations that may arise from a violation of one of the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act or as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, security, or stability. For the peaceful settlement of disputes, the use of negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration was advocated, the so-called Valletta Procedures. It was the first formal CSCE procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes (OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, 2004, p. 6). In the OSCE Summit held in Istanbul (Turkey) on 18-19 November 1999, Russia made a significant commitment to pull out its military bases from post-soviet countries (especially Georgia and Moldova), which remained there since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The withdrawal of Russian military bases was the last important achievement in the framework of creating a stable basement for security in Europe and for strengthening the sovereignty of newly independent European countries.

Despite the progress mentioned above, the OSCE failed to become the main source of the European security order due to the following complex circumstances and factors. At first, the United States was less enthusiastic about trying to create alternative security institutions in Europe to counterbalance NATO. Military and political elites in Washington believed that only norms, principles and institutions without huge military and economic resources would not be able to contain Russia or deal with other threats. A more powerful and strong alliance such as NATO was needed in a rapidly changing world to ensure the security of Europe. When the first conference

began on the outskirts of Helsinki in November 1972, the Americans showed little interest. American president Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, were more interested in superpower détente with the Soviet Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev than in the kind of multilateral, Pan-European détente that seemed to be fostered by the CSCE. The US attitude towards CSCE/OSCE has not changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union when the new post-Bipolar world order was established. (Crump, 2019, Vol. 43, No. 2). 'NATO-first strategy was one of the Bush administration's important political agendas during the cold war end days. At the meeting with Helmut Kohl in Camp David (USA) on 24 February 1990 Bush underlined the priority of NATO over the CSCE. For Bush, 'CSCE cannot replace NATO as the core of the West's deterrence strategy in Europe and as the fundamental justification for US troops in Europe', concluding that "if that happens, we will have a real problem.' In July 1990, Bush's advisors emphasised in internal discussions in Washington, D.C., that strengthening the CSCE at the expense of NATO was out of the question. However, the future shape and role of NATO and how it would coordinate with the EC/EU and organisations, such as the CSCE/OSCE, remained unclear until well into the first half of the 1990s, in the absence of credible military threats in Europe. (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg, 2017, p. 18). In his speech to the CSCE session in 1994, US president Bill Clinton called for a greater role for the security organisation, but also described NATO as 'the bedrock of security in Europe." He said the alliance's decision to expand, perhaps as early as 1996, will improve security for all of Europe, members and nonmembers alike (Norman Kempster, Dean E. Murphy, 1994). Besides the fact that NATO remained one of the strongest pillars of European security, western European countries especially Germany was able to achieve to maintain and develop a decades-long special economic, and trade relationship with Russia, exclusively in the Energy Supply field. After the end of the Cold War, EU countries became energy dependent on Russia for decades, and in the European energy supply system they created an order that sounds like 'Keep the Americans out, Russians in, and the Europeans above'.

The second important factor was the creation of the European Union as a political unit in 1992 and the formation of a common foreign and security policy within it significantly reduced the OSCE institutionally, as the main focus on the issue of European security was finally shifted to the EU and NATO.

The third, the inability of the OSCE and European security in general in the Yugoslav wars and post-Soviet conflicts convinced the post-socialist and post-communist countries of Eastern Europe (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) that in the matter of protecting their security and deterring Russia in the future, the OSCE and other security or peace-keeping structures cannot be effective mechanisms. Leaning on historical experiences, there was a feeling among the post-Communist countries that in case of Russian aggression, only norms, values, and principles would not be able to deter Moscow and protect their independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity

because, as historical experience shows, Moscow does not respect any norms or principles established by the civilised world. Furthermore, all post-communist countries had (and still have) the expectation that after overcoming economic and political crises, the Russian federation would "come back again" as a revisionist power and pose a significant challenge to their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, the Euro-Atlantic community was well aware of the Kremlin's destructive policy on the territorial integrity of newly independent neighboring states. There was clear evidence that ethnoterritorial conflicts in the South Caucasus region (Abkhazia and Samachablo in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan-Armenia) and in Moldova were inspired and escalated by the Kremlin. In 1991 when Moscow provoked the separatist movement of Russian minorities in the Pridnestrovian region, supported and weaponised their militants against Chisinau, other states having Russian minorities. Since Vladimir Putin became President and started to advance a policy of the so-called "Russian World" that mainly means to promote Russian culture as soft power to enhance its influence over neighboring countries. Moreover, the Kremlin announced that it would defend the rights of ethnic Russians or citizens of Russia, regardless of whether they are permanently or temporarily residing. Since 2000, the military doctrine of Russia contains provisions that declare 'discrimination and the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states" (Federation, 2000). Using Russian minorities as a tool to violate the territorial integrity of neighbouring countries significantly threatened the Baltic states, as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have a large Russian ethnic minority, each in solid numbers Latvia 24%, Estonia 25%, and Lithuania 5% (Coolican, 2021). After the Moldova case, these Russian minorities became a source of concern, especially in Estonia and Latvia. The Baltic states feared that Russia could influence and weaponise them against the perspective governments or intervene militarily in those countries. That is why immediately after gaining independence, they focused their efforts on alliance membership, deepening their partnership with the United States, and integration into the European Union, and to achieve these goals, they periodically increased the pressure on their Western partners.

And finally, the Western triumphant society, the winner of the Cold War, was less eager to create an effective security system with Russia based on OSCE because, despite the constructive position shown in the final stage of the Cold War by the USSR, there was historical mistrust towards the Kremlin among the Western political elites. Furthermore, some high-rank delegates in Paris perceived the CSCE summit primarily as a reward for Gorbachev's acceptance of the reunification of Germany, rather than an attempt to rebuild the European security architecture in such a way that it would include Russia (Crump, 2019, Vol. 43, No. 2). Later, suspicions of the West were justified when Russia provoked and supported separatist movements and ethno-territorial conflicts in the neighbouring countries. The West was convinced that identifying NATO and the European Union as the main instruments of the European

security system was the right decision. Moreover, strengthening and supporting its enlargement to the East was also the pragmatic choice of the Euro-Atlantic community. Shifting strategic aims of the Euro-Atlantic Community regarding the European Security architecture instantly became clear to the Kremlin. The Russian political elites were finally convinced that Western society was placing more emphasis on the North Atlantic Alliance, the growth of the European dimension in it, and the further development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU in the matter of developing the European security architecture.

Thus, in the late 1980s, the suddenly emerging prospect of ending the acute confrontation between the West and the East could not become the basis for creating an effective security system in Europe in the 1990s. This was stipulated due to several objective factors.

1. Western political elites believed that M. Gorbachev's progressive visions and strategies for European and world peace in general ("New Vision", Common European Family, etc.) were not so much well-minded and well-organised strategies, but they were forced by the economic and political crisis occurring at the beginning of 1980s. In fact, internal problems (corruption and economic stagnation), the Arms Race, unlimited aid from economically weak allies, and the war in Afghanistan had a negative impact on the development of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin was also well aware that sooner or later the USSR would run out of strategic resources. Especially those economic and military resources which had vital importance in maintaining influence on Eastern Europe. Moreover, there were no positive forecasts for the preservation of the unity of the USSR itself. That's why Moscow was considered by the Western alliance as a defeated party in the cold war ("We prevailed and they did not. We cannot let the Soviets snatch victory from the jaws of defeat " – Bush to Kohl at the meeting in Kamp David, 24 February 1990. (Svetlana Savranskaya & Tom Blanton, 2021)), while the Kremlin believed that it took unprecedented compromising steps to finally ease the 44-year extremely tense conflict and establish world peace, which was not appreciated at all; While there existed various interpretations of winners and losers of the Cold War, it means that there still existed basis of confrontation and fragmentation as well, which will involve actors of the Euro-Atlantic area under increasing risks of new confrontation (**Bazhunaishvili Lasha, Gorgiladze Irakli, 2020**).

2. Gorbachev's foreign policy strategy and policy visions did not reflect the position of the Russian political elite and military establishment generally. Therefore, there was a reasonable suspicion that in the event of his departure from power or in case of his overthrow, as well as after the stabilisation of the economic and political situation in Russia, the situation would radically change and Russia would be on the the return on traditional revisionist and expansionist policy line again. The risks of radicalisation of the Kremlin's policy were high even during Gorbachev's rule. Conservative Communists, military elites, the KGB and repre-

sentatives of other intelligence services severely criticised the foreign policy decisions of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. In August 1991 hardliners of the Soviet Union's Communist party unsuccessfully tried to overthrow Gorbachev's regime by coup d'état (so-called GKCHP).

3. Western countries were sceptical about the possibility of democratisation of Russia, as well as the based of Kremlin's foreign policy on liberal values in the future.

Thus, in addition to the fact that in 1990 by the main western powers the Soviet Union was promised an inclusive and cooperative future European Security Order, western countries under the US leadership had decided to rely on and perpetuate "Cold War security institutions" rather than experiment with a new pan-European and inclusive security organisation CSCE/OSCE, including the Soviet Union (Sarotte, 2010). Accordingly, from the very beginning, European Security in the 1990s was centred on exclusive NATO/EU (Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma, Benno Zogg, 2017), it was meant that Russia's place in European Security was determined "with" not "in". At the end of the 1990s, new confrontation phase between Russia and the West start growing. It was progressing toward escalation at a slow pace, but dynamically. The ground for a new confrontation between the West and Russia has been prepared again. The confrontation was slowly but dynamically progressing towards escalation.

RUSSIA'S SECURITY POLICY: FROM 'COLD PEACE' TO HARD POWER

In the 1990s, both NATO and the European Union underwent significant transformation. The component of political cooperation in both structures has increased. At their summit in London in July 1990, NATO leaders promised to transform the alliance from a military pact into a political organisation. In 1992, the Maastricht Agreement on the creation of the European Union entered into force, which laid the foundation for deepening the political integration of European countries. The policy of creating a European defense and security system was activated, which was primarily lobbied by France and Germany. Traditional competition between European and Atlantic security systems has been renewed. In 1992 Germany and France presented an initiative to create a common European military unit called EuroCorps. The European Union issued the Petersberg Declaration, which defined those missions that could be entrusted to the Western European Union (WEU) and that Eurocorps would also undertake. In 1996 NATO ministers agreed that the WEU would take responsibility for the creation of a European Security and Defence Identity. (McCormick, 2016). In December 2003, the EU council adopted the European Security Strategy, which declared that the EU is a global actor and should therefore be ready to take responsibility for global security issues as well (EU, 2009). But Central and Eastern European countries had less confidence regarding the European Security institutions and politics which mainly were orchestrated by Germany and France. That is why in the field of security, the main orientation of the former Warsaw Block countries was made to deepen the partnership with the United States and to join the North Atlantic Alliance.

They actively implemented all necessary reforms, harmonised standards with NATO standards, and insistently demanded membership of the Alliance.

The making of fundamental emphasis on NATO/EU in the field of continental security by the Euro-Atlantic Community did not go unnoticed by the Kremlin. Moreover, Russians made several conclusions:

1. With the participation of Russia, the common European security system based on the OSCE actually did not take place.

2. The European Security Architecture was not inclusive as promised. During the construction of the new European security system, Western partners unilaterally acted, and Russia's role and functions were not clearly defined. Finally, Russia found itself not integrated with the West. Meanwhile, the West still expecting compromises regarding strategic issues, especially NATO enlargement to the East, which was an important part of the "NATO First Strategy"

3. In the context of global or regional threats (terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, especially in the west Balkans), the Euro-Atlantic community actually acted unilaterally without Russia, which put the Kremlin in an off-side position.

Besides the fact that Yeltsin's Russia was preoccupied with economic and domestic political problems, Moscow reacted strongly regarding the NATO enlargement strategy. In December 1994, during a speech at the European Security and Cooperation Conference in Budapest, Boris Yeltsin made a harsh statement against western partners, which is known as a 'Cold Peace' speech. "History demonstrates that it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies of continents and of the world community, in general, can somehow be managed from one single capital. (Sciolino, 1994). The domineering U.S. was 'trying to split [the] continent again' through NATO expansion... (Svetlana Savranskaya & Tom Blanton, 2021) "Russia also expects its security to be taken into account," Yeltsin said. "We are concerned about the changes that are taking place in NATO. What is this going to mean for Russia? NATO was created during the Cold War. Why sow seeds of mistrust? After all, we are no longer enemies; we are all partners now - stated B. Yeltsin (Norman Kempster, Dean E. Murphy, 1994). After "Yeltsin's blow-up" in Budapest President of the United States Bill Clinton carried out several diplomatic attempts to calm down Boris Yeltsin and ensure that NATO enlargement is not a threat, but rather a process of creating more secure and integrated Europe and the world in general. "NATO expansion is not Anti-Russian; It is not intended to be exclusive of Russia and there is no imminent timetable (Memorandum of Conversation between Clinton and Yeltsin, 1994). In the letter sent from the White House to the Kremlin on 16 December 1994 President Bill Clinton stated that "the most important strategic aim of the US is to help to construct a unified, stable and peaceful Europe in the next century in which Russia, the United States and countries of Europe can fully participate. This process, which will take years to complete, must include strengthened CSCE/OSCE." (Letter from Clinton to Yeltsin,

1994). Clinton also stated that Russia must be part of several Western economic and political institutions including the World Trade Organisation, the Paris Club, and the G – 7. "Our common aim should be to achieve a full integration between Russia and the West – including strengthened links with NATO – with no new divisions in Europe" – stated Clinton in his letter (Letter From Clinton to Yeltsin, 1994). Therefore, Clinton promised and guaranteed Russia's integration into global and regional institutions instead of NATO's enlargement to the East. Moreover, on 27 May 1997, at the NATO Summit in Paris, France, NATO, and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security. Based on this agreement, in 2002, the NATO-Russia council was created, one of the important consultative institutions in the Euro – Atlantic regional Security structure.

Meanwhile, in the 1990s the US, NATO, and the EU became transformative powers for ex – Communist countries, assisting and financially supporting their reforms, economic development (mainly transition to market economics), and democratisation. In this process, international economic and financial institutions were involved. Consequently, great progress has been achieved in the field of stabilisation, transformation, democratization, and development of post-communist countries. In 1990 former Warsaw Block Countries Poland, Chez Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary became NATO member states and continue their integration policy with the EU.

The appearance of the Euro-Atlantic institutions in central and Eastern Europe as a transformative power in a strategically important area for Moscow (the so-called 'Near Abroad'), the democratization of Post-Communist European countries and their transition from post-Soviet-type countries into western-aligned democratic states was perceived as a threat to the Kremlin for the several reasons:

1. the democratization and implementation of western-style reforms put an end to those social and political institutions that Russia used as tools of influence over the "former allies";

2. Russia did not play any economic or political role in the transformation process of eastern European countries and once again became offside from the important process that took place in neighboring regions; and

3. the presence of an economically advanced and democratically developed countries in Russia's neighborhood posed a threat to the autocracy emerging in Russia, because this circumstance created a feeling among the Russian citizens that if development and democratization could be achieved in countries with limited economic capacity or poor natural resources, or in politically unstable states, why could it not be achieved in Russia, which is rich in resources and political experience!

The angry tone of Yeltsin's speech on European security was continued by his successor Vladimir Putin, a former KGB high-rank employee with conservative wives on Russia's role in global politics. After Putin became Prime Minister and then was elected as president of Russia, he became a strong leader and collected all the power

in his hands, establishing strong control over Russia's strategic economic resources. In addition to hardliners coming to power, several important factors contributed to the activation of Russia's critical and often contradictory policy toward European security. At first, the Enlargement process of the North Atlantic Alliance to the East (granting membership to Chez Republic, Hungary, and Poland) and at the same time carried out by NATO Humanitarian Intervention in the Western Balkans (especially, against Serbian authorities and military units that committed genocide and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo) in order to enforce peace in the region unilaterally from Russia, in fact, bypassing the UN and the OSCE, convinced Moscow that Russia was not considered an equal actor in the European security system by the West, and often "its interests were ignored" (Kramer, 2017, p. 43). As a result, Russia's attitude towards the OSCE and the European security system orchestrated by the West starts to shift from confidence to suspicions. Consequently, in the eyes of Moscow, the legitimacy of the OSCE, the degree of its recognition, and its prestige decreased significantly. Unilaterally taking responsibility for European security by the Euro-Atlantic structures in Kremlin was also identified as a threat. Second, since the end of the 1990s, the price of oil has started to increase. In 2000, a barrel of oil rose from 18 to 28 dollars and in subsequent years to 100 dollars. Subsequently, Russia's economic growth and political influence at global and regional levels increased significantly. The Russian hardliners under Putin's leadership returned their 'sense of pride'. And finally, after 9/11 NATO The strengthening of euro-atlantic institutions and becoming the main component of European security has turned into an irreversible process. Furthermore, for Western countries, the first place on the list of global threats was taken by terrorism and the second place was occupied by the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. What about Russia, it became a tertiary challenge for the West which was annecaptable for Moscow. As Russian researcher Yulia Shevtsova argues, the worst scenario for Russia, whether in global or regional politics, is not a confrontation with the United States, but Washington ignoring or neglecting Russia as a Global Power. Despite the asymmetry of the military and economic resources at their disposal, Russia's confrontation with the United States, the primacy of Russian threats in the agenda of the West, and the dialogue with Russia on various strategic issues (arms control, European Security, WMD, Terrorism etc.) represent a kind of guarantee for Russia to maintain its "superpower" status. This status has been the spine of the Russian system of personalised power, the means to legitimize political leadership, and the instrument to distract the attention from their domestic woes (Shevtsova, 2021). In 2005 Vladimir Putin publicly stated that "the collapse of the Soviet Union was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century and "For the Russian people, it has become a real drama" (Putin M. t., 2005). In the following years, Russia under Putin's presidency began to ignore and then criticise the values and principles of the liberal international order, also refused to honestly follow the

norms and rules of OSCE-based security, and returned to the power (actually, which he never betrayed).

The Russian hardliners who were inspired by the idea of 'Russia is Back" started realizing aggressive revisionist policy under Putin's leadership to return back its positions which were during Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Subsequently, regarding European security issues, Russia has formed more contradictory positions than compatible ones. The change of the post-Soviet regimes as a result of colour revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004, their democratic transitions, reforms, and their west-orientated foreign policy course made the Kremlin even more aggressive towards the West. In the following years, Russia's policy became even more offensive. Especially, Moscow had a negative attitude regarding the NATO enlargement to the Black Sea (in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania became members of the Alliance) possibility of deployment of American Anti-Missile systems in Central European countries, and active negotiations for granting MAP to Georgia and Ukraine. As President George W. Bush recalled in his memoirs, Russia and its leader "became more aggressive in the international arena and more locked in domestic political issues..." (Kramer, 2017, p. 64). In his famous 2007 angry speech at the Munich security conference President of Russia, Vladimir Putin blamed the West (generally the US and NATO) that after the cold war they proposed a unipolar world order "which did not take place either". He also reminded the Western public that the "universal, indivisible character of security is expressed as the basic principle that "security for one is security for all" (MSC, 2007). Citing this word, Vladimir Putin underlined that Russia was beyond the European Security Architecture and it was a national threat to Russia. Munich's speech can be perceived as a turning point in the relations between the West and Russia. In response to Putin's accusations, Western leaders choose a passive position, even though they did not make a response statement.

Putin's hard words against the US/NATO/EU soon transformed into aggressive actions to unilaterally acquire an effective tool to deter NATO integration in post-Soviet countries Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. in August 2008 Russia invaded Georgia using provocative actions of separatists against peaceful inhabitants and Georgian military units patrolling along the administrative border. In the next year, 2009, Russia continued its aggressive politics toward its neighbours. Moscow permanently violated the "Five Point Agreement" and instead of pulling military personnel from the occupied territories of Georgia it was increased to 8000 soldiers, Samachablo region was declared the independent state of South Ossetia by Moscow and started widening the borders of the separatist region threatening strategic communications (the highway runs from west to East and vice versa and even the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline) and territorial integrity of Georgia as well. "If we had faltered in 2008, the geopolitical arrangement would be different now and the number of countries in respect of which attempts were made to artificially drag them into the North Atlantic Alliance, would have probably been there [in NATO] now," stated Dmitry Medvedev in

2011. Medvedev emphasised that August 8 was for us almost what 9/11 was for the United States (McBride, 2008). It is true that "A Little War Shook the World" (Ronald D. Asmus) (Asmus, 2010), but the Euro-Atlantic community failed to have a relevant reaction to Kremlin's aggressive politics toward the European Security Architecture because Russia's attack on a sovereign country was perceived as a manifestation of imperial reflexes and the Georgia government was a priori accused of escalating the conflict situation and excessive use of military force against the provocation of Ossetian separatists. In addition, Georgia, located in the peripheral part of Europe (which was considered more of an alternative energy corridor than the main artery, whose status Russia did not give up to anyone) from a strategic point of view, turned out to have less geopolitical weight for European countries than Russian energy (gas and oil), other raw materials, and Russian Investment markets.

Unlike the Western European countries Former Warsaw Block and post-Soviet Baltic States supported Georgia in different ways (diplomatic and economic support). Moreover, they argued to their Western European and American partners that Moscow's aggression against Georgia was not an imperial reflex, but a deliberate and strategically calculated policy to undermine European security Central European countries. They insisted on strengthening security measures in Europe. The anti-Russian reactions of Eastern European countries did not go unpunished by Moscow. During the winter time, Moscow caused an artificial dispute with Ukraine over gas supply. In January 2009, the commercial dispute between Gazprom and the government of Ukraine turned into a crisis. Consequently, Moscow stopped the gas supply to Ukraine by locking those pipelines from which Eastern European countries were getting Russian Gas through Ukrainian transit. It was the first time that Moscow showed the power of energy sources in politics as a tool of pressure.

Barak Obama's attempts to 'restart' tense relations with Moscow were unsuccessful. Even Obama's administration's decision to not deploy antimissile systems in the Chez republic and Poland was not effective in deescalation. The next recidivism of Russian aggression was in Ukraine. In 2013, Ukraine's pro-Russian government under the leadership of President Viktor Yanukovych made the sudden decision not to sign the Associated Agreement with the EU, which was a progressive and important event for Ukraine after gaining independence. Instead, Yanukovych declared the importance of establishing close economic and political ties with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union led by Moscow. Russia was reluctant to improve EU-Ukraine relations, putting permanent pressure on Ukrainian politicians opposing Yanukovych's decision and demanding a successful association process with the EU. Simultaneously, antigovernment protests sparked in Kyiv and time to time widened finally transformed into the Revolution of Dignity (the second revolution after 1991). Protesters demanded the resignation of the president and finalised the agreement with the EU. Yanukovych responded to them with violence but could not overrun the power and number by using hard power and was forced to flee to Russia (Bharti, 2022, p. 8-9).

After the revolutionary change of government and successfully ended process of association with EU, Russia pushes forward its hard power to punish Ukrainians for their decision. 23-26 February 2014 Russian masked troops without any state symbols on uniforms so-called "Little Green Men" invaded and occupied key strategic locations before being controlled by Ukrainian militants and law enforcement forces. At the same time, Russian minorities living in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions backed by the Kremlin declared independence and started a separatist war against Ukraine. The "soft containment strategy" of the EU was also ineffective. Besides the fact that, by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 as a result of which OSCE-based security norms and principles collapsed, some leaders of leading EU countries considered that Russia was too big a country for isolation and punishment. They believed that political dialogue and moderate economic sanctions were the best tools to deter Russia (Kramer, 2017, p. 23). Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, was convinced that Russia was an important strategic partner for the EU in energy trade, and investment and so integrated into the international economic system that the Euro-Atlantic community would tolerate "Russia's legitimate aspirations for spheres of influence". But the visions of each side were wrong and exaggerated. On the one hand, a soft containment strategy and 'low voltage' economic sanctions could not deter the Russian aggression, the result of which turned out to be a military invasion of Ukraine by Russian military forces on February 24, 2022, and the start of a full-scale aggressive war.

However, surprisingly, West reacted unanimously and without compromise. In response to the aggression, the Euro-Atlantic states and their partners and international institutions cut off bilateral and multilateral political and economic relations, imposed total sanctions and suspended or excluded Russia's voting rights and even membership in international organisations. The tough and collective response from the West dispelled the illusion in the Kremlin that its other aggression would go unpunished. Subsequently, decades-long bilateral and multilateral relations between Russia and Western countries have collapsed in economic, political, military, strategic, and cultural fields. It can be said that relations and the index of trust between Russia and the West have fallen to the pre-1991 level. Officially in the Kremlin, the war is called a 'Special Military Operation", and its main goal is to prevent unknown threats from Ukraine (for example, neo-Nazism in Ukraine, Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientation, which was declared an existential threat to Russia, etc.). But it is a fact that Russia's strategic goal is to capture Ukrainian territories, especially the littoral regions of the Black and Azov Sea, the right bank of river Dnipro with its delta, and the city Kherson. If it acquires these territories, Russia would expand its borders to the west and will create a so-called buffer zone with respect to NATO. In addition, the above-mentioned areas are rich in industrial and rural resources and a present land bridge to the strategically important Crimea peninsula. At the meeting with the Defense Board of RF on 21 December 2022, RF Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu reported to President Vladimir Putin that "the Sea of Azov has again become

Russia's internal sea as it was during 300 years of our national history" (Putin P. o., 2022). If Russia succeeds and Ukraine loses strategically important Eastern regions and coastline, Ukraine would become an economically poor and geopolitically insignificant landlocked country.

NEW CONFRONTATION LINES AND REMAKE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

In total, the large-scale war in Ukraine put an end to the liberal international order based on collective institutions, norms, and principles established in 1991. Over the past 30 years, the European continent has faced one of the most acute crises, which has already led to significant changes and will continue to drive transformation. Observing current military and political events in the Black Sea region and generally in the Euro-Atlantic region, it is possible to figure out some important ongoing and expected transformations. Firstly, it should be mentioned that the era of partnership based on norms and institutions between Russia and Western countries in the field of European security is over. The primacy of power and new confrontation lines in the European region have returned. On 1 December 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced at a press conference in Moscow dedicated to European Security issues that the old relations with the West will no longer be restored. He accused the West of creating new lines of confrontation and trying to hide the OSCE. 'If or when, at some point in time, our western neneighborsnd our former partners suddenly become interested in resuming joint work on European security, it will not happen. That would mean going back to what we had before, but there would be no business as usual. ' (MFA of the Russian Federation, 2022). On 11 December 2022 Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia and the West 'have already arrived at a station named 'Confrontation', and we (Russians) have to be reserved, strong, to have underlying strength because we will have to live in the environment of this confrontation' (TASS, 2022). The second significant change is the emergency enlargement of NATO. The neutral states of the northern European region - Sweden and Finland, joined the alliance. As a result, NATO came close to Russia,'s northern borders of Russia and the balance of power in the Baltic Sea shifted in favour of NATO. Finish Prime Minister Sana Marine during her speech in Sydney (Australia) said that until Russia invaded Ukraine, Finland's priorities had to work bilateral relations with Russia and be close NATO partners, but not be a member. That was the best way to protect our nation." But after Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February, the priority of most Finns changed 'overnight' to security (Sullivan, 2022). Third, it should be emphasized that since the end of the Cold War, Europe and the world have never been so close to the threat of using nuclear weapons. Naturally, this circumstance will significantly change the security policy of Europe after the war and will continue to seek more nuclear security guarantees from Russia. Fourth, for the first time during its existence, along with normative power, the European Union acquire Smart Power

tools that are significantly transformative. Immediately after Russia began its war of aggression against Ukraine, the European Union announced that it would provide weapons to Ukraine through a new financing instrument, the European Peace Facility (EPF), marking the first time in EU history that the bloc provided lethal weaponry. Over the past six months, the EU has provided €2.5 billion to Ukraine through the EPF for arms and equipment (Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, Jacob Zack, 2022). In November 2022 the European Union launched a Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) to continue supporting Ukraine against the ongoing Russian war of aggression. The Council is launching today the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) to continue supporting Ukraine against the ongoing Russian war of aggression. The purpose of the mission, formally established on 17 October, is to enhance the military capability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to allow them to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders (Council, 2022). Fifth, the war accelerated the granting of the EU membership candidate status to the two countries of the so-called "Eastern Trio" - Ukraine and Moldova. What about the third member of Trio due to the oligarchic regime, Georgia, which was once advanced in reforms, was given a deadline and the so-called homework of de-oligarchizing and carrying out relevant reforms, as a result of which the issue will again be on the agenda. Sixth, the strategic importance of the Black Sea in the global economy was highlighted, especially in terms of providing Africa and South East Asia with cereals and providing an alternative energy corridor for Europe;

Moreover, there is no doubt that European security will be in a dynamic transformation mode in the coming decade. In parallel with NATO, the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) will be strengthened and enhanced. In June 2022, Denmark has already decided to become part of the CSDP through a referendum. Copenhagen official had previously refrained from cooperating with European partners in this direction. European countries in Russia's neighbourhood are already actively lobbying to increase defence spending and strengthen Europe's defense potential. During the visit to Kyiv 28 November 2022 Foreign Minister of Estonia called on its Europen partners to double their defence expenditure. "We would like to see European countries double their defense expenditure in the time of the Ukrainian war and after the war, and we are going to spend 3% of our GDP on national defense (Balmforth, 2022). Essentially, Moscow will also take retaliatory measures, creating new locked circles of mistrust and confrontation in the region. The area of clashes will remain the Black Sea region. Also, if the economic relations which are reduced by all-encompassing sanctions remain at the same poor level, it will be a factor of deepened confrontation between parties because both sides would have less reason to avoid escalation.

One of the important challenges to European security after the war would be gaining full energy independence from Russia. To complete this task, it is important to devel-

op alternative energy supply corridors. Presumably, in the energy balance of the European Union Russian oil and gas will be largely replaced by Azerbaijani and Central Asian (Kazakh-Turkmen) oil and gas, which would automatically increase the geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus-Black Sea Corridor, and its transit capacity, which was being built as an alternative corridor despite Russia's opposition for decades. The potential of the South Caucasus region to become a primary energy transit corridor for the EU may become the basis for the transformation of the European Union via enlargement to the east. With Georgia's accession to the EU, the European Union will acquire its own Trans-Caspian European Corridor for the transportation of Caspian oil and natural gas, as well as cargo from Central Asia, Iran (when its nuclear problem will be resolved in similar or more sophisticated forms than in 2015 and Iranian oil and gas will return to the world market) and China. Thus, in the new geopolitical reality, Georgia has a real chance to get EU and NATO membership.

Russia's aggression war against Ukraine increased the role of the United States in the security of European countries. This trend will continue in the following years because the US remains the only superpower with the military and economic capacity to deter Russia and ensure the security Euro-Atlantic community. Some European leaders admit that Europe is not strong enough without the United States. Finish Prime Minister Sana Marine during an address to the Lowy Institute, in Sydney, Friday 2 December 2022 stated that "we (Europeans) would be in trouble without the United States" (Sullivan, 2022) Facts and figures show (see the statistic data below, figure 1,2,3) that during wartime the United States provided much more effective and expensive military aid to Ukraine than the rest of the NATO countries. Moreover, the US has two advantages. First, it has the capacity to provide significant and decisive military assistance alone. Such a huge amount of military aid gives significant advantages to those involved in armed conflict. Second, the decision on military assistance is made only by the government of one state (by President and Congress), in contrast to collective organisations such as NATO or the European Union, where the provision of similar assistance depends on a collective decision, which can be interrupted due to a different opinion of one state.

Presumably, the participation of the United States in the Black Sea region will be even more active, especially in the matter of strengthening the security of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova and joining the Euro-Atlantic structures. On 7 December 2022, the Senate and House of Representatives of the US enacted a Bill (initiated by Senator Shaheen and Romney) named the "Black Sea Security Act of 2022" (S. 4509) where the US declared its strategic interests and policy aims regarding the Black Sea region. The bill clearly declares that:
- It is in the interest of the United States to support efforts to prevent the spread of further armed conflict in Europe by recognising the Black Sea region as an arena of Russian aggression;

- Littoral states of the Black Sea are critical in countering aggression by the Government of the Russian Federation and contributing to the collective security of NATO;
- The repeated, illegal, unprovoked, and violent attempts of the Russian Federation to expand its territory and control access to the Mediterranean Sea through the Black Sea constitutes a threat to the national security of the United States and NATO;
- The United States should continue to work within NATO and with NATO Allies to develop a long-term strategy to enhance security, establish a permanent, sustainable presence along NATO's eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of its allies and partners in the region;
- The United States should work within NATO and with NATO Allies to develop a regular, rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea;
- The United States should also work with the European Union in coordinating a strategy to support democratic initiatives and economic prosperity in the region, which includes two European Union members and four European Union aspirant nations (Congress, 2022);

Regarding the declared interest, the Senate and the Representative House proposed several subsequent measures:

1. Actively deter the threat of Russia's further escalation in the Black Sea region and defend the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea to prevent the spread of further armed conflict in Europe;
2. advocate within NATO, among NATO allies, and within the European Union to develop a long-term coordinated strategy to enhance security, establish a permanent, sustainable presence in the eastern flank, and bolster the democratic resilience of United States allies and partners in the region;
3. advocate within NATO and among NATO Allies to develop a regular, rotational maritime presence in the Black Sea;
4. support and bolster the economic ties between the United States and Black Sea partners and mobilise the Department of State, the Department of DefenseDefence, and other relevant Federal departments and agencies by enhancing the United States presence and investment in Black Sea states;
5. provide economic alternatives to the PRC's coercive economic options that destabilise and further erode the states of the economic integration of the Black Sea states;
6. ensure that the United States continues to support Black Sea states' efforts to strengthen their democratic institutions to prevent corruption and accelerate their advancement into the Euro-Atlantic community; and
7. Encourage the initiative undertaken by central and eastern European states to advance the Three Seas Initiative to strengthen transport, energy, and digital in-

frastructure connectivity in the region between the Adriatic Sea, Baltic Sea, and Black Sea (Congress, 2022).

It should be noted that Washington played a similar role for Central European countries in the 1990s and early 2000s. "Our nations are deeply indebted to the United States. Many of us know first-hand how important your support for our freedom and independence was during the dark Cold War years. U.S. engagement and support were essential for the success of our democratic transitions after the Iron Curtain fell twenty years ago. Without Washington's vision and leadership, it is doubtful that we would be in NATO and even the EU today" (Valdas Adamkus, Martin Butora, Emil Constantinescu, Pavol Demes, Lubos Dobrovsky, Matyas Eorsi, Istvan Gyarmati, Vaclav Havel, Rastislav Kacer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel Schwarzenberg, Michal Kovac, Ivan Krastev, Alexander Kwasniewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, 2009). This text was part of an open letter sent by Central and Eastern European (CEE) intellectuals and former policymakers to the Obama Administration in 2009. All in all, it is clear fact that after Barak Obama and Donald Trump created the illusion that the American Era is Over. But Joe Biden successfully realised that his 'America is Back" by enhancing the US role in the security of the Euro-Atlantic region;

Simultaneously to the military and political rivalries, the lines of ideological confrontation will be clear and sharp. This is already clearly demonstrated by the messages of the representatives of the highest political elite of Russia. At the Defense Board of RF meeting on 21 December 2022 President Vladimir Putin stated that 'Russians have always wanted to be part of the so-called civilised world. 'After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which we (Russians) ourselves allowed to take place, we thought for some reason that we would become part of that so-called civilised world any day. But it turned out that nobody wanted this to happen, despite our efforts and attempts, and this also concerns my efforts, because I made these attempts too. We tried to become closer, to become part of that world. But to no avail... According to this speech delivered by Putin, there were two or several "worlds". One is civilized where Russia was not allowed, and there is another that probably will emerge under Russia's leadership and would be an alternative to the civilised world. In addition, Vladimir Putin blamed Western countries for attempting of maintaining the "brainwashing of the citizens of Ukraine and stimulating the neo-Nazi and extremely nationalistic ideology among Ukrainians. It became clear back then that a clash with these forces, including in Ukraine, was inevitable, the only question was when would it happens" (Putin P. o., 2022).

CONCLUSION

Thus, after the end of the Cold War, the formation of an inclusive security system could not take place between the West and Russia. Although both M. Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin tried to integrate into civil society to form a European security system based on institutions, norms, and principles that a large part of the Russian

military-political establishment was still inspired by the primacy of force, the preservation of buffer zones and spheres of influence, which even during the collapse of the USSR, the Kremlin showed toward the newly emerging independent states in the neighbourhood, when through military-political intervention, sovereignty, and territorial integrity created existential threats. Observing the situation, a large part of the Euro-Atlantic community, as well as the former Soviet and socialist states, were convinced that the desire to return to the united European family and the attempt to integrate into the civilised world would lead to more or less internal political destabilisation, preservation of territorial integrity, and it was due to the integration into the global economic system and the overcoming of the acute economic crisis and the gain of time. Economically advanced Russia would return to the primacy of power (and did return) and would like to revise the post-bipolar order created in the region. Taking into account the mentioned reality, the Euro-Atlantic community based the European security system mainly on the institutions of the Cold War period (NATO, European Union), because the Security and Cooperation Organisation created in Europe at the end of the Cold War did not have the appropriate resources to deal effectively with the challenges. Basing the European security system on the Euro-Atlantic structures, their expansion to the east and the inclusion of the countries of Russia's neighbourhood in it led to a conflict with Russia inspired by the return of its lost influence on the international arena, which led to the collapse of the European quasi-security system based on the OSCE, the return of confrontational lines in the region, and the necessity of Euro-Atlantic order transformation.

Figure 1. Government support to Ukraine - by type of assistance, € billion. Bilateral commitments January 24 to August 3, 2022.


Source: Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Rebinskaya, E., E & Trebesch, C.(2022) ."The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?". Kiel Working Paper, No. 2218.

Figure 2. Military aid (including financial) in €billion (top 20 of 40 donors) Bilateral commitments January 24 to August 3, 2022.

Source: Source: Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Rebinskaya, E., E & Trebesch, C.(2022)   ."The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?". Kiel Working Paper, No. 2218.

Figure 3. Military aid (including financial) in €billion (top 20 of 40 donors) Bilateral commitments January 24 to August 3, 2022.

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