THE FIRST APPROACH TO THE DE-BAATHIFICATION IN IRAQ: JAY GARNER'S ORHA

Andrea Cerasuolo

*University of Studies of Naples "Federico II",
Department of Political Science,
Via Leopoldo Rodinò, 22, 80138, Napoli (NA), Italy*
and.cerasuolo@gmail.com

Abstract

The purpose of this analysis is to trace and examine the onset and course of the first U.S. organization, the *Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance* (ORHA), which dealt with the de-Baathification of the Iraqi society. This essay provides an overall assessment of the reasons which led to its establishment, its goals, its strategies and also the conflicts within George W. Bush's administration which caused the abrupt replacement of ORHA with Lewis Paul Bremer's *Coalition Provisional Authority* (CPA). In the conclusions, it will be illustrated how Garner's plans could have produced more favourable outcome for the Middle Eastern country.

Key words: *Iraq, de-Baathification, Baath, USA, planning*

INTRODUCTION

The analysis contained in this document is included into what is commonly referred to as the Second Gulf War and the subsequent occupation of Iraq by the Anglo-American troops. This operation, which was referred to as *Iraqi Freedom*, was one of the products of the geopolitical vision of the new neo-conservative administration of Washington and of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. In fact, this date represented a watershed not only in the Bush administration's approach to Islamist terrorism but also towards the Iraq issue. The *containment theory* of Iraq, pursued by the previous Clinton administration, was finally abandoned and in its place was spread in all its power - and in all its approximation - the doctrine of the *preventive attack*. Since November 2001 the US military had begun to examine the first plans for a large-scale attack on Iraq.

The voices opposed to the military intervention against Saddam Hussein in the US political arena were in an unenviable position: The members of the Bush administration, even in the face of objective data indicating the inoffensiveness of the Iraqi regime for the United States, had an easy game to argue that if the military

and the intelligence community had been misled by the terrorists of the -Qaeda, then US could not be considered safe even by the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. In short, after the events of September 11th, it was only a matter of time before the US intervention against the Iraqi Ba'athist regime took place. It constituted an ideal target: its exponents seemed - or were shown - reticent or frightful to the American public opinion.

In the summer of 2002 the Iraqi government was accused by the Bush administration of violating resolution no. 687 of 3rd April 1991 of the United Nations Security Council, namely to continue in secret the production and storage of weapons of mass destruction [U.N. Security Council 1991]. When several new inspections, conducted by the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Hans Blix, seemed to refute the American theses, the Bush administration went on to accuse Saddam Hussein of supporting the terrorist network of al-Qaeda. Then it was argued that in the 21st century there should not have been more space in the world for a tyrannical regime like the Iraqi one and that the export of democracy in the Middle East country was one of the duties of the United States [Redaelli, Plebani 2012: 128]. By then, Iraq was fully enrolled in the countries - along with Iran and North Korea, which constituted the axis of evil.

Finally, despite the lack of a UN authorization in this regard, the United States and its British ally decided to act on their own. In the night between March 19th and 20th, 2003, began the operation *Iraqi Freedom* that brought in less than a month after the capture of Baghdad and the fall of the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein. The major US war manoeuvres appeared to be *by the book*: the technological and air superiority of the allies had reduced their victims to a minimum. On May 1st, President Bush on the deck of the aircraft carrier *Abraham Lincoln*, decorated for the occasion with a huge banner bearing the words *Mission Accomplished*, thanked the troops for the successful endeavour.

Despite the triumphal rhetoric of the first weeks after the second Gulf conflict, there were several members of the US administration who had questioned about Iraq's post-war planning. Strong concerns were expressed in several forms by many Iraqis on the issue of the dismantling of the Saddam Hussein's power system and the Ba'ath party: many feared an emptiness of power and the retaliations of the former *ra'is*' supporters.

In this context the analysis of the institution and of the work carried out by the ORHA, a body set up to supervise the post-war Iraqi management, arises.

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1. The setting up of the ORHA

The days which followed the collapse of the Iraqi regime were characterized by the substantial lack of US post-war planning. Unlike the main military operations of the *Iraqi Freedom* campaign, the highest military hierarchies in the United States had neglected the organization of the military occupation of Iraq. Consequently, the situation on the ground soon began to slip away: mass looting, which had begun after the fall of Baghdad, continued for several days after the official end of hostilities [Ricks 2006:176-179]. On several occasions US soldiers requested instructions from their superiors and received an order not to interfere. Many thought that it was only the signs of a natural, however immoderate, euphoria at

the end of a despotic regime. In fact, things were much more complicated than they seemed in the eyes of the US military, who were looking inert at the unleashing of chaos.

Disorganization did not only affect aspects of public order. Among the civil and military leaders of Iraq's post-war planning there were misunderstandings and underlying uncertainties about the post-Saddam Iraq structure. This diversity of views within the US administration contributed to the lack of a rapid response to the problems which the Middle Eastern country was facing. At first, the idea was that of a rapid handover of powers to a hypothetical provisional government made up of members belonging to all opposition to the former *ra'is*. This provisional government should have been supported, besides the US military command, by an organization for the reconstruction of the country: it was the ORHA, the *Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance*, which would be led by the retired three-star general Jay Garner.

The first strategic considerations for the final attack on Saddam Hussein's regime date back at least to November 2001 [Ricks 2006: 46-49], that is shortly after US had exhausted the major efforts for the invasion of Afghanistan. Initially, the planning of the occupation of Iraq, as well as the implementation of the plans for the invasion, was entrusted to CENTCOM, the US strategic command which deals with military operations in the Middle East and North Africa. Subsequently, however, the post-war organization passed to Pentagon-based officials closely linked to the Defence Secretary's office.

Partly as a result of these changes, on January the 20th 2003, the White House instituted a post-war planning office at the Pentagon - the ORHA - with a confidential document: that is with a presidential directive on national security [Ricks 2006: 101; Bensahel et al. 2008: 53-55].

General Garner was contacted in mid-January 2003 [Chandrasekaran 2010: 31]: he was suggested to be the head of the governing body that would direct post-war operations in Iraq. The programs, which were presented to him, mainly concerned humanitarian assistance operations for the civilian population. The Undersecretary of Defence for Political Affairs proposed to the former General a commitment that would not have been more than ninety days: it was thought that at the end of that time there would have been an Iraqi government and diplomatic relations between the USA and Iraq would have been normalizing [Chandrasekaran 2010: 31]. Garner seemed to be the ideal candidate for that particular task given that in 1991 he had conducted the *Provide Comfort* operation to procure protection and humanitarian assistance to the Kurds in the north-east of Iraq exposed to regime reprisals [Ricks 2006: 101].

At the beginning of his new assignment at the Pentagon, the head dell'ORHA, had neither staff nor plans. Garner recruited personnel from his former colleagues, mostly retired generals like him; in the following weeks his working group was strengthened with several reservists of the armed forces, others came from the US agency for international development - the USAID - and from other federal government teams [Chandrasekaran 2010: 31]. The State Department, in particular, helped to swell the ranks of ORHA by sending some of its diplomats [Chandrasekaran 2010: 31].

The expectations that the creation of this office had collected, however, were for the most part disappointed. In retrospect, Conrad Crane, a US military historian who studied the planning stages of the second Gulf conflict, came to the conclusion that

the establishment of ORHA *created even more confusion* [Ricks 2006: 102]. Moreover, it must be noted, as other authors have done, that this office was created just over two months before the beginning of hostilities so that its efforts were late and in many cases proved useless. In addition to that, ORHA personnel soon discovered that several administrative and bureaucratic issues which were needed to set up their organization left little time to deal with substantive issues and long-term planning [Bensahel et al. 2008: XXI]. Finally, it should be noted that the new body seemed to be a duplication of already existing military organizations: this ended up creating discontent and confusion within CENTCOM, the military command that would also have to deal with the Iraqi post-war theatre, which had already developed its own plans to manage the transition period [Bensahel et al. 2008: 101-102].

In fact, it was not just the military that worried about the effectiveness of this new office. James Dobbins, a nation-building expert and government consultant for the post-war Iraqi reconstruction phase, argued that the decision to transfer the civilian aspects of reconstruction from the State Department to the Pentagon imposed huge financial and organizational costs on the US administration. In fact, the Department of Defence did not manage similar situations for at least fifty years while the State Department had gained considerable experience in that field during the previous decade [Hashim 2006: 292].

Despite the previous considerations, Garner was a prominent figure among those who revolved around Iraq's post-war planning. Ultimately, the occupation of the former general was to foresee all the possible problems that could have occurred during what the US military had designated as *Phase IV*, or what should have been done after overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein.

As regards the research topic of this analysis, it can be argued with a good degree of precision that already in the first half of March 2003 the ORHA had developed a de-Baathification approach different from the one that would be used by the organization that succeeded it, the CPA – *Coalition Provisional Authority*. On March 15th, a few days before the start of hostilities, during a meeting with the Secretary of Defence, the head of ORHA set out his plans concerning de-Baathification: it would have been a practical approach based on Iraqis' taking on responsibility. The intention was to dismiss the highest member of Ba'ath party and the chief of staff in each governmental and administrative office [Ricks 2006: 128]. More generally, as regards the rest of the highest members of the Ba'ath party, the ORHA designed two possible scenarios: the Iraqis, now sure not to be subjected to any reprisal due to the presence of US troops, would have ostracized or eliminated the most hated exponents of that party or, over time, would have reported them to the occupation forces [Ricks 2006: 128]. The Department of Defence seemed to take this line of action with the notation that an organic policy on the subject would then be established along with other US institutions [Ricks 2006: 128].

From the previous passage it can be already sensed the uncertainty regarding the de-Baathification policies that characterized the upper echelons of the United States. In fact, the ORHA was the body responsible for civilian operations in post-Saddam Iraq and yet, no more than five days before the start of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, the summits of the DOD admitted that in the US government an organic and shared approach to the issue and on the de-Baathification did not exist.

2. The debate on de-Baathification within the Bush administration

In fact, even before the mid-March, the debate on the treatment to be given to members of the Iraqi Ba'ath party had been animated. On March the 10th , a meeting of the *National Security Council* was held in which the various aspects of the future de-Baathification campaign were taken into consideration [Pfiffner 2010: 78]. The documents presented to President Bush during this meeting were the synthesis of two different and sometimes opposing positions on the de-Baathification that had developed within the two departments most involved in planning the US military intervention in Iraq: the Department of State and the Department of Defence.

In the previous months, in fact, there had been a lively debate between the Pentagon and the State Department. The latter advocated a policy of *de-saddamification.* This should have led to the removal from positions of public responsibility of two types of Ba'athists: those who had been guilty of crimes against humanity - in particular the creators and perpetrators of the repressions and embezzlement which the various ethnic groups of Iraq had endured under the Saddam's regime - and those who were at the top of the command structures [Pfiffner 2010: 76]. The CIA agreed with this approach [Pfiffner 2010: 77]. Among Iraqi exiles, this approach was supported by the *Iraq National Accord*, a grouping of secular and liberal-inspired exiles and dissidents, under the leadership of Iyad Allawi and other groups of liberals who clustered around the figure of Adnan al-Pachachi [Allawi 2007: 147], who had been foreign minister for Iraq during the 1960s and then took refuge abroad under the regime of Saddam Hussein.

The Department of Defence, on the other hand, pushed for a broader approach to the issue. In particular, DOD supported the need for deeper purges and the prohibition also for ordinary members of the party to maintain their positions in the highest levels of public administration [Chandrasekaran 2010: 76-77]. The Pentagon's approach to de-Baathification inspired the Vice Presidency's sympathies [Chandrasekaran 2010: 77]. Supporters of the method proposed by the leaders of the Pentagon were also members of the *Iraq National Congress* led by Ahmed Chalabi, the famous and controversial Iraqi exile, and Shiite Islamist parties [Allawi 2007: 147]. The position of Kurdish parties was ambivalent: they placed a certain rhetorical emphasis on de-Baathification but were prepared to recognize many extenuating circumstances for the various categories of Ba'athists in order to enjoy freedom of manoeuvre with the Sunni political groups in view of negotiations for greater autonomy of the Kurdish regions [Allawi 2007: 147].

In addition to that, Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi, another prominent Iraqi exile who held several departments both in the *Iraqi Governing Council* and in the subsequent transitional government, argues that among the folds of the projects drawn up by the Department of Defence there were proposals for action even harder against the Ba'ath party and its members: de-Baathification policies would have had to completely eradicate all structures and vestiges of the Ba'athist action in Iraqi society [Allawi 2007: 152].

During the abovementioned meeting of the *National Security Council* a compromise was reached: the highest ranking members of the Ba'ath party - about 1% of its members - would have been dismissed from any government office. All the others party members would have been subjected to *a process of truth and reconciliation* in the South African style [Chandrasekaran 2010: 77]. In any case, it was necessary to

demonstrate to the Iraqis that Saddam Hussein's power had vanished by politically neutralizing the chief exponents of the Ba'ath party [Pfiffner 2010: 78].

Therefore, the approach to the policies for de-Baathification agreed in the meeting of the *National Security Council* on March the 10th was not very different from the plan that the chief of ORHA would have presented in a few days to the head of the Department of Defence. The previous paragraphs were used to emphasize that within George W. Bush's administration there was not that unity of purpose whose image the president was trying to project outwards. A further proof of what was written took place in the aforementioned meeting between the officials of Defence and ORHA on March the 15th: at that time, DOD objections were not about the plans set up by the ORHA but regarding the personnel used by that organization to carry them out. The Department of Defence argued that it would be preferable to have its own employees in the ranks of ORHA and those who came from the State Department were considered *intruders* [Ricks 2006; 128].

The Pentagon was not the only one to sponsor the staff of its department for the ORHA: both the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and his deputy, Richard Armitage, urged that as many people as possible of their confidence join the new office for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. The two highest people in charge, after President Bush, of US foreign policy, considered the presence of diplomatic experts and Middle Eastern specialists fluent in Arabic within ORHA as a shelter against attempts to deliver post-war planning to Chalabi and his group of exiles who were considered unreliable by the State Department and the CIA. These two institutions considered essential involving in the creation of a transitional government that Iraqis who, although hostile in different degrees to the regime, had not moved away from their country [Chandrasekaran 2010: 34-35]. Several officials of the Department of Defence, on the other hand, were of the opinion that the *old-school* arabists of the State Department were looking for excuses to justify their opinion that within the Arab-Muslim world a Western-style democracy could have not been developed [Chandrasekaran 2010: 34-35].

It must be clear from now on that the difference of views summarized above did not represent an academic dispute about the nature of the Arab world but had important political repercussions on the entire US strategy of the *war on terror*. One of the most recurrent topics for justifying the war in Iraq and increasing both domestic and international consensus in this operation was the *export of democracy*. It served as a theoretical framework for intervention against Saddam Hussein's regime: it ideologically covered the information leaked on Iraqi regime's weapons of mass destruction and his alleged links to al-Qaeda.

One of the practical consequences of this approach and rhetoric was that of believing those who envisaged a relatively peaceful transition after the end of the main military operations. The *Iraq National Congress*, led by Chalabi, actually, ensured just that: it argued that the majority of Iraqis would welcome the US intervention as well as provide unpublished details on the weapons of mass destruction development program [Ricks 2006: 73-75]. Moreover, as already mentioned, the heads of the Department of Defence, who entertained the idea of a transition without jolts in a short time, believed that the network of informers and supporters constituted by the *Iraq National Congress*, with the precious US support, could quickly become a stable government to entrust the management of current Iraqi affairs leaving the United States the only task of planning a rapid withdrawal of troops from the Middle Eastern country. This approach was aimed to an

occupation - and a war - *aseptic*. Some sources report that within the Department of Defence there had already formed a front determined to designate the head of the *Iraq National Congress*, Chalabi, as president of the reconstituting Iraqi state [Ricks 2006: 127].

It can certainly be affirmed that the leaders of some of the United States executive bodies exploited the *wishful thinking* of some organizations of Iraqi exiles as a crowbar to force the most recalcitrant members of the administration endorsing their plans for a decisive change in strategy: a confident interventionist policy in the Middle East supported by the belief that political and social obstacles would have been negligible. This key to the events immediately preceding and following the second Gulf war makes it possible to understand why anyone who raises doubts about the information provided and about the plans proposed by the *Iraq National Congress* - such as the extensive approach to de-Baathification - were unwelcome to those who within the Bush administration were favourable of a completely offensive US posture in foreign policy: each attack on these plans was regarded as an attack against the prospect of *exporting democracy* and, consequently, against the *war on terror*. Anyone who expressed doubts about the measures proposed by the *Iraq National Congress* was labelled as a supporter of the *status quo*: the implication was that the international *status quo* had led to the events of the 9/11.

With these premises it is not surprising, therefore, that even after March the 10th, the proponents of the hard approach to de-Baathification have not given up. The Pentagon, above all, enjoyed an undoubted advantage over the *rivals* of the State Department and the CIA: the technical aspects of de-Baathification were managed by the *Special Plans Office* headed by Douglas Feith, who was one of the most avid supporters of extensive de-Baathification and worked closely with the leader of the *Iraq National Congress*, Ahmed Chalabi [Chandrasekaran 2010: 77; Pfiffner 2010: 78].

In fact, Garner stated on several occasions that the collaboration with Faith's office had been problematic. The former three-star general claimed that he had never received plans drawn up by the Undersecretary of Defence and his team. Moreover, the maximum exponent of the *Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance* stated to ignore that the *Office of Special Plans* was working on the Iraqi post-war planning even after the establishment of ORHA. He became aware of the activities of this office only ten days after arriving in Baghdad.

Essentially, the *Office for Special Plans* was actively involved in the design of three types of operations. The first type can be considered a continuation of the debate on de-Baathification: the *Office* was looking for the best way to purge as quickly as possible the followers of the Ba'ath Party out of the state administration. The second core of studies and planning concerned *dealing* with the Iraqi armed forces once hostilities ended. The third concern seemed to be to find the best way to include those Iraqi exiles who had helped supporting the Bush administration's positions as national leaders in the process of rebuilding Iraqi institutions [Chandrasekaran 2010: 32].

In addition to that, ORHA did not receive numerous volumes containing plans and memoranda produced by the State Department, the CIA and the National Defense University - an articulation of the Pentagon [Chandrasekaran 2010: 32]. Ignoring the existence of such researches, ORHA's officials had requested on several occasions at the *Office for Special Plans* copies of any document that might have been useful for post-war planning. From the sources it can be learned that this

office communicated to ORHA that there was nothing useful for these purposes and urged the ORHA to independently develop its own plans [Chandrasekaran 2010: 32].

In light of what has been reported so far, it is clear that the ORHA had to clash daily with many organizational difficulties and, in some aspects of its administrative action, was forced to fly blindly by the behaviour of other actors within the US executive.

Several further choices proved unsuccessful for the ORHA. It was decided to divide the planning work according to three functional guidelines: humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and civil administration. Both because of his past experience in Iraq and because of some threatening UN alarms on the risk of epidemics, hunger and evacuation of large sections of population from his habitual accommodation, the attention of Garner and his closest collaborators was centred on the aspects of planning that aimed to avert possible humanitarian crises. Plans to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure were entrusted to the USAID personnel within ORHA. Finally, responsibility for the planning aspects which would have affected the civil administration were entrusted to Michael Mobbs. An *unfortunate choice* given that Mobbs had close ties to some members of the Bush administration, in particular with the Undersecretary of Defence, Douglas Feith [Chandrasekaran 2010: 33], with whom he shared the same vision as regards the de-Baathification process. In fact, Mobbs in the first weeks after the official end of hostilities managed to direct up to eleven of the twenty-three Iraqi ministries [The Guardian, 4.4.2003]: a position that allowed him to have almost absolute control over the application of the first provisions for de-Baathification in those departments.

2.3 The action of ORHA in Iraqi theatre

In addition to the delays, omissions and mistakes in planning, the ORHA settlement in Baghdad was not timely: it happened only twelve days after US troops had finally conquered the city. The high command of military operations did not allow ORHA personnel to leave Kuwait for security reasons at least until April the 21st: there was no insistence because Garner and his team imagined that the Iraqi capital and its *command and control structures* had been severely tested by the events of war and by the massive wave of looting that had occurred after the fall of the city on April 9th [Galbraith 2006: 114; Chandrasekaran 2010: 45].

In the following days, the ORHA tried to buffer the critical points as best it could but the discontent for how the situation on the field was managed increased day by day. Several authors seem to share a common opinion about the retired general and his group: well-meaning people but unable to achieve the goals that had been set [Hashim 2006: 295; Galbraith 2006: 117]. A British diplomatic source claimed that extraordinary chaos reigned in the organization led by Garner: in his view, there was no clear line of action, no apparent strategy, no coordination, deficient structures, and its offices were practically inaccessible to a common Iraqi citizen [Galbraith 2006: 117].

According to another source, the limited effectiveness of ORHA in preparing quick and concrete responses to the needs of the Iraqi population and its administrative apparatus was also due to the lack of human resources. As an example, it is reported that among the ranks of a staff which numbered between six and eight hundred units there were only seventeen members who spoke fluently Arabic and

even less experts of the country where ORHA was operating [Hashim 2006: 294-295].

Other sources express a less negative judgment on action of ORHA, although they do not hesitate to highlight the relevant administrative and political limits of this organization. Ali Allawi, minister in the *Government Council* and then in the Iraqi interim government, argues that the charges of incompetence addressed to ORHA were unfair defamations that did not take into account the general situation of the country in which the organization operated [Allawi 2007: XVIII].

Trying to find a synthesis between the abovementioned judgments, it can be said that even if ORHA failed in its objectives of humanitarian assistance and first political reconciliation, it cannot be held responsible for the dissolution of Iraqi police forces in the days immediately following the end of hostilities. or because the American troops were not trained to maintain law and order [Hashim 2006: 292-293].

Regarding de-Baathification, the ORHA tried not to deviate from the plans agreed with the heads of the Department of Defence in the meeting of March 15th. On the contrary, his approach was based even more on *laisser faire*. According to some sources, the head of ORHA had sent a precise directive to all his staff: it was necessary to let the Iraqis decide for themselves which way to go for de-Baathification whether the population killed the members of the Baath party or asked for their removal from political and administrative life [Ricks 2006: 187]. In addition to that, ORHA's staff in the days following their settlement in Baghdad worked closely with the highest ranking employees, among whom without doubt there were many Ba'athists, in order to restart Iraqi public administration [Galbraith 2006: 120; Ricks 2006: 182].

Despite the efforts of the ORHA, in late April the top management of the Bush administration decided to end its activities [Galbraith 2006: 117; Chandrasekaran 2010: 60]: the President had decided to set up a new body - the *Coalition Provisional Authority* - that would be led by a former diplomat, Lewis Paul Bremer III, with the title of *presidential envoy* [Chandrasekaran 2010: 60; Ricks 2006: 182]. The ORHA continued to operate for just over a week, after which the remaining activities were suspended.

Garner, during his communications with the summits of the US administration, had made it clear that he would remain in Iraq until early July to assist the efforts of the future head of the *Coalition Provisional Authority*, Bremer. Actually, from the available sources, it is understood that the high officials of the *Provisional Authority* never expressed particular appreciation for the collaboration offered by the heads of the ORHA. This cohabitation did not last long: well before July, Garner and his collaborators returned to the United States [Ricks 2006: 186]. In fact, the head of the now dissolved *Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance* for Iraq returned to the United States at the beginning of June, a month earlier than expected [Ricks 2006: 196].

According to the available sources, before resuming his private affairs, Garner was received by President Bush who repeatedly stressed that the choice of rapid change of strategy in Iraq had been strongly supported and finally obtained by the heads of the Department of Defence [Ricks 2006: 196].

CONCLUSIONS

From what has been written, it can be inferred that ORHA almost immediately operated in an uncooperative and hostile environment: at the time of its establishment within the US administration there was no precise picture on what should be the strategy to be applied to the de-Baathification of Iraqi society. Moreover, although ORHA was established with the aim of defining organic plans for de-Baathification, its action in this sense was hindered in various ways by other organisms of the US government. Political rivalries and ideological differences in addition to the many interests that were represented by the composite front of the Iraqi opposition in exile led to a substantial lack of support for the newly established organism.

The creation of ORHA appears to be a compromise between the more extreme and the more pragmatic wing within the US administration regarding the position to be taken for de-Baathification. However, the proponents of an extensive approach, and especially the Department of Defence and the Office of the Vice-President, continued to work to hinder the work of ORHA, thus paving the way for an extensive approach to de-Baathification. These actions led to a success: the ORHA was the dismantling and the *Coalition Provisional Authority* was establishment which reversed the policies followed so far in the matter of de-Baathification. This was also done because it was intended above all to demonstrate that the export of democracy proceeded swiftly and that the plans of the neoconservative administration advanced without hindrances.

It can be concluded that the work of ORHA was undermined by the US administration itself. In fact, as reported by one of the available sources, when Garner told some members of his team that he felt the full weight of his failure, one of them replied that the ORHA had been founded to fail [Chandrasekaran 2010: 60].

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