

# UKRAINE BETWEEN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY'S VISION

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## **Abstract**

In the article a problem of positioning of Ukraine between Europe and Russia in Mykhailo Hrushevsky's creative heritage has been investigated. The scholar's emotionality in historiographic and politological discourses that became sensibly manifested when he put the question of the Ukrainians' geopolitical interest on axiologic lines „the friend – the foe” is particularly specified. In that case, on the contrary to his repeatedly declared pro-western orientation, M. Hrushevsky's sympathies were often at the side of the Russian neighbour. The fact that such ambivalence was characteristic to Ukrainian humanitarian studies and political thought not only of the 20th century, but elsewhere in Ukrainian historical time is pointed out. The aforementioned fact activates the continuation of the research of the problem „Ukraine between Europe and Russia” in wider chronological and thematic contexts.

**Key words:** *M. Hrushevsky, Ukraine, Russia, Europe, geopolitics*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The thesis about Ukraine as an original „Middle-world” between Europe and Russia has been firstly substantiated by Ukrainian romanticists in the mid 19th century and since then it remains one of the most discussed theses among historians and political scientists [Kutsyi 2016: 89-184]. Thus, the peaks of such discussions

always preceded periods of the attempts of Russian governments of whatever colour to prevent the „drift” of Ukrainians into the western direction. The contemporary polemics in the expert environment and public space concerning the geopolitical place of Ukraine, caused by Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014 and escalation of the war in the Donbas is a vividly testimony to this. Obviously, many arguments that are popular today, were already actively used in the discussion throughout the 20th century.

In this regard, the first decades of the 20th century when Ukrainians, similarly to other „stateless” peoples of Central-East Europe, were undergoing steep processes of national establishment, are of special interest. Reacting to public demands, the leaders of Ukrainian liberation were for the first time compelled to co-ordinate their entirely intellectual designs with the severe reality of the consequences of World War I. Primarily, they had to face disintegrations of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, as well as attempts of the young Bolshevik authorities to forcefully keep national "borderlands" under their control. For the Ukrainian intelligentsia, to whom the historical circumstances in 1917, in fact, granted „independence”, that meant a psychologically painful destruction of their stereotypes and illusions which since long ago had deeply taken roots in their mentality, impelling them to emotional discussions and, as a result, making them to reconsider the geopolitical models already consecrated by the historical tradition. Eventually, as mass media issues of today allow us to conclude, similar emotions influence a part of the Ukrainian society now, which, in fact, considerably encourage an immersing investigation into the events of the previous century.

In the article the processes under consideration are attempted to be recreated through a prism of views of Mykhailo Hrushevsky<sup>1</sup>, a landmark figure of Ukrainian movement of that time. As the most authoritative Ukrainian humanitarian and historian-conceptualist, in his „History of Ukraine-Rus” for the first time he tried to find out the civilization belonging of the Ukrainians, having outlined their place on the mental map of Europe. At the same time, M. Hrushevsky was not an “armchair” scientist, but an active public and political figure. As he once told about himself, „I came into politics through history and, as for me, such a route is a normal one” [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 226]. Therefore, as a practical politician and the all-time chairman of the revived Ukrainian state’s parliament (Central Rada), M. Hrushevsky at first hand verified the suitability of historiographic models to explain quickly

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<sup>1</sup> Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934) - an outstanding Ukrainian historian, sociologist, literary critic, publicist, public and political figure. A prominent organizer of science, the founder of the Lviv and Kiev scientific schools, a member of the Ukrainian and other Slavic academies. He is the author of more than 2000 works, among them the most fundamental ones are "History of Ukraine-Rus" (10 volumes, 1898-1937) and "History of Ukrainian Literature" (6 volumes, 1923-1995). In 1886-1894 he studied at the University of Kyiv. During 1894-1914 he conducted his activity in Lviv as a professor of the Department of Ukrainian History at Lviv University, a chairman of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, and as an active public figure. After 1905 he concentrated his activity in Kyiv and St. Petersburg, becoming one of the leaders of the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire. During the First World War, he was exiled to the Russian countryside. The all-time chairman of the Central Rada (March 1917 - April 1918). In 1919-1924 he was forced to flee the country. In 1924 he was elected as an academician and returned to Kyiv, where he headed the historical institutions of VUAN. From the autumn of 1929 academic institutions headed by him were repressed by Soviet government which led to an actual exile in Moscow from March 1931. He died in Kislovodsk due to an unsuccessful surgical operation under unclear circumstances.

changing realities. It is quite possible to trace his ideological searches and spiritual evolution as typical for a whole generation of the Ukrainian intellectuals who had chanced to feel admiration caused by the birth of the Ukrainian statehood and then to test the bitterness of its loss. Eventually, the consideration of the problem „Russia – Western Europe” in M. Hrushevsky’s heritage is also important as considering considerable influence of his ideas on the East European studies in the 20th century. This will help to find out the ideological roots of many contemporary discussions of historiosophical and geopolitical character, which too often focus on the consideration of Ukraine’s place between the East and the West.

Besides, it is necessary to notice that despite of M. Hrushevsky’s great popularity among the researchers of East European intellectual history, his historiographic heritage today is much more popular than his works on Political studies. Hrushevsky-politician still remains in the shadow of Hrushevsky-historian. Although there has been written quite enough works about his concept of the national state, the civilization context of this problem still remains hardly, if ever, noticed. Therefore, this article is intended to draw attention to the originality and – somewhat – to the topicality of the scientist’s politological discourse.

## **1. HISTORIOSOPHIC REFLECTIONS AND HISTORIOGRAPHIC PRACTICE**

### **1.1. The „allied” West**

M. Hrushevsky’s scholarly works positioned in co-ordinates „Russia – Western Europe” have always been a hard problem for researchers of his heritage. On the one hand, he was a graduate of a Russian university and a sympathizer of the Slavophile ideology, and as his ideological opponents of the period of the Ukrainian revolution repeatedly confirmed, through all his life he carried „a non-cooled” love to the „fiction of federal Russia” and „inexhaustible belief in the Moscow liberal” [Mukhyn 1936: 102]. On the other hand, as the author of an original scheme of the Ukrainian historical process that broke off with traditions of state-centric school of Russian historiography of the 19th century, Hrushevsky was perceived by many Russian intellectuals as a scientist, who lacked proper diligence and who by scientific means tried to carry out an insidious political plan of disintegration of „the unique and indivisible” Russian empires with the help of financial support of the hostile to Slavic peoples Germany and Austro-Hungary. Due to these and other facts, the Russian publicism of the previous century, as well as of the contemporary one made M. Hrushevsky one of the notorious leaders of the Ukrainian „pro-Mazepa” movement<sup>2</sup>.

Not less ambiguous was the interpretation of the role of Western Europe as a civilization factor in Hrushevsky’s works. Such an ambiguity was caused by a two-dimensional measurement of the problem, that is, historiosophic and historiographic. After all, for a positivistic philosophy adherent the civilization priorities were a priori connected with the western culture. Furthermore, a considerable amount of empirical material used by M. Hrushevsky was so

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<sup>2</sup> The Mazepa movement - a disdainful label of Russian imperial propaganda used in relation to the national liberation movement of Ukrainians in the Russian empire. The term began to be used in the 18th century after Hetman Ivan Mazepa’s speech against Russian Tsar Peter I in 1709 in front of Hetman’s supporters, and later on to others suspected of disloyalty to the regime.

multifarious that often made the scholar loose carefulness and to depart from his declared theoretical positions.

So, already in the first volumes of his „History of Ukraine-Rus” (1898) M. Hrushevsky positions the Ukrainian lands as an original gate from the East to the West, which during the times of massive migrations of militant steppe hordes played the honourable role of a „visor” of western civilisation in conditions of destructive influences of steppe hordes. However, such a noble bearing of the Slavic tribes living in territory of Ukraine cost the local population too much and was never properly estimated by the neighbours:

„Throughout centuries the struggle against the steppe takes away the energy of the people, its upper class and governments. Colonization and economic worries hampered a firm establishment of both public and political relations. Having a dangerous enemy along the whole southern-eastern bordering line, the Ukrainian political organisations were not capable to hold out if in their rear, along northern-western or northern lines some stronger political organisms were formed. They fell prey of those who were better protected and situated in more advantageous circumstances neighbours. Hence, a political decline brought the expropriation of everything that made up the national means by the foreign social strata.” [Hrushevskyi 1991: 15].

Since then an uneasy history of mutual relations between the Ukrainian lands and the Western world, actually, begun: as the scholar held it, „...*the historical living conditions directed Ukraine westwards, whereas its geographical ones directed - and still direct - it southwards, to the Black sea.*” [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 236]. For a long period, - actually, until the disintegration of the Old Rus’ state under the pressure of steppe hordes and due to internal civil strifes, those mutual relations M. Hrushevsky named as equal and partnership. Principality of Kiev which had made its civilization choice in favour of the Byzantine values, arose as an original regional leader which converted pagan tribes in its northeast borderlands to the Christian culture. The initial volumes of the scholar’s main work abound in references to how the Riurykids of Rus were favourably received at courts of the western capitals, and how influential governors of Europe competed for the hands of their daughters.

As an adherent of positivistic priorities of order and progress, M. Hrushevsky in his historiosophic reflexions generously praises the virtues of the western civilisation and exalts its significance in the formation of the Ukrainian national cultural type. The scientist underlines close connections of the Ukrainian lands with the German and Celtic cultures during prehistoric times. Further on he dwells on a mass flow of the Scandinavian element at the beginning of formation of the Old Rus’ state. During the princely time these contacts with the West grew only stronger: Hrushevsky draws his readers’ attention to „unusually branchy dynastic links” as the Riurykids were related to a German (Bavarian) dynasty and representatives of other principalities which were in the sphere of the German culture. Along with that, cultural and trade relations with the countries of the European West became stronger and gradually substituted earlier interrelations in the Black Sea direction, i. e., with the Balkan countries, Byzantium, and Asia Minor [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 234].

With the decline of Kiev in the end of the 12th century, the centre of Ukrainian statehood gravity M. Hrushevsky transfers to the Galician-Volhynian lands where the state of the Romanovych dynasty, „...*starting from the threshold of the 13th*

century, held on in the Ukrainian lands through the whole century after Kiev's decline in the full force of the tradition of a strong-power policy and life, prince-and-druzhyna militia regime, political forms, and the culture developed by the Kievan state" [Hrushevskiyi 1993a: 1]. The fact of close neighbourhood of the Galician-Volhynian principality with the countries of Western Europe had determined a civilization vector of development of the young state and other Ukrainian lands, which followed its political lead. The scientist himself emphasizes on „...the full advantage of the dominating western influences on that combination of Byzantine and Eastern influences which prevailed in the period of formation of the Kievan state" [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 234].

It is worth to mention, that – in Hrushevsky's opinion - the civilization divergences between Ukraine and Russia had taken roots as early as at the break of the 12th – 13th centuries. After all, according to him, the Vladimir-Muscovite state took for a development model the cultural practices of northeast and steppe tribes [Hrushevskiyi 2002: 77]. The civilization heritage of the Kievan state, in accordance with the scientist's views, the Muscovite state had acquired only partly, „...being all the time mixed with the Finnish, Tatar, and Mongolian elements", meanwhile „...the western Ukraine wherein since the 13th century the Ukrainian life got concentrated, plainly entered the domain of the West European life" [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 234]. Despite religious differences from the Catholic West, M. Hrushevsky constantly underlined that „...the whole sphere of its [Galician-Volhynian Rus'] political and cultural interests was oriented to the West" [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 234].

The western vector of the cultural development of the Ukrainian lands, continues M. Hrushevsky, becomes stronger with the inclusion of the Ukrainian lands into the structure of the Polish-Lithuanian state, after which „...for the Ukrainian culture new favourable horizons became opened again" [Hrushevskiyi 2007b: 316]. Illustrating a favourable character of the western influence on all manifestations of the Ukrainian life, the scientist first marks the economic increase of cities, reorientation of their internal life toward the German samples.

„Thus, - the researcher sums up this historical period, - Ukraine, connected closely and directly with the Western Europe, - first of all, with Germany and, further on, also with Italy, Ukraine only with some delay passed through the periods of Italian-German revival (Renaissance), German Reformation, and Catholic reaction, which fell on the Ukrainian lands with all its burden in the end of the 16th century" [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 235].

This period made still deeper the civilization differences between the peoples of the Ukrainian and Russian lands. According to M. Hrushevsky, under a powerful pressure of the steppe's oriental influences the Muscovite kingdom was more and more losing its Old Rus' cultural heritage. At the same time, „...Ukraine lived in the same way and by the same ideas as the West. It was from it that Ukraine scooped cultural means and from it Ukraine took samples for its culture" [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 235].

M. Hrushevsky considered, that it was indeed due to the constant interaction with the West European culture, that the features of national Ukrainian character were formed, making Ukrainians mentally related with their Polish, Czech, and Slovak neighbours. In that view, he considered, that „...the Ukrainian people belongs to the West European or, to speak shorter and more precisely, to the European circle not just by the power of historical ties which throughout centuries linked the Ukrainian life

*with the western one, but also by the structure of its national folk character”* [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 238-239].

As a matter of fact, the researcher was of the opinion, that the Great Russian character had been formed under the influence of the east civilization influences, which began to dominate during the time of the Mongol-Tatar invasion. Hence, it acquired such features as the lack of one’s personal dignity and disdain of the dignity of other persons, insufficient taste of comfortable life, and an inclination to anarchism. All that, in the opinion of Hrushevsky, is „...a complete antithesis to the Ukrainian national beliefs”, which „...makes the Ukrainian by spirit and character to be very congenial to the West European environment, either to the Germanic, or – in other dimensions (...), - to the Romance one” [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 239].

Accentuating various and considerable influences of the western culture on the Ukrainian one, M. Hrushevsky constantly emphasizes the creative character of that influence. In his view, the western influences mixed up with the old Byzantine traditions once acquired by the Old Rus’ society. This process resulted in the creation of an original Ukrainian culture, which was highly appreciated in that to me world. In that way the original Ukrainian art of the 17th – 18th centuries evolved, which, as Hrushevsky specifies, attracted „the West European man”.

“The culture and art of the 17th -18th centuries, to the very end of the Hetmanate, - underlined M. Hrushevsky, - should be referred to as western. Basically, they were German, partly Italian and French, all – either directly or by mediation – having passed through the Polish stratum” [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 235].

However, such an almost idyllic picture of the mutual relations between Ukraine and the West, depicted by M. Hrushevsky, by far did not sustain the verification by a branchy source material. Here again the pages of the majority of volumes of „History of Ukraine-Rus” become consecutive objections to practically all his aforementioned theses. Thus, paradoxical as it can be, the researcher again appeals to positivistic values. Thus, the West European influences on the Ukrainian education during the 14th – 16th centuries the scientist subjects to a double criticism. On the one hand, he grumbles at the fact that the borrowed western educational samples destroyed Ukraine’s own educational traditions and hampered regaining its internal reserves for the modernization of this important segment of social life:

„A ready-made type of school was borrowed from the Latin rite Polish samples, no original type was ever created. But for that mere reason the Ukrainian society can hardly be reproached in concern of its cultural weakness: it was too difficult to avoid an influence of the samples which had by then extended through all cultural Europe. Nevertheless, it was a great fault, and it should be noticed that in the early beginnings of the organisation of new school it had been more original, only that those independent beginnings had no further development” [Hrushevskyi 1995: 477].

Simultaneously, the researcher specifies another equally negative fact:

„The problem foregrounded the fact that this scholastic school gave in general very little real knowledge and absolutely no encouragement to it and to positive sciences. Besides, this school was very weakly connected with real life of the Ukrainian people in its past and present, small and it had a very poorly specified national character in wider meaning of that word” [Hrushevskyi 1995: 478].

Moreover, M. Hrushevsky complains of the fact that the pupils of such schools „...formally could feel themselves Ruthenians<sup>3</sup>, they were even brought up as hot defenders of their case, but by their education and study they were torn off from the people, its real life, its competitions and traditions, and by their all cultural gains, beginning from the Latin and Polish languages and finishing with their interests, views, and tastes they were connected with the Lithuanian- Polish life” [Hrushevskiy 1995: 478].

In absolutely other tonality in „History of Ukraine-Rus” the inclusion of the Ukrainian lands to the Polish-Lithuanian state is treated. On the pages of the third volume of this work M. Hrushevsky passionately refers to that event as a „fatal” crisis in the life of the people of Ukraine-Rus’, from which Rus’ and Old Rus’ culture gained nothing, but „...lost infinitely much (...) not only for the misfortune of its people, but to the detriment of the civilisation on the whole” [Hrushevskiy 1993: 503]. Explaining his being so categorical in judgments, the scientist singles out the differences of the Lithuanian and Polish domination on the Ukrainian lands:

„The Lithuanian superiority at least did not bring considerable changes into the cultural and national life, but the Polish destroyed materially and morally those upper strata, which held Rus culture, and they faded to give way to the gentry to the Polish, German bourgeoisie. With that decline, the cultural development of the Rus was almost cut off: only the lower, the masses and the lower clergy, were the ancient Russian cultural tradition, that is, those needy remains of the Old Russian culture, which had time to pass into those lower layers” [Hrushevskiy 1993: 503].

On the pages of the „History of Ukraine-Rus” German influences on the Ukrainian culture, so idealised later under the influence of foreign policy conditions in M. Hrushevsky’s historical publicism, had absolutely other value colouring:

„The German forms were transplanted on our soil by the government and the gentry without being adapted to local circumstances from the very beginning, they were plagued by national and religious exclusivity, trimmed or curved by fiscalism in the interests of noble state, and further spoiled and wrecked on the same motives. Being trapped in ready-made and canonical clichés, these forms did not develop, but degenerated and lurked under the oppression of unpopular politics and difficult economic circumstances” [Hrushevskiy 1995: 138-139].

M. Hrushevsky’s emotional attitude towards the influence of the western civilization was also rather negative, he viewed it as an exclusively destructive factor for the original Old Rus’ urban culture. In particular, as Natalia Yakovenko was the first to notice, its most evident example is the scientist’s judgments concerning the spread of Magdeburg law on the Ukrainian lands [Yakovenko 2008]. However, the researcher repeatedly attributes the full responsibility for such a status quo to the Polish government which, in his opinion, by a system of interdictions broke the old direct link between Ukraine and the West, thus, having made all so that the western culture could reach Ukraine in no other way but only through the „nasty

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<sup>3</sup> We would like to note that the meaning of ethnonym "Rusyn" in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries differed from its significance today (i.e., Rusyns as an ethnic group living in Transcarpathia, Eastern Poland, Eastern Slovakia and Vojevodyn). During the time period under investigation, it was the self-naming of Ukrainians that lived in Galicia.

Polish alembic” [Hrushevskiy 1995: 139]. The consequences of that for Ukrainian national life, as M. Hrushevsky described them, were simply fatal:

„Then, after this process of pauperisation and decline of the Ukrainian town folk had reached its extremes, and with an account for the poor condition of the Ukrainian element which resulted from the politics and administration of Poland, such a pale copy of the West European culture which the poor Polish culture was in the 17th - 18th centuries became something more, it became a “superior culture” [Hrushevskiy 1995: 139].

The contemporary researchers have already – and repeatedly - attempted to explain the fact, that the pages of Hrushevsky’s „History of Ukraine-Rus” became, actually, a historical indictment for the West in destruction of the original Ukrainian culture through the Polish hands. Thus, Leonid Zashkilniak points to M. Hrushevsky’s Slavophile sympathies acquired by it him still in gymnasium years [Zashkilniak 1994]. Serhiy Plokhyy appreciably agrees with such conclusions in his monograph on the outstanding scientist [Plokhyy 2005: 114]. At the same time, Natalia Yakovenko points out the „Russian mental tradition” in which the evolution of M. Hrushevsky’s creativity took place [Yakovenko 2008: 97]. Probably, these judgements need to be commented, because it is not only his anti-West views on which the aforementioned researchers accentuate, but also his ambivalence in his attitude toward the West.

## **1.2. The images of the „Foreigner”: Russia**

The image of Russia appears not less ambivalent in M. Hrushevsky’s heritage. The majority of researchers of Hrushevsky’s works consider his radical „derussianization” of Ukraine’s history as the main historiographic merit of the outstanding scientist. The Ukrainian historian declared it most accurately in his well known article „The Usual Scheme of „Russian History” and an Issue of the Rational Compilation of the History of East Slavic Peoples” (1904), which was firstly published in the Ukrainian language in a Petersburg edition, which had a reputation among that time experts, namely, in the „Collection of Articles On Slavic Studies”, edited by academician V. Lamanskyi. In fact, that article for the first time in the Ukrainian intellectual tradition conceptually grounded the statement about the Russians as a completely - in cultural, historical, and ethnic senses different people from the Ukrainians. Shortly, that text became a real credo for the historians who were effectively connected with the Ukrainian national movement.

M. Hrushevsky focused the aforementioned article on the all-round criticism of the supported by the Russian historiography Pogodin’s scheme of the East Europe region’s past, in which the civilization heritage of Kievan Rus’ inseparably belonged to the Russians, whereas the Ukrainian past was totally dissolved in imperial historical narratives. The danger of that scheme, according to M. Hrushevsky, consisted in that it was widely used by Slavic studies experts throughout Western Europe to whom it had never occurred to verify Mikchail Pogodin’s theses with the data of many sources.

The Ukrainian scientist dwelled on obvious irrationalities of that „usual” scheme which, after the scheme gained habitual use in the historiographic tradition, were paid almost no due attention:



„First of all, linking of the ancient history of the southern tribes, the Kievan state, with its political way, legislation, and culture, with Vladimir-Moscow principality of the 13th – 14th centuries is very irrational, it is as if this latter was the continuation of the former” [Hrushevskiy 2002: 77].

The Ukrainian historian was convinced that while Moscow scribes – as adherents of the genealogical approach - could have been excused for such an anti-historical method, it was not appropriate for the contemporary historiography which „seeks for the genetic link”. M Hrushevsky convinced his opponents that the Kievan state, law, and culture were the product of one nationality, that of Ukraine-Rus’, whereas Vladimir-Moscow represented the other one, - Great Russian. Therefore, to his mind, the Kievan period had passed not in Vladimir-Moscow, but into Galician-Volhynian in the 13th century, and then into Lithuanian-Polish in the 14th – 16th centuries. Thus, the Vladimir-Moscow state was neither a heir, nor a successor of Kiev, it grew from its own root, and Kievan Rus’ attitude towards it the scholar compares to that of the Roman empire towards Gallic provinces [Hrushevskiy 2002: 77].

The noticed misunderstanding brought to life another historiographic irrationality which manifested itself in the fact that the dominating nationalities of the East Europe region (Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians) were, actually, deprived of the sources concerning a well-founded beginnings of their history. This is how the historian saw this situation:

„So, when to consider a consequence of sewing up of the Kiev state to the beginnings of the state and cultural life of the Great Russian people, what do we observe? The history of the Great Russian nationality remains, in fact, without its beginnings. (...) The fiction of „the Kievan Rus’ period” does not give a possibility to accordingly represent to history of the Great Russian nationality. As „the Kievan Rus’ period” is integrated to the state and culture history of the Great Russian people, the history of the nationality of Ukraine-Rus’ remains without its beginnings. (...) But the place of Belarusian nationality is even worse in this scheme, because it vanishes entirely (...)” [Hrushevskiy 2002: 77-78].

The solution to eliminate the aforementioned historiographic misunderstanding, which M. Hrushevsky suggested, is very simple:

„(...) It is necessary to part with „the fiction that „the Rus’ history”, perpetually substituted by the Great Russian one, is the „common Rus” history. (...) Eventually, there cannot be any „common Rus” history at all, as there is no „common Rus” people. There can be a history of all „Rus’ peoples”, if there is anyone wishing to call them so, or a history of East Slavs. It is this latter, that, probably, should replace the present „Rus’ history” [Hrushevskiy 2002: 79].

The focal points of the scheme in view M. Hrushevsky repeated later, in 1906, in „the preface to the second edition of „A Sketch of the History of the Ukrainian People” (in Russian), and also laid out in detail in the third edition of the first volume of „History of Ukraine-Rus” (1913). Furthermore, after 1906 the scientist even sharpened certain questions, providing his wider and more extended arguments. M Hrushevsky expressed his expectations, that:

„...less than in ten years the carcass of Ukrainian history as an organic integrity from the beginnings of historical life of the Rus' tribes to our times will seem a phenomenon as much normal, as it seemed (and now it still seems to those people who had no chance to think it over) normal to stick the Ukrainian episodes in the traditional scheme of the „Russian state” ten years ago [Hrushevskyi 1991: 1].

It is necessary to notice, that the article in view became remarkable for Hrushevsky as a social thinker. After all, he had been brought in the environment of federalist values that dominated in the environment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia at Russian empire lands of the second half of the nineteenth century, and he was the first to suggest irredentistic ideas in relation to Russia. The scheme, well grounded in the aforementioned work, was with enthusiasm recognised by its author's many colleagues and became a constant and organic part of scientific creativity of a whole generation of Ukrainian 20th century historians working in the West: it is from it, that many contemporary specialists in Ukrainian history still proceed from in their designs of the past of Eastern Europe. At the same time, already at the beginning of the 20th century M. Hrushevsky's historical scheme incited certain objections on behalf of many German, Russian, and Polish researchers (particular, concerning the question of ethnic processes in the time of Kievan Rus' and the role of the Old Rus' inheritance in the historical destinies of the three East Slavic peoples).

The political and historiographic significance of M. Hrushevsky's scheme were correlated. After all, the formation and recognition of concepts about common past, especially, about ethnic origin, is of very great importance for national self-comprehension and consolidation of nations. It was precisely on this moment that the critic accentuated. Favourably received in the Ukrainian intellectual milieu as a harmonious theoretical substantiation of the independence of the national historical process, the aforementioned article caused polemics and cautions, first of all, - in the environment of Russian scientists. The majority of them became indignant of the mere fact of the admission of the Ukrainian language to an academic publication, which legalized it as an instrument of science and created a precedent for the continuation of the work on the popularisation of achievements of the Ukrainian cultural movement.

Most distinctly this position in his review of literature on Slavic studies was expressed by Tymophiy Florynskyi, M. Hrushevsky's former professor at St Volodymyr University. He stressed on inaccuracy and danger of the admission of a Ukrainian language article to the academic publication and condemned the very fact of „protection” over the Ukrainian cultural movement of some Russian scientists [Florynskyi 1905]. Separately the Kiev professor dwelt on historiosophic proposals of his former pupil, having deprived them of scientific character. In his final words the author appealed to Russian historians „to make an appropriate assessment of Hrushevsky's works”.

As a matter of fact, the theses stated in T. Florynskyi's review were later widely reprinted and distributed by adherents of right-monarchic ideology [Shcheholecv 1912: 139-140]. Its adherents also saw a powerful ideological implied sense in the publication, fairly considering the scientific positions stated in it the basis for a development of „separation tendencies” in the environment of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the country. Among other readers, there also were such who from a the position of the „plot theory” postulates tried to show the harms and banefulness of separate interpretation of historical destinies of the two neighbouring peoples,

appealing to the classical Slavophile thesis about an „external threat” for the Slavs. So, one of reviewers of M. Hrushevsky’s article pathetically wrote as follows:

„Can it be, that the old Slavic enmity which caused so much harm to the Slavs, will also infinitely go on in the environment of the Russian people, and instead of common cultural work we shall hear such exclamations, as: we are by ourselves, and you are by yourselves, we are Ukrainians, and you are Great Russians, so – let’s mind our own businesses! Who, eventually, will benefit from that, if not the enemies of the Slavs?” [Radchenko 1905: 453].

From the positions of the already analyzed historiosophic models, the northern neighbour is depicted by M. Hrushevsky as a consecutive antithesis to the civilised West, as a country that lives exclusively under laws of eastern despotism. The political elite of Muscovy the scientist expressively calls „northern barbarians”, opposing it to the „...skilled and civilised people of the western culture” [Hrushevskiyi 1997: 759]. From here it becomes quite natural that the foreign policy choice of the Cossack starshyna headed by Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in favour of the Moscow kingdom M. Hrushevsky considers fatal to the European prospects of Ukraine. However, that choice, he also remarks, was to a great extent made under the pressure of that time circumstances as a reaction to abuses of Catholic Rzeczpospolita Polska.

The geopolitical choice of that time Ukrainian elite M. Hrushevsky calls epoch-making also for the history of Eastern Europe as it cardinal changed the political map of that time world, having initiated a steep fall of Poland and the transformation of the Moscow kingdom in a powerful regional leader:

„... The transition of Ukraine from under the power Polish Rzeczpospolita „under a high hand” of the Moscow tsar (...) shifts the centre of political gravity in Eastern Europe from Poland to Moscow, gives a powerful impulse of Europeanization of Muscovy, of its inclusion in the political system of Europe, etc. This is what in these events attracts a „history of the world” specialist’s interest, and it should interest also us” [Hrushevskiyi 1996: 4].

However, along with the inclusion of the Ukrainian lands into Muscovy, they long enough remained in the sphere of European culture, hence, the researcher emotionally underlines, that „...Ukraine of the 17th century was Europe all the same, and it wanted to be such with each joint of its essence!” [Hrushevskiyi 1997: 1497]. And only after the liquidation of the Hetmanate in the end of the 18th - beginnings of the 19th centuries, Ukraine was forcefully made to reorient to the Russian imperial north. M. Hrushevsky specifies a compulsory russification of the Ukrainian life, economical exploitation of Ukrainian lands, purposeful destruction of the educational space generated after the western samples. As a result, the scientist remarks:

„Ukraine of the 19th century was torn off from the West, from Europe, and turned its face northward, its nose stuck into a god-forsaken place of Great Russian culture and life. All Ukrainian life was turned out of the normal conditions, from its historically and geographically generated path, and was thrown out on a Great Russian ground for vagrancy and plunder” [Hrushevskiyi 2007a: 236].

It is noteworthy, that M. Hrushevsky cherished his conviction in the fatality of a pro-Russian choice of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in his pupils. Here the best examples are M. Hrushevsky's consultations of his Lviv pupils, in whom he outlined an ideological model of interpretation of historical events investigated by them. So, in a letter Ivan Dzhydzhora, his favourite pupil who studied the peculiarities of Peter I's economic policy concerning the Ukrainian lands, M. Hrushevsky strictly advised not to adhere to the theses spread in that time science about the Russian tsar's economic pragmatism, but, contrarily, to try to prove, „...*that this was not mercantilism, but politics*” [Lystuvannia 2008: 281] (M. Hrushevsky's emphasis). To the Russian monarch himself the scientist refers as „...*the historical tyrant of Ukraine*”.

Along with such severe estimations of the consequences of joining of the Ukrainian lands to the Russian state, M. Hrushevsky again shows surprising as for a scientist-positivist ambivalence of historical thinking. Despite numerous remarks about mental incompatibility of Ukrainians and Russians, the researcher often points out their confessional closeness which forced the Ukrainian elite to cling to their northern neighbour, in particular, after definite transition of the Lithuanian administration to Catholicism. The author of „History of Ukraine-Rus” asserted that „...*at the break the 15th and 16th centuries the existence of such an inclination [towards Muscovy] became as already very clear*” [Hrushevskyi 1993b: 183].

Beside the religious argument, M. Hrushevsky also specifies the fact of the commonness of historical traditions uniting Ukrainian and Muscovite princes. The specified historical traditions the scientist explained so: Moscow „...*represented itself as a heir of the Ancient Rus' state*”, and also attracted „...*with strongly developed aristocratic structure, - mainly with that of princely aristocracy*” [Hrushevskyi 1993b: 338]. This closeness of religious practices and historical traditions, „notwithstanding their existing under a despotic form”, specifies M. Hrushevsky, soon became the basis for gradual change of geopolitical priorities, that, eventually, prepared the aforementioned civilization choice of the Cossack starshyna in Khmelnytskyi's time.

## **2. A TEST BY REVOLUTIONS. A POLITOLOGICAL DISCOURSE**

In M. Hrushevsky's understanding, for Ukraine's geopolitical positioning in coordinates „Russia – the West” Russian revolutions and the significant consequences caused by them became critical. As well as the majority of the intelligentsia of the Dnieper Ukraine, the scientist was full of sincere expectations about democratic achievements of the first Russian revolution in 1905. He finished his „Illustrated History of Ukraine”, upon which he worked just then, with a belief that „...*a wide national development of Ukrainians become in Russia also but a question of time and we can with full belief look in its future*” [Hrushevskyi 1913: 519]. His estimations of the events of 1917 were too not less elevated. The second Russian revolution, - as the scientist recollected already in emigration, - was seen by him and by his ideological colleagues as „a star of the new world” and „a worldwide liberation of work and working people”.

However, the reality of Russian democracy of different party colours, which unanimously did not recognise Ukraine's right to be a political subject, very quickly cooled M. Hrushevsky's enthusiasm. Elected chairman of the Ukrainian parliament (Central Rada) in the beginning of March, 1917, he was shocked by the

unwillingness of the Provisional government to come to any, even elementary, concessions to the Ukrainians, which was in particular sharp contrast with those freedoms which it granted to the Poles and Finns.

M. Hrushevsky's scepticism attains sharp radical hue after the Bolsheviks had come to power in Russia. He was amazed by the similarity of behaviour of the former imperial bureaucracy and figures of Russian revolutionary movement, who in their attitude to Ukraine turned out „blockheads-centralists and unifiers”. The mental identity of the „white” and „red” Russians was proved by the Ukrainian-Bolshevik war of the end of 1917 - beginning of 1918. In the article „Purification by Fire” (1918) M. Hrushevsky was the first among his contemporaries to define a hybrid character of the war: despite its socialist slogans of the struggle against the bourgeois Central Rada, it, actually, had nothing common with the ideas of socialism and democracy. The historian underlines a frankly interethnic character of the conflict:

„The task of this campaign is „to beat the Ukrainians” who after 250 years of enslavement ventured to raise their heads and to get rid of the Moscow parasite. (...) Now, we, in the most obvious way, have a struggle of the two peoples - Great Russian and Ukrainian. One attacks, the other defends itself” [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 89].

A practice of total public destruction which was embodied by the new Petersburg rulers, led to an essential correction of political outlook of M. Hrushevsky, radically changed his views as a scientist and a politician. The conscious destruction of Kiev architecture by M. Muravyov's artillery (including M. Hrushevsky's family seven-storyed house), and a later barbarous days long slaughter of the inhabitants of Kiev by Bolshevik armies, left to chairman of the Central Rada no geopolitical choice. He expressed his that time situation assessments in his work „On the Threshold of New Ukraine: Assumptions and Dreams” (1918), which he called his political testament. The emotional condition of the scientist is clearly demonstrated by the following quotation:

„Shooting to death, capture and destruction of Kiev by the Bolsheviks made up the summit, the culmination, the modular point in which this great, simply immeasurable in its consequences change in history of Ukraine, committed by the aggression of the Bolsheviks, concentrated. And for me this crisis is concretised still more sharply by this destruction of my house, of my study-room with all of my property in it, of my spiritual products, of all the dear that I collected around myself, of all thought over and suffered during the recent, most difficult and most significant year of my life. (...) And it seems to me, that what I suffer so bitterly, in this moment all Ukraine suffers too” [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 227].

As M. Hrushevsky underlines, the Bolsheviks' actions not only ruined Kiev, they also forced the Ukrainian community and its leaders to throw away the remains of their illusions concerning a possibility of co-habitation with Russia. In the destroyed Ukrainian capital, he insisted figuratively, „our orientation to Muscovy, to Russia” burnt down, which for centuries was instituted in the public discourse and which became axiomatic for the majority of the inhabitants of the Dnieper Ukraine. The politician points out to his compatriots that the blood of thousands of killed Ukrainians was shed in Kiev streets not in vain only under the condition that it was

possible to be freed spiritually from „the most difficult and harmful yoke” only by such a terrible sacrifice, which he calls „a dog’s duty” against Russia. These theses which, in fact, grounded the necessity in a construction of the national state, were eagerly received by Ukrainian intelligentsia, whereas the chairmen of the parliament that time publicistic milieu called his in no other way than „Father Hrushevsky”, by which underlying his prominent role in the establishment of the idea of Ukraine’s independent state.

Hopefully, that on his return to the destroyed Kiev, the chairman of the Central Rada appealed „with a new effort, with a new energy” to restore the communications with the Western world [Hrushevskiy 2007a: 238]. The scientist repeatedly reminded, that this was dictated not only by old Ukrainian traditions, but also by „that spiritual cognition” which undoubtedly always was between the Ukrainian national ethnic element and life and the West European ones. The researcher again underlines that Ukrainians belong to the European civilization circle by the structure of their national character alone. Therefore, M. Hrushevsky is convinced, their return to the European culture will take place quite naturally thanks to this internal kinship:

„Ukraine can come back now with a new, even – depending on the reaction – with an exaggerated force to this world, close to it in spirit and character. First of all, to the Germanic world, especially German world, with which in the past it had most communications, most borrowings and loans, and now the circumstances so develop that it is here that the easiest contact with the Western world can be established so as to make use of its stocks of knowledge, culture, public instinct, and discipline” [Hrushevskiy 2007a: 238].

It is interesting, that M. Hrushevsky, agitating for strengthening of communications with the Western world, urges not to get restricted only to those traditional time-honoured relations and not to replace one mental dependence with another. It is necessary to consider proclaimed by Hrushevsky orientation to one own forces, focused in the slogan „Ukrainian life should get emancipated”, as a display of certain political maturity both of the chairman of the Central Rada and Ukrainian intelligentsia in general. As M. Hrushevsky explains:

„The Ukrainian life (...) should, first of all, „find itself”. To clarify its means, problems and needs, and - at the same time - not to hasten to become fixed in any circle of communications, relations and influences, and to take with widely opened hand everything that can be useful for it” [Hrushevskiy 2007a: 241].

As an experienced historian, M. Hrushevsky illustrates at numerous examples that Ukraine should use a unique position between the East and the West, having absorbed all what is valuable and necessary for its existence from the cultures of her neighbours. Considering it, the scientist suggests and comprehensively proves a new geopolitical construction in which the young state itself could already become a regional leader. Remaining an adherent of the idea of „world federation”, the chairman of the Central Rada sees the federal associations at regional levels as the first step to its realisation, in particular, the federation of the people of the Black sea which, he repeats, from the time immemorial „...*did not divide, but connected the coastal countries*” [Hrushevskiy 2007a: 237]. Explaining his logics in the

geopolitical proposition, - so resembling the political organisation of GUAM of 1990s, - M. Hrushevsky explained so:

„The Black Sea unites and connects together countries with very different physical and economic conditions, which unusually well can supplement each other. (...) In case they would closely fasten one with another, these Black Sea countries could create unusually rich, large and multisided economic base, and the elementary care about national wealth requires such an economical policy when economical work on this base is conducted by the nation's own actions” [Hrushevskyi 2007a: 243].

The new geopolitical proposition, proved M. Hrushevsky, appeared on time. After all, having returned the power into Kiev at the beginning of March 1918 by means of the German weapon, the Central Rada, in fact, became a hostage of its idealised partner. The Germans who came as the allies, shortly turned out to be banal invaders. Seeing Ukraine only as a source of economic exploitation, they without doubt authorised the dispersal of the democratic Central Rada, having understood that it was in no condition to fulfil the obligations of gathering of excessive grocery tributes under which the Ukrainian peasants laid. The puppet government of hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi (from April 29 to December 14, 1918) established by the Germans left M. Hrushevsky out of active politics and he himself had to hide, being afraid of the reprisals of the new power.

His attitude to the political events the historian stated in his articles „After the Damage” (1918), full of many humiliating epithets describing his opponents: „a bad anecdote, created by the association of our landowners and German generals”, „a nasty landowner-gendarme regime of the former guards and policemen”, „a grandiose crime committed on Ukraine's basic political, national, and economic interests”, „the epoch of disaster and shame”. The author characterises hetman P. Skoropadskyi as a German „creation” in the role of an irresponsible governor”, „a simple tool in the hands of the unifiers of Russia”, etc. [Hrushevskyi 2013: 5]. The former allies also were criticised:

„As far as a resolute role in it [the hetman revolt] was played by German representatives, it [the UNR management] should gain an appointment of the international court of inquiry consisting of representatives of parliaments or other responsible democratic bodies of Germany, the Entente, and our Ukrainian Republic, so that this commission could find out how, by whose authority, and according to whose sanction the leaders of the German army, which came as though with the aim to support the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic in its war with Russia, factually, made an occupation of Ukraine, caused a revolt and, having given their figure the role of an irresponsible governor of Ukraine, together with him organized the robbery and destruction of the Ukrainian state” [Hrushevskyi 2013: 5].

Having found no understanding of and no support to his political ambitions in young politicians-leaders of the UPR's Directoria (from November 14, 1918 to November 10, 1920), M. Hrushevsky in the end of March, 1919 left for the West. There, travelling the European capitals, he tried, entirely unsuccessfully, to draw attention to the Ukrainian affairs in influential political circles. The historian so regretfully wrote about the results of his meetings:

„I witnessed the last illusions, which some Ukrainian optimists still had, among whom the chairman of the Ukrainian mission was the most determined one, to vanish into thin air. An absolutely ill-disposed position of the French ruling circles was already admitted by everyone (...). Neither the French, nor the English circles did not want to support Ukraine in the confrontation with the Polish or Russian conjuncture: they accepted all those arguments which the Polish and Russian sides put forward against Ukrainians. (...) In the American circles the tendency to abandon any participation in the European affairs was prevailing more and more...” [Hrushevskyi 2013: 116-117].

The June events of 1919, when the Supreme Council of the Parisian peace conference made a fatal for the Ukrainians decision to authorise a temporary occupation of Eastern Galicia by the Poles completely buried M. Hrushevsky's illusions concerning a possibilities to interest the western politicians with a question of Ukrainian independence. With undisguised irony the scientist so commented on this event:

„It is possible to consider as a new triumph of the grand principles of the Entente the fact, that Eastern Galicia was rescued from the Ukrainian democracy and handed to the Polish nobility and Catholic clergy” [Hrushevskyi 2013: 42].

Having understood the crash of his expectations in concern of the western partners, M. Hrushevsky again took up publicistic work in an attempt to clear up - for himself and his compatriots - the interest of Ukrainians in the new confused geopolitical realities. For the first time he turned to this problem in his article under the self-expressive title „Between Moscow and Warsaw” (1920). It was clear, that after the annexation of Eastern Galicia and the terror caused by the Poles against the indigenous population of the land, M. Hrushevsky's sympathy could not be on the side of the western neighbour at all. Bringing the reader to the logicity of an alternative, the scientist gave his arguments in favour of a new criterion of the geopolitical interest of the Ukrainians:

„(...) The perpetual transitions of Ukrainians from one orientation to the other, from one camp to the other one, extremely badly influence the reputation of our case and our cravings. The conviction taken by our people from the Polish school, i. e. that a successful politics should operate with slyness and treason, brings quite the other fruits. At this time, the betrayal of the socialist party at the moment of the approaching of the szlachta-ruled Poland was simply fatal for the Ukrainian issue! The Ukrainians, whose all future relies on the working people, can not be deserters from the socialist front to the bourgeois one! This is one thing. And the second is, that notwithstanding the various drawbacks of the Bolshevist politics in the Ukrainian question, we should not loose from our view the fact that all the same, we'd sooner with them, than with any other Russian government or party, should hope for a consent” [Hrushevskyi 2013: 106-107].

Even more overt curtseys to the Bolsheviks M. Hrushevsky made in his more often quoted program publicistic article „The Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries and Its Tasks” (1920). The article was an attempt to strengthen the ideology of main principles of the social and political program of a part of the Ukrainian SRs, headed by M. Hrushevsky, in the context of new geopolitical



realities. Pondering over them, the author reminded his readers of his article to the first volume of „Zapysky NTSH” (1892) („Proceedings of Shevchenko Scientific Society”), in which he justified the actions of the so-called „Tatar people” who helped the steppe people to destroy the power of their prince by means of certain economic and social preferences. Extrapolating a situation in the 13th century on those realities which developed in Ukraine under the Russian rule, the scientist called for a search of the compromise with the Bolshevik power in exchange for a possibility of an active participation in the life of the Ukrainian people. He wrote the next:

„We got convinced that the objective data, real conditions of the Ukrainian life, and the inheritance of imperial Russia do not give a possibility to build the Ukrainian life without peace making, without the consent with Russia. Having put off arrogance from our hearts, we should seek for the consent, we should gain good-neighbourhood and benevolent relations with it, even by making certain concessions, otherwise, we shall not move from the present deadlock” [Hrushevskyi 2013: 93].

The article caused literally a squall of indignation from the majority of representatives of emigratory and West Ukrainian intelligentsia, including the scientist’s recent party companions [Telvak 2008: 220-226]. Painfully bearing the defeat in the struggle for independence, they accused Hrushevsky in treasuring the national state ideal which he himself had announced in his work „On the Threshold of New Ukraine”. Every time he was compared more and more to Khmelnytskyi, who in Pereyaslav had actually passed the Ukrainians onto the slavery of Russian Moloch. Contemporary researchers, considering the reason for such a frank pro-Soviet pronouncement of the former chairman of the Central Rada, focus attention on the situational character of these ideas:

„Under the circumstances of the crash of the armed struggle, M. Hrushevsky ought to have made an amendment on his time political situation. And such a cardinal amendment was a change of a political accent: a social problem became prior to national” [Hyrych 2016: 108].

A wide discussion around the aforementioned article showed M. Hrushevsky, that the geopolitical choice, as well as a substitution of independence mottoes by federative ones, which he had made left him practically alone. So, the scientist took a decision to gradually stop political activity and fully to immerse into scientific work. Its possibilities for the historian were connected with access to archival materials which mostly remained in collections on the territory of the Soviet state. Thus, his geopolitical sympathies coincided with his scientific interests, which made his returns to Kiev only a matter of time. Hence, when the Soviet power, aiming at a split of the Ukrainian emigration in Western Europe, offered M. Hrushevsky the rank of academician and gave him a personal security guarantees, he decided to return to Ukraine, and he did it in March, 1924. However, his last decade of life proved an inaccuracy of his expectations on the declared democratic character of the builders of the Soviet empire. In the obituaries by which the Ukrainian press in the free world responded to the premature death of the outstanding figure in November, 1934, it was fairly underlined that he „fell the victim of his trust in the terrible power of the Bolsheviks” [Telvak 2008: 356-405].

## CONCLUSIONS

Generalising the observations of M. Hrushevsky's attitude to the problem „Russia – the West” within the context of the historical evolution of the Ukrainian people, a considerable emotionality of his historiographic and politological discourses should be pointed out, which, in general, was not inherent to the scientist an adherent of the positivistic formula of history writing, i.e. sine ira et studio. This emotionality arose when the researcher transferred purely scientific questions in the axiological plane „the native: the foreigner”. Here again, on the contrary to his repeatedly declared pro-western inclinations, M. Hrushevsky's sympathies, - although, not always very explicit, - often were on the side of the Russian neighbour.

The situation with Hrushevsky-politician was even more difficult: as well as the rest of the Ukrainian figures, he was long enough in the captivity of the illusions that the Ukrainians had true and disinterested allies in the east and in the west of Europe. Not less illusory was the belief in the possibility to reconcile the revolutionary initiatives put forward by independent movements with the federalist outlook adopted from the youth. The understanding of a situational and pragmatic character of any geopolitical configuration, as well as a requirement to rely only on one's own forces came to him too late. Unfortunately, Hrushevsky, together with the rest of the Ukrainian revolution leaders, reacted to the political events untimely and lacked the gift of anticipating them. All that postponed carrying out of the dream of the Ukrainians about their own state for long decades, the responsibility for that is often – but absolutely unjustly – laid on Hrushevsky.

In general, M. Hrushevsky considered the problem „Russia-the West” as if in two time lines: as a long historical period of co-habitation of Ukrainians with their western and east neighbours, and also from the viewpoint of his own life experience, first of all, taking into account the storming events of the first decades of the 20th century on the European continent. It was the latter that influenced the development of his outlook and the formulation of historiographic ideas and geopolitical constructions got corrected. The author of this article is of the opinion, that the aforesaid appreciably explain the noticed ambivalence of his theses in his publicistic works, as well as his radical ideological and political transformations. It should also be noted that this ambivalence, not in the last instance from M. Hrushevsky's side, became one of characteristic features of the Ukrainian humanitarian studies and political thought not only in the 20th century, but also in our time. This activates a continuation of the study of the problem „Ukraine between Europe and Russia” in wider chronological and thematic contexts.

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