# COOPERATION PERSPECTIVE IN BUILDING A HUMAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND COOPERATION OF VISEGRAD FOUR

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**Abstract**

The paper focuses on the analysis of the possible models of regional cooperation concepts, within the framework of human security building. Authors focus on the human security concept, its challenges and how it reflects contemporary security threats identified in the European Security Strategy. The particular focus is on the potential of Visegrad group cooperation in the European Union security and defence policy. A specific role of other actors, as the Organisation of Security and Cooperation is included.

*Key words: human security, regional cooperation, Visegrad group, cooperation, European Union*

## INTRODUCTION

The concept of security has been evolving for a long time, however, the main course was established during the Cold War. The nuclear threat resulted in military

deterrence that has come in the centre of security studies. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the international environment started to re-shape, so did the security environment. Multilateralism became prioritized over a zero-sum game and cooperation has become a buzzword for policy making at international level. Therefore, the paper focuses on the regional cooperation as a subsystem of the international level of analysis and its role in human security approach in Europe. It explores the particular stakeholders, their activities and potential for improvement in the context of successful process of building secure environment while applying a broad approach to security. We seek to answer the question *how do the particular stakeholders contribute to the human security approach and where does the biggest potential lie within the regional cooperation mechanisms.* Based on critical approach to security, the human security principle will be reviewed from the Copenhagen school perspective as well as o from policy making perspective. As we are concentrating on the European territory, later the European perception of security will be conceptualized followed by identification of core stakeholders at the regional level, including to special impact on cooperation between Visegrad Group countries.

## 1. CRITICAL SECURITY AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The European territory has experienced two World Wars and in the middle of 50s, it was completely destroyed. The Hitler's ambitions to restore the glory of the Third Reich ended up with damaged economies, over six million dead Jews and hundreds of thousands of war casualties. With the coming Cold war, the security had been strictly focusing on the state borders and state sovereignty as the "newly" adopted norm in the UN Charter. The fight over political, ideological and military hegemony gave rise to the realist perception of security concerning the military-political sector. The traditional security centred its attention on the issue of survival of referential object being mostly state or nation. However, at the moment we might observe that the priorities of different international actors are changing and thus there is a need to analyse this security shift. The shift in policy making and threat perception may be explained by the critical approach to security which broadens the traditional perception of the security concept and thus goes beyond the conventional military-political scope. The theoretical basis for this paper is put within the Welsh and Copenhagen school.

Critical Security Studies (CSS) or "Welsh School" of security studies is based on the extension of Marxian philosophy, while its origins can be found in the peace studies. (Peoples, & Vaughan-Williams, pp.18) Arguing against the traditional security studies, the Welsh school states that wars between states are no longer the most common ones. In fact, "New Wars" have emerged, being the civil wars, intra-state conflict and most currently the conflict with / or between the non-state actors such as Daesh (Kaldor, 2012). In order to further distinguish the Welsh school from the traditional security studies, Vaughan-Williams provides three features: a) security is a derivative concept – its understanding is dependent on the understating of politics and the world per se; b) broader security agenda in the context of security threat, but there also other, such as environmental, societal or economic; c) the change in the referential objects of security threats being not state anymore, rather people. There are then specific streams of political scientists dealing with each of the points and developing a more specific schools of thought. For us, the most

relevant is the Copenhagen school which argues for the re-conceptualization of military-oriented security to the broader one including also environmental, political, economic, and social security, while still veering in mind the important role of the military one (Buzan, 1983). Barry Buzan, Weaver and de Wild (1998) further elaborates on the issue of the security threat and the way it occurs. They argued that it is important to consider what is and what is not an issue for considering security in the above mentioned areas. Through the concept of securitization, they developed threat as a social construct. They define securitization as involving every subject within the public debate and it does not matter if it is connected to politics or not. The subject is consequently threatened by a question of survival limitations and requires some measures that are not used in the ordinary political proceedings. In reality the evaluation of the subject´s position differs from country to country. What might pose a threat for one country does not have to necessarily threaten the other. Although if this happens, the situation is used as an excuse and legitimization for the involvement of extraordinary tools to avoid, or combat a current threat. Those might include secret negotiations, limitations of the civil rights, arming actions and many others" (Buzan, 1991).

In other words, Buzan argues that threat might become anything that is being posed as a threat by the stakeholder, who has the political power to influence the public to believe an issue is a threat. Concerning the fact that threat embodies different variations for different subjects, the definition and criteria for securitization are triggered in inter-subjective construction of existential threat. Nevertheless, the crucial here is the  process of securitization, which starts by labelling an issue as a security threat by an important political actor, even though in that particular moment, only a small part of the public would consider it a security threat. This is known as a speech act. What the authors suggest is that security issues can evolve from the presentation of the issue and its constructivist character not because of what threat they actually represent. More crucial is though how this speech act is welcomed in the public. In order to be widely accepted, there are three felicity conditions that are about to be fulfilled when increasing the chances of public recognition of the threat. These conditions are a) the conventional chain of events and reactions to it; b) the expertise to speak about an issue; c) the historical connotation and liaisons. It is important to add that securitization does not apply to military threats only. The same logic can be used also in the framework of other areas falling under the scope of Copenhagen school. Based on recent development, the migration and the so called refugee crisis has been securitized in the context of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations (Huntington, 1996). Securitization has not always positive connotation. Waever, in contrast to Buzan proposes that environmental securitization has negative aspect when it comes to actors who should react to environmental threats and the reaction to it as such. Waever proposes to securitize issues only when necessary. Some scholars react to Securitization Theory with fear that in some issues it will create conflicts. Also the "speaking security" is problematic when it comes to who communicates it.

Turning back to the theoretical standards related to our analysis we have to define levels of these standards. Levels of analysis refers to the subjects measured by the spatial scales, which provide a framework for analysis, not the results per se (Krause & Williams, 1997). The aim of these levels is to distinguish a different set of actors and different practises used at these level in the context of action-reaction

effect. From a top-down approach, the first level is the international system that may be constituted by several international subsystems understood in territorial terms also as a regional level. The third level is then the state or national level, where state is the main actor. This state level may also have subunits such a bureaucracy or lobby groups. The final level is focused on an individual. All the levels may intertwine and overlay not only from the top-down, but also from the bottom-up.

## 2. HUMAN SECURITY – A POLICY OPERATIONALIZATION OF CRITICAL SECURITY

The Critical security studies provided us with the introduction to the security-shift analysis of different stakeholders' policies. Based on the Welsh and Copenhagen school, the focus of security is not only on state, but also on people and does not only relates to military threat, but also to non-military threats as well. These ideas and criticism of traditional security were later institutionalized in the concept of human security.

Human security may be identified as a policy approach within international fora. Having a closer look tough, there is number of definitions whose feasibility and operationalization is hard to explore. Nevertheless, the concept emerged in 1993 when it was firstly mentioned by *Mahbub ul Haq,* the Pakistani development leader and thinker, who introduced the human security, as a supplement to his "human development" concept in the United Nations Development Program (Gasper, 2005). The 1993 report prioritized human development before traditional security when suggesting the defence cuts and re-shifting from military industry towards peace economy and, in case of developing countries (according to World Bank classification developed and developing countries) investing rather in health care, literacy or safe drinking water (UNDP, 1993). Mitigating the realist approach towards international politics and security as well, the report proposed deeper commitment to multilateral cooperation bodies concentrating their capabilities on prevention by soft-power instruments and social justice. Later on, the 1994 report actually did pay a huge attention to the concept defining it firstly as "...safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life..." (UNDP 1994, 23). These two dimension are usually referred to as freedom from want and freedom from fear, where the first constitutes freedom from violence and the latter freedom from poverty. Thus the human security goes even beyond the CSS bringing both main critical arguments into one – where non-military threats apply to security of an individual or of a community of people, whether a marginalized group or a whole nation. The concept concerns not only the post-traditional areas covered by the Copenhagen school being political, economic, environmental and social, but also food security, health, personal and community security.

The areas involved reflect to some extend the Peace studies perspective developed by Johan Galtung and his study of roots of violence that might be seen in the context of human security as a root of the threats to human life and dignity. Galtung (1969, p.168) differentiates between direct and indirect violence. Direct violence is described as the one that is seen from the surface and relates to personal violence and physical harm. The indirect violence, on the other hand, is hidden under the surface and may take two forms. The famous structural violence concerns wrong and inappropriate allocation of resources, including food and

water, roots of different types of inequalities and unemployment. The violence is deeply rooted in the structures and reveal itself as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances. The structural violence is of great importance for this paper, since the human security concept tries to capture those issue in particular. The second form of indirect violence is the cultural violence, which was defined as *"those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence . . . that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence."* (Galtung, 1990)

The emergence of human security concept reflected the international development of value and norms such as human rights, development goals and principle of solidarity. However, despite being a people-centred approach, it does not stand in contradiction towards state security approach, rather a complementary one. It does not claim the insignificance of state sovereignty and state security, though it claims that it is not the only actor in the international politics that may be threatened. State security became insufficient when looking for human welfare, since individual can feel insecure even when state feels secure. States are not influenced by external impact, but are influenced from within as well. Hence the security discourse began to be more people-oriented (Newman 2001, 240). The focus here is on vulnerable groups of people under existential threat, including conflict, internally displaced person, refugees, and victims of natural disasters, those who live in poverty or close to the poverty level (Suhrke 1999, 272). Thus the human security aims not only to prevent the threat, but also to secure a better future as it is emphasizing the prevention mechanisms rather than late interventions. The debate about the purpose and goals of human security is nevertheless a bit more complex. In 2003 Sabina Alkire used the working definition stating that "the objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment" (Alkire 2003, 2), where under the vital core of human life she meant fundamental rights and freedoms pertaining to survival, live hood and basic dignity.

Even though there is a theoretical framework for human security to emerge, the crucial points in the history were identified as well as to enable the different policy orientation of particular stakeholders. Newman (2001, 241-242): recognizes three key historical marks:

1) The end of the Cold War and the diminishing of the security dilemma, a traditional realist point of view on international relations based on the state survival and power politics.
2) Globalisation, rise of multilateralism in foreign policy, collective crisis management – non-traditional forms of security, epidemiology, AIDS, drugs, terrorism, small arms, inhuman weapons, cyberwar, human trafficking
3) Normative changes – internationalisation of ethical standards and issues like forms of government, human rights and gender equality, development and education.

According to Mishra and Kumar (2013), there are key points that provided an appropriate environment for the human security concept:

1) Decreased threat of global nuclear war
2) Predominance of non-traditional and non-military threats
3) Democratization
4) Strengthening of human rights and freedoms in national and international policies
5) Increasing awareness of the important of human life and well-being

6) Globalization and related consequences
7) Increasing poverty and wide differences between developed North and poor South
8) Increasing number of internal armed and violent conflicts
9) Spread of small arms and light weapons, as well as the issue of anti-personnel mines

Alkire (2003, 10) classifies the reasons from the security studies perspective:
1) empirical changes in the nature of security threats,
2) analytical changes/advances can be observed as well referring to the interdependence between security threats
3) the institutional character of security structured at the national and international level has changed.

## 3. CRITIQUE OF HUMAN SECURITY

The human security has been evolving mainly within different institutions. In order to better capture the concept, many analysts and scholar became interested in order to develop a version easily operationalized in real policy. These diverse inputs into the topic resulted in diverse versions of the concept and no unified definition. According to Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (2009) the approaches towards human security may be classified as following:
1) realists and neo-realists approach that does not consider human security as an analytical category, hence not interesting for further research;
2) narrow approach of human security focusing on freedom from fear rather than freedom from want based on pragmatism, clear conceptualization and analytical relevance. The emphasizes was put on the violence to be incorporated into traditional security reasoning (Owen, 2004)
3) broader human security approach including freedom from fear as well as freedom from want.

Despite the good idea and enthusiastic approach, there are several deficiencies about the concept. Martin and Owen in their inspiring article The second generation of human security: lessons from the UN and EU experience outlined critique that might be a reason for the loss of interest of states in the concept (2010, 213-216):
1) ambiguity not only of theoretical conceptualisation, but also practical settlement, arguing that human security was written "by idealist for idealist" (The policy implication of the Commission on Human Security report 2003, 9)
2) missing clear distinction between different terms used when conceptualising such as development, humanitarian intervention and human rights. These terms are often used as synonyms, however, each of them has its specifics what can cause another conceptual irregularity. This substitution of terms is reflected also in
3) the "overstretched" use of human security by the UN (in relation to other concept and terms) resulting in the diminishing interest of the UN in using the term

On the other side, Martin and Owen consider the European way of operationalizing human security the most effective and successful, but still far from perfect. They proposed two ways how to achieve the human security goals. First one being the combination of military and civilian power and command, which the EU has been

trying and today after the successful missions in DRC, Bosnia and Somalia we can say that the EU is on the right way of well-balanced crisis management. Yet, they would like to entrain also the institutional side of the EU, more active European parliament and better coordination between the military and civilian units in the missions. Second way how to approach the human security is the threshold-based definition. There is a big potential in this formulation because if threshold method is interlinked with regional approach, each region could have its own crisis management unit that will administer it by a tailor-made method. The framework would be automatically narrowed down. This threshold-based definition was used by Owen (Owen 2004) as well as by King and Murray (2001). Based on the presumption that "security…focuses on the risks of being severely deprived" (Gary King & Murray 2001-02, 592), the authors developed a clear methodology of area selection for the human security analysis. To set the threshold the figure of generalized poverty was used (for details see King and Murray, 2001-02).

Unlike King and Murray, Kanti Bajpai (2000) underlined the freedom from fear rather than freedom from want, mainly referring to two issues - the bodily safety of the individual; and his or her personal freedom. (p. 38) encompassing not only the physical security, but also the psychological freedom of choice. Regarding the threats, he does admit the impact of direct as well as indirect threat, however only if there is an identifiable source of these threats.

The narrow-v-broad conflict was reviewed also by Roland Paris (2001) who argues that human security in its broader understanding may cause difficulties in decision-making processes about how to allocate scarce resources hence becoming more of a supporter of the narrow conception. This is especially relevant in the area of operationalization, feasibility and policy making. Nevertheless, he critically elaborates also on the narrow conception. As the major problem he sees the prioritization of certain values over the other without a sufficient reasoning. In order to avoid the prioritization, Paris suggest to remove the freedom from fear from the human security definition hence making a clear line between human security and physical security. Paris identifies also another problem being the ambiguity and involvement of many actor providing their own definitions. That results in difficult to determine the core values of the concept. He stresses that the concept is so vague that it is on the brink of meaninglessness that may result in the loss of the last interests into the concept.

As we may observe, it is clear that the main criticism of human security stems from its broadness. Following this critical trend, the concept being too vague and meaning too many things, there were attempts to focus on one specific area such as conflict prevention (Rothschild 1995), physical security (Hampson 2002) or development (Jennifer Leaning & Arie 2000). Emma Rothschild (1995) explored the term of "extended security" from four directions: 1) Downwards from nations to individuals; 2) Upwards from nation to the biosphere; 3) Horizontally from military to political, economic, social, environmental or human security; 4) The political responsibility for ensuring security is extended itself in all directions upwards, downwards and sideways to NGOs, public opinion, press.

Similar to Paris, Tadjbakhsh (2009) emphasizes the problem arising from policy implementation based on the fact that human security is complex and subjective. He criticizes the human security also from conceptual, analytical, people-centred perspective. As a policy concept, human security has not been considered from theoretical point of view of International Relations theories very often. Tadjbakhsh,

however, provides critique mainly from this point of view as the human security fall out the scope of realist theory and from Buzan and Weaver's critical security perspective, he outlines the potential over-securitization. Moreover, oppose to traditional streams of international politics, he identifies that human security may get into conflict with state sovereignty as it puts the individual into centre of security concerns rather than state.

This part provided a conceptual and policy analysis of human security as well as the criticism posed by several scholars. The debate centres on the two perceptions of human security – narrow and broad. The first one provides better guidebook for policy recommendations and implementations (regardless of the inclination to freedom from want and freedom from fear) whereas the latter encompasses the complexity the human security was initially developed for not realizing difficulties in the operationalization framework. One way or the other, the threats people face has changed and they multiplied as well - from WMD, terrorism and non-state armed groups to climate change and diseases. These are only examples of current issues that are perceived as threats in particular part of society. Human security calls on reaction that protects people in the first place. Human security is a normative movement because there exists a clear moral responsibility to move the security discourse from state to individual based on the context of norms relating to human rights, peace and stability (Newman 2001, 240). However, this moral responsibility is connected to the role of "external saviours" and "external judges" upon whom the decision lies (Chandler 2012, 213). This concept goes beyond the traditional model of state-centred security, one of these external saviours is the EU, not only from self-conception but also based on the expectations of international community.

## 4. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY AND HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH

European security has been a taboo for period of time. This approach can be traced back to 50s when the first defence project was rejected. In 1997, the Amsterdam treaty laid down the foundation for security cooperation. That happened not only because the European Union started already the political project outlined in the Maastricht treaty, but also due to the Yugoslav wars, where the EU was incapable of intervention and prevention of Srebrenica massacre. Later on, the Petersburg tasks were adopted. These defined the priorities of EU action in the field of security and defence being the humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks to combat crisis including peace-making. All these goals had to be guide by the human security principle focusing on individual rather than on state. Thus the Petersburg tasks represent the corner stone of the human rights principle of the EU external action and provided also basis for further institutional development in order to establish structures and mechanisms for fulfilling these goals. These inputs resulted in the European Security and Defence Cooperation, a new platform created in 1999 within the Common Foreign and Security Policy; rapid reaction forces concept adopted the same year in Helsinki, which is not considered as failure has been replaced by the concept of Battlegroup. The EU lack of military force became the driving factor for signing the Berlin Plus agreement enabling the EU to use NATO capabilities in cases and territories where NATO is not active. However, even though the institutionalization of security policy could be recognized, the EU still lacked one clear strategy that would defined the goals and tools of the EU as a unified actor. That showed up as crucial in 2003 when Europe was divided on the

Iraq invasion. Whereas the old Member States were more hesitant to contribute, or participate in any other way on this move (with the exception of the UK), the new Member states, in that time only candidate countries that were stuck with the traditional perception of security arising from their history and ambition to get back to the West after decades of socialist regime, supported the US campaign to Iraq without hesitation. This division triggered the former High Representative to draft first strategy to put Member States back on track for united Europe. The European Security Strategy, titled '*A Secure Europe in a Better World*' was prepared in 2003 and adopted in 2004. The strategy reflexed the complex EU attitude and approach in the area of crisis and conflict management. On the other side, its complexity and broad scope leave "door open or potential future missions" leaving out the concrete strategic thinking about the deploying the operations and setting their aims (Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, 2013, p. 59). The main contribution of the ESS is the definition of basic goals of the EU in the area of security and defence, identification of main threats and mechanisms that would be used to tackle the problems. The main goals are to a) confront accurate threats by conflict prevention using civilian as well as military capabilities; b) to build regional security by creating European Neighbourhood policy covering Middle East, Balkan and Caucasus; and c) to promote effective multilateralism in line with the UN and international law provisions. The strategy then defines the main threats, which are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. These reflect the recent development of the international politics including the 9/11, unconventional weapons, recognition of terrorist groups as threats and the factors that enable them to develop in scope and seize. Thus the main problem becomes the state failure where there is no official authority in the state and thus the reality differed from the de jure sovereignty. In the failed state, the non-state actors and rebels usually fulfil the role of the state in supplementing the public goods. The failed state is characterized as a geographical area where there is an ongoing social conflict rooted either in ethnical, religious or linguistic communities (Rotberg, 2003). These conditions are favourable for diverse criminal groups involved in organized crime and of course, there is a high potential of emerging a terrorist group or cell. After years of war waging, Iraq, despite all the odd was classified as a failed state, the most current example to be used a failed state might be Libya, where the elected government gradually loses the influence and popularity of public. From territorial scope, the EU headed its policies mainly to Balkan region, Arab-Israeli conflict, South Caucasus and Mediterranean area. In 2003 these were rational target areas – Balkan due to its geographical area as well as the mission to prevent another bloody conflict in the territory from the normative perspective. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been on the agenda as well since Javier Solana's term and the EU has been part of the Quartet is another way how to become stronger actor in international conflict resolution area using diplomatic means. With 10 new countries waiting for the membership, the EU started to shift its attention to other economically and politically less developed parts of Europe and border countries which explains the focus on South Caucasus. The interest in the Mediterranean area is reasoned by the Barcelona process and close relationship with North African countries that has been maintained since time of colonization. As for  the tools and mechanisms used for this strategy, the EU commits itself to a multilateral approach and international law provisions that should serve the perceptions on the EU as a force of good and thus distinguish the EU from the US

and NATO that do not hesitate to act also unilaterally. On the other hand, the EU put great emphasizes on the EU-US relationship and NATO is still considered the main guarantor of security on the European territory. Finally, the strategy determined promotion of democracy, good governance, liberal trade and development as a soft power instruments. This strategy represents a comprehensive and holistic approach based on effective multilateralism, rule of law, use of force as last resort and broadened perception of threats. It aims to address root causes of conflicts through community instruments and regional dialogue. These features refer directly to human security concept, however, the EU failed to clearly determine the human security per se being the guiding principle. The debates about why the EU was hesitant to put the concept in the strategy may be explained by rational behaviour and the strategy opened back door. Hence the EU called this approach rather holistic and multi-faced security.

After five years and with negative vote on constitutional treaty, the EU published a revision of the 2003 ESS titled *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World.* Even though this 2008 revision has been labelled as a new version, it is, as the title suggests, only an implementation report reflecting the recent development in security environment. It stresses crucial areas of interest as enlargement and European Neighbourhood policy, Security-development nexus, piracy, SALW, cluster munition and landmines. Regarding the threats defined, the 2008 revision added cyber security because of the attack on Estonia, energy security and climate change. The purpose of the revision was the push the EU MS to more coherent and effective external action and more strategic D-M in order to increase the influence in the world. What is, however, interesting on this revision might be the emphasis put on the coherence of the security a defence policy with the EU values hence promoting soft power instruments and EU as civilian (Duchêne, 1973) and normative power (Manners, 2002). Normative power refers to an "ideological power" (Galtung, 1973, pp. 33). The normativeness was transposed into a skill to change the norms of international system. This capability benefits from the perception of the EU as a "force for good" as oppose to the US.

In between the ESS and its revised version, the human security policy approach developed in the EU. In 2004 Barcelona report was published by the Human Security study group chaired by Mary Kaldor and accompanied by names like Christine Chinkin, Ulrich Albrecht or Flavio Lotti. Barcelona report provided basis for a neo-Kantian paradise with military build-up for EU. The main idea of this paradise is a combination of rational self-interest and international commitment that is referred to as enlightened self-interest. The ambition to promote the human security was demonstrated in the Madrid report published in 2007 aimed to include policy of human security into CFSP and CSDP structures in order to become "the heart of EU's external operations" (Human Security Study Group 2007, 7). This act would clearly manifest the shift from reaction to early protection and prevention as the main strategies used in the EU crisis management. It does not capture the criticism provided in previous part of this chapter as the broadest definition of human security was put in.

The EU is guided by six principles of human security being that 1) primacy of human rights; 2) legitimate political authority; 3) a bottom-up approach; 4) effective multilateralism; 5) integrated regional approach; 6) clear transparent civilian command. There is a clear affiliation towards effective multilateral crisis

management based on prevention. One of the main criticisms related to human security and the EU is rooted in its relevance. One might say that the EU has been exercising human security ever since, but it just does not call it that way (Human Security Study Group 2007, 10). The human security approach should guide especially the EU missions in order to secure the promotion of long-term wellbeing of individuals without subjugating and controlling the target area. (Martin & Kaldor, 2010, p. 57).

## 5. STAKEHOLDERS´ ROLE ANALYSIS AND CLOSER REGIONAL COOPERATION CAPACITY

The current challenges in relation to human security as stated in the European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003) provide the space for closer regional cooperation, with ambition to contribute to safer environment in the region and in the EU. We will analyse a potential of different stakeholders, concretely states and regional organisations (Visegrad Group and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in contributing to achievement of stable and secure environment.

There are set five main challenges (sometimes also illustrated as threats) to Europe and its security environment, connected to human security:
1) terrorism,
2) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
3) regional conflicts,
4) failing states (sources of political insecurity) and
5) organised crime.

In relation to **terrorism** as the threat to European security it has to be considered in a way that terrorism has an absolute disregard for human life and democratic values. The European Union member states are committed to jointly fight terrorism and provide the best possible protection for its citizens. The EU counter-terrorism strategy (EU counter-terrorism strategy, 2005) aims to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and to make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice. The EU fight against terrorism is based on 4 principles: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. All principles refer to human security concept.

The question of **non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction** is interconnected with the role of international community, in particular UN and the obligation to contribute to maintenance of peace and security. The EU refer to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UN SC 1540 Resolution, 2004), underlining the necessity of states to cooperate in promotion of „the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons" (UN SC 1540, 2004, article 8). In relation to the general principle of respect to international law, Council of the European Union adopted Decision 2014/913/CFSP (Decision 2014/913/CFSP, 2014) in support of the Hague Code of Conduct and ballistic missile non-proliferation in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

**Regional conflicts** became up-to-date threat to security, especially in connection to migration flows. However there are not regional conflicts in the European Union, in the neighbourhood territory there are several conflict areas or potential threats. EU

territorial interest in neighbourhood policy and Eastern partnership focuses on the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. As the output of the internal conflicts, elections and political development, state collapsed and it resulted in "new wars" in these territories – especially in the Western Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The lessons of international interventions in places, is that international forces have been ill-equipped for tasks required to restore public security. In these regions, international forces were unable to prevent continued human rights violations and the spread of organised crime, international community is strongly recommended by the EU to apply:

➔ preventive engagement to avoid new conflicts/crises. Building security in the EU's neighbourhood (Balkans, Southern Caucasus, and the Mediterranean)
➔ strengthening the international rules-based order through effective multilateralism
➔ the importance of international cooperation and EU partnerships
➔ needs of improving cooperation and solidarity between Member States (added by EU Internal Security Strategy, 2010)

The present main political threat is **failing states**. The current political environment had influenced the political insecurity, hate speech and propaganda which used to lead to destabilization and fragmentation of political surrounding, strengthening of radical political parties and presentation of extremist political parties in national parliaments of EU member states. Last years´ elections showed strong positions achieved by right-wing parties in a growing number of European countries amid a migrant crisis, sluggish economic growth and growing disillusionment with the European Union. The right-wing parties included below range across a wide policy spectrum, from populist and nationalist to far-right neo-fascist. (NY times, 2016)

**Organised crime** has been an agenda since the last century, but new aspects have to be underlined connected to the existing situation in Europe. The last decade stronger migration flows especially from African countries and the Arab Spring uprisings (as the output of the regimes transition) and from Middle East (as the result of existing conflict in Syria) had contributed to the increase of human trafficking cases, sexual exploitation and smuggling. The organised crimes contains in EU security strategy following illegal activities (ESS, 2003, p. 3-5)

1) drug trafficking,
2) economic crime,
3) human trafficking,
4) smuggling of persons,
5) arms trafficking,
6) sexual exploitation of minors and child pornography,
7) violent crimes,
8) money-laundering and document fraud.

As reflected above, all goals connected to building of secure environment are formed within a multilevel governance system. The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats, while different stakeholders are involved. There is a crucial role played by member states, the EU institutions and bodies, as well as by other international actors. The cooperative and coordination approach is requested to achieve the goal which is not only common to EU as an actor operating in the European territory, but also to all international and national stakeholders.

In relation to the identified key threats, strong cooperation between EU and UN and its agencies, in a way of improving the system of information sharing is necessary. The implementation practice in the EU in area of security policy and foreign policy enables member states to cooperate closely in the achievement of EU goals. There exist two main concepts of implementing regional cooperation and regional actorness. In relation to the research topic, there exist two models of regional cooperation which we analyse from the point of the achievement goals set in the European Security Strategy.

## 5.1. Visegrad group and its cooperation within the European Union

Foreign policy of the European Union provides possibility of enhanced cooperation. Enhanced cooperation is organised by Member States under the framework of European policies. It enables participating States to organise greater cooperation than that initially provided for by the Treaties under the policy concerned. Enhanced cooperation is carried out under the auspices of the European Union, through the European institutions and procedures. (TEU, 2007, article 20).

The Treaty of Lisbon has created three types of cooperation specific to the field of defence (TEU, 2007, article 43):

a. "Member States wishing to do so may establish permanent **structured cooperation**. They commit therefore to participating in European military equipment programmes and providing combat units for EU missions. The procedure in this field is more flexible. There is no minimum threshold for the number of Member States required and the Council authorises the permanent structured cooperation by qualified majority.

b. Member States may also participate in certain **missions relating to the common security and defence policy**. These missions are detailed in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union. For example, they concern humanitarian or peace-keeping missions. Such cooperation between Member States must be the subject of a decision given by the Council acting unanimously.

c. Lastly, the new **European Defence Agency** offers a framework for cooperation to Member States wishing to increase their military capacity. This agency is open to all Member States wishing to participate in it."

In which area or in what field Visegrad group countries should cooperate closely and what are the factors influencing the existence of such cooperation? The model of V4 countries provides possibility of cooperation between small and big states. The alliance of the different size actors provides possibility to contribute to training of common capacities, creating joint troops and also sharing experience from different field. The important factor is the role of technology, where the Visegrad group countries have common history and also common operating teams, using the same or similar technology. This may be an advantage on one side, however the disadvantage in finding proper partners for cooperation. Common training and using new technologies in the field may contribute to increasing of the capabilities of all stakeholders involved. The next factor influencing the proposed cooperation model is position of individual states in international relations.

Visegrad group countries establish regional model cooperation in the EU, which is successful in several political and social areas and the security and defence cooperation is one of the set priorities and challenges for all actors involved. One of the most important factor is the common approach to follow basic principles of

human security needs – morality, legality, ***enlightened self- interest' case***. Especially in the last decade the European Union and its leaders express a necessity to create a secure environment not only within the EU, but also in its neighbourhood. "Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in a violent conflict, weak states where an organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe" (ESS, 2003, p. 7).

As the European Union in external relations and foreign policy use to coordinate policies of member states, the model of regional cooperation between V4, as prototype of enhanced cooperation provide platform for more effective implementation of measures which should help to create secure environment. Factors identified above set framework for Long Term Vision of V4 Countries on Deepening their Defence Cooperation (V4 Defence cooperation, 2014). The specific need of cooperation, particularly with NATO, but also other stakeholders in the field (international and regional organisations, states etc.) are expressed. Common missions of states in security and defence policy have the highest potential in the moment. Next option is an initiative of structured cooperation within the regular and formal procedure in the EU, where Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Czech Republic may play a crucial role, like in settlement of humanitarian crises in Ukraine or human security environment strengthening in Central Asia and Caucasus. The role of V4 in settlement of Ukraine crisis is one of the connecting and important point of cooperation, as declared at meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in Kyiv in 2014 (Cabada, Waisová, 2018, p. 70), especially when the European Union presented more diffusion position to Ukraine then the unified one.

### 5.2. EU member states and cooperation within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

As set in the European Security Strategy, "regional organisations also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance"ESS, 2003, p. 9).

In 2016, when Germany presided the OSCE, and the chairmanship was governed in relation to motto "*Renewing dialogue, rebuilding trust, restoring security*" (OSCE, 2016). There were set two main areas of interest, mainly:

1) Crisis and conflict management (including confidence building measures)
2) cooperation between the OSCE and other regional and international stakeholders (OSCE, 2016)

Germany took responsibility for security and cooperation in Europe during one of the severest crises in Europe's security order since the end of the Cold War (OSCE, 2016, p. 2). In relation to this, the cooperation model with Visegrad group countries was applicable, as the common goal of Visegrad group is to contribute to regional stability via security and defence cooperation, as one of the priority under Czech presidency (V4 Czech presidency, 2015). The German chairmanship goals in OSCE over-lapped with priorities of V4 in the same period of implementation, what means that state as actors may contribute effectively in achievement of the goal common to the region as well as to the time. The Long Term Vision of the Visegrad Countries on Deepening Their Defence Cooperation (V4 Defence cooperation, 2014) set as the

common goal cooperation of military forces of V4 countries. It includes establishment of V4 EU Battlegroup as well as the Visegrad Group Military Educational Programme (V4 Defence cooperation, 2014, p. 2).

This approach is underlined also in the current strategic approach of Slovakia in relation to its presidency in the OSCE in 2019. "Slovakia's OSCE Chairmanship next year will pursue strategies that boost multilateralism, promote conflict prevention and focus on addressing the needs of people." (OSCE, 2018) Regarding the human dimension, he said that Slovakia is aware of the current challenges in this area. "We call on participating States to defend the third dimension and agree on a long-term sustainable solution that will allow us to focus on improving the implementation of our human dimension commitments," he said (OSCE, 2018).

OSCE civil and military crisis management may use the capacities built by the member states cooperating within V4 group. There is not necessary to establish a new platform of cooperation, the need to cooperate closely depends on a dialogue of the highest representatives of both regional actors.

**CONCLUSION**

In the new global context, the European Union's security policy should be built on human security, rather than state security. In order to cope with all identified threats to security in European Security Strategy, EU Member States have their own national security policies and strategies coordinated and actively cooperate with different stakeholders operating in the field. As the goal of human secure environment is set within international environment, there exist different possibilities and models what may be applied.

As we identify from the stated goals of security and defence policies and strategies on the European Union level, OSCE level and Visegrad group priorities, in response to effective cooperation between countries, bilateral, multilateral and regional patterns of cooperation among Member States need to be developed. Historical experience, the equilibrium in cooperation between small and big states, common defence history and joint teams operating in the battlefield, justify the model of Visegrad countries security cooperation, which should be accompanied with the position of Germany and a new one proposed by France (Globsec, 2018). The biggest potential of a proposed model of enhanced or structured cooperation in the European Union and also different stakeholders´ platform of cooperation within the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe is, that both are immediately applicable options. From the formal point of view, the founding treaties and set framework of cooperation has created the environment, where the human security concept may be applicable. Competences of all actors – states, international organisations and regional organisations may be implemented in a way of achievement universal goal – human secure environment, while contributing to the maintenance of peace and security in the region of its jurisdiction and well as the interest confirmed by bilateral or multilateral treaties.

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