



## PRELIMINARY OUTLINE OF THE CHOSEN EXAMPLES OF SECONDARY LITERATURE EXPLORING POSSIBLE AFFINITIES AS REGARDS THE APPROACH TO IMAGE-LANGUAGE RELATIONSHIP IN THE THEORIES OF WITTGENSTEIN AND LACAN

The purpose of this essay is to present certain affinities that can be found in the secondary literature concerning the theories of Jacques Lacan and Ludwig Wittgenstein. First of all, I must say that, while constituting a part of a broader project, this text is just a sort of an introduction, a shy and humble attempt at the trial of rendering justice as far as these two – seemingly so different approaches are concerned. I am not going to regard any of these philosophers as ‘better’ or ‘wiser’ than the other one. My goal is exemplified by the well-known Lacan’s analysis of the Kantian philosophy<sup>1</sup>. In agreement with this assumption and pushing it even further in the more ethical direction (aiming to render justice to both ‘sides’ of this juxtaposition) I perhaps should have actually written ‘Lacan with Wittgenstein’ only and only if I can equally justly say ‘Wittgenstein with Lacan’. This review of the secondary texts should be treated as preparatory attempts at the achievement of this effect.

Unfortunately, there are not many texts comparing the achievements of these two thinkers as regards the general philosophy of a human being in the relationship with the world, including the relationship between image and language. Nevertheless, as I am studying the problem of how these two concepts form themselves in their mutual references while belonging to the two separate and quite different frameworks, I assumed that a good starting point for such an elaboration would be at least to start to search for any traces of strivings to brought up this issue by other researchers who referred to both of the philosophers, even if only indirectly. That is why I must apologize the reader of this piece of writing: the text is not very original, as I said, it is rather aimed at the exploration and preparation of the ground before beginning any serious research on the matter. Obviously, this can’t hold me back from hoping that at least some analogies between the two approaches will bring a bit of inspiration for anyone interested in the research field.

As is well known, Lacan made a few references to the theory of Wittgenstein in his

<sup>1</sup> Lacan juxtaposes Kant’s theory and Sade’s philosophy in Seminar VI, that is, *Ethics of Psychoanalysis*. Hence many authors of the secondary literature refer to the Lacanian way of analysing the chosen texts written by the two, the method of the juxtaposition of Kant’s works and Sade’s novels, which can be encapsulated by means of the words ‘Kant with Sade’ (*Kant avec Sade*).

strivings to ‘return to Freud’<sup>2</sup>. He advised his students to read Wittgenstein and was far from underestimating the contributions made by the author of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*<sup>3</sup>. One of the commentators, J. Allouch, underlines that Freud, as embraced by Lacan, appears as ‘wittgensteinian’ – just like Wittgenstein he uses philosophy as a tool for fighting with any philosopher-theoretician which is alive in each of us, in the same way, Lacan regards psychoanalysis as an instrument in the struggle with the clinician as a representative of ‘common discourse, making judgments distorted by the deformations of the originary intuition, with which psychoanalysis started at its sources. Specifically, both Wittgenstein and Lacan are forced to wrestle with the incommensurability between that which is to be explained and the measures by means of which it is to be explained<sup>4</sup> and such a state of matters obtains also when one takes into account their grasp of the relationship between language and image. Still, as regards the latter, the use of language, and more precisely: the communication with the help of images, takes the privileged place and, taking into consideration all the sources of the power of expression being at our disposal, we must admit that we can never catch up with them. ‘Their

<sup>2</sup> Moreover, in Lacan’s writings, one can notice many ‘answers’ of this author to diverse objections to some areas of Freud’s theory which can be found in Wittgenstein’s works (concerning, for example, rejection of contingency, generalization of the theory of dreams, unilateral approach to hallucinations, linguistic ‘slips’, and all the other abortive or missed actions). Some of the latter’s remarks can be found in Bouveresse’s book *Wittgenstein Reads Freud*, where the reception of the Freudian theory by the author of *Philosophical Investigations* is, at least speaking in general terms, rendered.

<sup>3</sup> The remarks on Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be found in the 12<sup>th</sup> volume of Lacan’s seminar, entitled *Les envers de la psychanalyse*, embracing the period 1969–1970.

<sup>4</sup> J. Allouch, *Freud, Wittgenstein, Lacan*. Retrieved from: <<http://www.jeanallouch.com/pdf/125>>; [access: 15 mai 2021], p. 2.

relationship, both when they come into play as the measures, and as the aims of investigations, brings to mind, as it seems to follow from various interpretations and the above elaboration, the notion, in agreement with which a prototypical case determines the form of exploring things, which, however, is obligatory with reference to all the phenomena<sup>5</sup>. The prototypical form is subjected to changes<sup>6</sup>, and this dynamic character of examination still more complicates the task of taking account of the sense-creative relationship between that which is linguistic and that which is ‘imagistic’, as far as all the essential questions crucial for exhausting the topic are concerned.

Among many areas connected with the subject in question, brought up by the investigators of the theories formulated by Wittgenstein and by Lacan, only two issues contained in them were chosen so as to give a general review of the field of problems concerning language and image. One of the authors analyzing possible affinities between the approaches of Wittgenstein and Lacan is Françoise Fonteneau, who focuses on the way in which their methods of investigations find their grounding in ethics, here defined as the ‘ethics of silence’, obviously referring to the thesis placed by Wittgenstein as summarizing (one may say: opening and closing at the same time, like a door or gate) the

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Not only determining the human – ‘stable in its instability’ - character of seizing by the thought at least some of that towards which it makes its way but also reflecting itself in the changes of the discourse of both authors during all the process of development of their theories. However, these transformations are accompanied by either the trials to express ‘between the words’ what they cannot express or do it through the necessary silence. This helplessness in the later period of the development of Lacan’s theory finds its expression that ultimately ‘there’s only one mistake (*une bêtise*), next, another mistake, later – another one, then another’ - clumsiness characterizing the striving to utter that which is at stake utilizing every kind of another ‘new writing’ (*Ibidem*, p. 3).

whole content of *Tractatus*: 'Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent'<sup>7</sup>. It would make place for the new ethics that says 'nothing', that is, doesn't speak about any particular thing (but its 'silence' is all the more expressive, perhaps telling so much that one couldn't grasp the abundance it points to as well as its significance), the postulate of which might be established based on the point of view of the 'logic of philosopher, philosopher of the logic of analysis'<sup>8</sup>. At the same time, as if in the background of reflections of this author, we have to do with a kind of silent dialogue between Wittgenstein and Lacan: 'We postulate that the two fields, in which they are engaged, may teach each other, that this face-to-face gives birth to the questions which are salutary for a philosopher or an analyst, who interrogates oneself about one's act, that these two ethics gain from being confronted with each other. The vector of silence permits for such mutual interrogation: on one side certain ineffable ethics, on the second – the ethics of half-saying (*éthique du mi-dire*). Is it possible that the ethical experience is connected with the experience of a boundary, whose part would be silence?'<sup>9</sup>. This silence is inseparable from the postulate of the existence of sense but the sense that would be at stake is ambiguous, it is a sort of multiple sense – stripped of the illusion of consistency. It's only when we are aware of this 'heart' of ethics, which is silence, we can extricate the formalizations of certain kinds of problems, important for philosophy<sup>10</sup>. Needless

to say that this regards the issue of the relationship between image and language, as crucial, even fundamental, for both disciplines in question, represented by the respective teachings of Lacan and Wittgenstein.

The author, following Wittgenstein, underlines the importance of showing something (through images) as different than speaking (through words) – the two remarkably essential questions being part of the exploration of the image-language relationship, as it is conceptualized by the two main theories being compared in this article. (In my opinion, both of them can be approached as a kind of comparison. Uttering words when we deliver a linguistic account of what we speak about, we compare, however, such an attempt always tends to miss something. Showing is more like presenting a certain image – and what we have to effectuate is still only a comparison. As such it can't deliver us the meaning, as Lacan would have it, or it is a result of a certain language game: a meaning is conventionally prescribed to match its designate). According to Wittgenstein, knowledge or belief shows itself in the actions our life consists of<sup>11</sup>. It may be said that I know something or I believe in something but both 'states of mind' manifest themselves in what I do, as far as I am able to perceive a certain image – the image of a specific sense. What is shown and what is uttered unite themselves in the particular activity that we perform, the act being a sort of specular image of them, although always imperfect. Fonteneau accentuates that it is this same image that amounts to the surplus of sense: as being something more than that which can be spoken about, it 'hasn't

<sup>7</sup> L. Wittgenstein, *Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.*, transl. from German by C. B. Ogden, London 1922.

<sup>8</sup> F. Fonteneau, *L'éthique du silence. Wittgenstein et Lacan*, Paris 1999, p. 9.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 9–10.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 10.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 12.

acquired' sense<sup>12</sup>. One must however notice that it presents us with the corresponding excess - the unforeseen surplus is also inextricably involved in the act of showing: there is always something more that shines through the explicitly 'seen'.

A very similar situation takes place when we look at the matter from the Lacanian point of view. Lacan unquestionably supports the difference between 'statement' (*énoncé*) - something that is being spoken about (that is, actual words uttered) and 'enunciation' (*énonciation*) - the act of uttering them (speaking<sup>13</sup> can't speak itself, so to say, it doesn't catch up with itself, and even if it managed to achieve this, it wouldn't be able to grasp it in its wholeness and without any 'remains'). In its silent showing enunciation expresses something or manifests it in words, that is, delivers a certain image for those who can look in such a way that its constitutive lack of sense doesn't undergo any illusory fulfillment. Although it is closer to the truth of the unconscious, it by no means exhausts its speech.

As Fonteneau rightly underlines, for both thinkers it is obvious that metalanguage doesn't exist. Referring to Lacan's thesis that everything is metalanguage, he underlines that it is necessary however to admit that it isn't in any way contradictory to what Wittgenstein wanted to show by making the distinction between empirical sentences and grammatical sentences. It is true,

he maintains this distinction but he knows that it is every use made of language in each of the innumerable games joining speech and action that shows the functioning - if only a bit - of our language's grammar. Logic delivers us every time with the image - even if imperfectly - of how the grammar rules over speaking and everything we do but we can perceive what manifests itself in this way only when we reject or see through the - at first sight deceptive - images of this logic. To be able to notice and suspend them - leaving aside the question of if it is possible - is in itself an undertaking that must be described as ethical throughout. As Wittgenstein would say, there is no super-game: either we play (or only think we play) the same game and the communication goes on smoothly or we suddenly meet in our interlocutor a totally unknown face of the Other whom we at some point seem to recognize but don't understand at all as if it delivered us with a contorted, imperfect image of itself and that is the sign of the crucial difference of games we play.

As was mentioned, what gives the language-image relationship (since any relationship implicates both connection and separation) the consistency is its being rooted in action - in practices of life, which are first of all social practices (however, it is necessary to underline that the root and what grows out of it are something inseparable). Wittgenstein's statement that in the beginning there was an act, as well as the accent put by Lacan on *savoir-faire*, underline this primary status of *πραξις*. Since, as was said above, the sharpening of our 'sight' in the manner that has just been described, reveals this same relationship as all at once in an inevitable way 'cracked' or 'ruptured', the

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 14.

<sup>13</sup> Speaking in the case of Lacan's theory as well as in the case of Wittgenstein's approach is something broader than only using speech, as we understand it on the ground of our ordinary, common language. According to Lacan, speaking would be an articulation of our being. According to Wittgenstein, any language game is a combination of a certain linguistic unit/units (a word, words, a sentence, sentences) and actions, in which it/they is/are entwined.

result is that a new image, and a new language, in which we will try to conceive this inconsistency, as if in the form of a new dimension, must render justice to this essential separation, at the same time negating it (somehow in the dialectical way). The question remains if the ethics as grounding the relationship between language and image, as conceived by both philosophers, is then divided in itself, if it is possible that it never coincides with itself. I would be inclined to argue that this paradox of the image-language relationship finds its only solution precisely in the ethical dimension.

Fonteneau takes into consideration another paradox connected with ethics as the foundation of the analyzed relationship. Both Lacan and Wittgenstein exclude the existence of the ultimate foundation, in whatever way one would define it. Lacan constantly repeats that there is no Other of the Other. As a commentary, Fonteneau adds to it such a remark 'Wittgenstein presents ethics and esthetic as simulacra 'derivative of' something (*les simulacres «de» quelque chose*): «God Father created the World, the son of God (or the word that comes from God) is that which is left of ethics (*est ce qu'il y a d'éthique*)». With Wittgenstein, we first encounter a certain Name of the Father as divided (*un Nom-du-Père divisé*), a certain god divided and then united. What is needed is the connection between the existence of the world and ethics and for this: the word of God<sup>14</sup>. With Wittgenstein, the Name-of-the-Father appears (surely, not literally) but the evolution of this philosopher's thought leads to the negation of the mentioned 'unity', as a result of which ethics itself appears, similarly like with Lacan,

'splitted'. As a result of this, we can never be sure whether language and image have united with each other properly or whether they won't 'go apart'. What is important remains ultimately as the deed: action, practice, *savoir-faire* and - which unavoidably refers to others – the Other as the Real, and by the same, only the ethics of silence is possible.

In Fonteneau's later article: 'Wittgenstein and Lacan: un dialog'<sup>15</sup> the author brings up a question – not unrelated with the problems associated with the relationship between image and language – of a difference between symptoms and criteria. A criterion as 'a privileged symptom' seems to be closer to signifiers joined in the Other through a certain number of tangled relationships, whereas a symptom may be defined approximately as a set of signifieds tied with a given signifier, assuming that a signified is a sequence of images generated by the language in its purest form, that is, as a sequence of signifiers. The status of each of these elements of a set can after all change. Along with the increase of strength/power, the signifier gains on generality and loses on content, becomes impoverished as far as the signification is concerned, until it will become 'the real signifier', which – as is known – 'signifies nothing'<sup>16</sup> but in its non-signifyingness constitutes a 'criterion' as the 'writing' of the Real. An example of criterion as something the stability of which is provided by the Real of the number (*le réel du nombre*), the example of which is any Lacanian *mathème*, however, it 'also touches the Real of the symptom (*réel du symptôme*)', that is, it can write the Real 'only in use'. Of great import

<sup>15</sup> F. Fonteneau, *Wittgenstein et Lacan: un dialogue*, „Filozofski Vestnik” 2006, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 45-57.

<sup>16</sup> J. Lacan, *Le signifiant, comme tel, ne signifie rien*. In: *Les Psychoses*, Paris 1981, pp. 207-220.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 15.

is then the separateness but also the connection between them. Symptom as creative of a certain phantasmatic image has as its purpose to negate sexual non-relationship but at the same time the ‘hysterical witness’ shows something of *ex-sistence* of sexuality – doesn’t prove or demonstrate it but shows. The relationship language-image translates itself here in such a way that the result is the differentiation between ‘monstration’ (showing) and ‘de-monstration’ (proving), between image and language, which in the case of a particular, individual subject are inseparable: a symptom resulting from the particularity of a given Imaginary is necessary for writing using *mathème* – the ‘Real of contingency’ (*le réel de la contingence*)<sup>17</sup>.

Michael Grant in the text *On Wittgenstein and Lacan: A Note* understands the remark (to find in *On certainty*) ‘In the beginning was the deed’<sup>18</sup> as indicating ‘a gap or rupture between letter and voice, between signifying act and bodily singularity’. Language as a sequence of signifiers must join with an obscure, impenetrable auditory image, with a perception or a creation of this vocal image in order for any meaning to be able to appear. Otherwise speaking, it is not until necessity meets contingency – an unpredictable linguistic event – that a certain series of letters becomes meaningful. ‘If objective-denotative meaning is to be transformed into subjective-expressive sense, one has to supplement it with a vocal stain, a stain that is without meaning: sense = meaning + nonsense. This transformation of the chain is effected, of course,

retroactively. (See the graphs of desire)<sup>19</sup>.

This unclear image is the so-called ‘context of significant use’, the one that in *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* wasn’t described clearly as yet but on which Wittgenstein puts still and still stronger accent in the measure of the evolution of his theory. A certain universal, repeatable, transcendental structure joins with an empirical condition of a singular, individual bodily event. Whereas Lacan repeatedly writes that the Other as such has no grounding – there is no Other of the Other – Wittgenstein suggests the non-existence of any extralinguistic fundament for language, and even supposes that language as such is based in fact on the absence. A moment of perceiving any articulated image – thanks to this superposition of the highly abstractive system of differences on the vague, undifferentiated ‘happening’ of this dynamic, bodily, instinctual life – may be compared to the case when from the depths of obscure background suddenly an outlined meaningful figure appears.

Next, while still focusing on the mentioned lack of foundation for language, Grant refers to the analysis of joy we can read in *Zettel*, where Wittgenstein considers joy (as differentiated from the feeling of joy<sup>20</sup>) to be ‘something’ that can be localized neither inside the subject nor outside, then as that which essentially doesn’t have a designate<sup>21</sup>. Maybe if we could substitute Lacanian *jouissance* for joy, the conclusion

<sup>17</sup> F. Fonteneau, *Wittgenstein et Lacan: un dialogue, op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>18</sup> See the remark 396, in: L. Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, Oxford 1975.

<sup>19</sup> M. Grant, *On Wittgenstein and Lacan. A Note*: <<http://michaelgrant3.blogspot.com/2010/09/on-wittgenstein-and-lacan-note.html>>; [access: 15 mai 2021].

<sup>20</sup> Perhaps one may say that joy is closer to a pure affect, and only when it takes a concretized form, it becomes enjoyment (the joy becomes more entangled in some specific meaningful circumstances: ‘in-joy-meant’, as Lacan would have it).

<sup>21</sup> L. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, Berkeley–Los Angeles 1970, p. 486–487.



would be similar. We live with language, we live in language, it constitutes and reconstitutes us but that 'coexistence' is enveloped by nearly complete emptiness. This relationship is marked by (it would be never too much to repeat it again and again) an irremovable split – in fact, a true abyss between bodily life and language, the one we always want in vain to bury. In *Zettel* Wittgenstein calls a language game by name of a certain primitive behavior, and after a period he puts in brackets the word 'instinct'. Ultimately, however, as Grant notes, behavior, as well as instinct, is language and instinct – language game arises as a sort of the unity of words and instinctual behavior). (Similarly, the 'later' Lacan treats *sinthome* as language, that is, a certain letter rooted in – and generating – a specific form of behavior.) The accent put on one's own, unique way of seeing (Wittgenstein's concept 'seeing-as', as defined in Part II of *Philosophical Investigations*, and Lacan's conceptualization of *sinthome*'s particularity, as defined in the 23rd seminar *Le Sinthome*) is connected with a stronger pressure that both thinkers put on the materiality of that letter, on the bodily character of the speaking beings which are human subjects.

Language is truly *creatio ex nihilo*. In the light of this, it may be perhaps possible to see why Lacan ultimately understood language and the relationship of the subject with it not in the terms of the paternal metaphor, the Name of the Father, but as '*bodilying itself forth without reference to the Other*'<sup>22</sup>. That is how language joins image (the latter generated by any of sense organs) and results from this groundless 'hanging in the air', incarnating language, accompanied by

<sup>22</sup> M. Grant, *On Wittgenstein and Lacan. A Note, op. cit.*

individual, unique 'enjoy-meant' of every human being.

In the essay 'Lacan with Wittgenstein 1'<sup>23</sup> Michael Grant refers to the criticism<sup>24</sup> of the proposal presented by Baker and Haker, according to which Wittgenstein's theory conceptualizes the relation between the rule and its application as an internal relation. However, the rule and its application are indeed separated by a gap or even an abyss that must be crossed or overleapt. There may be indeed the necessity of making a certain leap (it may be said, of a sort of an existential 'leap of faith', like in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard, described in this thinker's *Fear and Trembling*<sup>25</sup>. The application is something additional, it is like bouncing from a hard ground of the rule, something that has as its purpose to perform a rebound away from it: 'The ground – the rule – is retroactively defined by the leap away from it'<sup>26</sup>. When Wittgenstein writes that 'I follow the rule blindly'<sup>27</sup>, this means that while passing from the rule's formulation to practice – a particular action determined by a given form of life – we lose from our sight the rule itself<sup>28</sup>. It is interesting to notice that this case reminds the phenomenon of changing aspects: when we see one pole, the second disappears from our field of vision, and the other way round. In Lacan's approach it would, approximately, mean that when we

<sup>23</sup> See: M. Grant, *Lacan with Wittgenstein I*: <<http://michael-grant3.blogspot.com/2008/08/lacan-with-wittgenstein.html>>; [access: 15 mai 2021].

<sup>24</sup> Inserted in the article *Acting from Rules* by James Guetta and Ruppert Read, published in „International Studies in Philosophy” 1996, 28:2, pp. 43–62.

<sup>25</sup> S. Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, transl. by R. Payne, New York 1939.

<sup>26</sup> M. Grant, *On Wittgenstein and Lacan. A Note, op. cit.*

<sup>27</sup> See the remark 219, in: L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford 1958.

<sup>28</sup> M. Grant, *Lacan with Wittgenstein I, op.cit.*

focus our attention on the signifier as such, the signified disappears, and *vice versa*. Both philosophers describe a similar observation, the either/or, the mutual exclusion, and we can ask: of what? Can't we say: language or image, letter or meaning – and this process of aspect-changing constitutes the process, during which what is at stake is just the retroactive production of sense?

Further, the author recalls the thesis, formulated in *Philosophical Grammar*<sup>29</sup>, where we can read that what delivers a sign the ultimate interpretation is the intention as a psychological 'terminal', expressed by a specified action. The mentioned 'interval condition' and the pendulous movement of anticipation-retroaction separates logic and psychology, establishes between them the impassable and yet, despite that, constantly surmounted precipice. The 'psychological terminus' might be supposed to be some mental image or any 'inner picture' – however, Wittgenstein himself would be the first to contradict such a division on 'inner' and 'outer'. In Lacan's opinion intention results from the desire of the Other, and ultimately – comes from the drive as ordering the chain of signifiers that take place one after another. At the same time, it seems that the mentioned rupture can be localized only as existing within the frames of the grammar, of the linguistic logic itself, in the Other alone. It is in this interval – in this

lack – that the 'extimate'<sup>30</sup> subject appears<sup>31</sup>.

Such an approach may be undermined by the argument that it puts an accent on temporality omitting the aspect of the spatiality of the process of generating sense. Of course, it is known that time and space finally come down to one and the same problem of spatiotemporality but here on this simplified level of analysis they are phenomenologically different, especially that some images are essentially more compatible with hearing (like music), some – with seeing (as painting), etc. However, when the sense is generated, all possible images, as well as linguistic expressions, are juxtaposed in the sequence of signifiers. Now, what is at stake here is a process in which the pendular movement of anticipation and the movement of retroaction coincide, firstly, when the movement 'ahead' as retroactive striving 'forward' to effectuate empirical acts of application of a rule as anticipating transcendental conditions – grammatical-logical norms; and secondly, when the movement 'backward' occurs by reaching these descriptive judgments in their status of grammatical assumptions as preceding their application in practice. Whereas, as it seems, this process happens within the framework of a particular topology, and it is characterized by its own rhythm, defined by certain specific characteristics, those enabling this pendular 'back' and 'forth'.

In another paper, being the continuation

<sup>29</sup> See the remark 98: 'By "intention" I mean here what uses a sign in a thought. The intention seems to interpret, to give the final interpretation; which is not a further sign or picture but something else, namely, the thing that cannot be further interpreted. But what we have reached is a psychological, not a logical terminus'. In: L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar*, Berkeley–Los Angeles 1974, p. 145.

<sup>30</sup> The word 'extimate' defines the subject who is at the same time inside as well as outside of the signifying chain, 'excluded' and 'included' simultaneously. My studies concerning the issue of extimacy as arising from Lacania as far as Wittgensteinian investigations can be found in my article. See: H. Lubowicz, 'Extimacy' (Extimité): *From Structural Theory of Language to Affective Theory of 'Ex-Centric' Subject* „Language and Psychoanalysis” 2019, 8(2), pp. 30–60: <<http://www.language-and-psychoanalysis.com/article/view/3319>>; [access: 15 mai 2021].

<sup>31</sup> M. Grant, *Lacan with Wittgenstein I*, *op. cit.*



of the one analyzed above, entitled 'Lacan with Wittgenstein 2', Grant states: 'If we try to think of language in topological terms such as these we will, it would seem, be led to question any picture of language that represents it as governed by rules laid down in advance, stretching like rails into the future'<sup>32</sup>. Indeed - but the rails may serve to be moved on in both directions, although not at the same time. As the author adds: 'We may think of anticipation and retroaction as inseparable from each other, each one being the other seen under a different aspect, like the sides of a Moebius strip, a three-dimensional figure with one surface and one edge only.'<sup>33</sup> Inseparable but the figure at the same time makes evident a rupture, like a fissure in itself, represented as the notation – diamond – used in the Lacanian formula of the phantasm ( $\$ \langle \rightarrow a \rangle$ ). The formula is such that the emergence of one 'pole' of the relationship will have as a result a kind of veiling of the other, in effect, hiding it: when we identify ourselves in language as a subject, we simultaneously lose ourselves in it as an object, we vanish in our subjectivity. Assuming that this mutual passing over into each other, as represented by the successive, various mathemes, should be seen as a fundamental characteristic of Lacan's style of writing, Grant says: 'For example, in his formula for the signifiers, S1/S2, the two letters, S1 and S2, are to be seen as passing through each other, in a kind of self-exceeding and interminable dialectic: the signifier is the signified of the signified, the signified the signifier of the signifier. The aim is to represent in writing the lack of the very

function that engenders it'<sup>34</sup>.

In the author's opinion, the dynamic conception of language is present in both Lacan's and Wittgenstein's works as this continuous movement between signifier and signified, between grammar and the empirical, the movement in which 'extimate' subject situates oneself at the mentioned interval as a certain lack and surplus at the same time. It may be said that image emerges from the constellation of linguistic elements, as a result of the pendular dynamics between S1 and S2, between the logical and the empirical, as a superposition, a 'folding' of a certain fragment of time-space, as the effect of piercing the chain by desire. When the dynamics are put in motion – by that which according to Lacan is the drive, or by that which in Wittgenstein's terms is called instinct<sup>35</sup> – language as a totality (of all the signifiers) and along with it the whole set of potential images (that is, all the signifieds). Nevertheless one should remember it is the totality not having its 'beyond', which could deliver it a possible grounding.

As most researchers know, Lacan explicitly said that his main goal is to 'return to Freud', and while explaining the Freudian analysis he referred to Wittgenstein. (Unfortunately, he took into consideration only the early philosophy of the author of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, totally ignoring this thinker's later theory, e. g. as it was encapsulated in *Philosophical Investigations* and his last writings on the philosophy of psychology, not to mention even Wittgenstein's works dating from the medium

<sup>32</sup> M. Grant, *Lacan with Wittgenstein 2*, <<http://michael-grant3.blogspot.com/2008/08/lacan-with-wittgenstein-2.html>>; [access: 15 mai 2021].

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>35</sup> See the remark 559 where Wittgenstein writes: 'You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable) It is there - like our life.' In: Wittgenstein, L., *On Certainty*, Oxford 1975.

‘phenomenological period’, beginning with the crucial, breakthrough text *Some Remarks on Logical Form* and others, like, for example, the very important, *Philosophical Remarks, The Big Typescript*, etc.). Similarly, almost every reader of Wittgenstein’s philosophy knows about this author’s interest and studies in Freudian theory, which is investigated in some of his notes). Then it turns out that both Lacan and Wittgenstein referred to Freud at some periods of their teachings. As Wittgenstein’s account of Freudian philosophy is mentioned quite rarely, it may be useful to present shortly a few texts that have brought up this subject.

In the short text ‘Points of Contact and Criticism Between Wittgenstein and Freud’<sup>36</sup> Steve Hoenish enumerates what joins and what separates both thinkers. As far as night-dreams are concerned, he brings up the issue of what these specific images are and of the question of whether the images of processes of dreaming are possible and what would characterize them. Wittgenstein doesn’t agree with Freud’s thesis, in agreement with which every nightdream is the fulfillment of a certain wish. There isn’t a singular explanation for all dreams. It is not possible to discover the essence of dreaming, to find the explanation of what it consists in<sup>37</sup>. The meaning of night-dreams may

be discovered thanks to their interpretation, however, according to Wittgenstein the interpretation all by itself doesn’t deliver it, because along with that which is interpreted, it remains ‘hanging in the air’<sup>38</sup>. Nonetheless, we ought to remember that both Freud and Lacan underline that during the process of interpretation we unavoidably meet a certain impassable wall of that which is beyond any further interpretation (the so-called ‘navel’ of the dream), which isn’t itself an interpretation but also it can’t be reduced to a kind of pure and simple void. Perhaps here we come upon a decisive, difficult to trespass at the moment difference between the clinical-therapeutic discourse and the philosophical one, which (the latter) is seeking to get beyond the limits determined by practice.

The author analyses also what image of a given thinker’s own conception (its character, aims, etc.) is implicated in the discourse he uses. Freud regarded his theory as a scientific one, Wittgenstein considered his approach to be philosophical. Freud wanted to establish a school, and Wittgenstein – thinking that philosophy didn’t deliver any new truths - didn’t experience such a need. As regards the image of the world (*Weltanschauung*), according to Bouveresse<sup>39</sup> (*Wittgenstein reads Freud*), Freud’s purpose was to ‘eliminate metaphysics to the advantage of the scientific conception of the world, which was in Wittgenstein’s opinion quite naive’<sup>40</sup>. Freud’s psychoanalysis was to

<sup>36</sup> S. Hoenish, *Points of Contact and Criticism Between Wittgenstein and Freud*: <<http://www.criticism.com/philosophy/wittgenstein-freud.php>>; [access: 15 mai 2021].

<sup>37</sup> Wittgenstein also asks whether it is right that we create our image of a night-dream as a thought expressed in language: ‘Suppose you look on a dream as a kind of language. A way of saying something or a way of symbolizing something. That might be a regular symbolism, not necessarily alphabetical - it might be like Chinese, say. We might then find a way of translating this symbolism into the language of ordinary speech, ordinary thoughts. But then the translation ought to be possible both ways. It ought to be possible by employing the same technique to translate ordinary thoughts into dream language. As Freud recognizes, this never is done and cannot be done. So we might question whether dreaming is a way of thinking something, whether it is a language at all.’ In: L. Wittgenstein, *Lectures and*

*Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, Berkeley–Los Angeles 1967, p. 48.

<sup>38</sup> See the passage 198, in: L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford 1958.

<sup>39</sup> J. Bouveresse, *Wittgenstein Reads Freud. The Myth of the Unconscious*, Princeton–New Jersey, 1995.

<sup>40</sup> It’s possible of course to dispute with J. Bouveresse (according to whom Wittgenstein repudiates the concept of unconsciousness). However, it seems rather more

explain the whole range of psychological behavior and Wittgenstein perhaps thought that the new 'science' was lacking enough power to achieve this. What regards the questions of the image of one's own person and others, can be concluded on the basis of the writings of both thinkers, especially the language applied to formulate them. Wittgenstein seemed to notice potential dangers following from imprudent or reckless reading and using them. And especially where one has to do with sometimes enormous human suffering, the language also may lead us astray, to evoke mistaken images. He appreciated Freud for his courage and cleverness but – as he stated in the conversation with Rush Rees<sup>41</sup> – he wouldn't expect wisdom from the father of psychoanalysis. According to Bouveresse, Wittgenstein was afraid that he himself is just only clever, not wise and he compared 'incalculable damage' made to humanity by Freud to the harm that he himself according to his conviction had already done. Its result is that in

justified to correct this thesis in such a way that it would state that Wittgenstein criticizes a certain interpretation of the unconscious, namely metaphysical, substantializing it, and understanding it in a dogmatic way. He doesn't negate that there are deep, underwater currents of the river of life, to which we are blind and which at the same time wind up the dynamics of repetition automatism. In order to 'see' something (in general: perceive, be aware of, or at last utter it), a certain contrasting background is necessary: a 'dark background', on which something can appear or manifest itself as a clear and distinct image, which can be precisely described by means of language. There are depths, which we aren't able to catch a glimpse of when we look from the perspective of our customary, habitual positions taken with regard to life challenges. We would have to immerse ourselves in the deeper waters but – if we aren't capable of diving – no image will appear to us, which Wittgenstein describes thus: we aren't aware that the door opens to the inside and we try to hit and push it outside to no effect (See: L. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, Oxford 2000, p. 48). We need a change of aspect, an emergence of a new image as a result of using the proper linguistic means in an appropriate way. Psychoanalysis seems to deliver such an opportunity, it reaches these most abyssal depths but doesn't expose those unprepared ones to the danger of the too prolonged, unhelpful, or even dangerous clinging to the bottom?

<sup>41</sup> L. Wittgenstein, *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, op. cit., p. 41

that situation everyone – whoever – might think that they were able to heal psychological or philosophical illnesses and meanwhile people 'intoxicated' with these conceptions, 'drunken' with them, didn't know how to use them in a sober and temperate way<sup>42</sup>. It might be said – he concluded – that Freudian psychoanalysis was based on a myth, that is, such a kind of discourse in which image and language join each other to produce a particular, 'visual' story. This is something that Lacan admitted, as well as Wittgenstein, emphasizing the assumption that the language of analysis didn't have much to do neither with the language of science nor with the language of pure fiction. In the essay 'The Myth of Psychoanalysis: Wittgenstein contra Freud'<sup>43</sup>. Hoenish refers the approach to psychoanalysis in the works of these thinkers to such an understanding of myth which was proposed by Roland Barthes in his *Mythologies*, regarding myth as an 'a type of speech'<sup>44</sup> the effect of which was a certain image or a set of images. This approach is based on the basic acceptance of something which constitutes downright its own kind of quasi-sensual apprehension, insight, or 'intuition that only mythologies – that is, invented manners of speaking – dissolve problems lying beyond the scope of scientific analysis.' As Hoenisch emphasizes, 'manners of speaking' of this kind are also 'ways of seeing' – perspectives<sup>45</sup>. Otherwise speaking, they put in order, employing linguistic tools, a certain set of images, giving it a definite organization producing meaning.

<sup>42</sup> S. Hoenish, *Points of Contact and Criticism Between Wittgenstein and Freud*, op. cit.

<sup>43</sup> S. Hoenish, *The Myth of Psychoanalysis: Wittgenstein contra Freud*: <<https://www.criticism.com/md/tech.pdf>>; [access: 15 mai 2021].

<sup>44</sup> R. Barthes, *Mythologies*, London 2009, p. 131.

<sup>45</sup> Hoenish, S., *The Myth of Psychoanalysis: Wittgenstein contra Freud*: op. cit.

As the author writes, the crucial thing for Wittgenstein is the way of looking – the point of view – on the analytic theory, just as it emerges from reading the writings of the father of psychoanalysis. The fact is that he didn't agree with Freud – not as regards the theory itself but the perspective from which the author of *Interpretation of Dreams* embraced his theory. Comparing the analytic method rather to that one which he himself applied as a cure for philosophical ailments, he could 'see himself as Freud's disciple'. Inventing a new 'analysis', in the opinion of Hoenisch, 'may be seen as based on two separate but connected myths', that is, the general myth of all psychoanalysis' and 'Wittgenstein's own myth'. The result is that one doesn't resolve problems but changes the light in which they are seen by 'putting them in sharper relief'. Madness and psychoanalysis are 'viewing a person in a certain manner [...] not just a manner of speaking, but also a manner of seeing, a way of arbitrarily segmenting personality attributes'<sup>46</sup>. If madness (in the clinical as well as philosophical meaning) were to be a certain kind of a foggy or misty way of seeing things (like in the biblical 'through the glass, darkly'<sup>47</sup>) or, as Lacan says in *Psychoses*, any single thing or situation were to become for the psychotic subject a signifier devoid of its signified, then both myths would have as their purpose the elaboration of such a way of dealing with language and image, which would aim at the removal of that haziness and, so to say, building the world anew. This would be a messianic message, especially for contemporary readers, living

in the truly schizophrenic reality of the 21st. century.

To understand an individual as well as collective mythology as a language articulated in the form of images, one must be acquainted with the meanings of the terms which are used in it. At this moment Wittgenstein's difference between symptom and criterion and Lacan's difference between symptom and *sinthome* show their usefulness. *Sinthome* and criterion are that which determines the grammar of linguistic expressions, the letter's own logic. They constitute the basis on which one can identify something as a defined entity. Criterion refers to the collective dimension of dealing with language, whereas *sinthome* refers to that which can be regarded as a unique trait, a grammatical or orthographical characteristic manifested by a given linguistic expression while appearing in the mouth of a given person or their behavior. Of course, as it was mentioned, one element of both of the relations may pass into the other and *vice versa*, depending on the transformations to which both collective and individual dealings with language to which we are subjected. This is accompanied by qualitative and quantitative changes of images perceived by a human being, sometimes perceptible only when we 'look away'. Thanks to the phenomenon of anamorphosis a certain surplus, 'something' standing out, is visible only for a given user or a group of users of the language. Obviously, it may be said that criterion is a privileged 'wittgensteinian' symptom<sup>48</sup> and it is just the same, as it seems, as far as *sinthome* is concerned – it is a peculiar symptom, having the highest possible power of tying and if this power

<sup>48</sup> F. Fonteneau, *Wittgenstein et Lacan: un dialogue*, op. cit.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>47</sup> 'For now, we see through a glass, darkly...' 1 *Corinthians 13* : 12 Characteristically, the word *εσόπτρον* here means 'mirror'.

weakens, another symptom can take over its place. Not without a bit of simplification, one might say that philosophy and psychoanalysis heal from having mistaken one concept for another, which amounts to a certain kind of illness of perception. This results in the situation when certain images, along with all of their linguistic entanglements (pseudo-criteria as symptoms deforming our image of a given word's grammar; formations resembling *sinthome* yet helpless as regards the efficiency of tying the chain) begin to veil other images, the more important or viable ones, and, among them, those being able to fulfill a salutary function for us. A philosopher fulfilling such a healing function must however satisfy himself with describing grammatical positions, just like an analyst searches for certain nodal points, those conditioning 'imagistic' and linguistic 'mapping' of the so-called reality.

Jacques Lamaire-Charpentier in his text *Freud, Wittgenstein, Lacan; la sublimation en acte*<sup>49</sup> interprets the dialogue among the three of them as concerning the concept of sublimation. Admittedly, Wittgenstein 'doesn't conceptualize it but he experiences it in his philosophical practice', and the so-called philosophical sublimation is always about the question of feelings<sup>50</sup>. In Freud's opinion, philosophy is the sublimation of repressed sexuality (Lacan's understanding of sublimation differs from that of Freud but – for now – let's leave that question aside). What does it have to do with the

relationship between image and language? P. L. Assoun writes in his book *Freud et Wittgenstein* that, according to the father of psychoanalysis, this relationship is overused and misleading. Freud criticizes philosophy precisely for eternalizing concepts<sup>51</sup>, for creating images of the world (*Weltanschauungen*), that is, linguistic representations of the world, bent to one's own imagination<sup>52</sup>. It would lead then to fixing and strengthening the not necessarily constructive linguistic-imagistic relationships. The famous definition of sublimation, which was suggested by Lacan, states that 'the most general formula of sublimation, which I deliver to you, is following – it rises a certain object [...] to the dignity of the Thing'<sup>53</sup>. Lamaire-Charpentier underlines that in the cases of Freud, Lacan, and Wittgenstein 'the unconscious is their Thing/their Unknown (*leur Inconnu*)', adding that each of them 'does' with it something else<sup>54</sup>. However, as far as these practices of life, interactions with the world, with the Other, are concerned, they cannot be spoken about, that is, prepositions may picture only other prepositions. The subject understood in this way is unconscious of his own boundaries, that is, he only imagines that he has them but, in fact, he can't know anything about it. One can't find oneself on the other side of this boundary to be able to think about it at all. Then, if the subject

<sup>51</sup> This brings to mind the similarity to certain important Wittgenstein's investigations in one of his works that were published after his death. It is there that he notices that a philosophical problem consolidates and when it becomes fixed, it starts to exert a destructive, deceptive influence only when we immobilize it with our gaze while "looking" at it with a kind of exciting 'perversive' fascination or when we are captivated by the strength riveted to it in spite of the images causing us the unavoidable deep anxieties (L. Wittgenstein, *The Big Typescript. TS 213*, Oxford 2005, pp. 86–93).

<sup>52</sup> P.-L. Assoun, *Le vocabulaire de Freud*, Paris 2007, p. 3.

<sup>53</sup> J. Lacan, *L'éthique de la psychanalyse*, Paris 1986, p.133.

<sup>54</sup> J. Lamaire-Charpentier, *Freud, Wittgenstein, Lacan; la sublimation en acte*, *op. cit.*

<sup>49</sup> J. Lamaire-Charpentier, *Freud, Wittgenstein, Lacan; la sublimation en acte*: <<http://www.implications-philosophiques.org/freud-wittgenstein-lacan-la-sublimation-en-acte/>>; [access: 15 mai 2021].

<sup>50</sup> *Ibidem*. It is interesting to note that Lacan remarks that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is one of the best philosophical works allowing to study the problematics of affects. Of course, affects are not feelings, however, it seems that any feeling contains a seed of a particular affect.

doesn't have any such a limit, he perceives the world, creates a certain image of it as of a general fact, that is (even if he imagines the Universe as infinite) he isomorphically mirrors it in language. Whereas instead of stating that one makes for oneself images of the world or of oneself, one should rather say: in this way one 'pictures oneself, 'one speaks of oneself'. It can be illustrated by the use of reflexive verbs, like 'it rains', which are applied in their fullest form in ancient Greek: where besides the active and passive voices, we have also the medial one – something in-between activity and passivity).

Therefore ultimately Wittgenstein, 'falls down' from the ladder and takes an interest not so much in the subject but more in an analysis of concepts, which doesn't mean that there is no subject in his philosophy, and all the less it witnesses to the absence of the Other (contrary to many interpretations of his theory as solipsistic). The Other becomes everything. Because the Other is necessarily everything, so is the subject, for whom the Other is a sort of transcendental condition and *vice versa*: everything equals nothing.



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**Wstępny zarys wybranej literatury wtórnej, badającej pokrewne wątki w ujmowaniu związku obraz-język w teoriach Wittgensteina i Lacana (streszczenie)**

Esej dostarcza wstępnego przeglądu kilku przykładowych tekstów należących do tzw. literatury wtórnej, skupiających się na pewnych kwestiach wspólnych dla Lacana oraz Wittgensteina, w szczególności jeśli chodzi o związek obrazu z językiem. Mając czysto przygotowawczy charakter, zaledwie bada grunt, eksplorując zarazem jedynie kilka zagadnień, które, nawet jeśli nie są wprost powiązane z analizowanym związkiem, mogą okazać się kluczowe w realizacji zadania polegającego na sformułowaniu podstawowych jego charakterystyk. Dodatkowo, kilka uwag poświęcono interpretacjom teorii Freuda obecnym w pismach obu myślicieli. Najważniejszym wnioskiem wyciągniętym z wszystkich tych rozważań wydaje się stwierdzenie, iż „areną”, na której rozgrywa się opisywana relacja, wydaje się być płaszczyzna na wskroś etyczna.

**Słowa kluczowe:** język, obraz, ethics, Wittgenstein, Lacan, Freud

**Preliminary Outline of the Chosen Secondary Literature Exploring Possible Affinities as Regards the Approach to Image-Language Relationship in the Theories of Wittgenstein and Lacan (Abstract)**

The essay is a kind of an introductory review of a few exemplary texts belonging to the so-called secondary literature focused on some issues common to Lacan and Wittgenstein, in particular as far as the image-language relationship is concerned. In its clearly preparatory character it just sounds the ground and at the same time explores only a few questions which, even if not directly connected with the analyzed relationship, may turn out crucial for the task of formulating the basic characteristics of the analyzed relationship. Additionally, a few remarks were also dedicated to the interpretations of the Freudian theory that are present in the writings of both thinkers. The most important conclusion drawn from all these investigations seems to be the statement that the 'arena' where the described relationship is played out appears to be the plane that is ethical throughout.

**Key words:** language, image, etyka, Wittgenstein, Lacan, Freud

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