



LOVE¹

1. Causes and essence

Definition. To love a thing is to deal with it as if it were considered precious (valuable), although a conscious judgment concerning its value hasn't been formed. [There is also love preceded by an entirely conscious judgment – rational love, actually very rare, – except for the domain of art].

Theories of love are divided into two groups, according to whether the object of love is regarded as an absolute value or as a value for us.

Group I. Two theories: 1) It is of value as identical with us; the theory of identity with an often outright pantheistic coloring. 2) It is of value as beautiful (alternatively, good); – the platonic theory, the Christian theory of the love of God.

Group II. The object is of value as useful or pleasant. Here various theories are possible, according to instincts love is supposed to gratify.

[N. B. The pantheistically colored theory of identity doesn't explain why we love this object rather than another. It explains only the universal love of all creations. And why this rather than that? because we recognize that identity with one object and don't recognize it with another. – Anyway, besides substantial identity, qualitative similarity may suffice („kindred spirits”).

II. Effects and reason for being

First of all: what is that dealing as with a valuable thing like?²

1) Reverence, adoration – hence surrender, submission to the loved thing, – delight of surrender.

2) (Egoistic): we desire to possess the valuable (loved) thing; alternatively, to see it, commune with it, etc.

3) (Non-egoistic): we desire its good, we wish it well.

¹ Archives of Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, signature III-181, folder 19 (44). It's a manuscript coming from the folder „Księga szkiców”, numbering 19 paginated pages, dated 3 XII 1912. This text is provided with the following information, created by Henryk Elzenberg 9 VIII 1953 while putting materials in order: „There isn't a central idea here, a theme hasn't played a role in my systematic thinking. It's a mass of loose things of very diverse character (from the most superficial, malicious sayings to great metaphysics), not making a whole; I didn't have time to check and sift”.

² Annotation in the margin: „This classification of love is unmethodical. The first division is according to how people conceive of the cause of their love; alternatively, what it is really like. The second is according to which of the essential characters of love comes to the foreground. This implicates that every particular kind of love ought to be defined by two factors, – one belonging to the first set, the other – to the second one, and by their combination. But in general: with regard to active people, it is bringing one of love's effects to the foreground that gives character to love, – with regard to reflective or purely sentimental ones – conception of cause – bathing in love”.

These are three characteristics of love; love adopts three moral characters according to which characteristic is regarded as the most essential: 1) love of devotion, surrender, slavishness; 2) love desire; love as „Wille zur Macht”, delight in exerting power (the reverse of the foregoing) belongs here, too; 3) love as doing good, *caritas*.

Questions: 1) Where does the happiness of love lie? 2) Where does the ethical value of love lie?

Happiness. – Here (and everywhere hereafter) two things should be distinguished: to love and to be loved. According to our hitherto definitions, the happiness of loving will be able to consist in:

A) Bathing in the feeling of identity (substantial or qualitative: one or the other, – or „a kindred spirit”); here the delight consists in the fact that I, as an individual, don’t feel alone in the world. But what does the torment of loneliness consist in? It consists in the absence of witnesses of our life and sufferings; and in the impossibility of confiding, of externalizing oneself. If I am happy, I need a witness and a confidant through vanity, willingness to pride oneself. If I am unhappy, I need pity. In fact, it most often happens so: in love we seek pity and compassion for our unhappiness (alternatively, happiness)³. Whereas only the one who understands us, who is identical with us to some degree, can sympathize with us. In this conception also the main delight of love is to be loved; then we dream „of a soft hand, which”, etc.; but we do not in the least dream that we ourselves shall put a soft hand upon somebody else’s sufferings⁴. That

³ Annotation in the margin: „To love with this love: it is to do good”.

⁴ Annotation in the margin: „To love and to be loved with this love: delight of shared wanting, parallel aspiring and

belongs to a completely different conception of love.

The above refers to qualitative identity; – of things, and to their similarity. Substantial identity is a quite different matter. At this point the difference between loving and *τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι* disappears – there isn’t reverence, adoration and what follows them, either. Here the essence of love consists in losing a sense of individual being. But what delight is in it? One needn’t ask about that.

B) Contemplation of beauty (alternatively, of good) – aesthetic happiness. To be loved with this love: if I feel indeed perfectly beautiful and good, this love doesn’t add anything more to me; – at most I may be disinterestedly glad that the other party has got to know my beauty and my goodness (God’s attitude towards his believers). If I don’t, then it is insincere delight, vanity and torment resulting from a sense of unworthiness.

C) Usefulness or pleasure; – nothing specific here. It is not that we love that gives us happiness but we love because of the good, the happiness we have experienced from a given object. Our loving is then: 1) desire; 2) gratitude. The latter perhaps specific: happiness of feeling and rendering gratitude. What would it consist in?

D) Adoration, surrender, submission, enslavement. Is there delight in that? Of irresponsibility. Not to have one’s own will; willingly accepting the one imposed on us from the outside, „to be wanted”. In this case delight of loving and *τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι* merge into one; or rather: we don’t need to be loved; provided that the person we love deign to let us love them⁵ (frequent examples of the typ-

willing”.

⁵ Annotation in the margin: „To be loved with this love is

ical, slavish love of women from the folk or those with less education). More seldom in love of a man for a woman – when a man, according to the custom, is called „a slave” not of a woman but of his own senses, which is quite different, and much less delightful, slavery. Male lust for slavery finds gratification rather in more ideal kinds of love: love of truth, love of homeland, etc.⁶

E) Love – desire; love – power. Delight of possessing or delight of dominating. Delight of desiring is possible, too, since desire represents a strong stimulus and brings homogeneity into the inner life.

a) Of possessing. – If I love but am not loved, the delight consists in actual, physical possessing (I possess a woman⁷, a beautiful vase, a copy of „The Iliad”, – a certain truth. If we succeed in liberating Poland, at the first moment our love of our country will take on this brutal character of possessing). To be loved with possessive love: if you yourself love, it’s delight of slavery, discussed in *d*,. If you yourself don’t love, it’s torture.

b) Of dominating. – To love with dominant love: the delight is clear and doesn’t need any closer defining. You can love so only if you are loved, and loved just with more or less slavish love. For if you dominate not through love but through subjection of that person, now it’s pure possessing. To be loved with dominant love, it’s slavish delight.

c) It’s necessary to add here delight in being desired (since love-desiring evidently

isn’t delight⁸). If you yourself love, than to be desired is delight according to how you love; – whether more lustfully or more devotedly (in the former case the delight is lesser). If you don’t love, – to be desired, i. e. to feel desired, is always delight and a sense of power intensifies, self-love is gratified.

F) Love as doing good. To love with this love gives happiness according to whether the beloved object is of value for us as identical with us or similar to us, or as beautiful or good, – egoistical happiness in the former case (we do good to ourselves), – ethical in the latter (we contribute to the existence and expansion of good and beauty). The former quality characterizes family love or love of homeland experienced by people whose „I” fuses with the familial or national *I*. You love with this kind of love equally, whether you are loved or not. But you demand their love in return, – you demand gratitude. To be loved in this way is, certainly, egoistic satisfaction, – it becomes torment if we either don’t feel worthy, or feel it our duty to be grateful, yet for our part cannot pay.

a) Love-similarity requires, in order to be happy, the same love from the other person.

a’) Love-identity, – towards another human being – is happiness mixed with torment if they don’t love us, - and perfect happiness if they love us with the same love.

b) Love as contemplation of beauty is always and everywhere a painful feeling. To be loved by the object of such love (excluding the fact that it enables us to possess) adds nothing to our happiness; on the contrary, it may take away from it, if we experience that love for us as a weakness and a flaw.

c) Love-gratitude, since it itself is already payment, doesn’t require reciprocity.

⁸ Annotation in the margin: „But yes, it may be”.

delight as long as I don’t love with the same one: a sense of power, domination analogical [to that in the point] E b, even though I don’t love”.

⁶ Annotation in the margin: „[...] people’s love for God: «children»”.

⁷ Annotation in the margin: „As regards a woman, a living being in general, that could love me but doesn’t want to, here delight of tyranny, forcing power, may adjoin itself”.

If we meet with that person's love, we react as if we didn't love at all.

d) Surrender and devotion requires dominant love on the part of that person. If it meets with a different kind of love, an amorous misunderstanding arises.

e) α) Possessing demands that one either not be loved or be loved slavishly.

e) β) Love-dominating is twofold: 1) as domination without fighting, and as such it requires slavish love on the other's part; 2) as domination repeatedly won by fighting; – and this love harmonizes with all the others; – and according to how great my need to fight for domination is, more satisfying is going to be love as aesthetic contemplation on the other's part, – as a feeling of identity, as a feeling of likeness, as *caritas*; – and further even as, just the same as mine, love-domination. Then love becomes, indeed, fight for domination, and we love our adversary in the beloved person. The more one must fight, the more infrequent a liking for such love is. Hence that love of women, rather babies, lambish, tiny, with big, goggled eyes and fair hair, not very intelligent but meek and kind: the common ideal of vanquished weaklings, ineffective great people, wasted by lust for domination but unable to dominate. This is the dream coming with ultimate defeats. Impacted on by temporary defeat, we desire love that would consolidate our powers (thus love-likeness, love-identity, even aesthetic love). Impacted on by ultimate defeat, we desire love that would let us forget about the defeat thanks to an easy victory.

f) This requires no other love but gratitude. If it meets with any other love, it experiences it as dissonance, all the more so because often the greater merit it attributes

to itself, the less that person has deserved for whatever they did to be loved so. Nevertheless, mutual *caritas* is possible.

If love of one kind encounters in the other person any different love from that which suits it, then one of those amorous misunderstandings, so often taken as a subject of literary works, arises.

So much for the logical analysis. Now let's refer to experience. Well: what are my personal dreams of love? (At the moment I'm talking about love of a woman.) First of all: it is a dream of being loved and not of loving. But of loving as well – as an addition. Why? To be loved is satisfaction only insofar as the loved one is worth something herself (therefore my love isn't love-domination; – quite a matter of course, – my lust for power has come through the whole personal creation; in that case I shall be grateful to this woman for her loving me and my love for her will be nothing else but just gratitude for her love; alternatively, a feeling of possessing her love and delectation of it, manifesting itself in kindness to her. As for me, „to love” a woman would have a twofold meaning, according to two phases: 1) to try to apprehend love; 2) to enjoy her love. And since I am a kind-hearted person, I would be very good and nice to her in return for her love.

Now: why do I desire to be loved? It can be stated very simply: 1) I desire sensual delight; 2) because it is more pleasant to possess a woman who gives herself willingly rather than unwillingly, then I desire that a woman who will give me that delight also love me. And now: why do I desire to be loved by this woman and not by that – so and not otherwise? Well: 3) I don't desire to be under anybody's power, – nor do I have any inclination to dominate, – nor

to lose my sense of individual being, – how on earth may that woman love me? With love of „a kindred spirit”, love-of-similarity. I arrive at the same immediately without taking sensual lust into account: for me love is coming out of loneliness, a possibility of confiding, to be understood – and to sense „a soft, merciful hand upon my aching heart”. In order that all this may be possible, a woman must be intelligent and cultured. Then again, pity offends and humiliates me, – save it goes hand in hand with reverence; so she would have „to understand” me all the more, that is, to see my strength – and not, God forbid, to penetrate all my weaknesses, therefore she would have to be similar to me in essential points.

My conception of love: friendship and sensual delight. This is the most common. There is also: a dream of love as of domination, and then a higher form: love-adoration, where a woman’s love for me would be only enjoying my love, letting me love her. This is a completely opposite, generous interpretation of my dreams of love. And now I don’t really know which of them, the malicious or generous one, is true.

[Adoration accepted graciously. To be loved in order for the adoration to be accepted graciously. What do I gain from it? That I am allowed to freely express my adoration, to pray aloud, to externalize].

Love of man and woman. Why do you love at all, and why do you love this human being and not another? If one wants to define the essence of love, it’s necessary to take these two questions into consideration.

The answer to the former is easy: all we need is to ask what elements are found in love and nowhere else? The first such element is sensual desire and this is super-certain and

unquestionable. The second seems to be the essential psychological difference between a man and a woman, which is of such a kind that in their relationship a man seeks gratification of certain psychological, specifically male, needs and a woman – specifically female ones. I have defined this relationship elsewhere. Love is: 1) sensual desire, 2) aspiration for certain psychic experiences.

Now the latter question. Well, it’s obvious that as far as the two matters are concerned, the choice will be made solely according to the degree to which a given person will satisfy these needs. Thus, an essentially amorous choice will depend on two elements: 1) physical beauty; 2) psychological “femininity” (and *vice versa* “masculinity”). (Therefore what I have written above is mistaken: there is only one question, not two. If a choice is being made for other reasons, it isn’t a love-choice any more).

Reason for being and ethical value⁹. – We are taking all the forms of love point by point and analyzing them. In order to determine the ethical value, however, the following further differences should be taken into account:

1) Required love or love capable of being returned: love of one human being to another.

2) Love that cannot be returned, thus love of nature, truth, art, homeland. Here it’s necessary to consider further a subdivision, namely:

a) we can possess an object of love, so it can become an object of desire (works of art, and possibly also truth);

b) it cannot be possessed and in this sense

⁹ Annotation in the margin: „Basically, only *φιλεῖν*, and not *φιλεῖσθαι*, has aesthetic value. Or maybe a certain ennobling influence of *τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι* exists. Rather, an ethically unfavorable influence would seem probable”.

it cannot be an object of desire, it can be only created. Thus homeland and any moral beauty, heroism, etc.

A) Love-identity. One doesn't sense the „I” in contrast with a „not-I”. The value will depend on what at all the worth of such fusion or widening of self is.

A¹) Similarity – ?

B) Aesthetic contemplation. To love so – enormous value, to let others love us so, if we deserve it, doesn't add anything to our worth, if we don't deserve, it's an immoral thing.

C) Gratitude – ?

D) Adoration, surrender etc.; – Negative aspects strike the eye. At the same time, however, it is here that the positive feature common to all forms of love appears most strongly, – since just this part is the most essential characteristic of love: namely, the fact that reverence for something outside of ourselves and our occupation with that thing bring us out of ourselves; they save from egotism of thoughts and imagination and give a clear sense at least to our individual life, determining its certain definite direction and becoming a germ of actions. The disadvantage is this: if what we love isn't really beautiful and good, if we haven't formed a conscious and clear judgment about it, then two sins occur: 1) unreasonableness of motives on which the whole direction of our life is dependent; 2) abandoning oneself to poor and paltry goals. Thirdly at last, there is an absolutely fundamental sin: namely, we forgo acting at our own discretion wherever the loved thing's interest comes into play. It's fabulous facilitation of our life. It has, however, advantages as well: freeing a human being from constant hesitation about one's conduct, it makes action more productive. Here

is, e. g., my longing for love in the broader meaning (not of a woman): „to have a delimited route”, that is, a sharp criterion for behavior, and not to need to be in two minds at every moment because 1) it is painful; 2) it leads to continuous self-analysis and egotism; 3) makes me unproductive. (Egotism and self-realization are also painful and immoral – why?) Irrational love is to replace the rational „knowledge of good and evil”. It is, without question, ethically lower than that knowledge; nonetheless, it may be the only love accessible to a human being.

Achtung! If I am judging love in ethical terms, it means that I have a ready-made ethical criterion, that is, that I don't need love. I need it only insofar as I lack an ethical criterion. Is that so? Not necessarily. I suppose I know what is good and what is evil but good and evil things are so many and of so many kinds that if I want to serve all the good ones equally, I shall distract myself again and often have straightforwardly to choose between two virtues. Now then, unreasonable love determines what kind of good we shall serve. A polytheistic symbol: which of gods – services held by Christians in particular temples. Love of such a woman and not of a different one may become a living symbol of such an ethical direction of our life or of a different one.

E) α) Possessing – further modifications, not directly. β) Dominating. γ) Desiring – the ethical value of desire: super-interesting issue. According to the position of eudaimonism, lust deserved the greatest condemnation. But desiring something not regarded as indispensable [...] was already permitted also there. It can even have certain eudaimonistic meaning, as Pindar's *γλυκὺς*

*ἡμερος*¹⁰ testifies, partly with regard to an inflow of energy and vital force, partly with regard to giving a uniform direction to one's life and eliminating various conflicting, petty strivings (but then, where do these strivings originate, if not from desires? So it isn't desire in itself that matters but disproportionate intensification of one desire, as compared with others.) According also to the strictly ethical stance, the latter is significant as increasing productivity and giving a style to one's soul. Whereas it is absolutely unethical lust (irrespective of eudaimonism) if 1) it springs from irrational drive, it is blind; 2) it weakens one's ability whether to judge objectively or to act disinterestedly. A human being dominated by lust is ethically disgusting. In order to lose this meaning, desire must be combined with a great amount of „skepticism”, „didacticism”; a human being should prove to themselves by action that they are not dominated.

F) Love-beneficence is of enormous social significance; it is the love Christianity means when it says „Love your neighbors”. Strictly ethically, it is the consummation of amorous reverence I was talking about previously. That gave a certain uniform program to one's life and here we have the detection of that program. It makes possible: 1) acting; 2) acting in a certain designated direction.

Does indeed action alone (and not productive, producing beauty action) has ethical value? Love makes action possible; good, but why to act? Whether because – since action delivers from egotism and egotism makes us unproductive – any action, even though itself not producing, trains for

productivity?¹¹. It is a fact that I immediately experience egotism as a disgusting thing, probably as an expression of impotence (wallowing in one's own impotence). Whereas any exertion of one's strength outside of oneself is beautiful in itself. Action that is to a certain degree fight is always beautiful. After all, I said at one time that every effort is beautiful and, according also to the so called ethics of will, it is a fundamental good.

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It would be further necessary to explore what positive or negative impact the fact of being loved with this or that love, – and mutual love – can have; alternatively, even whether amorous misunderstandings and fights entail certain ethical values.

Now then, as regards love of man and woman, its first and most unquestionable characteristic is sensuality – what is the ethical meaning of sensuality? The fact is known that sensuality as a constant trait of one's disposition refines aesthetic sensitivity, while being dominated by sensual lust at a given moment and a propensity to utterly give in to lust blunt this same aesthetic sensitivity. The ideal is then a sensual but controlling the senses human being (Indian: „one's senses' master”). This sensitivity that sensuality provides is an immensely important thing; without it any artistry and life's aesthetics are impossible.

[The French are more sensual, Germans sexually stronger. It's very possible that some

¹⁰ Annotation in the margin: „One might contrast *ἡμερος* (desire) with *ἐπιθυμία* (lust)”.

¹¹ Annotation in the margin: „Act, stoics used to say, and in order to act, will. And why am I to will, where am I going to take motives for action from? Christians came and said to this: „love”. Love and you will already be willing, scil. to act for the good of that which you will conceive an affection for. Only a question remains: how to kindle love in oneself?”.

attenuation of sexual strength positively influences permanent sensitivity of senses. For I was puzzled by the fact that people ready at every moment to... are at the same time deprived of all aesthetic, and even sensual, sensitivity, apart from this single specific one, e. g. they manifest a total insensibility to a touch of the hand, a brush of the hair, etc.]¹².

Sensual love, as long as it is really love, consists in sensual fastidiousness: „only this one and not another”, the more general sensuality must get the upper hand over the sexual-animal love. From this it would follow that mainly people of lesser strength (with underdeveloped purely sexual lustfulness), of more refined nervous sensuality, are capable of sensual love, which also seems to be proven correct by experience. (The paradise of sensual love is France, not Germany).

Thus: it is the more general sensuality that plays a positive role. But now, as far as love is concerned: does love excite or blunt this sensuality? When unsatisfied, it excites, of course – and a peculiar thing: unsatisfied sensual love is one of the most known stimuli for poetic creativity. Satisfied love seems rather to blunt. Whether in other respects love has positive or negative effects remains to be explored.

[Incidentally: what is the ethical value of happiness if we call happiness satisfaction not of the noblest but of the most essential, the strongest enduring needs of a given human being's nature and an appearance of the awareness of this satisfaction. It's possible to think about it one way or another: on the one hand, happiness may be considered exciting eagerness for action, and on the other

hand, something soporific, like a narcotic. It's nevertheless an important and interesting question].

The present remark occurred to me while I was reflecting on the second question: what is the ethical meaning of the other, psychic element of love of man and woman, namely, the complementary relationship of their souls? For it's beyond doubt that gratification of this need constitutes one of the most perfect forms of happiness¹³. How does the ethical value of this love present itself now? As regards its lower type (woman as slave), there seems to be nothing but evil. In the higher one (woman as queen), there is probably nothing but good.

Here once more an analysis of the psychology of love.

[N.B. Not to forget that a human being seems to essentially need the object of their action or feeling to willingly surrender itself to this action or feeling, the clay being modeled to willingly let us model it, and hence this passionate human liking for living clay, hence also the desire to be mutually hated by people we hate. This fact seems unquestioned. How to explain it, I don't know. Isn't a certain kind of setting the seal of value at stake here? The very object of my action approves of my acting. Or else: a human being's ideal is not to know resistance from the world. Now then, isn't precisely such consent of the very object of my action the highest ideal of such absence of resistance, of such complete accordance between me and the world outside of me? The former explanation is ethical, the latter eudaimonistic].

The normal state of a man: effort. The dream of a man: moment of victory after

¹² Annotation in the margin: „In order to be able to ennoble people, one has to be noble oneself; in order to at least make them similar to oneself, one has to believe in oneself [...]”.

¹³ Annotation in the margin: „Psychical possession and desire as well, hence opening to heart-depth with each other, in the absence of which love is lacking”.

the highest exertion of effort. „Heroism”. Action, fight, creativity.

The normal state of a woman: calmness. The dream of a woman: undisturbed silence of calmness. Staying in the state that is satisfaction with herself. It can be attained either by surrender or by domination, queenship or slavishness. Woman queen or slave.

Hence two types of love, according to whether an actor or a creator loves a queen or a slave.

1) Slave. – It’s a liking of weak men, who, instead of strenuous creative effort, seek out somewhere else the soft clay of the soft feminine nature to mold in. The delight of a man consists here in exerting his creative activity on the feminine soul and the specifically amorous addition is exactly that consent on a woman’s part; from this originates that it is more pleasant to shape a woman than any lifeless or unwilling clay (which is ultimately the delight of Titans). The delight of a woman consists in the fact that: 1) in her purely passive state she is freed from effort, action, she can stay calmly satisfied and devoted; 2) although a woman desires calmness in her depth, she likes it, however, when winds agitate ripples on her surface („mood” is an ultra-feminine thing). She attains this by casting her lot with a man. A man, as directly engaged in fight, is deeply stirred by successes and failures; a woman, as engaged indirectly, gets from them as many stirrings as her nature needs at the moment. On the other hand, it’s agreeable to a man to see the subdued reflection of his experiences in a woman’s soul; it affects his own sad experiences in an alleviating, soothing and subtilizing way. Here a woman is an element that alleviates what is too acute, a soothing element. This

character of love exists also in its other type; then it is invariant. A man agitates a woman’s soul, and a woman soothes a man’s soul. One alleviates what is the disadvantage of the other’s normal state: a woman soothes a man’s pain of fight (in a way analogous to having read a book that expresses the same feelings as those experienced by us), a man alleviates a woman’s boredom and monotony of calmness. Appeasement and excitement.

[Thus: on the one hand, gratification of principal instincts; on the second hand, alleviation of the bad effects of these instincts.]

2) Queen: staying in a sense of her own beauty, radiating beauty to the outside. What does a man give a woman here? He maintains her with his adoration in a sense of her beauty (of her worth – I’m talking about the psyche); - thanks to him, she enjoys this sense; it’s clear and simple¹⁴. Whereas what a woman gives a man I explained extensively at one time. It should be divided: 1) that he loves, 2) that he is loved. That he loves: it is graciously accepted courage; a stimulus to activity, a harbor, a respite in fight, resting on roses. That he is loved: likewise a stimulus to acting in the awareness of his strength and worth, and gracious acceptance of courage.

Such a relationship between souls doesn’t seem to contain any unethical element. Universal love. “To love humanity” is a comfortable way of loving nobody.

„People” can be loved either through a sense of identity with them (*I* drowning in humanity), or through a sense of similarity („nos semblables”), or through admiration and reverence for its ethical, cultural worth, etc., or because they are useful to us

¹⁴ Annotation in the margin: „A woman loves in a man his creativity and heroism”.

(solidary) – and this love may manifest itself either by inactive devotion and surrender, or by doing good. Whereas lust to dominate humanity out of love for it is excluded, save in order to do good to it.

To be investigated: specific causes and the ethical value of universal love.

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How to arouse love in oneself?

Identity: what I was talking about doing good as a source of love (to identify with oneself so as to be able to love) falls within this category.

Similarity: deluding oneself about the similarity (lack of psychological sophistication), intentional uncriticalism; or: to make people similar to oneself so as to be able to love.

Aesthetic contemplation: to commune with the beautiful; to beautify so as to be able to love (alternatively, to ennoble, etc.) or to delude oneself.

Usefulness (to become aware of it).

Possessing and dominating: To weaken, to break, to bend to one's power so as to be able to love. A known phenomenon.

Rendering good. To make unhappy so as to be able to love. This phenomenon is known: tormenting the loved ones (and watching that any happiness doesn't fall on them from anywhere than from us) so as to be able afterwards to console them, make them happy, etc.

As regards our relation to people, meeting beautiful, worthy of aesthetic love people doesn't depend on us. In order to love, we can: 1) identify people with ourselves, 2) make them similar to ourselves, 3) ennoble, 4) break, 5) torment. [...]

Comments. If my definition of love is true, then why, they will ask, may a thing be considered worthwhile, be revered, and not be

loved? I'm denying that this is possible. Reverence that doesn't entail love isn't the substantial reverence based on one's own value judgment but it is a theoretical assessment based on other people's value judgments. If a woman says: "I respect this man very much but I don't love him", it means „I know that this man has traits of mind and character that are universally regarded as valuable but they are indifferent to me". In such a case love assumes the characteristics of anxiety: I know these are certain extraordinary attributes, which I don't comprehend. In general, reverence assumes the form either of love or of anxiety.

„A desire for love haunts us when we have suffered a defeat, when we are dissatisfied with ourselves, when we don't want to be ourselves. A dream of love is a cowardly dream of death". Which love was I thinking about while writing this? It may be love as identity or as surrender, adoration; the fact that the „after a defeat" responds with a desire for pity.

We desire pity but we wouldn't bear pity unless from people who revere us. The love we desire to be loved with is a combination of pity and reverence. (Pity for our „undeserved sufferings", reverence for our extraordinary attributes? No: pity for our human weakness, reverence for our...)

A lonely human being desires to act in order to get out of oneself but cannot (because doesn't have a stimulus for action).

Why is loneliness (from which love exactly is the best escape) so awful? Isn't it because one senses one's individual being in it?

2. Love (generaliter)

[11 XI 1913]

To love a being is either to revere its excellence or to wish its excellence. But what

accounts for the fact that, from among many imperfect beings, we love only certain ones and not others? The conviction („faith”, according to the terminology of theological virtues) that they are able to develop towards excellence, that they aren't fossilized in the today's manifestation of their essence, but that they are alive and able to develop like buds¹⁵ (and that, of course, this is not simple changeability, yielding to undulation of influences without a steady line of development). [„Faith” gives birth to „love” through the intermediary of „hope”]. And the definitely crystallized characters, encrusted in certain explicit imperfectness, are the least able to arouse love. (Here perhaps a mention of the contrast between a human being with a character and a human-being with a soul). [Look *De l'homme* 12].

In „normal” conditions of life we prefer to associate with people not embodying this disturbing element of development, people with whom we ultimately know what to stick to („characters” *κατ' ἐξοχήν*) and our attitude to whom is regulated once and for all: in normal conditions we don't like to love. For love of a perfect being is taking root, of an imperfect one – anxiety; – and taking root as well as anxiety are factors that arouse a need for self-perfection in ourselves, thus they bring about pain and uneasiness. [N.B. By perfection I understand throughout what a human being can achieve, that is, full realization of one's own type].

*Translated from Polish by
Hanna Lubowicz*

¹⁵ Annotation in the margin: „And that's why Poland can be loved very much.

Miłość

(abstrakt)

Tekst pochodzi z archiwów wchodzących w skład spuścizny Henryka Elzenberga. Jest on rezultatem usiłowań filozofa zmierzających do pewnego usystematyzowania pojęcia i zjawiska miłości. Według samego Autora, ów zarys takiej klasyfikacji należy odbierać jako zbiór luźnych zapisków o zróżnicowanym charakterze, nie stanowiących całości. Definiując istotę miłości, filozof wyodrębnia dwie główne grupy teorii miłości w zależności od tego, czy kochaną rzecz uważa się za absolutną czy względną. Jednocześnie stara się wyszczególnić podstawowe wartości mogące wzbudzać miłość, które obejmują: identyczność lub podobieństwo, piękno lub dobro oraz użyteczność lub przyjemność. Trojaki charakter moralny miłości wynika ze sposobu obchodzenia się z danym obiektem miłości: uwielbianie/poważanie, posiadanie/panowanie, pragnienie jego dobra/życzenie mu dobrze. Jeśli chcemy opisać szczęście miłości w odróżnieniu od etycznej lub estetycznej wartości miłości, potrzeba nam wyszczególnienia rozmaitych konfiguracji różnych rodzajów kochania i bycia kochanym, jakie występują

w poszczególnych zjawiskach miłosnych, pozwalających na zbadanie uwarunkowań wyborów miłosnych oraz źródeł miłosnych nieporozumień. Odwołanie się do psychologii miłości między mężczyzną a kobietą pomaga w wydzieleniu jej dwóch istotnych składowych, tej tkwiącej w zmysłach i tej zakorzenionej w psychice. Jeśli chodzi o drugi składnik – komplementarną naturę psychologicznej męskości i kobiecości – wyróżnić można dalsze dwa typy miłości w oparciu o ich przeciwstawne cechy: niższy – kiedy to kobieta jawi się jako niewolnica, oraz wyższy, kiedy to jawi się ona jako królowa. Ostatecznym ideałem miłości wydaje się być związek pokrewnych dusz jako droga do złagodzenia samotności, nieodłącznie związanej z poczuciem własnego jednostkowego bycia, poprzez wyjście poza siebie i uzewnętrznianie się.

Słowa kluczowe:

miłość, analiza logiczna, osobiste doświadczenie, psychologia miłości, wartość etyczna miłości, miłosne nieporozumienie, miłość zmysłowa, zaspokojenie, wybór miłosny, poważanie

Love

(Summary)

The text comes from the archives constituting the legacy of Henryk Ezenberg. It is the result of the philosopher's attempts aiming at a certain systematization of the concept and the phenomenon of love. According to the author himself, this outline of such a classification must be taken as a set of loose notes of diversified character, not constituting a whole. Defining love's essence, the philosopher distinguishes the

two main groups of love theories, depending on whether the loved thing is regarded as absolute or relative. At the same time he tries to single out the fundamental values able to arouse love, which embrace identity or similarity, beauty or good, and utility or pleasure. The triple moral character of love arises from the way of dealing with a given love object, which may consist in adoration/reverance, possession/ domination, or

desire of its good/wishing it well. If we want to describe happiness of love in its difference from the ethical or esthetical value of love, we need to specify the various configurations of different kinds of loving and being loved, which occur in particular amorous phenomena, letting us to explore the determinants of amorous choices as well as the sources of amorous misunderstandings. The reference to psychology of love between a man and a woman helps to isolate its two essential elements, the one residing in one's senses, the other rooted in one's psyche. As regards the latter element - the complementary nature of psychological masculinity and femininity – the further two types of love

can be highlighted based on their opposite characteristics: the lower one where woman appears as a slave, and the higher one where she appears as a queen. The ultimate ideal of love seems to be the relationship of kindred souls as a route to alleviate the loneliness inherent in the sense of one's own individual being through getting out of oneself and externalizing oneself.

Key words:

love, logical analysis, personal experience, psychology of love, ethical value of love, amorous misunderstanding, sensual love, satisfaction, amorous choice, reverence

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Ledera. Zajmuje się psychoanalizą lacanowską i filozofią języka (obroniła pracę magisterską p.t. *Widzenie aspektu w filozofii Ludwiga Wittgensteina* pod kierownictwem prof. Jacka Hołówki). Szczególną uwagę w pracy naukowej przykładą do zagadnień z pogranicza filozofii (przede wszystkim, ale nie tylko) i psychologii klinicznej. Współpracowała z różnymi czasopismami naukowymi jako tłumacz.

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