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Heidegger's Critique of Causal Explanation in Relation to Psychotherapy. Critical Sketches on Heidegger's "Zollikon Seminars"

The article represents a critical re-evaluation of the contribution to psychiatry and psychotherapy made by Heidegger. The author gives a detailed analysis of "Zollikon Seminars", placing emphasis on Heideggerian concept of the human being in the first part of the article. According to Heidegger, the human being is not just present in the world, but he is present in the world along with other beings, he exists in indissociability with things, with the world. The existence of the human being, but not its interpretation, which reduces the concept of the human being to thinking, consciousness or instinct, represents the starting point of his philosophical inquiry. But that, which ever-already is, needs to be given an opportunity to show itself. Therefore, the matter of the causal explanation, given with a view to psychotherapy became one of the focal points for "Zollikon Seminars". The second part of the article is devoted to critique of Freud, delivered by Heidegger, which clarified Heidegger's approach to the existence of the human being through the striking antithesis of causality and motivation and critique of the causal explanation. The third part of the article comprises a reference to psychopathology and the practice of psychiatry, which, according to our reckoning, Heidegger has elided in his reflections. It is fair to assume that, if Heidegger gave consideration to the uniqueness of the psychopathology practice, which its phenomena appear in, with regard to the causal explanation, his intuition on this subject, concerning a radical distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of causality, could take a different direction. Having examined the critique, delivered by him, more intently, we are able to say that Heidegger, despite his innovative approach, still, did not take into consideration a number of problems, being present in the practice of psychotherapy and psychiatry. Nevertheless, the importance of Heideggerian approach resides primarily in a fact that Heidegger, for his part, insisted on the "productive meeting" of philosophers and psychiatrists, meant to amend understanding of the practice of psychiatry. An opportunity to combine the causal and the hermeneutic approaches in

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psychiatry was not considered by Heidegger, although, it seems to us, it is exactly the practice of psychiatry, which the “meeting” of the causal theory and philosophy can become really potentially productive and “stimulating” in.

Key words: Heidegger, phenomenology, psychopathology, causal explanation, Dasein, psychiatry, human being, determinism and freedom

An issue of the borderline of philosophy and psychiatry has been drawing much attention recently. And it is Karl Jaspers, a philosopher and psychiatrist, who is quite often gets mentioned in this context. But when it comes to Martin Heidegger, he, being one of the most prominent philosophers of the twentieth century, is often not given the adequate consideration. Nevertheless, there is a quite obvious association between Heidegger and psychiatry. In 1959–1969 Heidegger has delivered course of lectures to psychiatrists and students of psychiatry both at the psychiatrist clinic of the University of Zurich and in Zollikon. Paraphrasing of these lectures was published as “Zollikon Seminars” by Medard Boss, a psychiatrist and the actual initiator of the mentioned lectures and events. The German edition made by Boss first appeared in 1987. Refereeing to “Zollikon Seminars” we don’t imply just the lectures delivered by Heidegger to psychiatrists and students of psychiatry. Quite literally, “Zollikon Seminars” include three parts. The first part comprises protocols and shorthand notes of the lectures (1959–1969), which undergone meticulous editing and correcting made by Heidegger personally. The second part is represented by the records of dialogs, between Heidegger and Boss (1961–1972), which has been predominantly revised by Heidegger. The third part incorporates excerpts from 256 letters written by Heidegger to Boss (1947–1971). It was empathised by Boss in the introduction that the text of “Zollikon Seminars” should be considered a trustworthy source, being entirely authorized by Heidegger.

In an effort to find some new methodological foundations we should thoroughly scrutinize the past. In the 1920–1930s an issue of an inseparable link between the human being and being was extensively amplified in the philosophic works of Marcel and Heidegger and, with regard to the psychological practice, of Swiss psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. The latter two are associated primarily with existential analysis, which emerged shortly before World War II. An acquaintance with Heidegger’s fundamental ontology has crucially affected their scientific standpoints and perspectives on the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic practice. First, Binswanger started to elaborate a concept of the existential analysis of a priori structures or what is referred to as “psychiatric Dasein-analysis” and then Boss gave his mind to, if we can put it that way, “Heidegger’s Dasein-analysis”. Both of

them had quite a number of followers and soon the terms “existential analysis” and “Dasein-analysis” started to be considered synonyms. In general terms, we may say that the existential analysis is applied for analyzing the mode of existence of the human in the world. Which entirely corresponds with the line the transformation of classic psychology into “non-classical” was occurring in, given that the classic psychology is regarded as the traditional academic science, focused on a scientific ideal of knowledge. We might also specify a common vector of evolution the classic psychology undergone on the way to non-classic psychology: starting from treating the human being, as an isolated object to realizing the interoperability of the human being and the world, his life proceeds in.

The focal points of these seminars for Heidegger were defined the following question, “Which understanding of the human being should be considered the baseline for therapeutic activity?” Heidegger brings us back to the otherness of the human being. He starts “Zollikon Seminars” by adducing a demand of a different idea of the psyche, the subject, the personality, the self, namely, considered from a Dasein-point of view. Such perspective, in its turn, requires different understanding, based on a new vision of the human existence. “You may have noticed that I do not want to make philosophers out of you, but I would like to enable you to be attentive to what concerns the human being unavoidably and yet is not easily accessible to him. In order to enable you to be more attentive, a special methodological attitude will be required from all of us” (Heidegger 2001: 112). It means to think the thinkable as it is, discuss phenomena as they are, on the grounds of themselves in their own phenomenological content. We must attain a new way of thinking, therefore, Heidegger makes a sort of epoché procedure, i.e. the entire science should be “disabled” for a while in order for the practice of this new vision to happen. The ancient Greeks were familiar with such way of viewing, that is why Heidegger often refers to Aristotle for assistance. Why was he chosen Aristotle to appeal to of all others? Let us make a brief excursus.

In his “On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics B, I” (1939) Heidegger claimed, that the Greeks were the first to fundamentally experience being (*to on*) as *phainomenon*, that which of itself shows itself, that which appears. The presence of beings in the world is experienced as their appearing, where *phainesthai* means that a being brings itself to radiant self-manifestation (sich zum Scheinen bringen) and “is” precisely insofar as it shows itself in that self-manifestation. A man is privy to the entity only in terms of its the broadest sense, in other words, only in terms of some form of “manifestation-as” in *logos*. Heidegger claimed that could be no human relations without a language. The real essence of the language is saying (*sagen*) through showing (*zeigen*) (Heidegger 1998). We are always drawn to that, which *ever-already is*, and it is only necessary to find for such “is” a way to demonstrate itself.

Beings as *phainomena* are correlative to modes of “awareness” (Vernehmen) in the broadest sense, that is, to a *legein* or *noein* that is revelatory of the *phainomenon* as what and how it is. Without *logos*, no isness. The uniqueness of man as “the living being who has *logos*” consists in the fact that his essence is the locus of meaning and that he has access to beings only in terms of some modality of their “appearance-as...” in *logos*. Aristotle thematizes the function of *logos* as *déloun* (to make visible), *apophainesthai* (to show forth), and most importantly as *alētheuein* (to uncover and bring out of hiddenness). For man, *to on* is always *on legomenon*, «read» beings, beings articulated according to the multiplicity of modes of meaningful presence that are expressed in the implicit “as” or the explicit “is” of apophantic discourse. A being always implies a Being-dimension that is expressed in the “as”, and the only locus of this Being-dimension is man’s essence as *logos* or *alētheuein*. *To on* and *legein* “apriori correlative”; man’s very nature is “phenomenological” (*legein ta phainomena*) – was the conclusion Heidegger came to in this opusculum. *Logos* is *entelechia* of man (Sheehan 1975).

As Heidegger has stated in “Zollikon Seminars”, “The thing addresses me. If one understands language as ‘saying’ in the sense of the letting-be-shown of something, receiving-perceiving [Vernehmen] is always language and jointly a saying of words” (Heidegger 2001: 200). Hereafter, he added, “To speak means to say, which means to show and to let [something] be seen. It means to communicate and, correspondingly, to listen, to submit oneself to a claim addressed to oneself and to comply and respond to it” (Heidegger 2001: 215).

What was the reason we made this excursus for?

Upon a closer look, all lectures, delivered in Zollikon, could be considered a kind of a group therapy, “which should make possible a freer view, a more adequate letting-be-seen of the constitution of human beings” (Heidegger 2001: 132). Heidegger started step by step to give an idea of this new way of viewing. What was so challenging in the form, discussions held by Heidegger assumed? The fact is that they used to proceed in the form of gradual, step-by-step training of the phenomenological “viewing”, which primarily required to abandon applying the philosophical knowledge without its verification. This requirement refers us to one of the basic principles, the phenomenological study relies on, i.e. to the principle of presuppositionless, which presumes abandoning phenomenologically unclear, unverified and unverifiable presuppositions. Since phenomenology does not cave in to any standpoint, any line, therefore, “the expression “phenomenology” signifies primarily a concept of a method. It does not characterize the “what” of the objects of philosophical research in terms of their content, but the “how” of such research (Heidegger 2010: 123).

Let us recall the meaning and the purpose of phenomenological method originally posed by E. Husserl, those it traditionally kept for phenomenological research.

It was considered a way of the intuitive clarification, the reflective analysis and the comprehensive description of various objective content, represented in consciousness, allowing to make the philosophical and scientific concepts and regulations used by us evident, rigorous and adequate. The phenomenological method represents an attempt to draw full attention to phenomena, a specific attempt to enrich the world of our experience through showing some of its previously neglected aspects.

However, Heidegger's phenomenological method stands far from phenomenology of Kant and Husserl within the traditional meaning. The common concept of phenomenon, which originated in Kant's doctrine through empirical visualization, according to Heidegger, is not the phenomenological concept of the phenomenon. According to Heidegger, a *phenomenon* stands for something which shows itself, the manifest [das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare]. Being can show itself in various manners. It is also possible for being to show itself as something which, actually, it is not. It is a state of appearance. "Phenomenon, the self-showing-in-itself, means a distinctive way something can be encountered. (...) What thus shows itself in itself are the phenomena of phenomenology" (Heidegger 2010: 123). The second part of phenomenology as the science of phenomena is represented by *logos*. *Logos* allows something to be seen for those talking to each other. In the assumption to comprehend being, *logos* appears as foundation, attitude and proportion. Heideggerian *logos* is letting-something-be-seen, *logos* appears as foundation, attitude and proportion. Heideggerian *logos* is letting-something-be-seen, opening, something, which takes things from hiddenness into "being-true". *Logos* of phenomenology of being, which we, ourselves, are (Dasein), has the character of hermeneutics, which being gets informed about its meaning and basic structures through. "Hence phenomenology means: (...) to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself" (Heidegger 2010: 132).

Thus, we can see that the reference point of Heidegger's reflection shifted from the human being to the phenomena as such, to being of things as they are. Things were considered not in the context of what they represent for the human being, but the human being was rather considered in the context of what he represents for the existence of things, or, to be more precise, "in what way" the human being, inseparably connected to things, to the world, "is".

Whereas, Husserl, examining the problem of perception, tended to take up a position of "pure observer", Heidegger considered this perception not as independent reviewing and examining of things. It emerges in a concrete, practical dealing with things. According to Heidegger, every contemplative position precedes an unclear, vaguely perceivable, practical involvement in dealing with the world of things.

But everything which surrounds the human being needs to show itself. And that is not all. The human being is not just present in the world, but he is present in the world along with other beings. In his life he faces the problem of execution, realization of his being, which he treats as his own possibility. However, according to Heidegger, the execution and realization of one's own being becomes possible only in the state of openness. The human being, himself, represents such openness, which things pass through into the state of being-true, get executed. Therefore, everything given to us ought to be accepted and described as the way, which it gives itself in, and only in the contest, which it gives itself in. It implies a refusal to talk of the phenomena beyond something, which was manifested, beyond something which we clearly perceive in it. *Phenomenological description*, i.e. full and transparent designating, linguistic expressing of primary data of "experience", is meant to facilitate it. After all, as Heidegger reminded referring to Aristotle, "human nature is exclusively phenomenological (legein ta phainomena)".

Applying the phenomenological method in order to describe the psychopathological phenomena became one of the first attempts to use it beyond the realm of philosophy. The method was applied for such purpose by K. Jaspers and his followers, who devoted much time to interviewing their patients, getting the detailed information on their condition. Therein, "phenomenological description" meant a description of human experiences, but not their interpretation, made from the perspective of a specific theory or common sense. In contrast to Freud's causal approach, focused on revealing the hidden causes of human behavior, "existential therapy" insisted on the importance of the descriptive approach, aimed at disclosing the way the certain experience proceeds in.

Thereupon, one of the major issues for "Zollikon Seminars" became the matter of the causal explanation in relation to psychotherapy, which was understood as something obvious. Why did Heidegger make such a fierce attack on the method of the causal explanation and, particularly, Freudian psychoanalysis? The radicalism of Heidegger's approach, which primarily resided in the attempt to go beyond two of the most enduring traditions of philosophical thought (the subject-object division of reality, on the one hand, and the metaphysical dichotomy of entity and essence, sensual and preterensual, on the other hand) made it difficult get it across to psychiatrists, professionals of scientific mentality. Heidegger's "human being" is neither a subject nor an object. He is the presence of something bigger, which sends a message to the world through him. "According to natural science, the human being can be identified only as something present-at-hand in nature. The question arises: Can human nature be found at all in this way? From the projection of the natural sciences, we can see the human being only as an entity of nature, that is, we claim to define the human being's being utilizing a method, never designed to include its special nature" (Heidegger 2001: 26).

Heidegger considered the method of the causal explanation to be as such priority-driven natural-scientific method, "(...) according to Freud, only that which can be explained in terms of psychological, unbroken, the causal connections between forces is real and genuinely actual. As the world renowned, contemporary physicist Max Planck said a few years ago, 'Only that which can be measured is real.' However, one can rightfully object to it: Why can't there be something real which is not susceptible to exact measurement? Why not sorrow, for example?" (Heidegger 2001: 7) Therefore, being, as a predetermined the causal connection, is considered self-evident. On the assumption of such explanation, the human being is inevitably considered a causally explainable object. Hereafter, Heidegger noted that, from the stand point of natural science, the human being can certainly be also considered a part of nature. But the question remains "whether something human will result – something, which relates to the human being as the human being" (Heidegger 2001: 27).

Heideggerian approach to human reality didn't emanate from defining consciousness as some substance (Cartesian paradigm), endowed with certain properties. He rather tried, as unbiased as possible, to access the essence of what which we, ourselves, are, without attributing to this comprehending anything external to such "reality". Therefore, instead of operating with traditional notions, such as "the self", "subject", "consciousness", "cogito", Heidegger posed the category of *Dasein* as the original basic structure. The existence of the human being, but not its interpretation, which reduces the concept of the human being to thinking, consciousness or instinct, represents the starting point of philosophical inquiry. In the early notes on his ideas, preceding publishing "Being and Time", Heidegger spoke of "actual life" as a concept, betokening the concept of *Dasein*. Therein, his understanding of life is close to the traditions, associated with the names of Nietzsche, Dilthey and Bergson. Life is something very primary, all-encompassing, and all other possible forms of its manifestation are just its derivatives.

According to Heidegger, the very "question of the human being", being posed in a traditional way, (i.e., "What is the human being?") is false. Heidegger asks a different question, "In what way *is* the human being?" He made a stand against such understanding of the human being, which implied the recognition of the substantial nature of human existence and immanent features that constitute the nature of such existence. In order to avoid biased speculative interpretations, given to human reality, Heidegger formally defined the human being as *Dasein*, and then tried to give a thorough *phenomenological description* of this phenomenon, as initially as possible, in the form it always has before any possible theoretical comprehension. According to Heidegger, the fundamental distinctive feature, which is primarily inherent to human existence, is his attitude to his own being. It has to be especially noted, that the fundamental feature is neither ratio,

nor sociality, but exactly, the attitude of the human being to his own existence. *Dasein exists in such ways that its own being is always a problem for it.* “Thus it is constitutive of the being of Dasein to have, in its very being, a relation of being to this being” (Heidegger 2010: 78). If science means the science of “physics”, then the science of the human being must satisfy the essential requirements of modern science. What is meant by this? This means that “the unavoidable result of such a science of the human being would be the technical construction of the human being as machine” (Heidegger 2001: 135).

Such is the baseline of Heideggerian approach. However, having examined the critique, delivered by him, more intently, we are able to say that Heidegger, despite his innovative approach, still, did not take into consideration a number of problems, being present in the practice of psychotherapy and psychiatry. We will substantiate our rebuttal to critique of the causal explanation delivered by Heidegger and demonstrate that this explanation, being applied in the practice of psychiatry and psychotherapy, does not necessarily mean “dehumanization”, i.e. the elimination of the human being as such (his reduction to the object), as it was presumed by Heidegger.

To begin with let’s make two introductory remarks.

Firstly, as it is known, Heidegger was very critical about Freud and psychoanalysis, which, however, did not stop him from inspiring many psychoanalysts in the latter half of the 20th century. In this context J. Lacan is usually mentioned as the most striking example of Heidegger’s influence on the elaboration of psychoanalysis. The fierce critique of psychoanalysis, delivered by Heidegger, on one hand, and his role in the elaboration of psychoanalysis, on the other hand, led to a discussion on the compatibility of “Heidegger and Freud” (Jackson 2007; Bolton *et al.* 1996; Dallmayr 1993).

However, we will not delve into this discussion, since it worthy of separate reviewing, but focus our attention only on critique of the causal explanation delivered by Heidegger and the role it played in psychotherapy and the medical practice.

Secondly, even though Heidegger’s philosophy is often considered “ambiguous”, hard to understand, his cooperation with psychiatrists in the 1960s seems to benefited him. Participating in these seminars, Heidegger sought to be understood, expounded his philosophy in a more “comprehensible” form, while most of its focal themes remained unchanged.

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Heidegger’s critical attitude towards the causal explanation in psychoanalysis is evidenced by many remarks in “Zollikon Seminars”. Talking to Boss, Heidegger once noted, “The human being is essentially in need of help because he is always

in danger of losing himself and of not coming to grips with himself. This danger is connected with the human being's freedom. The entire question of the human being's capacity for being ill is connected with the imperfection of his unfolding essence. Each illness is a loss of freedom, a constriction of the possibility for living. The 'psychoanalytic case history' [Lebensgeschichte] is by no means a history, but [an explanation by means of] a naturalistic chain of causes, a chain of cause and effect, and even more, a construct" (Heidegger 2001: 157).

This quote denotes the major problem, psychoanalysis faces according to Heidegger: psychoanalysis interprets the history of the human being as a causal chain, herewith, the chain, which was "constructed". In the same conversation Heidegger posed a question of whether the human being is present in general, in all his uniqueness, within the "construction of Freudian theory of libido". "Attempts to explain human phenomena on the basis of instincts have the characteristic method of a science whose object field is not the human being at all but rather mechanics. Therefore, it is fundamentally questionable whether such a method, determined by nonhuman objectivity, is able to assert anything about the human being as the human being" (Heidegger 2001: 172).

Heidegger also suggested that Freud purposely tried to substantiate the causal approach to the phenomenon of the human being. According to Heidegger, this approach can't be obtained on the basis of the conscious human activity, therefore, Freud had to "invent" the unconscious, "For conscious, human phenomena, he also postulates an unbroken [chain] of explanation, that is, the continuity of causal connections. Since there is no such thing 'within consciousness', he has to invent 'the unconscious' in which there must be an unbroken [chain of] causal connections. The postulate is the complete explanation of psychical life whereby explanation [Erklären] and understanding [Verstehen] are identified. This postulate is not derived from the psychical phenomena themselves but is a *postulate* of modern natural science" (Heidegger 2001: 207–208).

Thus, Heidegger considered the unconscious the major point of contention in Freudian theory, since it allowed Freud to present the human being as a causation-driven object. Heidegger rejected the notion of the unconscious, talking of "the fatal separation of consciousness and unconsciousness". The above mentioned quotation manifests that Heidegger considered the baseline of Freudian theory to be his causal theory, close to the theory of natural science. However, he pointed out the rootedness of Freud's metapsychology in philosophical origins, "Freud's metapsychology is the application of Neo-Kantian philosophy to the human being. On the one hand, he has the natural sciences, and on the other hand, the Kantian theory of objectivity" (Heidegger 2001: 207).

Therefore, in his approach to the phenomenon of the human being, Freud has conjoined natural science, on one hand, and neo-Kantian philosophy, on the other

hand. Such combination of natural science and philosophy in the approach to the problem of the human being would actually be expected to cause Heidegger's disapproval. However, surprisingly, he considered this meeting of natural science and philosophy in psychiatry (referring to the approach to the human being in medical practice) as "productive", believing that "in psychiatry that the continuous encounter between the thinking of the natural scientist and that of the philosopher is very productive and exciting" (Heidegger 2001: 238).

Apparently Heidegger's reflection on such meeting originated from the search of new opportunities and challenges rather than from negative critique. Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, applying the causal theoretical perspective would necessarily lead to objectification. Theories that remain related to the principle of causality inevitably "go along with the objectification of everything that is" (Heidegger 2001: 233), thereby, rejecting their opportunity to see the genuine human being-in-the world². Therefore, it is no worth expecting to get any understanding of the human being and his world from modern system theories³.

According to Heidegger, objectification fundamentally obstructs psychotherapy, as if it implies that "psychotherapy can be done only if one objectifies the human being beforehand, then what is decisive thereby is psychotherapy and not the existence of the human being. Since one can [supposedly] only do therapy, which is a concerned handling of objects, and thus something purely technical, then the outcome of such psychotherapy cannot result in a healthier human being. In such a therapy, the human being is finally eliminated. At best, such a therapy could [only] result in a more polished object" (Heidegger 2001: 215).

² Heidegger stated that our own being can be denote as "being-in-the-world". According to V. Bibikhin, "the human being doesn't differ from the world in the main melody of his life". We exist, being in the world. The existence of the human being is possible only there and then, where and when the world is given to such existence. There is deep indissociability, existing between the human being and the world. Before any reflexive treatment, we always find ourselves being already present in the world, experiencing this world, which affects us in one way or another. It determines states we are in, our experiences. We are ever-already "tuned" in a certain way before we become aware of ourselves in this world. According to Heidegger, Dasein neither consciousness nor a thing. It would be also incorrect to regard it as a subject that can replace consciousness. On the contrary, the word Dasein rather refers to something, the experience, for the first time ever, can become possible in. We get involved in the total entirety of bonds, preceding to direct reflexive comprehension and incomprehensible by it. This total entirety of bonds constitutes an indistinct implicit background, which predetermines the being of Dasein. Thus, according to Heidegger, existence is not givenness, not a substance, but rather an opportunity, openness, a project. That is to say, the human being is a project, remaining in constant dynamics, in constant openness, the one, that is yet to be realized. Moreover, the concepts of "an opportunity" and "a project" are not of contemplative "psychological", but of existential ontological semantics.

³ "It would be necessary for medicine to search for the essential potentiality-to-be human. If one looks for foundations in the causal-genetic sense, one abandons the human being's essence beforehand, and thus one misses the question of what being human is" (Heidegger 2001: 195–196).

This quote evidently demonstrates that Heidegger's theoretical reflections reached their culmination in the point of making the extensive statement that the human being will be finally eliminated in the objectification of the therapeutic approach. But what actually can be lost, when the causal approach is applied? According to Heidegger, causality is an idea, an ontological definition, and it refers to the definition of the ontological structure of nature. As for motivation, is related to the existence of the human beings in the world qua the acting and enduring being. In his letter to Boss, Heidegger once again focused on the issues of motivation and causation, considered by him crucially important for the participants of the seminar, "But it also seems important to make clear to the seminar participants what fundamental opposition lies behind the properly made distinction between causality and motivation. It must become clear that it is not only concerned with a methodical (technical-practical) distinction, but with a fundamentally different way of determining being human and determining the human being's position in contemporary world civilization. Only by reflecting on this does the full importance of the distinction come to light" (Heidegger 2001: 280). Causality, therefore, should be distinguished from motivation since "the theme of physics is inanimate nature. The theme of psychiatry and psychotherapy is the human being" (Heidegger 2001: 135).

We might assume that causality still consider the human being as the motivated being. However, it is improper to say, that it was exactly the stand Heidegger took, taking into consideration the explanation he gave to the difference between causality and motivation in reference to the famous twain, "determinism and freedom", "Determinism denies freedom, and yet by denying it, it already must presuppose a certain idea of freedom. Freedom as represented in the natural sciences has always been understood as non causal, as an a-causal occurrence. Therefore, determinism [as causal determination] remains outside of freedom from the start. Freedom has nothing to do with causality. Freedom is to be free and open for being claimed by something. This claim is then the ground of action, the motive. It has nothing whatsoever to do with causal chains. What claims [the human being] is the motive for human response. Being open for a claim [Offensein für einen Anspruch] lies outside the dimension of causality. Thus, determinism does not even come close to the realm of freedom in the first place. It cannot say anything about freedom at all. Therefore, as far as freedom is concerned, it does not matter at all whether we know all the causes, or none of the causes, or how many causes a thing has. It is a basic determination of Da-sein to be open" (Heidegger 2001: 217).

Thus, there is a fundamental split between the realm of motivation and freedom, on one hand, and the realm of nature and causality, on the other hand. The causal approach will never be able to recognize being of the human being as being motivated and free and do justice to him. As for us, we, according to Heidegger,

eventually “do psychology, sociology, and psychotherapy in order to help the human being reach the goal of adjustment and freedom in the broadest sense. This is the joint concern of physicians and sociologists because all social and pathological disturbances of the individual human being are disturbances in adjustment and freedom” (Heidegger 2001: 154). Thus, applying the theory of causality to the human being, seeking assistance of a doctor or a psychotherapist, makes impossible to treat this being as a free one. Therefore, as it can be concluded, subsequently to Heidegger’s statements, causal theories must be left aside in psychotherapy, if the realm of motivation and freedom should be preserved in the therapeutic context. “Causality plays a role in calculating the law like sequence of one state after another. Since one does no calculation whatsoever in the phenomenological way of seeing, causality has no meaning here as well” (Heidegger 2001: 209ff). However, the real situation in psychotherapy and psychiatry appears to be somewhat more complex than Heidegger might have seen it.⁴

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Thus, within in “Zollikon Seminars” Heidegger was delivering lectures on psychotherapy to psychiatrists. He was not delivering lectures to psychologists. Nevertheless, Heidegger touched upon general psychological theories. Psychiatry has inevitably inherited all philosophical and conceptual problems of psychology, including the problem of meaning and causation, but, while evolving, it faced its own specific problems.

Heidegger focused on the problems, inherited from psychology, but at the same time, he made no reckoning of matters which have direct relation to psychiatry and might be of interest to psychiatrists, i.e., to psychopathology. Psychiatrists and psychotherapists at their practice have to face a “disease” or a “mental disorder”. There appears to be a crucial difference between general psychology and psychopathology. It is crucial for psychiatrists and it concerns the matter of causation (Meynen *et al.* 2009: 61).

The essential problems are detected even in explanations, given to understandable (“understandable” as “interpretable”) mental states as causes of behavior in “normal cases”, which gives a good reason to doubt the relevance of such explanations in cases of disorder. The reason for it is simple: the concept of “disorder” is applicable exactly to the cases, which cannot be treated in the context of “meaning”, the cases, since the meaning has been “exhausted” in such cases.

The concept of (mental) disorder “gets into a game” exactly in a case of a serious disruption of the content (semantic) relation between mental states and reality, or

⁴ See. critique of Heidegger’s approach to psychopathological phenomena and mental diseases (Kouba 2015: 96 ff).

between mental states as such, or between mental states and action. Thus, mental disorders conceptually relate to the “breakage” of meaning, and in such cases a demand for explanation given in terms of “non-meaningful processes” is quite acceptable. Such situations allow to take the mechanisms, unrelated to the “meaning” (for instance, physical causation), as a basis. Such, obviously direct, relation between the (mental) disorder and the non-meaningful or causal explanation is obscured by the complicated question of the boundaries of the meaningful deception (Bolton *et al.* 1996: xvi).

Bolton and Hill evidently demonstrated the unique situation in the case of psychopathology. The problem of the causal explanation seems to lie in the very concept of psychopathology, but it is very important to take into account whether psychopathology can really involve a form of the causal explanation, and, if such is the case, what is the extent of such involvement. Of course, the fact that this problem has not been solved yet does not mean that the question of the causal explanation, itself, turns out to be irrelevant. Bolton and Hill have rightly stated that psychiatry includes all philosophical problems of psychology. And Heidegger was absolutely right discussing psychological theories on lectures delivered to psychiatrists. Psychiatry is often considered a discipline made up from a number of indicators, related to neuro-scientific, psychological, sociological and even ethical methods and approaches. Conceptual pluralism of psychiatry can serve as a good aid for clinical practice.

Heidegger was interested also in the situation, which allowed the psychiatric practice to unfold: a practitioner (a therapist) and a patient. As we have seen, it concerned Heidegger that the patient, qua the human being, should be done justice to in this particular practical situation. Heidegger seems to understand that a therapeutic situation requires a special approach, “In order to be able to give a sufficiently clear interpretation of the relationship between a psychiatrist and a patient for this exploration, some medical experience, which I lack, is necessary as well. Here, as elsewhere, I am dependent on the cooperation of the seminar participants” (Heidegger 2001: 274). Herein, Heidegger expressed some uncertainty, not been aware of how it happens in the real practice of psychotherapy and psychiatry, and declared the importance of such knowledge, admitting that the knowledge he had was insufficient for analyzing such situation. In the cases, involving practical “doctor – patient” relations, it is, of course, important to focus on the fact that the identification of psychopathological state within the therapeutic situation can already involve the absence or “breakage” of meaning. In other words, apart from the scientific and (meta) psychological theories, there can be some operative idea of causality in the practical situation in psychotherapy. We believe, that it was that very interest, Heidegger had in the therapeutic situation (which is characteristic for psychopathology, and not psychology), that should

have focused him on its specifics rather than the theoretical ideas of psychology, due to the fact that psychology is the science based on general theories, dealing with mental functioning, while psychiatry resides in medical practice, which applies the theories concerning pathological mental functioning. Of course, it should be taken into consideration, that in the 1960s psychiatry was “managed” by psychoanalysts to a far greater degree than it is now, and that psychology was in some degree equated with Freudian metapsychology. Nevertheless, the difference still remains between the understanding of the “normal” behavior and the explanation of the psychopathological behavior, but this difference (between the psychiatric *practice* and the psychological *theory*) seems not to have been examined adequately within “Zollikon Seminars”. Heidegger didn’t give much consideration to the way the causal explanation and hermeneutic understanding correlate in the psychiatric practice (Meynen *et al.* 2009: 62).

And yet, is it really so “inhuman” of a psychiatrist to apply the method of the causal explanation to his patient and does it necessary mean “objectification” or elimination of the human being as such?

Let’s refer to two examples, given in the article by Gerben Meynen and Jacco Verburgt “Psychopathology and the causal explanation in practice. A critical note on Heidegger’s *Zollikon Seminars*”.

Suppose a man has his leg broken. He will be pleased if a doctor applies some causal explanations for this phenomenon, a broken leg, in order to correct this situation. We are unlikely to believe that such approach is “inhuman” of a doctor, on the contrary, it will rather be considered a manifestation of “humanity”: the doctor turns to the causal explanation of an incident in order to help his patient. A physician, being the human being himself, should know when and how the causal explanation should be applied and, what is more important, resorting to the causal explanation in the case of a broken leg is motivated precisely by the fact that a doctor realizes that he is dealing not with some “object” but with another human being. Thus, it would seem, he should be aware of when and how (to what extent) he should resort to the causal explanations.

Though, Heidegger seemed to be aware (at least partially) of the necessity to resort to the causal explanation, at the same time he noted in his conversation with Boss, “For instance, when I give quinine to someone suffering from malaria, I am merely the occasion for the quinine killing the amoebas. The patient’s body [as cause] then heals him. If the physician understands his role as merely being-the-occasion [Anlass-sein], then it is indeed still possible that the being-with [the patient] can continue. But if the physician were to understand himself in such a way that he has brought about [caused] the healing of the patient as an ‘object’, then the being human and the being-with are lost. As a physician one must, as it were, stand back and let the other human being be. These [dealings with the

patient as 'being-with' or as an 'object'] are entirely different modes of comportment, which cannot be distinguished from outside at all. Herein lies the existential difference between a family doctor and a specialist in a clinic. It is characteristic that family doctors are a dying breed" (Heidegger 2001: 210).

Such concept of the medical practice could be considered superficial or, to a certain degree, "black and white". Perhaps, Heidegger neglected the fact that causal explanation can be applied in therapeutic practice not because of the human being, qua the human being, being eliminated in it in advance, but in a virtue of such explanation being motivated by this very attitude to the human being *qua* the human being. It also seems that he doubted the possibility of such approach whether it came to the practice of a psychiatrist or of an orthopedist. But, nevertheless, the situation in psychopathology appears to be much more interesting and challenging than a situation in the usual, everyday medical practice.

Let's proceed to the second example.

Let's imagine that a man has undergone an operation. At night he got worse, and, experiencing a motor dysfunction, he started to blame a doctor for the deterioration of his condition. It seems that in such case a doctor could feel hurt or offended by unjust accusations, as they are made by another human being and, therefore, should be taken seriously. But should a doctor really feel resentment in such situation? If he did not apply the causal explanation, he would be resentful and act according to such mortification. On the other hand, being a doctor, he had to take into consideration that his patient's behavior was possibly provoked by the postoperative state therefore appears to be the sign of a consciousness disorder, extreme excitement or delirium. In such case, all accusations made by the patient could be primarily understood as a manifestation of his severe mental condition and they might indicate a need for medical intervention. Thereby, these accusations and threats would be treated as actions of the human being, but they would not be considered as "motivated" ones (as they would have been considered in a normal situation). They would be considered conditioned (in a certain sense) by the state of delusion or disorder. Would such consideration (when the patient's words are interpreted not on the basis of free motivation, but as causally conditioned) be "inhumane" of a physician? Or, on the contrary, if a doctor treated the patient's words not from the perspective of the causal explanation, but as freely motivated words of the human being, and, therefore, started acting accordingly, i.e., got offended or indignant by the patient's ungratefulness, could we call such actions more "humane of a doctor"? Or do these questions seem rhetorical? (Meynen *et al.* 2009: 63)

In some cases of psychopathology resorting to the causal explanation turns out to be the only possible or relevant step. It applies to the case, when he actions of a patient, being considered not causal but freely motivated, could lead to

a deterioration of a patient's condition, prevent him from getting the proper treatment and bring to the adverse effects.

Regarding the above mentioned (certainly, in some way, exaggerated) example, we would like to emphasize the importance of the psychiatric practice, which Heidegger sometimes neglected, unlike his student H.-G. Gadamer, who noted in the chapter on hermeneutics and psychiatry of his "Über die Verborgenheit der Gesundheit" (Gadamer 1993), that the practice does not come down just to employing scientific knowledge, but it is rather some aspects of practice, which pose a demand for scientific research, and the results of such research should always be practically revalidated and reconfirmed, remaining in deep correlation with practice. It is exactly the reason why the work of physicians cannot be merely treated as the work of a scientist or a researcher or a technical expert, who would naively employ scientific knowledge in hope to solve the problems, physicians have to face. The work of a doctor, to a certain extent, could be compared to art, which, as we all know, unlike trade, cannot be mastered by acquiring the simple technique. "The Art of Healing" involves much more than just employing the knowledge and the practice of psychiatry, as Gadamer has concluded, it should be considered not a mere alternative, available among many others, existing in the world and corresponding to different professions, but the practice with the unique world of its own.

Gadamer emphasised that psychiatry is not just a "meeting point" for hermeneutics and psychological or physiological theories. The practice of psychiatry, for its part, can largely facilitate our understanding of the problem of causality and motivation. The practice cannot be reduced only to employing theoretical knowledge.

So, for a number of cases in the practice of psychiatry the employment of the causal explanation seems to be quite justified, whereas, in other cases, the hermeneutic approach is more appropriate. However, employment of the causal approach does not emanate from the objectivation of the human being or his objectification, but, on the contrary, it initially implies an attitude toward the human being qua the human being, the human being in need of assistance. Thus, the complexity and ambiguity, which the psychiatric practice "physician (therapist) and patient" unfolds in, were neglected in "Zollikon Seminars". Since Heidegger considered therapeutic practice, he should have focused on the specific character of the very situation, which this practice unfolds in. The situation which requires the causal method of explanation as the only possible one.

Nevertheless, the importance of Heideggerian approach, its value, resides primarily in a fact that Heidegger, for his part, insisted on the "productive meeting" of philosophers and psychiatrists, meant to amend understanding of the practice of psychiatry (referring to the approach to the human being in medical practice), admitting lacking knowledge in this area. Probably, it was the latter, which kept Heidegger from contemplating the most relevant and *concrete* problems of the

psychiatric practice in relation to the causal explanation, despite the fact that he acknowledged the specifics of the psychotherapeutic situation. An opportunity to combine the causal and the hermeneutic approaches in psychiatry was not considered by Heidegger, although, it seems to us, it is exactly the practice of psychiatry, which the “meeting” of the causal theory and philosophy can become really potentially productive and “stimulating” in. Not only psychiatry, but also philosophy would benefit from such meeting and through learning from psychiatry, open a “new territory”. The “territory”, which no longer would imply such unequivocally “black and white” critique of Freud’s metapsychology.

If Heidegger gave consideration to the uniqueness of the psychopathology practice, which its phenomena appear in, with regard to the causal explanation, his intuition on this subject, concerning a radical distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of causality, could take a different direction⁵. In medical practice the causal explanation and hermeneutic understanding appear to be alternatives, non-exclusive for each other, which stimulates a number of questions, i.e. What is the psychopathological condition? When exactly, in which cases should the causal theories be applied? What are the principles the psychiatrists should be guided by when “choosing” between the causal and non-causal explanation? Where does the boundary between motivation and causality go?

However, Heidegger insisted that psychiatry takes a dangerous stand and can be influenced by psychology with its method, borrowed from the natural sciences, which reduces the human being (a patient) to the object. Although, he seems to acknowledge the fact that the relationship between the causal explanation, on one hand, and the hermeneutic approach (understanding of motivation), on the other hand, may be essential for psychiatry, yet, he warned us, “Day by day, the overpowering force of calculative thinking strikes back more decisively at the human being himself as an object. [Therefore,] thoughtful thinking [besinnliches Denken] must realize that it will remain isolated in the future and will address only a few” (Heidegger 2001: 272).

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⁵ “But it also seems important to make clear to the seminar participants what fundamental opposition lies behind the properly made distinction between causality and motivation.

It must become clear that it is not only concerned with a methodical (technical-practical) distinction, but with a fundamentally different way of determining being human and determining the human being’s position in contemporary world civilization. Only by reflecting on this does the full importance of the distinction come to light” (Heidegger 2001: 280).

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