
The article presents main tendencies in the reception of phenomenology in the light of Marxism in Poland in the post-war period. As it is argued, although phenomenology was marginalized and even refused from the Marxist position, a dialogue between both traditions established interesting developments, especially with regard to the problem of the body, and constitution of solidarity as a social phenomenon. The main thesis of the study is that the confrontation with Marxism enabled phenomenologists a problematization of the phenomenon of work as a specific way of being. The article is divided into three parts. First, the author defines main ideological points of the Marxist critique of phenomenology, i.e., a critique of phenomenology as a bourgeois philosophy that cannot offer anything to the communist society since it abandons the sphere of praxis. Next, positive developments of the phenomenological method are to be reconstructed; moreover, the author analyzes Szewczyk’s original reading of Husserl, and his analysis of experience of the body. Finally, the article points out a Marxist background of some thoughts of Wojtyła and Tischner, including Tischner’s ethics of solidarity, and Wojtyła’s emphasis on human dignity.

Key words: Phenomenological movement, Marxism, idealism, bourgeois philosophy, epoché, solidarity, Kroński, Szewczyk, Wojtyła, Tischner

Introduction

The question of the relationship between Marxism and phenomenology – as Waldenfels (1982: 219) and Mickunas (1997: 435) rightly point out – goes back to the 1920’s and 1930’s when Lukács and Adorno have developed and criticized Husserl in the light of the Marxist thesis that society constitutes consciousness,
and not *vice versa* (Adorno 2003; Westerman 2010). One can add to the list further Marxist readings of phenomenology in France (McBride 1975), Italy (Nowicki 1975), Yugoslavia (Lorenc 1976; Uzelac 1997), Hungary (Vajda 1971; 2016), or in Czechoslovakia (Mournal 1997). The list, however, is incomplete without Poland where during the Communism period of 1945–1989 phenomenology was indeed confronted with Marxism, and in result marginalized (or even refused) as an abstract and bourgeois philosophy (Górniak-Kociowska 1997; Węgrzecki 2001: 18–20). In turn, to say that phenomenology was just criticized, especially after 1970, when so-called “normalization” of political relations took place, seems to be an oversimplification. One can notice also original re-readings, developments, and interesting inspirations that have rose from a dialogue of the Marxist thinkers with phenomenologists. Therefore, it is true – following Węgrzecki (2001: 19) – that besides ideological refutations of phenomenology by Marxists, one can also notice positive elaborations of the phenomenological philosophy. Of course, I do not claim that Marxism enabled phenomenology to flourish, or to develop. Just the opposite. Rather what I want to claim here is that there were mutual and complex interrelationships between Marxism and phenomenology in Poland in the period of 1945–1989. The tale of their complex interrelationship demands, then, a careful reading. Nonetheless, it is still a relatively less known chapter of the history of the phenomenological movement in Central Europe.

In this regard, the present article is an attempt to shed more light on the historical and conceptual complexity of the Marxism-phenomenology confrontation in Poland before 1989. Thus, I want to present both critical refutations and original elaborations of phenomenology from the Marxist point of view, as well as further developments of the Marxist ideas by phenomenologists. By doing so, the study presents a contribution to the history of the phenomenological movement in Central Europe, and it deepens hermeneutical and historical perspectives formulated in other studies on the tradition of phenomenology in Poland (Gubser 2014; Płotka 2017a; 2017b). My concern here, however, is not to present a detailed study on Marxism-phenomenology in Poland, since such an analysis seems to require more attention than one can expect from an article. Instead, I try to define main trends in the Marxist readings of phenomenology. In this context, my main thesis is that the confrontation with Marxism enabled phenomenologist a problematization of the phenomenon of work as a specific way of being. To show this, first, I will reconstruct main points of the Marxist critique of phenomenology. The critique refers mainly to ideological issues by refusing phenomenology as a bourgeois philosophy that cannot offer anything to the communist society since it abandons the sphere of *praxis*. Next, I will show positive developments of the phenomenological methods by Marxists. Yet the most interesting Marxist contribution to phenomenology was formulated by a student of Ingarden –
Jan Szewczyk (1930–1975) – whose original reading of Husserl emphasizes the importance of experiencing the body. Finally, I will reconstruct further developments of the Marxist ideas within phenomenology. With this regard, I will refer to some thoughts of Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II) (1920–2005) and Józef Tischner (1931–2000) for whom a dialog between phenomenology and Marxism resulted in original philosophical theories, including Tischner’s ethics of solidarity. Therefore, as we will see, main topics of the Marxist readings of phenomenology include the question of *praxis*, the status of the body, and a description of solidarity as a communal phenomenon.

**An ideological misreading: Idealism and bourgeois philosophy**

As Kemp-Welch (2008: 26–27) states, “[p]re-war Poland had pluralistic traditions”, but during the post-war period Poland was consolidated ideologically and “it was to have a political monopoly” of Stalinism. Kemp-Welch’s description seems to hold for philosophy as well. After all, the pre-war philosophy in Poland was pluralistic, and it included, e.g., the Lvov-Warsaw School of logic, descriptive and experimental psychology, positivism, neo-Thomism, and phenomenology (cf. Płotka 2017a). In turn, the post-war philosophy was monopolized by Marxism which promoted a materialist, dialectical, and ideological view on philosophy. With this regard, it is not surprising that the editors of *Myśl Filozoficzna* – an official philosophical journal of the Communist party during the Stalinist period – listed phenomenology as one, besides Thomism and Znaniecki’s sociology, of the “enemies” of Marxism, and they declared an ideological struggle with idealistic and reactionary philosophy of Husserl and Ingarden (Schaff *et al.* 1951). As early as 1949, however, Ingarden was banned from teaching because of the charges of “idealism”, and as an “enemy of materialism”. In this part of the article, I aim at a presentation of the main lines of the Marxist critique of phenomenology in general, and a refutation of Ingarden’s philosophy in particular.

Gubser (2014: 190) states that “[p]erhaps the most shocking attack” on Ingarden came from the philosopher Tadeusz Kroński (1907–1958), a Hegel specialist, whose review of Ingarden’s *opus magnum – Controversy over the Existence of the World* – was published in *Myśl Filozoficzna* in 1952. Kroński’s review presents a radical critique of phenomenology from a Marxist standpoint, and as such it seems to define a conceptual framework for other critiques before 1989. Kroński (1952: 318) says that although Ingarden rejects Husserl’s idealism, his book is in

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2 On Kroński, and his relationship to Milosz, a Polish Nobel Prize winner in literature, see Fiut 2001.
fact idealistic. To show this, Kroński differentiates between subjective and objective idealism. Whereas the former reduces the existence of the world to consciousness, the latter rejects any possibility to affirm the existence of whatsoever. Kroński (1952: 320) calls Husserl a subjective idealist since *epoché* requires to comprehend a phenomenon despite of its existence, or non-existence. To phrase it differently, the existence of whatsoever has an intentional character. Moreover, Husserl's method is an anti-materialistic philosophy. In this context, Ingarden seems to reject Husserl's idealism, and to re-establish realist phenomenology. According to Kroński (1952: 322), however, Ingarden is focused merely on ontology, and he does not re-evaluate metaphysics. Ontology is to be understood by Ingarden as a philosophical theory of a possible being. As such it is speculative, “infantile”, and “empty”; additionally, it equals to “scholastics”. Kroński’s crucial arguments against Ingarden’s ontology are threefold. First, Kroński (1952: 325) questions Ingarden’s methodology, because his language is vague and metaphorical; in addition, Ingarden’s method is not autonomous since one can trace it back in a philosophical tradition. Ingarden, then, at least repeats some well-known theses. Second, by focusing on the possible being, Ingarden rejects the real world, and thus he represents bourgeois interests (Kroński 1952: 320–321, 330). After all, as Kroński (1952: 329) insists, Ingarden reestablishes God as a guarantee of the existence of the real world, and of values which are realized by a man. This leads Kroński to state that Ingarden’s realism is in fact “objective idealism”. Finally, Ingarden rejects materialism as a possible solution of the controversy over the existence of the world (Kroński 1952: 324, 327, 329–330). “Materialism – writes Kroński (1952: 324) – is for Ingarden impossible ‘logically’, because it presuppose ‘dogmatically’ a priority of the material world over the consciousness, and for this reason it does not fit frameworks of ontological speculations of confronting and combining ‘existential moments’”. Kroński’s (1952: 319, 324, 331) review is full of irony and *ad personam* arguments. He calls *Controversy over the Existence of the World* a reactive book (Kroński 1952: 318), and he claims that phenomenology in general does not offer anything new since it marks a shift from philosophy of the 19th century to contemporary thought (Kroński 1952: 321). Thus, as Kroński (1952: 330) summarizes his review, “Ingarden’s idealism is not so much a critique of Husserl, but it is simply a different form of idealism”. In other words, “Ingarden’s book is a glaring example of the fruitlessness, degeneration and bankruptcy of contemporary bourgeois philosophy” (Kroński: 331).

It is hard to call Kroński’s review a thorough and substantive reading of Ingarden. Rather it is ideological through and through. After all, Kroński does not appreciate Ingarden’s detailed differentiations, and he rejects Ingarden’s central claim that ontology goes before metaphysics. Furthermore Kroński binds Ingarden’s ontology with bourgeois philosophy since – at least for him – it rejects materialism.
Hence, Kroński’s criticism follows from a Marxist outspoken aversion to idealism, and it does not take into account Ingarden’s methodology. In contrast to Kroński, then, one has to suspend a naïve affirmation of the world, and to ask about possible ways of existence of the world. For this reason, Kroński’s review presents in fact a serious misreading of phenomenology. Nonetheless, as rooted in naïve Marxism, it gives leading clues for a standard Marxist reading of phenomenology. Indeed, many arguments formulated by Kroński already in 1952, were repeated and developed during the international conference on “Marxist Critique of Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Roman Ingarden” which was organized by the Polish Academy of Sciences and the editorial board of the journal “Dialectics and Humanism” in Jadwisin, close to Warsaw, in 1975 (Küng, Swiderski 1976).

According to the editors of the journal (Kuczyński et al. 1975: 69), the idea to confront Marxism and phenomenology steams from a recognition of the lack of any forum for discussions on the relationship between both traditions. However, the dominant position of Marxism has to be secured, and for this reason the editors declare that, e.g., one has to employ Marx’s methodology of interpretation of Hegel as presented in his 1844 manuscripts, i.e., to support Marxism as such, and moreover, one has to keep in mind that “only Marxism (…) can provide definite and feasible prospects for overcoming [the] crisis” (Kuczyński et al. 1975: 70) of culture. In consequence, during the opening address of the conference the organizers state that “[w]e do not believe that it is essential and useful to seek similarities and to strive towards a syncretic meeting between phenomenology and Marxism, as it is done in certain research centers. On the contrary, we are convinced that in their initial principles and main tendencies those philosophies are diametrically opposed to each other” (Kuczyński 1975b: 8). The conference schedule encompasses both Marxist and non-Marxist thinkers, including specialists in phenomenology, e.g. Funke, Küng, Smith, Stróżewski, Swiderski, Tymieniecka, and Waldenfels, yet given the declaration, let me focus on the main points of the Marxist view on phenomenology.

It is no overstatement to say that the view is deeply rooted in ideology. And so, Matroshilova (1975: 30) points out methodological limitations of Husserlian phenomenology since (1) whereas it declares an analysis of the subject, it strives in fact at abstract structures, and (2) epoché never cannot be completed; thus, phenomenology is a “subjective-idealistic” philosophy. As Matroshilova (1975: 31) declares, the critique can be used in the Marxist criticism of phenomenology. Also Oiserman (1975: 61) defined phenomenology as a form of idealism since (1) it is solely focused on pure consciousness, and (2) it formulates maximal claims to be a rigorous science. But Husserl’s critique of science by pointing out total insignificance of sciences for human life, “refers only to bourgeois pseudo-scientific objectivism” (Oiserman 1975: 62). Here the subject is alienated from the
external world, and contemplates the ideal being. In consequence, phenomenology fits Marx’s description of “the speculative-idealistic philosophy as alienated consciousness, as consciousness cultivating its alienation and deprived of understanding real, socio-economic sources of this alienation” (Oiserman 1975: 60). Marxism, by contrast, overcomes naïve phenomenology, and it asks about dialectical and social-historical foundation of philosophy as such. In this direction seems to go Kuczyński (1975a: 114) for whom Husserl reduces a man to pure consciousness. For Husserl, as Kuczyński argues, the subject is to be understood as *homo contemplator* since it has the world as its intentional correlate; the world, then, is “within” consciousness, “out of which there is no way to the real world of action and practice”. In turn, Marxism presupposes metaphysical materialism, and for this reason it enables to comprehend a man as *homo contemplator* who discovers an objective meaning (shaped in a historical and class fashion), and he co-creates it by his activity. Kuczyński (1975a: 117–118) notes, however, a possibility of a “dialectization” of Ingarden’s later philosophy of responsibility and action since it seems to presuppose the world outside pure consciousness, and it offers to comprehend consciousness as an action; nonetheless, “I believe that dialectics cannot be accepted by phenomenology … and if accepted, it bursts it open” (Kuczyński 1975a: 119).³

In different direction goes Resmussen. He states that Husserl’s alienation form the society rests on his method of *epoché*. According to Rasmussen (1975: 65), “the social world itself is that very world which must be suspended”. For this reason, Husserl fails to present a comprehensive social theory. In this regard, Marxism offers a framework for a criticism of phenomenology since it provides “the socio-historical context in which phenomenology functioned” (Rasmussen 1975: 70). In his comment on Ramussen’s paper, Łoziński (1975: 71) questions the thesis that “it is the method of transcendental reduction that makes social phenomena inapproachable and that Husserl’s phenomenology has no theory of society either”. Following Łoziński, Husserl provides a basis for comprehending spiritual life as a foundation for the social life. For Husserl objects are structured as multi-layer beings, and one can try to show that constituted objectivity is “not less objective than things we perceive through senses” (Łoziński 1975: 75). Surprisingly, Husserl’s method is comparable to Marx’s *Capital* which may be understood as a phenomenological work since “[p]urchase, sale and work, then eating, dressing and dwelling, and, finally, all the forms of human life – all these are ‘directly given’” (Łoziński 1975: 75). Nonetheless, one has to limit the thesis, because both Marxism and phenomenology

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³ Also Czerniak (1976: 142) holds that phenomenology, contrary to Marxism, cannot change the reality since it is focused on an ideal domain of knowledge. With this regard, Hempolinski (1975: 141) tried to show that Półtawski’s critique of phenomenology as a philosophy that suspends practice, is close to the Marxist critique.
presuppose different “ontological perspectives”. As Łoziński (1976: 122) warns, any “categorial barrowings” are inadequate (Łoziński 1976: 122). Łoziński develops his critique in other publications to show that phenomenology has a clear ideological background. First, without a question of how phenomenology justifies itself, a phenomenologist places his philosophy outside a social context (Łoziński 1979: 87), and in result he becomes a mere observer of the social world. Second, and more importantly, phenomenology asks about sense of social actions, however, it presupposes a subjective perspective of the constitution process, and thus it makes impossible to undertake any action (Łoziński 1979: 89). Accordingly, ideology inherent in phenomenology is cynical: it expresses a protest against the world, but it accepts the world as indifferent for any action.

One can see that the Marxist reading of phenomenology, as presented so far, is mostly ideological, and as such it is naïve. It reduces phenomenology to a few general, though unjustified phrases (e.g., idealism), and evaluations (e.g., bourgeois interests). Such a reading employs rather unjustified conceptual shortcuts, than a thorough study of, say, Ingarden or Husserl. Brief, it is a misreading of phenomenology. Such a Marxist misreading is noticeable also in Leszek Kołakowski’s (1975) interpretation of Husserl. All in one, main objections against phenomenology can be summarized as follows: (1) phenomenology is a form of idealism; (2) its method (i.e., epoché) is inadequate, since (3) it rejects real actions in the world, and thus (4) it represents bourgeois interests. If this is the case, the Marxist reading of phenomenology in Poland mirrors other critiques formulated in the Eastern Block.

A development: The question of method and the body

In the light of the presented overwhelming critique of phenomenology which presupposes an ideological perspective on Marxism, it seems that during the Communist period in Poland one cannot expect any positive developments of phenomenology formulated by Marxists. Nonetheless, there were positive elaborations. In this context, Węgrzecki (2001: 19) points out Martel’s (1967) book in which the author appreciates some elements of Husserl’s philosophy, especially his method. In this part of the article, I will present a development of phenomenology from a Marxist standpoint. As we will see, however, it was not Martel who developed phenomenology in an original direction, but Szewczyk who tried to defend phenomenology as a transcendental enterprise which concerns first and foremost the phenomenon of work.

Already in the “Foreword” to his book, Martel (1967: 11–12) declares that one of the main tasks of his work is a critical evaluation of the principles of Husserl’s phenomenology, on the one hand, and a confrontation of this philosophy with
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Marxism, on the other. Nonetheless, such a confrontation, according to Martel’s declarations, supposed to list not only differences, but, more interestingly, “eventual connections”. Husserl’s phenomenology is, of course, interpreted from a Marxist point of view as a result of socio-political changes of the shift of centuries, i.e., as a breakdown of a bourgeois order of society, and as a crisis of a bourgeois civilization (Martel 1967: 19–20). In this context, Husserl offers a critique of sciences, and tries to overcome the crisis by showing that neither science, nor human life cannot forget about a human being as a subject responsible for a scientific concept of the world, and for actual historical actions (Matel 1967: 28). Nonetheless, Martel’s reconstruction of phenomenology is mainly rooted in Husserl’s texts, and as such it adopts better methodological foundation than the radical-ideological reading. And so, for instance, Martel points out maximal claims of phenomenology as the “first philosophy”, he emphasizes an eidetic character of phenomenology, but he refers also to the method of reduction, static and genetic analysis, Husserl’s concept of the life-world, and his concept of humanism. Again, Martel refers in many places to the Marxist reading of phenomenology, e.g., following classical exposition of Trần Đức Thảo, Martel (1967: 67) argues that eidos becomes a pure possibility, and as such it is placed outside the reality; in addition, he (Martel 1967: 131, 156) formulates a charge of transcendental solipsism, and of idealism since the transcendental subject becomes finally a non-worldly source of the world. As it seems, only Marxism with its materialist dialectics can overcome the divide between the transcendental subject, and the world. How, then, one can define differences between Marxism and phenomenology?

Martel (1967: 200–201) lists six possible charges against phenomenology:
(1) its “essentialism” (Husserl brakes a unity of an “essence” and its “existence”, and presents sense as a being itself); (2) its subjectivism (objective contents of any object are derivative from the subject in a sense that the subject creates contents); (3) its transcendentalism and apriorism (Husserl refers rather to the pure subject, than to a socially constructed subject embedded in history); (4) its idealism (the world is constituted by cognitive consciousness); (5) its intuitionism and abstract rationalism (cognition is direct, but it seems rather to be dialectical); and finally (6) its rational immanentism (an overcoming of pure cognition is possible only within the domain of knowledge). It is true that Martel’s list incorporates main, if not all, Marxist charges against phenomenology, but for Martel those charges do not hold for phenomenology. To defend Husserl’s phenomenology one should rather read Husserl as a materialist, just as Lenin had read Hegel. But what does it mean? For Martel (1967: 201), the transcendental subject is to be understood as embedded in the structure of the world, as essentially and intentionally connected with the world. For this reason, contra the idealist exposition of Husserl, objects of the world do not hold sense due to consciousness, but rather they are rooted in
the world, and thus – not outside the world (Martel 1967: 203). Moreover, they are culturally and historically constituted, and not solely internally and solipsistic. In this very context, according to Martel (1967: 205–206), one has to read Husserl's method of genetic analysis, i.e., as a reconstruction of how sense of an object is co-constituted by the world, intersubjectivity (society), and its history. This view, however, build a bridge between phenomenology and Marxism since cognition is no more an internal process, but an action. What connects both traditions, then, is a re-evaluation of praxis, but with a strong genetical background (Martel 1967: 212, 215–216). Briefly, what phenomenology contributes to Marxism is the method of genetic analysis which enables one to investigate mutual relationships between social subject and the world of practice.

Given Martel's re-reading of Marxist critique of phenomenology, it is no surprising that in the 1970's and in the 1980's phenomenology was used in Poland within sociological-methodological studies. But what is more interesting, Martel's interpretation of the “materialism phenomenology” was developed by Szewczyk who took the question of the body into account. Szewczyk studied at the Jagiellonian University under Ingarden between 1957 and 1962. In 1966 he gained a Ph.D. degree with a work on the critique of Hume's theory of causality. He was ideologically involved in Communism, but later he took a revisionist position. Szewczyk's (1969: 124; 1987: 145) view on Marx, and on phenomenology was defined mainly by Stanisław Brzozowski's (1878–1911) philosophy of work. He postulates to interpret work as an embodied action which does not presuppose any dualism of thinking and the world. This anti-dualistic view on action is present also in his reading of phenomenology.

While considering a discussion between Ingarden and Husserl, Szewczyk claims that the dispute concerns the essence of philosophy. Inasmuch as Husserl postulates to perform epoché, in order to make cognitive processes available in immanence, Ingarden wants to distance himself from subjectivity, and he claims to describe the content of an idea (Szewczyk 1966: 197–198). Ingarden's ontologization of philosophy leads finally to the point where phenomenology leaves its proper field of researchers, i.e., subjectivity, what seems to question “a cognitive aspect of description” (Szewczyk 1966: 200). According to Szewczyk (1975: 616), Ingarden's idealistic reading of Husserl includes Husserl to the Cartesian tradition since Ingarden refers mainly to reduction and the notion of the self as a residuum of epoché. Ingarden's argumentation against Husserl is, however, misleading because for Husserl – as Szewczyk (1975: 617) argues – consciousness is not

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5 More on Szewczyk's life, see Sowa 2012. See also bibliography, Jarowski 1975.
6 On Brzozowski's contribution to Marxism, see Walicki 1989.
outside the world, but in it. Moreover, Husserl comprehends “pure consciousness” as a quasi-spatial being which is essentially embedded in the world, and for this reason Husserl overcomes Cartesian dualism.

Szewczyk's anti-dualistic view on consciousness and action follows from his theory of work, and his view on Marx. Szewczyk (1971: 14) is clear that the only way to develop Marxism is to adopt Husserl's radicalism which postulates to constitute knowledge on absolutely certain foundations. For Szewczyk (1969: 124–125; 1987: 143, 145), Marxism is first and foremost an analysis of work understood as a dialectical phenomenon, i.e., as a condition of a historical development of the society. But how one can analyze the phenomenon of work? At bottom, work is constituted in a subjective experience. Accordingly, to analyze the phenomenon of work means to investigate a “conscious activity of a man” (Szewczyk 1987: 146). In this context, consciousness is to be understood as a being mediated by the material world, and as such it is self-knowledge which concerns its own work. After all, Marx reduces the object to the subject, and comprehends the subject as its activity (Szewczyk 1987: 159). If so, Marxism suspends the question of the non-existence or existence of the world, and thus it is a form of transcendental philosophy. Husserl, however, cannot contribute to this form of Marxism since he is focused mainly on an intellectual work. So, phenomenology is for Szewczyk (1987: 161) an “alienated philosophy” that leads a philosopher to self-knowledge. Nonetheless, even if both theories are different, materialism of Marxism and idealism of phenomenology are no more opposed to each other, because the way of being of consciousness is an inclination towards the objects in the world (Szewczyk 1987: 162). In brief, consciousness' being is an embodied work (Szewczyk 1970: 185–194).

Szewczyk refers to similar ideas in his interpretation of Husserl. Szewczyk's (1987: 41) main argument is to suspend Cartesian exposition of the self, since if one understands cogito as a cognitive subject, consciousness seems to be empty. In turn, Husserl offers to describe consciousness in quasi-spatial categories, such as a “horizon”, or a “stream”. In consequence, consciousness from a phenomenological point of view, has to be understood as embedded in the world, yet not as a mere thing. The self is rather the body, than a cognitive subject. Or, to say it differently, the body and the world are a united whole. After all, the body is the subject of work, and consciousness acts only as an embodied subject in the world (Szewczyk 1971: 34–35). For this very reason, as Szewczyk (1987: 94) emphasizes, phenomenology used to be an overcoming of a fetishization of positivism (and – as it seems – of naïve Marxism): the self is the embodied subject who actively explores and acts in the material world. Here “to perform reduction” means: “to be conscious of my own constitutive, yet embodied role in the world” (Szewczyk 1987: 81).

Szewczyk's interpretation of Husserl, and his philosophy of work met different reactions. Rainko (1969: 150) and Lebiedziński (1970: 162–164), for instance,
present a radical position. They both identify Szewczyk’s view on Marx with “a form of phenomenology”, and they argue that Marxism is here not more than a form of a reflection on the world, and on the place of a man in the world. If so, however, Szewczyk offers to analyze eidos of work, and not a concrete, i.e., empirically and historically constituted, phenomenon of work. Therefore, Szewczyk’s position adopts an abstract-idealistic perspective, and for this reason it cannot be incorporated into Marx’s philosophy. Also Sarna (1981: 31–32) claims that Szewczyk falls into idealism since he cuts himself off from the world; instead of an attempt to interpret the world, Szewczyk should rather change it. Yet the radical criticism is questionable since it seems to adopt the ideological reading of phenomenology. In this context, Żurawicki (1969: 133–134) and Ochocki (1969: 143–144) take a moderate position; and so, the former states that Szewczyk’s view on Marxism is partial since he omits dialectical materialism, and he reduces Marxism to philosophy work, whereas the latter claims that Szewczyk’s interpretation has nothing to offer nothing, because Marxism was always regarded as philosophy of work. In turn, Sowa (1969: 136–137) and Fiut (1988: 351) appreciates two aspects of Szewczyk’s interpretation: his emphasis on Marxism as philosophy of work, and his theory of consciousness which constitutes the spatial world as the material world. Fiut (1988: 356) questions, however, Szewczyk’s interpretation of Ingarden as partial.

The Marxist-ideological reading of phenomenology, as we already have seen above, has a limited range of application. By contrast, Martel and Szewczyk have shown that Marxism has a potential to reinterpret phenomenology as a “materialist” philosophy (Martel), or as transcendental, yet spatial analysis (Szewczyk). Therefore, what Marxism introduced to phenomenology in the period of 1945–1989 is a re-evaluation and re-interpretation of Husserl’s method as follows: (1) the transcendental subject is embedded in the (materialist) structure of the world, what equals the thesis that (2) objects of the world are rooted in the world; moreover, (3) the process of constitution is to be understood as a cultural, historical, and embodied process; therefore, (4) the method is developed as a reconstruction of a co-constituted sense, and thus (5) cognition is but an action; and finally (6) the method takes praxis into account as a universal background of philosophy. The re-evaluation is deeply rooted in Marxism, however, it inspired also non-Marxist thinkers.

Inspirations: Dignity of work and solidarity

As Gubser (2014: 219) rightly states, materialist Marxism suspends any ethics for a man since ethics is to be understood as a socially constructed ideology of a class struggle. If so, the society defines a framework for understanding human dignity,
and his or her work. I think that precisely this consequence of Marxism inspired some non-Marxist thinkers to formulate an adequate philosophical response to Marxism. In this part of the article, I will refer to Wojtyła's philosophy of action, and his attempt to secure metaphysical and phenomenological grounds of human action, and to Tischner’s conception of ethics of solidarity. They both, as non-Marxist thinkers, undertook a challenge of Marxism, and they tried to show that phenomenology can adopt critically at least some theses of Marxism in a dialogue with this current of philosophy.

Wojtyła's philosophical theory is a fusion of the phenomenological method with neo-Thomistic metaphysics (Burgos 2009). His Ph.D. thesis (from 1948) was dedicated to St. John of the Cross. Already in this early work Wojtyła emphasizes a central role that experience plays in philosophy; later Wojtyła (1969) will define experience as a starting point of both his project of adequate anthropology and ethics. In the 1950’s, during his lectures at the Catholic University in Lublin (Wojtyła 2006), and in his habilitation thesis (given in 1959) (Wojtyła 2001), Wojtyła takes phenomenology into account and he discusses with Scheler’s material ethics by claiming that his description of the relationship between a person and values is inadequate. Wojtyła’s discussion with Scheler can be regarded also as an indirect discussion with the Marxist reading of phenomenology, since, as Wojtyła would argue contra Marxism, phenomenology can refer to the phenomenon of action.

And so, for Wojtyła (2001: 16, 45–46), Scheler’s main thesis of material ethics is that values are material contents of intentional acts. In this senses, as Scheler argues, values are independent of a person, and build an objective hierarchy. Nonetheless, as Wojtyła (2001: 70, 73–74) shows, Scheler does not explain how a person knows this hierarchy, and, more importantly, how these values are instantiated in action. In a word, what lacks in Scheler’s descriptions of moral action is dynamism inherent to action itself. In result, Wojtyła summarizes his criticism of Scheler, his phenomenology does not take practical level of values into account, and he misses to describe this aspect adequate. Wojtyła (1979) develops the phenomenology of action in The Acting Person by showing that an agent transcends him- or herself in a practical act since he or she grasps objective values, and instantiates them in the real world. This theory is a basis for bringing “dignity” back to human work (Gubser 2014: 210), and to comprehend another subject as a real man. After all, given that alienation is for Wojtyła (1977: 69) “such a situation in a human being, such state, in which he is not capable to experience another human being as the ‘other I’”, it is obvious that one of Wojtyła’s aims is to overcome solipsistic limits of the

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7 Wojtyła (2001: 16) defines the phenomenological method as (1) a direct (2) intuition which (3) provides material a priori.
transcendental ego. In a word, his theory of action aims at a practical redefinition of phenomenology, i.e., it offers to take the phenomenon of action into account.

Inasmuch as Wojtyła refers to Marxism only indirectly by developing a phenomenology of action, Tischner clearly declares his commitments to Szewczyk’s (and thus – Marxist) heritage and the idea of the “work on work”, i.e., the idea that work functions as a liberating factor, and for this reason a re-organization of the human work leads towards a kind of liberation (cf. Szewczyk 2012; Tischner 1981: 48; Karoń-Ostrowska 2003: 65–68). First, however, let me note that Tischner studied philosophy at the Jagiellonian University under Ingarden between 1957 and 1959. He accomplished his Ph.D. in 1963. This early work concerns Husserl’s theory of the transcendental ego. However, after a one-year fellowship in the Husserl-Archives in Leuven (in 1969), in his Habilitation thesis (from 1974) devoted to the phenomenology of egoic consciousness, Tischner redefines Husserl’s theory, and in consequence he presents his original theory of the axiological self, understood as a guarantee of axiological structure of the self. At the end of 1970’s, and in the 1980’s Tischner takes a position of hermeneutical phenomenology. At the same time, he presents an original theory of ethics of solidarity which can be regarded as a consequence of a confrontation with the notion of Marxism as a philosophy of work. For Tischner (1981: 47), a central problem of Marxism is the phenomenon of work, including the question of exploitation. Precisely in this context, one has to read Tischner’s project of ethics of solidarity.

The doctrine is based on the following general theses (Tischner 2007a: 39–41): (1) “ethics of solidarity wants to be an ethics of conscience”, what assumes that (2) “man is a being endowed with a conscience”. The latter means that (3) “[a] conscience is a natural ‘ethical sense’ of man”, yet (4) the conscience is self-referential, i.e., “it calls us to want to have a conscience”. (5) The conscience is the voice of God, and (6) it calls us for solidarity with the others. However, (7) “[a]uthentic solidarity … is a solidarity of consciences”. (8) The conscience arises from “the cry for help from the man who has been hurt by another man”. (9) Suffering of the others founds the conscience. Finally, then, (10) solidarity is realized in work. Thus, what Tischner aims at here is an attempt to secure a possibility of natural ethical sense. Given the general doctrine, Tischner develops his view by considering the question of how to understand the theory if a realization of the voice of conscience is impossible? In this regard, Tischner refers to the phenomenon of work, and he claims that: (1) a crisis of human work is established on a lack of respect for a men; (2) a particular case of the crisis is a moral exploitation of work. (3) An unfair payment can serve as an example of an unfair exploitation. (4) The exploitation causes an unjustified suffering, and for this reason (according to the general theses) (5) the exploitation causes justified, since natural, protest against it. (6) In respond, one has to restore a natural relation to human work. This means that (7) the
work once again has to serve the community of workers, since (8) only this work is a meaningful work. It is clear that the ethics of solidarity aims to justify the protest of workers against the unjustified rejection of human dignity (cf. Tischner 2007b). In other words, the phenomenology of work establishes a social action.

This is not the place to provide a detailed presentation of Wojtyla’s and Tischner’s theories. Rather let me notice that a confrontation with Marxism seems to inspire phenomenology to develop a theory of action (Wojtyla), and ethics of solidarity (Tischner). Both theories can be used as a basis of a theory of the social protest. Indeed, phenomenology seems to have a potential to express such a protest. What makes this form of phenomenology unique is a Marxist thesis that philosophy is a form of action at the same time.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the 1970’s, Jaroszewski (1974: 24–25) defined philosophy as strictly connected to Marxism, and in this context he pointed out four main tasks for a philosophical reflection in Poland: (1) a reflection on “human personality, on those properties which make it a socialist personality”; (2) “[p]hilosophical analysis of the projected and desirable consumption model and value systems of the future Polish society”; (3) “the development of Marxist methodological studies”; and (4) “the development of Marxist philosophical thought in Poland”. Given that phenomenology is a descriptive discipline, one see that phenomenology did not fit the picture. After all, as Kuczyński (1975b: 8) states, phenomenology and Marxism are “diametrically opposed to each other”. This distinct opposition resulted not only in a marginalization of phenomenology at the universities, but first and foremost in a multi-dimensional criticism of it.

With this regard, let me remind, that the main task of the present study was to define main trends in the Marxist reading of phenomenology. In the foregoing, I have to sought to define what I called the Marxist-ideological reading of phenomenology (e.g., Kroński, Kuczyński, Łoziński). The reading reduces phenomenology

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8 This aspect of phenomenology was noted in Poland with regard to Jan Patočka’s (1907–1977) philosophy, and his concept of care for the soul, and his idea of the “solidarity of the shaken”. Patočka was mentioned frequently in journals connected with the “Solidarity,” i.e., in Tygodnik Solidarność, and in Miesięcznik Małopolski. E.g., Tomkowski emphasizes, while commenting Polish translation of Kacířské eseje o filosofii dějin, that “[p]hilosophy and politics only apparently build two separate worlds” (Tomkowski 1989, 12). Rather Patočka’s idea of care for the soul shows that philosophy can have a direct impact on political events. From a Marxist point of view, however, the idea is simply meaningless since Marxism rejects the value of any mental life. But people are still responsible for his or her life, even if the war goes on (Tomkowski 1989, 12). Noteworthy, a political potential of Patočka was evident also for the Communist regime: a part of Baraň’s (1984) review of Polish translation of Kacířské eseje dedicated to the last essay in which a thesis on the war was formulated – was censored.
to a form of idealism, and it claims that a phenomenologist rejects real actions in the world, and for this reason he or she represents bourgeois interests. I tried to show that such an exposition is in fact a misreading of phenomenology. The Marxist-ideological reading of phenomenology made a false assumption that phenomenology cannot concern *praxis* at all. But the phenomenon of action can be at least an object of a phenomenological description. If so, the Marxist line of thought is questionable from the very beginning. Next, I presented developments of the phenomenological method by Marxists (Martel, Szewczyk) what resulted in a re-interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology. This reading points out, e.g., that the transcendental subject is embedded in the (materialist) structure of the world, and that the process of constitution is to be understood as a cultural, historical, and embodied process. Therefore, cognition is but an action, and *praxis* is a universal background of philosophy. Finally, I tried to show that a confrontation with Marxism inspires phenomenology to develop a theory of action (Wojtyła), and ethics of solidarity (Tischner). Both theories – as it seems – can be practically implemented.

At the end, one can ask: Why, in spite of the overwhelming criticism of Marxism, phenomenology was popular in Poland during the period of 1945–1989? And, more importantly, what Marxism contributes, if anything, to phenomenology in Poland? Paradoxically, because phenomenology was “diametrically opposed” to Marxism, it offered a more fruitful view on a man and the world. It is true that phenomenology presented at that time “a vision of personal freedom and transcendence that stood in stark contrast to the stultifying realities of late communism” (Gubser 2014: 133). Phenomenology was, then, “a code for communicating current dissatisfactions and future hopes with one another and the wider world” (Gubser 2014: 136). Nonetheless, as presented above, the Marxist reading of phenomenology, besides a fruitless criticism, inspired phenomenology to describe the phenomenon of work as a specific way of being. As such, the Marxist reading of phenomenology in Poland in the period of 1945–1989 is not only a historical issue, but rather it offers an important contribution to contemporary phenomenology, and it gives a leading clue to explore the phenomenology of work in detail.

Bibliography


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