


MISCELLANEA

ANTHROPOLOGICA ET SOCIOLOGICA

20(1)



**PHENOMENOLOGY, PRACTICE, AND ACTION:
PERSPECTIVES ON CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE**

KWARTALNIK
GDAŃSK 2019

WYDAWNICTWO UNIwersYTETU GDAŃSKIEGO

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SUNNY

Publikacja sfinansowana z funduszu działalności statutowej Instytutu Filozofii, Socjologii i Dziennikarstwa
oraz Wydziału Nauk Społecznych Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego

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e-ISSN 2354-0389

Pierwotną wersją pisma jest wersja elektroniczna.
Numery archiwalne dostępne są na: www.maes-online.com

Adres redakcji:

Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica
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Introduction

Phenomenology, Practice, and Action: Perspectives on Central and Eastern Europe

Phenomenology, one of the leading trends in contemporary philosophy, consists first and foremost in a systematic analysis of what is given in experience. Due to its methodological background, phenomenology enables one to investigate such diverse topics as, e.g., the world, culture, social reality, embodiment, etc. (e.g., Zahavi 2012), and because of this methodological potential it is used also in, e.g., psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and in the cognitive sciences. In this context phenomenologists ask about such phenomena as, e.g., joint actions, or about constitution of meanings in practice. In a word, phenomenology today is strictly connected with the question of practice and action. Considering its history, however, phenomenology was developed at the very beginning mainly as a theoretical project which struggled with psychologism in logic, descriptive psychology, and the question of ultimately justified theory of knowledge.¹ So, it is not surprising that if one reads classical books in phenomenology, say, Husserl's *Logical Investigations* or *Ideas I*, they seem to lack any clear reference to practice or action. Consequently, phenomenology was traditionally regarded as interested exclusively in theoretical topics, whereas the questions of practice and action seemed to be completely absent. Indeed, if one limits phenomenology to consciousness and to the question of intentionality, Husserl's project can be regarded as a theoretical philosophy. After all, practice and action, though somehow connected to consciousness, are not specific conscious phenomena as, e.g., the act of perception, temporal experience of what is happening *etc.* Nonetheless, more recent readings in Husserl has show that both topics: practice and action, were important, or even crucial themes for him (e.g., Spahn 1996; Sepp 1997; Melle 2007; Heffernan 2017). How, then, phenomenology of practice can be developed?

Given that practice and action are topics for a phenomenological inquiry, one seems to stand in the face of two basic options: either one investigates *essences*

¹ On the history of the phenomenological movement, see Spiegelberg 1994.

of these phenomena, or one attempts to explore *normative* questions. Let me look closer at both directions. The first option, rather uncontroversial, consists in asking the question of *what* is practice or action? A phenomenologist understands this question as the question concerning the essence of practice what means that the question requires descriptive-eidetic analysis of action. Thus this way of analysis explores – to use technical terms – noetic-noematic structure of action as instantiated by or grounded on some sort of acts of consciousness. This approach comprehends practice as a phenomenon, i.e., as an entity grasped in its constituted meaning in a correlation with consciousness. Here practice can be understood – from a noetical point of view – as a consequence of rational activity of consciousness. In turn – from a noematic point of view – practice can be regarded as instantiated by different forms of actions which are present in the so-called life-world (*Lebenswelt*) (e.g., Gmainer-Pranzl 2007). So, the first approach can be developed as a systematic analysis of different types of practice and, even more importantly, general structures of actions. In a word, it is developed as *phenomenology of practice or action*. Regardless of the question of “what,” one can developed also the question of *how* to act in given practical situation. The latter question of “how” concerns what I called *normative* dimension of philosophy. The ultimate aim of this normative approach is to define general rules or norms of (moral) actions. Strictly speaking, this approach can be developed as ethics (e.g., Melle 2007).

Both sketched possible directions for developing phenomenology of practice and action were, of course, present in the history of the phenomenological movement. Even regardless of Husserl’s (1988) clear interests in ethics, one can indicate in this context, for instance, Scheler’s (1973) project of material ethics, Heidegger’s (1962) detailed analyses of everyday activities, Merleau-Ponty’s (2012) examination of practical context of perception, or Wojtyła’s (1979) investigations into the acting person. Moreover, one can also ask about practical, e.g., political involvement of a philosopher. After all, besides investigating practice as a phenomenon, one can examine the problem of how philosopher’s theory, say an ethical theory, was implemented by him or her in practical life or with regard to concrete practical problem. This plurality of perspectives, of course, requires a systematization. The contributions to this thematic issue of “Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica” set out to elaborate on these potentials of phenomenology of practice and action. The collected papers took up the task to describe the conceptual and methodological resources and horizons of phenomenology of practice and action. What makes this collection of papers unique is its thematic emphasis put on the tradition of the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe. This theoretical perspective stems from a recognition that historical and political circumstances in Central and Eastern Europe have led to a significant reformulation

of the ways of how to do phenomenology. It is well known that in the Communist period phenomenology was regarded as an idealistic, and bourgeois philosophy. Although some phenomenologists wanted to abandon any political commitment, many of them used phenomenology as a background of their political-practical reformulation of philosophy. Well known examples are Patočka, or Wojtyła. However, this aspect of a heritage of the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe is still not widely known. Therefore, a further aim of the special issue is to raise also historical questions: Who could be regarded as key figures of the “practical turn” in phenomenology in Central and Eastern Europe? How was phenomenology redefined as a practical philosophy within the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe? How can we understand political and social roles of phenomenology and phenomenologists as a part of the opposition movements before 1989? What role did the exile play in supporting, and preserving the phenomenological movement beyond the Iron Curtain? Can we say that phenomenology grounds a specific form of ethics? If yes, what are the specific problems of this form of ethical phenomenology? What is the thematic scope of phenomenology of *praxis*? What are the main phenomena connected with practice? How, if at all, phenomenology can be practically implemented?

Regarded in detail, then, the presented collection of papers concerns both traditional, i.e., Husserlian tradition of phenomenology, and its developments in the history of the phenomenological movement in Central and Eastern Europe. In her paper “The Ego as Moral Person. Husserl’s Concept of Personhood in the Context of his Later Ethics,” Irene Breuer (Bergische Universität Wuppertal) presents Husserl’s philosophical project in the context of its practical implications. The author focuses on the concept of a person and shows that it is a cornerstone of Husserl’s later idea of the ethics of love. Breuer argues that the basis for this concept Husserl presented in his *Ideas II* where he conceives a person as a concrete subject – as opposed to a transcendental subject – which is individualised by its actions and passions. Moreover, a person, according to Breuer, is a being which undergoes a changing life-history. Next, the author tracks implications of this concept in Husserl’s later ethical project, also in the context of his idea of “renewal,” as well as his analysis of Fichte’s practical philosophy. It is argued, following Husserl, that a person as moral person realises its ethical existence under the guidance of practical reason.

In his study, Tomasz Kąkol (University of Gdańsk) compares phenomenological theories of empathy which is to be understood in the text as “mind-reading” with contemporary cognitivists’ approach to this problem. In this regard, the author focuses on Stein and Ingarden who both present different theories of empathy. Kąkol attempts to show that although both theories seem to be incompatible at first glance, after a thorough analysis they can be understood as complementary.

It is argued also that empathy is indispensable in practice, though this topic has to be carefully examined. Also Carlos Lobo (Collège international de philosophie) contextualizes Ingarden's philosophy. In his paper on "Relativity of Taste without Relativism. An Introduction to Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience," Lobo reads Ingarden's critique of relativism in the context of the phenomenology of aesthetic experience formulated by Geiger, as well as in relation to Husserl's refutation of relativism. Ingarden's position is summarized in four ontological-aesthetical theses: (1) values do exist as the proper correlates of aesthetic experience, (2) aesthetic values must be distinguished from artistic values, (3) artistic and aesthetic values are founded in other ontic strata, and finally (4) the act of valuation in aesthetic experience does not presuppose any value judgement. The author situates his discussion of Ingarden's position in the context of modern physics, also interpreted from a philosophical point of view (Weyl, Bachelard, Geiger). The ultimate thesis presented by Lobo is that the relativism, which states or presupposes that any feeling is right, is wrong.

In the paper on "Roman Ingarden: Phenomenology, Responsibility and the Ontological Foundations of Morality," Simona Bertolini (University of Parma) explores practical implications of Ingarden's ontology. The author is aware that Ingarden does not present any ethics as such, and moreover that his philosophy cannot be associated directly with a "practical turn" in phenomenology, but – as she argues – in his investigations into the nature of a human being, Ingarden considers ontological foundations of moral actions. Ingarden's philosophy of a human being is summarized in three theses: (1) man's life goes between two different spheres of reality: nature and spirit, (2) by explaining the relation of dependence which connects the natural and spiritual realms, Ingarden notices a conflict between them, (3) a human being overcomes the conflict by realizing values. Therefore, following Bertolini, moral responsibility emerges as an essential moment in the constitution of humanity. The author presents also implications of Ingarden's ontology of freedom.

Wojciech Starzyński (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences) in his paper on "Irena Krońska: A Student and a Critic of Roman Ingarden's Philosophy" presents three stages in Krońska's approach towards Ingarden's philosophy. Krońska was studied under Ingarden in Lvov in the 1930's. The author reconstructs main line of arguments formulated by Krońska in her review of Ingarden's *Controversy over the Existence of the World* published in 1949 in the *Revue philosophique de France et de l'étranger*. As Starzyński argues, this review is unique in the context of the reception of Ingarden's philosophy since it contextualizes Ingarden's ontological project, especially in the context of the development of phenomenology in France and Germany. Moreover, the author presents Krońska's cooperation with Ingarden in the 1960's, especially in the context of the

March 1968 events in Poland. Finally, Starzyński introduces Krońska's approach to Ingarden's philosophy as presented in her epistolary exchange with Patočka.

Michael Gubser's (James Madison University) paper on "Phenomenology contra Nazism: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Aurel Kolnai" asks about the relationship between phenomenology and political activity with regard to Hildebrand and Kolani. As Gubser shows, they both were influenced by Scheler and Reinach for whom philosophy is strictly connected with practice. The author reconstructs Hildebrand's theory of ethical acts. The act arises, namely, as a conscious engagement with a particular object or state of affairs. Here a value has its own proper emotional response. At this basis Gubser presents Hildebrand's personalism and his conviction that a corporate state organized around Christian communities is a compelling alternative to totalitarian absolutism and to the individualism of liberalism. Also for Kolani, values stand in the center of philosophical inquiries. According to Gubser, Kolani specifies four types of value experience.

Natalia Artemenko (St. Petersburg State University) in her paper explores the relationship between phenomenology and psychiatry and psychoanalysis in regard to Heidegger's philosophy. The author presents a detailed and critical analysis of "Zollikon Seminars." Artemenko reconstructs Heidegger's view of a human being as connected with other subjects, i.e., as an intersubjective being. In the article, Heidegger's critique of Freud is presented. In this context, the author examines Heidegger's approach to the existence of the human being as understood in the light of a conceptual duality of causality and motivation. According to Artemenko, however, Heidegger does not consider crucial problems formulated within psychoanalysis. Despite these lacks, following the author, Heidegger's central contribution here seems to be an attempt to understand the practice of psychiatry.

In the essay "The Rupture and The Rapture: Eternity in Jan Patočka and Krzysztof Michalski," Nicolas de Warren (Pennsylvania State University) interprets Michalski's philosophical account of eternity presented in his last book on Nietzsche – *The Flame of Eternity. An Interpretation of Nietzsche's Thought*. It is argued in the essay that in order to understand Michalski's position one has to contextualize his philosophy, and refer to Heidegger's and Patočka's thought. The author tracks the way of how to understand the problem of eternity by reference to Ancient Greek philosophy, e.g., Anaximander. The ultimate aim of the essay is to describe main differences of Patočka's and Michalski's approaches to eternity. In this regard, the thesis presented in the essay is that whereas for Patočka human temporality attains meaning through a movement of freedom in the rupture of eternity, for Michalski human temporality attains meaning through a movement of desire in the rapture of eternity.

In the paper "Praxis, the Body, and Solidarity: Some Reflections on the Marxist Readings of Phenomenology in Poland (1945–1989)," Witold Płotka (Cardinal

Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw) explores main tendencies in the post-war reception of phenomenology in the light of Marxism. It is argued that although phenomenology was marginalized and even refused from the Marxist position, a dialogue between both traditions established interesting developments. The author claims that the confrontation with Marxism enabled phenomenologists a problematization of the phenomenon of work as a specific way of being. Płotka defines main ideological points of the Marxist critique of phenomenology, i.e., a critique of phenomenology as a bourgeois philosophy that cannot offer anything to the communist society since it abandons the sphere of praxis. Next, positive developments of the phenomenological method are reconstructed, including Szewczyk's original reading of Husserl. The article points out also a Marxist background of some thoughts of Wojtyła and Tischner.

In her paper "On the Absence of Eco-phenomenology in Poland," Magdalena Hoły-Łuczaj (University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszów) formulates an interesting problem of why eco-phenomenology is less popular in Poland than in the West. Hoły-Łuczaj's thesis in this regard is that Tischner's philosophy of drama, which is an anthropocentric theory, influenced philosophy in Poland to marginalize eco-phenomenology. To show this, the author reconstructs main points of eco-phenomenology, next she asks about environmental philosophy in Poland and presents main elements of Tischner's philosophy of drama. As Hoły-Łuczaj argues Tischner looked at reality mainly from the perspective of human beings' affairs; at the same time, Tischner is not interested in nonhuman beings at all.

Witold Płotka

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ARTICLES

Irene Breuer¹

The Ego as Moral Person. Husserl's Concept of Personhood in the Context of his Later Ethics

Husserl's philosophy has ethical roots. In the well-known *Crisis* text, he speaks of the task of philosophers as "functionaries of mankind" (*Crisis*: 17). "To be human is essentially to be a human being in a socially and generatively united civilisation" (*Crisis*: 15). The philosopher bears a responsibility for "the true being of mankind" (*Crisis*: 17) for it is through philosophy that mankind's being towards a telos can come to realisation. This task, to which "we are called" (*Crisis*: 17) can only be accomplished on the grounds of the human person as a moral person. In the following I would thus like to show that Husserl's statements are only comprehensible from out of the ethical-moral reflections underlying his concept of personhood in the context of his later ethical thought. An analysis of Husserl's concept of personhood can shed light on the task of philosophy and make comprehensible not only his phenomenological ethics but also his phenomenological anthropology.

Key words: Personalistic ethics, categorical imperative, absolute ought, person, value theory, Husserl

1. Husserl's Concept of Personhood. General Remarks

In *Ideas II* Husserl develops an ontology of the person. He begins by establishing different kinds of realities. Conceiving of a layered model, he first distinguishes between nature in the rather strict sense, that is, "material nature", and nature in a broader sense, i.e. "things which have a soul" or those "living, animal natures" which are the objects of physics. Husserl emphasises that what is at stake here is not an empirical reflection on nature, but an *a priori* investigation, which is carried out in a transcendental phenomenological way. In Husserl's words: "It is

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clear that, in this sense, ‘nature’ is a sphere of ‘mere things’, a sphere of objectivities which distinguishes itself by means of a demarcation traced out *a priori* in the essence of constituting consciousness from all other spheres of objects that may be treated theoretically” (*Ideas II*: 27). To this end, he contrasts “the sphere of things experienceable by us” and the realm of “natural objects”, and gains access to the former by performing “a sort of disengaging”, i.e. an epoché. An epoché is necessary, because in scientific thinking, reality or substantiality and causality “*belong inseparably together*”, i.e. “real properties are *eo ipso* causal ones” (*Ideas II*: 48), while phenomenology considers these material things only insofar as they correlate with things as given in themselves. He thus makes clear that we grasp these natural objectivities in the “natural scientific attitude”, which is achieved only after we have performed a reduction on our everyday emotional intentions and on the apperceptions that have their origins in these intentions, for instance those of value. This is because in ordinary life we are guided to such an extent by our epistemological interests and our evaluative apperceptions that we perceive all things as endowed with certain value-based characteristics. In the theoretical attitude, by contrast, we grasp the experienced thing in its “materiality” and in “relation to ‘circumstances’” (*Ideas II*: 44), i.e. in its ‘relational reality’, as we may call it. Through this shift in attitude we are able to grasp “the real” of the phenomenal thing itself (*Ideas II*: 46). It is thus obvious that the regional ontology of nature belongs to the realm of transcendental phenomenology, which operates on *a priori* grounds.

As to the second kind of reality, i.e. ensouled nature, Husserl introduces here a new concept of the Ego: The “I as human being”, which is interwoven with other unities, i.e. the pure transcendental Ego and the empirical Ego – the unity of living body and soul. The “I as human being” is the Ego which is able to ascribe to itself not only its living experiences but its cognitions, its character traits and its own living body as well. Husserl’s later reflections specify this conception of the “I as human being” and introduce the concept of the “personal Ego”, which cannot be neither without the “subjective possessions” (*Ideas II*: 134) of its psychic life, i.e. its “original and acquired character traits, capacities, dispositions, among others.” nor without its psychic lived experiences (*Ideas II*: 110f.). This personal Ego “has its spiritual individuality, its intellectual and practical abilities and skills, its character, its sensibility” (*Ideas II*: 147) and “a spiritual individuality”, i.e. a “character, its sense-mode [*Sinnesart*]” (Hua XIV: 23). Thus, the apprehension in which a human being is given “as a person” “*seems to contain a surplus*” (*Ideas II*: 147) if compared to the apprehension of a human as unity of living body and soul, a surplus which for Husserl encompasses the possession not only of personal characteristics but of the world, insofar as persons live in a world on which they find themselves dependent (*Ideas II*: 47). This world concerns the person insofar as

it engages itself not only in “experiencing” the “universal life” (Hua XIV: 46), but also in the activities of other “communities of persons”, like social and religious institutions and more generally in law, morals, the state, etc. (*Ideas II*: 141). The participation of individual persons pertaining to this “surrounding world of spirit” in these institutions and in their dependence on them is defined as “monadic life” (Hua XIV: 46). The I-human being therein in his commerce with things and others is “a being who maintains (...) his individuality throughout.” The concepts of “human being” and “I” are thus defined according to two different modes of apprehension and experience: the “psychological” one and the “*human-scientific* (personal)” one. On the one hand, the human being as “spiritually real” and the Ego as “personal Ego” are objects of “human-scientific (personal) apprehension”, on the other, the human being “in the sense of nature” is an object of “natural-scientific anthropology” while the “spiritual” Ego is an object of “psychological apprehension” (*Ideas II*: 150).

At this point, we are confronted with a radical break between the naturalistic/scientific approach on the one hand and the personal/ psychological attitude on the other, which in my view can be overcome in two steps: first, through Husserl’s revision of his conception of the individual human essence and second, through the enlargement of this sphere to its universal-ethical dimension or, in Husserl’s terms, to the concept of a “transcendental person” (Hua XXXIV: 200). In fact, Husserl’s ground-breaking revision of the concept of “essence” – an “open” essence which can assume new properties according to varying circumstances – allows us to understand the modifications of the essence as resulting from the work of culture and science. The personal I is therefore bound to science and natural things through its cultural achievements. This individual personal I taken in its universal dimension, i.e. the “transcendental person”, represents the highest level of Husserl’s ethical considerations (Luft: 2012: 37). It is a person whose practical reality is underpinned by the work of science. I will take up these considerations at the end of the paper.

2. The Pure Transcendental I as Personal I

This twofold meaning of the “I as human being” can be enlarged to a third meaning provided that we take into consideration the reinterpretation of the pure transcendental I. In fact, the conception of the I as human being seems to have led Husserl to a revision of the I as an empty I-pole contained in *Ideas I*. The “the in-depth-thinking on the pure I” goes hand in hand with Husserl’s investigations into habitualities and intersubjectivity and leads to the concretion of his conception of the monad (Marbach 1974: 305). And in a supplementary

note to *Ideas II*, Husserl comes to the realisation that “the doctrine of the pure Ego – before all else as pole – must be [revised?]” (*Ideas II*: 324). He now claims that the pure I is not isolated from its context, but is given as a pole of “affects and actions” (*Ideas II*: 324). In Husserl’s words, this inner structure, that is, “this pure I is also included in the personal I, each egoical act of the personal I is also an act of the pure I” (Ms. A VI 21, p. 21 a and b as quoted in Marbach 1974: 315). The individuality of the personal I seems thus to have ‘streamed into’ the pure I: “This pure I as pole is nothing without its acts, without its stream of experience, without the living life that streams also into it” (Ms. E III 2, p. 5a as quoted in Marbach 1974: 304). Nevertheless, we should distinguish between the pure I and the I as person. Although the pure I neither originates nor decays, it is no common structure but a singular “I myself”, an active subject, which perceives itself, has memories and phantasies. The I as “pure I” is self-conscious and unchanging in itself, while as “personal I”, it is changing in its practices, in its activities and passivities (Marbach 1974: 313–316). Moreover, in self-perception, which is the pure I’s self-reflection, the I identifies itself as the subject of each cogito and as the identical subject of its manifold actions and passions. Correlatively, the pure I conceives itself as subject of its “manifold possessions”, i.e. that which is immanently or transcendently pre-given (*Ideas II*: 260). Thus, the pure I cannot be conceived without its possessions affecting it. Moreover, it is “given in absolute selfhood” (*Ideas II*: 119), that is as a “centre of an identity” (*Ideas II*: 324); it remains unchanged as long as it “remains of the same conviction”, i.e. although the Ego remains self-identical as pole, it changes along with its varying convictions. With reference to Paul Ricoeur we may distinguish between the Ego’s sameness “as synonymous with *idem*-identity” and the Ego’s mutability as “selfhood understood as *ipse*-identity” (Ricoeur 2012: 3). The Ego is thus self-same although becoming other. Consequently, the pure I possesses a core of selfhood insofar as it is able to grasp its comportment and its motivations. This core of selfhood is itself unreflected insofar as it is the intentional object of the pure I. By way of self-reflection the I “know(s) about (its) unreflected Ego-life” (*Ideas II*: 260). Thus, the reflective I presupposes a pre-reflective self individualised by its actions and passions. The unreflected selfhood unfolds thus in factual life as factual existence and is retroactively experienced as an I endowed with personality by way of the pure I’s reflection: the pure I comes across itself as an already existing and singular I. This means that the pre-reflective self as pre-existent is retroactively uncovered as such by the pure, transcendental I.

3. The Third Level: The “Personal Reality” and the Constitution of an *Êthos*

Summarising the above, we can conclude that human beings as persons have the pure I's functional capacity in common; but they nonetheless vary according to the “how”, i.e. the specific character and qualitative content of this self-perception. The person as such is the subject of active intentionality but as self-reflected it uncovers its pure I, which in its turn uncovers in self-reflection a pre-reflective affective I as a passive ground. Both selfhoods, the pure I with its core of identity and the underlying affective I, are the conditions of the possibility for the constitution of a personal being with unique characteristics. To be a person means not only to be the subject of the Ego-acts i.e. of active intentionality, but also to be subject of affections and habitualities i.e. of passive intentionality.

Let us now consider the third level of reality: the “personal ‘reality’” (*Ideas II*: 262 fn. 1). What is needed to reach this level is an “Objectivation of a higher level superposed on that of the other strata of apprehension in such a way that what is constituted is the unity of an object, one which in turn (...) involves Objective strata of lower and higher levels, distinguishable only after the fact” (*Ideas II*: 256). Thus, we grasp an “objective spirit” (*Ideas II*: 256), a human being, a “personal subject” in relation to the acts which it itself performs through motivation, and with “personal features or properties of character”. Husserl distinguishes here between the “pure-Ego-reflection”, that is, the reflection on the pure Ego that every Ego performs, and the “reflective thematic experience” i.e. the reflection on the empirical Ego that the personal Ego performs to uncover the “experiential nexuses” in which it shows itself (*Ideas II*: 261). This “personal Ego is the human Ego.” But repeated reflection on myself does not suffice to let an “an experiential apperception of the Ego” originate, as personal Egos exist in a community of other human beings (*Ideas II*: 262). Thus, the personal Ego experiences not only its own comportment but also the comportment of others within the shared surrounding world. Insofar as the personal I experiences itself in its own behaviour and at the same time apperceives itself in a “human nexus”, it comes to know itself as a “personal ‘reality’” (*Ideas II*: 262 fn. 1). This means that the personal I has to perform an “inductive apperception” in order to be able to grasp itself as personal reality; that is to say, the ability to grasp itself as a real person requires being part of a community of other human beings that are Is. Thus, I am a person only insofar as I am a member of a community: to be a person is to be a social being.

The constitution of personal agreement with the Other presupposes an actual “being-for-each-other”. In such a situation, the Self addresses the Other and reaches a primary understanding of the other's bodily perceiving and actions, i.e. its “bodily performances [*leibliche Bekundungen*]”. But it is only through

communication that a social agreement may originate, i.e. the sphere of the social (Hua XV: 479). The “speech bond” is for Husserl the “primary form of the communicative agreement” or sociality. Through this agreement there arises a “personality of a higher level” (Hua XV: 472) grounded on common habitualities, i.e. shared customs, an *êthos* in the Aristotelian sense. The constitution of an *êthos* presupposes a practical intention which impels us to action or, in Husserl’s words, an “intentionality of drives” (Hua XV: 594). This is because we are originally conjoined in a community of drives in the manner of an “intentional intermingling” (Hua XV: 366). Husserl understands this sphere as “radically pre-egoical”: it belongs to the lower strata of the stream devoid of Ego, i.e. to the sphere of the I but before the I is constituted as Self. Thus it belongs to the sphere of the “passivity devoid of Ego [*ichlosen Passivität*]” (Hua XV: 595). This insight allows Husserl to postulate a mutual constitution of the I and the world, insofar the constitution of the world on the one hand and of persons on the other can only be carried out by an intersubjective community and a transcendental intersubjective constitution of existing bodies respectively (Hua XV: 466).

This “pre-egoical” sphere in which I am not yet split from the Others, i.e. in which I am not yet individualised, is essentially different from the above mentioned pre-reflexive Self that possesses its own individuality. In fact, the personal I experiences itself as already existing, insofar as “the I does not originally arise out of experience (...) but out of life (it is what it is not *for* the Ego, but it is itself the Ego)” (*Ideas II*: 264). “I am the subject of my life”, such that the I is primarily and originally a subject that constitutes objects to meet its primal needs, it “develops by living”, it is “simply there” in its self-givenness and in its actions and passions. This ‘simple being-there’ is therefore the originary way a person is given. Only at a second stage does the I experience itself “in the sense of an associative apperception” (*Ideas II*: 264). This implies that the reflection which starts from the personal I uncovers the pre-reflective Self as a pre-given factual existent entity. Insofar as self-reflection has an “essential constitutive function” (*Ideas II*: 263), it can be understood as a retroactive constitution of the I.

In *Ideas II*, Husserl develops a stratified model of the I based on these insights by establishing different levels of apperceptions which presuppose the facultative possibility of an active intentionality. The lowest strata belongs to the pure I, the object of “pure-Ego-reflection” performed by the empirical I; the next strata belongs to the “empirical I” as an intentional object of “reflective thematic experience” carried out by the personal I insofar as it experiences itself; finally the last strata belongs to the personal I, which shows itself in relation to both the acts it carries out and in its personal character (*Ideas II*: 261). It is important to note that the personal I is the only I capable of consciously relating to others and to its surroundings, such that it opens itself up not only to the world, but to its own history.

Through self-reflection as self-perceiving, it discovers aspects of its self formerly unknown to him, i.e. its “unreflected consciousness” (*Ideas II*: 255) and it comes to know itself as the I of its manifold actions and passions, which may vary in time according to circumstances. Self-reflection is therefore a unified process of both self-knowledge and individuation. The Self grasps itself in its selfhood insofar as it recognises the history of its transformations as its own while in a parallel fashion it grasps its *ipseity* insofar as it remains the same throughout its changes. To be a person is therefore to be a being which undergoes a changing life-history. The I as person is thus grasped in its diachronic singularity.

4. The Person as the Subject of Acts of Reason and as a Free Ego

Husserl conceives the personal I as a person in a specific and strong sense as “the subject of acts which are to be judged from the standpoint of reason, the subject that is ‘self-responsible’, the subject that is free” (*Ideas II*: 269). It is a matter of a demand not only of self-responsibility, but also of an active positioning and active thinking of the I, an Ego that takes decisions and positions for itself and does so “in the mode of reason” (*Ideas II*: 282), i.e. it “takes decisions based on ‘grounds’” (Hua XIV: 20f). The personal I is therefore a “person as the subject of acts of reason, whose motivations and motivating powers come to givenness in our own original lived experience as well as in the lived experience, available to us in empathy, of others” (*Ideas II*: 282). What is here displayed is its individuality, i.e. its “individual idiosyncrasy” which must be distinguished from the “individuation of uniqueness”. “Individuation” relates to the general “I ‘form’ in its generality” and concerns each monad in its individualisation; individuation means thus numerical unity. By “individuality”, by contrast, Husserl means the qualitative unity concerning the “qualitative idiosyncrasy” i.e. the freedom of the I to take decisions. There is an *a priori* manifold of possible acts or positions, but each act is “necessary out of pure possibility”, i.e. it is “*a priori* (necessary) in a new special sense” (Hua XIV: 22). Husserl defines this *a priori* necessity in a new sense as an “individual necessity” (Hua XIV: 24). It concerns the essence of the individual being: if the I is “an identical I”, that is, if the essence of a person is unchangeable – in Husserl’s words if “I hold to myself as the I, that I am” – then “only one reasonably possible as the case may be” for each I, such that the “real decision is only one reasonably possible” (Hua XIV: 22f.). The I can think of manifold possibilities, but it is able to realize “intuitively” whether the possibility under consideration is compatible or incompatible with its own essence. An incompatible possibility for the I implies that the I is fantasised as an other I. Husserl still conceives of essence

in an Aristotelian sense: there are certain possibilities potentially available the unchanging essence; possibilities which are *a priori* necessary but vary according to each individual. This is a conception that he later calls into question.

I am thus responsible for my theoretical convictions and not only for my acts, such that the person has, in addition to its qualitative idiosyncrasy or its “aesthetic character”, a “moral” character (*Ideas II*: 284). The question of whether every person can comply with this requirement is left open. But it is clear that a human being “has its character, its person[ality], is a unity, constituted in the course of its life, as a subject of position-taking, i.e., a unity of multifarious motivations based upon multifarious presuppositions” (*Ideas II*: 286f.). But, as Husserl adds, “[w]hat is most proper to the person resides in the Ego as substrate of decisions and not in the Ego of mere faculties”. That means it does not reside in the “practical” possibilities of the “I can”. Every I as a “subject of position-taking and of habitual convictions” has its “style”. The personal subject is dependent on motivations and is as a “subject of actual and possible decisions” determined not only by its idiosyncrasies but also by “factual relations”: the subject is thus a “unity of determinations” (*Ideas II*: 342f) and these determinations have both a practical and a moral character.

5. Husserl’s Personalistic Ethics

Hence, Husserl’s statements about the person as a subject of acts of reason are only comprehensible from his ethical-moral reflections. In order to show how these conceptions are related, Husserl’s reflections will first be placed in the greater perspective of the development of his axiology and ethics. Taken only in its chief contours, the discussion will focus on the ontology of the ethical subject on which his later ethics are grounded. Husserl’s pre-war axiology and ethics of the categorical imperative and of the highest good as developed in the Göttingen lectures, which were strongly influenced by Brentano, will be briefly reviewed. Husserl’s pre-war ethics comprises his lecture courses on axiology and ethics from 1902, 1908/09, 1911 and 1914, which lectures were mostly published in Hua XXVIII. His post-war ethics are located in manuscripts from the first half of the 1920s. Three lectures on Fichte’s ideal of humanity can be found at the beginning of this period. These were mainly given in the winter of 1917–1928 and have been published in Hua XXV, p. 267–293. There is also the Freiburg lecture course from 1919–1920, entitled “Introduction to Philosophy”, which was published for the most part in Hua Mat. IX, in Hua XXXV and in Hua XLII. Finally, in 1922/23 Husserl wrote various articles on “renewal” for the Japanese journal *The Kaizo*. These were published in Hua XXV. This overview (cf. Melle: 1991, 115f.), which is not intended to be complete, gives an insight into the principal phases of Husserl’s

ethical reflections. It will allow us to point out the features of an ontology of the ethical person that will enable us to solve the problem posed in *Ideas II*, namely, the break in the unity of ontological reality.

5.1. The Ethics of the Categorical Imperative

Husserl's early ethics is characterised by a search for analogues to the forms and laws of the intellect and its acts. He develops the idea of "parallel or analogous forms of rationality" (Melle 2002: 239), i.e. forms of emotional and volitional rationality whose objectivity and truth is analogous to those of the act of thinking. "A formal axiology and formal praxis as the sciences of the formal laws of the heart" are parallel to "formal logic as the science of formal laws of theoretical reason" (Melle 2007: 8; cf. Hua XXVIII: 49f.). One of the laws of formal axiology is of particular relevance, the law of absorption: "The better is the enemy of the good and the best absorbs everything else that can be appreciated as practically good in and for itself" (Hua XXVIII: 136, as quoted in Melle 2007: 9), from which the categorical imperative is deduced. This principle, which Husserl takes from Brentano, says: "Do the best that is attainable" (Hua XXVIII: 221). This is an imperative that is required to be made into a law of the subject's willing. This imperative is a noetic expression. "Objectively, the expression would be: the best attainable within the entire practical sphere is not merely the best comparatively speaking, but rather the sole practical good" (Hua XXVIII: 221 as quoted in Melle 1991: 120). The best attainable, although subjectively contingent, is objectively obliging: choice is guided by a will aiming at and grasping its own and whole realm of practical possibilities and must select the highest value therein (cf. Melle 2002: 236, Melle 1991: 120). The imperative thus allows for inclination and preference insofar as what we ought to choose is founded on value. Contrary to Kant's, Husserl's axiology is a "logic of the heart [*Gemüt*]" based on the relation of the heart to what appears as good and bad (Hart 1992: 299). The personal I decides to rule and shape its life according to the categorical imperative. Here a central thought of Husserl's ethics emerges, namely, the notion of a self-regulation of the whole of life based on the recognition of what is truly good, a notion that determines my own identity as an ethical subject.

But already in this period, Husserl questions the rational universalism and objectivism of his ethics, insofar as pure axiological laws do not provide the material value-content necessary to justify ethical choices (Hua XXVIII: 419–422; cf. Peucker 2008: 317; Hart 1992: 324f.; Melle 1998: xlvi–xlviii). First, any *a priori* value scale would contradict our ethical frame of decisions, insofar as the type of goods which are "absolutely obliging [absolut gesollten]" depends on the particular circumstances we are living through (Hua Mat IX; 144f). Second, rational willing

and doing seems to be guided by the order of preference in practical realizable values that are established by evaluative acts that themselves institute this order of preference, such that this willing and doing would not realize any insight of its own (Melle 2007: 9). Finally, the categorical imperative can only be followed if values can be compared to one another (an objection raised to Husserl by the Munich Phenomenologist Moritz Geiger, cf. Hua XXVIII: 419f.; Hart 1992: 297–303, 324f.), something that exceeds formal axiology, insofar as only subjective processes enable us to experience something as of value. Although Husserl claims that feelings and emotions give us access to certain value-properties, these are non-objectifying acts, a distinction that characterises the difference between reason and feeling consciousness (Peucker 2008: 317f.; cf. Peucker 2010: 60; Hua XXVIII: 260–269 and 332–344). The solution to this problem lies in the consideration of the subjective values of love that are the object of the subjective ethical will on the one hand and the acknowledgment of the Others' wills and values on the other.

5.2. The Ethics of Love and the Absolute Ought

In the later Freiburg lecture course of 1919/20, "Introduction to Philosophy" (cf. Hua Mat. IX, 1–287; Hua XXXV, 43–46; cf. Melle 2002: 237–241) and in writings on ethics of the same period (cf. Hua XLII, 265–527), which mark the transition to Husserl's later ethics, after stating the "evident, absolute validity" of the categorical imperative as an "unconditionally valid positive criterion of the ethically good and bad will" (Hua Mat. IX: 133), Husserl realises that the objective value has to be distinguished from the same value as an individual, subjective value of love (Hua Mat. IX, 146 Fn. 1, as quoted by Melle 2002: 238). This "problem of love", which is "one of the main problems of phenomenology" (Hua XLII: 524), leads him to question the validity of the categorical imperative. As Husserl explicitly admits: "I will have to renounce or set limits to the whole doctrine of Brentano's categorical imperative" (Hua Mat IX: 132 Fn. 1; cf. Hua XLII: 390). Insofar as love is "something specifically personal", the highest practical good may not coincide with the absolute ought (Hua Mat. IX, 132, Fn. 1). Personal values of love such as "individual values" (e.g. love for individual persons such as love for one's own child or for a friend, for personalities of a higher order such as one's own family or community or love of the neighbour) "make up the largest part of the values of an absolute ought" (Hua XLII: 337). In concrete situations, i.e. whenever individual values give rise to concrete duties (e.g. whenever washing the own child becomes a duty out of love or whenever playing a Mozart sonata is to be preferred over some pleasurable activity), (Hua XLII: 390), the formal imperative is concretised in an "individual categorical imperative of the moment [*individuellen kategorischen Imperative der Stunde*]", (Hua XLII: 377; cf. Melle 2002: 244), which prescribes

what is to be done as “absolute ought” (Hua XLII: 390 and 321). In case of conflict, absolute values of love have a priority over objective values: to go against the former would amount to a self-betrayal, a “betrayal of one’s own essence” (Hua XLII: 377; cf. Melle 2002: 244). All these personal absolute values are equally absolute such that the law of absorption cannot be applied to values of personal love. In case of having to choose, there is only one option left: to sacrifice one value for the sake of another, which amounts to a sacrifice of oneself. (Hua XLII: 346 and 415; cf. Melle 2002: 244). Hence, if on the one hand the “absolute ought essentially concerns absolute values, persons and their personal and ideal values” (Hua XLII: 377) and if on the other, absolute values cannot be submitted to the law of absorption, then Brentano’s categorical imperative cannot be applied to certain kind of values insofar as it is grounded on precisely that law of formal axiology (cf. Sowa, Vongehr 2014: cvi).

Brentano’s formulation is insufficient “for the voice of conscience, of the absolute ought, can demand something from me that I would in no way recognise as the ‘best’ in a comparison of values” (Hua XLII: 390). Each of us has our own absolute ought “and what is to be chosen must answer not to what is the best, but to the question ‘What ought I?’; (...) or ‘Which is now necessary to me?’ [*Was soll ich? (...) Welches ist jetzt mein Notwendiges?*]”, (Hua XLII: 390). However insufficient, Brentano’s formulation is still valid in the realm of objective values, namely to those to which a “neutral observer” bound by a generally valid willing and acting would actually endorse (Hua XLII: 351). These objective values arise out of the special characteristics of the object, which motivates a practical apperception of the subject. Insofar as subjective values are concerned, the direction of the intentional ray is inverse, because it is now from the subject that a “loving valuing” emanates towards this object (Hua XLII: 352). Should the imperative not be valid for a realm of subjective values, then the ethical rationalism implied in it would not seem to apply either. Husserl explicitly admits a moment of irrationality: “Among the persons of my environment, my child is the ‘closest’ to me, and therein is contained an irrationality of the absolute ought” (Hua XLII: 384 as quoted by Melle: 1991: 134). The rationality of the absolute ought seems to house a ‘core’ of irrationality, “‘irrational’ existences and values, the irrational truths (truths of being)”, (Hua XLII: 350), which are connected with the ‘irrational’ values of love, namely those values that being absolute, exceed any scale of values (Hua XLII: 352). However, this is not Husserl’s final word on the irrationality of rationality. We will return to this later on.

In this context it is important to note that ethical duties differ from moral ones: the example of the call to a duty or vocation shows that an ethical obligation may arise not only out of the values of personal love that address what is considered good in itself, be it for my own or in others’ benefit (Hua XLII: 278), but from

other value-realms such as the love for a certain profession. Whenever this calling, initially “instinctively” aimed at, becomes a conscious, life-determining aim of the will (Hua XLII: 359), endorsing the norm that requires us to live “in ethical seriousness”, i.e. to live “in the seriousness of the decision for a true and authentic Dasein”, then such a calling is to be regarded as a model for the ethical life generally (Hua XLII: 455). Husserl points here to a central theme of his late ethics: the absolute ought grounded in the personal love and calling of the subject which, together with the striving for the autonomy of reason, make up the individual essence of a person. In Husserl’s words: “The realm of values [is] personally rooted insofar as realm of general norms. It belongs to the ‘essence’ of each personal individuality to have a realm of personal decisions, personal love, personal ought (...), types, classes of personal values and corresponding general and *a priori* norms” (Hua XLII: 344). Husserl does not renounce his former axiological ethics, he rather endows it with a grounding affective structure that provides ethics with a material content, namely, the subjective values of love, such that not only the will and the call for a particular vocation but the whole life of a person now become linked to the absolute ought of love.

5.3. The Love of Eternal Values and Fichte’s Influence

It is in connection with Fichtean themes that the categorical imperative fuses in certain respects with the absolute ought, thus giving rise to the idea of an ideal position-taking that brings blessedness and allows for a material-teleological formulation of the “necessary (...) love for eternal values”, namely a “positive” and “highest blessedness” (Hua XXV, 287). Striving for a life that is self-determined and self-responsible amounts to a blessed life: “A blessed total life as such would be a unified life in which all its intentions and all its striving would run into the form of filled intentions” (Hua XXXV: 44). Much in Fichtean terms, Husserl defines the “universal, philosophical doctrine of reason” as “the science of the reasonable or truly good life as such, or of the blessed life” (Hua XXXV: 45), whose principal task is to contribute to the fulfilment of a “blessed life in common” (Hua XXXV: 44) of the individual and the community as well. We find here the second step of the solution for the lack of its own content in the personal will: only within life in a community and with the acknowledgment of Other’s values can individual willing and doing realize its own insights. The subject can master its own life, it can overcome doubt, negation, lack of values and certainties only if it both leads a life under the guidance of reliable knowledge and conscience, i.e. a life that is wholly self-justifying and strives for rational autonomy within an encompassing community. Blessedness characterises an intentional life that is not only subjectively satisfying, but is “a life of firm and positive knowledge and conscience”

that withstands reflective critique and is justifiable in its totality (Hua XXXV: 45). Hence, the recognition not only of what is simply good but of the good as such needs to be expressed in an activity that acknowledges the Other and what he/she considers the best. This performance can be understood as a “moral act” which is “caught up in the categoriality” and thus constitutes the distinctive moment of a moral category (Sokolowski 2017: 60–63).² The absolute ought, as that which is required for each individual’s self-realization and true self-preservation, is an instance of the general features of the categorical imperative that determines the best on the basis of a correctly motivated will (Hua XXXV: 45; Hart 1992: 318).

The content of the absolute ought of love developed in his three post-war lectures on “Fichte’s Ideal of Humanity” is determined by the way the divine entelechy effected by the world-life’s idea “is profiled through an individual life in a concrete situation” (Hart 1992: 324; cf. Hua XXV: 267–293). The revelation of the absolute ought must be made into a law of my willing and it is proper to and distinctive of each person according to its unique situation. Although the evidence will always be inadequate, there is an absoluteness in the form of determination of both the absolute ought as the truth of the person and the good to be chosen whenever it is loved for the sake of itself, namely, provided it is not a mere means (Hart 2002: 325f.; Hua XXV: 288). Only a true ethical will transforms life into an ethical life. A particular form of such a general will is the choice of vocation that makes up my true self, such that the categorical imperative demands the ethical subject to devote himself to the pursuit of a particular class of values (cf. Melle 2002: 239). The position-taking in which a person orders all his/ her life under the guidance of this true self, i.e. the primary ethical task, is called “the ethical truth of the person”, a truth that has both a formal-logical as well as a pre-logical, “situational” [*Situationswahrheit*] character (Hua VIII: 297). It is a truth which concerns the particular subject of the will and its individual life, as such it is called “the truth of the will [*Willenswahrheit*]” (Hua XXXV: 252). Hence, the ideal of the true self, namely the absolute ought, is a leading of a life in analogy to a career towards which all decisions and projects are ordered and unified (Hart 1995: 151). My choices and my position-takings therefore constitute my personal identity: my person is constituted by such and such position-takings. But it is clear that my acts disclosing my truly being me, those characteristics that define my essence, are inseparably linked with those of Others (cf. Hart 1992: 328; Hua XXVIII: 176), such that, as we have seen, individual ethics opens up to a social, communitarian ethics. True love of self is inseparable from true love of the neighbour [*Nächstenliebe*],

² Although Husserl ties “the ethical” not to this practical acknowledgment of the Other but to a good, true and ideal life, he states that we are originally intermingled with Others, such that our search for our true self is inseparable from the search by Others and the love of my self is interwoven with the love for Others (Hart 1992: 308).

(cf. Hua XXXVII: 10–12; Hua XIV: 165–84, 192–204). The spiritual life of both, the individual person or a social personality of a higher order, i.e. a community, is a personal life, insofar as only a person can build up an ethical will in response to its capacity to conceive the wholeness and unity of his life. Husserl's later ethics is grounded on such an "ontology of the spirit or of personal life", as developed in the *Kaizo* articles of the early 1920s and in the above-mentioned manuscripts with respect to the values of love.

5.4. The Ontology of the Ethical Subject

The foundation of Husserl's later ethics is an ontology of the person, but not the person as such (as was developed in *Ideas II*) but as an ethical subject. Persons are characterised by three essential traits. First, they are responsible for their own being, that is, for their convictions and for their acts. A person, however, is not pure freedom, but is determined by passivity. On the one hand, passivity comprises primal instincts and drives, which affect the rational activity of the ego and on the other, it concerns the history and the factual determinations of its life as a whole (Melle 2012: 243f.). The sphere of the person thus has an entirely different ontology to that of natural things, as was stated at the beginning of this article. Husserl emphasises that personal life is determined by pre-egoical striving tendencies (Hua XXVII: 25), which express themselves in knowledge-intentions as a striving for clarity and fullness and which are articulated in actions of will that aim at obtaining what is desired (cf. Hua XXXVII: 248). These personal strivings aim at a state of fulfilled happiness, namely that of "eudaimonia" (cf. Hua XXVIII: 11; Hua XXXVII: 37 and 44; Hua XLII: 303 and 469) in the Aristotelian sense of the word (cf. Peucker: 2010: 62–65). An ethics whose task is to discover the aims of our strivings and the means to realise them can provide a practical orientation when it comes to selecting the "essence of practical goods", namely that which makes them true and authentic (Hua XXVIII: 37). Therefore, "ethics always wanted to be a theory and a practical discipline of the perfect human life and human being, a theory and practical discipline of the methods of self-shaping of the subject and its life to perfection or to happiness" (Hua XXXV: 46, as quoted in Peucker 2008: 321). However, such a state is not at all attainable for human beings, because our life is characterised by disappointments, errors, inhibitions of our strivings and what Husserl later calls the "core of 'primal contingency' [*Kern von 'Urzufälligem'*]", (Hua XV: 386), of our factual life, namely, the irrational contingencies to which the subject is exposed in the course of its life. By this 'primal contingency', Husserl means the open possibilities of the "irrational or senseless [*Unsinnigkeiten*]" – destiny, death, illness and misery (Hua XLII: 398) and of the "senseless fortuitousness [*unsinnige Zufällen*]", insofar as "the being of absolute

human beings” is a mere “contingency, contingency of their surroundings, upbringing, education, health and illness” (Hua XLII: 409 and 300). The world is “unpredictable; would it itself be predicable, it would be of no avail to the I, which has bumped into it by hazard and fate and which is dragged around by and in it” (Hua XLII: 286). Hence, the Ego is not only subject to pre-existing structures imposed upon it, but also to future contingencies over the course of its life. The I bumps into an already existing world – as Husserl claims: “I have not chosen my life” (Hua XLII: 409) – and is born amid a family and a certain community, in particular surroundings under particular historical circumstances, in a cultural tradition, in a determinate place in time and space and so forth, which were already constituted by others and which it has to retroactively endow with sense. We may thus conclude that phenomenology’s realm is enlarged to encompass the problems concerning the irrationality, indeterminacy and contingency of factual life which the subject is powerlessly and frequently unwillingly subject to.

Such experiences motivate a critique that affects the sphere of our aims, i.e. the sphere of praxis and will. Although Husserl claims that virtuous acts conform to a kind of “second nature” of the person, this is not passively acquired in a process of habituation but it rather requires the Ego to be the “*causa sui*” of its own morality to the extent that it is “determined by itself as being thus”, aiming at goals that are wanted and effected on grounds of a self-evaluation (Hua XXXVII: 163). Husserl stresses here the importance of a critical self-reflection or self-evaluation to the constitution of an ethical life insofar as this life presupposes a radical self-critique through which the personal I can arrive at a higher form of consciousness and thus reorganise its whole life. Husserl calls this process “renewal [*Erneuerung*]”. In his “Essay on Renewal” from 1922–1924, Husserl defines ethics and ethical life by this concept of renewal: “Renewal of humans, of the individual human as well as the communalised humanity, is the chief theme of all ethics. The ethical life in its essence is one that stands consciously under the idea of renewal, a life guided and shaped willingly by the idea of renewal” (Hua XXVII: 20, as quoted in Melle 2007: 10). Self-consciousness, personal self-contemplation, self-evaluation and self-determination are the essential traits of persons that distinguish them from the “passive-unfree” strivings (inclinations, affects) of other living beings (Hua XXVII, 23f.). Hence, the human as person oversees its life and aims at universal values. There are two types of human life or types of persons. The first one concerns a pre-ethical level comprising the choice of a career while the second one concerns life-history at a lower level, wherein the person commits itself to leading a life according to reason. At the third level, the human form of life attains its absolute sense, “a life-form of authentic humanity”: the I has taken the resolution to shape itself into an “authentic and true human being”, who not only leads and justifies its life according to reason, but

whose theoretical, practical and axiological reason strives to reach the ideal of “absolute, personal perfection” (Hua XXVII: 29–35).

5.5. The Ethics of Renewal

This renewal aims at the “authentic” person, a person that can have or experience values. To experience them, it has to feel emotions: this process of valuing already starts at the apperception of emotions aroused by the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, which in turn constitute the sensation-material subjected to the valuing act (cf. Hua IV; Hua XI). The experiencing of values is required in order to hear the call for the “absolute ought” that consists in leading a purposeful and active life guided by “truth, reason and rightness” and in accordance with our subjective capacities, that is, the telos is the “best possible life” relative to each subject’s nature, as Aristotle demands. The ethical postulate thus consists in wanting and having the will to lead the whole of our life under the guidance of reason (Hua XXVII: 32f.). But “reason” is not an absolute telos insofar as it is relative not only to the “best possible” capacity or conscience (Hua XXVII: 34), but also to the “material state of affairs” in which the person is already situated (Hua XXVIII: 40f.). Listening to this inner call is not listening to the abstract voice of reason but instead answering our “positive drives” in their search for “positive values” (Hua XXVII: 25) guided not only by reason but also by “pure love” (Hua XXVII: 28). Hence, embracing this quest is first of all an act of love, a love for the pursuit of rationality and a question of emotions.

The human being is motivated by love to search for these ideal values and this is an ideal that does not transcend it but arises “out of itself”, out of “the living I”, the “true” and “best I” (Hua XXVII: 35) that is able to justify its acts. Once this ideal I is found, the ethical demand is posed: the subject has to acknowledge that the ethical life-form is not only the relative best possible one, but also the only truly good one. In agreement with his ontology of the person and the ethics of the categorical imperative, Husserl defines ethics as “the science of the total life of action of a rational subjectivity, lived from the point of view of reason that regulates this whole life in a unified way” (Hua XXVII: 21). This ethical demand is defined as an “ethical imperative” whose demands are categorical. The subject can be valued as a “true subject” only insofar as it willingly submits to the categorical imperative: “Be a true subject, lead a life that you can wholly justify by insight, a life out of practical reason [*Sei ein wahrer Mensch; führe ein Leben, das du durchgängig einsichtig rechtfertigen kannst, ein Leben aus praktischer Vernunft!*],” (Hua XXVII: 36). Husserl here advocates an unrestricted ethical rationalism which is grounded on a particular emotion: personal pure love. For Husserl, the moral person is a subject who is able to rationally justify its life, such that the

ethical demand is a demand to assume a radical responsibility for one's own life. The quest for rational justification and self-responsibility does not arise out of a universal demand (Kant) but out of affective life, more precisely, the love for reason. Hence, the deepest being of the person and the root of its individuality is not to be found in reason and rational striving but in love. The personal I has a core of personal love from which it follows its vocation, its calling: "The I, which as such an innermost I and which is beckoned by this ownmost calling, this I, has individuality" (Ms. B I 21,55, as quoted in Melle 2007: 12) which expresses itself in the intensity and the direction of its love. Moreover, the demand for justification can only be complied with if the moral subject is a part of the community, of a "personality of a higher order" (Hua XXVII: 22). As mentioned above, to be a person means to be a moral person only insofar as embedded it is in a community: being a moral person is being a social being who engages in the love-driven pursue of rationality and self-determination. This ethical striving towards self-determination and self-justification which permeates our life as a whole can be understood as the foundation of Husserl's phenomenology insofar as it is determined by "a philosophical *ethos*": the ethical striving towards a true life wherein all acts can be ideally justified and accounted for (Peucker 2011: 10) and which is ultimately driven by love.

5.6. The Overcoming of Irrationality and Senselessness through Love and Faith

For Husserl the irrationality of fate, contingency, death, illness, the possible failure of my own forces that prevent me from fulfilling my aims can only be surmounted if I remain "heroic", if I do not let these disappointments break me down (Hua XLII: 304). But, Husserl asks, what happens when "the attainable good continually dwindles" or "when I cannot hope that it will ever be different"? These questions lead Husserl to ask: "Can I live in a 'senseless' world?" (Hua XLII: 307f.). The answer lies in the loving care of a mother who doesn't give up even if confronted with the end of the world. She does her duty out of love, she perseveres, but she is far from being blessed. Blissfulness in the sense of *eudaimonia* is in tension with self-content and the categorical imperative (Hua XLII: 311). This conflict can only be resolved within a "community of love" (Hua XLII: 313) wherein each person not only acknowledges but takes over the values of Others as if they were its own. A subject as "functionary of an ethic community" does its best in relation to its surrounding world, thus attaining self-content and blessedness (Hua XLII: 316). However, neither the ideal of reason alone nor the idea of a community of love suffices to counterbalance the effects of the irrationality and senselessness of our lives: only a rational faith in a divine teleology or a divine arrangement of

the world can reconcile us with rationality and sense: “I can be blessed, and I can only be such in all suffering, misfortune, and irrationality of my surroundings, when I believe that God exists and that this world is God’s world; and if I will with all the strength of my soul to hold fast to the absolute ought, and that itself is an absolute willing, then I must believe absolutely that God is; faith is the absolute and highest requirement” (Hua XLII: 308, as quoted by Melle 2007: 15). The subject has no knowledge of the existence of God, but it can posit God on the basis of a motivation of the heart: “The world ‘has to’ be a lovely and good one, one that has a universal teleology” (Hua XLII: 254). Human action is free and responsible, but human action must be divinely guided; “all irrational contingencies, all sinful confusions, all irrational disturbances” (Hua XLII: 254) have to be the practical background to a universal teleology and everything therein must also have a teleological function in order that a “free, responsible human life in the world be possible” (Hua XLII: 254). For the sake of its self-preservation as a person, it must believe in God insofar as “I live, I have to be able to live, I can only live in hope, I can only truly live in vocation and in the hope that it presupposes *za*. I believe not out of arbitrariness, but out of the necessity to be me, and a member of mankind (...) Destiny and misery bring faith into being and with it the overcoming of destiny” (Hua XLII: 407). Much like Nietzsche, Husserl claims that this is the “absolute ought, which affirms life because of the misery, the reality and possibility of one’s own and others’ destinies” (Hua XLII: 408); an absolute ought that needs the support of loving faith.

6. Conclusion: The Re-establishment of the Unity of Ontological Reality: The Open, Historical Essence of a Person and its Universalisation as a Transcendental Person

At this point we are able to take up the problem of the split in the ontological reality caused by the break between the scientific and the phenomenological attitudes. The first step towards bridging this gap is the consideration of the open essence of a thing which is afterwards extended to the Ego. Husserl asks himself whether a thing is “an identical subject of identical properties” and whether its behaviour is “predelineated by its own essence” (*Ideas II*: 312). The ground-breaking question, which breaks with the Aristotelian tradition, reads: “But does each thing (...) have such an essence of its own in the first place? Or is the thing, as it were, always underway, (...) in principle only a relatively identical something, which does not have its essence in advance or graspable once and for all, but instead has an open essence, one that can always take on new properties according to the

circumstances of givenness?” (*Ideas II*, 313). This question leads him to acknowledge that the Ego is not an empty pole but is the “bearer of its habitualities”, i.e. it has “its individual history”. Although a personal Ego has an absolute individuation, as stated above, it “allows itself to be determined by its ‘over and against’ in the surrounding world” and by its own “history” (*Ideas II*: 314f.) such that it acquires new properties. This means that the I as an ensouled nature acquires new habits in response to its cultural environment, habits which were not part of its original essence. The condition of the possibility for this capacity of transformation is the ‘flexible’ nature of our consciousness: “Consciousness has its own essence, one in flux and not determinable exactly” (*Ideas II*: 315). To restore the unity of both approaches we need to relate this essential openness of consciousness to the I as person. Husserl does precisely this when he claims “[a]bsolute individuation enters into the *personal Ego*” (*Ideas II*: 315). This means that the person is the only reality which has a personal, individual I, is bearer of habitualities and therefore has a personality with an individual history. The essence of the personal I can therefore change and assume new properties, according to its own history, while being related to nature through its cultural and scientific achievements.

We have already seen that a person as moral person realises its ethical existence under the guidance of practical reason. This telos of an ethical life-form that rules the whole of an individual life according to the individual categorical imperative guided by love can be achieved in various manners, for example through scientific activity, through political or artistic life (Hua XXVII: 40). Science and the lifeworld are closely connected – if severed, then a crisis ensues (cf. *Crisis*). Life in its full sense is not merely a life devoted to practical interests but one that serves theoretical interests too. This is what “renders the human subject to its fullness as person” (Luft 2012: 37). Husserl terms this person as the “transcendental person who, entering into the universality of the concrete transcendental, appropriates for itself the wholly encompassing life” (Hua XXXIV: 200f., as quoted in Luft 2012: 37). It is precisely around this person insofar as it is transcendental that Husserl’s moral-ethical reflections crystallise. Hence, if the transcendental Ego itself is construed from out of the context of the personal Ego and this personal Ego is nothing other than a moral person, then we may conclude that the transcendental person is the universal structure underlying any individual Ego with its individual life. We may also conclude that the unity of ontological reality, the unity of the lifeworld and science, is re-composed by an ethical demand that rules not only the life of individuals, but that of communities as well, as both share a universal character – that of being moral persons.

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On Empathy. E. Stein and R. Ingarden vs. Cognitive Psychology

In this paper I compare (using as paradigmatic examples E. Stein and R. Ingarden) phenomenological theories of empathy (understood as “mind-reading”) with contemporary cognitivists’ approach to this issue, arguing that although they are *prima facie* incompatible, in fact they can be seen as complementary. Since empathy is indispensable in practice, a correct conceptualization of this topic is desirable.

Key words: cognitive science(s), empathy, R. Ingarden, mind-body problem, mind-reading, phenomenology, E. Stein

‘Empathy’ in the phenomenological sense (German ‘*Einfuehlung*’) has a broader meaning than it does in contemporary psychology, as it refers to knowing other mind(s). Cognitive science uses the suggestive term ‘mind-reading’ here. At first glance the accounts of empathy given by such classic phenomenologists as Stein and Ingarden seem to be in tension with contemporary cognitive theories, particularly because those two philosophers seem to maintain that empathy is a kind of direct or immediate cognition – or simply another kind of perception. Cognitivists, in turn, purport to deny this, holding that empathy is somehow mediated – in short, that it is a kind of inference or reasoning. But upon closer examination this contrast vanishes, as I try to show in what follows. Let’s start with Edith Stein’s doctoral thesis on empathy.

1. At the beginning of her work Stein states that “there is a close, yet *very loose* [emphasis added] parallel between” empathy and other perception such as sensory perception of a mesoscopic physical object (Stein 1989: 6–7). The reason is

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that the content of an act of empathy – the mental state of the other – is not primordially (*originaer*) given even in the primordial act of empathy, similarly as the averted sides of this table are not primordially given in my actual primordial act of perception of this table. ‘Being loose’ of this parallel means that those averted sides in virtue of the essence of this act can always be given primordially, whereas this is not the case with empathy. Nevertheless, Stein holds that empathy is a kind of a *sui generis* perception (*Erfahrung*). That is why she criticizes three genetic theories of empathy (imitation theory, association theory, and analogy theory). For their consequence, as Stein thinks, is that empathy is not a kind of *Erfahrung*. It is crucial to note here that Stein doesn’t see genetic psychology (to use the term from the beginning of the 20th century) as a rival in respect to phenomenology: on the contrary, she precisely formulated questions pertaining to this science: “(1) What psychological mechanism functions in the experience (*Erlebnis*) of empathy? (2) How has the individual acquired this mechanism in the course of his development?” (Stein 1989: 123, footnote 31). Still, what Stein opposes is having consequences inconsistent with the phenomenological description of the phenomenon. First, the imitation theory of Adam Smith is recalled – Stein writes: “If, as in memory, we put ourselves in the place of the foreign ‘I’ and suppress it while we surround ourselves with its situation, we have one of these situations of ‘appropriate’ experience (*Erlebnis*). If we then again concede to the foreign ‘I’ its place and ascribe this experience to him, we gain a knowledge of his experience” (Stein 1989: 14). Interestingly, what Stein calls the imitation theory is, to be precise, a conception by Theodor Lipps, though interpreted rather as a theory according to which empathy is a kind of contagion of feeling.²

But later the situation becomes blurred: Stein talks about “emphatic representation” (Stein 1989: 57, 115), contradicting her made earlier claim that empathy is not a representational act (Stein 1989: 19). Furthermore, she begins to speak of empathy as an “interpretation” and “projecting into” (*hineinversetzen*, (Stein 1989: 61ff), that is, interpreting the other particular body as a living one and of “transferring the self into the other’s orientation” (Stein 1989: 65). Indeed, the following passage is very similar to Smith’s account, formerly rejected: “Understanding of a bodily expression is based on comprehending the foreign living body already interpreted as a living body of an ‘I. I project myself into the foreign living body, carry out the experience already co-given to me as *empty*

² Stein also invokes here Max Scheler’s four arguments against the imitation theory: 1) imitation presupposes empathy (“presupposes a comprehending expression as expression”); 2) “we also understand expressions that we cannot imitate, for example the expressive movements of animals”; 3) “we comprehend the inadequacy of an expression, an impossibility if the comprehension occurred by an imitation of the expression alone”; 4) “we also understand experiences unfamiliar to us from our own earlier experience” (Stein 1989: 123, footnote 32). Later we will see how to respond to them.

[emphasis added] with its countenance, and experience the experience ending in this expression” (Stein 1989: 82).

2. Ingarden in his *The Controversy over the Existence of the World* draws an analogy between the physical object contrasted with its adumbrations (in which it is bodily given in perception) and the state of one’s soul (even from the first person perspective!) contrasted with its bodily expressions (*wyrazy*). But he softens the “immediate” character of empathy by adding that psychic facts are “in some sense” (*niejako*) perceived in bodily expressions (Ingarden 1987a: 224). His hesitation regarding this issue is further visible in that, on the one hand, it seems impossible, as Ingarden suggests, for at least certain bodily expressions not to be immediately grounded by appropriate mental facts (Ingarden explicitly mentions here as examples dissatisfaction and astonishment, accompanied by particular facial expressions – (Ingarden 1987a: 224). But on the other hand, there are also, he continues, mental facts that may *not* be bodily expressed, or expressed “imperfectly”, as he writes, or inadequately, due to e.g., pretending.

One can try of course to interpret this in a way charitable to Ingarden: both dissatisfaction and astonishment can be feigned, so it is a matter of an inappropriate example, not hesitation. But the problem is deeper: for even if mental states are given in bodily expressions through empathy in some similar way as ordinary objects are given in adumbrations through perception, Husserl and both of his pupils know that this is possible by the essence of the act of such a perception that those intended objects are illusory. Consequently, the same goes for “other minds”, and if we stress, following Ingarden, that this applies equally to our own self, the question arises: what is the epistemological difference between introspection, empathy, and outer perception?

Here, I think, it is necessary to look closer at Ingarden’s theory of mind (taken over, with several changes, from Husserl, and partly shared with Stein).

- 1) We should distinguish between I or the subject, the stream of consciousness, the soul, our body as felt from the first person perspective (let us call it ‘*Leib*’), and our body (let us call it ‘*Körper*’) as perceived from “the outside” (that does not mean necessarily “by others”).
- 2) The stream of consciousness has the form of a process; its contents are experiences.
- 3) I or the subject endures through time and is indispensable for the unity of the stream of consciousness (continuity and connectedness of experiences does not suffice for that unity). It is absolutely indivisible (Ingarden 1987: 116), unextended (Ingarden 1987a: 211) and immaterial (Ingarden 1987: 140) as well. The reason is simply that the question about its localization is meaningless (Ingarden 1987a: 213) (compare below, point 5).

- 4) The soul, which also endures through time, is the *locus* (not in the spatial sense of the term) of psychological “powers” (and “weaknesses”), or, more precisely, mental dispositions and character traits.
- 5) ‘I’ has several meanings. It can denote a pure subject of consciousness (‘I’ taken only as a subject of experience, or as an agent of conscious actions) or a particularly structured center of the soul; it can also denote a person and, finally, a psychophysical individual such as a human being.
- 6) Person is a soul with a structured center – I.
- 7) *Leib* and *Körper* are one and the same, albeit experienced in two ways (Ingarden 1987a: 194–195, 209; however, compare pp. 213f, footnote 86).
- 8) *Leib* is the (phenomenal) *locus* of the kinesthetic, proprioceptive etc. impressions or sensations.
- 9) The soul and *Leib* are *not* identical; the positive characterization of the relation between them is a serious problem for Ingarden – he analyzes several possibilities in terms of his relations of existential (in)separability, (in)dependence and originality/derivativeness, but does not take any definite stand on these matters.

It seems that Ingarden’s thesis 9) would not be satisfactorily warranted for many people, since it is just the result of the phenomenological insight (according to the author of *The Controversy*..., we never, phenomenologically speaking, identify ourselves with our body). Maybe we could say instead that *Leib* has the properties that the soul lacks or/and vice versa: observe that *Leib* is defined as having several *categorical* qualities, whereas the soul is the bearer of distinctive *dispositions*. On the other hand, one could insist that one cannot exclude the possibility that these are the same: that is, there are several dispositional qualities (the power of moving our body, for instance) that have appropriate manifestations (kinesthetic self-experiences in this case). Moreover, it seems that Ingarden’s thesis 7) should be revised for similar reasons.

Instead, I propose the following, in my opinion more correct account:

I can think of myself as having no body, just as Descartes, among other people, could. Interestingly, Descartes could do so in a time that was deprived of electronic communication and virtual reality. With a greater effort I can also think of the existence of my physical duplicate lacking my actual conscious mental sphere. If ‘*a*’ and ‘*b*’ are the names of one and the same thing, it cannot be thought of ‘*a*’ without ‘*b*’ (and ‘*b*’ without ‘*a*’), for we speak of one and the same thing, and nothing can exist without itself. Therefore, the popular ‘psychophysical identity thesis’ is once again false. But it also follows that two weaker theses are dubious (i.e., that purely mental objects are impossible and that an appropriately arranged brain by this sole fact entails the existence of a conscious mind). This argument (favored by Descartes and popularized by Kripke) *prima facie* suffers from the following defect: it can be thought that water is not H₂O – and indeed, people thought this

way in the past. But today we *do* know that water is H₂O. On the other hand, we don't know whether the psychophysical identity thesis is true. Hence, it is not false, but at most *dubious*.

The rejoinder is that if the abovementioned thesis is dubious, why should it be certain that purely mental objects are impossible? – or that an appropriately arranged brain necessarily implies a conscious mind? Furthermore, it was Kripke who objected to the alleged analogy between the psychophysical identity thesis and water-like identities. Consider the thesis that light = a beam of photons. When I say “light” in similar contexts I refer to “something we have in this room”, as Kripke noted. But this thing is identified by particular sensations it causes in us. Nevertheless, in the case of conscious mental states such as pain, we don't identify this state by particular sensations it causes in us – rather, pain *is* (identical with) such a sensation.

The next step is to strengthen this minimal dualism (the denial of the psychophysical identity thesis) so as to arrive at a dualism with a causally effective conscious mind, i.e., one able to act freely. In turn, free will cannot be consistently denied for two reasons. First, if someone argues against free will, she must assume that to speak of “the arguments” is inappropriate – rather, one could talk about “forcing” or “brainwashing”.³ Second, even the most extreme “immoralist” assumes that at least one moral norm holds (say, “maximize only your own well-being”). But if the norm holds, the very notion of moral obligation presupposes that I *can follow* that norm and that I *can refrain from following* it, as Kant rightly observed. And since the problem of human free will is analogous to the problem of the Prime Mover (this was also stressed by Kant⁴), the existence of free will is incompatible with the statement that an appropriate physical organization of the brain (or maybe the whole body) necessarily entails the existence of the conscious mind with that particular content.

A critic could say that this is not necessary, for the weaker dualism (i.e., property dualism) is sufficient.⁵ To respond, it suffices to notice that it is not the case that properties are causes – what causes something is *the subject* of properties instead.

One can point out here that in this way we create “an unbridgeable dualism between lived body and perceived body” (Zahavi 2001: 162), even if not an old-fashioned mind-body dualism. The problem seems to be, as Zahavi puts it, how we then “should ever be able to recognize other embodied subjects” (Zahavi 2001: 162) and the objective world in general (Zahavi 2001: 159–160)? Stein perfectly knows and accepts Husserl's view that it is precisely by means of empathy that

³ A. Cygański takes this argument to be “cheap”, as he puts it. See, however, (Chmielecki 2013: 178).

⁴ And also Stein. See (Stein 1989: 56, 72).

⁵ K. Cekiera's remark.

we can come to consider our own “zero point of orientation” as a “spatial point among many” (Stein 1989: 63) and in this way we constitute ourselves as a psycho-physical individual. The recognition is thus taken for granted and serves as a motivation for taking ourselves as an unbroken, unified entity. If one wants to go back to the level of her own body, i.e., to explain the recognition of others as made possible only by the empathy directed toward her own body, so to speak (Zahavi 2001: 161, 163), then we only change the place of encountering difficulty: we can, e.g., postulate the existence of a self-representation of her own body which purportedly permits her “to bridge the gap between interiority and exteriority” (Zahavi 2001: 164). And, of course, one has to be warned that if we agree that “thus empathy as the basis of intersubjective experience becomes the condition of possible knowledge of the existing outer world, as Husserl and Royce present it” (Stein 1989: 64), how to avoid *petitio principii* or *regressus*, given the fact that this very body (along with its self-representation) is posited?

3. Before passing on to cognitive psychology, let me describe two reasons for my reservations concerning phenomenology conceived as a meaning- and ground-bestowing science for everything else (thus was it thought of, albeit to a lesser degree, not only by Husserl, but also by Stein and Ingarden).

Sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology strive to talk about the world existing independently with regard to us, and it is reasonable to agree that much of what they say is true in the classic sense of the term (or at least sufficiently similar to being true). Everyday knowledge (hence, pre-scientific) is also full of true propositions such as that now I am writing this article and not playing, say, World of Tanks – let alone that I am not a brain in a vat. Philosophers who reject such realism place themselves above the natural sciences and I have no doubts about who is more competent here. The reasonableness of such scientific realism is warranted mostly by the unexplainable otherwise, the celebrated *correspondence* between older and newer theories (see e.g. Heller 2012). Indeed, the value of epistemology is ambivalent: I agree with T. Sider and other “Australian ontologists” that, on the one hand, “it may well be that the epistemological foundations of speculative metaphysics [=ontology – T.K.] are particularly difficult to secure”. But on the other hand, “any theory that rules out the possibility of high-level philosophical knowledge of the world is just another theory” (Sider 2001: xv). After all, there is a recurring problem with epistemological principles such as the Kantian principle of “possible (sensuous) experience” or the neopositivist principle of empirical meaning: either they are rejected on their own terms or they generate epistemic regress (see Leszczyński 2014: 169).⁶

⁶ R. Urbaniak recently tried to defend the neopositivist principle (see Urbaniak 2016: 112–115). He neglects regress and considers several positions with regard to the status of the principle stating that “meaningful propositions are either analytic (analytically false or analytically true) or they

Nevertheless, I believe, as I said at the beginning, that both Stein's, Ingarden's, and cognitivists' accounts of empathy can be seen as complementary rather than as rivals. Indeed, what Stein and others called 'genetic psychology,' can nowadays be identified with cognitive psychology. As usual in science, this is by no means the last word, but it is instructive to recall theses or rather hypotheses of the latter:

- 1) Cognitive psychologists agree with phenomenology that there are several grades of empathy (once again, in the broad, phenomenological sense), both in the developmental (or genetic) and structural aspect;
- 2) Moreover, they agree that it has a quasi-perceptual nature in that, on the one hand, it occurs immediately and its object is experienced as given, not inferred or concluded; on the other, however, this doesn't preclude the underlying unconscious and automatic processes which are similar to reasoning or inference;
- 3) Lastly, cognitive psychologists argue for the innate or genetic, not environmental or created by socialization source of those faculties and for the existence of the specific parts of the brain engaged in executing those functions, though this is an issue on which phenomenology of course cannot take a stand.

As for the first point, psychologists have studied such faculties as the ability to detect biological (as opposed to mechanical) movement (to be sure, the division has its grey area, since, e.g., Brown's movements have many characteristics attributable to biological ones), the abilities to detect face in general and that particular face (it has been proved that one can have the former without the latter – I mean here the syndrome called prosopagnosia), the ability to detect simple or basic emotions such as fear, astonishment, anger, and happiness (interestingly, it is independent of recognizing faces) and many others. Next come such faculties as attribution of propositional attitudes (that is, mental states whose contents are expressible in the form of a proposition) such as beliefs and desires or pretending (or tactical deception – it is believed to be present among chimps – here the term 'mind-writing' instead of the standard 'mind-reading' will be more appropriate).

satisfy a certain (depending on the appropriate version of the theory) condition of empirical meaningfulness" (p. 112). But below he blatantly states that the option according to which this principle is, as he puts it, an "empirical hypothesis", is not "ruled out" (p. 114). Second, he thinks that it would also be right to treat this criterion as "meaningless" (!), (p. 114) for "many things meaningless from the cognitive point of view are utile, such as making sandwiches" (p. 114). The question is, then, what is the neopositivist principle for? The answer is hilarious: to deny, inter alia, Islam (!), (see very meaningful allusions on p. 124). As for Husserl's principle, W. Płotka states that the supposed dilemma (either contradiction or regress) is false since it falsely excludes the descriptive character of phenomenology (as opposed to argumentative) (Płotka 2015: 40–85). But then the rejoinder suffers from *ignoratio elenchi*: for we need the criterion of the aptness of descriptions. If, once again following Husserl, one opts for the evidence (understood as in the statement 'It's evident!'), Płotka clearly points out that the evidence is problematic too (Płotka 2015: 83) not only because for phenomenology everything is such (as opposed to being naïve, not reflected upon) but also because the evidence has various "degrees and levels" (p. 262) and is always "horizontal and situated" (p. 272).

Lastly, several psychologists point out that more complex acts can also exist, ones comprised of both reflexive and reflective (conscious, that is) layers.

As for the mechanism, cognitivists basically take into account two theories: the so-called theory-theory and simulation theory, the latter being the modern descendant of the imitation theory. Both of them have their proponents, but the simulation theory seems to be better warranted after the relatively new discovery of the so-called mirror neurons.

With regard to the second point, it is worth noticing that in this way we can answer Scheler's objections to imitation theory that we cited after Stein. Interestingly, D. Zahavi adds the following charges: 1. If terms such as 'reasoning' or 'inference' are used to denote "sub-personal processes", then their meanings become unclear; 2. If we claim that we just experience other minds, "the explanatory power" of the alleged sub-personal level processes cannot be "unaffected" – this power, to be sure, becomes weak (Zahavi 2009: 303–304). As for the first one, I see nothing problematic in the notion of automatic or unconscious reasoning, similarly as Zahavi himself sees nothing unusual in that perception of mesoscopic objects such as a stethoscope is not theory-laden in the same sense as "the positing of black holes" is, although it is "influenced by what is co-given with it" (Zahavi 2009: 301). Moreover, I suspect that Stein and Ingarden's hesitation as regards the status of empathy (perception or not?), far from being neglect, reveals that the difference between experience and inference (sometimes) is hard to detect: If I see that the car has run out of gas, then only after reflection can I come to suspect that I performed such reasoning as 'I can see the gas gauge is low; if this is so, then the car has run out of gas; therefore: the car has run out of gas' (or even more complicated: 'I can see that the needle of the gas gauge points to the letter 'E', that means, 'Empty', so...' etc.). Nevertheless, I would insist that I *perceive* the lack of gas (although this experience is not infallible) or at least perceive (sub-consciously?) several "empirical facts" along with the perception that this reasoning holds (or at least is sufficiently reliable). In this way I would also answer the second objection.

The question of genesis and neural modules being the base for those abilities is carefully examined. In 2008 it was claimed that experimental study confirmed that newborns are capable of discerning biological movement (Simion, Regolin, Bulf 2008). One of the first signals of the possibility of autism (or "mind-blindness" – in fact, a serious distortion or even the lack of empathy in the phenomenological sense) is that of little interest in faces during the first year. In 2005 it was discovered that even 15-month-old infants (probably unconsciously) discern false beliefs (it had hitherto been believed that only 3-year-olds and older can do this) (Baillargeon, Onishi 2005). The detector(s) of simple or basic emotions is (are) known to be innate; secondary emotions, such as pride, envy, or shame, can also be at least in part based genetically (for example, two-year-old children

experience shame). In 1999 it was confirmed, using over 100 3-year-old twins (both monozygotic and dizygotic ones) that “two-thirds of children’s variance on mind-reading tests is attributable to genetic factors” (Botterill, Carruthers 1999: 94). Moreover, the existence of Williams syndrome suggests that mind-reading or empathy is a distinctive faculty in that people with this syndrome have poor intelligence apart from their prowess at mind-reading (Botterill, Carruthers 1999: 99).

With regard to the identification of specific brain structures purportedly “realizing”, to use the term popular in those circles, the cognitive functions I mentioned, the basic methodology is mostly “lesion studies” and/or subtractional neuroimaging by four techniques (fMRI, PET, EEG, MEG), i.e., comparing brain activation measured in control conditions with brain activation measured in experimental conditions. For example, by the famous lesion study in the 90-ies, the famous neurocognitivist Antonio Damasio discovered the key role of the amygdala in the detection and expression of fear (Damasio 2000: 71–76). Both of those methodologies are sometimes used to reject the antinaturalistic theory of mind, but this is, to reassure a phenomenological audience, an obvious *non sequitur*.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. I would like to thank two anonymous referees who helped me to re-consider the matter more carefully. However, the sole responsibility for errors is mine.

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Carlos Lobo¹

Relativity of Taste without Relativism. An Introduction to Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience

The author explores Ingarden's aesthetics taking as a leading thread his repeated attempts at a refutation of the common locus of relativity of taste. Ingarden's position is summarized in four theses: (1) values do exist as the proper correlates of aesthetic experience, (2) aesthetic values must be distinguished from artistic values, (3) artistic and aesthetic values are founded in other ontic strata, and finally (4) acts of valuation in aesthetic experience are presupposed by value judgements. In the light of the philosophical and phenomenological interpretation of the physical theory of relativity (special and general) by authors such as Weyl or Geiger, Ingarden's refutation of the relativity of taste appears as incomplete. The phenomenology of aesthetic experience formulated by Geiger and Husserl and their own refutations of relativism in general and aesthetic relativism in particular suggest a more fruitful approach, which is undermined by Ingarden: the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjective aesthetic experience.

Key words: Relativism, aesthetic experience, aesthetic values, intersubjectivity, Ingarden, Husserl, Weyl

In his book on *Symmetry*, the mathematician and philosopher Hermann Weyl provides us with a striking insight on the tasks falling upon a rigorous relativistic theory of art. What has been named traditionally "form" (*Form/Gestalt*), in works of arts and more generally in aesthetic experiences, can be mathematically described as a group structure, i.e. symmetries (vs symmetry breakings) in the mathematical sense of the term. As suggested by Weyl, Paul Andrew Ushenko has already developed such a theory of relativity (hence of invariance, in a mathematical sense) for the perception of the work of art. Following A. Speiser (*Musik und Mathematik*,

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1926), Weyl insists on the fruitfulness of this approach. But he admits that “certainly we have not already discovered the adequate mathematical tools” to describe it. But although they have historically contributed to plead for group theoretical considerations in art, I shall let aside the contributions of Andreas Speiser (1926; 1932) or Paul Andrew Ushenko.² The first proposes indeed a rigorous theory of the relativity of the work of art, but his analyses seem confined to a sub-sphere of aesthetic experience, that of perception of work of art as perception of form, and if we go as far as to give an explanation of the perceptual foundation of artistic value, the specific aesthetic experience (*Erlebnis*) (which belongs to the sphere of feelings and emotions) and its correlates, aesthetic values, are kept aside.

This is certainly not the only failing. Correctly understood, the philosophical understanding of the principle of relativity, mathematically mastered through complex continuous groups and tensor calculus, opens, as Weyl phrases it, to the mystery of intersubjectivity, and its correlates, the positing of an objective domain of phenomena, a nature *materialiter spectata*, understood following Kant’s statement, as a system of invariant laws. But contrary to Kant’s transcendental metaphysics, exposed in his *First Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature*, this nomological frame is established, in General Relativity, through a purely mathematical process: the introduction of the metrical ground form, which enables the formulation of “physical laws, so that they remain invariant for arbitrary transformations” (Weyl 1952: 226). No determined laws are *a priori* posited, but only the general relations of co-variances between the metrical field and a material factor, which is contingent and *a posteriori*.

The present hypothesis demands analogically invariant laws for the world as such and in its full extension, the lifeworld, as world of praxis and feelings, the world of culture in its more encompassing sense. In other words, this entails that the world as such, in its phenomenological constitution, is amenable to a formal and mathematical treatment: a *mundus formaliter spectatus*.³ And as the aesthetic experience represents apparently the most variable domain of human experience, seemingly rebellious to any structural approach, it represents the touchstone for any true formalization in human sciences, any sound “structuralism”. “Intentionality” or the “correlational *a priori*”⁴ provides us with the frame to thinking this possibility.

² Among Ushenko’s work one is noticeable: Ushenko 1941. The implementation of the principle of relativity to the sphere of aesthetic require to define precisely the kind of observables at stake as well as the type of coordinate system.

³ This goes on a par with the promotion of a mathematical treatment of biology and more generally a “formal typic” (*sic*). See Hua 41: 286. Subsequently, references to *Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff / Dordrecht: Springer, 1950–) volumes will be abbreviated followed by the volume and page numbers. The list of cited volumes is included into the bibliography.

⁴ This is still vindicated in 1935: “*Der erste Durchbruch dieses universalen Korrelationsapriori von Erfahrungsgegenstand und Gegebenheitsweisen* (während der Ausarbeitung meiner ‘Logischen

These structures, as experienced, are indeed *correlated* to dynamical processes from the part of the listener, reader and spectator. We are thus led to the following hypothesis: a scientific exploration of aesthetic experience *with its correlates* – artistic *and* aesthetical values – should be *relativistic* in the rigorous sense of the term, i.e. it presupposes *invariant laws of aesthetic pleasure*. Following this analogy, the observables and the reference frame are respectively what is called aesthetic values and aesthetic sensibility (or “taste”).

Thus understood the problem of aesthetic experience should justify a phenomenological approach, in its traditional sense. And yet, very few among the phenomenologists interested in aesthetical experience considered noteworthy the classical problem of “taste”, and the phenomenological eidetic description of the correlation of affective acts (correlation between modes of axiological positing and correlated values) as an adequate method for its solution. Even fewer saw in this problem a parallel, in the axiological sphere, of the problem of objectivity, in the field of natural sciences.

My hypothesis is that this parallel exist and that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, precisely under the form of its method of parallelization of objectifying and non-objectifying (affective and practical) forms of intentionality, provides the adequate frame and method for a new setting and a solution of the so-called dialectic of taste exposed in Kant’s Third Critique. And by taking into account the *a priori* correlation, it provides an adequate philosophical interpretation and understanding of the problem of relativity of observation taken in its more rigorous sense, that of relativity theory, as well as an adequate interpretation of relativity of taste.

To our knowledge, among commentators, the French philosopher and mathematician Gilles Châtelet is one among the few who insisted, in recent times, on the fact that relativity theory and transcendental phenomenology followed a parallel path: same date of birth and development, and that, in a deeper sense, they were scientifically contemporary. According to Châtelet, “Husserl’s phenomenology, contemporary to relativity theory, poses a question which could be phrased thus: ‘Following which conditions is a world possible?’; generalizing thus Kant’s question. The triumph of relativity has rendered more promising the exploration of the ‘a priori’” (Châtelet 2010).⁵ Although Einstein himself imbedded his theory in different philosophical interpretations such as positivism (through the influence of Mach), empirical realism (with Hume), and finally

Untersuchungen’ ungefähr im Jahre 1898) erschütterte mich so tief, daß seitdem meine gesamte Lebensarbeit Von dieser Aufgabe einer systematischen Ausarbeitung dieses Korrelationsapriori beherrscht war” (*Krisis* § 48, especially note 1, p. 167 (Hua 6: 167), emphasis is mine).

⁵ I have commented extensively this sentence, comparing it to Mannerism in painting in: Lobo 2017a.

a very blurred out Kantian *apriorism*, Relativity theory (special and general) did not only developed symmetrically, but also complementarily to transcendental phenomenology in its full extension, i.e. under the form of a transcendental monadology.

This view is confirmed and summed up by the leading figure of the so-called French epistemology, Gaston Bachelard who, in 1929, in *La valeur inductive de la relativité*, without quoting Husserl or even mentioning phenomenology, equates Einstein's Relativity with something which is central in transcendental phenomenology, since relativity consists, according to him, in taking *seriously appearances* and in considering exclusively the *conditions of possibility of objectivity*, i.e. of translatability and communicability of observables between possible observers. And his statement that the "Relativist does *not merely* establish the *a priori* possibility of an experience", entails that *at least* he does. But moreover, the Relativist physicists annexes a dimension of experience and knowledge of the phenomenon currently treated by transcendental philosophy, since "he studies this possibility by itself and for itself", by building up "a system of the possible", in a way which is neither metaphysical nor merely logical, but was traditionally devolved to transcendental philosophy. He even reaches the level of a renewed form of idealism, a blending of transcendentalism and Platonism, that one is tempted to identify to Husserl's phenomenology, and "one even gets the impression that the Relativist goes further and that, taken by a true Platonic realism of the possible, he is inclined to assign a form of substance to a rich and consistent organization of the possible" (Bachelard 2016: 122), that is, to consider as the ultimate physical reality the background of possibilities structured through the mathematical groups at the basis of tensor calculus. The last form of this organization of the possible culminates in a mathematical expression of the *a priori* and ideal intersubjective possibility of communication of physical observations.

In investigating the underpinnings of such a hypothesis, for reasons briefly alluded to above, my purpose is clearly *not* to bring water to the mill of common sense mistakes and confusions about relativity theory. It is neither to promote a naively objectivistic approach of aesthetics, be it grounded on so-called mathematical laws (we think here to the multifarious trends of Pythagoreanism or mathematism which persisted throughout the history of art and esthetical reflection: gold number, theory of proportions and their variants, old and new, etc.).⁶

⁶ The literature on the subject is so vast, that it is almost derisory to try to indicate them. But it is worth mentioning the influential aesthetical conceptions of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (two will be centuries later, the place of birth of another great mathematician: George Boole), and as his follower, he exposes in his *De Luce* and *On Divine Names*, a mathematical conception of beauty, which consists in an identity of proportionalities (quoted by Edgard de Bruynes, *Etudes d'esthétique médiévale*, 1948, 1998, Albin Michel, Paris, vol. 2, p. 124).

It is to explain why the attempts by some of Husserl's followers, such as Moritz Geiger and Roman Ingarden, although well informed of both (phenomenology and relativity theory), partially failed in their attempt to set up a *true relativistic phenomenological theory of aesthetic experience*, by stumbling on the main obstacle to the constitution of such a theory. This obstacle is the traditional *locus communis* of any aesthetic reflection, a *locus*, which constitutes, according to Kant, the only thinkable dialectic of a Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, that of the relativity of taste, taken in its ordinary and proverbial sense: *de gustibus non est disputandum*. This saying expresses precisely what must be called *common sense relativism*.

(I) As a cross-check, we shall study rather attentively Ingarden refutation of common sense relativism and show how he draws the main lines for a theory of general relativity of aesthetic and artistic experience, at its due level, which is as well the least explored, that of axiological experience.

(II) This refutation is itself hindered by the amphibological use of the words "subjectivity" and "objectivity". Although he tries to list exhaustively their diverse meanings, this refutation remains incomplete. This is clearly a consequence of his anti-idealism. Still, these analyses of some of Ingarden's arguments are nothing but rough indications for a more extensive work, which is still to be done, and would shed a new light on other aspects of Ingarden's thought and positions: on ontology and in controversial question about transcendental idealism.

(III) On the footsteps of Moritz Geiger and Hermann Weyl, we shall see that the refutation of epistemological relativism as well as axiological relativism forces us to adopt a deeper understanding of *intersubjective experience*, which brings to light the circularity of any realist foundation or justification of the positing of beings or values. I shall study later and elsewhere the rich proposals and renewed and stimulating approaches of Geiger on aesthetic, on *Einfühlung*, and intersubjectivity (Geiger 1910: 29–73; 1911a: 125–162; 1911b: 1–42). Yet it is worth mentioning his contribution to the philosophical interpretation of the principle of relativity.

(IV) We shall end and conclude by gathering some statements from Husserl's writings which represent one of the clearest setting of the problem of axiological relativism and its refutation: clear and critical elaboration of the fundamental insight at the ground of modern science and a modification of the transcendental frame adjusted to this new epistemological situation; sharp distinction of the parallel but different paths for a refutation of axiological and logical relativisms; and, accordingly, an adequate refutation of aesthetic axiological relativism.

I. Ingarden's refutation of aesthetic relativism

Against objectivist and formal as well as against relativist and subjectivist approaches, Roman Ingarden aesthetics is installed from the start in the frame of the phenomenological description, but with some restrictions. Starting from the so-called "realist Husserl", Ingarden considers *aesthetic commonplace relativism* not only a *variant of psychologism*, but maybe its deepest and most resisting form.

His major contribution to the question is an eidetic-analytical description of aesthetic experience as *experience of a certain category of value* – namely aesthetic values.

For Ingarden, the sense and forms of "relativism" are numerous and equivocal. Some of them are partially acceptable. But the elucidation of aesthetic experience in its diversity and dynamic (which expresses itself in diverse and sometimes opposed value judgments) is given through three major following statements: 1) Aesthetic values are not reducible to pleasure, which is something psychological and represents, phenomenologically, in Husserlian terms, a "real" (*reell*) component of the lived experience (*Erlebnis*). 2) Aesthetic values are moments of a synthetic unity belonging in the aesthetic object and founded on the work of art, and even on an axiological founding level, that of artistic values. 3) Aesthetic values are given and experienced as such, *as* founded unities; that is to say that some dependence relation is clearly or confusedly aimed at in aesthetic experience, but this dependency does not entail that this value be something subjective (i.e. "relative" in the common relativistic sense). It will be useful to have an overview of those propositions.

Against one of the fundamental theses of common-place relativism, Ingarden not only shows that aesthetic experience is analysable, but he even distinguishes clearly between two *strata*, ordinarily involved in this experience, which cannot be clearly disclosed without phenomenological analysis. Last but not least, he tries to dominate the amphibology of the notions of "subjectivism" and "objectivism".

Let me recall those distinctions, at least those, which are necessary to understand Ingarden's particular stance against commonplace relativism. As we learned from his talk in Brussels (Ingarden 1947), those distinctions are just another way to pursue the fight against psychologism, started by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations*. Since relativism rests on confusions, the only way to defeat it is to exhibit clearly the different "objective" components of aesthetic experience, which are mixed up in the so-called "aesthetic pleasure". For the sake of clarity and concision, let us stick to the main arguments, insisting on their impact on aesthetic relativism.

Thesis 1. *Values do exist, in a non-naive sense, as the proper correlates of aesthetic experience.* Yet, this type of correlates presupposes the recognizance of

a non-objectifying (of affective and axiological)⁷ intentionality and, methodologically speaking, the phenomenological method of investigation. This method is, as repeatedly said by Husserl, in this particular case, that of “parallelization” or “analogy”.⁸

Yet, this method receives some restrictions with Ingarden. It is taken in the frame of the so-called “realism” and aesthetic objectivism. Hence, against psychologically oriented aesthetics of music, Ingarden claims that musical work cannot be reduced to something psychological (*mental*), but as for any other ontic entity, one can consider it as mental *in another sense of the term*: “that is *relative to the experience of consciousness of ‘mental’ individuals*” (emphasis mine). Because he is aware of the ambiguity of such a statement, Ingarden explains that this comes from the equivocal and confused use of the concept of *dependence*, such as it is used by “psychologists theorists”. On the one hand, *dependent* means that the experience is “subjective”. On the other hand, “this ‘subjective’ objectivity is identified with everything that is an experience of consciousness”, “without *this shift being noticed*” [emphasis mine]. In order to avoid falling into a form of radical subjectivism, “it is assumed that at best only material things or processes (they often say ‘physical appearances’) are ‘independent’ of experiences of consciousness”.⁹

In order to overcome this ambiguity, we must refer back to the formal and object-like notion of dependency which was at the core of Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation, and led him explicitly to introduce of the formal and phenomenological concept of “*foundation*” (*Fundierung*). Through the distinction between *a priori* – “objective” and “ideal” – dependency, both concepts of *dependence* and *independence*, as well as those of *abstract* and *concrete*, were “freed from all relation to interpretative acts and to any phenomenological content that might be interpreted”, “no reference back to consciousness”, “no references to differences in the ‘modes of presentation’”. The shift here pinpointed by Ingarden belongs to the denounced and incorrect, “misguided confusions and the subjective slanting of expressions of purely objective, ideal states of affairs” (Husserl 2001: 20; Hua 19/1: 240).

In the case of aesthetic experience with works of arts, the ideal states of affairs are the aesthetic values founded on the artistic values. These axiological qualities or aesthetic values are the direct correlates and the constituents of any true work

⁷ In the Fifth Logical investigation, the class of “objectifying acts” is isolated from that of “non-objectifying” (§ 41, Hua 19/1: 417) and developed, in the perspective of an investigation into the form and phenomenological foundations of their logical expression, in the Sixth Logical Investigation: *Logische Untersuchungen*, Chapter 9 and (Hua 19/2: 734–750). For this particular question, see Lobo 2006 and Lobo 2010.

⁸ Cf. especially the first section of the Lessons on Ethics and the Theory of value (Hua 28: 10, *passim*). This parallelism remains in the later period, including the *Krisis*. (Concerning the period of 1920, and Hua 37, see my paper at the conference of Gdańsk: Lobo 2016: 5–14).

⁹ The Musical Works and mental experiences, in Ingarden 1989: 18.

of art, but they are themselves more or less composed on a purely axiological level. For the literary work of art, Ingarden isolates thus the *aesthetic components* (beauty as a category, beauty in many qualitative variations, qualities of positive aesthetic values, such as charm, daintiness, prettiness, depth, maturity, coherence, etc.), which represent “all different value qualities or perhaps also categories of values, which in the individual case occur *in concreto* in different *qualitative variations*”. Each sphere of values being threefold, the sphere of aesthetic values – although characterized by its neutrality if we compare it to other axiological spheres (like the practical one) – *contains positive, negative values* and axiological *indifferent* components. Thus, opposite aesthetic values “are also value qualities, but only of ‘negative’ values or ‘non-values’, that are to be distinguished from complete ‘lack of value’, that is, from complete value neutrality”¹⁰

At this axiological level, Ingarden introduces that which could be called the *depth dimension* or aesthetic experience itself and subsequently a sort of perspective within the purely aesthetic stratum of aesthetic experience – not to be confused with the value qualities just mentioned. Apparently, this axiological depth must be distinguished from the relation of foreground and background with which he describes the relation between artistic value and aesthetic value. No picture is deprived of “aesthetically valuable qualities”, or “*appropriate* value qualities”. But in order to become the object of an aesthetic experience these values must be combined in a certain way: “Only a special selection (combination) of aesthetically valuable qualities results in an assortment of aesthetic value qualities and constitutes a work of art of a definite kind or category, that is positive in value” (Ingarden 1986: 166).

Thesis 2. *Aesthetic values must be distinguished from artistic values.* All those components which entered the afore mentioned constitution must be distinguished from the *artistic components* strictly speaking, which divide in turn into axiological (positive or negative) and neutral. Both are relative in a very special

¹⁰ *The Picture*, in Ingarden 1986: 165. Compare to Husserl’s presentation of the doctrine of adiaphoron in his *Lessons in Ethics and Theory of Value* (as Hua 28). This problem is rather entangled. It involves different dimensions and layers, which are intimately connected: that of the adiaphoron, that of neutralization of value (eventually under the form of skeptical neutralization) and that of the objectification of value. See respectively, on the distinction between what is value-less and neutral-value Hua 28: 84–89 which leads to the principle of the *quartum non datum*; analogically in an axiological sum, the adiaphoron plays the role of a *zero*, i.e. that of a neutral element (Hua 28: 93); and can be preferable to a negative value (Hua 28: 130). The axiological neutralization modifies any values, including positive and negative values. This modification cannot suspend contrary to the skeptical pretention absolutely every act, while the act of neutralizing implies a practical position taking from the part of the subject performing it, which contradicts the pretention of the skeptic itself contradictory to “an absolute *epoché*”, since it takes in absolute terms, something which has “simply” a methodological meaning (Hua 28: 238–239). The phenomenological and transcendental *epoché*, the pure *epoché*, is fully inscribed in the deep striving toward understanding which is not suspended by the implementation (Hua 28: 248–249).

sense. Relativity of “tastes” is thus partially and subtly elucidated, 1) by the composition of different sorts of aesthetical values and 2) by the *dependence* of some of the components *on* others (some of them are relative or relational). But in any case, claims Ingarden, there are necessarily absolute valuable qualities. Even though there are *relative values*, which consists solely in significance for something else, and indeed something else of a wholly determinate kind, there remain “aesthetically valuable qualities which are valuable in themselves”. The latter ones are “*not relative but absolutely valuable*”. There are relativized only secondarily, they “acquire *this relativity* to the viewer only *derivatively*”.

Ingarden concludes thus that aesthetic relativism “that denies the existence of objective values”, on the pretext that “value relativity of a certain kind has been discovered”, is not only superficial but “completely erroneous and at bottom attacks only the possibility of the relative values as such” (Ingarden 1986: 168–169).

Is aesthetic relativism defeated, with such arguments and distinctions? It is dubious and Ingarden does not seem to be convinced either. Other ambiguities are still at play on both sides which require further analysis. And indeed, in the same book, “The problem of relativity” of artistic and aesthetic values is once again confronted (Ingarden 1986: 231). Anew, Ingarden distinguishes different senses of *relative*, and, subsequently, different forms of relativism. 1) The first kind of relativism stems from the equivocal expression “mental”. The relativism proceeding from this confusion is just a variant of Psychologism, i.e. mere blindness to the phenomenological noetico-noematic correlation. 2) The second form is due to the lack of clarity of the concept of “*ontic dependence*”, usually and wrongly assimilated to a mere lack autonomy, autonomy being confused with objectivity. 3) From this dependence must be distinguished the axiological dependence, the dependence of the artistic values on the constituting axiological activity of the recipient. But, as for ontic dependence, axiological dependence, does not entail that artistic values would be part of the subject, consequently they are not subjective.

Thesis 3. *Artistic values as well as aesthetic values are founded in other ontic strata*, whose experience belong to a pre-aesthetic experience (i.e. to a kinesthetic and sensuous experience). This applies to musical works as well as works of art, and correlatively, to the consciousness of them, to their specific “perception”. As every value is relative, they are *relative* in the general sense of the term. Different legitimate meanings of relativity of aesthetical values are here at play. This installs a new complexity and new relativities. But after such a careful and cautious analysis of aesthetic experience and such refined distinctions of the different pertinent meanings of relativity, Ingarden stumbles once again against the stubborn denial from the part of the relativist and his *De gustibus non est disputandum*. In his most radical form, it appears as a mere denial: “there is no such thing as beauty”;

combined to a sentimentalist and even hedonist reduction: “Beauty consists only in pleasure”, presupposing a vague but stubborn naturalism: “Every object as such is axiologically neutral”. The only undisputable fact is that “it pleases us”, and this independently of the thing itself. To sum up, Ingarden argues: “This conception is tantamount to a complete denial of beauty and is completely skeptical regarding the cognitive accomplishment of pleasure”. This skeptical denial rests ultimately on the confusion between the *aesthetic object* as such and the *work of art on which it is founded*, and the whole axiological aesthetic unity, which is thus constituted (by the founding of aesthetic value on the artistic value) with the perceivable work of art reduced to a perceptive “aesthetic unity” – deprived of any axiological components or dimensions. The experience of the aesthetic value rests on two layered manifolds which gives way to the infinite variety of concretizations of the same “aesthetic value”. The fact that a same work of art can be aesthetically diversely experienced by different subjects, or differently experienced by the same subject at different times does not entail any denial of “the absoluteness of the aesthetic value in the sense just set forth”, since this variability can be easily explained by and founded on the diversity and richness of “aesthetically valuable qualities” themselves. These partial and diverse realizations of the composition of values at the core of a work of art are called “concretizations”. But whatever the variations motivated through “subjective conditions”, the work of art once produced is endowed with “a particular aesthetic value, completely independently of the relation of this object to the viewer” (Ingarden 1986: 232). Taken literally, this statement, as we shall see, is a remnant of naïve objectivism or absolutism.

Thesis 4. Moreover, this act of valuation in aesthetic experience is not and does not presuppose any value judgement, which is a predicative and theoretical act, in the larger sense of the term. On the contrary, aesthetic value judgments presuppose the “existence” of those values originally given in pre-judicative valuating acts, and to start with, in aesthetic emotion. Conversely, an aesthetic value judgment is right if it is fulfilled by and harmonizes with an authentic valuation. A valuation can be possibly empty or improperly fulfilled, wrong or illusory. The transference of the central relation of intention-fulfilment of intention to affective acts is fully legitimate. Thus, the variability of aesthetic judgements is not necessarily the expression of the variability of the aesthetic valuation itself. For the same reason, aesthetic judgments can evolve through time, and aesthetic experiences can deepened and modified (modalized). But these arguments are obviously insufficient to get rid of relativism. Aesthetic values are neither “created by the valuation of aesthetic object”, nor founded on the value judgement on the work of art, and even less on the “assessment” on its ontic constitution (Ingarden 1986: 232).

II. Logical and phenomenological refutation of aesthetic relativism

A more systematic refutation of relativism is displayed throughout the late investigation on the knowledge of the literary work of art (Ingarden 1968; 1973). Common sense relativism is clearly identified with a form of axiological or ethical relativism. If a phenomenology of aesthetic experience has any sense and any chance of coming to light, it must, from the start, get rid from “the so-called subjectivity and relativity of aesthetic values”. It is motivated by the empirical and apparently plain fact of the variability of aesthetic experience from one subject to the other, and for the same subject: “we cannot realize two identical or similar aesthetic concretizations of the same work”. But as common as they are, the principles underpinning it have never been tested and amount to an *aposteriori* and *ad hoc* reconstruction of aesthetic experience rather than a straightaway description of it. On the contrary, the equation between variability and relativism will be immediately “given up as soon as we simply analyze the process of reading without prejudice and as soon as we ask ourselves how actually fare in our attempts to become acquainted with a particular work in a correct reading” (Ingarden 1973: 310).

This fictitious reconstruction of aesthetic experience is reinforced by the confusion between the variability of diverse concretizations of the same aesthetic value and the relativity of the *criteria* of the judgement on it; or in other terms, by the confusion between the original “valuation” (*Wertung*) or “evaluation” (*Bewertung*) of the work of art as the correlate of aesthetic experience strictly speaking and the “judgement of value” or “value judgment” (Ingarden 1973: 312), and the subsequent subordination of the former (valuation) to the latter (judgment). With the requirement of a criterion of value judgement comes into play a typical skeptical argument.¹¹ The fulfilment of an aesthetic experience is suspended to the successful application of such a criterion of judgement.¹² The judgment being in turn subordinated to the (inner) perception of a criteria in the object evaluated, we seem to move into a vicious circle, which is no other than that of “psychologism”. This virulent form of psychologism proceeds from a reduction of experience (*Erlebnis*) to its real content (to an ineffable mental act); an obsolete theory, according to Ingarden. Combined to the belief in the relativity

¹¹ As we learn from Sextus Empiricus’s *Outlines of Skepticism* (Pyrrhoneion Hypothyposeon, Book II, c. 3–8) exposition of the criterion arguments.

¹² “The widespread opinion prevails that in order to make such an evaluation we must necessarily have so-called criteria for this evaluation, criteria which provide general principles of value (in a specific category of value) and which must be applied to the particular case in order to decide whether the conditions provided by the criterion are fulfilled in that special case” (Ingarden 1973: 312).

(i.e. extreme variability) of aesthetic “impressions” and values, it gives rise to the principle of aesthetic skepticism or relativism. Relativism of taste appears a peculiarly resisting form of “psychologist theory” and the root or first and ultimate lair of all forms of ethical skepticism.

Beyond subjective insufficiencies (or “inabilities”), two quasi-spontaneous conceptions, of diverse virulence, stand on the way as obstacles to an unprejudiced account of aesthetic experience. The first one is the psychologistic reduction of the meaning of a work to a mental experience, understood as a solipsistic and uncommunicable experience. This form of subjectivism, according to Ingarden, is less pregnant nowadays. The second misinterpretation, much more difficult to overcome, reduces aesthetic feelings to “aesthetic impressions” and considers all values, and in particular aesthetic values, as relative. The very possibility of a common or congruent experience of the “same” work of art is denied, and consequently each experience is performed in a fully solipsistic and inexpressible mode; “each is supposed to ‘see’ (perceive) the work of art in question in a completely different way and to obtain completely different and mutually incomparable aesthetic objects.” “From this arises the principle of *de gustibus non est disputandum* and also the assertion that we have no common language and are unable to come to any understanding” (Ingarden 1973: 321). For Ingarden, the first theory has been refuted long ago, but “the second, however, still awaits refutation and is regarded by many as indubitable”. Despite the absence of any “satisfactory proof”, this theory is largely shared among cultivated people. What is required for such a proof? Answer: something that is banned from the start, i.e. “a satisfactory theory of value” and “a sufficient clarification of the aesthetic experience and of the cognition of aesthetic objects?” (Ingarden 1973: 322).

These requirements apply to the refutation of the second theory as well. Ingarden comes then to a key argument which is the touchstone for relativism and his own anti-relativism. It is exposed under the form of rather logically convoluted argument, which won't be retaken later one. The problem is stated in the term of cognitive communication. The relativist *thesis* that the content of the cognition of aesthetic objects is uncommunicable if and only if it is “logically *proved that it is impossible* for two persons who have immediate aesthetic contact with the *same* objects constituted on the basis of this work of art and to cognize them in the *same aesthetically valuable qualitative harmonies*” (Ingarden 1973: 322, the emphasis is mine).

Let us sum up this strange argument: the only positive argument in favor of aesthetic relativism would be *to prove* the impossibility of *communicability* of the result of the experiences of any two subjects, proof which would require the “logical proof” of the impossibility for any two persons to be equally and affectively acquainted with the *same object*. But the requirement is at the same time a trap, and

reveals as double-edged. A trap: since the proof of an impossible agreement on the knowledge about aesthetic values presupposes that nonetheless both subjects are conscious of the same object, and the argument requires, consequently, that they agree on the fact that their axiological and affective disagreement or impossible agreement is founded on an epistemological agreement (“we don’t appreciate things in the same way, but we are talking about the same thing”). In other words: To be coherent relativism cannot be absolute. But not being absolute means that it presupposes some residuum or some ground of absoluteness or non-relativism. No wonder that Ingarden settles abruptly that “an indubitable proof of this is lacking” (Ingarden 1973: 322, the emphasis is mine). But the argument is also double-edged: because the trap itself slips from one level to the other, from the level of mutual agreement on the object, on the work of art and to that on the value (artistic and aesthetic) and that of the knowledge about it. Considered from a logical point of view, this amounts to require a logical proof of a radical idealistic subjectivism, which denies in fact the possibility of any objective knowledge of a real being, but still presupposes the validity of ideal of formal objectivities (such as proofs, inferences, propositions, etc.). From an epistemological point of view, Ingarden requirement presupposes that the constitution of an intersubjective agreement is founded on objective knowledge. As we see, intersubjectivity remains for Ingarden,¹³ as in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, at each level or form of reality (that of the thing, that of the work of art and that of the value), a mere and derived *criterium* of objectivity, in no case, as in Husserl, the fundamental constitutive dimension of objectivity.

The question connected to this problem, that of “the universal validity of aesthetic evaluation”, is discussed on the following chapter, without receiving either any clear answer. No surprise, that the refutation of relativism should be attempted once again, later on (Ingarden 1973: 376). It is considered as ethically vital, since the saying: *De gustibus...*, “legitimizes a complete anarchy in both judgments of works of art and our contact with them.”

Ingarden tries to trace back the modern dominant forms of aesthetic relativism, to its origins. This form of subjectivism takes two different forms in our times: 1) Sensualistic colored axiological skepticism (neo-positivists of various provenance). 2) Historical relativism (derived, according to Ingarden, from Dilthey and Hegel). The sources of aesthetical relativism lie in the confusion between diverse dimensions of aesthetical experience: 1. between work of art and its various concretizations; 2. between artistic and aesthetic value and subsequently between aesthetic judgment and value judgment; 3. between the value itself and

¹³ This is the case in *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, Chap. 14, and especially § 66 in Ingarden 1972. Despite the reference to the § 43 of the *Cartesian Meditations*, intersubjectivity remains a rather derivate problem, and not the fundamental constitutive stratum for, at least, any real objectivity.

the value judgment: “since they basically deny the existence of all values, especially aesthetic values, they try to reduce them to ‘value judgements’ (evaluations), which they make relative to psychology and sociology, or to philosophy of history”; between the value itself and the subjective mode of behavior toward values (*Stellungnahme*); and last, between those dimensions and the fact that the literary works of art are “schematic configurations” determining “sets of possible aesthetic concretizations”. Once these “confusions have been unmasked, and the appropriate distinction have been made” (Ingarden 1973: 377), “the basis for axiological skepticism has been destroyed”, claims Ingarden. “So long as this has not been done and the points of departure of the skeptical solution to the whole question have not been rectified, axiological skepticism and relativism with regard to aesthetic values is simply an easy way out, which serves to free its proponents from the trouble of a responsible investigation of the question” (Ingarden 1973: 377).

The touchstone for the “correctness or incorrectness of the common saying *De gustibus non est disputandum*” faces difficulties as long as those distinctions have not been done. In order to implement the criterion, it is necessary to distinguish between the judgment describing the aesthetic object, from the judgment stating that this object has, qualitatively, a certain value, and, last, from the value judgment on the aesthetic experience; and all those judgments from the original act of valuing. Even though, Ingarden still considers rather difficult the application of this criterion, as long as the two terms of the correlation have not been “investigated and explicated thoroughly enough”: the valuing act (feeling or emotion) and the value itself. But *prior* to this, the crucial question remains, that of the ontological status of values: Is there any sense in positing values and especially aesthetic values as existing beings?

Because he takes stance for a kind of axiological absolutism, or realism, Ingarden proceeds to an absolutizing of the correlation itself, at least of the “value” correlate. This is why he claims that, in order to answer this question, it is not enough to start from the “reaction to value”, since “this ideal correlation, which would have to be proved in detail, cannot [moreover] by itself protect us from axiological skepticism, especially in the sphere of aesthetic values” (Ingarden 1973: 381). But, observes Ingarden, the necessary correlation between value and value responses for *all* aesthetic experience has not been established. Since it seems possible that there can be aesthetic reactions without aesthetic values or vice versa, there is still a ground for relativism. Consequently, and against the optimistic and premature conclusion that the “basis for axiological skepticism has been destroyed” (Ingarden 1973: 377), we must admit that it is still alive.

Under such circumstances, the criterion of the logical proof of “the saying *De gustibus non est disputandum*” must itself be reshaped and rephrased, under the form of a mortal dilemma: (1) no value response can deviate from this ideal

correlation, in other words, no value response can be inadequate, or (2) value responses are always defective. The first option forbids any discussion of taste since the discussion presupposes that value responses *can be* “defective or inadequate”. The second, discussing of taste is senseless since “all value responses would be equally good or equally bad” (Ingarden 1973: 381).

Now if we examine both options, not only from a dialectical point of view, but phenomenologically, we see that the first requisite is not tenable. It presupposes indeed that the correlation between valuation and value, or value response and value, in aesthetic experience functions as a *norm*, and that deceptive aesthetic experiences (affective fallacies) must be interpreted as a lacking correlation. This presupposition is clearly contradictory with the very notion of correlation which can never be lacking, although it can be deceptive. The *pretention* to a value in an affective act (as an aesthetic pleasure) must not be confused with its fulfillment, nor with the ideal value to which the posited value refers. The fact that posited values (presumed as valid) can reveal afterwards as deceptive and illusory is itself an index of a new correlation, obtained through a modification of the former. The correlation of a deception is not an incomplete or a deceptive correlation. The second requisite is not logically sustainable, neither for the sceptic nor for the phenomenologist – for whom the phenomena is precisely the correlation, be it valid or not. For the former, no value response can be deceptive, since all are equally valid. Mimicking Protagoras’s assertion: is aesthetically valid, that which appears to be so to the individual to which it appears so, for the time and during the circumstances under which it appears to be so. This mimicking of phenomenism is the simulacrum of phenomenology.

Ingarden cannot escape the conclusion which seems to be a direct consequence of his axiological and ontological dogmatic “realism”, and the restrictions it imposes to his phenomenology. They emerge in the confession that the two terms of this correlation “have not yet been investigated and explicated thoroughly enough”; that we “do not know what aesthetic values even exist or which of them can appear in the concretization of literary works of art” (Ingarden 1973: 378). The tasks of the anti-relativistic axiology thus promoted are to “really looking at these values and explaining their qualitative determinations and discovering the sufficient foundations of their existence and their appearance” (Ingarden 1973: 405).

Such statements clearly do not belong in the frame of a transcendental phenomenology, which cannot investigate and describe this correlation in its essence unless those questions concerning *transcendent values*, i.e. absolute values have not been neatly and firmly bracketed. From a phenomenological point of view, the deceptive and the fulfilled aesthetic experiences are equally interesting, and the deceptive is even more important, since it provides a quasi-natural entry into

the abstractive analysis of the components (or modes) of axiological experience, precisely because the absolute denial of such a possibility from the part of the relativist offers the strongest support for the claim that this experience can never be invalidated, and the last ground for ethical skepticism.

III. The last obstacle to the refutation of relativism: Axiological realism

These limits of Ingarden's phenomenology are consequences of the restrictions imposed by Ingarden to the full transcendental method. They represent a particular expression in his famous but ambiguous "realism". Why ambiguous? Because, his position cannot be assimilated to that of naturalistic realism, or to a form of empiricist realism, but rather to a "phenomenological realism", i.e. a very peculiar kind of (rigid) Platonism.¹⁴ As "realists mathematicians", the axiological realists posit values as ontic rigid entities, independent of any constitution (cf., e.g., Ingarden 1973: 306–307). We could label Ingarden's realism, an axiological and aesthetic Platonism, which result of an embedding of phenomenological eidetic descriptions into a larger frame where diverse influences are melded to Husserl's central reference (for instance that of Bergson and Kant¹⁵), and we could discern other influences such as that of Hume combined, perhaps, to a Meinongian ontology.

Dziemidok claims rightly that: "For Ingarden the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of values is the most fundamental problem of axiology" (Dziemidok 1989: 75). Unfortunately, Ingarden's rejection of transcendental reduction or rather its subordination to the eidetic variation leads him to undermine some aspects of this experience, and expose his phenomenology to objections developed very clearly by Bohdan Dziemidok, in his article "Ingarden's theory of Values and the Evaluation of the Work of Art".

As a consequence of the rejection or limitation of transcendental reduction, what is at stake in this struggle against commonplace relativism is nothing less, as what we learned in opposite ways from Hume and Kant, than a defense of a united humanity or a generic human nature (Ingarden 1960; 1961). That exposes him to critics from the "right side" of the Academic world, among late contemporaries.¹⁶ But also, to unexpected critics, *subjectivist absolutists* and *objectivist relativists*, coming from the left side: from an anarchical socialism which is relativistic, but

¹⁴ For a presentation of what a non-rigid Platonism, or "modal Platonism" in Husserl means, I must refer here to my articles: Lobo 2017. And more specifically: Lobo 2011: 161–186.

¹⁵ Cf. Schutz 2013. For further on the integration of Bergson into Husserl's phenomenology, see Ingarden 1922: 284–461.

¹⁶ Such as: Markiewicz 1976: 324, 326; Kuczyńska 1972: 41; Drobnickij 1972: 27, 29, 36; Hawthorn 1973: 146–148; Morawski 1974: 8, 41–49.

not subjectivist, and absolutists which are not objectivists, but radical subjectivists. Both groups of positions are, according to Ingarden, inconsistent positions, but *partially* acceptable, if we consider the equivalence between subjectivity and relativism, subjectivity and subjectivism.

The solution of the problem concerning the nature of values (*changeability – unchangeability, universality – particularity*) is largely determined by the approach taken in the controversy toward the *mode of existence of values*. *Aesthetic subjectivism naturally leads to relativism* (only the Epicurean Philodemos and E. Abramowski do not conform to this rule). However, the opposite does not hold true, *for one can be a relativist while simultaneously rejecting subjectivism (only extreme axiological relativism is usually combined with subjectivism)*. A similarly regular, though complex, relation obtains *between objectivism and aesthetic absolutism*. Absolutism is first of all close to objectivism, although one may encounter an *exceptional case of absolutist subjectivism* (E. Abramowski). Still, not every follower of aesthetic objectivism must also be an absolutist (e.g., the Soviet Aestheticians J. Boriew and L. Stolowicz). (Dziemidok 1989: 83)

This assimilation of *absolute and objective, subjective and relative* is closely linked to Ingarden realism, and is position against the idealist turn of Husserl. To my knowledge, one of the most harmful aspect of this rejection is that Ingarden misses the most efficient way to defeat relativism: transcendental intersubjectivity.

Ingarden's concern is precisely that, which has been pointed out by Kant and Hume in opposite ways: the existence of a standard of taste is the *criteria* of the possible unity of mankind, not only as rational being, but as sensible and natural being – through its acculturation (*Kultivierung*). In other words, aesthetic relativism and consequently artistic *relativism* are the major and the sole obstacles to the constitution of a scientific aesthetical theory, and subsequently of a rational axiology. This so much looked-for science, since the time of Plato's Hippias and Symposium, should not be alien to the general standard of any strong scientific theory: it must have, somehow, a *nomological* (lawful), and this nomological structure should be accountable under a mathematical form. Now despite its status of positive physical theory, this lawfulness is precisely at the core of relativity theory under the form of the physical and mathematical theory of invariants. On the other hand, we must at least ask if the setting of invariants in the realm of subjectivity does not represent precisely the aim of the method of eidetic variation within the frame and the field opened by transcendental reduction.

3.1. The fundamental insight of modern physics

In order to understand why, despite the many attempts to overcome it, especially following the work of some eminent followers of Husserl, such as Ingarden and

Geiger, this theory is still a *desideratum*, we must take into account a special form of obstacle: the resistance opposed – even fragmentarily – by common-place relativism. The relative failure of Geiger and Ingarden lies in an unquestioned presupposition, clearly pointed at by Weyl and by Husserl.

In the debates between *objectivism* and *subjectivism*, *absolutism* and *relativism* in aesthetic, and in ethics in general, as well as in epistemology, the hidden presupposition and mismatch consists in putting *objective on the side of the absolute*, and the *relative on the side of the subjective*. This common-sense assimilation, contradicted by the performances of science, has resisted throughout logical and reflective epistemological analyses. And yet, “one of the most fundamental insights of science”¹⁷ (which was already at play with Galileo and Copernicus) phrases this way: the “immediate experience is *subjective and absolute*”, while the “objective world”, such as it is crystalized by the methods of natural sciences, “is of necessity *relative*”.

With these opposite pairs of concepts (*subjective-absolute* vs *objective-relative*), we have a guiding thread for the dissolution of most of the puzzles of modern philosophy. Those puzzles are aspects of that which Husserl calls the “fateful objectivism” of modernity. But at the same time, with Descartes we had an indication that subjectivity was not tantamount to relativity, and as Weyl rephrased the Cartesian discovery of the *cogito*: “Whoever desires the absolute must take the subjectivity and egocentricity into the bargain”. On the other hand, “whoever feels drawn toward the objective faces the problem of relativity” (Weyl 1949: 116). The vivid consciousness of this fundamental split, characteristic of modern philosophy in his idealist trends (from Descartes to Fichte) as well as in its empiricist tradition (especially with Hume), emerges within science under the form of a scientific theory, special and general relativity.

The modern idea of science appears historically split under the form of a Janus called Descartes and Galileo,¹⁸ and the misinterpretation of the principle of

¹⁷ This insight has been suggested by Born: “This thought is vividly and beautifully developed in the introduction of Born’s book on relativity theory, quoted earlier”. In his introduction, Born states: “Tout phénomène perçu directement conduit à une affirmation qui possède une certaine valeur absolue. Quand je vois une fleur rouge, quand j’éprouve du plaisir ou de la douleur, j’ai là des données dont il serait déraisonnable de douter. Elles ont une valeur indiscutable, mais pour moi seules elles sont absolues, mais subjective” (Born 1923: ix).

¹⁸ Among many other passages: “Kein Wunder, daß wir schon bei Descartes die Idee einer Universalmathematik finden. Natürlich wirkte in dieser Hinsicht mit das Schwergewicht der sofort mit Galilei einsetzenden theoretischen und praktischen Erfolge. Demnach bekommt korrelativ Welt und Philosophie ein völlig neues Gesicht. Die Welt muß an sich eine rationale Welt sein, im neuen Sinne der Rationalität, welcher an der Mathematik bzw. der mathematisierten Natur abgenommen worden war, und dementsprechend muß die Philosophie, die universale Wissenschaft von der Welt, aufzubauen sein als einheitlich rationale Theorie *more geometrico*. Allerdings wenn, wie das – in der gegebenen historischen Situation – als selbstverständlich gilt, die naturwissenschaftlich rationale Natur eine an sich seiende Körperwelt ist, so mußte die Welt an-sich eine in einem früher

relativity admitted by both, paradoxically, gives way to a fatal dualism, splitting the correlation into a confused notion of subjectivity and a restricted notion of objectivity, and the world, into a lifeworld without clear ontological status and a nature restricted to its physicalist nucleus. This is the source of modern naturalism. Beyond all the subtle and kin distinctions proposed by Ingarden, something remains unquestioned in the refutation of aesthetic relativism: precisely this presupposition that *relativism means subjectivism*. As derivatives forms or corollaries of this presupposition, we should mention the assimilation of relativism to a kind of “perspectivism” (view point and limitation of perspective) to the classical frame of projective geometry.

3.2. Geiger’s clear understanding of Relativity theory

But despite the well-known controversy between Geiger and Husserl, on psychological and phenomenological method, and more especially on the possibility of implementing the descriptive method of static phenomenology to aesthetic leaved experiences, Geiger’s position is complex and would require a careful examination.

Geiger suggests some arguments for a refutation of aesthetic relativism, considered as the den of axiological and ethical relativism. This position could seem paradoxical, since his phenomenology of aesthetic experience focuses on pleasure and taste as the central phenomenon of aesthetic experience and seems to fall back into a kind of hedonism; moreover, he is rather skeptical regarding the possibility of a psychological direct observation of leaved experience in general, and aesthetic experience in particular.¹⁹ As it is summed up by Husserl: “Geiger means that the analytical observation of emotional feelings is impossible, since, while “experienced” feelings cannot become object, be objectified”.²⁰ Nonetheless, this hedonism does not evolve into a relativistic and axiological skepticism. We find even some interesting and incentive suggestions in his work on “empathy” that could develop into a strong relativity theory of aesthetic pleasure. Most

unbekannten Sinn eigentümlich *gespaltene Welt* sein, *gespalten in Natur* an-sich und in eine davon unterschiedene Seinsart: das psychisch Seiende” Hua 6: 62, the emphasis is mine.

¹⁹ See Husserl’s discussion of Geiger’s objection presented for the first time in his *Dissertation*: Dissertation de 1904, *Bemerkungen zur Psychologie der Gefühlselemente und Gefühlsverbindungen*, 1904 (then in Geiger 1911a: 125–162) in *Ideas I*. This discussion is deepened in the manuscript (part of the Volume of the Husserliana on Gefühl in preparation). Text Nr. IV (§§ 1–3 = S. 78–101) Gefühlsbewusstsein – Bewusstsein von Gefühlen. Gefühl als Akt und als Zustand, § 1. Über die Beobachtung von Gefühlen. Lektüre von und Kommentar zu Moritz Geigers Abhandlung in der Lipps-Festschrift [from the manuscript A VI 8 I/60a “30”]. See my commentary in Lobo 2009: 121–126.

²⁰ “Geiger meint, die > *analysierende Beobachtung* von emotionalen Gefühlen <sei> unmöglich, weil Gefühle während des „Erlebens“ nicht zum Objekt gemacht, nicht vergegenständlicht werden können” (A VI 8 I/60a “30”).

interestingly, Geiger has developed a clear philosophical interpretation of relativity theory, understood as a theory of invariants.

Geiger is known as a member of the Munich school. His famous book has since then been repeatedly quoted as an important contribution, if not to phenomenology, at least to modern aesthetic theory. On the other side – and this is undermined or fully ignored – Geiger was well acquainted with Einstein's theory as well as modern mathematics. He did not only write a book on the axiomatic of Euclid's geometry inspired by Hilbert *Grundlagen der Geometrie*, he was recommended as a trained mathematician not only by Husserl,²¹ but also by Weyl.²² He also wrote a valuable book on the meaning and philosophical importance of relativity theory.²³ To go straight to the point, his essay on the interpretation of relativity demonstrates a clear understanding of Einstein's theory, avoiding absurd confusions with common place relativism in any domain, and distinguishing unessential philosophical interpretations from philosophical substantiations of the theory itself, mostly those through which Einstein himself went: a kind of phenomenist positivism, an empirical-realism and a Kantian Apriorism, with their correlative worldviews (*Weltanschauung*).

Relativity theory is not commonplace relativism. Against “obscurantists and retrogrades”, i.e. against common sense relativism and so-called “philosophical world views” based on it, as well as tenants of classical physics (“absolutists”) – Geiger insists on his true scientific meaning of relativity theory: a scientific theory positing objective laws of optical and gravitational phenomena. While obscurantists tend to assimilate it to mere relativism, Geiger argues that the implications of the theory of relativity are opposed to the “that ill-fated relativism, which pervades our world today in art and life, in morality and politics”.²⁴ And contrary to retrogrades who take

²¹ Although Husserl declares to Ingarden that “Schon Geiger ist nur Phänom<enologe>”, he praises him above Pfänder. Husserl 1994, Bd. I: 215. And in 1930, to Gurwitsch about Geiger's book on Hilbert: “Ich finde sie in der ersten Durchsicht wirklich förderlich, da die rein math<ematische> Untersuchung Prof. Geigers nun einen ontol <ogischen>, also erst eigentlich philosophischen Sinn erhält.” (Husserl 1994, Bd. II: 102).

²² In Weyl 1949: 29, Weyl recommends the reading of Geiger's, *Systematische Axiomatik der euklidischen Geometrie*, (Geiger 1924), on the side of Hilbert, Gonseth and Pasch.

²³ See Husserl's Letter to Natorp, on this particular book by Geiger: “Ich bin besonders von seiner letzten Arbeit, die mir bei oberflächlicherem Betracht nicht sogleich einging, doch nach ihrem genaueren Studium stark beeindruckt. Es störte mich anfangs, daß grade in dieser ins Tiefe gehenden Arbeit der Charakter der Phänomenologie in den Hintergrund zu treten schien. Bei nochmaliger Prüfung finde ich aber, daß von einer Abbiegung (zur Metaphysik) doch nicht die Rede sein kann, jedenfalls aber eine starke systematische Kraft (obwohl anderer Art und Methode als in Hartmann) zutage tritt. Ich bin in diesem Urteil wohl nicht befangen dadurch, daß er von seiner Seite in sehr tief einschneidenden Fragen auf dasselbe hinauskommt, was ich von meiner Seite gefunden zu haben meine” (Husserl 1994, Bd. V: 145).

²⁴ “For these reasons, we need to defend, scientifically, the theory of relativity, against obscurantists and retrogrades. *The so-called philosophical explanations, which, for general philosophical*

a stance in defense of an absolutist understanding of scientific laws and objectivity, Geiger insists on the philosophical import of Relativity theory, after three Centuries of naïve objectivism, here comes a scientific theory which, under the form of a mathematical theory of invariants, gives an exact account of the conditions of possibility of physical phenomena and experience involving light and gravitational forces.

A first task of a philosophical interpretation of Relativity theory is thus to purge this physical theory of all philosophical inadequate interpretations in which is usually wrapped, including to a certain extent Einstein's own popular presentations and self-understanding – except the final one (Geiger 1921: 6). After a clear and accessible presentation of the main lines of Special and General relativity (Geiger 1921: 6–15), Geiger starts with a critical examination of the three major philosophical interpretations quoted above, before concluding (Geiger 1921: 31–46). He distinguishes: three senses or modes of “relativization” (*Relativierung*) and “absolutization” (*Absolutierung*) (Geiger 1921: 21). But still, Geiger falls into an opposite excess, when assimilating absolute and objective. I shall skip the critical examination and sketch the main lines of Geiger interpretation.

But I must insist first on his “philosophically neutral” presentation of Special and General Relativity: “the so-called Relativity theory is as much absolutist as any other physical theory. It searches to free the natural laws of movement of any relativity, and to formulate them in such a way that they have the same validity for the observer *whatever* its movement” (Geiger 1921: 12). The search for *objectivity* i.e. for invariants, for laws is thus tantamount to the searching of the *absolute*, according to Geiger. That means *independent* of the subject, i.e. of the observer. In this context, the progress of the “relativization” in physics means on the contrary that what was considered up to then as objective (i.e. absolute) is now demonstrated as relative, *dependent* of the position of the observer (time, space, and finally mass) and thus *subjective*.

This is confirmed by the interpretation given in the last part of the article, which is akin to that of Weyl. By deepening the conditions of experience, physics confirms in its main lines the philosophical statement of transcendental philosophy: space and time are “rejected in the subjectivity, as well as colors”,²⁵ and “become in fact pure subjective forms of intuition” – and there is no sense in determining qualitatively a physical reality lying beyond “the mathematical determinations” of the four dimensional world – at least a world reduced to the physical world.

reasons, take a positive or negative stance towards a scientific theory, must remain far from us. We will have to go the opposite way. For us, the theory of relativity is initially a physical theory. The decision about its correctness or incorrectness as a physical theory, falls upon the physicist – and not the philosopher – not to talk about the journalists” (Geiger 1921: 5–6).

²⁵ At this stage, one must recall that colors along with tastes are an essential part of commonplace relativism.

3.3. Philosophical meaning and import of Relativity theory

Now what is Geiger's philosophical interpretation of Relativity theory? It consists in the combination of two spiritual roots: a cultural root, relativism properly speaking, and another which is metaphysical which stems from 19th-century metaphysics: the nomological form of physics and nature. Contrary to a dominant historical view which interprets the starting point of modern physics (the Copernic revolution) as "relativization of man and the earth, because it unties the whole world from its dependence from man", Geiger claims that relativity theory shows that physics is rather the exploration of always deeper dependences of phenomena to the "subject"; "because it *relativizes* and *subjectivizes* space and time", Relativity theory "transforms them into the state of movement of the observer", it "insists even stronger on the man, the observer, the spectator, it considers man not so much as a component of the world than the world as given to a man, as apprehended from a point of view" (Geiger 1921). But this does not convert physical reality into naught. "On the contrary", the aims of Relativity theory "is to replace all that is relative, subjective and qualitative by the unique and stable and always clearer thing which forms the reason of all scientific research: *the law*". What is constantly postulated by empirical sciences behind all the details of their theories, the "guiding thread of the physicist to the most invisible researches of his laboratory", which define the fundamental tendency of his theoretical activity, can be expressed by the "*unwritten maxim*", "*In the beginning was the law*" (Geiger 1921: 46). The transcendental determination of objectivity, exposed under the title of analogies of experience by Kant, is recast into its due frame, that of a mathematical theory of invariance. Relativity theory strives toward a systematic overcoming of any subjectivism, by establishing the formal conditions of objectivity, i.e. of a nomological theory of physical phenomena (optical and gravitational, to start with).

Now, are there invariants in Geiger's researches on aesthetic? Only a close examination of his writing on the essence of empathy and on empathy in aesthetic and artistic experience would answer this question. A Relativity theory of aesthetic experience would amount to the positing of invariant laws stemming from whatever the affective and cognitive positions of the singular subject experiencing that which appears to phenomenological reflection as a peculiar kind of object (aesthetic values), but is primarily constituted in an emotional and affective activity. This is precisely against such a reflection, that Geiger expresses strong doubts.²⁶

Following his strong commitments with physics and mathematics recent achievements, Geiger approaches the issue of aesthetic experience from the point of view of *observation*, and the concrete conditions of *self-observation*. But the

²⁶ Among others, in his dissertation published as the *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genußes*, in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* (Geiger 1913).

situation described is that of a sort of distortion, which has much more to do with the formalization of experimental situation at stake in quantum mechanics, than that of Relativity theory, which deals with the convertibility (transformations) of different types of coordinate systems, with more or less rigid or relaxed constraints (coefficients).

Geiger rises thus the famous objection of the *inevitable modification of actual experience induced on the experiencing subject by self-observation*. Quantum Mechanics brought to the fore another understanding of relation between object and subject: "Observation is impossible without an encroachment the effect of which can be predicted only in a statistical sense. Thus, a new light is thrown on the relationship of subject and object; they are tied together more closely than classical physics had realized. (...) There are obvious analogies to this situation in the domain of psychic self-observation" (Weyl 1949: 263). This old analogy which was proposed from the beginning have been renewed in recent years.

IV. For a refutation of aesthetical skepticism on the footsteps of Husserl

Does Husserl's phenomenology of aesthetic experience represent a rigorous form of relativity theory we are looking for? And does he escape the usual misunderstandings related to subjectivism and relativism? This seems at least plausible, without any metaphysical dogmatic options, if we try developing the analysis in the frame of the correlational *a priori*, namely under neutralization of the natural-thesis and of any subsequent position of "transcendences".

What is disclosed in this frame is precisely the correlation between aesthetical experience and its aesthetic correlates (i.e. values), in their manifold and multifarious modes and components, and especially according to the dynamic relations between intention and fulfilment. Ingarden refusal to satisfy this methodological requirement led to phenomenological inconsistencies such as that of proposing, on the footsteps of Husserl, a refined and abstract analysis of the moments of such an experience (the constituents or more precisely the modifications occurring in the sphere of positing, such as those of the modes of belief (Ingarden 1973: 214–215) or, respectively, of valuing) and asking for a proof of the existence of ideal (absolute) aesthetical values. It is not only "ideally" that this correlation exists, but rather it develops under various forms, susceptible of various modifications such as modifications of the axiological-thesis (of value positing), of fulfilment, of determination, etc.

4.1. The roots of ethical and axiological skepticism

By looking back to Husserl's "early" investigations in ethics from 1902 onward, and his first attempts of refutation of ethical and axiological skepticism, it appears that aesthetic relativism is obviously nothing but the most radical form and, maybe, the root of all axiological skepticism – according to Socrates the root of all evil ("the greatest and worst of all evils") lies in the conception of degrees of good confused with supposed intensities of pleasure. This is the presupposition and the ultimate argument of relativism. Relativists and ethical skeptics rely on the natural belief that, whenever "the feeling of pleasure or pain in the soul is most intense", we must take it as a sure and univocal indication "that the object of this intense feeling is the plainest and truest", for the one who feels in such a way. The fundamental task and responsibility of philosophy according to Socrates (and Plato), as for Husserl and beyond, is to prove that "this is not the case" (*Phaedo*, 83c).

For fear of falling into such an ethical skepticism, some philosophers have promoted reason as the real foundation of ethics. Because its theoretical goals are to set up a phenomenology of *axiological reason* (aesthetical and practical reason), subsequently Husserl criticizes, in his lessons on ethics, the strange to-ing and fro-ing between so-called empiricists and rationalists, between partisans of foundation of morals on feelings and partisans of a foundation in understanding or reason.

Fearing that "sensibility" and "feeling" would necessarily lead to skepticism in ethics, rationalists such as Kant have conceded too much, and admitted that the sphere of feelings (to the exception of respect) is fully empirical and irrational, not only in the practical sense, but also theoretically: since no "geometrizing" of the phenomena of the "inner sense" seems possible, no psychology and no scientific anthropology can be constituted (Kant 2004: 7). By the same token, this kind of rationalists presupposed that the sphere of taste was irreducibly affected by relativity: "In matter of feelings and taste, there is no arguing about feeling and taste", even though there is room for a talking about them. According to those thinkers, feeling is inevitably the source of an irreducible and moving relativity (Hua 28: 384–385).

Conversely, some partisans of a foundation of morals in feelings, developed an objective approach under "empirical clothing" (Hua 37: 58). Authors such as Hume, which are reputed sceptics, showed that, by taking feelings and sensation as source and fundament of all moral judgements, it was possible to promote an empirical science of morals, and even grounding empirically an objective standard of taste, as one of the most spectacular achievement of a general anthropology. Against relativism, Hume argued in his *Treatise*: "the dispute about ethical issues is quite easily understandable". As in other empirical natural sciences,

there is no point in starting from individual differences in the modes of feelings (*Gefühlswesen*), but “one must take, as a basis, general modes of feelings, more precisely modes of feeling, desiring and willing”.²⁷ Those general modes would be grounded, according to Hume, in the constitution of human being, in “human nature”. Those feelings are so natural that: “there never was any nation of the world, nor any single person in any nation, who was utterly deprived of them, and who, in any instance, never shewed the least approbation or dislike of manners. These sentiments are so rooted in our constitution and temper, that without entirely confounding the human mind by disease or madness, ‘tis impossible to extirpate and destroy them”.²⁸

Yet, the relativist will not dismiss and will object: that such an empirical necessity is limited to human nature, and that such a conviction should be grounded on an empirical enquiry into every possible kinds of nation and culture. This in turn is submitted to the fate of any empirical science; and, if this knowledge was to remain valid, it would be of no use in practical instances, since this would amount to ground our practical moral beliefs in the knowledge of their universality and the rational conviction of their intrinsic validity – against Hume’s general claim. Even though we would admit that “certain modes of feeling and approving are universally spread in humanity”, the relativist would ask: “why should these general modes of feeling really have any advantage over the particular, the individuals and groups of individuals. Why should one admit relativism of the species of intelligent beings and reject individual relativism? Why deny it to the individual, when he is self-centered and says: I feel that way, you feel different, I have that taste, you have another?” And he would argue that there would be no reason to prefer one trend rather than the other. Individuals, groups, societies, nations, “differ in their sensuous taste”, and this affects all moral qualifications, it seems that we have no other ground to distinguish between good and bad taste, as virtue or vice. “A special kind of disgust is defined as vice, that’s all; a special kind of amenity as a virtue” (Hua 28: 389).

4.2. Refutation of aesthetic skepticism

The only escape from such skeptical doubts is to look for ideal foundations and agree with the idealist claim that the true correlate of a feeling should be an *ideal value*. Feeling and not judgments, because the objectivity of judgements on value presupposes ‘values and especially moral values’, independent of any contingent variation, “values *per se*”. Consequently, concludes Husserl, there is a “sky-high

²⁷ *Treatise of Human Nature* quoted in Hua 28: 388.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

distance between sensual and moral values”, and “between the taste of the common and the taste of the nobility”.²⁹

The refutation of relativism clears thus the way to the constitution of a formal axiology. Kant’s psychologist conception of the sphere of values, feelings and emotions represents a relativistic residue which hinders a rigorous phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Although rationalist in his theory of praxis, Kant did not eradicate relativism from the sphere of feeling (agreement) and even from the sphere of aesthetic experience, but just preserved a sphere of a possible, but limited form of “intersubjectivity”. Hume’s ground for his objectivist approach to taste and the positing of a norm of taste – i.e. a human nature – constitutes only an ideal of sensibility, an ideal support of a *sensus communis*. Kant “does not therefore see, that the fact of the dispute in both domains says equally little”, and at least nothing against the possibility of an ideal, providing the norm or the standard for rightness of judgment, will or feeling: “each time there is, *de facto*, a judgement, a feeling, there is always in every case a right judgement and a right feeling, even though nobody accomplishes it actually.”

If, in the domain of valuation, we hear often the sentence *de gustibus “non est disputandum”*, we also hear the parallel sentence in the sphere of knowledge: *Everything is a matter of standpoint*. Both prove nothing. Men show in their cognitive behavior, and already in their perception, their memory and again in their logical judgments, very different position taking. There is conflict everywhere. And yet there is undoubtedly genuine validity here, the possibility of a truly correct opinion, of a correct perception, of a correct memory, a correct theoretical judgment, and so on. And everything conflicting with it is just a fact, it is precisely false. And this correctness, correlatively the cognitive truth, is bounded by *a priori* laws, to which all laws of logic belong. *The same holds true for the emotional sphere*, which is not so thoroughly explored, and *whose logic of feeling as analogous to the logic of judgment* or, in our language, whose formal axiology is not yet well founded, or is at least only now emerging in the context of phenomenology. (Hua 37: 226)

We have here a typical example of Husserl’s method of parallelization, and as we can easily notice, this parallel has developed historically. The “logic of feeling”, which includes a “logic of aesthetic pleasure”, should become possible in the frame of phenomenology, on condition that phenomenology, through the thorough critic of naturalism and objectivism, succeeds in disentangling the modern dualism. Against the fatal self-misinterpretation of modern rationality, we must acknowledge that what is objective is necessarily relative (for all appearances are ruled) and that which is subjective and spiritual is absolute.

²⁹ “The dignity of the ethical lies in its ideal and absolutely irretrievable validity and in the sublimity of its absolute values over all low and all apparent values, a sublimity which itself can be grasped as value distance and belongs to the sphere of objective validity” (Hua 28: 389–390).

4.3. The fundamental insight of modern science critically exposed

That which is objective is relative. This is particularly clear from the famous refutation of the hypothesis of an *intuitus originarius*, in *Ideas II* (Hua 4).³⁰ Roughly speaking, such an originary intuition is not only intellectual in the Greek sense of the term, but extends throughout the whole reality and all individual existences taken in their full inner constitution and complete history. This infinite intuition perceives and for-sees everything, the general course of the world. Leibniz's Good, Newton's *sensorium dei* or Laplace's demon are instantiations of such this theoretical intuitive power. Any positing of an objective or absolute entity which would not be *ideally* intersubjectively accessible and would escape the absolute legality of an intersubjective constitution is just as mythical as the complementary fiction of a fully inner and proper experience of evidence (*Evidenz*), that would escape the requirement of intersubjective testability ("transcendental Psychologism"). The distinction between primary quality and secondary qualities is thus only a distinction of two levels or two stages of intersubjective constitution of objectivity. Even an infinite mind, *as far as we can conceive it*, is bounded by the requisite of a mutual understanding with an indefinite number of finite minds.³¹ Correctly understood: "*the distinction between secondary and primary qualities*" does not allow to understand the former as purely subjective: their "non-Objectivity" means nothing else than: "in no way do they escape the *relativity of appearances*, not even in the way we easily overlook insofar as we spontaneously think of ourselves as normally sensing in a world of beings of normal sensibility". The "*main feature of the relativity consists in the dependence upon the subject*". And yet as we saw, such a dependence is precisely a necessary condition for the constitution of

³⁰ English translation as Husserl 1989. Since the pages from the German edition are given in the English translation, page number refer to the German edition.

³¹ The passage, we are here alluding to, starts: "Shall we say that God sees the things as they are in themselves while we see them through our sense organs, which are a kind of distorting eyeglasses? That things are filled space with absolute quality and it is only that we know nothing of it? But should the things which appear to us as they appear to us be the same as the things which appear to God as they appear to God, then a unity of mutual understanding would have to be possible between God and us, just as, between different men, only through mutual understanding is there the possibility of *knowing* that the things seen by the one are *the same* as those seen by the other. But how would the identification be thinkable if not in the sense that the supposed absolute spirit sees the things precisely also through sensuous appearances, which, likewise, have to be exchangeable in an understanding that is reciprocal – or, at least, unilateral – as is the case with the appearances we share among us men? And if not in that case, then God would be blind to colors, etc., and men blind to his qualities. Is there any sense, however, to arguing about which are the true qualities? The new qualities would again be secondary and would be eliminated once more by physics, which has to be the same for all, if the things are the same. Obviously, the absolute spirit would also have to have a Body for there to be mutual understanding, and thus the dependency on sense organs would have to be there as well" – Hua 4: 85.

an objective world. First, under the form of a common world of things “shared by subjects”, actual or potential subjects, “to which they actually relate, hence to which they *can relate* through appearances, as is required by thingly being” (Hua 4: 86). The variability, due to the diversity of their sensory constitution and even of some deficiency, does not imply that the “true reality” should stand *beyond* any possible observation. Of course, constitution of experience and of nature does not mean creation. Yet, a physical theory pretending to give an account of physical phenomena which would not presuppose the possibility of directly or indirectly experiencing them is just absurd as that of a phenomenology which would not explain *how* such a physical theory is subjectively constituted. Those are the two sides of a same absurdity. There can be contingent differences of sensuous activity, and we can even imagine subjects differently embodied with completely different sensorial systems, “provided that they make possible a common understanding and constitute a common nature as an appearing one”. The subjects ideally presupposed by science “cannot be blind as regards *all* the senses and consequently at *once blind to space, to motion, to energy*”. “Otherwise there would be no world of things there for them”, and “in any case it would not be the *same* as ours, precisely *the spatial world, the world of nature*” (Hua 4: 86). The objective nature as the realm of so-called *independent* realities is just another layer and a correlate of an idealized form of intersubjective constitution. From a transcendental point of view, “nature is an intersubjective reality”. The subjects are ideal and even virtual, but they must be posited in such a way that they may have some sort of (direct or indirect) communication with us, and more generally with factually and contingently embodied subjects. This represent what could be named the Cartesian way to a transcendental monadology.³² Any position or presupposition of reality implies that it holds, “not just for me and my companions of the moment, but for us and for everyone *who can have dealings with us and can come to a mutual understanding with us about things and about other people*”. *Communicability* is not just a mere criterion of objectivity, but a phenomenological index of an intersubjective constitution, an index of constitutive possibilities. As such, these background of possibilities without being fully undetermined is intrinsically open: “There is always the *possibility that new spirits enter into this nexus*”. But the subjects must be bodies (“which are represented through possible appearances in our consciousness and through corresponding ones in theirs”), and capable of experiencing the same phenomena under analogous ways as mine.

Each singular thing is just an ideal rule (“*a rule of possible appearances*”), and an index of an intersubjective agreement of a manifold of mono-subjective experiences, each one raising its pretention to validity. Space itself becomes objective,

³² This justifies the qualification of “Cartesian monadology” (see Lobo 2014, “Self-variation and self-modification”).

as “an intersubjective unity only as related to a totality of normal ‘like-sensing’ subjects”. This dynamical process at work in the lower level of objectifying experience is continued at a higher level, through diverse mediations (symbolical, technical). These mediations support the work of the free imagination of possible subjects, “endowed with different sense faculties” and opens the horizon of a fully different and purely ideal intersubjectivity. By contrast, the real and factual intersubjectivity of humans and animals are revealed “as a new dimension of relativities”. This leads, correlatively, to the “thought of a purely physicalist thing” (Hua 4: 86–87, the emphasis is mine).

Conversely, *that which is spiritual is absolute*, irrelative, even though it is also, in a different sense, derivatively relativized. “Nature is a field of relativities throughout”, but “it can be so because these are always in fact relative to an absolute, the spirit, which consequently is what sustains all the relativities”. As we learn (from the paragraph 64 of *Ideas II, Relativity of nature, absoluteness of spirit*), this represents the unsurpassable limit of any naturalization, and any objectivism.

Of course, as we just saw, subjectivity is also the index of spheres of relativities, in as much as it “manifests dependencies of various kinds once it is placed in relation to the nature constituted with reference to the personal world”. But at the risk of falling into some form of absolute relativism, and breaking the correlational *a priori* (intentionality), here again the possibility of seizing subjectivity as something independent is always presupposed: “the spirit can be grasped as dependent on nature”, but this necessary naturalization hits a limit. The physicalist reduction at defining spirit by mere “natural dependencies is unthinkable”: “Subjects cannot be dissolved into nature, *for in that case what gives nature its sense would be missing*”. Indeed, the meaning of natural phenomena and that of their objective positivity would be dissolved by the same token. As Husserl argues, against naïve forms of realisms, and in full agreement with the philosophical meaning of relativity theory, the elimination of all spirits from the world would put an end to *nature*, as it is posited by physics, since, “as true, objective-intersubjective existence”, nature is the correlate of an intersubjective constituting activity, an intersubjectivity which is a complex combination of facticity and ideality, human and non-human, rational and irrational, actual and potential monades. Or, as Weyl formulates it, the elimination of the subjectivity from physical sciences leaves paradoxically as residuum and symbol of subjectivity the coordinate system. Conversely, the elimination of nature does not suppress all that is spiritual and subjective, but only what is required for its embodied intersubjective and social constitution, what is lost is “the possibility of sociality, the possibility of comprehension, for that presupposes a certain Bodily intersubjectivity” (Hua 4: 86–87). But the absoluteness of subjectivity as individual spirit would remain.

The “result of the phenomenological sense-clarification of the mode of being of the real world, and of any conceivable real world at all, is that only the being of transcendental subjectivity has the sense of absolute being, that only it is ‘irrelative’ (i.e. relative only to itself), whereas the real world indeed is but as an essential relativity to transcendental subjectivity, due, namely, to the fact that it can have its sense as being only as an intentional sense-formation of transcendental subjectivity”, a phenomenology of aesthetic experience is precisely the investigation of the “essential relativity” of aesthetic values to “transcendental subjectivity”. This is a typical example of relativization of transcendental subjectivity and a clear expression, as well, of the requirement of an effective communication, of an effective intersubjective community of real and contingent subjects, within the solipsistic subject, in that of feelings, apparently the most intimate experience: that of pleasure to appearances from an individualized standpoint).

4.4. Husserl’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience and its variability

Moving to the phenomenology of aesthetic experience, we can state that values, artistic and aesthetic values, “are not simply objectivities founded in general and in this sense objectivities of a higher level”, but “objectivities originally constituted as spontaneous products and which, only as such, come to possible originary givenness” (Hua 4: 8). Whatever the correlate, every posited entity “depends” on a correlative act, and loses its meaning as soon as it is severed from this correlation.

Following Husserl’s constant method, let us exemplify this. The example of a radiant blue sky. The seeing can be performed in a pure theoretical way, in a cognitive attitude, or in an affective one. Both can coexist, but according to the fundamental attitude the one or the other is repressed on the background of the performing consciousness. And it is always possible to convert from one attitude to the other: this “characteristic change of attitude belongs, as an ideal possibility, to all acts”. One of the sources of axiological and aesthetic relativism lies in the naive ontology of naturalist attitude. Since there are no values in nature, following a common saying, one infers that the object of pleasure, be it aesthetical or purely physiological, is, in the proper sense of the terms, neither object, nor objective. As soon as we see that the natural object of any degree of constitution and values are correlates of parallel attitudes, and that, by essence, it is always possible to convert from one to the other, objects and values are disclosed as correlates.

If we come more precisely to the artistic value, e.g. a picture, as correlate of an act of “delight”, we seize that, as the thing, every work of art, as aesthetically valuable, can support endless modifications and is itself a rule for possible aesthetic

experiences,³³ for “possible aesthetic feelings”, for possible axiological theses, in various modes and position-takings, even for series of objectifications. A picture, which is not a mere physical thing, can be looked at in diverse attitudes: “in the performance of aesthetic pleasure”, as an object of judgment when we “judge the picture, with the eyes of the art critic or art historian, as ‘beautiful’”, or “in the performance of the theoretical or judgmental attitude”. The affective or feeling attitude, as a valuating attitude, must not be confused, “as so often happens by equivocation”, with a judgment, possibly a predicating of value. This valuating as an original experience of value is an “*axiological intuition*” (*sic*), which as such is different from the sense intuition as well as the categorial intuition which fulfils the value predicative judgment. Through this axiological intuition a new form of object is constituted, which can be judged axiologically.

In that case, in the judging in terms of value, such as it emerges out of the attitude of a purely delighting abandon or surrender, the work of art is objective in quite a different manner. It is intuited, however not only with sense intuition (we are not living in the performance of perception) but with *axiological intuition*. In the active abandon of the “being-occupied-with-it-in-aesthetic-pleasure,” in the aesthetic enjoyment, understood as act, the Object is, as we said, the Object of the delight. (Hua 4: 8–9)

Both sort of intuition are acts of positing, but in a different sense. The theoretical positing is a doxic-thetic act. So is the aesthetic judgement expressing and founded on the original aesthetic delight. In the lowest level, that of a “simple sense intuition”, where we perceive the sensible character of the picture, we are also performing a theoretical act, in the larger sense of the term, and grasping “a mere thing in the most straightforward manner” (Hua 4: 8–9). To the primitive “object” emerging from the “mere delighting abandon” is assigned a new meaning “the character of aesthetic enjoyableness”, as an attribute, as the “*what*”, so to speak, which is “a new ‘theoretical’ Objectivity” (theoretical in a broad sense), of a higher level: namely a value. As such, in the constitutive process, it is not apprehended as an object. The aesthetical value is not constituted by the objectifying intentionality, but through feeling-intentionality, namely aesthetic emotion and pleasure.

These descriptions have been so difficult to understand for the former generation of phenomenologists, and face still nowadays strong resistances. It was not unnecessary to quote more extensively those analyses which are no *hapax* in Husserl’s writing and teaching, but a constant position as he declares here explicitly.

³³ This should help to elucidate Kant’s conception of the “exemplarity” of the work of (fine) arts, in the third Critique.

Concluding remarks

Since this contribution was just an invitation to explore more attentively the resources of transcendental phenomenology and take into account more attentively Husserl's insights, we shall conclude by summarizing some propositions which draw a clear position of the problem of relativity of taste, and the dissolution of his *nexus* to aesthetic skepticism.

Aesthetic values are constituted originally in feelings as are constituted perceptive objects in their analog sphere, that of opinion and perception.

As the latter is ruled by the relation of intention and fulfilment, and other modifications which constituted the horizon of determination (object perceived from afar or near), analogously aesthetic feelings as axiological intention can "relate to the object emptily", "and as the former is fulfilled in intuitive representing, so is the empty feeling fulfilled by way of the delighting". Aesthetic feelings, as any other intention, are subjected to an endless series of modifications, and be performed under the "mode of non-originary pleasure" or "in the mode of the evaluation of the pleasurable as such without the feelings being moved "originally" and in "a lively way", which "would be the analog, in the sphere of feelings, of obscure representations as opposed to the clear". An aesthetic pleasure can be incomplete, and even empty. "For example, if at a first glance, I find the violin 'beautiful' and a 'work of art,' the pleasure is then incomplete, if the beauty itself is present at all. I can see the violin and find it to be beautiful, without my feelings being aroused in any 'genuine' way" (Hua 4: 9–10, the emphasis is mine).

In both cases, something is posited which is submitted to an endless and open process of thetic-modifications or modalizations. This process is described as a "striving" to a goal which is either cognitive or affective", or in other words, "a representing (cognitive, tending toward knowledge) striving versus an evaluating one, which tends toward expectations, toward the delighting enjoyment". As a further and deeper perceptual experience can erase and prove wrong a former perceptive intention, analogously, a deeper aesthetic experience can modify (increase or diminish) and even invert the former presumed value (positive or negative).

Consequently, the relativism, which states or presupposes that *any feeling is right*, is wrong.

The sketchy remarks define what should be a full scientific program. We would come to another understanding of the source of values, located beyond the scholastic opposition between material and formal values, or that between subjectivists and objectivists aesthetical theories, since the phenomenological and formal exposition would pave the way to a deeper understanding of the distinction between subjective and objective values, between evanescent and stable values, mono-values and poly-values, and subsequently clarify the way value judgment

can be founded and how they can be fulfilled, confirmed or deceived, and, cor-
relatively how feelings, even pre-reflective and pre-expressive, can be fallacious or
sound; or how they come to expression by being grasped and transformed into
a theme of new objectifying acts.

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Simona Bertolini¹

Roman Ingarden: Phenomenology, Responsibility and the Ontological Foundations of Morality

Even if Roman Ingarden did not develop an ethics *stricto sensu*, and although his philosophy cannot be immediately associated with a “practical turn” in phenomenology, his investigation of the essence of the real world brought him to consider the nature of man and the ontological conditions of possibility of his morally oriented actions. Without expressing normative prescriptions, and maintaining his observations in the field of eidetic description, the author felt the need to provide a *foundation* for ethics, inasmuch as he strived to both highlight ethical phenomenon evidence in material ontology contexts, as well as demonstrate the structural presuppositions of this phenomenon within the context of formal ontology. It is exactly this priority of ontological investigation that represents one of the most original contributions of the Polish philosopher on practical topics. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the way in which such a particular phenomenological-ontological metaethics takes shape through the theses expressed in Ingarden’s articles on human nature and responsibility.

Key words: Phenomenological ontology, human nature, freedom, responsibility, structure of the world

1. Introduction

Roman Ingarden is undoubtedly the best-known Polish phenomenologist. He studied philosophy under Husserl both in Göttingen and in Freiburg, where he received his PhD with Husserl as director. The founder of phenomenology considered him as one of his best students and they stayed in close touch even when, after submitting his dissertation, he returned to Poland (see Husserl 1968). The philosopher, who remained faithful to the realistic approach of the Göttingen “circle” and did not share the presuppositions of transcendental phenomenology

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presented by Husserl in the first volume of *Ideas* (Ingarden 1998; Küng 1975), was one of the phenomenological *ontology* practitioners, i.e. his research was focused mainly on the application of phenomenological rigor to investigate various types of objects and the correlations between them. In *Controversy over the Existence of the World* (Ingarden's ontological *opus magnum* appeared for the first time in 1947–1948 and was published in Polish), the structure of the real world is indeed investigated through a “purely apriori analysis of the contents of ideas” rather than from the metaphysical assumption of its existence, according to the definition of ontological inquiry provided in the first pages of the work (Ingarden 1964: 45).²

It is in this ontological context that Ingarden offered his contribution regarding the question of practice and morality, writing papers dedicated to several topics related (directly or indirectly) to this issue. Even if he did not develop an ethics *stricto sensu*, and although his philosophy cannot be immediately associated with a “practical turn” in phenomenology (i.e., with a practical repercussion of the phenomenological method itself), his “journey” into the grammar of reality brought him to consider the nature of man and the ontological conditions of possibility of his morally oriented actions. Without expressing normative prescriptions, and maintaining his observations in the field of eidetic description, the author felt the need to provide a *foundation* for ethics, inasmuch as he strived to both highlight ethical phenomenon evidence in material ontology contexts, as well as demonstrate the structural presuppositions of this phenomenon within the context of formal ontology. As a consequence, the Polish philosopher cannot be forgotten when the space of dialogue between phenomenology and morality is investigated, inasmuch as he employed the former in order to define what a moral man and a moral world are, thus fixing the presuppositions of any ethics as such. With regards to this, it would not be incorrect to use the expression “phenomenological-ontological metaethics”.

The aim of the present paper is to illustrate the way in which such a peculiar “metaethics” takes shape through the theses expressed in Ingarden's articles on human nature and responsibility; their theoretical implications, with particular regards to the practical sphere, will be highlighted in the conclusive paragraph. Provided that the essence of man requires practical and ethical possibilities, what is the formal constitution of a world in which these must be possible and not

² Ontology, divided into existential, formal and material ontology, is indeed considered by Ingarden as a preliminary step in orienting the unsolved metaphysical controversy between realism and idealism. See Ingarden 1964; Ingarden 1998: 21–54 (*Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus*). While the first volume of Ingarden's *Controversy* addresses existential ontology and the second volume (divided into two parts) is dedicated to formal ontology, the third presents a specific formal study on the concept of causality (see Ingarden 1964, 1965a, 1965b, 1974). Hence, whereas existential and formal analysis is developed in the work, no material ontology is ever actually presented.

contradictory? And again: since moral conduct involves responsibility and free decisions, what is the structure of a world in which freedom is not in conflict with the laws of nature? And how can we describe the structure of man? As we shall see, these are some of the main questions which the philosopher asked himself while investigating man and reality from a formal and a material point of view, starting from the methodological assumption that each phenomenon (in this case the phenomenon of responsibility and morality) must be described both in its evidence and its ontological conditions.

2. Some remarks on human nature

Let's turn now to Ingarden's works, first of all to his reflections on the essence of man, published in 1983 in the volume titled *Man and Value* (Ingarden 1983).³ Here we find a series of essays written in different years (*Man and His Reality* 1935/1939, *Man and Nature* 1958, *On Human Nature* 1961), from which we can reconstruct a unitary picture concerning the human position in the world. This picture can be synthetically subdivided into three decisive points.

a. Man's life swings between two different spheres of reality which are always underlined by Western philosophers while speaking of the peculiarity of humans: on the one hand the sphere of nature and, on the other hand, the sphere of spirit. As Ingarden states,

man exists and lives on the boundary of two different essences, only one of which seems to comprise his humanity, and the other (...) stems from his animality, and conditions the first. Man finds himself on the boundary of two regions of being: nature and the specifically human world. ... Man is forced therefore to live on the substratum of nature and within its framework, but owing to his peculiar essence he must cross its bounds; yet he can never fully appease his need for being human. Such is the tragedy of man's fate. (Ingarden 1983: 20)

Man belongs to nature and to the animal realm, *but*, as man, he also belongs to a specifically human, spiritual and cultural world, for which he has to fight incessantly in order to surpass the impassable limits of animality. Although Ingarden, unlike many authors belonging to the classical metaphysical tradition, does not deny the central role of the animal component, he adds that human specificity is due to the spiritual "side", for it is the essential autonomy of this side that makes

³ As we read in the foreword of the work, "This book has come about as the translation of a collection of six of Roman Ingarden's essays which were issued in 1972, in Poland, in a volume entitled *Little Book on Man*, to which the translator attached three essays devoted exclusively to the problem of values" (Ingarden 1983: 11).

possible the creation of a *human reality*: “man is distinguished from the beasts in that ... he creates for himself an entirely new reality or, one might say, *quasi-reality*” (Ingarden 1983: 25), “for which the realm of so-called ‘nature’ is just a necessary substratum” (Ingarden 1983: 29). For Ingarden man is man not only by virtue of his own spirituality, but also because of the realization of this in the world around him, in which a sort of second world, a “superimposed reality” (Ingarden 1983: 29), takes shape and develops on the basis of the “first”, i.e. on the basis of nature. This is the reason why the context of human life is made up of two types of objects: not only natural things, but also spiritual formations (*Gebilde*) which could not exist if humans were not part of evolutionary history, such as “works of art, scientific theories, metaphysical or theological systems, (...) countries, public institutions (universities, for example); legal systems, money, etc.” (Ingarden 1983: 25). These objects bear on the natural world but do not belong to it, inasmuch as they depend on a peculiar and unique animal being, characterized by the “ability” to transcend its animal basis in order to create a new, non-natural reality.

b. By explaining the relation of dependence which connects the natural and spiritual realms, the author insists on the *conflict* which inexorably persists between them. Although nature represents the necessary condition of humanity, it is not described as an original root or “mother nature”, but rather as a cold and binding region in which man cannot recognize himself (Ingarden 1983: 19). Ingarden depicts humans as if they were slaves and not children of the natural world, dominated by its titanic force and too weak to construct a parallel and autonomous sphere of life. Indeed, if compared to their inorganic and organic substratum, cultural products “are nothing more than a certain sort of shadow of reality” (Ingarden 1983: 19), which cannot find in material things a secure support able to guarantee the existence of culture without the aid of human action and consciousness (Ingarden 1983: 23); otherwise put, spiritual being will never reach the ontological autonomy of (and from) nature.⁴ The result is the description of two conflicting dimensions: on one hand the fragile world of spiritual contents, not able to completely transform and control its primordial basis; on the other the wild and natural world, which both supports and limits human realization, imposing its indifferent “rules” on man and not allowing him to forget their determining strength.

It is not therefore possible, given this picture, to read Ingarden’s anthropology in the light of the reflections developed in the last decades within the context of environmental ethics, where the natural side of man, i.e. the fact that man is thought

⁴ In fact, the objects of the spiritual world are depicted as *intentional*, which means that they are ontologically (both formally and existentially) different from the individual objects of the natural world (on this subject, see Ingarden 1964: 82, 254–255, 262; Ingarden 1965a: chapters VIII–IX; Thomasson 2005).

of as an organism depending on natural conditions, often acts as presupposition for extending the region of moral patients to natural beings (animals, human beings or ecosystems), which represents a necessary theoretical step to moderate the exploitation of environment (for an introduction see Jamieson 2008; Light, Rolston 2003). Though Ingarden admits that man is an animal among others and a member of the natural universe, he does not stress the importance of giving value to these roots. In the same way he does not take into consideration the possibility of conceiving the richness of nature as the perfect background for the full development of spiritual potentialities (for instance natural landscapes as the perfect setting in which to increase esthetic feelings). On the contrary, the unique relation between man and nature which is considered in the mentioned essays is a relation of frustrated *denial*, since man, as such, tends to subject the non-human world to his spiritual needs⁵ and to even forget he belongs to it:

Man lives in a world different from nature and forgets almost completely that at the basis of this whole, new reality is concealed a nature indifferent to every value, and insensitive to his happiness or discontent. He forgets also that his humanity consists of only a thin layer of his surface, and that it is this layer which changes the whole sense of his life and fortunes. (...) He forgets that his being and life depends on what happens in nature, and thinks he can exceed and vanquish nature itself. (Ingarden 1983: 19)

Provided that human spirituality has to transcend nature and animal life, this transcendence is not explained as a balanced “going beyond”, but as the unsuccessful and desperate attempt to absorb and deny their conditioning completely. As we have read, such is the impassable “tragedy of man’s fate”.

c. It is in describing the peculiarity of the spiritual world that Ingarden emphasizes the strict relation existing between the nature of man and morality. Actually, as he explicitly states, what characterizes the above-mentioned “quasi-reality” as a *human* dimension is primarily the fact that its objects and products embody or attest a series of *values* disclosed and realized by man, among which the moral ones cover a central role:

He first attains to his genuine stature as a human being because, and only because, he creates a reality which manifests or embodies in itself the values of goodness, beauty, truth and law; because in his life, or at least in that in it which is of sole importance, he remains in the service of realizing values within the reality he has created; only thus does he attain to the mission that tells of his humanity. (Ingarden 1983: 30)

⁵ In stating that, we do not mean to affirm that Ingarden supports any indiscriminate forms of dominion on nature. As a matter of fact, as we will presently see, “spiritual needs” coincide first of all with the need to put values into practice, and not with an inconsiderate thirst for power and dominion.

There is a certain set of special values which man fixes for himself and tries to realize, and even feels a calling to realize. (...) It is not in this case a matter of relative values, at least not primarily; neither those values that are relative with respect to his purely vital needs (such as nourishment, for example), nor those relative to his pleasure (such as, e.g., delight and rapture) are here at issue, but values that are absolute in their immanent quality, irrespective of the fact that their realization depends on man's creative power, in a word – moral and aesthetic values. (Ingarden 1983: 22)

Man differs from beast “because, and only because”, he “feels a calling to realize” values whose validity is not related to his personal utility and pleasure. Unlike animals, he can transcend his immediate experience trying to actualize, for example, the “absolute quality” of beauty, truth and goodness, that is the absoluteness of aesthetic, cognitive and moral values in the narrower sense of the word (Ingarden 1983: 128–129, 132). In particular, concretizing the latter through a morally oriented conduct implies that man is available to “make sacrifices” and, in addition, to be seen as “morally responsible”, i.e. worthy of praise or blame for *his* actions and their consequences. As Ingarden explicitly asserts in a lecture delivered in 1962, “there can be no question of any fact or behavior, in particular of any deed, falling under the category of moral values, without the presence of this accountability” (Ingarden 1983: 165–166).⁶

Consequently, moral responsibility and the attempt to bear it, in spite of man's natural needs, emerge as *essential* (and not contingent) moments in the constitution of humanity, moments without which man and the human world would not deserve this name.⁷ Moral predisposition and the responsibility related to it are thus credited with being some of the features belonging to the *anthropological definition*: in Ingarden's perspective we cannot think of a man which is free from any moral feeling, any moral judgment, any reference to a moral hierarchy etc.; in parallel, we cannot think of a hypothetical state of nature whose peculiarity can be resumed through the well-known Latin phrases, employed by Thomas Hobbes, “*homo homini lupus*” or “*bellum omnium contra omnes*”. For the Polish author, the *intrinsic* morality of man is one of the most unequivocal results of the pure description of the “thing itself” referring to the human sphere.

3. The structure of responsibility

Starting from these ethical implications which emerged through the analysis of the essence of man, i.e. taking for granted the evidence of responsibility, Ingarden

⁶ The text of this lecture is published with the title *An Analysis of Moral Values*.

⁷ As for the definition of essence and eidetic inquiry in Ingarden's thought, see Ingarden 2007; Ingarden 1965a: 229–278, 379–454; De Santis 2015.

feels the need both to deepen the presuppositions of this evidence and to investigate some of them in the context of formal ontology. In this regard, a significant source of information is the treatise *On Responsibility*, based on a paper read in 1968 (Ingarden 1983: 53–117).

After distinguishing “different situations in which the phenomenon of responsibility emerges”,⁸ the philosopher here indicates three of its necessary conditions (Ingarden 1983: 69 et seq.): 1) reference to values (according to the assertions made in the previous paragraph with reference to the strict relation between moral responsibility and the concretization of moral values); 2) identity of the subject or, to be more precise, of the *person* who acts responsibly; 3) presupposition of freedom. That is to say that a man can be said to bear responsibility for something, to assume responsibility, to be called to account for something and to act responsibly *only if*: 1) we assume a sphere of values as “reference background”; 2) we take for granted that the same man is a unitary person (and not, for example, a simple bundle of single experiences), which is the reason why I can say that *he*, exactly *that man*, is responsible; 3) we consider him as a *free* man, inasmuch as nobody can be responsible for choosing or doing something without free will (if the decisions of a person are conditioned by a mental disorder, for instance, it is obvious that such person cannot be said to be responsible for what he has decided and done).

On the basis of these observations, deepening the practical dimension from an ontological perspective entails, for Ingarden, three possible investigative directions: 1) the development of an ontology of values, which could be compared with the axiological reflections of other authors belonging to the phenomenological tradition, such as Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand or Nicolai Hartmann (Hartmann 1926; Scheler 1966; von Hildebrand 1982); 2) the detailed study of the identity problem referred to individual objects and – more specifically – to personal individuality; 3) the analysis of the concept of free person and its justification in the context of formal ontology, also assuming the theoretical results reached in *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. While the former task is pursued (at least partially) by the philosopher in a series of essays of which an English version is now available in the already mentioned volume *Man and Value* (Ingarden 1983: 119–178),⁹ and while “the problem of the identity of a temporally

⁸ “Someone 1. *bears* responsibility for something or, differently put, *is* responsible for something, 2. *assumes* responsibility for something, 3. *is called* to account for something, 4. *acts* responsibly” (Ingarden 1983: 53). With regard to the first point, Ingarden specifies that “that for which the agent is responsible is of a twofold kind: first, it is a certain behaviour; secondly, it is whatever is brought forth, in particular, realized, by this behaviour, i.e., the result” (Ingarden 1983: 56). Employing well-known ethical debate terminology, we can state that the author interprets the concept of responsibility in both a deontological and a consequentialist perspective.

⁹ These essays presuppose and intend to support “a well-founded recognition of the existence of values as determinations of objects of a special kind”, refusing any attempt “to reduce values to

conditioned individual object” is the title of chapter XIV of *Controversy* (see Ingarden 1965b),¹⁰ the latter task determines the second part of the treatise *On Responsibility*. Here the author summarizes some theses also expressed in the last volume of his ontological masterpiece (Ingarden 1974) and illustrates a possible world-structure compatible with human freedom and responsibility itself.¹¹

The theoretical proposal that emerges in this treatise, which I am going to describe in the next pages, is a complex formal model which could enter the contemporary debate on the compatibility of free will and determinism (see Beebe 2013; Kane 2005; *infra*, *Conclusion*). The illustration of this model must not be interpreted as a change of topic, but rather as a more accurate definition, from the point of view of formal ontology, of what we assume when speaking of a free man and a moral world. This philosophical operation plays a double role: on the one hand it intends to “dig up” and explain the structural presuppositions of such concepts, starting from the phenomenon and plumbing it; on the other hand, this procedure “downward” contributes to founding said phenomenon thus implicating a way “upward” as well, for freedom, responsibility and

certain subjective modes of human behaviour or even to the behaviour of entire human communities” (Ingarden 1983: 131). The examination of Ingarden’s conception of value is a task that goes beyond the scope of the present paper (for this topic see Golaszewska 1976; Kocay 1995; Wegrzecki 1994). However, it is worth stressing the strict relation between the fact that values “call” man to realize them (as we read) and their ontological status, which Ingarden attempts to delineate in the essay *What we do not Know about Values* (see Ingarden 1983: 131–164), coinciding with a paper read in Cracow in 1964. The author here investigates the concept of value through ontological categories which are crucial in *Controversy over the Existence of the World* (from an existential, formal and material point of view), suggesting several paths of research and providing few definitive answers. Value is depicted as a peculiar objectuality which “is never something that exists for itself, but is always the value of *something*” (Ingarden 1983: 137), and whose form and mode of being (*Seinsweise*) are different from those of the types of objects analyzed in *Controversy* (real, ideal and intentional objects). As for its “valuableness” (*Werthhaftigkeit*), i.e. its normativity, Ingarden supposes that it is the value-matter which plays the leading role (Ingarden 1983: 143), in a bidirectional connection context linking value and valuable object: “the value of an object (...) is determined in its matter and valuableness by the properties, or perhaps nature, of the object, but at the same time, once it has been determined as a positive value, it confers upon the object a particular dignity, a certain wholly new aspect, which this object could never manage to attain without this value” (Ingarden 1983: 143).

¹⁰ Here Ingarden defines the single person and the single man as an “object persisting in time”, different from both “processes” and “events” (which represent other kinds of temporally conditioned individual objects). The same distinction is already present in the first volume of *Controversy*, where it is considered in its existential implications: while the mode of being of events is characterized by the instantaneous coming-into-being of something (Ingarden 1964: 193–198), and processes consist of several temporal phases (Ingarden 1964: 198–215), objects persisting in time remain identical through the succession of instants and despite possible changes of their properties (Ingarden 1964: 215). As Ingarden specifies, these objects can be things (a stone, a mountain, a home etc.) as well as living and human beings (Ingarden 1964: 230–245).

¹¹ It is because of this crucial role of the ontic foundations of responsibility that E.M. Swiderski counts Ingarden among the exponents of “moral realism” (see Swiderski 2005).

morality cannot be thought of as compatible with whichever structure of the world, and certainly not with the deterministic structure that seems to conform to natural laws. The question Ingarden raises can be summarized as follows: taking for granted that responsibility requires freedom and freedom implies the possibility to deliberate autonomously without being determined by external causes, how are free will and responsibility possible in a world where any event has a cause and is part of a wider natural “chain”, as sciences seem to teach? Starting from this phenomenal contradiction, the challenge Ingarden takes on in his treatise coincides with finding out a form of the world able to justify both the rigidly determined events of nature and the free decisions of man, namely what emerges from the faithful description of both the natural region and the spiritual domain of reality.

In this respect, the author proposes to substitute the deterministic conception of the world (according to which *every* event is necessitated by other events and is therefore inevitable)¹² with an alternative view that however cannot be said to be indeterministic (i.e. a view denying any kind of conditioning¹³), but is rather presented as a third option. The main concept of this new perspective is the notion of *relatively isolated system*:

In place of radical determinism in the sense of Laplace, and of indeterminism, which are mutually contradictory and both very unsatisfactory, I propose a third conception. According to it this world would consist of an immense multiplicity of partially open, and at the same time partially isolated (“shielded”), systems, which despite their mutual partial segregation and shieldedness are “interlinked” through causal relations. In various systems of a world so structured there are then on the one hand factual states which are simultaneous but at the same time existentially independent, and on the other hand also factual states which are causally interdependent existentially. The former correspond to those aspects of two or more systems whose respective states are mutually and simultaneously shielded. (Ingarden 1983: 103)

¹² Ingarden explicitly mentions Laplace, whose famous definition of determinism is expressed as follows: “We ought then to consider the present state of the universe as the effect of its previous state and as the cause of that which is to follow. An intelligence that, at a given instant, could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings that make it up, if moreover it were vast enough to submit these data to analysis, would encompass in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atoms. For such an intelligence nothing would be uncertain, and the future, like the past, would be open to its eyes” (Laplace 1995: 2). Unlike other thinkers (see for example Popper 1972), Ingarden does not believe that twentieth century physics has essentially altered the presuppositions of determinism (see Ingarden 1983: 102–103). On this debate, see Pomian 1990.

¹³ For the definition of determinism and indeterminism, see Butterfield 1998.

This view, according to which the world is a totality composed of systems that are partially open and partially closed,¹⁴ is presented as appropriate to include and justify the different kinds of determinations observable in the variety of reality, inasmuch as any intramundane conditioning can be explicated as a case of particularization of this theoretical paradigm. Moreover, provided that any single man can be considered as a system among others, the same structure emerges as being suitable to account for human self-determination as well, whose concrete realization is independent from other conditions without being totally untied from the external context. Conceiving man as a system which is partially isolated thus enables Ingarden to explain freedom in its phenomenal complexity, namely both man's capacity to determine himself and, at the same time, his undeniable relation to the world: the former as corresponding to the "closed" side of the man-system, the latter corresponding to the "opened" side (Ingarden 1983: 84–86). It is quite evident that neither a deterministic nor an indeterministic conception would have permitted to explain this phenomenal diversification.

The same world-conception represents a useful instrument to explain the complex relation that connects the different aspects of man himself, depicted by Ingarden as a "relatively isolated system of a very high order", which "as such contains in itself very numerous, likewise relatively isolated, systems of lower and lower levels, which are hierarchically ordered (...), and are at the same time both partially interconnected and also partially segregated" (Ingarden 1983: 87). That is to say that also different human spheres are conceived as a number of systems partially independent and partially related to one another.¹⁵ This makes it possible to legitimate differences and interrelations between them, as well as the resulting possibility of free will. More specifically, Ingarden speaks of three regions constituting the human being, namely the *body*, "the ego with the stream of experiences" and the *soul* (Ingarden 1983: 99).¹⁶ He affirms that:

¹⁴ Employing the concept of system, Ingarden expressly quotes von Bertalanffy's legacy, although defining it as "not wholly satisfactory" (Ingarden 1983: 87). On Ingarden's "relatively isolated system," see also Makota 1990.

¹⁵ On the basis of these observations, we infer that the concept of "system of high order" is a relative: provided that it concerns the inner hierarchy and complexity of a system (the more minor systems constitute it, the higher is its order), it can change into a system of lower order when the same system is compared to more complex ones. The single man, for instance, is a very high order system if referred to the variety of his inner components, while it becomes a system of lower level when considered in the context of the community or society to which he belongs. Likewise, in *Controversy over the Existence of the World* Ingarden employs the phrase "object of higher order" (see Ingarden 1965a: § 43), stating for instance that "the real world appears to be an individual object of higher order, which is ultimately composed of a manifoldness of originally individual (autonomous) objects" (Ingarden 1965a: 144).

¹⁶ We employ the word "soul" with reference to the German term "Seele". By doing so, we distance ourselves from the published English translation of the treatise, in which "Seele" is translated as "psyche". For this reason, when reporting whole quotes, we will slightly modify the published text.

it [the stream of consciousness] is, so to speak, a surface of contact between the body and the soul of man. On the one hand it consists of data, conveyed to the ego by means of the bodily information system, about bodily happenings and properties, and further about the properties and processes of external things. On the other hand it contains from time to time manifestations and modes of appearance of changes in the soul, and of its properties. (Ingarden 1983: 97)

Immediately afterwards, Ingarden defines the soul as follows:

it genuinely belongs to the essence of the soul to be conscious, to have experiences, but its manifestations must also pass the threshold of consciousness. But the soul itself is, in its properties as well as in the transformations occurring in it, nothing specifically “consciousness-like”; it is itself not experience, but it expresses itself in experiences. And not everything that happens in the soul must at once, or in general, attain to awareness. It seems that only acts of thought are consciousness-like, or consciously performed. Perhaps it is also the same with acts of the will, especially with volitional decisions. These are in both cases modes of behaviour, or better put, “deeds” of the ego, which is the organizational centre of the human soul and which “embodies” and “represents” it. It is whatever “speaks” on behalf of the human soul, performs various acts, assumes responsibilities, enters into obligations, etc. All this cannot happen unconsciously. (Ingarden 1983: 97–98)

In these quotations we discover the structural presuppositions for making *free* decisions and, among such presuppositions, the fundamental role of soul:

- 1) Firstly, we find out that soul and consciousness do not coincide: the German word “*Seele*”, employed by Ingarden without any speculative or religious meaning, refers rather to that deep, original and partially hidden core thanks to which all moral and character traits of a person belong to that specific person and not to others. For instance, the being-generous or the being-brave of a man belong to his soul, as well as “occurrences” of which the same man is not aware yet, such as “an emerging love or some other emotion, internal collapse, despair, dawning hope” (Ingarden 1983: 98).
- 2) Secondly, the last words of the quotation declare that “volitional decisions” concern the expression of soul in acts that are “consciousness-like, or consciously performed”. This means that the profoundness of soul has to be considered as the origin of self-determination and as the true source of free choices and actions, provided that this profoundness is “transformed” into a *conscious* content, thus permitting to elaborate a rational decision and to find the means to realize it.¹⁷ Consequently, we can affirm that freedom, responsibility and morality have for Ingarden a *spiritual* origin, assuming the word “spirit” in

¹⁷ Yet the author adds in a footnote: “Perhaps, since it is questionable whether decisions are not sometimes made in the soul before a conscious decision is made” (Ingarden 1983: 115, footnote 30).

relation to a “system of lower level” within an holistic conception of human being. Evidently, Ingarden’s view cannot be credited with being either a naturalistic or a metaphysical-theological conception, to the extent that the philosopher maintains concepts belonging to the platonic-Christian tradition (it is the case of spirit or soul), though depriving them of any speculative implication and relating their meaning to purely phenomenal fields.

- 3) Thirdly, what emerges from the above-quoted words is the ontological and anthropological structure that underlies the free expression of soul despite biological and bodily conditionings. How is it possible that man does not follow his “animal instincts” thus choosing to behave differently, to control himself etc? How is it possible that he is not wholly biologically conditioned? Also in this case, the concept of *relatively isolated system* helps to provide an answer: since – as Ingarden specifies – both soul and body are partially opened and partially closed in their relation to the conscious I, consciousness can become the “mouthpiece” of soul avoiding the immediate influence of body. This would explain the possibility of free will and of the free actions based on it, without denying that these actions however have to rely on bodily or “animal” bases. In other words, this view would *formally* support the “material” description of man emerging from Ingarden’s essays dedicated to the human nature, where man is described as finding himself “on the boundary” of spirituality and culture on one side, and “animality” on the other.

The ontological concept of system permits thus to combine freedom with the legality of nature and, what is more, to found free will in its phenomenal specificity, which presupposes the constant compromise with concrete limitations, both external and internal. In effect, as we all know from our own experience, deciding freely does not mean being *absolutely* free, or being free from any form of conditionality, but entails that man can *also* acquire self-determination besides (and on the base of) natural conditionings, which is possible, for Ingarden, thanks to the relative independence of the soul-system. This is a clear example of the author’s attempt to capture and ontologically “translate” the intrinsic shades and complexity of the phenomenal evidence of human reality.

4. Implications of Ingarden’s ontology of freedom, with particular regards to the practical sphere

Ingarden’s observations on freedom can be read and interpreted from several points of view.

- 1) First of all, they can be considered in the context of the development of the philosopher’s thought, in relation to both the ontological investigation carried

out in *Controversy over the Existence of the World* and the debate on idealism and realism whose problematic aspects represent the starting point of the work. As Edward Swiderski supposes, the moral-anthropological investigation could have brought Ingarden to revise his philosophical method and to “relax his former steadfast commitment to essence-analysis as the *sine qua non* of philosophical work destined ultimately, according to him, to resolve the central metaphysical puzzle, that of existence” (Swiderski 1994: 185). Put another way, the description and foundation of the *practical* human dimension, even though eidetic, may provide a demonstration of the metaphysical “weight” of the external world and thus open a sort of gap connecting essence and existence, the same gap that Ingarden had looked for (and not found) in the existential and formal analysis carried out through his *opus magnum*.

- 2) Secondly, the same observations can enter the contemporary Anglo-Saxon debate on compatibility between free will and determinism. In this respect, Ingarden’s position can be credited with being “incompatibilist”, inasmuch as the philosopher expressly asserts that freedom is *not compatible* with a deterministic structure of the world, in which each event is predetermined within a natural causal chain. However, unlike other incompatibilist authors, he does not conclude that free will is impossible (see Wegner 2003) nor that its justification requests the intervention of contingency and chance, i.e., the indeterministic negation of determination (see Kane 1996; Balaguer 2010). As already said, Ingarden does not query the evidence of free choice, but finds its possibility by denying determinism and at the same time proposing a third, not indeterministic ontological alternative. This allows to “save” both free will and its phenomenal manifestation, in which no trace of indeterminateness is observable.
- 3) Besides, the description of man through the concept of *relatively isolated system* can be interpreted as the pivotal moment of an anthropological investigation which follows in the wake of the so-called “anthropological turn” of the first half of the twentieth century.¹⁸ Ingarden offers in fact an interesting theoretical model according to which man is neither a “homme machine” (from a monistic-reductionistic perspective) nor “a whole composed of two heterogeneous and (...) disjoint factors” (from a dualistic-Cartesian perspective), but a unity that is constituted of many interrelated dimensions (Ingarden 1983: 86). As stated above, these do not belong exclusively to the biological sphere, but are both psychophysical and spiritual, provided that the domain of “spirituality” is thought of as a phenomenal region, without referring to extra-phenomenal, speculative or theological foundations. Such an articulated view, based on the dialectical relation between unity and plurality, allows us to count

¹⁸ As it is known, this expression, when used with regard to the history of philosophy, refers first of all to the anthropological contributions of Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner and Arnold Gehlen.

Ingarden among those authors who have contributed to elaborate the traits of a “phenomenological anthropology” (see, for instance, Fink 1995; Hartmann 1949; Scheler 1976; Stein 2004), of which the conception of man as a relatively isolated system certainly represents an original version.

- 4) Last but not least, the conclusions reached in the treatise *On Responsibility* can be surveyed with regard to their ethical entailments, raising the question of whether such entailments are admissible and, if so, which is their methodological value. As already mentioned, free will and personal identity are preliminarily depicted by Ingarden as necessary conditions of responsibility, which is in turn indicated as a *conditio sine qua non* in order to concretize morale values. Therefore, since in the above-quoted treatise we found the justification of both presence of freedom in the world and unity of the person-system (by means of the relation among its lower level systems, such as body and soul), we can state that also morality is thereby justified, although indirectly: within the world-conformation described by Ingarden there is place not only for natural events, but also for moral decisions and moral actions, the same actions that contribute to characterize man and human dimension, as we argued in the second paragraph.

Of course, this does not mean that the author developed here a moral philosophy. On the contrary, whereas the above-quoted article on the *Analysis of Moral Values*, dating back to 1962, briefly fixes some principles in order to acknowledge and define moral activity, the inquiry on responsibility, carried out few years later, seems to distance itself from ethics, investigating the concept of responsibility in a more general sense.¹⁹ Rather than deepening the ethical issue, Ingarden seems to prefer dealing with it indirectly, and including it in a wider field of research strictly linked with the ontology of the real world; otherwise put, he seems to prioritize ontology over ethical problems *stricto sensu*. However, despite this moving backwards of the moral subject, it is exactly in the priority of ontological investigation that we can identify one of the most original contributions of the Polish philosopher on the practical topic. Ingarden’s gradual “distancing” is that which characterizes his approach towards the moral sphere: after deciphering the capacity to assume moral responsibility as an essential feature of man, and after indicating the conditions for some activity “to be able to fall under the category of a value in a moral sense” (as argued in *An Analysis of Moral Values*), the author takes a further “retrograde step” and asks how the world has to be for such conditions

¹⁹ As Ingarden states at the beginning of the essay, “The problem of responsibility has heretofore been treated primarily as a special problem of ethics, without any more precise investigation of its wider contexts. (...) It also seems that responsibility comes up in realms other than the moral. Moral responsibility is only a certain special case. Thus, the range of cases and examples to be taken into consideration has to be expanded” (Ingarden 1983: 53).

(or some of them) to be realized and admissible. What emerges this way is a sort of “map” of the moral world, that is, the formal outline of a world in which responsibility, morality and – consequently – humanity are not contradictory, and the conceptuality of moral philosophy can acquire its meaning and justification. It is in this sense that we employed the word “metaethics” in the introduction of the paper. Instead of analyzing the universe of ethical problems, Ingarden comprehends the central value of this universe and puts ontology “at its service”, arranging an image of reality where the objective domain of any moral definition and moral reasoning is guaranteed. We can thus conclude confirming that Ingarden’s thought implies neither a practical turn in phenomenology nor a detailed description of the moral dimension, but rather, at the basis of both of them, a rigorous ontological foundation of the object and the possibility of ethics itself.

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Wojciech Starzyński¹

Irena Krońska: A Student and a Critic of Roman Ingarden's Philosophy

In this article on Irena Krońska (1915–1973) I attempt to present three stages in her approach towards the philosophy of Roman Ingarden. The first one may be associated with her review in *Revue philosophique de France et de l'étranger* of 1949, printed following the publication of the *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, Volume 1. The second one encompasses the period up to 1968 when Krońska was cooperating with Ingarden. The third one covers the period after Ingarden's death in 1970 and provides an assessment of his work, largely in the framework of correspondence between Krońska and Patočka. I maintain that Krońska was consistent in her criticism, voiced from the perspective of Phenomenology, inasmuch as she disapproved of Ingarden's ontologism and sense of "positivism" that was in his removedness and lack of ethic-existential content which for Krońska constituted the essence of philosophy.

Key words: Irena Krońska, Roman Ingarden, Jan Patočka, Polish phenomenology

Introduction

The following article aims to address the problem of Irena Krońska's philosophical position and its relation to Polish phenomenology, in particular to determine what was the character of Krońska's critique of Roman Ingarden's thought. How is it possible that a person one could hardly call a phenomenologist, for her few published works dealt primarily with Greek philosophy, exerted such a remarkable impact on Polish phenomenology? It seems that the thesis could be cautiously supported twofold. To start with, Krońska was the very first philosopher who framed a critical line of interpretation of Ingarden's philosophy, whereby – in contrast to a violent critique put forward a few years later by her converted to Marxism

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husband, Tadeusz Kroński (see Kroński 1952) – she adopted a phenomenological stance. Secondly, her standpoint, though autonomous, still, was shaped by relationships with Polish philosophers like Tadeusz Kroński and Leszek Kołakowski, but also and primarily, by an extraordinary exchange of letters with Jan Patočka. The correspondence with the latter definitively proves that Krońska was in favour of the phenomenological philosophy, however, alternative to that proposed by Ingarden. Central to the problem at hand, for consideration here, is consequently the history of relationships between Krońska and Ingarden. Of particular interest is the criticism of Ingarden's thought, voiced in several publications, the wider context of which has been studied with respect to a longstanding correspondence between Krońska and Ingarden. The exchange of letters between them allows for an understanding of Krońska's stance more easily and comprehensively.

Krońska's review of Ingarden's *Controversy over the Existence of the World*

At this point, I shall remind that Krońska, nee Krzemicka, was born in 1915 and during 1933–37 she was a student of classical philology and philosophy at the Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov. This is where she met Ingarden, who was her first professor of philosophy. Ingarden inspired in the young student an interest in phenomenology and despite the fact that it was classical philology that was her major, we could risk a claim that during her Lvov studies Krońska became *de facto* a philosopher-phenomenologist. Further personal developments in her life enabled her to become independent of the influence of Ingarden's thought: upon graduation, Krzemicka left Lvov, moved to Warsaw, married Tadeusz Kroński, who introduced her to Patočka who became their mutual friend. Krzemicka's first publication (on the translation of philosophical texts) backs up the statement. The text was published owing to Patočka, who translated the work into Czech (Krzemicka 1938). Krzemicka employs there a combination of Ingarden's and Husserl's method with the ideas presented in Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*, what on the one hand proves her thorough knowledge of Ingarden's thought, and on the other hand, demonstrates her gaining research independence. Also written in April 1939, Krzemicka's letter to Patočka shows a great enthusiasm of the young student to get acquainted with the latest publications by Husserl, Fink or Landgrebe, as well as to combine the perspectives of phenomenology and ancient Greek philosophy (see Krzemicka 1939). During World War II, Mr. and Mrs. Kroński – both of Jewish origin – managed to escape the jaws of death at the hands of the Nazis, and following being held in a prisoner of war camp, they ended up in Paris. There, Krońska became familiar with new philosophical currents, with

Sartre's and Heidegger's philosophies to the fore. She did not stop, however, tracking what is going on in Polish philosophy. With the first volume of the *Controversy over the Existence of the World* published in 1947, Krońska prepared its review for the journal *Revue philosophique de France et de l'étranger* (Krońska 1949). Ingarden was clearly impressed with its style and content and in a letter as of 14 April 1949 he wrote:

Dear Mrs. Krońska, in these days, I have received the most recent volume of *Revue philosophique* where we read your article on the first volume of the *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. (...) I shall thank you for the article. In my opinion it is well-written, quite rightly (with minor flaws) informing about the content of the book, serious, with no compliments, and at the same time addressing in a critical manner some aspects we could argue about. I also think it did not come easily to write the article and the very fact you have managed to write it in this form is very much to your credit and to the credit of your work over the last years (Ingarden 1949).²

How can we characterize the criticism of Ingarden's main work? In the text discussed here, Krońska places Ingarden among authors such as Sartre, Heidegger or Nicolai Hartmann. The thought of each of them emerged in reaction to the idealistic turn in Husserl's philosophy. Ingarden opposed Husserl in that he developed phenomenological "realism." Krońska refers to Ingarden's viewpoint, original and autonomous, as she underlines it, as to plural realism. This form of realism would preserve as basic to the phenomenological method, together with its *epoché*, and would distance itself from Husserl's transcendental reduction, deemed unacceptable. Phenomenology, therefore, would concern "validation," understood as "doing justice" to things as they appear in all their heterogeneity and complexity, rather than "reduction." As opposed to the philosophers mentioned above, Ingarden fulfils this requirement abiding by a kind of methodological minimalism, which Krońska links to Husserl, previously postulating for phenomenology as a rigorous science (*strenge Wissenschaft*). This link, in turn, leads Krońska towards describing Ingarden's position as a special type of "positivism." From that moment, such a qualification of Ingarden's philosophy would be reflected in all of her analyses of the thought of the author of the *Controversy over the Existence of the World*.

This rather enigmatic accusation may seem odd, considering that it was Ingarden in the mid-1930s that strongly criticized neo-positivism, represented by the

² "Droga Pani, doręczono mi w tych dniach ostatni zeszyt *Revue Philosophique*, w którym znajduje się artykuł Pani o I t. *Sporu*. (...) Za artykuł Pani bardzo dziękuję. Uważam, że jest dobry, tzn. trafnie (z drobnymi wykojejeniami) informujący o treści książki, poważny, bez komplementów, a zarazem poruszający krytycznie pewne punkty, co do których można dyskutować. Sądzę też, że artykuł ten nie było łatwo napisać i to, że Pani go w tej postaci zdołała napisać, dobrze świadczy o Pani i Pani pracy w ostatnich latach."

Vienna Circle, referring himself also to similar tendencies noticeable within the Lvov-Warsaw school. What is worth noting, Krońska is perfectly aware that it is not about this kind of positivism, but about a certain form of it implemented into phenomenology. She gives the difference by taking the term in quotes (“positivism”), although she also freely refers to a positivist formula that Ingarden concludes with one of his texts: “that positive facts, given in all valid experience, should be simply taken into account” (Ingarden 1963a: 654). In the 1949 text, the accusation of positivism is reduced to the statement that with the problem of the existence of the world as a point of departure, Ingarden considers it as a relationship between the world and consciousness, thus developing a theory he denotes as existential-ontological analysis. According to Krońska, the ontologization of phenomenology would result in a change of the object of considerations – no longer would that be phenomena as such but rather modes of existence, an analysis of which encourages considerations about different existential moments. Philosophy comes to be considered as a reflection on the existential moments, which are grouped in previously exclusive pairs (autonomy-heteronomy, distinctiveness-connectiveness, originality-derivativeness, independence-dependence). Krońska notes that these notions introduced by Ingarden are as a matter of fact derived from the notion of dependence/independence, that is, focus not on a phenomenon but rather on a relationship between the phenomenon of consciousness and the world. Ingarden would offer some logicism here, for it appears that ontological aspects are subject to the laws of logic, in particular, logical consistency, which becomes the key to differentiating between the basic notions. Subsequently, the concept of existential ontology is further developed in that listed are all possible combinations of existential moments. As Krońska observes, the result is a somewhat awkward thesis about “19 possible modes of existence for the ‘world’” (Krońska 1949: 223). The possibilities are then subject to temporal analysis, which introduces the following existential moments: actuality, post-actuality, and fissurative character.

Krońska concludes her review with a discussion of the possibility of solving the eponymous controversy. Ingarden sees it in the transition from ontological analyses to metaphysics. He approaches metaphysics as a discipline which, after preliminary ontological analyses, considered from the perspective of possibilities, shifts to the reality, still within the limits established by ontology. We shall keep in mind, however, that, according to Krońska, the preference of ontology is linked to the primacy of logic, for ontology is based on the rule of logical consistency, which allows for the introduction of contradictory word pairs. In other words, if Ingarden's ontology described the concept of a possible world as previously complying with the rule of logical consistency, Ingarden would be guilty of logicism, in that he would fail to subject his basic assumption for validation procedure.

Ingarden denies the accusations, curiously enough without offering any arguments. In a letter to Krońska of 14 April 1949, he writes:

As for what came to my mind during reading, I feel like we should discuss this in person, not in a letter. Let me only indicate the issues: in your presentation of my views, the thesis that I understand existential moments relatively is wrong. I am inclined to believe an analysis of the concept of a relationship in volume 2 supports my stance. Furthermore, the idea that there are 19 possible ways of the world's existence is wrong (the 19 ways refer to the coexistence of the world and pure consciousness). Also, I cannot agree with the statement that ontology in my works is based on logics. I did not address the problem in the *Controversy I*, but it is vivid in *Essentiale Fragen*, where the logical theses are clearly based on relevant ontological (formal) ones. The misunderstanding here lies in basing the assumptions of one science on another one and applying in scientific considerations the laws of logic being two different aspects. It is beyond any doubt that in my considerations I do apply the laws of logic but never as indicators of ontological assumptions.

I think I have listed the most important problems. (...) Whether we shall resign the laws of logic within ontology is disputable, crucial when considering the issue of the theory of knowledge, this I admit.

Anyway, I do consider your article well-written and I doubt it anyone in Poland could excel you at writing one (Ingarden 1949).³

Despite this prelude to a more detailed discussion, no track of its continuation is left, which does not imply, however, that the relationship between Krońska and Ingarden did not continue. However, it should be emphasized that a very unfavorable historical circumstances accompanied the reception of Ingarden's main work in post-war and communist Poland. It has to be recalled that Kroński himself had seemed to identify with phenomenology from the early thirties, among others publishing in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* and *Ateneum*, two reviews of Ingarden's *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (Kroński 1933, 1938). As we learn

³ "Co do poszczególnych kwestii, które mi się nasunęły podczas czytania, to trzeba zdaje się pomówić i w liście nie da się tego załatwić. Ograniczając się do wymienienia samych kwestyj, powiem: w przedstawieniu moich poglądów nie jest słuszna teza Pani jakoby momenty egzystencjalne były pojęte przeze mnie relatywnie. Myślę, że analiza stosunku w II t. potwierdza moje stanowisko. Niesłuszne jest także, że istnieje 19 możliwych sposobów istnienia świata (te 19 sposobów dotyczyć współistnienia świata i czystej świadomości). Zarzut, że ontologia jest u mnie oparta na logice nie jest słuszny. W *Sporze I* nie wypowiadałem się na ten temat, widać to jednak w *Essentiale Fragen*, gdzie wyraźnie tezy logiczne oparte są na odpowiednio dobranych ontologicznych (formalnych). Nieporozumienie wynika stąd, że co innego jest opieranie się twierdzeń jednej nauki na drugiej, a co innego stosowanie się w rozważaniu naukowym do praw logiki. Otóż ja się w rozważaniach niewątpliwie stosuję do logiki, ale nie używam ich jako przesłanek twierdzeń ontologicznych.

To chyba najważniejsze sprawy. (...) Czy w ramach ontologii należałoby zawiesić ważność praw logiki – to jest kwestia do dyskusji. Kwestia ta wchodzi bardzo poważnie w rachubę w rozważaniach teorii poznania, na to się oczywiście piszę.

W każdym razie uważam artykuł Pani za dobry i – myślę – że w Polsce nikt lepszego nie napisze."

from the recently issued several letters of Kroński to Patočka, in 1939, as a result of tense relations with his supervisor prof. Tatarkiewicz, Kroński intended to move to Lvov and complete his doctoral thesis under the direction of Ingarden. In a letter from February 2, we read: "I am very scared now, what you [J. Patočka] and Prof. Ingarden will say about my article ... The article on Husserl by Prof. Ingarden in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* will be published soon. Tatarkiewicz is very angry for that reason and I will be happy when I will be able to go to Ingarden to Lvov!" (Kroński 1939). It seems that at least until his important essay on *Fascism and the European Tradition* (Kroński 1960), written in 1942–43, he was still using the phenomenological method, and the violent transition to Marxist positions occurred after the war during his stay in Paris. In 1949, the Kroński family decided to return to Poland, where Tadeusz Kroński became an influential philosopher-intellectualist and professor actively supporting Stalinism. In this attitude, but also to confirm his usefulness for the new regime and to dismiss any suspicion on the part of the communist authorities (he was denied membership in the party), he published in 1952 his review of the *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, where he formulated the allegation of "realistic idealism" against the author, and he assessed the book itself as "an example of infertility, decay and bankruptcy of contemporary bourgeois philosophy" (Kroński 1952: 331). By juxtaposing two reviews, one can get the impression that Kroński was using in some way the objections formulated three years earlier by Krońska, however, within his strange rhetoric and to achieve his new ideological goals. In the said period from 1950 to 1956, Ingarden was sent by the authorities' decision to a forced leave, without any possibility of teaching at the university, he was also banned from publishing his phenomenological work, however, he was not deprived of his livelihood, being involved in translation and publishing work. And it was in these circumstances that a new cooperation was established between Krońska, now as wife of a prominent professor and degraded and in some way humiliated until 1956, Ingarden.

Cooperation of Krońska and Ingarden

Starting from 1951, their cooperation based chiefly on publishing the series "Biblioteka Klasyków Filozofii" (BKF) ["Library of the Classics of Philosophy"]. Krońska was its Editor-In-Chief, whereas Ingarden was on the Editorial Board. The situation is normalized in 1957, when Ingarden returns to the university, in the meantime in 1958 Kroński suddenly dies. At that time, they communicated mainly by means of letters, since Ingarden was living and working in Krakow and Krońska in Warsaw. They focused on current editorial projects. Nevertheless,

Ingarden did not cease to underline Krońska's credit to Polish philosophy on the one hand, and on the other hand, he did not cease to regret she failed to pursue an academic career. When referring to the post-war lives of his students in a letter of 8 March 1963, Ingarden writes:

I did have a certain hope that you will defend your dissertation in Paris, and then you came back to Poland and things turned out differently. It could not be helped. Somehow the most able of my colleagues and friends who could influence Polish philosophy, like Alexander Rosenblum, Ignacy Wasserberg, Alfons Baron, and among them, yourself, failed to follow formalities. Your activity in the "Library of the Classics of Philosophy" will certainly mark Polish culture, this I do not forget, but your great philosophical skills could have predisposed you to an altogether different role (Ingarden 1963b).⁴

On a different occasion, Ingarden advances even a kind of philosophical reflection on Krońska's case, on the one hand, deliberating upon her unfulfilled philosophical talent, and on the other, taking into consideration her substantial contribution to Polish culture through her work on the series of the "Library of the Classics of Philosophy" and over 100 volumes published.

I think that in the various unforeseen or anticipated bad events and processes – which happen in every age – one should keep faith in the value of the work we have devoted to life. If not today, then sometime in the future positive and creative work will bring positive results, perhaps late, when we will not see it ourselves, but all productive work settles down slowly in human culture. What you have done over a dozen years for the culture of Polish philosophy is certainly a lasting value, the significance of which will be seen in the future. I have often admired your perseverance and not lowering the requirements for the quality of work, that is, the selection and quality of translations that you released for the BKF, and I also admired how much you have learned over the years in terms of philosophy, in its extremely manifold manifestations, and how great you have gained the ability to understand the author's tendencies and the problems of various positions. It will not be lost either. So although it is difficult, and must be, for people who have a significant cultural importance in the intellectual life of their era – one must keep on with the same eagerness that we can see in you and realize a tasks that you have always guided. Once in Paris in 1946, you told me that you survived the war only because you were philosophers. I formulated something similar in the form of

⁴ "Miałem jeszcze pewną nadzieję, że uzyska Pani doktorat w Paryżu, ale niestety przed końcem powróciła Pani do Polski – no i wszystko się inaczej potoczyło. Ale trudno. Jakoś tak się dziwnie składało, że szereg najzdolniejszych moich kolegów i przyjaciół, którzy mogli wpłynąć na los filozofii polskiej – jak np. Aleksander Rosenblum, Ignacy Wasserberg, zapoznany w swych szczególnych talentach Alfons Baron itd., a min. i Pani, jakoś nie zdołali załatwić spraw formalnych. Pani działalność w BKF pozostanie niewątpliwie w kulturze polskiej i o tym nie zapominam, ale Pani wielkie zdolności także w zakresie filozofii mogły Panią predysponować do zupełnie innej roli."

transformation of an old saying. I said: *primum philosophari, deinde vivere*. I think that we should stay with it (Ingarden 1967).⁵

Convinced of Krońska's exceptional abilities, Ingarden comes up with an idea for writing together with her volumes encompassing Ingarden's lectures on ethics and aesthetics and publish these under their names. "You will manage perfectly – writes Ingarden in a letter of 16 January 1966 – and maybe you will even find it interesting enough to elaborate on the problems only briefly outlined so that it would not be solely editing" (Ingarden 1966).⁶ Krońska accepts the offer, but the work had to be deferred in time till current obligations were met. In the end, the project was dismissed. 1968 sees Anti-Jewish campaigns in Poland and Krońska may no longer occupy the position of the editor of the "Library of the Classics of Philosophy" (BKF). She is summarily dismissed from the publishing house. In addition, all printed copies of the II volume of the *Dictionary of Philosophers* that Krońska was preparing at the time, by the decision of the authorities, were destroyed.

Initially, immediately after Krońska's dismissal, Ingarden reacts vehemently and writes a letter to Krońska:

It is with great sadness that I learned about your fate. I deem it a complete failure of the "Library of the Classics of Philosophy" and I do not hope for it, *rebus sic stantibus*, to continue to exist. This constitutes an irretrievable loss for Polish culture. A comparably irretrievable loss is the *Dictionary*. I deeply regret it happened, being also concerned about how you will now manage to do it. (...) I send you

⁵ "Myślę, że w różnych nieprzewidywanych lub przewidywanych niedobrych zdarzeniach i procesach – które w każdej epoce się zdarzają – należy zachować wiarę w wartość pracy, której poświęciliśmy życie. Jeżeli nie dziś, to kiedyś w przyszłości praca pozytywna, twórcza, przyniesie dodatnie wyniki, być może późno, gdy już sami tego nie będziemy oglądać, ale wszelka wytwórcza praca osadza się w ludzkiej kulturze powoli. To, co Pani działalnością lat kilkunastu zrobiła dla kultury polskiej filozofii, jest z pewnością wartością trwałą, której doniosłość się jeszcze w przyszłości okaże. Nieraz podziwiałem Pani wytrwałość i nie obniżanie wymogów co do jakości pracy, to znaczy doboru i jakości tłumaczeń, które Pani wypuszczała z redakcji BKF, i podziwiałem też, jak wiele się Pani przez te lata zdołała nauczyć w zakresie samej filozofii, jej nad wyraz rozmaitych przejawów, i jak wielką Pani zdobyła umiejętność rozumienia przeciwstawnych sobie nieraz tendencji autora i problematyki rozmaitych stanowisk. To także nie będzie utracone. Więc jakkolwiek trudno jest i musi być ludziom, którzy mają istotną wagę kulturalną w życiu umysłowym swej epoki – trzeba dalej z tą samą, tak widoczną u Pani, żarliwością realizować zadania, które Pani zawsze przyświecały. Kiedyś w Paryżu w roku 1946 powiedziała mi Pani, żeście przetrwali wojnę tylko dlatego, że jesteście filozofami. Ja sobie coś podobnego inaczej sformułowałem pod postacią przeistoczenia starego powiedzenia. Mówiłem: *primum philosophari, deinde vivere*. Myślę, że należy przy tym pozostać."

⁶ "Pani mogłaby to świetnie zrobić, a przy tym może by to Panią na tyle zainteresowało, żeby Pani wypracowała różne sprawy tylko naszkicowane, tak iż wkład Pani nie byłby tylko redakcyjny."

my kindest regards and wish the situation improves. Should you have any trouble, please let me know, I will be glad help you (Ingarden 1968a).⁷

Krońska replies, clearly reassured with Ingarden's support, but she is soon disillusioned, for Ingarden does not publicly comment on the situation and remains an employee of the "Library of the Classics of Philosophy." In September 1968, he sends an odd letter. Krońska comments on the margin: "Of course, there is no envelope sender header. It is not my intention to reply. No more illusions he [Ingarden] could understand anything beyond his success in life and in the field of philosophy. Amusingly enough, he must have felt stupid, for the letter is clumsily written, with spelling mistakes in it" (Krońska 1968).⁸ Ingarden himself explains in the letter that he came to Warsaw to attend the "Library of the Classics of Philosophy" meeting, but unfortunately did not have time to pay Krońska a visit. "Your friends will probably report to you about the meeting." Krońska notes on the margin: "They have reported, indeed." Ingarden continues: "I was told after the meeting there are plans to give you some translation and editing work, but not to have you on the Editorial Board." Krońska replies in the margin: "How keen I am to start. How he does not understand a thing." Ingarden concludes: "Myself, I have decided to remain [on the Board] to see how the situation develops. As for the time being, I am so tired with all that mess that I intend to go to Rabka" (Ingarden 1968b).⁹

From then on, the correspondence between Krońska and Ingarden comes to a halt. Krońska, disappointed with her "master's" attitude towards the events of 1968, fails to reply to his letters, in which he describes his current affairs, but remains silent about what happened on the Editorial Board. Meanwhile, Krońska's exchange of letters with Patočka greatly intensifies, the two of them united by a somewhat common fate, for Patočka at the time was forced to retire and his publications were blacklisted.

⁷ „Z wielką przykrością dowiedziałem się o Pani losie. Uważam to za klęskę BKF i nie mam nadziei, *rebus sic stantibus*, żeby BKF nadal istniał. Jest to niepowetowana strata w stanie dobra kulturalnego polskiego. Także wstrzymanie *Słownika* [filozofów] nie da się powetować. Ubolewam nad tym. Oczywiście dochodzi do tego troska o to, jak sobie Pani teraz da radę. (...) Serdecznie Panią pozdrawiam i życzę poprawy sytuacji. Gdyby Pani była w kłopotach pieniężnych, proszę mi napisać. Chętnie Pani pomogę.”

⁸ “Na kopercie oczywiście nie było nadawcy. Nie mam zamiaru odpisywać. Przypieczętowany koniec złudzeń, że [Ingarden] mógłby jeszcze cokolwiek rozumieć oprócz swoich sukcesów życiowych, filozoficznych. Zabawne, że pisząc musiało mu być jednak 'łyso,' bo list napisany niezdarne i z błędami ortograficznymi.”

⁹ “O przebiegu posiedzenia zapewne opowiedzą Pani znajomi. (...) Po posiedzeniu powiedziano mi, iż zamierzają dać Pani różne prace tłumaczeniowe i redakcyjne, ale do Komitetu Pani nie wezmą. Sam na razie postanowiłem zostać do czasu, jak się rozwinie akcja nowych tłumaczeń. Na razie po tych wszystkich jazdach jestem bardzo zmęczony i zamierzam wyjechać do Rabki.”

Krońska and Patočka: Epistolary contacts and new work on Ingarden

The question of Ingarden's philosophy appears in the correspondence between Krońska and Patočka when, in 1970, at the age of 77, Ingarden dies suddenly and unexpectedly. Both Krońska and Patočka are moved, and Krońska immediately offered condolences to the widow. "I am writing to you, for I cannot recover from the sadness at the news of your husband's death. (...) I consider it a painful and unexpected blow. I belong to these many people who owe a lot to the late Roman Ingarden: I owe him my philosophical initiation. He was the one to introduce me in Lvov in the 1930s to the world I had not known before, but which then became my world" (Krońska 1970a).¹⁰ In Krońska's letters to Patočka, in turn, we read that just before Ingarden's death, she was willing to write a letter to Ingarden, in which she wished to phrase her bitter remarks on his ethics, so blatantly contrary to his conduct of life.

Under the circumstances, Krońska still felt she had a score to settle with Ingarden. Her perspective in the end was different, but the ideal-philosophical dimension blended with the private sphere.

Ingarden's unexpected death – she writes to her Czech friend – has shaken me deeply both despite of and in view of what you are aware of [the "Library of the Classics of Philosophy" affairs]. He has been a part of my world for years and I cannot accept he no longer is. I feel like writing about him, though for the time being I lack words, I expect it should not take the form of obituaries that have been published recently, all more or less similar and not conveying what is really important.

It is him whom I owe my beginnings as a philosopher – a fact that cannot be forgotten.

In the light of this death, a definite fact, I wish I have not written him in my last letter which I did not feel would indeed be an ultimate one what I have written about to you, my dear Friend. It may be I will write an obituary different from these published in newspapers – I feel an urge to do so, a duty and subjective difficulties (Krońska 1970b).¹¹

¹⁰ "Piszę do Pani, nie mogąc otrząsnąć się z uczucia przygnębienia po usłyszeniu przed kilkunastu godzinami okropnej wiadomości o zgonie Pani Męża. (...) Jego śmierć odczuwam jako cios nie tylko straszny, lecz całkowicie nieoczekiwany, ze strony przyrody zdradziecki. Należę do osób, które śp. Romanowi Ingardenowi zawdzięczają bardzo wiele: inicjację filozoficzną. To On otworzył przede mną we Lwowie, w latach 30., świat, którego wcześniej nie znałam, a który stał się odtąd moim światem."

¹¹ "La mort, absolument inattendue d'Ingarden m'a profondément bouleversée, malgré tout et avec tout que vous savez. Depuis des années, des décades, il faisait partie de mon monde et je ne peux pas admettre son absence. Je crois que je vais écrire sur lui, me je ne trouve pas encore l'expression, je sens que cela doit être différent des articles nécrologiques qui ont paru ce dernier temps et qui disent à peu près la même chose sans dire la chose. Et c'est à lui que je dois mon initiation philosophique – chose qui ne s'oublie pas. Face à cette mort, fait irréparable, j'aurais préféré ne pas

Patočka replies to Krońska on 17 July 1970. “I, too, was highly agitated by the news of Ingarden’s death. However, opposed to his ideas and conduct of life, we have all lost a real prominent philosopher. This unfortunate time which takes what we hold dear, has taken its toll where least expected. He wrote me a letter, probably two weeks prior to his death, describing all his scientific plans” (Patočka 1970).¹²

In these circumstances, Krońska, in consultation with the Ingarden family, Danuta Gierulanka (Ingarden’s research assistant) and the Niemeyer publishing house, undertakes editorial works aimed at publishing the German version of a new volume of Ingarden texts devoted to aesthetics. This project was interrupted by Krońska’s disease, and the materials became a basis for the volume *Gegenstand und Aufgaben der Literaturwissenschaft: Aufsätze und Diskussionsbeiträge (1937–1964)* published several years later (Ingarden 1976). It is probably at that time that Krońska also writes a never published text in French “L’esthétique phénoménologique en Pologne.”

During that time, in this emotional climate, an idea emerged among Ingarden’s disciples to publish a posthumous volume devoted to Ingarden. Both Patočka and Krońska were invited to contribute, whereby Krońska published another text on Ingarden in the journal *Twórczość* [‘Creative Output’] (Krońska 1971a). This marked a twist in their correspondence, and the reflections on the work of Ingarden now became a recurring topic. In a letter of 9 July 1971, Patočka refers to one of Ingarden’s last pieces, the one on Husserl’s *Crisis* (see Ingarden 1970), and expresses his perplexity that Ingarden did not notice the new content present in the late Husserl. He concludes similarly as Krońska does:

If “noetic” analysis surrenders its position almost completely, is it not a fact worthy of being noted? This means that the notion of “subjectivity” has undergone a drastic change. Meanwhile, how “idealization” has come to be understood, has also changed, a fact noted by few critics only, and I regret to say also Ingarden has failed to note that. Just as though the problem of the existence of the external world limited his horizons. I deem it an important problem, I disagree with Heidegger who regarded it as non-existent, but before we proceed to any serious considerations, we shall elucidate from the perspective of phenomenology the notion of the world, external world, and so on (Patočka 1971a).¹³

lui avoir dit dans ma dernière lettre que je ne presentais pas être dernière dans ce sens définitif, et dans ma lettre précédente adressée à vous, cher Ami, ce que j’y avais dit. Peut-être lui consacrerai-je un article nécrologique différent de ceux qui ont paru depuis dans nos hebdomadaires – je sens le besoin, le devoir et les difficultés subjectives.”

¹² “La mort d’Ingarden m’a aussi très ému. Malgré tout ce qu’on ait pu objecter à ses idées et son attitude personnelle, nous avons tous perdu un grand et véritable philosophe. Ce temps malheureux qui nous prend tant de choses s’est tourné soudain vers une victime qu’on ne soupçonnait pas. Il m’avait écrit quelque 14 jours avant sa mort une lettre où il parlait longuement de ses plans de travail.”

¹³ “Je métonne qu’il n’ait rien trouvé davantage de neuf. Si l’analyse ‘noétique’ perd presque tout le terrain qu’elle occupait avant, n’est-ce pas là un fait digne de remarquer? Cela signifie en même

Krońska, in turn, once again chooses to assess Ingarden's work, this time employing a kind of existential analysis that would shed some light on the theoretical content in his philosophy and would thus enable to interpret more broadly his conduct of life. In her reply to Patočka she writes: "At the moment your letter reached me I was just writing on Ingarden to our volume, hence I wanted to have all his books at hand. (...) I undertake to present his stance towards the world, which I think is typical and constitutive of him as a human being and a philosopher and which I believe is reflected in all of his works, including the last article on the *Crisis* that you have commented upon in your last letter"¹⁴ (Krońska 1971b).

Shortly after Patočka receives this letter, he sends Krońska to translate his article on the criticism of Ingarden's concept of aesthetics (see Patočka 1972). Krońska, in turn, spends some more time working on her texts on Ingarden, and finally sends these to her Czech friend in October 1971. It seems that it is precisely this "Retrospective Fragment" that contains further elements of her 'settlement' with the work and person of Ingarden, elements somewhat blurred, but grasped more easily if one is familiar with the correspondence between Krońska and Patočka.

At this point, let's take a look at how Krońska comes to terms with Ingarden's work. To begin with, Krońska once again undertakes an analysis of Ingarden's positivism, its purpose being to indicate these elements of his thought which added to the existential leaning of his philosophy. She finds such elements in the concluding sentences of the French version of Ingarden's *Man and His Reality* (Ingarden 1960). The initial version of the text, a radio speech dating back to 1939, described the world as such built upon fundamental values of the good, the truth, and the beauty. The version of the text written right after World War II presents a human being on the border of two worlds: that of a human and that of an animal. Ingarden writes about the tragic in human experience, which manifests the true nature of human life: the genius and the futility of existence. The tragedy of human condition demonstrated in such a way does not make Ingarden reformulate his philosophy. As Krońska puts it, he used a language more emotional than usually, but he wrote in the same spirit as in the *Controversy over the Existence of the World*.

temps que la notion de 'subjectivité' a changé profondément. Et la manière dont l' 'idéalisation' est conçue, a subi aussi des modifications que peu de critiques ont remarquées – je regrette d'avoir à constater que c'est aussi le cas d'I. C'est que le problème de l'existence du monde extérieur barre tout son horizon. Je crois que c'est un problème important, je ne le considère pas comme inexistant à la façon de Heidegger, mais il serait bon d'éclaircir phénoménologiquement cette notion du monde, monde extérieur etc. avant de passer aux considérations constructives."

¹⁴ "Au moment de l'arrivée de votre lettre j'étais en train d'écrire sur Ingarden pour notre revue, donc je préférerais avoir tous ses ouvrages sous la main (...) J'y tâche de montrer un trait d'attitude envers le monde qui me semble caractéristique et constitutif pour Ingarden en tant qu'homme et philosophe, et que l'on trouve, à ce qu'il me semble, dans tous ses ouvrages, aussi dans le dernier article sur la *Krisis* que vous avez interprété parfaitement dans votre dernière lettre."

Similarly, Krońska unveils Ingarden's bewilderment with what was told him by Husserl, for whom philosophy is not only a mission and vocation, but also means of offering rescue to the one suffering the tragedy of his existence. Krońska argues that Ingarden was amazed, for the thought was unfamiliar to him as a "Positivist," yet he experienced it himself when in Lvov during World War II he plunged into work on the *Controversy over the Existence of the World*. Ingarden alone expresses in the introduction to his *magnum opus* that the war did not have a solely negative influence on the book. "The true face of war was revealed fully mainly in Poland; the war had to be endured, the war had to be won with an inner spiritual attitude, what, in turn, required fortitude and courage in every sphere of activity as well as unswerving moral stance. (...) It was my struggle for these that allowed me to survive through this period" (Ingarden 1987a: 12). Therefore, "extreme situations" Ingarden was faced with, as Krońska mentions, do emphasize even more strongly the main line in Ingarden's philosophy, namely how he approached positivism, understood in a such way that "positive states of things, learnt through a relevant experience, shall be accepted" (Krońska 1971a: 89; Ingarden 1963a: 654). This could easily be juxtaposed with a radical opposition to Husserl's reduction.

Krońska's article is enthusiastically received by Patočka, who fully agrees with the thesis concerning Ingarden's positivism. In a letter of 23 October 1971, he writes: "I have just read a remarkable article you have written about Ingarden. I am impressed both with its depth and form. You have managed to write his portrait being neither too academic nor too literary – the result is Ingarden himself, it's really him, this is how I still see him. He was a prominent philosopher, a Positivist, in your understanding of the term, with no desire to amend the world (...)." ¹⁵ Patočka saw Ingarden's positivism manifested through a certain anti-speculative scepticism that would cover under-realized and under-elucidated ontological assumptions, which were decisive of the whole of his philosophy. Patočka believes "Ingarden was faithful to anti-speculative philosophy and suspected that Husserl, and even more so, Heidegger allow for speculation. But, then, does not his own 'ontology' lack the necessary basis? His aim is to adopt ontological reasoning. The question is, what 'to be' means for Ingarden. How does he evaluate what is and what is not?" ¹⁶ According to Patočka, Ingarden's positivism transpires also in the

¹⁵ "Je viens de lire le bel article consacré par vous à Ingarden. Le fond et la forme m'ont beaucoup impressionné. Vous avez su broser de lui un portrait vrai sans donner dans l'académisme ni dans le jargon 'littéraire' – c'est bien lui, tel que je le vois devant moi. C'était un philosophe remarquable, positiviste au sens que vous dites, ne voulant pas projeter des programmes de réforme du monde (...)"

¹⁶ "Il a été fidèle à un programme de philosophie non-spéculative et soupçonnait de la spéculation chez Husserl, d'autant plus chez Heidegger. Mais sa propre conception de l'«ontologie» n'est-elle pas précisément pour cela dépourvue d'un fondement indispensable? Il veut faire de l'ontologie; mais que veut dire 'être' chez Ingarden? Où prend-il ses mesures de ce qui est et n'est pas?"

way he approaches aesthetics, with the works of art perceived as intentional, having a specific mode of existence. What such a perception triggers is that Ingarden is no longer interested in art as such – at least so it seems to Patočka. It becomes merely one of the many elements of the structure Ingarden strived to describe. “You, my friend, have perfectly described his texts on literary works; in themselves, they were of no interest to him, he was neither moved nor thrilled by these, as was the case with texts on art or music; they constitute examples of the modes of ‘intentional being’ – but what is it?”¹⁷ (Patočka 1971b).

Krońska appears to be moved by Patočka's remarks and in her next letter, she renders her theory of Ingarden's positivism exhaustive. “As for my text on Ingarden, I certainly do not deserve all this praise, which I owe to your friendship. I did not have much to say and that I did speak was solely with the intention to convey a simple message, yet such none of Ingarden scientists wrote nor would ever write. It is not still sharply defined, hence the subtitle ‘Fragment.’ It may well be that what constitutes a gap in his philosophy, a weaker point, precisely this ‘Positivism,’ equally unfamiliar to me, whether with or without quotation marks, results from what you wrote: that he does not ask about being as such”¹⁸ (Krońska 1971c). Krońska thinks that when related to existential engagement and responsibility for the theses advanced, the positivism gains on importance. “For me it is also a matter of courage. In philosophy, important as it was to Ingarden, he failed to accept all the risk it entails, he imposed some conditionalities to adjust to”¹⁹ (Krońska 1971c). To put it differently, here Ingarden's positivism meant for Krońska taking such an attitude towards reality, such as its reduction, that would allow for it to be easily studied, without being subject to its dangers, the feeling of being threatened or the feeling of anxiety. This idea, which finalizes considerations on the philosophy of Ingarden, encompasses all the remarks made already in the late 1940s. In the light of 1968, however, these have taken a new, existential meaning.

¹⁷ “Vous avez parfaitement caractérisé ses essais sur l'œuvre littéraire; celle-ci ne l'intéressait pas pour elle-même, il n'en était pas intérieurement saisi et bouleversé, c'est tout comme ses essais sur l'œuvre plastique ou sur la musique; ce sont des exemples des modes d'être intentionnel – mais qu'est-ce que c'est?”

¹⁸ “Grand merci de votre grande lettre du 23 octobre (elle a dû se croiser avec la mienne). En ce qui concerne mon essai sur Ingarden, je ne la mérite pas, c'est certain, et ne la dois qu'à votre amitié. Je n'avais pas grand chose à dire, et si j'ai néanmoins pris la parole, c'est uniquement pour dire une chose peut-être minime, mais qu'aucun des Ingardenologues n'a jamais dit et ne dira pas; ce n'est pas encore tout à fait explicite, d'où le sous-titre: ‘fragment.’ Il se peut que ce qui est dans sa philosophie un manque, une déficience, justement ce ‘positivisme’ qui m'est aussi étranger que le positivisme sans guillemets, vient de ce que vous dites: qu'il ne se pose pas la question de l'être en tant que tel.”

¹⁹ “Pour moi c'est aussi une question de – courage. La philosophie, si importante qu'elle fut pour lui, il ne l'a pourtant jamais acceptée avec tous les risques qu'elle comporte, il lui avait posé certaines conditions et elle devait s'y tenir.”

Now, let's get back to Patočka. He seems to approve of Krońska's line of arguing, significant to him inasmuch as he perceives an analogy between the situation of Ingarden and his own – a Central-European philosopher, forced to face the difficulties related to living and composing in the reality of the Soviet bloc countries. "What you write about Ingarden, I am actively interested in all of it. I find myself in a situation analogous to his. I respect his careful and systematic work, clarity of analysis, attention to detail, and consequence. Yet, he is a thinker who has come to a standstill, he never fights; his criticism poses a mere correction of a copy. A marvellous professor. Not fond of poison hemlock, he does not see any reason a philosopher would want to have to do with it. Still, there are many things he could teach us" (Patočka 1971c).²⁰

Conclusion

Returning to the question that was my point of departure in this article, it seems as Krońska, though lacking a scientific record of strictly phenomenological works, will go down in history as the first one to formulate a consistent critique of the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden. However, this criticism should be considered only as an indistinct outline of a positive program, whose impact or direct consequences for Polish philosophy are difficult to evaluate. Finally, we have to mention one of the last initiatives of Irena Krońska, who shortly before her death in 1974, made possible a philosophical exchange between young PhD student, Krzysztof Michalski and Jan Patočka (see de Warren 2016, Starzyński 2018: 24–26). This exchange certainly had its consequences for the development of Polish philosophy and phenomenology, which should be examined in a separate study.

English translation by Aleksandra Wójcicka

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²⁰ "Ce que vous écrivez sur Ingarden m'intéresse vivement. Nous nous trouvons par rapport à lui dans une situation assez analogique. J'estime dans Ingarden le travail assidu, méthodique, clair de l'analyse, sa pénétration, son souci de conséquence. Mais c'est un penseur de tout repos qui au fond ne combat jamais; ses critiques, c'est de la correction de copies. Magnifique professeur. Mais il n'a aucun goût pour la ciguë, ni ne voit pourquoi la philosophie aurait quoi que ce soit à y faire. N'empêche qu'il nous apprend beaucoup de choses."

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Phenomenology contra Nazism: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Aurel Kolnai

This paper discusses the relationship between phenomenology and political activism in the work of two lesser-known second-generation phenomenologists: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Aurel Kolnai. As young philosophers in the 1920s, Hildebrand and Kolnai became staunch adherents of the phenomenological movement. Influenced especially by Max Scheler and Adolf Reinach, they were particularly interested in questions of ethical theory and moral action. In the 1930s, with the rise of Hitler, they joined an important circle of conservative Catholic critics of Nazism based around the journal *Der christliche Ständestaat* in Vienna. After examining the links between phenomenology and activism in their work, my essay concludes by considering how these two thinkers can revise our understanding of phenomenology's history of social engagement and its potential relevance to social and political debate today.

Key words: phenomenology, ethics, politics, Hildebrand, Kolnai, Nazism, Scheler

Beyond the circle of phenomenological scholars, the political implications of phenomenology are typically understood in two ways: either as non-existent or as bad. In the first sense, phenomenology is often considered an apolitical school of philosophy, concerned more with matters of logic, consciousness, and perception than with social and ethical theory. Robert Sokolowski's remark that "phenomenology has not developed a political philosophy" may be taken as emblematic and can be read by those outside the movement as suggesting political indifference.² In the second sense, when phenomenologists do take political stands, they are usually considered quite poor. Heidegger is the obvious example here; the recent publication of his *Schwarze Hefte* from the late 1930s has reignited the longstanding

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² Sokolowski 1999: 203–204. There are important exceptions: See, for example, Hart 1992; and, very recently, the essays collected in Szanto & Moran 2016.

debate about his Nazi allegiances.³ Sartre's Stalinism is another example the dubious political commitments emanating from wider phenomenological circles.⁴ One might also cite the strident German nationalism and war boosterism of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler in World War I as further examples of the ill-conceived partnership of phenomenology and politics (Husserl 1987; Scheler 1982). These two characterizations – politically indifferent and politically appalling – can also be linked: phenomenological indifference to social philosophy means that it has no critical resources for making sound political decisions when they are needed.⁵ My essay challenges this characterization by highlighting two lesser known inter-war philosophers – Dietrich von Hildebrand and Aurel Kolnai – who expanded phenomenology in the direction of social and ethical thought and then drew on it to mount a journalistic assault on National Socialism.

Dietrich von Hildebrand

Phenomenological interest in ethical and social themes coincided with the birth of movement itself. Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl, for example, dedicated treatises to questions of moral awareness, empathy for the other, even sociopolitical arrangements.⁶ Outside of the war writings of Max Scheler and Husserl, however, this interest remained largely academic, accompanied by largely impotent hand-wringing about modern despair. Even Scheler, who more than anyone else established phenomenology as a social philosophy, is much better known for his assertion of the real existence of values and his analyses of the experience of sympathy than for his screeds against modern capitalism (Scheler 1972, 1973, 2008). When it came to practical concerns like choosing values or acting morally in a world of ethical disharmony – not to mention political action – early phenomenology came up short of immediate guidance; it was, in other words, better at describing moral circumstances than at prescribing appropriate stands. Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889–1977) was the first to mobilize it fully in the service of

³ For the most prominent English-language Heidegger prosecution, see Wolin 1992. The most recent attack – and the most radical in its effort to dismiss Heidegger's philosophy as Nazi ideology – is Faye 2009. For a stringent critique of Faye and of the prosecutorial approach to intellectual history, see Gordon's review in *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (Gordon 2010).

⁴ The classic criticism here is Judt 2011.

⁵ This picture is brightened when we consider East European phenomenologists such as Jan Patočka, Václav Havel, and Karol Wojtyła, who drew on phenomenology as fuel for anti-regime activism. On this story, see Gubser 2014; Tucker 2000; and Findlay 2002.

⁶ Brentano 1969, 1973; Husserl's well-known *Cartesian Meditations* (Husserl 1977) was delivered as a lecture in 1929, but its concern for ethics and otherness was anticipated by numerous manuscripts and articles over the preceding decade, notably the *Kaizo* essays on renewal from 1923, reprinted in Husserl 1973.

activism. The son of a famous sculptor, Hildebrand is best-known as an interwar personalist who took up cudgels against National Socialism. Less familiar was his membership in the early phenomenological movement – and the influence of phenomenology on both his personalism and his anti-fascism.⁷

Hildebrand learned of phenomenology at the University of Munich, where he met Theodor Lipps, Alexander Pfänder, Moritz Geiger, Max Scheler, and Adolf Reinach – the latter particularly influential as a friend and teacher.⁸ As a young philosopher, he praised Husserl's seminal philosophy, though Scheler and Reinach, with their worldly concerns and rejection of transcendentalism, proved more direct phenomenological forebears.⁹ His first adumbration of an act-oriented moral theory came in a 1912 dissertation on ethical action, lauded by Husserl and later published in his house journal, the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*.¹⁰ The treatise offered a three-part anatomy of ethical acts: The first was conscious engagement with or taking notice of [*Kenntnisnahme*] a particular object or state of affairs. From this initial notice, a person took a position [*Stellungnahme*] regarding the object or situation based on an emotional reaction to the value with which it was laden.¹¹ As Hildebrand explained in 1933, “[t]he soul of every morally good attitude is abandonment to that which is objectively important, is interest in a thing because it has value” (Hildebrand 1950: 3). This value response [*Wertantwort*] was Hildebrand's signature addition to phenomenological ethics.¹² Each value had its own proper emotional response, which in turn stirred action – the third element – aimed at realizing the value in a new and better state of affairs.¹³

Several points bear note. First, while Hildebrand indicated, like Scheler, that values attach to objects, ethics applied properly only to states of affairs [*Sachverhalte*] – situations relating persons to objects and values, such as an action designed to realize good in the world or a stance regarding a particular right or

⁷ For favorable takes on Hildebrand, see Schwarz 1960; and Hildebrand 2000. For a review of his early ethics, see Mertens 1969: 269–278. On the relation between personalism and resistance, see Seifert 1998.

⁸ For a brief account of Hildebrand's early philosophical mentors and friends, see Hildebrand 2012: 7–19.

⁹ See Wenisch 1994: 15–16. Like other realists, Hildebrand (1994: 15) observed “with great pain” Husserl's transcendental violation of reality.

¹⁰ Hildebrand 1916: 126–251. On Husserl's appreciation, see Schuhmann 1992.

¹¹ The concept of *Stellungnahme*, as Hildebrand notes in Hildebrand 1916: 140 came from Reinach, though Husserl, too, anticipated it in his 1914 ethics lectures. Its most basic form was ‘for’ or ‘against.’ On the spontaneity of *Stellungnahme*, see Hildebrand 1916: 138.

¹² On *Wertantwort*, see Seifert 1992: 34–58.

¹³ Hildebrand 1916: 154. On the Schelerian centrality of feeling, see Hildebrand 1922: 463–602. Hildebrand's student Balduin Schwarz (1949: 655–676), points out that all values, as per Scheler, stood in a hierarchy leading to the divine.

wrong. The concept of states of affairs, introduced by Carl Stumpf and expanded by subsequent thinkers, provided an important correction to Brentano's objectivism, for ethics now involved not simply the proper judgment regarding an object's love-worthiness (as Brentano prominently maintained in *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*), but the complex situational relation between persons, objects, and values – a relationship of judgment and action aimed at realizing good. This conceptual expansion helped phenomenology better to confront real worldly circumstances.¹⁴

Additionally, Hildebrand shared Scheler's commitment to the whole spiritual person, not simply the mind, body, or ego. "Every experience," Hildebrand wrote, "is the experience of a person. (...) [and a] relation to the person always takes place whenever an experience is the bearer of moral value" (Hildebrand 1916: 214). Like other phenomenologists, the Protestant Hildebrand converted to Catholicism in 1914, adopting a faith that became the hub of his thought and fed his personalist vision. In a post-conversion essay on the recognition of value, Hildebrand fixed virtue in a person's "basic moral attitude [*sittliche Grundhaltung*]."¹⁵ Personal goodness, he averred, sprouted from a "single root (...) a spirit that is in all of us" (Hildebrand 1916: 587). He shared with other Schelerians a preoccupation with Christian virtues – and especially, like Kolnai after him, sexuality.¹⁶ Volumes on virginity and marriage appeared in 1927 and 1928, respectively, examining in worldly, embodied forms the interpersonal love that Scheler had exalted philosophically.¹⁷

Hildebrand's personalist convictions carried forward into 1930's *Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft* [*The Metaphysics of Community*], where he declared every affirmation of another person's worth "morally positive" and every rejection "negative."¹⁸ In a Schelerian critique that foreshadowed his own denunciation of Nazism, Hildebrand decried modern relativism and vitalism as value distortions and insisted that authentic community arose only from "devotion to God and one's neighbor." In the contemporary world, however,

man falls into the misconception that the ethos in which the individual feels simply a momentary part of the whole relieves one from the spasms of the I [*Ichkrampf*], lets one leave the egocentric position of the modern age. In this one forgets that

¹⁴ On the history of the *Sachverhalt* concept, see Baltzer-Jaray 2009: 41–66.

¹⁵ Hildebrand 1916: 548. Scheler, too, as is well-known, was a Catholic convert; Husserl converted from Judaism to Lutheranism.

¹⁶ This personalist theme would later appear prominently in the work of the philosopher-turned-Pope Karol Wojtyła.

¹⁷ Hildebrand 1962; 1984. Increasingly devout, he also published *Liturgy and Personality: The Healing Power of Formal Prayer* (Hildebrand 1960) in 1933, a book that defended Catholic liturgy as an essential element of worship.

¹⁸ Hildebrand 1955: 304. The analysis, of course, echoes Scheler's *Formalism in Ethics*.

there is also a descent under one's own life, a descent into a merely vitalist 'social consciousness' whereby the individual relinquishes any spiritual attitude to which, as a personality, he is not only entitled but positively obliged. (Hildebrand 1955: 9)

Devotion to values and love of others, by contrast, allowed one to escape egotism and establish communal ties; indeed, personality grew from self-transcendence rather than self-possession. Values themselves had a socially unifying effect – a “*virtus unitiva*” – that helped to forge communities of purpose; this *virtus* was, in fact, “the key to understanding the objective structure of society” (Hildebrand 1955: 118). Communities came about, per Hildebrand, through a process of *incorporation*: the incorporation of values by persons, of persons into wider communities, and of persons and communities into the value realm. The “*res publica*” – the true community – emerged in a shared openness to the value hierarchy and recognition of the “primacy of the individual person” (Hildebrand 1955: 185, 397). As a bridge to his anti-totalitarian activism, Hildebrand ended his 1930 tract with an attack on the “dangerous mistake” of state or social exemptions from morality, an apparent critique of both left and right moral relativism and German jurist Carl Schmitt's prominent theory of state exception. In 1933, he espoused instead a Christian corporatism that embedded persons in hierarchical 'natural' communities – family, church, nation, and only latterly, state.¹⁹ Within a year, he found a contemporary model of this vision in neighboring Austria.

With the Nazi ascension, Hildebrand, a vocal adversary since before the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923 – on a 1921 trip to Paris, he had condemned German nationalism and blamed his country for launching the Great War – made the difficult decision to leave his beloved Munich, passing first to his birth city of Florence and then on to Austria, where he championed Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß' conservative Christian policies.²⁰ Dollfuß has not fared well with historians: In the effort to overcome internal fragmentation and rising Nazi threats, he adjourned the Austrian parliament in March 1933 and imposed authoritarian rule – dubbed 'Austro-Fascist' by its critics – based on Christian corporatist principles. In line with recent papal doctrine, he sought to reorganize Austrian society into supra-partisan

¹⁹ Hildebrand 1933: 48–58. “The higher the domain of value,” he continued, “the deeper the stratum in the person to which it beckons, and the more it addresses itself not only to the individual, but rather to the community” (Hildebrand 1933: 56) The passages are cited in James Chappel's (2012: 224) *Slaying the Leviathan*.

²⁰ Hildebrand's resistance to German patriotism during World War I stood in marked contrast to the nationalism of Husserl, Scheler, Reinach, and other phenomenological contemporaries. On Hildebrand's battle against Nazism, see Ernst Wenisch's introduction to *Memoiren und Aufsätze*, as well as a concluding essay by Balduin Schwarz; and the essays collected in Seifert (ed.) 1998. On Hildebrand's remark about World War I, see Connelly 2012: 109. A longer discussion of Hildebrand and the Jew-turned-Catholic priest Johannes Österreicher is contained in Chapter 4 (Connelly 2012: 94–146).

estates that would quell social disorder and promote loyalty to church and state. This effort prompted a strike in early 1934, which Dollfuß crushed in a bloody civil war that led to the abolition of the Social Democratic Party. The artillery bombardment of the Karl-Marx Hof, a low-income tenement block in Vienna's outskirts and a symbol of the city's progressive tradition, became an emblem of the chancellor's heavy-handedness. Claiming to defend Austria against Nazism, critics charge, he marched it halfway there.

Nonetheless, Dollfuß had his advocates. The essayist Karl Kraus came to respect his defiance of Hitler and defense of Austrian independence against Nazi calls for *Anschluss*. And the newly-exiled Hildebrand not only viewed the chancellor's measures as necessary in the face of internal and external Nazi threats; he also saw them as midwives of a more devotional society that would reject the anomie of liberal modernity. In this regard, Dollfuß' authoritarianism did not contradict his vision of communal reciprocity; as James Chappel has shown, Hildebrand was one of the premier representatives of a conservative Catholic anti-Nazism that saw in hierarchical and illiberal corporatism a defense of the human person besieged by both right and left totalitarianism and liberal individualism (Chappel 2012: 200–246; 2011). Whereas both liberalism and totalitarianism stripped men of spiritual qualities and subsumed them in the amorphous mass, corporatism dignified each person by embedding him in communities of love and meaning, overseen and secured by the corporate state.

Upon arrival in Vienna, Hildebrand was recruited to edit the regime's mouth-piece journal *Der christliche Ständestaat* [*The Christian Corporate State*], funded by Dollfuß himself.²¹ In that capacity, he attracted around him "perhaps the central group of Catholic-conservative resistance against Nazism outside of Germany."²² In Dollfuß' vision of a corporate state organized around Christian communities and social estates, Hildebrand saw both a compelling alternative to totalitarian absolutism and a worthy response to the forlorn individualism and godlessness of liberalism. Indeed, modern antipersonalism, embodied in the rise of mass man and state leviathan, was liberalism's miscarried child – and it led, Hildebrand believed, directly to fascist nihilism. Austria's Catholic mission, he declared in 1933, was

to give the correct answer to the weighty mistakes of Liberalism, which have undermined Europe for centuries, to show the correct way for the German people in a time of boundless confusion, in which the bankruptcy of individualistic Liberalism has led to two new and far more terrible mistakes that threaten to destroy the

²¹ Rudolf Ebner has written an excellent monograph on Hildebrand's Austrian journal, entitled *Die österreichische Wochenschrift 'Der christliche Ständestaat': Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933–1938* (Ebner 1976).

²² Seefried 2006: 251. Quoted in Chappel 2012: 205.

whole of Western culture at its roots: Bolshevism and National Socialism. (Hildebrand 1994: 166)

In the face of existential threat, corporatism afforded the chance to rebuild organic communities around “solidary togetherness,” to recognize that a person’s responsibility to his ethos, family, church, and humanity preceded his duties as citizen and therefore needed state protection.²³ Such a social and spiritual rehabilitation required the affirmation of man “as a being [*Wesen*] with an immortal soul and a calling to eternal community with God” – an integralist message that persisted throughout Hildebrand’s Austrian years.²⁴

While their focus was cultural and political, Hildebrand’s essays in *Der christliche Ständestaat* rested on his phenomenological analyses of yesteryear. Most obviously, he defended the existence of a Christian-*cum*-Schelerian “hierarchy of goods” that National Socialists rejected in favor of “blood materialism.” The Nazi “heresy” elevated the vital over the spiritual, degrading the person to a “mere function of blood and race” and denying the value-richness that phenomenology revealed (Hildebrand 1994: 168, 236–237). Nazism and Bolshevism, Hildebrand declared in 1941, now an American émigré, reflected an antipersonalist “slave uprising against the spirit,” a tragic preemption of higher intellectual and spiritual values by the agents of blood and might (Hildebrand 1941: 457–472; 1994: 198). While this claim echoed Scheler’s assault on modern *ressentiment*, Hildebrand also drew on another realist forebear, Reinach: the discovery of social acts presupposed the orientation of free persons to the independent world of values, a stance that Nazis and Bolsheviks – and Liberals before them – denied.²⁵ Much of this critique was stock phenomenologalese:

In today’s chaos, in which the idolatry of the vital sphere has led to an antipersonalism and a revolt against the spirit, we must not see a corrective for rationalism, but a terrible aberration that simply draws its consequences from rationalism and makes for us the compelling task, now more than ever, to elaborate clearly the true nobility of the realm of the spirit and the spiritual person. (Hildebrand 1994: 185)

Like Husserl, Hildebrand blamed an overweening scientism for crippling human understanding and prompting a crisis of meaning and spirit. Only by acknowledging the infinite worth of persons and the objective hierarchy of values – realities

²³ Hildebrand 1994: 168, 191; 1954: 288. “The individual is not a citizen in the first instance,” wrote Hildebrand in 1929. Quoted in Chappel 2011: 573.

²⁴ Hildebrand 1994: 318. Man’s highest aim, Hildebrand argued, was likeness to God and orientation toward the divine (Hildebrand 1994: 232).

²⁵ Hildebrand 1994: 171. Hildebrand was fond of emphasizing, in phenomenological fashion, that his criticism concerned not simply the *activities* of Nazism, but its ideological essence. For Reinach’s influential analysis of social acts, see Reinach 1983.

disclosed by Scheler – could man hope to “rehabilitat[e] the spirit” (Hildebrand 1994: 205). This conviction fueled his forceful condemnation of Nazi racism in the 1937 talk “Jews and the Christian West,” which rejected anti-Semitism on personalist grounds and celebrated Jews as a root of the Christian faith, a privileged people in God’s eyes.²⁶ Forced to flee Vienna a year later in the face of Nazi annexation, Hildebrand spent the second half of his life – a Christian philosopher at Fordham University – dedicated to the social and spiritual renewal he had adumbrated in his European years.

Aurel Kolnai

Hildebrand was not the only student of phenomenology to target Nazi dictatorship and European anti-Semitism. The list of contributors to *Der christliche Ständestaat* included several Jews-turned-Catholic with phenomenological backgrounds. Hildebrand called on Annie Kraus, an erstwhile Husserl student and a colleague of several interwar phenomenologists, to pen a 1934 critique of “religious anti-Semitism.” Kraus, who would not convert until 1942, insisted that Catholic appreciation for the Old Testament bound its believers to recognize Jewish contributions to their confession; the widespread Catholic anti-Semitism of the day was therefore a violation of the faith, even “an anti-Christianism.”²⁷ And Waldemar Gurian, who had studied with both Scheler and Hildebrand, pioneered what later became totalitarianism theory, linking Bolshevism and Nazism, putative enemies, under a unified term of opprobrium.²⁸ In neither of these cases, however, is there a clear connection between earlier phenomenological studies and later resistance writings, though the common background is suggestive.

For Hildebrand’s fellow anti-Nazi Aurel Kolnai (1900–1973), by contrast, the link between phenomenology and activism was direct – or at least he aimed to make it so. Despite admiration for Hildebrand the philosopher, Kolnai differed vehemently from his elder colleague’s views on Austria. The Hungarian Kolnai, whose experience under Bela Kun’s Bolshevik Republic inspired a lifelong antipathy toward dictatorship, deemed his confederate’s embrace of Dollfuß naïve and contemptible. “So great a philosopher, and no character, no backbone at all,” he fulminated in 1934.²⁹ Hildebrand’s phenomenology was

directed against the pseudo-world of constructivisms, snobbisms, philosophies of resentment and of power-seeking spiritual supermen – intended to overcome the

²⁶ Connelly 2012: 130–33; Hildebrand 1994: 340–358. Hildebrand himself had a Jewish grandmother.

²⁷ Kraus 1934. On Kraus, see Connelly 2012: 113–115; and Rexin 2009.

²⁸ On Gurian, see especially Chappel 2011; 2012.

²⁹ Quoted in Dunlop 2002: 137.

professional feeble-mindedness of thinking in formulae. (...) What a shame he is a toady of Austrofascism. (...) There is no philosophical thinker whose thought I am so close to (I've known that for years!) – and yet I shudder to shake hands with him when I think of his vomit-making Regime-salon Thursday evenings and his apotheosis of Dollfuß!³⁰

Kolnai's revulsion at Hildebrand's political alliance illustrates in stark relief a fixation of his wider oeuvre: the failure of philosophers to translate ethical principles into effective moral practice.

Born to a liberal Jewish family, Kolnai fled Budapest for Vienna near the end of Kun's regime to avoid right-wing anti-Semitic reprisals.³¹ Working as an independent writer, he first took interest in phenomenology when he enrolled at the University of Vienna in 1922.³² Not only was the philosophy, he later wrote, a "glorious movement of a new realism, the most important departure in philosophy since Socrates and Aristotle;" in its Schelerian form, phenomenology spurred Kolnai's budding interest in Catholicism, a religion to which he would convert in 1926 (Kolnai 2002: 26). The phenomenological method, said Kolnai in his Hildebrand-influenced 1930 book on sexual ethics, offered "the most penetrating analysis" of spiritual and mental essence available to philosophers, revealing "what is really meant (...) in a spiritual act" and dispensing with scientific "'inferences' and 'inductions'" in order to "attain a 'direct view' of the objects or their spiritual structure."³³ His conversions to phenomenology and Catholicism were clearly of a piece.

In later life, Kolnai was fond of saying that his 1925/26 dissertation on ethical value contained the seeds of all his subsequent thought.³⁴ It is certainly true that the essay suggested the lines of his 1930s critique of Nazism. Its express purpose was to "complete the phenomenology of moral values" pioneered by Brentano, Husserl, Scheler, and Hildebrand by grafting onto it a Thomist affirmation of objective ends and moral rules in order to bind ideas with practical reality (Kolnai 2002: 4). Phenomenological ethicists, Kolnai averred, had left their task incomplete, confirming the existence of absolute values but failing to enlist them for moral practice. He would "design the bridges which lead to a morally valuable reality" (Kolnai 2002: 12). This engineering feat required him to span the chasms between absolute values, everyday circumstance, and contemporary norms, to

³⁰ Quoted in Dunlop 2002: 146–147.

³¹ On Kolnai, see Dunlop 2002; Congdon 1991: 233–253; Balázs & Dunlop 2004.

³² Kolnai 1999: 126. By his account, it was a course by the psychologist Karl Bühler that stimulated his interest in Husserl and Brentano. Kolnai 1999: 129.

³³ Kolnai 2005: 2–3. Echoing Hildebrand and presaging Wojtyła, the book presented sexuality as central to a loving marriage, not simply a means of reproduction.

³⁴ Kolnai 2002: xi–xiv. "Ethical Value and Reality" was published in 1927.

“bring about an ethically desirable state of things ... on the basis of existent moral needs and powers” (Kolnai 2002: 3, 27).

The key to achieving this goal was recognizing that no single group of values should monopolize decision-making. The expanse of values was infinite and kaleidoscopic, and men needed a rubric to map it. To that end, Kolnai introduced the concepts of value limitation and gradation. Every value, he wrote, had “limits of appropriateness” and applicability, and at the margins it verged on domain of others (Kolnai 2002: 59). In addition, values were graded, each implying others that had a “watered down and (...) peripheral presence” in the precinct of the first (Kolnai 2002: 62). In other words, values interpenetrated, one or two emphatic in any given situation, others muted but present. As circumstances changed, new emphases arose.

Kolnai further specified four types of value experience. The most common ethical encounter was the struggle against vice – what Kolnai called value exclusion. So crucial was this police work that he dedicated much of his career to combating the evils of materialism and totalitarianism. But he also identified three further forms of value experience, these inclusive rather than exclusive: coordination, by which features of reality were related with compatible values; incorporation, through which one embraced and absorbed the values of a loved one; and directness, which indentured one to God and the good. The latter two in particular broached the heights of moral “rapture,” through which a person transcended herself by affirming the being of another while still preserving the “distance” essential to personal dignity and autonomy (Kolnai 2002: 136–137).

Kolnai resisted the rigorist tendency to impose an austere moral yardstick on complicated human realities, a monomania typical of absolutism. Practical ethics, he insisted, had to abjure purity: responsible decisions required a survey of “the entire range of ethical value” appropriate to a situation (Kolnai 2002: 59). Duty ethics, vitalism, utilitarianism, and especially totalitarian planning – all of these attitudes disregarded the value conflicts intrinsic to moral life, yielding at times to “blatant immoralism” in the name of ethical absolutes. Communism in particular promoted a “moratorium on values” in its pursuit of false utopia, a bearing that betrayed deep “contempt for Mankind” (Kolnai 2002: 43, 105). Like Scheler and Hildebrand, Kolnai traced these ills to totalitarianism’s liberal precursor – to the “atomistic individualism” that had laid waste to human community. As correctives in the quest for ethical renewal, he embraced Catholicism and democracy, the latter a “movement for social liberation and construction in the most serious and responsible sense” (Kolnai 2002: 157–158).

Like other Catholic phenomenologists, Kolnai saw the human person as an ultimate value.³⁵ Accordingly, he preferred reform – what he celebrated as the

³⁵ His descriptors were abundant: the person was “an axiological ‘manifold,’” a “conjunction of experiences and acts (...) laid around an ethical core,” responsible and willing “to take on obligations” (Kolnai 2012: 21, 147, 155).

“[m]eliorism of the ethics of moral-mindedness” – over revolution because it respected the “precious value” of each person.³⁶ Genuine reform, Kolnai insisted, required “the actual presence of ethical need, the availability of moral energy in the circles concerned, and respect for emphatic and consideration for unemphatic constants” (Kolnai 2002: 56). At times, reform could even entail drastic action: the revival of a materialist society, for example, demanded “extensive transformation” that involved “working, inventive, free and promising engagement for the cause of good in the business of the world” (Kolnai 2002: 158, 190). Yet it always respected real circumstances and genuine needs rather than sacrificing men to beautiful utopias.

Phenomenology, it seemed to Kolnai, provided the best philosophical prop for this ethical vision. Its appreciation of moral plenitude, its orientation toward objective values – what he called its value-intentionality – became the marks of ethical probity and good will (Kolnai 2002: 169–181).

The moral seriousness which most quickly leads us to intuit the idea of a finite concrete world is itself closely related to that reverence for the world which prevents us from inspecting and dissecting it as though it were a ‘globe’ we could roll about in the palms of our hands. (Kolnai 2002: 94)

By contrast, “[t]he pursuit of distant (...) ends” led revolutionaries to override present needs.³⁷ Men must resist “the dreary imperious demand to confine the motives of conduct within materially simple, indeed uniform bounds,” an attitude driven by “ice-cold pride.” Kolnai’s own resistance to this form of politics increased in the 1930s.

Vienna’s high press, with its sophisticated mix of cultural analysis and political commentary, was an ideal venue for Kolnai’s philosophically-oriented social essays, and he was able, like Hildebrand, to adapt the technical and granular analyses of phenomenology to the more colloquial flair of local *feuilletons*. Throughout the late 1920s, in the face of Central Europe’s polarizing politics, he penned a series of ‘essential’ analyses – presenting a phenomenon “according to its essence,” not as a factual catalog of surface traits – of political and ideological movements on the radical fringes: the left and right extremists who threatened personal sanctity, distorted value hierarchies, and clamored for dictatorship.³⁸

³⁶ Kolnai, “Duty, Inclination, and ‘Moral-Mindedness,’” (1928) in: Kolnai 2002: 191; Kolnai 2002: 156.

³⁷ Kolnai 2002: 34. At the same time, more far-ranging ethical concerns and responsibilities could reveal “a calling of solitary dignity.” (Kolnai 2002: 136–137, 144) There was simply no formula.

³⁸ The quotation comes from Kolnai 1938: 19; but prominent earlier examples of the procedure include Kolnai 1926; 1927b. The best review of Kolnai’s Vienna journalism is in Congdon 1991: 241–253. Despite his rejection of Hildebrand’s politics, he did agree to contribute several articles

Even as Kolnai joined the Social Democratic Party, however, his editorials displayed a deepening conservatism. Echoing phenomenological contemporaries such as Scheler and Hildebrand, Kolnai singled out Liberalism for particular censure. In two articles from 1927, he condemned Liberalism's utilitarian conception of progress; while they were right to emphasize the gradual amelioration of want over revolutionary fervor, Liberals reduced men to material contingencies, making them animalesque and poor.³⁹ Rooted in naturalism, Liberal ideology denied the spirit and turned subjects into anonymous mass men who exemplified the scientific meaninglessness Husserl later diagnosed and incubated crises that extremists could exploit.⁴⁰ As with Hildebrand, Kolnai linked the rise of Nazism to the depredations of Liberalism; in its "cult of 'relativism,' 'tolerance' and 'indifferentism, in its explanation of social phenomena by 'psychology', or by a succession of different 'modes of general outlook' or world attitudes of mind, the Liberal Spirit has definitely overreached itself" (Kolnai 1938: 15). In 1927, Kolnai declared Bolshevism a graver threat than Fascism because it was more seductive: as he put it colorfully, "it stood at once nearer to God and the devil" (Kolnai 1926: 213). By 1931, however, he was coming to see the Nazi threat as more urgent – a quintessential counter-revolution distinguished from conservative anti-Communism by its embrace of revolutionary violence, terror, and deception.⁴¹ In 1933's "Der Inhalt der Politik [The Content of Politics]," Kolnai assailed the right-wing jurist Carl Schmitt's vision of politics as an external relation of friend or foe. War, in Schmitt's view, was an intimate partner of the politics of existential survival. Kolnai countered by stressing the primacy of domestic political disputes and "the coexistence of opponents" in a common society. Political discussion, not mortal combat, was the "essential mark" of politics, its proper content debates over the "fashioning" of a shared destiny.⁴²

In the face of Austria's increasing brutality, Kolnai continued to endorse the vision of a Europe of spiritual persons limned in his earlier phenomenological treatises.⁴³ Indeed, we find in the 1930s his first clear statement of the pragmatic conservatism for which he became known in the West:

Conservatism, of the culture-, law-, person- and continuity-affirming sort, can only effectively take up its struggle against the anarcho-naturalistic extreme right

to *Die christliche Ständestaat* under the moniker 'Van Helsing,' cribbed from Bram Stoker's warrior against spiritual evil.

³⁹ Kolnai, "Die Ideologie des sozialen Fortschritts," *Der deutsche Volkswirt* 1: 30(1927): 933–36; "Kritik des sozialen Fortschritts," *Der deutsche Volkswirt* 1: 31(1927): 965–69.

⁴⁰ Kolnai seconded G.K. Chesterton's condemnation of the servile capitalist state in which property was plutocratically concentrated. Kolnai 1927a.

⁴¹ Kolnai 1931/1932. On Nazism as counter-revolution, see Kolnai 1938: 672.

⁴² Kolnai, "What is Politics About?" in Balázs & Dunlop 2004: 31, 34. Schmitt's 1927 classic, revised and republished in 1932, is Schmitt 1996. For a recent summary of it, see Jay 2010: 86–89.

⁴³ See e.g. Kolnai 1933/1934b: 444.

if it is aware of being conservative with a very specific character and aims, which has distinct bridges to the left and takes over from it certain responsibilities, but otherwise occupies a middle point, from which it strikes the actual enemy, the right-totalitarian and mythical variety, beating it on its own territory and hitting it partly with its own weapons. (Kolnai 1924: 943)

Here he echoed the earlier call for a personalist order, Christian and democratic: Whereas “[f]ree democracy means the personalistic life of man in society, fascist dictatorship means the person-denying rule of the masses.”⁴⁴ No doubt it was for this reason that Kolnai deplored Hildebrand’s truck with Dollfuß, for he saw in the Austrian strongman not a bastion against Hitler but an agent in the suppression of personal freedom and political liberty.⁴⁵

In posthumously published memoirs, Kolnai reflected back on the relation between his phenomenological and political interests. While acknowledging the danger of abstraction from reality, he ventured that Husserl’s brainchild had a democratic-conservative slant. “[I]t bases philosophy on the broad pediment of ‘current experience’ and develops it in keeping with the categories and valuations of ordinary man,” Kolnai wrote. But this bias did not pander to base popular will or delirious visions of national unity:

The phenomenological attitude reveals... a ‘democratic’ slant in the sense of thinking ‘in correspondence with’ the thinking of the ‘people,’ not in the sense of any sanctification of ‘the people’s will.’ It has a natural affinity to ‘government with the people’ rather than ‘by the people.’ It is aligned to the conservative-democratic idea of popular participation in government as opposed to the national-democratic and totalitarian formula of an ‘identity between the rulers and the ruled.’⁴⁶

This democratic-conservatism, already emergent in the 1930s, became the hallmark of Kolnai’s second career, after he fled Central Europe in 1937, settling ultimately in England where he was hailed by philosophers such as David Wiggins, Bernard Williams, and Pierre Manent.⁴⁷ It drew expressly on phenomenological

⁴⁴ Kolnai 1933–34a: 319; 1933/1934b: 442. Francesca Murphy identifies constitutional monarchy – at once conservative and democratic – as Kolnai’s ideal. Introduction to Kolnai 1999: xi.

⁴⁵ Kolnai also expressed guarded concern with the Catholic embrace of corporatism in the 1931 encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*. See Kolnai 1931: 892.

⁴⁶ Kolnai 1999: 140–141. Kolnai’s reverence for Tomáš Masaryk as “the greatest, noblest and truest representative of Western civilization” underscores his belief that democracy required guidance from wise leaders. See Kolnai 1938: 27, 223, 685. On Masaryk’s vision of guided democracy, see Orzoff 2009: 8, 30–32. *The War against the West* reveals Kolnai’s concern for ‘titanism,’ or the ‘Superman’ ideology – a Masarykian phrase designating modern humanity’s hubristic tendency to elevate itself to the position of God. Kolnai 1938: 223.

⁴⁷ Wiggins and Williams co-introduced a volume of Kolnai’s later essays entitled *Ethics, Value, and Reality* (Kolnai 1978: ix–xxv). Pierre Manent admired Kolnai’s anti-utopian thought, most famously

convictions little-known in the English-speaking world but shared by many of his Central European compatriots.

Conclusion

What should we take away from this survey of two lesser-known interwar philosophers regarding the social and political implications of phenomenology? First, it calls into question the common characterization of phenomenology as a brand of apolitical esoterica, a philosophy that only became worldly by partnering with other social and political traditions. As Hildebrand and Kolnai show, later East European phenomenologists such as Patočka, Wojtyła, or Józef Tischner did not have to graft onto phenomenology other overtly political programs in order to make it socially engaged; they could draw on a ready tradition of phenomenological social thought and engagement. Interwar first and second-generation phenomenologists were already tapping a novel repertoire of experiential analyses in order to make claims about ethical and social matters and even to bolster activism against totalitarian threats. Hildebrand and Kolnai exhibit one of the characteristic features of this phenomenological social thought in their insistence on embedding political claims in the bedrock of human experience – the real life of the person – and a world of objective moral values, putatively revealed by phenomenological insight.

It is perhaps tempting, given these examples of phenomenological anti-Nazism and anti-communism, to credit phenomenology primarily with exhibiting political will in times of grave crisis, when remaining apolitical was not a viable possibility. A philosophy that engages the social world only in times of extreme danger, we might concede, is hardly one with much utility in more mundane periods, when political evil is not quite so brazen. Not only, however, does this view ignore the range of stands taken by phenomenologists since the movement's origin; but more importantly it ignores one of the few red threads running through phenomenology's varied social and political manifestations: its critique of modern liberalism. Thus, Hildebrand and Kolnai – as well as Wojtyła and Patočka later on – saw totalitarianism not as a monster *sui generis*, but as a political emanation of the impoverished mental, moral, and communal world of modern liberal societies, with their atomized individuals, bureaucratic rationality, and market morality. In other words, phenomenological political thought was geared not only toward protecting men in times of terror but also toward building moral communities from the ground up in the modern industrial world. In this sense, it can speak to concerns

articulated in "The Utopian Mind," in Dunlop (ed.) 1995: 1–129. See Wiggins, "Aurel Kolnai and Utopia" and Manent "Aurel Kolnai: A Political Philosopher Confronts the Scourge of our Epoch," in Balázs & Dunlop 2004: 219–230, 207–218.

today about the price paid by the breakdown of community, the privatization of ethics, and the reduction of values to purely economic terms.

Finally, it is important to note the Catholic conservative slant of both Hildebrand's and Kolnai's positions, a widespread attitude among interwar phenomenologists, but a position that is unlikely to inspire much enthusiasm today. In Hildebrand's case, of course, it licensed the embrace of autocracy in the name of Christian corporate values. Indeed, despite his laudable attacks on Nazism and anti-Semitism, Hildebrand's position may again raise the spectre of phenomenology's 'bad politics.' It is important to recall, however, that despite Kolnai's claim that phenomenology had a 'conservative slant,' it did in fact support non-conservative political positions at various points in its history. Here we should note the alliance of phenomenology and Marxist humanism across postwar Central and Eastern Europe, especially in 1960s Prague, Yugoslavia, and Hungary.⁴⁸ It is thus inaccurate to characterize phenomenology as solely conservative in its political leanings. Its most steady social and political commitments – the critique of liberalism and the defense of the human person – could as well support left- as right-wing political critiques.

What this account does suggest is that phenomenological social and ethical theories have implications that extend beyond simply a proper understanding of an important school of philosophy. First, the tale of Hildebrand and Kolnai bears on our increased awareness of the political role played by interwar Catholicism in shaping the post-World War II world. As James Chappel, Piotr Kosicki, John Connelly and others have shown, the impact of Catholic thinkers on the post-war political settlement and the tempering of anti-Semitism in Western Europe was substantial indeed (Chappel 2012; Kosicki 2011; Connelly 2012). Phenomenologists provide an important chapter of this story. Furthermore, an account of early phenomenology allows us to place anti-communist regime critics of the 1960s and 1970s in their proper intellectual context rather than seeing them as liberal or market vanguards, a corrective with deep political implications as we continue to promote democratic and market reforms across the globe. Finally, the phenomenological understanding of the human being not simply as a calculating and self-interested individual but as a person with social and moral commitments, embedded in wider communities of meaning and purpose, provides a striking counterpoint to today's political and moral discourse, which seems unable to imagine sources of morality beyond the private individual or possibilities for collective social action. While phenomenological social thought need not be revived in its interwar forms, the recovery of phenomenological history can retrieve a valuable heritage with important lessons for how we arrived at the present political moment and valuable clues about what we should attend to in the future.

⁴⁸ For a brief survey, see Satterwhite 1992.

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Heidegger's Critique of Causal Explanation in Relation to Psychotherapy. Critical Sketches on Heidegger's "Zollikon Seminars"

The article represents a critical re-evaluation of the contribution to psychiatry and psychotherapy made by Heidegger. The author gives a detailed analysis of "Zollikon Seminars", placing emphasis on Heideggerian concept of the human being in the first part of the article. According to Heidegger, the human being is not just present in the world, but he is present in the world along with other beings, he exists in indissociability with things, with the world. The existence of the human being, but not its interpretation, which reduces the concept of the human being to thinking, consciousness or instinct, represents the starting point of his philosophical inquiry. But that, which ever-already is, needs to be given an opportunity to show itself. Therefore, the matter of the causal explanation, given with a view to psychotherapy became one of the focal points for "Zollikon Seminars". The second part of the article is devoted to critique of Freud, delivered by Heidegger, which clarified Heidegger's approach to the existence of the human being through the striking antithesis of causality and motivation and critique of the causal explanation. The third part of the article comprises a reference to psychopathology and the practice of psychiatry, which, according to our reckoning, Heidegger has elided in his reflections. It is fair to assume that, if Heidegger gave consideration to the uniqueness of the psychopathology practice, which its phenomena appear in, with regard to the causal explanation, his intuition on this subject, concerning a radical distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of causality, could take a different direction. Having examined the critique, delivered by him, more intently, we are able to say that Heidegger, despite his innovative approach, still, did not take into consideration a number of problems, being present in the practice of psychotherapy and psychiatry. Nevertheless, the importance of Heideggerian approach resides primarily in a fact that Heidegger, for his part, insisted on the "productive meeting" of philosophers and psychiatrists, meant to amend understanding of the practice of psychiatry. An opportunity to combine the causal and the hermeneutic approaches in

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psychiatry was not considered by Heidegger, although, it seems to us, it is exactly the practice of psychiatry, which the “meeting” of the causal theory and philosophy can become really potentially productive and “stimulating” in.

Key words: Heidegger, phenomenology, psychopathology, causal explanation, Dasein, psychiatry, human being, determinism and freedom

An issue of the borderline of philosophy and psychiatry has been drawing much attention recently. And it is Karl Jaspers, a philosopher and psychiatrist, who is quite often gets mentioned in this context. But when it comes to Martin Heidegger, he, being one of the most prominent philosophers of the twentieth century, is often not given the adequate consideration. Nevertheless, there is a quite obvious association between Heidegger and psychiatry. In 1959–1969 Heidegger has delivered course of lectures to psychiatrists and students of psychiatry both at the psychiatrist clinic of the University of Zurich and in Zollikon. Paraphrasing of these lectures was published as “Zollikon Seminars” by Medard Boss, a psychiatrist and the actual initiator of the mentioned lectures and events. The German edition made by Boss first appeared in 1987. Refereeing to “Zollikon Seminars” we don’t imply just the lectures delivered by Heidegger to psychiatrists and students of psychiatry. Quite literally, “Zollikon Seminars” include three parts. The first part comprises protocols and shorthand notes of the lectures (1959–1969), which undergone meticulous editing and correcting made by Heidegger personally. The second part is represented by the records of dialogs, between Heidegger and Boss (1961–1972), which has been predominantly revised by Heidegger. The third part incorporates excerpts from 256 letters written by Heidegger to Boss (1947–1971). It was empathised by Boss in the introduction that the text of “Zollikon Seminars” should be considered a trustworthy source, being entirely authorized by Heidegger.

In an effort to find some new methodological foundations we should thoroughly scrutinize the past. In the 1920–1930s an issue of an inseparable link between the human being and being was extensively amplified in the philosophic works of Marcel and Heidegger and, with regard to the psychological practice, of Swiss psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss. The latter two are associated primarily with existential analysis, which emerged shortly before World War II. An acquaintance with Heidegger’s fundamental ontology has crucially affected their scientific standpoints and perspectives on the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic practice. First, Binswanger started to elaborate a concept of the existential analysis of a priori structures or what is referred to as “psychiatric Dasein-analysis” and then Boss gave his mind to, if we can put it that way, “Heidegger’s Dasein-analysis”. Both of

them had quite a number of followers and soon the terms “existential analysis” and “Dasein-analysis” started to be considered synonyms. In general terms, we may say that the existential analysis is applied for analyzing the mode of existence of the human in the world. Which entirely corresponds with the line the transformation of classic psychology into “non-classical” was occurring in, given that the classic psychology is regarded as the traditional academic science, focused on a scientific ideal of knowledge. We might also specify a common vector of evolution the classic psychology undergone on the way to non-classic psychology: starting from treating the human being, as an isolated object to realizing the interoperability of the human being and the world, his life proceeds in.

The focal points of these seminars for Heidegger were defined the following question, “Which understanding of the human being should be considered the baseline for therapeutic activity?” Heidegger brings us back to the otherness of the human being. He starts “Zollikon Seminars” by adducing a demand of a different idea of the psyche, the subject, the personality, the self, namely, considered from a Dasein-point of view. Such perspective, in its turn, requires different understanding, based on a new vision of the human existence. “You may have noticed that I do not want to make philosophers out of you, but I would like to enable you to be attentive to what concerns the human being unavoidably and yet is not easily accessible to him. In order to enable you to be more attentive, a special methodological attitude will be required from all of us” (Heidegger 2001: 112). It means to think the thinkable as it is, discuss phenomena as they are, on the grounds of themselves in their own phenomenological content. We must attain a new way of thinking, therefore, Heidegger makes a sort of epoché procedure, i.e. the entire science should be “disabled” for a while in order for the practice of this new vision to happen. The ancient Greeks were familiar with such way of viewing, that is why Heidegger often refers to Aristotle for assistance. Why was he chosen Aristotle to appeal to of all others? Let us make a brief excursus.

In his “On the Essence and Concept of Φύσις in Aristotle’s Physics B, I” (1939) Heidegger claimed, that the Greeks were the first to fundamentally experience being (*to on*) as *phainomenon*, that which of itself shows itself, that which appears. The presence of beings in the world is experienced as their appearing, where *phainesthai* means that a being brings itself to radiant self-manifestation (sich zum Scheinen bringen) and “is” precisely insofar as it shows itself in that self-manifestation. A man is privy to the entity only in terms of its the broadest sense, in other words, only in terms of some form of “manifestation-as” in *logos*. Heidegger claimed that could be no human relations without a language. The real essence of the language is saying (*sagen*) through showing (*zeigen*) (Heidegger 1998). We are always drawn to that, which *ever-already is*, and it is only necessary to find for such “is” a way to demonstrate itself.

Beings as *phainomena* are correlative to modes of “awareness” (Vernehmen) in the broadest sense, that is, to a *legein* or *noein* that is revelatory of the *phainomenon* as what and how it is. Without *logos*, no isness. The uniqueness of man as “the living being who has *logos*” consists in the fact that his essence is the locus of meaning and that he has access to beings only in terms of some modality of their “appearance-as...” in *logos*. Aristotle thematizes the function of *logos* as *déloun* (to make visible), *apophainesthai* (to show forth), and most importantly as *alētheuein* (to uncover and bring out of hiddenness). For man, *to on* is always *on legomenon*, «read» beings, beings articulated according to the multiplicity of modes of meaningful presence that are expressed in the implicit “as” or the explicit “is” of apophantic discourse. A being always implies a Being-dimension that is expressed in the “as”, and the only locus of this Being-dimension is man’s essence as *logos* or *alētheuein*. *To on* and *legein* “apriori correlative”; man’s very nature is “phenomenological” (*legein ta phainomena*) – was the conclusion Heidegger came to in this opusculum. *Logos* is *entelechia* of man (Sheehan 1975).

As Heidegger has stated in “Zollikon Seminars”, “The thing addresses me. If one understands language as ‘saying’ in the sense of the letting-be-shown of something, receiving-perceiving [Vernehmen] is always language and jointly a saying of words” (Heidegger 2001: 200). Hereafter, he added, “To speak means to say, which means to show and to let [something] be seen. It means to communicate and, correspondingly, to listen, to submit oneself to a claim addressed to oneself and to comply and respond to it” (Heidegger 2001: 215).

What was the reason we made this excursus for?

Upon a closer look, all lectures, delivered in Zollikon, could be considered a kind of a group therapy, “which should make possible a freer view, a more adequate letting-be-seen of the constitution of human beings” (Heidegger 2001: 132). Heidegger started step by step to give an idea of this new way of viewing. What was so challenging in the form, discussions held by Heidegger assumed? The fact is that they used to proceed in the form of gradual, step-by-step training of the phenomenological “viewing”, which primarily required to abandon applying the philosophical knowledge without its verification. This requirement refers us to one of the basic principles, the phenomenological study relies on, i.e. to the principle of presuppositionless, which presumes abandoning phenomenologically unclear, unverified and unverifiable presuppositions. Since phenomenology does not cave in to any standpoint, any line, therefore, “the expression “phenomenology” signifies primarily a concept of a method. It does not characterize the “what” of the objects of philosophical research in terms of their content, but the “how” of such research (Heidegger 2010: 123).

Let us recall the meaning and the purpose of phenomenological method originally posed by E. Husserl, those it traditionally kept for phenomenological research.

It was considered a way of the intuitive clarification, the reflective analysis and the comprehensive description of various objective content, represented in consciousness, allowing to make the philosophical and scientific concepts and regulations used by us evident, rigorous and adequate. The phenomenological method represents an attempt to draw full attention to phenomena, a specific attempt to enrich the world of our experience through showing some of its previously neglected aspects.

However, Heidegger's phenomenological method stands far from phenomenology of Kant and Husserl within the traditional meaning. The common concept of phenomenon, which originated in Kant's doctrine through empirical visualization, according to Heidegger, is not the phenomenological concept of the phenomenon. According to Heidegger, a *phenomenon* stands for something which shows itself, the manifest [das, was sich zeigt, das Sichzeigende, das Offenbare]. Being can show itself in various manners. It is also possible for being to show itself as something which, actually, it is not. It is a state of appearance. "Phenomenon, the self-showing-in-itself, means a distinctive way something can be encountered. (...) What thus shows itself in itself are the phenomena of phenomenology" (Heidegger 2010: 123). The second part of phenomenology as the science of phenomena is represented by *logos*. *Logos* allows something to be seen for those talking to each other. In the assumption to comprehend being, *logos* appears as foundation, attitude and proportion. Heideggerian *logos* is letting-something-be-seen, *logos* appears as foundation, attitude and proportion. Heideggerian *logos* is letting-something-be-seen, opening, something, which takes things from hiddenness into "being-true". *Logos* of phenomenology of being, which we, ourselves, are (Dasein), has the character of hermeneutics, which being gets informed about its meaning and basic structures through. "Hence phenomenology means: (...) to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself" (Heidegger 2010: 132).

Thus, we can see that the reference point of Heidegger's reflection shifted from the human being to the phenomena as such, to being of things as they are. Things were considered not in the context of what they represent for the human being, but the human being was rather considered in the context of what he represents for the existence of things, or, to be more precise, "in what way" the human being, inseparably connected to things, to the world, "is".

Whereas, Husserl, examining the problem of perception, tended to take up a position of "pure observer", Heidegger considered this perception not as independent reviewing and examining of things. It emerges in a concrete, practical dealing with things. According to Heidegger, every contemplative position precedes an unclear, vaguely perceivable, practical involvement in dealing with the world of things.

But everything which surrounds the human being needs to show itself. And that is not all. The human being is not just present in the world, but he is present in the world along with other beings. In his life he faces the problem of execution, realization of his being, which he treats as his own possibility. However, according to Heidegger, the execution and realization of one's own being becomes possible only in the state of openness. The human being, himself, represents such openness, which things pass through into the state of being-true, get executed. Therefore, everything given to us ought to be accepted and described as the way, which it gives itself in, and only in the contest, which it gives itself in. It implies a refusal to talk of the phenomena beyond something, which was manifested, beyond something which we clearly perceive in it. *Phenomenological description*, i.e. full and transparent designating, linguistic expressing of primary data of "experience", is meant to facilitate it. After all, as Heidegger reminded referring to Aristotle, "human nature is exclusively phenomenological (legein ta phainomena)".

Applying the phenomenological method in order to describe the psychopathological phenomena became one of the first attempts to use it beyond the realm of philosophy. The method was applied for such purpose by K. Jaspers and his followers, who devoted much time to interviewing their patients, getting the detailed information on their condition. Therein, "phenomenological description" meant a description of human experiences, but not their interpretation, made from the perspective of a specific theory or common sense. In contrast to Freud's causal approach, focused on revealing the hidden causes of human behavior, "existential therapy" insisted on the importance of the descriptive approach, aimed at disclosing the way the certain experience proceeds in.

Thereupon, one of the major issues for "Zollikon Seminars" became the matter of the causal explanation in relation to psychotherapy, which was understood as something obvious. Why did Heidegger make such a fierce attack on the method of the causal explanation and, particularly, Freudian psychoanalysis? The radicalism of Heidegger's approach, which primarily resided in the attempt to go beyond two of the most enduring traditions of philosophical thought (the subject-object division of reality, on the one hand, and the metaphysical dichotomy of entity and essence, sensual and preterensual, on the other hand) made it difficult get it across to psychiatrists, professionals of scientific mentality. Heidegger's "human being" is neither a subject nor an object. He is the presence of something bigger, which sends a message to the world through him. "According to natural science, the human being can be identified only as something present-at-hand in nature. The question arises: Can human nature be found at all in this way? From the projection of the natural sciences, we can see the human being only as an entity of nature, that is, we claim to define the human being's being utilizing a method, never designed to include its special nature" (Heidegger 2001: 26).

Heidegger considered the method of the causal explanation to be as such priority-driven natural-scientific method, "(...) according to Freud, only that which can be explained in terms of psychological, unbroken, the causal connections between forces is real and genuinely actual. As the world renowned, contemporary physicist Max Planck said a few years ago, 'Only that which can be measured is real.' However, one can rightfully object to it: Why can't there be something real which is not susceptible to exact measurement? Why not sorrow, for example?" (Heidegger 2001: 7) Therefore, being, as a predetermined the causal connection, is considered self-evident. On the assumption of such explanation, the human being is inevitably considered a causally explainable object. Hereafter, Heidegger noted that, from the stand point of natural science, the human being can certainly be also considered a part of nature. But the question remains "whether something human will result – something, which relates to the human being as the human being" (Heidegger 2001: 27).

Heideggerian approach to human reality didn't emanate from defining consciousness as some substance (Cartesian paradigm), endowed with certain properties. He rather tried, as unbiased as possible, to access the essence of what which we, ourselves, are, without attributing to this comprehending anything external to such "reality". Therefore, instead of operating with traditional notions, such as "the self", "subject", "consciousness", "cogito", Heidegger posed the category of *Dasein* as the original basic structure. The existence of the human being, but not its interpretation, which reduces the concept of the human being to thinking, consciousness or instinct, represents the starting point of philosophical inquiry. In the early notes on his ideas, preceding publishing "Being and Time", Heidegger spoke of "actual life" as a concept, betokening the concept of *Dasein*. Therein, his understanding of life is close to the traditions, associated with the names of Nietzsche, Dilthey and Bergson. Life is something very primary, all-encompassing, and all other possible forms of its manifestation are just its derivatives.

According to Heidegger, the very "question of the human being", being posed in a traditional way, (i.e., "What is the human being?") is false. Heidegger asks a different question, "In what way *is* the human being?" He made a stand against such understanding of the human being, which implied the recognition of the substantial nature of human existence and immanent features that constitute the nature of such existence. In order to avoid biased speculative interpretations, given to human reality, Heidegger formally defined the human being as *Dasein*, and then tried to give a thorough *phenomenological description* of this phenomenon, as initially as possible, in the form it always has before any possible theoretical comprehension. According to Heidegger, the fundamental distinctive feature, which is primarily inherent to human existence, is his attitude to his own being. It has to be especially noted, that the fundamental feature is neither ratio,

nor sociality, but exactly, the attitude of the human being to his own existence. *Dasein exists in such ways that its own being is always a problem for it.* “Thus it is constitutive of the being of Dasein to have, in its very being, a relation of being to this being” (Heidegger 2010: 78). If science means the science of “physics”, then the science of the human being must satisfy the essential requirements of modern science. What is meant by this? This means that “the unavoidable result of such a science of the human being would be the technical construction of the human being as machine” (Heidegger 2001: 135).

Such is the baseline of Heideggerian approach. However, having examined the critique, delivered by him, more intently, we are able to say that Heidegger, despite his innovative approach, still, did not take into consideration a number of problems, being present in the practice of psychotherapy and psychiatry. We will substantiate our rebuttal to critique of the causal explanation delivered by Heidegger and demonstrate that this explanation, being applied in the practice of psychiatry and psychotherapy, does not necessarily mean “dehumanization”, i.e. the elimination of the human being as such (his reduction to the object), as it was presumed by Heidegger.

To begin with let’s make two introductory remarks.

Firstly, as it is known, Heidegger was very critical about Freud and psychoanalysis, which, however, did not stop him from inspiring many psychoanalysts in the latter half of the 20th century. In this context J. Lacan is usually mentioned as the most striking example of Heidegger’s influence on the elaboration of psychoanalysis. The fierce critique of psychoanalysis, delivered by Heidegger, on one hand, and his role in the elaboration of psychoanalysis, on the other hand, led to a discussion on the compatibility of “Heidegger and Freud” (Jackson 2007; Bolton *et al.* 1996; Dallmayr 1993).

However, we will not delve into this discussion, since it worthy of separate reviewing, but focus our attention only on critique of the causal explanation delivered by Heidegger and the role it played in psychotherapy and the medical practice.

Secondly, even though Heidegger’s philosophy is often considered “ambiguous”, hard to understand, his cooperation with psychiatrists in the 1960s seems to benefited him. Participating in these seminars, Heidegger sought to be understood, expounded his philosophy in a more “comprehensible” form, while most of its focal themes remained unchanged.

* * *

Heidegger’s critical attitude towards the causal explanation in psychoanalysis is evidenced by many remarks in “Zollikon Seminars”. Talking to Boss, Heidegger once noted, “The human being is essentially in need of help because he is always

in danger of losing himself and of not coming to grips with himself. This danger is connected with the human being's freedom. The entire question of the human being's capacity for being ill is connected with the imperfection of his unfolding essence. Each illness is a loss of freedom, a constriction of the possibility for living. The 'psychoanalytic case history' [Lebensgeschichte] is by no means a history, but [an explanation by means of] a naturalistic chain of causes, a chain of cause and effect, and even more, a construct" (Heidegger 2001: 157).

This quote denotes the major problem, psychoanalysis faces according to Heidegger: psychoanalysis interprets the history of the human being as a causal chain, herewith, the chain, which was "constructed". In the same conversation Heidegger posed a question of whether the human being is present in general, in all his uniqueness, within the "construction of Freudian theory of libido". "Attempts to explain human phenomena on the basis of instincts have the characteristic method of a science whose object field is not the human being at all but rather mechanics. Therefore, it is fundamentally questionable whether such a method, determined by nonhuman objectivity, is able to assert anything about the human being as the human being" (Heidegger 2001: 172).

Heidegger also suggested that Freud purposely tried to substantiate the causal approach to the phenomenon of the human being. According to Heidegger, this approach can't be obtained on the basis of the conscious human activity, therefore, Freud had to "invent" the unconscious, "For conscious, human phenomena, he also postulates an unbroken [chain] of explanation, that is, the continuity of causal connections. Since there is no such thing 'within consciousness', he has to invent 'the unconscious' in which there must be an unbroken [chain of] causal connections. The postulate is the complete explanation of psychical life whereby explanation [Erklären] and understanding [Verstehen] are identified. This postulate is not derived from the psychical phenomena themselves but is a *postulate* of modern natural science" (Heidegger 2001: 207–208).

Thus, Heidegger considered the unconscious the major point of contention in Freudian theory, since it allowed Freud to present the human being as a causation-driven object. Heidegger rejected the notion of the unconscious, talking of "the fatal separation of consciousness and unconsciousness". The above mentioned quotation manifests that Heidegger considered the baseline of Freudian theory to be his causal theory, close to the theory of natural science. However, he pointed out the rootedness of Freud's metapsychology in philosophical origins, "Freud's metapsychology is the application of Neo-Kantian philosophy to the human being. On the one hand, he has the natural sciences, and on the other hand, the Kantian theory of objectivity" (Heidegger 2001: 207).

Therefore, in his approach to the phenomenon of the human being, Freud has conjoined natural science, on one hand, and neo-Kantian philosophy, on the other

hand. Such combination of natural science and philosophy in the approach to the problem of the human being would actually be expected to cause Heidegger's disapproval. However, surprisingly, he considered this meeting of natural science and philosophy in psychiatry (referring to the approach to the human being in medical practice) as "productive", believing that "in psychiatry that the continuous encounter between the thinking of the natural scientist and that of the philosopher is very productive and exciting" (Heidegger 2001: 238).

Apparently Heidegger's reflection on such meeting originated from the search of new opportunities and challenges rather than from negative critique. Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, applying the causal theoretical perspective would necessarily lead to objectification. Theories that remain related to the principle of causality inevitably "go along with the objectification of everything that is" (Heidegger 2001: 233), thereby, rejecting their opportunity to see the genuine human being-in-the world². Therefore, it is no worth expecting to get any understanding of the human being and his world from modern system theories³.

According to Heidegger, objectification fundamentally obstructs psychotherapy, as if it implies that "psychotherapy can be done only if one objectifies the human being beforehand, then what is decisive thereby is psychotherapy and not the existence of the human being. Since one can [supposedly] only do therapy, which is a concerned handling of objects, and thus something purely technical, then the outcome of such psychotherapy cannot result in a healthier human being. In such a therapy, the human being is finally eliminated. At best, such a therapy could [only] result in a more polished object" (Heidegger 2001: 215).

² Heidegger stated that our own being can be denote as "being-in-the-world". According to V. Bibikhin, "the human being doesn't differ from the world in the main melody of his life". We exist, being in the world. The existence of the human being is possible only there and then, where and when the world is given to such existence. There is deep indissociability, existing between the human being and the world. Before any reflexive treatment, we always find ourselves being already present in the world, experiencing this world, which affects us in one way or another. It determines states we are in, our experiences. We are ever-already "tuned" in a certain way before we become aware of ourselves in this world. According to Heidegger, Dasein neither consciousness nor a thing. It would be also incorrect to regard it as a subject that can replace consciousness. On the contrary, the word Dasein rather refers to something, the experience, for the first time ever, can become possible in. We get involved in the total entirety of bonds, preceding to direct reflexive comprehension and incomprehensible by it. This total entirety of bonds constitutes an indistinct implicit background, which predetermines the being of Dasein. Thus, according to Heidegger, existence is not givenness, not a substance, but rather an opportunity, openness, a project. That is to say, the human being is a project, remaining in constant dynamics, in constant openness, the one, that is yet to be realized. Moreover, the concepts of "an opportunity" and "a project" are not of contemplative "psychological", but of existential ontological semantics.

³ "It would be necessary for medicine to search for the essential potentiality-to-be human. If one looks for foundations in the causal-genetic sense, one abandons the human being's essence beforehand, and thus one misses the question of what being human is" (Heidegger 2001: 195–196).

This quote evidently demonstrates that Heidegger's theoretical reflections reached their culmination in the point of making the extensive statement that the human being will be finally eliminated in the objectification of the therapeutic approach. But what actually can be lost, when the causal approach is applied? According to Heidegger, causality is an idea, an ontological definition, and it refers to the definition of the ontological structure of nature. As for motivation, is related to the existence of the human beings in the world qua the acting and enduring being. In his letter to Boss, Heidegger once again focused on the issues of motivation and causation, considered by him crucially important for the participants of the seminar, "But it also seems important to make clear to the seminar participants what fundamental opposition lies behind the properly made distinction between causality and motivation. It must become clear that it is not only concerned with a methodical (technical-practical) distinction, but with a fundamentally different way of determining being human and determining the human being's position in contemporary world civilization. Only by reflecting on this does the full importance of the distinction come to light" (Heidegger 2001: 280). Causality, therefore, should be distinguished from motivation since "the theme of physics is inanimate nature. The theme of psychiatry and psychotherapy is the human being" (Heidegger 2001: 135).

We might assume that causality still consider the human being as the motivated being. However, it is improper to say, that it was exactly the stand Heidegger took, taking into consideration the explanation he gave to the difference between causality and motivation in reference to the famous twain, "determinism and freedom", "Determinism denies freedom, and yet by denying it, it already must presuppose a certain idea of freedom. Freedom as represented in the natural sciences has always been understood as non causal, as an a-causal occurrence. Therefore, determinism [as causal determination] remains outside of freedom from the start. Freedom has nothing to do with causality. Freedom is to be free and open for being claimed by something. This claim is then the ground of action, the motive. It has nothing whatsoever to do with causal chains. What claims [the human being] is the motive for human response. Being open for a claim [Offensein für einen Anspruch] lies outside the dimension of causality. Thus, determinism does not even come close to the realm of freedom in the first place. It cannot say anything about freedom at all. Therefore, as far as freedom is concerned, it does not matter at all whether we know all the causes, or none of the causes, or how many causes a thing has. It is a basic determination of Da-sein to be open" (Heidegger 2001: 217).

Thus, there is a fundamental split between the realm of motivation and freedom, on one hand, and the realm of nature and causality, on the other hand. The causal approach will never be able to recognize being of the human being as being motivated and free and do justice to him. As for us, we, according to Heidegger,

eventually “do psychology, sociology, and psychotherapy in order to help the human being reach the goal of adjustment and freedom in the broadest sense. This is the joint concern of physicians and sociologists because all social and pathological disturbances of the individual human being are disturbances in adjustment and freedom” (Heidegger 2001: 154). Thus, applying the theory of causality to the human being, seeking assistance of a doctor or a psychotherapist, makes impossible to treat this being as a free one. Therefore, as it can be concluded, subsequently to Heidegger’s statements, causal theories must be left aside in psychotherapy, if the realm of motivation and freedom should be preserved in the therapeutic context. “Causality plays a role in calculating the law like sequence of one state after another. Since one does no calculation whatsoever in the phenomenological way of seeing, causality has no meaning here as well” (Heidegger 2001: 209ff). However, the real situation in psychotherapy and psychiatry appears to be somewhat more complex than Heidegger might have seen it.⁴

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Thus, within in “Zollikon Seminars” Heidegger was delivering lectures on psychotherapy to psychiatrists. He was not delivering lectures to psychologists. Nevertheless, Heidegger touched upon general psychological theories. Psychiatry has inevitably inherited all philosophical and conceptual problems of psychology, including the problem of meaning and causation, but, while evolving, it faced its own specific problems.

Heidegger focused on the problems, inherited from psychology, but at the same time, he made no reckoning of matters which have direct relation to psychiatry and might be of interest to psychiatrists, i.e., to psychopathology. Psychiatrists and psychotherapists at their practice have to face a “disease” or a “mental disorder”. There appears to be a crucial difference between general psychology and psychopathology. It is crucial for psychiatrists and it concerns the matter of causation (Meynen *et al.* 2009: 61).

The essential problems are detected even in explanations, given to understandable (“understandable” as “interpretable”) mental states as causes of behavior in “normal cases”, which gives a good reason to doubt the relevance of such explanations in cases of disorder. The reason for it is simple: the concept of “disorder” is applicable exactly to the cases, which cannot be treated in the context of “meaning”, the cases, since the meaning has been “exhausted” in such cases.

The concept of (mental) disorder “gets into a game” exactly in a case of a serious disruption of the content (semantic) relation between mental states and reality, or

⁴ See. critique of Heidegger’s approach to psychopathological phenomena and mental diseases (Kouba 2015: 96 ff).

between mental states as such, or between mental states and action. Thus, mental disorders conceptually relate to the “breakage” of meaning, and in such cases a demand for explanation given in terms of “non-meaningful processes” is quite acceptable. Such situations allow to take the mechanisms, unrelated to the “meaning” (for instance, physical causation), as a basis. Such, obviously direct, relation between the (mental) disorder and the non-meaningful or causal explanation is obscured by the complicated question of the boundaries of the meaningful deception (Bolton *et al.* 1996: xvi).

Bolton and Hill evidently demonstrated the unique situation in the case of psychopathology. The problem of the causal explanation seems to lie in the very concept of psychopathology, but it is very important to take into account whether psychopathology can really involve a form of the causal explanation, and, if such is the case, what is the extent of such involvement. Of course, the fact that this problem has not been solved yet does not mean that the question of the causal explanation, itself, turns out to be irrelevant. Bolton and Hill have rightly stated that psychiatry includes all philosophical problems of psychology. And Heidegger was absolutely right discussing psychological theories on lectures delivered to psychiatrists. Psychiatry is often considered a discipline made up from a number of indicators, related to neuro-scientific, psychological, sociological and even ethical methods and approaches. Conceptual pluralism of psychiatry can serve as a good aid for clinical practice.

Heidegger was interested also in the situation, which allowed the psychiatric practice to unfold: a practitioner (a therapist) and a patient. As we have seen, it concerned Heidegger that the patient, qua the human being, should be done justice to in this particular practical situation. Heidegger seems to understand that a therapeutic situation requires a special approach, “In order to be able to give a sufficiently clear interpretation of the relationship between a psychiatrist and a patient for this exploration, some medical experience, which I lack, is necessary as well. Here, as elsewhere, I am dependent on the cooperation of the seminar participants” (Heidegger 2001: 274). Herein, Heidegger expressed some uncertainty, not been aware of how it happens in the real practice of psychotherapy and psychiatry, and declared the importance of such knowledge, admitting that the knowledge he had was insufficient for analyzing such situation. In the cases, involving practical “doctor – patient” relations, it is, of course, important to focus on the fact that the identification of psychopathological state within the therapeutic situation can already involve the absence or “breakage” of meaning. In other words, apart from the scientific and (meta) psychological theories, there can be some operative idea of causality in the practical situation in psychotherapy. We believe, that it was that very interest, Heidegger had in the therapeutic situation (which is characteristic for psychopathology, and not psychology), that should

have focused him on its specifics rather than the theoretical ideas of psychology, due to the fact that psychology is the science based on general theories, dealing with mental functioning, while psychiatry resides in medical practice, which applies the theories concerning pathological mental functioning. Of course, it should be taken into consideration, that in the 1960s psychiatry was “managed” by psychoanalysts to a far greater degree than it is now, and that psychology was in some degree equated with Freudian metapsychology. Nevertheless, the difference still remains between the understanding of the “normal” behavior and the explanation of the psychopathological behavior, but this difference (between the psychiatric *practice* and the psychological *theory*) seems not to have been examined adequately within “Zollikon Seminars”. Heidegger didn’t give much consideration to the way the causal explanation and hermeneutic understanding correlate in the psychiatric practice (Meynen *et al.* 2009: 62).

And yet, is it really so “inhuman” of a psychiatrist to apply the method of the causal explanation to his patient and does it necessary mean “objectification” or elimination of the human being as such?

Let’s refer to two examples, given in the article by Gerben Meynen and Jacco Verburgt “Psychopathology and the causal explanation in practice. A critical note on Heidegger’s *Zollikon Seminars*”.

Suppose a man has his leg broken. He will be pleased if a doctor applies some causal explanations for this phenomenon, a broken leg, in order to correct this situation. We are unlikely to believe that such approach is “inhuman” of a doctor, on the contrary, it will rather be considered a manifestation of “humanity”: the doctor turns to the causal explanation of an incident in order to help his patient. A physician, being the human being himself, should know when and how the causal explanation should be applied and, what is more important, resorting to the causal explanation in the case of a broken leg is motivated precisely by the fact that a doctor realizes that he is dealing not with some “object” but with another human being. Thus, it would seem, he should be aware of when and how (to what extent) he should resort to the causal explanations.

Though, Heidegger seemed to be aware (at least partially) of the necessity to resort to the causal explanation, at the same time he noted in his conversation with Boss, “For instance, when I give quinine to someone suffering from malaria, I am merely the occasion for the quinine killing the amoebas. The patient’s body [as cause] then heals him. If the physician understands his role as merely being-the-occasion [Anlass-sein], then it is indeed still possible that the being-with [the patient] can continue. But if the physician were to understand himself in such a way that he has brought about [caused] the healing of the patient as an ‘object’, then the being human and the being-with are lost. As a physician one must, as it were, stand back and let the other human being be. These [dealings with the

patient as 'being-with' or as an 'object'] are entirely different modes of comportment, which cannot be distinguished from outside at all. Herein lies the existential difference between a family doctor and a specialist in a clinic. It is characteristic that family doctors are a dying breed" (Heidegger 2001: 210).

Such concept of the medical practice could be considered superficial or, to a certain degree, "black and white". Perhaps, Heidegger neglected the fact that causal explanation can be applied in therapeutic practice not because of the human being, qua the human being, being eliminated in it in advance, but in a virtue of such explanation being motivated by this very attitude to the human being *qua* the human being. It also seems that he doubted the possibility of such approach whether it came to the practice of a psychiatrist or of an orthopedist. But, nevertheless, the situation in psychopathology appears to be much more interesting and challenging than a situation in the usual, everyday medical practice.

Let's proceed to the second example.

Let's imagine that a man has undergone an operation. At night he got worse, and, experiencing a motor dysfunction, he started to blame a doctor for the deterioration of his condition. It seems that in such case a doctor could feel hurt or offended by unjust accusations, as they are made by another human being and, therefore, should be taken seriously. But should a doctor really feel resentment in such situation? If he did not apply the causal explanation, he would be resentful and act according to such mortification. On the other hand, being a doctor, he had to take into consideration that his patient's behavior was possibly provoked by the postoperative state therefore appears to be the sign of a consciousness disorder, extreme excitement or delirium. In such case, all accusations made by the patient could be primarily understood as a manifestation of his severe mental condition and they might indicate a need for medical intervention. Thereby, these accusations and threats would be treated as actions of the human being, but they would not be considered as "motivated" ones (as they would have been considered in a normal situation). They would be considered conditioned (in a certain sense) by the state of delusion or disorder. Would such consideration (when the patient's words are interpreted not on the basis of free motivation, but as causally conditioned) be "inhumane" of a physician? Or, on the contrary, if a doctor treated the patient's words not from the perspective of the causal explanation, but as freely motivated words of the human being, and, therefore, started acting accordingly, i.e., got offended or indignant by the patient's ungratefulness, could we call such actions more "humane of a doctor"? Or do these questions seem rhetorical? (Meynen *et al.* 2009: 63)

In some cases of psychopathology resorting to the causal explanation turns out to be the only possible or relevant step. It applies to the case, when he actions of a patient, being considered not causal but freely motivated, could lead to

a deterioration of a patient's condition, prevent him from getting the proper treatment and bring to the adverse effects.

Regarding the above mentioned (certainly, in some way, exaggerated) example, we would like to emphasize the importance of the psychiatric practice, which Heidegger sometimes neglected, unlike his student H.-G. Gadamer, who noted in the chapter on hermeneutics and psychiatry of his "Über die Verborgenheit der Gesundheit" (Gadamer 1993), that the practice does not come down just to employing scientific knowledge, but it is rather some aspects of practice, which pose a demand for scientific research, and the results of such research should always be practically revalidated and reconfirmed, remaining in deep correlation with practice. It is exactly the reason why the work of physicians cannot be merely treated as the work of a scientist or a researcher or a technical expert, who would naively employ scientific knowledge in hope to solve the problems, physicians have to face. The work of a doctor, to a certain extent, could be compared to art, which, as we all know, unlike trade, cannot be mastered by acquiring the simple technique. "The Art of Healing" involves much more than just employing the knowledge and the practice of psychiatry, as Gadamer has concluded, it should be considered not a mere alternative, available among many others, existing in the world and corresponding to different professions, but the practice with the unique world of its own.

Gadamer emphasised that psychiatry is not just a "meeting point" for hermeneutics and psychological or physiological theories. The practice of psychiatry, for its part, can largely facilitate our understanding of the problem of causality and motivation. The practice cannot be reduced only to employing theoretical knowledge.

So, for a number of cases in the practice of psychiatry the employment of the causal explanation seems to be quite justified, whereas, in other cases, the hermeneutic approach is more appropriate. However, employment of the causal approach does not emanate from the objectivation of the human being or his objectification, but, on the contrary, it initially implies an attitude toward the human being qua the human being, the human being in need of assistance. Thus, the complexity and ambiguity, which the psychiatric practice "physician (therapist) and patient" unfolds in, were neglected in "Zollikon Seminars". Since Heidegger considered therapeutic practice, he should have focused on the specific character of the very situation, which this practice unfolds in. The situation which requires the causal method of explanation as the only possible one.

Nevertheless, the importance of Heideggerian approach, its value, resides primarily in a fact that Heidegger, for his part, insisted on the "productive meeting" of philosophers and psychiatrists, meant to amend understanding of the practice of psychiatry (referring to the approach to the human being in medical practice), admitting lacking knowledge in this area. Probably, it was the latter, which kept Heidegger from contemplating the most relevant and *concrete* problems of the

psychiatric practice in relation to the causal explanation, despite the fact that he acknowledged the specifics of the psychotherapeutic situation. An opportunity to combine the causal and the hermeneutic approaches in psychiatry was not considered by Heidegger, although, it seems to us, it is exactly the practice of psychiatry, which the “meeting” of the causal theory and philosophy can become really potentially productive and “stimulating” in. Not only psychiatry, but also philosophy would benefit from such meeting and through learning from psychiatry, open a “new territory”. The “territory”, which no longer would imply such unequivocally “black and white” critique of Freud’s metapsychology.

If Heidegger gave consideration to the uniqueness of the psychopathology practice, which its phenomena appear in, with regard to the causal explanation, his intuition on this subject, concerning a radical distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of causality, could take a different direction⁵. In medical practice the causal explanation and hermeneutic understanding appear to be alternatives, non-exclusive for each other, which stimulates a number of questions, i.e. What is the psychopathological condition? When exactly, in which cases should the causal theories be applied? What are the principles the psychiatrists should be guided by when “choosing” between the causal and non-causal explanation? Where does the boundary between motivation and causality go?

However, Heidegger insisted that psychiatry takes a dangerous stand and can be influenced by psychology with its method, borrowed from the natural sciences, which reduces the human being (a patient) to the object. Although, he seems to acknowledge the fact that the relationship between the causal explanation, on one hand, and the hermeneutic approach (understanding of motivation), on the other hand, may be essential for psychiatry, yet, he warned us, “Day by day, the overpowering force of calculative thinking strikes back more decisively at the human being himself as an object. [Therefore,] thoughtful thinking [besinnliches Denken] must realize that it will remain isolated in the future and will address only a few” (Heidegger 2001: 272).

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⁵ “But it also seems important to make clear to the seminar participants what fundamental opposition lies behind the properly made distinction between causality and motivation.

It must become clear that it is not only concerned with a methodical (technical-practical) distinction, but with a fundamentally different way of determining being human and determining the human being’s position in contemporary world civilization. Only by reflecting on this does the full importance of the distinction come to light” (Heidegger 2001: 280).

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Nicolas de Warren¹

The Rupture and The Rapture: Eternity in Jan Patočka and Krzysztof Michalski

The author interprets Michalski's philosophical account of eternity presented in his last book on Nietzsche – *The Flame of Eternity. An Interpretation of Nietzsche's Thought*. It is argued that in order to understand Michalski's position one has to contextualize his philosophy, and refer to Heidegger's and Patočka's thought. The author tracks the way of how to understand the problem of eternity by reference to Ancient Greek philosophy, e.g., Anaximander. The thesis presented in the paper is that whereas for Patočka human temporality attains meaning through a movement of freedom in the rupture of eternity, for Michalski human temporality attains meaning through a movement of desire in the rapture of eternity.

Key words: Eternity, time, Nietzsche, Patočka, Michalski

I

A primary concern with eternity once characterized the orientation and significance of philosophical thought. To engage in a life of thinking crystallized around an abiding attunement to eternity as concept, value, and question. This philosophical concern has long become eclipsed in the modern world, if not outright rejected, with its single-minded attention to the temporal condition of human existence, its fragility and finitude. This eclipse of eternity in the light of temporality's sovereign presence defines some of the most influential philosophical approaches to the human condition since the early 20th century. If the question of time remains inseparable from the question of human existence, such that to ask "what is time?" is to ask in the same breath "who are we?," this double-question

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no longer rests upon a third point of reference with the question “what is eternity?” or better: how is eternity manifest in human experience? Even as Augustine’s meditations on time in the *Confessions* are often invoked in such modern analyses of temporality, as with Edmund Husserl’s 1904–1905 lectures on inner time-consciousness, the alignment of Augustine’s reflections on the temporal condition of human life towards eternity is rarely, if at all, noticed, let alone followed or honored (see de Warren 2016a).

Martin Heidegger’s 1924 lecture *The Concept of Time* is in this respect instructive. Heidegger launches into the question of time with a rejection of a certain formulation of the relation between time and eternity. As he writes:

If time finds its meaning in eternity, then it must be understood starting from eternity. The point of departure and path of this inquiry are thereby indicated in advance: from eternity to time. This way of posing the question is fine, provided that we have the aforementioned point of departure at our disposal, that is, that we are acquainted with eternity and adequately understand it (Heidegger 1992: 1).

In questioning whether human existence is able to take eternity as a point of departure for a reflection on time, Heidegger repeats Augustine’s inversion of the relation between time and eternity. Rather than move from eternity to time (as does Plotinus in the *Enneads*), Augustine in the *Confessions* proceeds from time to eternity. It is through a reflection on the temporal condition of human existence that we arrive at eternity. Time finds its meaning in eternity only to the extent that we have discovered eternity within time. This movement of ascend towards the eternal as the inverse image of the descent of eternity into time brings into one spiraling motion the circuit between time and eternity in the narrative structure of the *Confessions*. Human life is a moving image of eternity that seeks to return to the eternal life from which it first fell. But, even as Heidegger repeats an Augustinian inversion of the relationship between time and eternity, Heidegger’s own analysis of the temporal human condition, as sketched in his 1924 lecture, further elaborated during his Marburg lectures in the mid-1920s, and presented in *Sein und Zeit*, decidedly breaks with Augustine’s alignment of human temporality towards eternity. With an insistence on the authenticity of being-towards-death and the ecstatic structure of temporality, time is not derivative from eternity; on contrary, eternity becomes derived from time in so far as any conception of eternity (as well as time understood as chronology) must draw upon Dasein’s original temporality. In Heidegger’s thinking, human existence repossesses itself from its perpetual distention in the world, not through any appeal to eternal life, but within temporality itself in the turning, or conversion, of Dasein back upon itself in its authentic being towards its own death. If, as Heidegger (1992: 21) remarks in his 1924 lecture, “time

itself is meaningless; time is temporal,” then by the same token, eternity itself is meaningless; it is temporal.

With this claim, Heidegger rejects the derivation of time from eternity as well as the exclusive determination of temporal existence in terms of “world-time” or chronological time. Such conceptions of time and eternity, as well as the very contrast between time and eternity, are beholden to a metaphysics of presence and being-present. On Heidegger’s reading, the history of the concept of time is underwritten by an unquestioned adherence to Aristotle’s seminal definition of time as the number of motion with regard to the before and after with its primacy of the now (the present). Within the history of metaphysics, eternity is likewise understood in terms of two alternatives: either as a timeless form of existence or as a permanent form of existence. With both notions, eternity is thought in terms of being-present. Whereas the first notion understands eternity as being-present beyond time, and often ascribed to a perfect or most real being, the second notion understands eternity as being-present for all time.

Linguists have noted that the Greek term for eternity (αἰών) carries an original meaning of “life” with different possible significations (force of life, quality of life, span of life) (Benveniste 1937). In light of this connection between “eternity” and “life,” Heidegger’s statement, quoted above, can be read as a declaration that the meaning of human existence, or Dasein’s temporality, should not be made dependent upon any conception of eternal life, either as an aspiration for eternal life, or immortality, or in relation to an eternal life, or God. This philosophical eclipsing of eternity is mirrored in the cultural and social manifestations of modernity’s experience of time: the acceleration of time, the fragmentation of time, the fetishism of the moment, etc. Much as eternity no longer figures substantially within philosophical reflection, it no longer enjoys any salient place within the relentless, restless pace of modern life. We simply no longer have any patience for eternity; it can no longer be endured for the sake of time.

This intrinsic connection between modernity and eternity is insightfully formulated in Leo Strauss’s observation that

Modern thought reaches its culmination, its highest self-consciousness, in the most radical historicism, i.e., in explicitly condemning to oblivion the notion of eternity. For oblivion of eternity, or, in other words, estrangement from man’s deepest desire and therewith from the primary issues, is the price modern man has to pay, from the very beginning, for attempting to be absolutely sovereign, to become the master and the owner of nature, to conquer chance (Strauss 1957: 55).

Modernity is the forgetfulness of eternity and its indispensable significance for human life. In this forgetting, the “deepest desire” of human existence becomes obscured, as the desire for eternity itself. This eclipsing of the desire for eternity

takes the form of an heightened historical and temporal self-consciousness, even as this modern consciousness rests on self-forgetting and misrecognition, not so much in terms of a lack of self-knowledge, but as the extinguishing of the “deepest desire” of human life. Bereft of any passion for eternity, what remains is an obsession with time and how we never have enough of it. For Strauss, this amnesia of modernity’s self-consciousness is directly connected to the condition of nihilism and the assumed sovereignty of modern subjectivity. The quest for mastery over the totality of beings expresses itself with the infinite desire to conquer chance and to command our encounter with the world according to the totalizing logic of management, optimization, and utility.

Strauss was not alone in recognizing and responding in his own way to modernity’s “oblivion of eternity.” This concern unites a disparate constellation of philosophers (disparate in the sense that each was not necessarily known or influenced by the others) and forms a counter-historical narrative to the history of the problem of time in 20th-century thought. On this alternative narrative, the “analytic of finitude,” the “empirical-transcendental doublet,” the “cogito and its unthought” and “the retreat and return of the origin” – to borrow here Michel Foucault’s useful four-fold characterization of the modern *episteme* – would have as its secret plot the forgetting of eternity. If, as Foucault proposes at the end of *Les mots et les choses*, “some event of which we at the moment do no more than sense the possibility (...) were to cause” the modern *episteme* to collapse, so that “one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea,” this event would, when cast in terms of modernity’s essential forgetting of eternity, take the form of an *anamnesis* of eternity (Foucault 1989: 422). Effaced by the waves of time’s unyielding expanse, the human might nonetheless emerge once again, re-born, in the image of an as yet unimagined eternity.

Among those philosophers committed to a recuperation of eternity against modernity’s oblivion, Jan Patočka and Krzysztof Michalski each occupies a unique place in the broader constellation of contemporary philosophical conceptions of eternity. Whereas the significance and configuration of eternity has been explored in Bergson, Rosenzweig, Whitehead, and Deleuze, the same cannot be said of either Patočka or (and especially) Michalski (see Latta 2014; Williams 2011) Unlike these other better known figures, neither Patočka or Michalski produced any systematic exposition of their philosophical views. Both thinkers, moreover, matured philosophically in the political climate of Eastern Europe, thus giving their respective philosophical thinking (as well as intellectual engagement) an unmistakable political edge that lines their common cause to “care of the soul” and “life in truth.” As I shall explore in this paper, both reject classical metaphysical notions of eternity as either a timeless present or a permanent present, as well as any metaphysical idea of immortality. Each develops instead a view of eternity

as an interruption and resistance within temporal existence. This emphasis on eternity as an instance of temporal disruption does not rely on any traditional notion of the “now” in the form of being-present. The instant of eternity is not identifiable as a moment, or now, whether as a permanent present or present without temporal affect. Yet, despite these significant aspects of commonality, Patočka and Michalski diverge significantly in their fundamental conception of how human life becomes meaningful in view of eternity’s disruptions. As I shall propose, whereas for Patočka human temporality attains meaning through a movement of *freedom in the rupture of eternity*, for Michalski human temporality attains meaning through a movement of *desire in the rapture of eternity*.

II

The concept of eternity is only delineated in fragmentary ways in Patočka’s writings: to the degree that Patočka’s concern with eternity changed over the course of his thinking and to the degree that Patočka did not aspire to a systematic exposition of his thinking during its development. As a defining theme of Patočka’s thinking, the concept of eternity is plotted according to a number of topical coordinates: the care of the soul, the idea Europe, the question of the whole, the movement of freedom, and the meaning of history. Central to Patočka’s guiding claim is the thought that the Idea of Europe, the praxis of politics, and the pursuit of philosophy are each predicated on the discovery of eternity as a vital problem for human existence, not, however, in terms of a desired immortality and promise of existence beyond human mortality, but as a certain authentic shaping of life within the bounds of finite human existence. As Patočka remarks in his home-seminars *Plato and Europe*, “the philosophical discovery of eternity is a peculiar thing.” The peculiarity of this *philosophical* discovery is not *that* human beings have with the epoch of Greek thought and culture become concerned with eternity, but rather *how* this concern becomes grasped in an original way as opening the possibility of a life in truth, philosophically as well as politically. Thus, although mythical consciousness before the Greek discovery of eternity was thoroughly imbued with an aspiration for immortality and vision of eternity (as Patočka explores in his interpretations of the Gilgamesh epic and the Genesis narrative), it is only with the advent of philosophy as “care for the soul” in view of truthful existence (truth of the self in relation to the truth of the whole) that eternity becomes properly discovered, not as an answer to the predicament of the human condition (as with a vision of immortality), but as a fundamental form of questioning and orientation in the world. The peculiarity of this philosophical discovery is this peculiarity of living in the form of an unsettled question and unsettling concern for *more*

than living in the form of time, that is, temporally, without any suppression or abandonment of what makes temporal existence so singular: its finitude.

A further peculiarity of the Greek discovery of eternity is its tragic destiny for Western civilization, or Europe. As roughly delineated and intermittently explored in Patočka's *Heretical Essays, Plato and Europe*, and other writings, the Greek discovery of eternity produced a double-effect: the institution of eternity as an original concern of human existence, thus thrusting human life into history properly speaking, and the institution of the forgetting and obscuring of this original concern. This dimension of self-oblivion inscribed within the destiny of this epochal discovery passes through, on Patočka's telling, four essential inflection points; with each inflection, there is a further unveiling of the value and significance of eternity for human life as well as a further progression in its forgetting and obscuring: Pre-Socratic thinking, Plato, Christianity, Nietzsche. The edges of these four epochal inflections are not clean; each should be understood as a transition and transformation that thickens the narrative of the forgetting of eternity as the veritable plot of Western history leading to the modern age. Patočka does not argue for any *single* moment of origin (the origin is always in the plural): the so-called "original discovery" of the problem of eternity as the question of the care of the soul in Plato is itself preceded by an "original discovery" of eternity in Pre-Socratic fragments, which, in turn, is preceded by an "original discovery" of the problem of mortality, or human finitude, in the Epic of Gilgamesh and Greek tragedy (see de Warren 2016b). In the same vein, the eclipse of eternity with the culmination of the modern age in Nietzsche and the metaphysical catastrophe of 20th century does not announce an end without an after life. The question of the end issues from what remains after the end. Ever since "the" beginning, Europe remained after Europe (much as philosophy remained after philosophy), as both what comes *after* the end and as what it is *after* from the beginning.

The initial decisive impulse in this imbricated discovery of eternity (as both its unveiling and veiling, remembrance and forgetting) is located by Patočka in the Pre-Socratic fragments and, in particular, with Anaximander. In this regard, Patočka follows in the vein of Heidegger's approach to the Pre-Socratic thinkers; his own reading of Anaximander is especially under the sway of Heidegger's thinking. In his 1946 essay "Der Spruch des Anaximander," Heidegger proposes that "das Geschick des Abend-Landes hängt an der Übersetzung des Wortes εἶναι" (Heidegger 1980: 340). In the fragments of Anaximander, Heidegger identifies an unthought ambiguity in the employment of the Greek participle ὄν. As Heidegger comments: "Thus ὄν says 'being' in the sense of to be a being; at the same time it names a being which is. In the duality of the participial significance of ὄν the distinction between 'to be' and 'a being' lies concealed" (Heidegger 1975: 32). This concealment belies and displaces from view, and hence thinking, the ontological

difference between “beings” and “Being.” It is in fact this tension within the participle ὄν, as either a nominal meaning or verbal meaning (“to be” and “to being,” as it were), upon which the metaphysical forgetting of being is grounded and propelled. As Heidegger argues, “the history of Being begins with the oblivion of Being, since Being – together with its essence, its distinction from entities – keeps to itself.” Insofar as this distinction must remain unthought and forgotten for there to be an history of metaphysics, “the oblivion of Being is oblivion of the distinction between Being and beings” (Heidegger 1975: 50). Heidegger additionally discerns in the Greek τὸ χρεών what he calls a first naming of being; it is a naming that bespeaks an experience of being which will become named again, and differently, with other critical (and fateful) terms of Greek thinking: Μοῖρα in Parmenides, Λόγος in Heraclitus, ἰδέα in Plato, and ἐνέργεια in Aristotle. In the fragments of Anaximander, as “the oldest fragment of Western thinking,” Heidegger understands the event of Being – “presencing” – as enjoined in a two-fold absence, as approach to and passing from, or what he terms “jointure” (*Fuge*) – the name given by Heidegger to Anaximander’s Greek term Δίκη (“justice”). Within the reigning principle of “justice” – jointure – there pervades “injustice” or “disjointure” as marking the traces of an ontological difference (Heidegger 1980: 317).²

In contrast to Heidegger’s reading, Patočka repeatedly emphasizes in *Plato and Europe* the Greek experience of being as ἀγήρωσ (“ageless” or “never-aging”), thus placing an accent on the dimension of “eternity” as essential for grasping both the difference between beings and Being as well as the consequences of its metaphysical oblivion. For Patočka, it is revealing that Anaximander characterizes τὸ ἀπειρον (“the boundless” or “the infinite”) as ἀγήρωσ in a comparable sense with the Homeric image of the gods as ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήρωσ (“immortal and ageless”).³ As Marcel Conche notes, the boundless as eternal means in Anaximander’s thought “what retains its vital force” (Conche 1991: 148–149). As “deathless” and “imperishable,” as alive and divine, τὸ ἀπειρον, as the principle of all things, “encompasses and steers all things,” where the conjunction of “to steer”/“to guide” and “to encompass”/“to pervade” in Anaximander’s fragment possess cosmological *and* political significance (Naddaf 2005: 66). Patočka lends a self-marking turn (i.e., marking his own thinking) to the meaning of “agelessness of being” in speaking of the resistance within the ebb and flow of manifestation to any seamless consolidation of “what-is” into “being-present.” With this inflection of the agelessness of being as resistance, not only prosaically towards temporal ebb and flow, but more revealing, as resistance to the seamless smoothing, as it

² See also the 1941 lectures *Grundbegriffe*. The Anaximander fragment: “Whence things have their origin, there they must also pass away according to necessity; for they must pay penalty and be judged for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time.”

³ Anaximander, DK 12, A 11, B2.

were, of the constitutive tension within the Greek participle ὄν (as marking the ontological difference), Patočka seeks to reanimate Anaximander's discovery of τὸ ἀπειρον as the ἀρχή ("source" or "principle") of all things. Patočka attempts to extend the experience of what Heidegger called the "epoché of being" (*die Epoche des Seins*) – the manner in which being withholds itself from its own allowance of manifestation – in a more intrepid form in which τὸ ἀπειρον in its "agelessness" exceeds and resists any seamless manifestation. The various names of philosophical thought *given* to this original experience of eternity would thus translate an undecidable principle of resistance against any translation or manifestation of itself. The "substrate" (τὸ ὑποκειμενον) of "the agelessness of infinite" is neither "being" nor a material or spatial thing, but, as Patočka tele-graphs through this reading, freedom as an unbounded resistance against the decline of the world and as an elevation of vitality, or life itself.

Patočka lessens to the point of erasure an *ontological* determination of eternity in speaking repeatedly of eternity as *resistance*. As Patočka proposes: "It [eternity] is after all a resistance, a battle against that fall, against time, against the entire declining tendency of the world and of life. In a certain sense, this battle is understandably futile, but in another sense it is not, because the situation in which man finds himself varies accordingly to how he confronts it. And freedom of mankind lies – perhaps – exactly in this!" (Patočka 2002: 13).⁴ Patočka's characterization of eternity as "resistance" carries an implicit political significance as well as explicit metaphysical significance. What reigns through the order of being in its double ebbing and flowing, approaching and passing away, is the "disjuncture" or "rift" of eternity as resistance against "the entire declining tendency of the world." In turning back to Anaximander's fragments, Patočka discerns the traces of an *experience* of eternity as disruption ("injustice") within the ontological order of temporality, or being-present. Patočka in this manner retains Anaximander's term "the infinite" (or "the boundless") – τὸ ἀπειρον – to name the source of all things while in the same gesture displacing any ontological determination, or claim, to the meaning of "the boundless" as intellect, space, or even, "Being."⁵ As source or principle of all things, τὸ ἀπειρον is itself nothing, neither a kind of being or Being as such. On this interpretation, the "substrate" of τὸ ἀπειρον is freedom as manifest in "unbounded" resistance against the decline of the world in terms of which vitality becomes preserved and elevated. In a primary existential sense, freedom manifests itself in a necessary and liberating form of *injustice*. This injustice of eternity expresses an absence of power, or, formulated more explicitly, the power of powerlessness. The "agelessness of being" of "the unbounded" is

⁴ As Marcel Conche suggests, the boundless (*aperion*) as "eternal" (*aion*) signifies in Anaximander's thought "what retains its vital force." See Conche 1991: 148–149.

⁵ On the different possible interpretations of [arche] and [apeiron], see Conche 1991: 54–77.

movement of resistance, or “disjointure,” of eternity’s higher of law of injustice.⁶ As Patočka proposes in other writings, and explicitly in his essay on the Czech poet Mácha, “original temporality, with its moments of being-ahead, repetition, and the instant, are manifest in Mácha in the rupture operated in the midst of time by eternity.” This experience of the “ecstasy of eternity,” here understood as the rupture or shaking of freedom from perpetual decline and the pre-giveness of the world, is figured as “nothing,” or, in Mácha poetic image, an “obscure sentiment” of emptiness (Patočka 1990: 269). As Patočka comments: “We actually find in the poet the distinction between vulgar time, which is an ‘eternal here’ [*eternal it was*], and the rupture operative by eternity which announces itself as ‘nothing’ with which one must come to terms, towards which one must be ahead of” (Patočka 1990: 272).⁷ This experience of eternity does not represent a “pallid intellectualism” or “idea” in an abstract sense, as either psychological illusion, metaphysical existence, or Idea of reason. Instead, this pursuit of eternity as an aspirational resistance against the decline of the world is embodied in a form of life dedicated to the care of the soul.

In Patočka’s narrative of the discovery of eternity amongst Greek thinking, it is Plato who discovers eternity as indispensable for a genuine form of human life (both individual as well as collective). As Patočka remarks: “for the first time [*in Greek culture*] the soul [*with Plato*] is something that even in its fate after death is something that lives from within. Its fate after death becomes a component of its entire concern and care of itself” (Patočka 2002: 126). Even as Plato discovered the care of the soul in its orientation towards eternity, Patočka argues that Plato mis-understood the significance of his own discovery. Plato’s dialogues present different images of the soul’s aspiration to eternity that confuse an openness towards eternity with the soul’s achievement of immortal existence. Central to the “care of the soul” is the question of immortality: “that, if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect to this time, which we call life, but in respect to all time, and if we neglect it, the danger now appears to be terrible. For if death were an escape from everything, it would be a boon to the wicked, for when they die they would be freed from the body and from their wickedness together with their souls. But now, since the soul is seen to be immortal, it cannot escape” (*Phaedo*, 107c). The care of the soul is orientated towards a preparation, or care, for death (μελέτη θανάτου) which Socrates equates with the beginning of philosophical thought and the life of philosophy. As Patočka remarks: “In relation to itself, the soul is the discoverer of eternity. The soul extends toward eternity, and its most

⁶ See Derrida’s reading of Anaximander and the “undecidable” of the “higher law” in *Specters of Marx*.

⁷ For Mácha’s poem *May*: <https://czech.mml.ox.ac.uk/karel-hynek-macha-maj-1836> (access: 23.04.2019).

proper problem – the problem of the status of its own being – is the problem of this constitutive relation to eternity: whether in its being it is something fleeting, or whether in its depths it is not something eternal” (Patočka 2002: 125).

The care of the soul can be disassociated from any *necessary* philosophical commitment to immortality, while still retaining what is central to its philosophical significance, an elevation of human life. With eternity as the animating principle for the care of the soul’s elevation, the achievement of a *life worth living* takes an orientation towards eternity, and not immortality, if latter represents an imperishable state of being or after-life. Whereas the quest for immortality is predicated on the abandonment of the body, as the embodiment of natural decline and decay, the pursuit of eternity remains bound to the decline of the world. As Patočka states: “This is the attempt to embody what is eternal within time, and within one’s own being, and at the same time, an effort to stand firm in the storm of time, stand firm in all dangers carried within it, to stand firm when the care of the soul becomes dangerous for a human being” (Patočka 2002: 87). An orientation towards eternity is anchored within the soul’s care for itself *before* death, and not a concern with securing the soul’s continued existence *after* death. The soul’s orientation towards eternity within its mortal existence is thus different in practice and concept from a vision of the soul’s immortal endurance after death. With the latter, death represents a moment of separation, when the soul attains immortality for itself. With the former, caring for one’s death in view of eternity allows for an orientation towards life from within life itself. As Patočka suggests, to live *in* eternity is to embrace life in a transcendence, or exposure, to something greater than life itself – to the “higher law” of injustice, or freedom in resistance to pre-given meaning and repetitive attachments within the order of being.

Within the wider scope of Patočka’s narrative of Western metaphysics, the epochal transformation of Christianity produces a “deepening” of the Platonic understanding of the care of the soul, and hence, of the sense in which the “soul has its own eternity,” not, however, in any terms of *being or becoming* eternal, i.e., immortal, but in terms of possessing itself authentically in an exposure towards eternity (Patočka 2002: 12). The defining insight of Christianity, its “abysmal deepening of the soul,” is principally understood by Patočka through the concept of the person (i.e., care of the soul) as an immanent self-responsibility in an absolute transcendence towards God. As Patočka explains: “The responsible human as such is *I*; it is an individual that is not identical with any role it could possibly assume.” The non-identity of the self with its objectified roles and functions in the world establishes the locus for its constitution as responsibility. Self-responsibility centers on an inscrutable axis of conversion. The responsible self shoulders its own existence in opening itself to a transcendence beyond the world of pre-given meanings and towards a God who sees without being seen, hidden,

as it were, beyond being. This inscrutable transcendence, or mystery, manifests itself, or “breaks through,” with the experience of death as an ontological revelation. As Patočka writes: “in the confrontation with death and in coming to terms with nothingness it [*the person*] takes upon itself what we all must carry out in ourselves, where no one can take our place” (Patočka 1996: 107).

Christianity, however, despite this “deepening” of the significance of eternity for the care of the soul critically leaves the concept of the person inadequately thought. In a clear allusion to Dostoevsky’s *Brothers Karamazov*, Patočka proposes that the person is “vested in a relation to an infinite love and humans are individuals because they are guilty, and *always* guilty, with respect to it” (Patočka 1996: 107).⁸ The image of transcendence towards God and eternity, in terms of which human existence becomes vested with an inscrutable and absolute responsibility, thus rupturing its attachments to the world for the sake of their transformation and authentic re-positioning, remains captivated by a Greek understanding of transcendence. Christianity has yet to arrive at itself in remaining the hostage of Greek thinking (Plato) even as it breaks with Plato’s “anonymous” transcendence of the Good. On the one hand, as Patočka writes: “Nietzsche coined the saying that Christianity is Platonism for the people and there is this much truth in it, in that the Christian God took over the transcendence of the onto-theological conception as a matter of course.” On the other hand: “Christianity remains thus far the greatest, unsurpassed but also un-thought human *élan or upswing* that enabled humans to struggle against decadence” (Patočka 1996: 108; my italics, translation modified).

III

This opposition between Nietzsche and Christianity plays a critical role in Patočka’s understanding of modernity as forgetting of eternity. Nietzsche’s effort to surpass and over-turn Christianity hinges on this argument that Christianity represents a trans-valued form of Platonism – a Platonism for the masses. In his manner, Nietzsche proposes that Christianity contains the impulse for its own collapse into modern nihilism. The Christian foundation of the world of becoming in the eternal being of God becomes inverted into its opposite. In response to the nihilism of the “Last Humans,” Nietzsche’s image of the “Over-Human,” for Patočka, represents the reversal of Christianity. As he writes: “In place of the ideals of the beyond, Nietzsche establishes the project of becoming master of the earth, and to submit the planet to the will to will.” As he further remarks: “A novel doctrine of time and eternity comes to crown this metaphysics of worldliness.” The

⁸ For an interpretation of the importance of Dostoevsky for Patočka, see de Warren 2015.

“Over-Human” is “perfectly worldly” in regarding the world as “infinite reserve of energy” within an infinite of time of repetition. On this reading, Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal recurrence represents the triumph of “mechanistic metaphysics” and technological science, and, in this regard, marks the final eclipsing of eternity as rupture of transcendence within the world.

In his reflections on the meaning of history in the *Heretical Essays* – essays which partially emerged from a young Michalski’s instigation – as well as in a significant continuation, and perhaps even re-calibration, of Patočka’s thinking in one of his final texts, *Autour de la philosophie de la religion de Masaryk*, Patočka recognizes Nietzsche as bringing metaphysical thinking to its consequent end, as the fulfillment of modern subjectivity’s self-appointed mastery over beings (see Patočka, Michalski 2015). On this reading, nihilism is considered as an elemental constituent of Nietzsche’s philosophy of history and his incisive critique of the historical present. In underpinning the crisis of modernity, nihilism does not just define the predicament of the 19th century, but, as Nietzsche explored in his writings, brings to its culmination the history of Western metaphysical thought since its Greek and, more pointedly, Platonic origins. In keeping with the guiding line of Heidegger’s influential interpretation, Patočka argues that nihilism represents in Nietzsche’s thinking the metaphysical condition of the modern age. Under the title of Platonism, metaphysical thinking established a validation of the world based on an ontological difference between “being” and “becoming,” between the eternal, conceived as a transcendent form of presence without beginning or end, and time, conceived as the immanent texture of becoming; on this image of thought, the many senses of what it is to be in the world are determined by an appeal to an order of being, of what truly is, or obtains, which itself remains indifferent to becoming. This metaphysical difference between eternity and time becomes repeated and displaced with the advent of Christianity and its institution of a kingdom of God, whose perfected being radically transcends the world of becoming. With the “death of God” so vociferously proclaimed by the avatars of the Enlightenment, the emergence of nihilism in the modern age attests for Nietzsche to the self-imploding consequence of such a metaphysical interpretation of the world.

The devaluation and forgetting of eternity defines modernity with two alternatives, both of which are rejected by Patočka. Either the rational alternative proposed by Kant – human life can support itself only the basis of postulates of practical reason, which are heuristic devices to secure the sense of eternity *as if* eternity remained a vital principle; or Nietzsche’s alternative of the Over-Human and the Will to Power. For this Nietzschean view, on Patočka’s reading, human beings can no longer rely on a world “beyond” or on a transcendent signifier (“God is dead”) and must instead find (a) source(s) of meaning in its own affirmation of power and mastery of the world, thus giving birth to a new form of humanity, the

Over-Human, which declares itself autonomous and the source of supreme value. This is mirrored in the thought of eternal recurrence, which Patočka understands as eternal repetition of the same (identical). This thought is the “absolutization” of the instinctual, corporeal self, such that subjectivity elevates itself, appoints itself, affirms itself as supreme source of meaning in the form of an “unconditioned animality” – to wit a new form of animality, beyond traditional difference between animal and human. Whereas the Kantian alternative subsumes religion, the relics of religion, to a secular form of reason, the Nietzschean alternative envisions an Over-Human, makes the Human into a new form of divinity.

Seen through the lens of Nietzsche’s thinking, Patočka distinguishes between two contrasting forms of modern nihilism: passive nihilism and active nihilism. Passive nihilism revolts against any appeal to a transcendent being or beyond, yet nonetheless finds itself unable to accommodate itself to a world bereft of any sheltering sky with the death of God. This revolt against God reaches a perfect pitch of intensity with a self-destructive rage against the world in the absence of God. As with Ivan Karamazov, passive nihilism suffers from what it vigorously denies only to surreptitiously desire it *ex nihilo* in a profound resentment against God, to be a God. At the core of passive nihilism resides the yawning chasm of a metaphysical horror that breaks into the world even as this world bereft of God strives to keep the revelation of Horror – the Apocalypse – at bay.

Active nihilism represents Nietzsche’s response to nihilism. As critically understood by Patočka, the death of God, as Zarathustra announces, heralds the birth of the Over-Human and the doctrine of the Will to Power. Nietzsche’s Over-Human represents the affirmation of the Will to Power and unchecked amplitude of modern subjectivism: in the absence of any transcendent God, the human being affirms itself as a new god. In keeping with basic outlines of Heidegger’s influential reading, the modern age of metaphysics is formed from active nihilism and the transformative dominance of technology. In lieu of any traditional transcendent values – God, historical progress, etc. – the modern age promises the emergence of new humanity through technological transformation and mastery of the Earth, or the totality of beings. The Over-Human attains the place once represented by transcendence in affirming itself the immanent master over beings. Time is not suppressed or surpassed through an appeal to eternity, but on the contrary, time becomes fully dominated, controlled, and programmed.

For Patočka, there are two direct consequences of this Nietzschean endorsement of active nihilism. The Will to Power defines in metaphysical terms the essence of the 20th century as war. Central to this drama is the not only the perpetual and destructive conflicts of wars without end, but the irruption of another scene of war, or *polemos*, between the Last Humans and the Over-Human, as momentarily glimpsed with the frontline experience of the First World War in its eschatological

(albeit failed) promise in the writings of Jünger and de Chardin. The Will to Power represents the affirmation of Titanism, or the mastery of beings through the self-affirmation of modern subjectivism, with the caveat, however, that the veritable subject, or agency, of modern subjectivism is, in fact, technology. In its mobilization of power over beings, the essence of modern technology follows an autonomous, self-propelled course of expansion and development, under the Promethean guise of serving as a mere instrument for the realization of the worldly projects of human life. In truth, technology drives subjectivism; the modern subject, in its dependence on technology for the reshaping of the world in its presumed image, transforms the world into an inhuman image in which the subject nonetheless persists in the illusion of its own autonomy. As Patočka observes, in the doctrine of the eternal return, “eternity will not exist in transcendence but here in the absolute down-below in the form of infinite repetition.” The infinite becomes the repetition of the same in the complete erasure of any ontological difference and resistance of disjointure, or injustice. “The eternal return would be an ‘idea’ that could inspire the activity of men dedicated to worldly fanaticism and who aim at taking possession of total truth and exclusive possession of beings” (Patočka 1985: 200).

IV

In *The Flame of Eternity*, Michalski responds to the modern oblivion of eternity through a deeply personal confrontation with Nietzsche’s thinking shaped around the central claim that the central problem which animates Nietzsche’s writings is the question of time *and* eternity. Noticeably, this emphasis on eternity in Nietzsche’s thinking takes its bearings from a reference point that shadows Michalski’s thinking, one very much inscribed within his own personal biography (see Patočka, Michalski 2015). Although never explicitly referenced, Michalski’s guiding insight into the centrality of eternity innovatively takes up Patočka’s claim that philosophy discovers eternity as its principal theme. Yet, against Patočka’s critical appraisal of Nietzsche as marking the completed forgetting of eternity in its devaluation as the eternal return, Michalski proposes a novel interpretation of Nietzsche’s celebrated and contested doctrine both against the grain of Patočka’s own reading and yet in the grain of Patočka’s own insight into the “higher justice,” “nothingness,” and “resistance” of eternity’s instants of rupture. Michalski’s redemption of Nietzsche from the history of metaphysics as the closure of eternity further deepens the sense in which Patočka considered Christianity as the unsurpassed yet unthought *élan* against the decline of the world.

Michalski’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s thinking revolves around the figure of Zarathustra, whose embodiment of truthfulness as the highest of virtues, whose

overcoming of the pretensions of morality, and whose efforts to awaken the Last Human from his dogmatic slumber are probed and pursued over the course of his reflections in *The Flame of Eternity*. The proposition here is that “understanding what links these seemingly conflicting, or even mutually exclusive, concepts – eternity and passing, Paradise and its loss – this is the task Nietzsche posed to himself in the story of Zarathustra. Zarathustra, *the teacher of the eternal return*” (Michalski 2011: 155). If Nietzsche could write in *The Birth of Tragedy* the celebrated statement that “only as an aesthetic phenomena are existence and the world justified,” in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche is able to more fully express this defining human need for redemption under the heading of the eternal recurrence of the same: “To redeem that which has passed away and re-create the ‘It was’ into a ‘Thus I willed it!’ – that alone should I call redemption!” As Zarathustra declares: “‘It was’: that is the will’s gnashing of teeth and loneliest sorrow (...). Backwards the will is unable to will; that it cannot break time and time’s desire – that is the will’s loneliest sorrow” (Nietzsche 2008: 121). The problem – for Zarathustra and for Michalski – is that the sadness of time and the search for innocence as a revitalizing movement of life against nihilism, or the redemption of life from its temporal existence, defines what matter most for human life. It is not an issue of either truth or justification, but something more akin to a creative freedom within time (not from time) that would usher forth in a “sacred affirmation” of life. As Michalski formulates the desire of philosophy: “To the liberation of the freedom hidden within our lives, which have been distorted by nihilism. To affirmative creation” (Michalski 2011: 15).

A concern with eternity animates Nietzsche’s writings until its final crystallization in the thought of the eternal recurrence in the teachings of Zarathustra. This refraction of eternity within Nietzsche’s *oeuvre* reflects Michalski’s contention that eternity constitutes an intrinsic element of time, but not as standing outside or beyond time, nor as what might robustly endure in sempiternal indifference towards time’s passage. Eternity is neither for Nietzsche just an idea or a concept, but, as Michalski stresses, a *physiological* notion. It is the body that expresses most intimately and inescapably the temporality of human life in its ebb and flow, within which burns the flame of eternity. As developed by Michalski, Nietzsche’s thinking does not consider eternity as involving a suppression, abandonment, or transcendence of time. In the thought of the eternal recurrence, eternity is not envisioned as a present without beginning or end, nor as an indeterminate present extended to infinity, nor as cyclical repetition. Eternity is what Michalski calls the “core” and “essence” of time – ever present, ever returning, yet never enjoining a fixed position within the succession of time. Eternity is not a moment *in* time nor a moment *outside* of time; eternity is the instant in which time becomes renewed, but never exactly as the same time which just was or just will be. There is thus an essential difference between the moment and the instant: whereas the moment is the form

of an experience of the now inscribed within the passage of time, hence a moment with regard to before and after, the instant is the experience of a renewing disjunction of time's sedimentation and progression.⁹ The instant of eternity opens a breathless interval within time in which time as such, and my life in time, can be renewed as a whole without thereby becoming a whole. This interval of eternity – the instant – is not an interval spanning before and after, which would allow for a passage from one moment to the next. Rather, this instant marks a disruption of temporal existence in its unquestioned self-acceptance. Eternity is thought under the sign of a fracture within life as the impossibility of uniting life in its passing into a unified totality, or whole. This recurring, yet seized instant of eternity holds life apart from itself by rupturing any definitive self-enclosure of life within itself or, indeed, within the world of its mundane cares.

V

Zarathustra's speeches are structured dramatically into a *Bildungs* narrative, which gravitates around the visions he receives in Part Three while aboard a ship crossing the sea from the Isles of the Blest. Part One of Nietzsche's operatic work centers on the announcement of the death of God and the overcoming of the Last Human. At the beginning of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, after his salutation to the sun, Zarathustra descends to bring fire into the hearts of men, the Last Humans, who wish to know nothing of the twilight of the gods. Brusquely rejected by the crowds of the market-place, Zarathustra searches for companions – animals, beggars, cripples – for his teachings, who in turn fail to understand him. In "On Redemption," Zarathustra identifies the eternal recurrence as critical to his teachings yet remains himself inadequate to the demand placed upon him by this singular thought. In Part Two, Zarathustra's speeches center on the Will to Power and the Over-Human. Freedom is here the driving thought. Part Three finds Zarathustra, the Wanderer, having abandoned his friends upon the Isles of the Blest. He sets across the sea by ship, where along the way he is graced with a revelation of his guiding star, the eternal recurrence of the same, in "On the Vision and Riddle." Whereas Zarathustra announces the death of God and the death of the Last Human to everybody (in the market-place) and then teaches the Will to Power and the Over-Man to fewer (to his companions after his rejection in the market-place), the eternal recurrence is only spoken to himself – to everybody and to nobody.

⁹ Michalski himself does not clearly distinguish terminologically between "the moment" and "the instant." I am here delineating this difference in order to render more explicit Michalski's operative distinction between the moment, as a moment *of* time, and the instant, as the instance *of* eternity within time.

Significantly, Zarathustra reveals his vision while aboard a ship at sea, addressing “you, bold searchers” and “whoever has embarked with cunning sails upon terrifying seas” (Nietzsche 2008: 134). In this vision, Zarathustra recounts how, while climbing upwards at twilight, he discovers on his shoulder a strange, whispering creature – half dwarf, half mole. Zarathustra challenges the dwarf to bear his own “abyss-deep thought,” and as the dwarf jumps down from Zarathustra’s shoulder, they find themselves standing in front of a gateway. Zarathustra declares: “Behold this gateway, dwarf! It has two faces.” It is a gateway between two paths, one extending back into the past for eternity and the other reaching into the future for eternity. The gateway, as inscribed above, is the Moment in which both paths meet yet diverge. The dwarf rejects a linear reading of this metaphor of time: for the dwarf, “time itself is a circle,” for whatever has been will always be, much as whatever is to be will always have been. As he pronounces: “And this slow-moving spider, crawling in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself (...) must we not eternally come back again?” Suddenly, Zarathustra’s conversation with the dwarf is interrupted by a dog’s howling. The scene transforms, as Zarathustra now finds himself alone, without the dwarf, no longer standing at the gateway, “in the most desolate moonlight.” Zarathustra now beholds a frightening spectacle: a young shepherd, writhing and convulsing, with a large black snake emerging from his mouth. Desperately, Zarathustra tries to pull the snake from the shepherd’s mouth and cries out to bite the snake’s head-off. The shepherd bites and spits out the snake’s head. No longer shepherd, no longer human, he laughs. Zarathustra closes his account of this cryptic vision with the challenge: “Guess for me this riddle that I saw then; interpret for me the vision of the loneliest!” (Nietzsche 2008: 138).

Michalski’s reading of this vision of the loneliest calls attention to the shift from the discussion with the dwarf standing before the gateway “the Moment” to the frightful scene of the shepherd and the emerging snake from his mouth. The gateway poses the question of time, to which the dwarf represents, or proposes, an answer.

What is this question? The passage of time does not merely split a past that once was from a future yet to be. Within this streaming of time, there is a continual slippage of possibilities, of times not taken or seized. Against these slippages of times within time, we desire to hold onto every moment, as if we could hold in every moment today and tomorrow (today for tomorrow and tomorrow for today), a moment that would never pass us by, a moment we would never miss; and in such a pristine moment we would dream of plunging and submerging ever deeper, so as to never return to the unceasing ebb and flow of moments forever passing by, and so find refuge from the ravages and sadness of time. Every moment takes shape as something like a decision that separates a time that could have been from a time that will have been. With each decision in our lives, we feel as if life becomes split

in two, the one we have become and the one we might have become. With each moment as a decision, we continue to live down the path we have chosen, to which we are riveted; and yet remain haunted by the shadow of another life, or lives, that might have just as well been, and which, even with its separation into the never-was, still accompanies us as we careen down the path we have chosen for ourselves. We might begin to regret this other life not taken, and all these other lives which continue to speak to us from afar, calling upon us to re-make a choice that cannot be undone. Is there something like a kipple of lives which we accumulate as we live: the kipple of paths not taken, lovers not chosen, and decisions not made or made otherwise? We are burdened by this kipple of our own lives, cast away as shadows of what might have been and who we might have become; but we never lose anything about ourselves, and, in this sense, nothing is ever left behind; we seem to carry ourselves fully, and that is the weight that crushes us.

Michalski does not frame the eternal recurrence in terms of the weight of decisions, whose consequences can be neither known nor controlled, and, in this sense, he follows Zarathustra's rejection of the dwarf's spirit of gravity. He equally rejects the popular rendition of what Kundera (2009) called Nietzsche's "mad myth," namely, that Nietzsche's "idea of eternal return is a mysterious one, and Nietzsche has often perplexed other philosophers with it: to think that everything recurs as we once experienced it, and that the recurrence itself recurs ad infinitum." The mystery, for Michalski, lies elsewhere than with this apparent puzzle of a recurrence ad infinitum. The attempt to decipher the parable of the gateway and the dwarf's response does not involve alternative interpretations. Rather, the transition to the scene of shepherd and the snake represents a transformation of the *situation* in which the question of time becomes posed, confronted, and engaged. As Michalski observes: "It is not, therefore, primarily the words (of the dwarf) that stand corrected but the situation in which they are said. This is why there is a change of scene" (Michalski 2011: 181). Flashing forth like a nightmare in the twinkle of an eye, this scene with the shepherd and the snake shifts the focus from the Moment to the Instant, where the instant of eternity is not understood as a gateway between an infinite past and infinite future. The instant of the eternal recurrence can only be grasped, or lived, by a person who, like the shepherd, is struggling inwardly with time itself, i.e., with the snake. The implicit point is that the shepherd is, in fact, Zarathustra himself: only Zarathustra can answer the riddle of his vision; only a person in whom Zarathustra lives can likewise speak to the riddle of Zarathustra's vision.

In contrast to the moment, the instant is not open to another instant placed in the future. It is, instead, pregnant with a future that is not entirely defined or anticipated by the present and the sedimentation of the past. The instant is here characterized by the shepherd's violent dismembering of the snake. As a representation

of time in its sinuous progression, as either an image of a continuous linear progression or, as with the mythical Ouroboros as a representation of the eternal cycle of renewal, the snake becomes severed. In mythical thought, the image of a snake eating its own tail (the Ouroboros) signified the cycle of life and death. Yet, it is precisely this notion of the eternal recurrence that is literally bitten-off with the shepherd's transformative experience. The instant is this act of self-transformation; the shepherd has been liberated from images of time as either cyclical return or as the gateway between two eternities. The past becomes released, much as Zarathustra is no longer burdened by the spirit of gravity (the dwarf sitting on his shoulder), in the laughter of an affirmative "Yes" to time once again; the act of biting off the snake's head keeps the mouth open for the emergence of yet another snake (to keep within the logic of this image). Eternity is not the snake that encircles, but the snake that engorges the shepherd while at the same time, by the shepherd's very action, becoming decapitated, severed, and disjointed. In this sense, the shepherd's biting off the snake's head becomes itself repeated eternally. It is not a liberation *from* time enacted once and for all, nor a submission to the cycle of undifferentiated repetition. The snake will return to engorge the shepherd; the shepherd will once again, and always, bite off the snake's head; and the shepherd will laugh, repeatedly, albeit differently, until the end of time.

Michalski further proposes that the instant takes on a special meaning for Nietzsche's thought of the eternal recurrence. The instant is neither singular nor plural. It is neither an unrepeatable instance nor a repeatable moment. It is not singular because the instant is not self-enclosed; it is not plural because it cannot be repeated. Neither singular nor plural, the instant is the instance of self-renewal and self-transformation in otherness. As he writes: "Eternity is its hidden current, its inextinguishable fire – its vitality, which shatters any form it may attain" (Michalski 2011: 187). If, as suggested by this reading of the shepherd and the snake, the instant of eternity does not liberate life completely, once and for all, from time, the implication is that Zarathustra's own vision of the eternal recurrence does not represent a refutation of the dwarf's cyclical image of time. In Nietzsche's parable, the dwarf represents knowledge, the termites of reduction, and the spirit of gravity, while Zarathustra represents lightness, laughter, and the abundance of overflowing freedom. This conflict is itself unending. As Michalski states: "The dwarf and Zarathustra, the spirit of gravity and the dancing god, the peace that knowledge brings and the risk of life: two human/inhuman figures bound together by an irresolvable conflict, empty so long as I do not inscribe them within my own life. The human condition" (Michalski 2011: 199).

This stress on the disruption of eternity in time, as a leveraging instant for the transformation of life, shatters the binding of the past without leaving it behind. The instant of rupture produces a discontinuity that does not sever time from

itself, erasing or suppressing the “it was” as if it never was. Instead, the transformation of time is thought as a re-contextualization or resituating of the past (and future) with regard to the renewed present that finds its axis on another vector of life. The past is not left behind but assumed once more, yet from a perspective that this very past could neither anticipate nor inhibit. The past is, when continually renewed, re-inscribed into life to become sedimented once more. In this manner, the instant of eternity does not break the horizontal line of time in favor of a vertical height of transcendence. Michalski abandons the classical topology of horizontal and vertical: the flow of time becomes circumscribed once again from an eccentric axis that is other than the axis along which time, and my life in time, has hitherto unfolded. As Zarathustra remarks: “Die Mitte ist überall. Krumm ist der Pfad der Ewigkeit” (Nietzsche 2008: 190).¹⁰

Eternity is an instant, yet this instant interrupts the immanence of time so as to incite a rupture within the seamless continuity of temporal progression and its supported fixed world of meanings, leaving us momentarily breathless. The instant of eternity does not have the form of the now. The instant stands opposed to the now: for if every now can in principle enter into a settled relation of before and after then the instant disrupts the chronological structuring of time. If eternity, as the instant within time that finds no place in time, is understood as the force of temporal disruption, then this disjointing of time does not open *another* temporality along a vertical line. The instant throws time off its axis, either in terms of a past that has become monumentalized (or antiquated) or in terms of a future that has been immortalized (as the telos of history, ideal of human perfection, etc.). In throwing time out of joint, the instant does not displace time onto another axis, certainly not onto the axis of God’s glory or a Kingdom of Ends. On the contrary, the instant of eternity decenters time without providing its own center, another center. In this sense, there is no “order of eternity” or “eternal order,” nor does Michalski ever succumb to the temptation of adopting the geometry of verticality in speaking of eternity. Eternity is not an axis of orientation in contrast to the horizontal axis of time. The disruptive instant of eternity never arrives from where we expect it nor from where we last experienced it. It enters into time sideways on and slips into life like a knife. The classical configuration of time and eternity as the intersection in every moment of a horizontal sequence of nows and the vertical transcendence of the Now is surpassed. Temporality is woven from a pluralization of angular vectors within time without any stabilizing verticality or uniform horizontality.

Along with this angular interaction between eternity (the instant) and time (the now with regard to before and after), the meaning of “shattering” itself changes.

¹⁰ “The center is everywhere. Crooked is the path of eternity.”

This notion of shattering, central to Michalski's conception of the care of the self, exhibits an evident proximity with Patočka's thinking. Such a "shattering" communicates an image of radical transformation in terms of action, such that when Michalski speaks of the Will to Power as self-overcoming, popular images come to mind of being born again, changing radically our clothing, our views, or other forms of heroic elevation. Such images might further raise the suspicion that a Romanticism, revolutionary or spiritual, still lingers in Michalski's thinking, or even a certain decisionistic heroism. Yet, Michalski does not endorse such radical self-transformation in terms of action or revolution. His guiding thought is rather the Biblical image of the Apocalypse, which, in its original Greek meaning of "uncovering" or "disclosure" (ἀποκάλυψις), assigns to such a transformation the essential mode of *seeing*. Self-transformation is predicated on assuming a radically different way of seeing, as seeing myself beyond and other than myself, as open to what Michalski calls "new spaces of possibilities." These "new possibilities" are fraught with risk and allow my life as such to become "re-dimensionalized" so as to give myself more leeway within my own life-span to become myself anew.

In this optic, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* comes to be regarded as the Revelation of John of Patmos retold and reconfigured. Zarathustra is Christ reborn. As Michalski proposes: "Perhaps, however, the Nietzschean interpretation of life as the *will to power* implies not only a critique of Christianity but also a unique reading of the Biblical story of Jesus" (Michalski 2011: 175). Against the grain of Nietzsche scholarship, Michalski argues that Nietzsche's thinking is profoundly haunted by a "struggle with God." This struggle with God "opens the door to an understanding of religion that may also prove convincing to a mind living among a multitude of incompatible meanings, a diversity of cultures, in a modernity permeated by science." Zarathustra's announcement of the death of God and the rebirth of Dionysius does not foretell a world without God, but a world in which the radicalism of God can be thought and experienced anew. In a world marked by an ever-increasing quotient of conflicting systems of meaning, the true conflict is announced with this possibility of experiencing again the call to God which, in Iwaszkiewicz's words, is that "little bee that calls from nowhere as no one does." The presence of Christ is the burning touch of God that "undermines everything I have been." The radicalism of Christ in the world of contemporary culture, as Michalski ever so slightly insinuates, is the radicalism of the declaration: *all temples are fragile and temporary*. This, then, is the meaning of the slogan "the death of God" when no longer understood as either frivolous or self-congratulatory.

Michalski discerns various echoes of the Biblical Jesus in Zarathustra's narrative, beginning with the kenotic salutation to the sun at the beginning of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Much as the sun is not self-sufficient, since it needs otherness to which it shares, or gives, its light, Zarathustra's wisdom is characterized

as a cup that overflows: “Behold, I am weary of my wisdom, like a bee that has gathered too much honey; I need hands outstretched to receive it.” Although Michalski remains on this point discrete, it must surely have been known to him that Nietzsche himself makes an explicit connection between Dionysus and Christ (Steigler 2011: 281–282). Even as Zarathustra announces the death of God, and even as Zarathustra, in his self-identification with Dionysus reborn, is declared the Anti-Christ, the veritable meaning of Christ, shorn of Christianity and liberated from a God who guarantees a stable order of things, becomes lived again. As Bataille noted: “The extreme, unconditional longing of humanity was expressed for the first time by Nietzsche *independently from a moral goal and from serving a God*” (Bataille 2015: 4). Zarathustra or Christ *names* this unconditional longing in its sublime independence. Much of the rhetorical prowess and cunning of Michalski’s reading hinges on the default assumption that Zarathustra represents the death of God and the extreme expression of the Anti-Christ. Much of Michalski’s boldness stems from this provocation of reading Nietzsche as the Crucified. It is a reading most likely to be favorably received by nobody. *The Flame of Eternity* thus shows its hand as a book for everybody (all will reject this thesis) as well as for nobody (none will accept or welcome it).

VI

The instant of eternity is the time of the Apocalypse and the Second Coming. In what constitutes a significant juncture in Michalski’s thinking, he contends that there are two basic ways of reading the Apocalypse of John. One way is to read it as the revelation that awaits us in the future, such that time would progress towards the fulfillment of a final historical plan or ordained destiny. If the end of time, so conceived, whether in the Kingdom of Heaven beyond time or the Kingdom of Ends in historical time, is placed in the future, it becomes a future for which we can prepare and await in the present. As Michalski wryly remarks: “I can sleep well – assuming, of course, that I have prepared well” (Michalski 2011: 64). We can rest assured in the promised presence of a penultimate meaning to the time of our lives. The achievement of time in eternity, on this picture, would either take the form of a religious transcendence of time in an eternal order or the secular progression of history as structured by a final order of things. In either form, the revelation of eternity promises stability and finality.

Michalski proposes an alternative reading of the Apocalypse. Rather than interpret the end of time as a future that we can face and prepare for, Michalski takes the Biblical statement “the time is near” as marking the stigmata of the present. The Apocalypse is now. In each moment, there is an instant of eternity concealed,

waiting for its dramatic disclosure and launching, or overflowing, of “the radically new.” As Michalski writes: “The Apocalypse is happening all the time; Christ arrives at every moment of our lives and, by this token, tears each of us out of the world as we find it, out of the world as we know it, and calls us into the new one” (Michalski 2011: 64). The awakening of the Apocalypse is the awakening of time to the possibility of a new beginning, yet this revelation catches us off-guard and unprepared. It is the address that we must not sleep, namely, not surrender ourselves to the unthinking acceptance of our temporal existence.

These two contrasting conceptions of the Apocalypse are not, however, understood as two alternative “conceptual interpretations, one true, the other false.” In a manner reminiscent of Kołakowski’s essay “In Praise of Inconsequence,” a basic motif running through Michalski’s thinking is the contention that human life must thrive and survive in inconsequence. In contrast to the soldier who remains steadfast and unswervingly content to wage war until no enemy is left standing, or the neighbor who denounces the neighbor as a matter of unswerving duty, inconsequence emerges by contrast from the acute consciousness of the necessary contradictions and unresolvable tensions of the world. As Kołakowski argues, there are values that exclude and contradict each other, and yet do not thereby cease to be significant values. Inconsequence, on this thinking, is the refusal of accepting a certain value as valid for all time among a plurality of values which mutually contradict each other, while still insisting on the meaningfulness of values. This virtue of inconsequence is apparent in Michalski’s repeated insistence on the irresolvable tensions that determine and animate human life. These two views of the Apocalypse are incompatible but not, in Michalski’s estimation, in need of a decision either way, once and for all. This perpetual tension (as with the dwarf and Zarathustra) reflects “two sides of the human condition.”

Michalski’s reading of Zarathustra as Dionysus reborn, as Christ resurrected, receives additional amplitude with a contrast between Socrates and Jesus in their respective attitudes towards death. In the celebrated account of the death of Socrates in the *Phaedo*, Plato’s urging that the philosophical life is a preparation for death encourages an attitude of composure (but not complacency). Michalski reads Socrates’s dismissal of any fear of death as dependent upon an attitude towards the world predicated on the assumption of “the true order of life.” When Socrates admonishes not to fear death, we are bolstered in this attitude through the claim that there is a fixed order to the world. As Michalski comments:

For *Phaedo*’s Socrates, the truly important things in life are *ideas*: the eternal order of the world, the understanding of which leads to unperturbed peace and serenity in the face of death. The dying Socrates wanted to give us concepts that would provide peace, concepts that will soothe our anxiety in the face of death. The Gospel of Matthew, as I understand it, is the complete opposite: it testifies to the incurable

presence of the Unknown in every moment of my life, a presence that rips apart every human certainty (...) and disturbs all peace, all serenity (Michalski 2011: 89).

As with the contrasting visions of the Apocalypse, with these two contrasting visions of death, one is not true at the expense of the other. The opposition here in question is not between truth and falsehood. Nor is the opposition dialectical. Rather, we are witnessing a *tension* that “constitutes the only possible meaning of human life.” The cry of Jesus on the Cross is here; every moment is undermined by the instant of this cry meant to awaken us to the fragility of the world and everything that we take to be solid and significant. This tension can be said to be asymmetrical: it is not a tension between two views, each of which is equal in standing or claim. Instead, this tension, as Michalski elucidates:

Does not mean a struggle between two orders, between two tendencies, two principles, one thing with another. Eternity – the kind of *change* that Jesus heralds in this interpretation – does not, in fact, open a separate sphere of meanings. It is rather the impossibility of stabilizing, the impossibility of enclosing any meaning within the context of human life (Michalski 2011: 207).

For Michalski, this impossibility of closure is another way to express Pascal’s declaration that “Jesus will be in agony until the end of the world, we must not sleep during that time” (Pascal 1991: 273). This impossibility of closure only becomes *tragic* when burdened by the spirit of seriousness and gravity, when, in other words, this impossibility becomes unbearable and self-defeating rather than self-affirming.

Setting aside a thorough assessment of the merits or inadequacies of Michalski’s admittedly brief evocation of Plato’s *Phaedo*, the contrast with the message of Christ is instructive for Michalski’s view of a philosophical consolation in non-consolation and inconsequence. On Michalski’s reckoning, the final words of Christ on the Cross – “Father, why have you forsaken me?” – express anxiety, not serenity, before death. This lament is not, however, sign of an anxiety in the face of death as the possibility of one’s impossibility. In this confrontation with death, there is a confrontation with “the unthinkable” and “mystery,” not (on Michalski’s reading), as with Socrates’ death, a stable order of meaning. Whereas the vision of Apocalypse reveals the instability of the world and the principle of inconsequence – and hence, in this manner, verges on breeding skepticism – the acceptance of death reveals the proximity of mystery. This presence of death does not delineate a horizon awaiting me in the future. Death is now. It is here, in every moment, as the trembling announcement that ruptures life from within. This nothingness of death is not destruction, but “foreignness,” “transcendence,” and “incompatibility.” In a gesture against Heidegger, the immanence of death within me, as that

uncanny sense of not being entirely myself, does not uncover a more authentic sense of self, in terms of which my existence becomes whole with itself, at one with itself as a distinct singularity.

Death touches me with what Michalski calls “the fire of nothingness,” or, as he hesitantly raises in the form of a question without any stated need for answer or response, “the fire of God?” (Michalski 2011: 83). The possibility of an apocalypse of hope and instance of my death lurks within every moment as the flame of eternity within me: how many times might I die in life and to life before I am truly dead? As Michalski writes: “It may be that only in life so conceived – life that cannot be consolidated into a totality, fractured life, marked with the irremediable fissure of eternity – perhaps only in such a life one may find a place for God.” The qualification “perhaps” marks a note of hesitancy, or gamble, that is all the more compelling given its truthfulness.

The unrest within us, this momentary breathlessness, catches us off-guard and exposes within us a fracture. From this fracture we might break from the world and all that we have been in order to become anew and other, but we might just as much, from the fear of it, allow ourselves to be taken back by the world and its fixed order of meaning. For the fear of it we might want to insist in our being what we have been. The unrest within us is the unrest that keeps us disjointed with and from ourselves as well as the world, and the wonder here at being is the wounding of my being from within: not the wonder of why or who I am, but the pain that I cannot entirely support the subject that I am. This spacing within the self produced by the instant of eternity, as disjoining time from its seamless continuity, opens a space that is not vertical in alignment; it does not trace a path of escape or retreat. This space – or, better, this interval within – occurs in the fractional instant of the blinking of an eye, and, within this hairline fracture within time, this anarchic wink, there is an opening just wide enough to lend a space for the angular presence of God. This sideways disruption of God’s presence within the frozen sea does not announce a Kingdom of God. There is no Kingdom above and there are no Temples below. As Michalski writes: “God’s presence in human life is not (...) something like a set order that determines” the truth or falsity of the world. This real presence of God within does not provide a fixed orientation; one cannot live according to God nor live *in* God, even as God, in this spacing, touches us.

God’s presence burns within as the rapture of eternity. In Michalski’s words:

After all, the continuity of instants constitutes my life as I know it, everything that I, Krzysztof Michalski, am, everything that I hold dear, my memories, my biography. Breaking this continuity, tearing me out of the context in which I have become who I am, causes pain. This pain is identical, then, with life; it is a wound and a fire that cannot be healed so long as I am alive (Michalski 2011: 121).

Much as the fracture within, as the space within me that finds no place, is proper to me without admitting of a proper place, it cannot be assimilated through an act of baptism or made my possession through a proper name. This momentary breathlessness within the sadness of time marks a placeholder for a name yet to be spoken; in this infinitely small space, there abides a thousand names, of which Zarathustra, Christ, or Michalski are but a few of the many.¹¹

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¹¹ This paper presents a condensed version of my discussion of Michalski's Nietzsche interpretation in de Warren 2018.

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Witold Płotka¹

Praxis, the Body, and Solidarity: Some Reflections on the Marxist Readings of Phenomenology in Poland (1945–1989)

The article presents main tendencies in the reception of phenomenology in the light of Marxism in Poland in the post-war period. As it is argued, although phenomenology was marginalized and even refused from the Marxist position, a dialogue between both traditions established interesting developments, especially with regard to the problem of the body, and constitution of solidarity as a social phenomenon. The main thesis of the study is that the confrontation with Marxism enabled phenomenologists a problematization of the phenomenon of work as a specific way of being. The article is divided into three parts. First, the author defines main ideological points of the Marxist critique of phenomenology, i.e., a critique of phenomenology as a bourgeois philosophy that cannot offer anything to the communist society since it abandons the sphere of praxis. Next, positive developments of the phenomenological method are to be reconstructed; moreover, the author analyzes Szewczyk's original reading of Husserl, and his analysis of experience of the body. Finally, the article points out a Marxist background of some thoughts of Wojtyła and Tischner, including Tischner's ethics of solidarity, and Wojtyła's emphasis on human dignity.

Key words: Phenomenological movement, Marxism, idealism, bourgeois philosophy, epoché, solidarity, Kroński, Szewczyk, Wojtyła, Tischner

Introduction

The question of the relationship between Marxism and phenomenology – as Waldenfels (1982: 219) and Mickunas (1997: 435) rightly point out – goes back to the 1920's and 1930's when Lukács and Adorno have developed and criticized Husserl in the light of the Marxist thesis that society constitutes consciousness,

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and not *vice versa* (Adorno 2003; Westerman 2010). One can add to the list further Marxist readings of phenomenology in France (McBride 1975), Italy (Nowicki 1975), Yugoslavia (Lorenec 1976; Uzelac 1997), Hungary (Vajda 1971; 2016), or in Czechoslovakia (Moural 1997). The list, however, is incomplete without Poland where during the Communism period of 1945–1989 phenomenology was indeed confronted with Marxism, and in result marginalized (or even refused) as an abstract and bourgeois philosophy (Górniak-Kocikowska 1997; Węgrzecki 2001: 18–20). In turn, to say that phenomenology was just criticized, especially after 1970, when so-called “normalization” of political relations took place, seems to be an oversimplification. One can notice also original re-readings, developments, and interesting inspirations that have rose from a dialogue of the Marxist thinkers with phenomenologists. Therefore, it is true – following Węgrzecki (2001: 19) – that besides ideological refutations of phenomenology by Marxists, one can also notice positive elaborations of the phenomenological philosophy. Of course, I do not claim that Marxism enabled phenomenology to flourish, or to develop. Just the opposite. Rather what I want to claim here is that there were mutual and complex *interrelationships* between Marxism and phenomenology in Poland in the period of 1945–1989. The tale of their complex interrelationship demands, then, a careful reading. Nonetheless, it is still a relatively less known chapter of the history of the phenomenological movement in Central Europe.

In this regard, the present article is an attempt to shed more light on the historical and conceptual complexity of the Marxism-phenomenology confrontation in Poland before 1989. Thus, I want to present both critical refutations and original elaborations of phenomenology from the Marxist point of view, as well as further developments of the Marxist ideas by phenomenologists. By doing so, the study presents a contribution to the history of the phenomenological movement in Central Europe, and it deepens hermeneutical and historical perspectives formulated in other studies on the tradition of phenomenology in Poland (Gubser 2014; Płotka 2017a; 2017b). My concern here, however, is not to present a detailed study on Marxism-phenomenology in Poland, since such an analysis seems to require more attention than one can expect from an article. Instead, I try to define main trends in the Marxist readings of phenomenology. In this context, my main thesis is that the confrontation with Marxism enabled phenomenologist a problematization of the phenomenon of work as a specific way of being. To show this, first, I will reconstruct main points of the Marxist critique of phenomenology. The critique refers mainly to ideological issues by refusing phenomenology as a bourgeois philosophy that cannot offer anything to the communist society since it abandons the sphere of *praxis*. Next, I will show positive developments of the phenomenological methods by Marxists. Yet the most interesting Marxist contribution to phenomenology was formulated by a student of Ingarden –

Jan Szewczyk (1930–1975) – whose original reading of Husserl emphasizes the importance of experiencing the body. Finally, I will reconstruct further developments of the Marxist ideas within phenomenology. With this regard, I will refer to some thoughts of Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II) (1920–2005) and Józef Tischner (1931–2000) for whom a dialog between phenomenology and Marxism resulted in original philosophical theories, including Tischner’s ethics of solidarity. Therefore, as we will see, main topics of the Marxist readings of phenomenology include the question of *praxis*, the status of the body, and a description of solidarity as a communal phenomenon.

An ideological misreading: Idealism and bourgeois philosophy

As Kemp-Welch (2008: 26–27) states, “[p]re-war Poland had pluralistic traditions”, but during the post-war period Poland was consolidated ideologically and “it was to have a political monopoly” of Stalinism. Kemp-Welch’s description seems to hold for philosophy as well. After all, the pre-war philosophy in Poland was pluralistic, and it included, e.g., the Lvov-Warsaw School of logic, descriptive and experimental psychology, positivism, neo-Thomism, and phenomenology (cf. Płotka 2017a). In turn, the post-war philosophy was monopolized by Marxism which promoted a materialist, dialectical, and ideological view on philosophy. With this regard, it is not surprising that the editors of *Mysł Filozoficzna* – an official philosophical journal of the Communist party during the Stalinist period – listed phenomenology as one, besides Thomism and Znaniecki’s sociology, of the “enemies” of Marxism, and they declared an ideological struggle with idealistic and reactionary philosophy of Husserl and Ingarden (Schaff *et al.* 1951). As early as 1949, however, Ingarden was banned from teaching because of the charges of “idealism”, and as an “enemy of materialism”. In this part of the article, I aim at a presentation of the main lines of the Marxist critique of phenomenology in general, and a refutation of Ingarden’s philosophy in particular.

Gubser (2014: 190) states that “[p]erhaps the most shocking attack” on Ingarden came from the philosopher Tadeusz Kroński (1907–1958),² a Hegel specialist, whose review of Ingarden’s *opus magnum* – *Controversy over the Existence of the World* – was published in *Mysł Filozoficzna* in 1952. Kroński’s review presents a radical critique of phenomenology from a Marxist standpoint, and as such it seems to define a conceptual framework for other critiques before 1989. Kroński (1952: 318) says that although Ingarden rejects Husserl’s idealism, his book is in

² On Kroński, and his relationship to Miłosz, a Polish Nobel Prize winner in literature, see Fiut 2001.

fact idealistic. To show this, Kroński differentiates between subjective and objective idealism. Whereas the former reduces the existence of the world to consciousness, the latter rejects any possibility to affirm the existence of whatsoever. Kroński (1952: 320) calls Husserl a subjective idealist since *epoché* requires to comprehend a phenomenon despite of its existence, or non-existence. To phrase it differently, the existence of whatsoever has an intentional character. Moreover, Husserl's method is an anti-materialistic philosophy. In this context, Ingarden seems to reject Husserl's idealism, and to re-establish realist phenomenology. According to Kroński (1952: 322), however, Ingarden is focused merely on ontology, and he does not re-evaluate metaphysics. Ontology is to be understood by Ingarden as a philosophical theory of a possible being. As such it is speculative, "infantile", and "empty"; additionally, it equals to "scholastics". Kroński's crucial arguments against Ingarden's ontology are threefold. First, Kroński (1952: 325) questions Ingarden's methodology, because his language is vague and metaphorical; in addition, Ingarden's method is not autonomous since one can trace it back in a philosophical tradition. Ingarden, then, at least repeats some well-known theses. Second, by focusing on the possible being, Ingarden rejects the real world, and thus he represents bourgeois interests (Kroński 1952: 320–321, 330). After all, as Kroński (1952: 329) insists, Ingarden reestablishes God as a guarantee of the existence of the real world, and of values which are realized by a man. This leads Kroński to state that Ingarden's realism is in fact "objective idealism". Finally, Ingarden rejects materialism as a possible solution of the controversy over the existence of the world (Kroński 1952: 324, 327, 329–330). "Materialism – writes Kroński (1952: 324) – is for Ingarden impossible 'logically', because it presuppose 'dogmatically' a priority of the material world over the consciousness, and for this reason it does not fit frameworks of ontological speculations of confronting and combining 'existential moments'". Kroński's (1952: 319, 324, 331) review is full of irony and *ad personam* arguments. He calls *Controversy over the Existence of the World* a reactive book (Kroński 1952: 318), and he claims that phenomenology in general does not offer anything new since it marks a shift from philosophy of the 19th century to contemporary thought (Kroński 1952: 321). Thus, as Kroński (1952: 330) summarizes his review, "Ingarden's idealism is not so much a critique of Husserl, but it is simply a different form of idealism". In other words, "Ingarden's book is a glaring example of the fruitlessness, degeneration and bankruptcy of contemporary bourgeois philosophy" (Kroński: 331).

It is hard to call Kroński's review a thorough and substantive reading of Ingarden. Rather it is ideological through and through. After all, Kroński does not appreciate Ingarden's detailed differentiations, and he rejects Ingarden's central claim that ontology goes before metaphysics. Furthermore Kroński binds Ingarden's ontology with bourgeois philosophy since – at least for him – it rejects materialism.

Hence, Kroński's criticism follows from a Marxist outspoken aversion to idealism, and it does not take in account Ingarden's methodology. In contrast to Kroński, then, one has to suspend a naïve affirmation of the world, and to ask about possible ways of existence of the world. For this reason, Kroński's review presents in fact a serious *misreading* of phenomenology. Nonetheless, as rooted in naïve Marxism, it gives leading clues for a standard Marxist reading of phenomenology. Indeed, many arguments formulated by Kroński already in 1952, were repeated and developed during the international conference on "Marxist Critique of Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Roman Ingarden" which was organized by the Polish Academy of Sciences and the editorial board of the journal "Dialectics and Humanism" in Jadwisin, close to Warsaw, in 1975 (Küng, Swiderski 1976).

According to the editors of the journal (Kuczyński *et al.* 1975: 69), the idea to confront Marxism and phenomenology steams from a recognition of the lack of any forum for discussions on the relationship between both traditions. However, the dominant position of Marxism has to be secured, and for this reason the editors declare that, e.g., one has to employ Marx's methodology of interpretation of Hegel as presented in his 1844 manuscripts, i.e., to support Marxism as such, and moreover, one has to keep in mind that "only Marxism (...) can provide definite and feasible prospects for overcoming [the] crisis" (Kuczyński *et al.* 1975: 70) of culture. In consequence, during the opening address of the conference the organizers state that "[w]e do not believe that it is essential and useful to seek similarities and to strive towards a syncretic meeting between phenomenology and Marxism, as it is done in certain research centers. On the contrary, we are convinced that in their initial principles and main tendencies those philosophies are diametrically opposed to each other" (Kuczyński 1975b: 8). The conference schedule encompasses both Marxist and non-Marxist thinkers, including specialists in phenomenology, e.g. Funke, Küng, Smith, Stróżewski, Swiderski, Tymieniecka, and Waldenfels, yet given the declaration, let me focus on the main points of the Marxist view on phenomenology.

It is no overstatement to say that the view is deeply rooted in ideology. And so, Matroshilova (1975: 30) points out methodological limitations of Husserlian phenomenology since (1) whereas it declares an analysis of the subject, it strives in fact at abstract structures, and (2) *epoché* never cannot be completed; thus, phenomenology is a "subjective-idealistic" philosophy. As Matroshilova (1975: 31) declares, the critique can be used in the Marxist criticism of phenomenology. Also Oiserman (1975: 61) defined phenomenology as a form of idealism since (1) it is solely focused on pure consciousness, and (2) it formulates maximal claims to be a rigorous science. But Husserl's critique of science by pointing out total insignificance of sciences for human life, "refers only to bourgeois pseudo-scientific objectivism" (Oiserman 1975: 62). Here the subject is alienated from the

external world, and contemplates the ideal being. In consequence, phenomenology fits Marx's description of "the speculative-idealistic philosophy as alienated consciousness, as consciousness cultivating its alienation and deprived of understanding real, socio-economic sources of this alienation" (Oiserman 1975: 60). Marxism, by contrast, overcomes naïve phenomenology, and it asks about dialectical and social-historical foundation of philosophy as such. In this direction seems to go Kuczyński (1975a: 114) for whom Husserl reduces a man to pure consciousness. For Husserl, as Kuczyński argues, the subject is to be understood as *homo contemplator* since it has the world as its intentional correlate; the world, then, is "within" consciousness, "out of which there is no way to the real world of action and practice". In turn, Marxism presupposes metaphysical materialism, and for this reason it enables to comprehend a man as *homo contemplator* who discovers an objective meaning (shaped in a historical and class fashion), and he co-creates it by his activity. Kuczyński (1975a: 117–118) notes, however, a possibility of a "dialectization" of Ingarden's later philosophy of responsibility and action since it seems to presuppose the world outside pure consciousness, and it offers to comprehend consciousness as an action; nonetheless, "I believe that dialectics cannot be accepted by phenomenology ... and if accepted, it bursts it open" (Kuczyński 1975a: 119).³

In different direction goes Resmussen. He states that Husserl's alienation form the society rests on his method of *epoché*. According to Rasmussen (1975: 65), "the social world itself is that very world which must be suspended". For this reason, Husserl fails to present a comprehensive social theory. In this regard, Marxism offers a framework for a criticism of phenomenology since it provides "the socio-historical context in which phenomenology functioned" (Rasmussen 1975: 70). In his comment on Ramussen's paper, Łoziński (1975: 71) questions the thesis that "it is the method of transcendental reduction that makes social phenomena inapproachable and that Husserl's phenomenology has no theory of society either". Following Łoziński, Husserl provides a basis for comprehending spiritual life as a foundation for the social life. For Husserl objects are structured as multi-layer beings, and one can try to show that constituted objectivity is "not less objective than things we perceive through senses" (Łoziński 1975: 75). Surprisingly, Husserl's method is comparable to Marx's *Capital* which may be understood as a phenomenological work since "[p]urchase, sale and work, then eating, dressing and dwelling, and, finally, all the forms of human life – all these are 'directly given'" (Łoziński 1975: 75). Nonetheless, one has to limit the thesis, because both Marxism and phenomenology

³ Also Czerniak (1976: 142) holds that phenomenology, contrary to Marxism, cannot change the reality since it is focused on an ideal domain of knowledge. With this regard, Hempoliński (1975: 141) tried to show that Póltawski's critique of phenomenology as a philosophy that suspends practice, is close to the Marxist critique.

presuppose different “ontological perspectives”. As Łoziński (1976: 122) warns, any “categorical borrowings” are inadequate (Łoziński 1976: 122). Łoziński develops his critique in other publications to show that phenomenology has a clear ideological background. First, without a question of how phenomenology justifies itself, a phenomenologist places his philosophy outside a social context (Łoziński 1979: 87), and in result he becomes a mere observer of the social world. Second, and more importantly, phenomenology asks about sense of social actions, however, it presupposes a subjective perspective of the constitution process, and thus it makes impossible to undertake any action (Łoziński 1979: 89). Accordingly, ideology inherent in phenomenology is cynical: it expresses a protest against the world, but it accepts the world as indifferent for any action.

One can see that the Marxist reading of phenomenology, as presented so far, is mostly ideological, and as such it is naïve. It reduces phenomenology to a few general, though unjustified phrases (e.g., idealism), and evaluations (e.g., bourgeois interests). Such a reading employs rather unjustified conceptual shortcuts, than a thorough study of, say, Ingarden or Husserl. Brief, it is a *misreading* of phenomenology. Such a Marxist misreading is noticeable also in Leszek Kołakowski’s (1975) interpretation of Husserl. All in one, main objections against phenomenology can be summarized as follows: (1) phenomenology is a form of idealism; (2) its method (i.e., *epoché*) is inadequate, since (3) it rejects real actions in the world, and thus (4) it represents bourgeois interests. If this is the case, the Marxist reading of phenomenology in Poland mirrors other critiques formulated in the Eastern Block.

A development: The question of method and the body

In the light of the presented overwhelming critique of phenomenology which presupposes an ideological perspective on Marxism, it seems that during the Communist period in Poland one cannot expect any positive developments of phenomenology formulated by Marxists. Nonetheless, there were positive elaborations. In this context, Węgrzecki (2001: 19) points out Martel’s (1967) book in which the author appreciates some elements of Husserl’s philosophy, especially his method. In this part of the article, I will present a development of phenomenology from a Marxist standpoint. As we will see, however, it was not Martel who developed phenomenology in an original direction, but Szewczyk who tried to defend phenomenology as a transcendental enterprise which concerns first and foremost the phenomenon of work.

Already in the “Foreword” to his book, Martel (1967: 11–12) declares that one of the main tasks of his work is a critical evaluation of the principles of Husserl’s phenomenology, on the one hand, and a confrontation of this philosophy with

Marxism, on the other. Nonetheless, such a confrontation, according to Martel's declarations, supposed to list not only differences, but, more interestingly, "eventual connections". Husserl's phenomenology is, of course, interpreted from a Marxist point of view as a result of socio-political changes of the shift of centuries, i.e., as a breakdown of a bourgeois order of society, and as a crisis of a bourgeois civilization (Martel 1967: 19–20). In this context, Husserl offers a critique of sciences, and tries to overcome the crisis by showing that neither science, nor human life cannot forget about a human being as a subject responsible for a scientific concept of the world, and for actual historical actions (Martel 1967: 28). Nonetheless, Martel's reconstruction of phenomenology is mainly rooted in Husserl's texts, and as such it adopts better methodological foundation than the radical-ideological reading. And so, for instance, Martel points out maximal claims of phenomenology as the "first philosophy", he emphasizes an eidetic character of phenomenology, but he refers also to the method of reduction, static and genetic analysis, Husserl's concept of the life-world, and his concept of humanism. Again, Martel refers in many places to the Marxist reading of phenomenology, e.g., following classical exposition of Trần Đức Thảo, Martel (1967: 67) argues that *eidōs* becomes a pure possibility, and as such it is placed outside the reality; in addition, he (Martel 1967: 131, 156) formulates a charge of transcendental solipsism, and of idealism since the transcendental subject becomes finally a non-worldly source of the world. As it seems, only Marxism with its materialist dialectics can overcome the divide between the transcendental subject, and the world. How, then, one can define differences between Marxism and phenomenology?

Martel (1967: 200–201) lists six possible charges against phenomenology: (1) its "essentialism" (Husserl brakes a unity of an "essence" and its "existence", and presents sense as a being itself); (2) its subjectivism (objective contents of any object are derivative from the subject in a sense that the subject creates contents); (3) its transcendentalism and apriorism (Husserl refers rather to the pure subject, than to a socially constructed subject embedded in history); (4) its idealism (the world is constituted by cognitive consciousness); (5) its intuitionism and abstract rationalism (cognition is direct, but it seems rather to be dialectical); and finally (6) its rational immanentism (an overcoming of pure cognition is possible only within the domain of knowledge). It is true that Martel's list incorporates main, if not all, Marxist charges against phenomenology, but for Martel those charges do not hold for phenomenology. To defend Husserl's phenomenology one should rather read Husserl as a materialist, just as Lenin had read Hegel. But what does it mean? For Martel (1967: 201), the transcendental subject is to be understood as embedded in the structure of the world, as essentially and intentionally connected with the world. For this reason, *contra* the idealist exposition of Husserl, objects of the world do not hold sense due to consciousness, but rather they are rooted in

the world, and thus – *not* outside the world (Martel 1967: 203). Moreover, they are culturally and historically constituted, and not solely internally and solipsistic. In this very context, according to Martel (1967: 205–206), one has to read Husserl's method of genetic analysis, i.e., as a *reconstruction* of how sense of an object is co-constituted by the world, intersubjectivity (society), and its history. This view, however, build a bridge between phenomenology and Marxism since cognition is no more an internal process, but an action. What connects both traditions, then, is a re-evaluation of *praxis*, but with a strong genetical background (Martel 1967: 212, 215–216). Briefly, what phenomenology contributes to Marxism is the method of genetic analysis which enables one to investigate mutual relationships between social subject and the world of practice.

Given Martel's re-reading of Marxist critique of phenomenology, it is no surprising that in the 1970's and in the 1980's phenomenology was used in Poland within sociological-methodological studies.⁴ But what is more interesting, Martel's interpretation of the "materialism phenomenology" was developed by Szewczyk who took the question of the body into account. Szewczyk studied at the Jagiellonian University under Ingarden between 1957 and 1962.⁵ In 1966 he gained a Ph.D. degree with a work on the critique of Hume's theory of causality. He was ideologically involved in Communism, but later he took a revisionist position. Szewczyk's (1969: 124; 1987: 145) view on Marx, and on phenomenology was defined mainly by Stanisław Brzozowski's (1878–1911) philosophy of work.⁶ He postulates to interpret work as an embodied action which does not presuppose any dualism of thinking and the world. This anti-dualistic view on action is present also in his reading of phenomenology.

While considering a discussion between Ingarden and Husserl, Szewczyk claims that the dispute concerns the essence of philosophy. Inasmuch as Husserl postulates to perform *epoché*, in order to make cognitive processes available in immanence, Ingarden wants to distance himself from subjectivity, and he claims to describe the content of an idea (Szewczyk 1966: 197–198). Ingarden's ontologization of philosophy leads finally to the point where phenomenology leaves its proper field of researchers, i.e., subjectivity, what seems to question "a cognitive aspect of description" (Szewczyk 1966: 200). According to Szewczyk (1975: 616), Ingarden's idealistic reading of Husserl includes Husserl to the Cartesian tradition since Ingarden refers mainly to reduction and the notion of the self as a residuum of *epoché*. Ingarden's argumentation against Husserl is, however, misleading because for Husserl – as Szewczyk (1975: 617) argues – consciousness is not

⁴ Cf. Krasnodebski 1983; see also Lipiec 1972; Niżnik 1977; Czerniak 1980. For discussion on idealism of phenomenology in social theory, see Tittenbrun 1981: 73, 77.

⁵ More on Szewczyk's life, see Sowa 2012. See also bibliography, Jarowski 1975.

⁶ On Brzozowski's contribution to Marxism, see Walicki 1989.

outside the world, but *in* it. Moreover, Husserl comprehends “pure consciousness” as a *quasi*-spatial being which is essentially embedded in the world, and for this reason Husserl overcomes Cartesian dualism.

Szewczyk's anti-dualistic view on consciousness and action follows from his theory of work, and his view on Marx. Szewczyk (1971: 14) is clear that the only way to develop Marxism is to adopt Husserl's radicalism which postulates to constitute knowledge on absolutely certain foundations. For Szewczyk (1969: 124–125; 1987: 143, 145), Marxism is first and foremost an analysis of work understood as a dialectical phenomenon, i.e., as a condition of a historical development of the society. But how one can analyze the phenomenon of work? At bottom, work is constituted in a subjective experience. Accordingly, to analyze the phenomenon of work means to investigate a “conscious activity of a man” (Szewczyk 1987: 146). In this context, consciousness is to be understood as a being mediated by the material world, and as such it is self-knowledge which concerns its own work. After all, Marx reduces the object to the subject, and comprehends the subject as its activity (Szewczyk 1987: 159). If so, Marxism suspends the question of the non-existence or existence of the world, and thus it is a form of transcendental philosophy. Husserl, however, cannot contribute to this form of Marxism since he is focused mainly on an intellectual work. So, phenomenology is for Szewczyk (1987: 161) an “alienated philosophy” that leads a philosopher to self-knowledge. Nonetheless, even if both theories are different, materialism of Marxism and idealism of phenomenology are no more opposed to each other, because the way of being of consciousness is an inclination towards the objects in the world (Szewczyk 1987: 162). In brief, consciousness' being is an embodied work (Szewczyk 1970: 185–194).

Szewczyk refers to similar ideas in his interpretation of Husserl. Szewczyk's (1987: 41) main argument is to suspend Cartesian exposition of the self, since if one understands *cogito* as a cognitive subject, consciousness seems to be empty. In turn, Husserl offers to describe consciousness in *quasi*-spatial categories, such as a “horizon”, or a “stream”. In consequence, consciousness from a phenomenological point of view, has to be understood as embedded in the world, yet not as a mere thing. The self is rather the body, than a cognitive subject. Or, to say it differently, the body and the world are a united whole. After all, the body is the subject of work, and consciousness acts only as an embodied subject in the world (Szewczyk 1971: 34–35). For this very reason, as Szewczyk (1987: 94) emphasizes, phenomenology used to be an overcoming of a fetishization of positivism (and – as it seems – of naïve Marxism): the self is the embodied subject who actively explores and acts in the material world. Here “to perform reduction” means: “to be conscious of my own constitutive, yet embodied role in the world” (Szewczyk 1987: 81).

Szewczyk's interpretation of Husserl, and his philosophy of work met different reactions. Rainko (1969: 150) and Lebedziński (1970: 162–164), for instance,

present a radical position. They both identify Szewczyk's view on Marx with "a form of phenomenology", and they argue that Marxism is here not more than a form of a reflection on the world, and on the place of a man in the world. If so, however, Szewczyk offers to analyze *eidos* of work, and not a concrete, i.e., empirically and historically constituted, phenomenon of work. Therefore, Szewczyk's position adopts an abstract-idealistic perspective, and for this reason it cannot be incorporated into Marx's philosophy. Also Sarna (1981: 31–32) claims that Szewczyk falls into idealism since he cuts himself off from the world; instead of an attempt to interpret the world, Szewczyk should rather change it. Yet the radical criticism is questionable since it seems to adopt the ideological reading of phenomenology. In this context, Żurawicki (1969: 133–134) and Ochocki (1969: 143–144) take a moderate position; and so, the former states that Szewczyk's view on Marxism is partial since he omits dialectical materialism, and he reduces Marxism to philosophy work, whereas the latter claims that Szewczyk's interpretation has nothing to offer nothing, because Marxism was always regarded as philosophy of work. In turn, Sowa (1969: 136–137) and Fiut (1988: 351) appreciates two aspects of Szewczyk's interpretation: his emphasis on Marxism as philosophy of work, and his theory of consciousness which constitutes the spatial world as the material world. Fiut (1988: 356) questions, however, Szewczyk's interpretation of Ingarden as partial.

The Marxist-ideological reading of phenomenology, as we already have seen above, has a limited range of application. By contrast, Martel and Szewczyk have shown that Marxism has a potential to reinterpret phenomenology as a "materialist" philosophy (Martel), or as transcendental, yet spatial analysis (Szewczyk). Therefore, what Marxism introduced to phenomenology in the period of 1945–1989 is a re-evaluation and re-interpretation of Husserl's method as follows: (1) the transcendental subject is embedded in the (materialist) structure of the world, what equals the thesis that (2) objects of the world are rooted in the world; moreover, (3) the process of constitution is to be understood as a cultural, historical, and embodied process; therefore, (4) the method is developed as a reconstruction of a co-constituted sense, and thus (5) cognition is but an action; and finally (6) the method takes *praxis* into account as a universal background of philosophy. The re-evaluation is deeply rooted in Marxism, however, it inspired also non-Marxist thinkers.

Inspirations: Dignity of work and solidarity

As Gubser (2014: 219) rightly states, materialist Marxism suspends any ethics for a man since ethics is to be understood as a socially constructed ideology of a class struggle. If so, the society defines a framework for understanding human dignity,

and his or her work. I think that precisely this consequence of Marxism inspired some non-Marxist thinkers to formulate an adequate philosophical response to Marxism. In this part of the article, I will refer to Wojtyła's philosophy of action, and his attempt to secure metaphysical and phenomenological grounds of human action, and to Tischner's conception of ethics of solidarity. They both, as non-Marxist thinkers, undertook a challenge of Marxism, and they tried to show that phenomenology can adopt critically at least some theses of Marxism in a dialogue with this current of philosophy.

Wojtyła's philosophical theory is a fusion of the phenomenological method with neo-Thomistic metaphysics (Burgos 2009). His Ph.D. thesis (from 1948) was dedicated to St. John of the Cross. Already in this early work Wojtyła emphasizes a central role that experience plays in philosophy; later Wojtyła (1969) will define experience as a starting point of both his project of adequate anthropology and ethics. In the 1950's, during his lectures at the Catholic University in Lublin (Wojtyła 2006), and in his habilitation thesis (given in 1959) (Wojtyła 2001), Wojtyła takes phenomenology⁷ into account and he discusses with Scheler's material ethics by claiming that his description of the relationship between a person and values is inadequate. Wojtyła's discussion with Scheler can be regarded also as an indirect discussion with the Marxist reading of phenomenology, since, as Wojtyła would argue *contra* Marxism, phenomenology can refer to the phenomenon of action.

And so, for Wojtyła (2001: 16, 45–46), Scheler's main thesis of material ethics is that values are material contents of intentional acts. In this sense, as Scheler argues, values are independent of a person, and build an objective hierarchy. Nonetheless, as Wojtyła (2001: 70, 73–74) shows, Scheler does not explain how a person knows this hierarchy, and, more importantly, how these values are instantiated in action. In a word, what lacks in Scheler's descriptions of moral action is dynamism inherent to action itself. In result, Wojtyła summarizes his criticism of Scheler, his phenomenology does not take practical level of values into account, and he misses to describe this aspect adequately. Wojtyła (1979) develops the phenomenology of action in *The Acting Person* by showing that an agent *transcends* him- or herself in a practical act since he or she grasps objective values, and instantiates them in the real world. This theory is a basis for bringing "dignity" back to human work (Gubser 2014: 210), and to comprehend another subject as a real man. After all, given that alienation is for Wojtyła (1977: 69) "such a situation in a human being, such state, in which he is not capable to experience another human being as the 'other I'", it is obvious that one of Wojtyła's aims is to overcome solipsistic limits of the

⁷ Wojtyła (2001: 16) defines the phenomenological method as (1) a direct (2) intuition which (3) provides material *a priori*.

transcendental ego. In a word, his theory of action aims at a practical redefinition of phenomenology, i.e., it offers to take the phenomenon of action into account.

Inasmuch as Wojtyła refers to Marxism only indirectly by developing a phenomenology of action, Tischner clearly declares his commitments to Szewczyk's (and thus – Marxist) heritage and the idea of the “work on work”, i.e., the idea that work functions as a liberating factor, and for this reason a re-organization of the human work leads towards a kind of liberation (cf. Szewczyk 2012; Tischner 1981: 48; Karoń-Ostrowska 2003: 65–68). First, however, let me note that Tischner studied philosophy at the Jagiellonian University under Ingarden between 1957 and 1959. He accomplished his Ph.D. in 1963. This early work concerns Husserl's theory of the transcendental ego. However, after a one-year fellowship in the Husserl-Archives in Leuven (in 1969), in his Habilitation thesis (from 1974) devoted to the phenomenology of egoic consciousness, Tischner redefines Husserl's theory, and in consequence he presents his original theory of the axiological self, understood as a guarantee of axiological structure of the self. At the end of 1970's, and in the 1980's Tischner takes a position of hermeneutical phenomenology. At the same time, he presents an original theory of ethics of solidarity which can be regarded as a consequence of a confrontation with the notion of Marxism as a philosophy of work. For Tischner (1981: 47), a central problem of Marxism is the phenomenon of work, including the question of exploitation. Precisely in this context, one has to read Tischner's project of ethics of solidarity.

The doctrine is based on the following general theses (Tischner 2007a: 39–41): (1) “ethics of solidarity wants to be an ethics of conscience”, what assumes that (2) “man is a being endowed with a conscience”. The latter means that (3) “[a] conscience is a natural ‘ethical sense’ of man”, yet (4) the conscience is self-referential, i.e., “it calls us to want to have a conscience”. (5) The conscience is the voice of God, and (6) it calls us for solidarity with the others. However, (7) “[a]uthentic solidarity ... is a solidarity of consciences”. (8) The conscience arises from “the cry for help from the man who has been hurt by another man”. (9) Suffering of the others founds the conscience. Finally, then, (10) solidarity is realized in work. Thus, what Tischner aims at here is an attempt to secure a possibility of *natural* ethical sense. Given the general doctrine, Tischner develops his view by considering the question of how to understand the theory if a realization of the voice of conscience is impossible? In this regard, Tischner refers to the phenomenon of work, and he claims that: (1) a crisis of human work is established on a lack of respect for a men; (2) a particular case of the crisis is a moral exploitation of work. (3) An unfair payment can serve as an example of an unfair exploitation. (4) The exploitation causes an unjustified suffering, and for this reason (according to the general theses) (5) the exploitation causes *justified*, since natural, protest against it. (6) In respond, one has to restore a natural relation to human work. This means that (7) the

work once again has to serve the community of workers, since (8) only this work is a meaningful work. It is clear that the ethics of solidarity aims to justify the protest of workers against the unjustified rejection of human dignity (cf. Tischner 2007b). In other words, the phenomenology of work establishes a social action.

This is not the place to provide a detailed presentation of Wojtyła's and Tischner's theories. Rather let me notice that a confrontation with Marxism seems to inspire phenomenology to develop a theory of action (Wojtyła), and ethics of solidarity (Tischner). Both theories can be used as a basis of a theory of the social protest. Indeed, phenomenology seems to have a potential to express such a protest.⁸ What makes this form of phenomenology unique is a Marxist thesis that philosophy is a form of action at the same time.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the 1970's, Jaroszewski (1974: 24–25) defined philosophy as strictly connected to Marxism, and in this context he pointed out four main tasks for a philosophical reflection in Poland: (1) a reflection on “human personality, on those properties which make it a socialist personality”; (2) “[p]hilosophical analysis of the projected and desirable consumption model and value systems of the future Polish society”; (3) [t]he development of Marxist methodological studies”; and (4) “the development of Marxist philosophical thought in Poland”. Given that phenomenology is a descriptive discipline, one sees that phenomenology did not fit the picture. After all, as Kuczyński (1975b: 8) states, phenomenology and Marxism are “diametrically opposed to each other”. This distinct opposition resulted not only in a marginalization of phenomenology at the universities, but first and foremost in a multi-dimensional criticism of it.

With this regard, let me remind, that the main task of the present study was to define main trends in the Marxist reading of phenomenology. In the foregoing, I have sought to define what I called the Marxist-ideological reading of phenomenology (e.g., Kroński, Kuczyński, Łoziński). The reading reduces phenomenology

⁸ This aspect of phenomenology was noted in Poland with regard to Jan Patočka's (1907–1977) philosophy, and his concept of care for the soul, and his idea of the “solidarity of the shaken”. Patočka was mentioned frequently in journals connected with the “Solidarity,” i.e., in *Tygodnik Solidarność*, and in *Miesięcznik Małopolski*. E.g., Tomkowski emphasizes, while commenting Polish translation of *Kacířské eseje o filosofii dějin*, that “[p]hilosophy and politics only apparently build two separate worlds” (Tomkowski 1989, 12). Rather Patočka's idea of care for the soul shows that philosophy can have a direct impact on political events. From a Marxist point of view, however, the idea is simply meaningless since Marxism rejects the value of any mental life. But people are still responsible for his or her life, even if the war goes on (Tomkowski 1989, 12). Noteworthy, a political potential of Patočka was evident also for the Communist regime: a part of Baran's (1984) review of Polish translation of *Kacířské eseje* dedicated to the last essay in which a thesis on the war was formulated – was censored.

to a form of idealism, and it claims that a phenomenologist rejects real actions in the world, and for this reason he or she represents bourgeois interests. I tried to show that such an exposition is in fact a misreading of phenomenology. The Marxist-ideological reading of phenomenology made a false assumption that phenomenology cannot concern *praxis* at all. But the phenomenon of action can be at least an object of a phenomenological description. If so, the Marxist line of thought is questionable from the very beginning. Next, I presented developments of the phenomenological method by Marxists (Martel, Szewczyk) what resulted in a re-interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology. This reading points out, e.g., that the transcendental subject is embedded in the (materialist) structure of the world, and that the process of constitution is to be understood as a cultural, historical, and embodied process. Therefore, cognition is but an action, and *praxis* is a universal background of philosophy. Finally, I tried to show that a confrontation with Marxism inspires phenomenology to develop a theory of action (Wojtyła), and ethics of solidarity (Tischner). Both theories – as it seems – can be practically implemented.

At the end, one can ask: Why, in spite of the overwhelming criticism of Marxism, phenomenology was popular in Poland during the period of 1945–1989? And, more importantly, what Marxism contributes, if anything, to phenomenology in Poland? Paradoxically, because phenomenology was “diametrically opposed” to Marxism, it offered a more fruitful view on a man and the world. It is true that phenomenology presented at that time “a vision of personal freedom and transcendence that stood in stark contrast to the stultifying realities of late communism” (Gubser 2014: 133). Phenomenology was, then, “a code for communicating current dissatisfactions and future hopes with one another and the wider world” (Gubser 2014: 136). Nonetheless, as presented above, the Marxist reading of phenomenology, besides a fruitless criticism, inspired phenomenology to describe the phenomenon of work as a specific way of being. As such, the Marxist reading of phenomenology in Poland in the period of 1945–1989 is not only a historical issue, but rather it offers an important contribution to contemporary phenomenology, and it gives a leading clue to explore the phenomenology of work in detail.

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Magdalena Hoły-Łuczaj¹

On the Absence of Eco-phenomenology in Poland

The paper aims to identify and explain the absence of eco-phenomenological perspective in Polish philosophy. Eco-phenomenology, which emerged as the specialized area of phenomenological movement in the 1980s, explores relations between human beings and nature. The lack of it in Poland, as the paper argues, is not only due to the specific political situation, but primarily because of the great impact of Jozef Tischner's "philosophy of drama," which has strongly anthropocentric implications.

Key words: eco-phenomenology, environmental ethics, Polish philosophy, Tischner, philosophy of drama

Introduction

Eco-phenomenology is one of the most interesting crossroads of ontology and ethics in contemporary philosophy. This branch of phenomenology is not limited to the analysis of relations between human beings on which traditional ethics is focused, but explores interrelations between humans and environment. The field of eco-phenomenology is growing fast and gets more and more attention. In Poland, however, eco-phenomenology is barely known and does not have any representatives. In the article, I shall explain reasons for this absence. I will argue that this is mainly due to the great influence of Jozef Tischner's philosophy of drama, which was equally original and anthropocentric theory.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first part, I outline basic principles of eco-phenomenology. Next, I reconstruct the development of environmental philosophy in Poland. In the third, main, part, I analyze and discuss Tischner's concepts related to the nonhuman beings and the environment. In the fourth part, I unpack this intellectual heritage in works of Tischner's students.

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Ecology and Phenomenological Perspective

The environmental philosophy claims it can bring a change to the world and transform current, ecologically destructive attitude toward the environment into respectful and caring, by altering thinking about the identity of human beings, nature, and their mutual relations. That is to say, environmental philosophy believes our behavior and disposition towards others is determined by the recognition of how someone *sees* his or her own position and the position of other beings. Such a perspective seems to be phenomenological par excellence (see Kirkman 2002: 79). And eco-phenomenology makes an intensive use of it.

Phenomenology has a reputation as a highly abstract, theoretical inquiry into consciousness, being, or structure of objects (Toadvine 2003: 10). While it seems that this is a well-deserved reputation, we should remember that phenomenology is internally very diverse. Some phenomenologists put emphasis that they do purely theoretical work, whereas others point to the practical implications of the phenomenological investigations. This is the case of eco-phenomenology. Representatives of it are aware that world faces serious environmental concerns and they want to help solve practical problems related to it by careful philosophical examination. They believe that contribution, which philosophy can offer, is an insightful clarification of our metaphysical and ethical assumptions, which underlie all of our current behavior. To be precise, they claim it is phenomenology alone that can alter presuppositions which guide and influence our behavior.

It is so – as Ted Toadvine, one of the most prominent representatives of eco-phenomenology, holds – because phenomenology takes its starting point in return to things, that it is the world as we experience – perceive, recognize, value – it. This perspective undermines the distinction between theory and practice. According to it, the way we see the world (domain of theory) determines the way we act (domain of practice). This concerns also human attitude toward nature, the heart of the matter for eco-phenomenology.

The first works which employed ecophenomenological perspective were written in the 1980s when environmental philosophy has already been well established. But it was in 2001 when the most important book on ecophenomenology was published. It was entitled just *Ecophenomenology*. More interesting was a subtitle of this seminal book: *Back to the Earth Itself*. It gives us, as Iain Thomson puts it, a clever twist on the famous battle-cry of Husserlian phenomenology – ‘Back to the things themselves!’ (*Zu den Sachen selbst!*) – in which the crucial *Sache*, the ‘heart of the matter’ or ‘sake’, has been replaced by ‘earth’ (Thomson 2004: 386). It is the earth and our relation with it, which we need to rethink in order to find some remedy for the contemporary environmental crisis.

Eco-phenomenology, which emerges at the crossroad of ethics and ontology, is a kind of philosophical anthropology. It asks about human place in the order of reality, primarily concentrating on the relations between nature and human beings. The idea inspiring the eco-phenomenological movement is that today we have incorrect presuppositions about it. This is the ballast of tradition which weighs us down. According to eco-phenomenology, the most environmentally-destructive ethical and metaphysical concepts inherited from the past centuries are dualisms of mind and world, man and nature, and matter and spirit. They result in the image of human being as a superior being which can and should dominate and arbitrarily use the rest of the world, according to our, human, needs (Toadvine 2003: 10–12).

Eco-phenomenology advocates reorientation of human relation to the (natural) world by providing alternative ontological categories. They are indivisibility of man and world, the interrelatedness of them, and the possibility to uncover the identity of nonhuman beings, which is different from creating it. Eco-phenomenologists believe that such assumptions are adequate for describing the fundamentals of reality. Supporters of the eco-phenomenology movement argue that conceptual dichotomies (typical for Platonism and Cartesianism) fundamentally mischaracterize our ordinary experience. Eco-phenomenology, according to them, offers a perspective, which is far from the counterintuitive assumption inherited from the history of philosophy (Toadvine 2003: 12–14).

Here, however, we should specify that eco-phenomenologists do not condemn the entire history of philosophy. They criticize mainly some ancient and modern concepts, already mentioned Platonism and Cartesianism alone. The heroes, or speaking in a more moderate manner, predecessors of ecophenomenology are Freidrich Nietzsche and the most important phenomenologists: Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel Levinas. What needs to be underlined is that their ideas according to eco-phenomenology are not incomplete and require further development but constitute a powerful *source of inspiration*. In this sense, the relationships of authors in question with eco-phenomenology are only indirect – they are implied (but in a valid manner) to them by the supporters of eco-phenomenology. Below is provided, due to obvious space limits, a brief overview of the their key concepts from the standpoint of eco-phenomenology.

Husserl is a relevant thinker for eco-phenomenology as the founder of phenomenology, who formulated its basic principles, according to which our perception of what we call ‘reality’ is complex phenomenon, grounded in both our subjectivity and external elements. Husserl also layed down foundations for a new approach to nature and culture since it offers a description of reality as value-laden and meaning-structured lifeworld. Furthermore, his critique of naturalism helps

to overcome uncritical scientism and instrumental rationality (Toadvine 2016, 2003; Brown 2003; Kohak 2003). And last, but not least, he established the phenomenological movement to which belong key figures of the twentieth century continental philosophy.

Heidegger seems to be the most significant figure among them. It was his concept of being-in-the-world from early writings and critique of technology as well as the idea of “letting be” from the later works, which influenced so strongly environmental philosophy and eco-phenomenology (Toadvine 2016, 2003; Zimmerman 1990). But even though over the past decades environmentalists have consistently focused more on Heidegger than on any other philosopher, we cannot forget that two French philosophers – Merleau-Ponty and Levinas – also provided a great source of inspiration for eco-phenomenology. In Merleau-Ponty, these are primarily descriptions of corporeality and the flesh of the world concept of phenomenology as “concrete reflection” (Langer 2003). He shows that bodily, that is natural, element is an irreducible part of human condition, what can be seen as a recognition of kinship with nature. Levinas, on the other hand, helps to think the otherness of nonhuman beings which deserves respect and care and requires abandoning hubristic attitude towards the environment by human beings (Edelglass *et al.* 2012; Calarco 2010).

All of the above figures are well-known philosophers in Poland, whose ideas are often analyzed jointly in works on anthropological or ethical issues. Yet, there are never or hardly ever read in Poland as pro-environmental thinkers.² In what follows, I shall reflect on the reasons for this absence.

Environmental Philosophy in Poland

Let me begin with describing problematic situation of the development of environmental philosophy, or more broadly speaking environmental thinking in Poland. It can be best illustrated with some anecdote. At the turn of the 1970s and the 1980s, during the visit in West Germany, a member of Polish anticommunist organization, who attempted to present it as a left-wing group, was asked by some German activist: “and what about your green policy? what are your environmental actions?”. Dead silence answered him. Both parties were equally shocked. German activist couldn’t understand how left-wing organization can omit issues related to the environment protection, while Polish couldn’t understand that someone would expect interest in green issues from people who had to struggle with the persecution of the anti-regime opposition, lack of the free speech, and poverty caused by the bad economy.

² The following works are rare exceptions: Bialer 2015; Fiut 2005; Przyłębski 1992.

So, as Dominika Dzwonkowska reminds us, while Rachel Carson was awaking a pro-environmental awareness in the 1960s in the USA, in Poland the area of ecological problems was not even discussed. In Poland, as in the other countries behind the Iron Curtain, the destruction of nature was of minimal concern. The Polish government was focused on industrialization and the priority was how to produce more steel and not how to protect the environment (Dzwonkowska 2017: 136).

In Poland problems typical for environmental ethics become a subject of interest at the turn of the 1980s and the 1990s. Back then first works introducing basic concepts of environmental philosophy for Polish audience were published. They analyzed and discussed Thomas Regan's idea of moral extensionism, Robin Attfield's individualistic environmental ethics, Paul W. Taylor's ethics of respect for nature, the land ethic of Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicott, deep ecology, Holmes Rolston III ecocentrism, Gaia hypothesis (Tyburski 2006: 12–14). These books have given the impulse for others to carry out research in environmental ethics and have started the intellectual debate within this field in Poland (Dzwonkowska 2017: 138). At the turn of the 1990s and the 2000s Polish scholars started to develop their own ideas. Today, there is a wide array of concepts offered by them.

One of the most clear-cut is Christian environmental ethics (Jozef M. Dolega, T. Slipko, G. Holub). This approach is an anthropocentric one. It is grounded in the classical idea of the ladder of beings, according to which human beings rule over nature. Yet, Christian environmental ethics points to the fact that it shouldn't be cruel exploitation, which does not consider any constraints of this use. Human beings have to take care of nature in order avoid an ecological crisis, which effects would be harmful to all mankind. Another premise of this approach is that nature is the gift given by God, who made human beings responsible for it (Dzwonkowska 2017: 144–145).

Another distinct approach is scientific biocentrism of Zdzisława Piątek. According to her, the theory of evolution is a test of the neutral perception of living Nature. It rejects the illusion of anthropocentrism and it overcomes the tendency to accept teleological explanations. So, for Piątek, unlike Paul Taylor, living organisms are not teleological centers of life. However, Piątek recognizes Taylor's philosophy as the most appropriate in terms of enabling human beings to live with the other organisms on Earth in harmony (Piątek 2008, 1998; Dzwonkowska 2017: 140).

Definitely worth mentioning is also Włodzimierz Tyburski's environmental axiology. He constructed the catalogue of environmental values. Basically, it consists of two groups: (1) values that are the aims themselves: life and health and (2) values that are means to achieve some goal: responsibility, moderation, justice, solidarity/community. Such a formulation of set of environmental reveals its close connection to biocentrism, according to which undisturbed life and well-being of

some entity is a core good, and all actions that contribute to maintain it are also positively assessed (Dzwonkowska 2017: 141–142).

Finally, we should point to Henryk Skolimowski's eco-philosophy. He also defined the set of pro-environmental values grounded in the claim that "the world is a sanctuary". The values for the new ethics are: reverence for life; responsibility for the environment; sympathy/compassion; moderation/temperance; diversity (Dzwonkowska 2017: 143; Małecka, Stark 2018). Skolimowski is best known Polish environmental philosopher, but we should keep in mind that for decades he worked and taught abroad, mainly in United Kingdom and the United States.

The other interesting ideas in the field of environmental ethics were brought by Andrzej Papuzinski, Zbigniew Hull, Helena Ciazela, Ignacy Stanislaw Fiut, just to name a few, who pointed to various aspects of ecological issues.

So even though environmental philosophy is not so popular in Poland as it is in the United States, Canada, Scandinavian countries, Netherlands or Germany, there is quite a big number of various approaches to it with the different theoretical background. Yet, we will not find eco-phenomenology among them. Why? My hypothesis is that to a large extent it is due to the impact of Josef Tischner philosophy of drama – one of the most original theories in the history of Polish philosophy.

Development of Phenomenology in Poland

In Poland, the father of phenomenology is Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), a direct student of Edmund Husserl. He was a versatile philosopher, who worked in the field of ontology (he opposed the idealism of his teacher), epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, and anthropology. However, we need to bear in mind that it was ontology which was the most important field of research for Ingarden. All his other ideas – epistemological, ethical, anthropological – are grounded in his ontology. That is to say, Ingarden's anthropology is complementary to his ontological concepts, yet the latter are the core, when it comes to the significance and volume of his work. Having said that, we cannot forget how important is his *Książeczka o człowieku* ("Little Book About Man"), in which Ingarden develops, among other concepts, his interesting and original theory of responsibility. Of particular importance for us is that there could be traced some implications for environmental ethics in it (for example a distinction between moral agency and patiency of animals – see Ingarden 1973: 82, 116–117). They are not explicit (Ingarden died when environmental philosophy was just emerging), but they could be treated as a source of inspiration, as it is in the case of Heidegger or Levinas. Yet, they have never been examined from this angle. As it was already indicated, I believe this is a result of Tischner's influence on Polish phenomenology.

Józef Tischner (1931–2000) was both a priest and a philosopher, who unlike the great majority of Christian or Catholic theorist preferred phenomenology – as Ingarden’s student – to Thomistic approach. Tischner attended the seminar conducted by Ingarden, who was later a supervisor of his master (1959) and doctoral thesis (1963) at Jagiellonian University in Cracow. Since the 1970s Tischner was gaining more and more popularity. He has influenced subsequent generations of philosophers in Poland. Today, there is The Tischner Institute, which takes care of Tischner’s legacy and promotes his works. Each year ‘Tischner Days’ take place in Cracow in order to celebrate the memory of him and present further perspectives of research in his philosophy.³

Tischner made the most significant contribution in the field of phenomenological ethics and anthropology in Poland (see Wolenski and Skoczynski 2010: 543). He was one of the first commentators of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas in Poland. He introduced their ideas to a wider philosophical audience. His well-known book *Myslenie według wartości* (*Thinking in Accordance with Values*, 1982) is a collection of texts, which the core part discusses concepts brought by Husserl and philosophers belonging to his circle: Heidegger, Ingarden, Gadamer, and Levinas. Some of them were written already in 1976. Tischner, however, was not only an interpreter of those great thinkers, but he also has created his own theory drawing upon their ideas. Another, equally important source of inspiration for him was the philosophy of dialogue represented by Martin Buber.⁴ From the combination of different elements of Heidegger’s phenomenology (i.e. temporality, conscience), Levinas philosophy (i.e. otherness, face), and Buber’s paradigm of I–Though relation emerged his original “philosophy of drama”.

Tischner’s Philosophy of Drama

A book with such a title (*Filozofia dramatu. Wprowadzenie* – “The Philosophy of Drama. Introduction”) was published in 1990. The framework of the philosophy of drama is the idea that the relations between human beings can be described and analyzed as a peculiar kind of drama, or theatrical performance.

The most fundamental in it is what is happening between people – “the actors”. Their relations is the actual action of the drama. The essential of it is the openness to another human being which can never be objectified. It is different with “the

³ See: <http://www.tischner.org.pl/eng> (access: 24.04.2019).

⁴ Interestingly, Martin Buber is also very important figure for environmental philosophy, what was discussed also in Poland: see Bialer 2015; Grochowska 2008.

scene”, which for Tischner was the rest of the world – that is to say, all other non-human beings.

In Polish one can say that something is either “in” the world or “at” the world to localize or describe the most general place, where human beings and things can be. The second expression is even more popular. Tischner referred to it in recognizing that humans are of the world as the actors are at the stage. What is important for the matter of our discussion, the author of *The Philosophy of Drama* argued that the relation between two actors is completely different than between actors and the scene. Human beings are always agents or subjects. Tischner claimed that we always should see in the other human being a subject, whose subjectivity should never be pressed into ready categories and assumptions or adjusted to our expectations, imaginations, and projections. We should always “be open dialogically” toward other human beings (Tischner 2001: 9). That is to say, we should be ready to let the other person freely disclose herself or himself in their otherness, uniqueness, and peculiarity. Nonhuman beings, on the other hand, have to be always objects for us – we have to fit them into our mental and pragmatic typologies so that they become understandable and tamed (Tischner 2001: 13). According to Tischner objectifying is the only way humans can experience what they find in their surroundings.

This is a strongly dualistic concept. Tischner believed that nonhuman beings and human beings are “the opposite”: “[Subject] is the opposite to object – nothing more and nothing less” (Tischner 2001: 13). This definition (a little vague and not clear cut to say the least) tells us that nonhuman beings are completely disparate to human beings. Yet, they are not only different but also inferior according to philosophy of drama. Tischner believed that the world, “the scene”, is something that is below us both descriptively and prescriptively. The statement “Under our feet is our world – the scene of the drama”⁵ is commented as follows:

The scene is at the feet of a man. The Bible says: subdue the earth. A human being subordinate everything, what is – in accordance with nature – *below* [Tischner highlights this word – MHL] him. The basic act of subordination is objectification.⁶

And further:

After the creation of the first people, God said: subdue the Earth. These words are still in us. They determine the most original relation of human being to the scene. First of all, they show the place of the earth in the hierarchy of values: man

⁵ “Pod naszymi stopami jest nasz świat – scena dramatu” (Tischner 2001: 8).

⁶ “Scena znajduje się u stóp człowieka. Mówi Pismo: czyńcie sobie ziemię poddaną. Człowiek poddaje sobie to, co wedle natury znajduje się niżej człowieka. Aktem podstawowym poddania jest akt przedmiotowania” (Tischner 2001: 9).

is above the earth and the earth below man. Earth is not a God. Earth is not a human being.⁷

The anthropocentric conviction that the scene – a totality of nonhuman beings – is situated *lower* than human beings is supported by the quote from the Bible (we shouldn't forget that Tischner was a priest): “subdue the earth”. This famous saying is usually interpreted on the ground of environmental philosophy and beyond as an encouragement for people to exploit nature (see Lovejoy 2009: 131). Even though some scholars (as for example already mentioned advocates of Christian environmental philosophy) seek to mitigate such a reading, arguing that it doesn't mean that human beings are allowed to predatory abuse or plundering nature, these words cannot be understood otherwise than showing that satisfying human interests is the ultimate and the only goal of the whole universe. This is also the case of Tischner's philosophy of drama.

However, we have to remember that Tischner primarily didn't aim to diminish the status of nature, but rather attempted to enhance the status of human beings, showing how valuable they are and how much they deserve. We cannot lose sight of the overall context of his philosophy. Tischner intended to reinforce the condition of human being as an individual because he believed (and was right in it) that in the 20th century human beings were too often treated as a kind of a mass. That century was cruelly marked by two totalitarianisms. Human individuality was disrespected – it served only “greater” good: race or state. Tischner's phenomenology was driven by the desire to ground inherent value of each human beings, which we always meet face to face (in Levinasian sense). If nonhuman beings drew his attention they were always a kind of background or the scene of human existence. The point of reference was always human beings. Such an approach was already presented in *Etyka Solidarności* (*The Ethics of Solidarity*, 1981). He describes here a home during tough times in Polish history as follows:

Home became a refuge, in which peasant could protect his identity. Whoever abandoned the farm, has made betrayal. But we do not betray stones, do not betray the trees themselves, do not betray the soil as such. When someone betrayed, he betrayed someone – a man. Stones, trees, soil, and everything that the farm constituted of was one great indication of the people who we must always be faithful.⁸

⁷ “Po stworzeniu pierwszych ludzi Bóg rzekł: «czyńcie sobie ziemię poddaną». Słowa te są nadal w nas. Określają podstawowy zarys stosunku człowieka do sceny dramatu. Przede wszystkim ukazują miejsce ziemi w hierarchii wartości: człowiek jest ponad ziemią, a ziemia poniżej człowieka. Ziemia nie jest bogiem. Ziemia nie jest człowiekiem” (Tischner 2005: 80).

⁸ “Dom stawał się «placówką», w której chłop bronił swojej tożsamości. Kto porzucał gospodarstwo, ten zdradzał. Ale przecież nie zdradza się kamieni, nie zdradza się samych drzew, nie zdradza się gleby jako takiej. Gdy ktoś zdradza, zdradza kogoś – człowieka. Kamienie, drzewa, gleba,

The problem with Tischner's approach, however, is not that he looked at reality through the prism of human beings' affairs and was more interested in them than nonhuman beings. The most bothering issue is that he sought to reinforce it at the cost of nature. Such passages reveal *strongly* anthropocentric character of Tischner's philosophy, if we refer to the distinction between strong and weak anthropocentrism. The latter holds that mediation in human interests is irreducible component in our perception of the reality, but ascribe at least *some* non-instrumental value to nonhuman beings (Hargrove 2006: 186). Tischner's claims, whereas, are oriented *purely* to human well-being – nonhuman beings are merely tools (instruments) to gain it. In *The Philosophy of Drama* we read:

Anyone who neglects nature can cause a scene rebellion. The wisdom pervading farming says how should deal with nature. It tells the farmer what he has to do in order to bring out of nature what is best, that is what serves life best. Various forms of life are arranged in a hierarchy. Therefore, the wisdom of farming must think hierarchically. Human life is more valuable than the life of grass, tree life, animal life. Man is at [in] the world, the world-scene is *below* [Tischner again highlights this word – MHL].⁹

This passage starts with the assumption that people must not overexploit nature, but should rather proceed in accordance with natural constraints. However, the justification for this claim is instrumental – Tischner argues that we need to act this way if we want to get out of nature what serves life best. Moreover, he doesn't refer here to the common meaning of life in the environmental philosophy (basically, the totality of nature), but only that of human beings, what he explicitly says elsewhere: "The earth serves human beings only when human beings know how to serve the Earth. Human beings need to help the Earth to breed more and better to sustain their lives".¹⁰

Tischner advanced the claim that there is the objective hierarchy of universe, symbolized by the figure of the great chain of being, which was criticized on the ground of environmental philosophy. Obviously, not every environmental philosopher is an egalitarianist, but the critique of the great chain of being was common

I wszystko, co stanowiło gospodarstwo, było jednym, wielkim wskazaniem na ludzi, którym zawsze trzeba być wiernym" (Tischner 2005: 82).

⁹ "Kto zlekceważy naturę, może spowodować bunt sceny. O tym, jak należy postępować z naturą, mówi mądrość przenikająca gospodarowanie. Ukazuje ona gospodarzowi, co powinien zrobić, by wydobyć z natury to, co najlepsze, czyli to, co najlepiej służy życiu. Różne formy życia układają się w hierarchię. Dlatego mądrość gospodarowania musi myśleć hierarchicznie. Życie człowieka jest cenniejsze od życia trawy, życia drzewa, życia zwierząt. Człowiek jest bowiem na świecie, świat-scena jest *poniżej* [Tischner again highlights this word – MHL] człowieka (Tischner 2001: 221).

¹⁰ "Ziemia służy człowiekowi tylko wtedy, gdy człowiek potrafi jej służyć. Człowiek musi pomóc ziemi, aby rodziła lepiej i więcej, by w ten sposób podtrzymywała jego życie" (Tischner 2005: 83).

since it gives too easily alibi for the abuse of nature (Lovejoy 2009: 128–131; Sessions 1995: 159–160). This concept supports the conviction that human beings have every right – as “superior” beings – not only to satisfy their needs but also secondary interests or even whims. It does not leave room for own good of non-human beings. Everything is subordinated to human beings. Tischner’s theory rests on this assumption. He does not suggest to stop the exploitation of nature because of its own sake, but because it could disturb sustaining the life of human beings. People should protect nature, but only due to the fact its devastation might have harmful effects for themselves. Tischner advocates care for nature, yet it is anthropocentric and instrumental reinforcement, which does not allow to see in nature a partner, but only a servant.

Summing up, Tischner’s anthropocentrism, which is clearly visible, should be primarily understood as the opposite to Marxist, or more precisely, communist state-centrism. According to him, each human role is always oriented directly toward other human beings and not the development of economy (e.g. “farming is the role of a human being [received] from other human beings for other human beings” – Tischner 2005: 84). Unfortunately, the connotations of such claims, as well as some of his other direct statements, diminished the ontological status of nature, and in result its ethical status. Tischner phenomenology was occupied with the problems of freedom, responsibility, wrongdoing, evil as belonging exclusively to the domain of human interrelations.

Tischner’s Followers

This approach was taken over by other Polish phenomenologically oriented ethicists or theorists working in the field of philosophical anthropology. The most prominent representatives of phenomenological tradition in ethics or philosophical anthropology in Poland were fellow-workers or students of Tischner. We can list here, among others: Karol Tarnowski (1937–), Jacek Filek (1945–), Tadeusz Gadacz (1955–), and Cezary Wodziński (1959–2016). All of them investigate further issues essential for Tischner’s philosophy work. They analyzed problems of freedom and responsibility (Gadacz, Filek), subject (Tarnowski), evil (Wodziński) referring to primarily Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, and Buber. Even though neither of them employs specific categories and terminology of the philosophy of drama, their works represent the same attitude toward the scope of moral consideration: they believe it is purely human sphere. Natural, nonhuman beings are excluded from the domain of ethics. In their writings, there are no signals of non-anthropocentric turn.

It can be illustrated with two recent publications, respectively on Tischner’s philosophy and ethics. First one is a book by Dobrosław Kot entitled *Myślenie*

dramatyczne (“Dramatic Thinking”, 2016). It aims to examine the problem of thinking as a fundamental activity for human beings and at the same time, it’s the newest study on Tischner’s philosophy of drama (Kot 2016: 9–13). Kot highlights that Tischner’s work is of crucial importance for him but he seeks to critically refer to it (Kot 2016: 13). However, when it comes to the idea of the scene, Kot does not make any critical remarks. He accepts recognizing the world as the scene (Kot 2016: 42, 44), with which relations are radically different from relations with other human beings (Kot 2016: 87, 160).

Even more telling is another example, which is Jacek Filek’s book *Etyka. Reinterpretacja* (*Ethics. Reinterpretation*, 2014). Filek reconstructs the development of ethics, claiming that there were basically three stages of it. In the first period (Socrates–Augustine), ethics was focused on the issue of truth. During the second period (Descartes–Nietzsche) the most important was a problem of freedom. In the third period (Husserl–Levinas) the question of responsibility came to the fore. Filek’s work is without a doubt an interesting, in-depth novel mapping of ethics. The only drawback is that it limits the scope of ethics to human beings with any discussion. Such boundaries of ethics are accepted by Filek as obvious. What is particularly striking about it is that even Albert Schweitzer’s philosophy is presented without its environmental implications. Schweitzer’s concept of “reverence for life”, which sense is best expressed in famous quotation “I am life which wills to live, and I exist in the midst of life which wills to live”, was a great source for environmental philosophy since it supports belief that not only human beings, but also other living things deserve respect and care. Filek, however, reads this famous saying *only* as a call for respect for life, which everyone (that is every human being) internally experiences and not abstract notions of the “person” or the “moral law” (Filek 2014: 206). Filek does it even though he knew “environmental” interpretations of Schweitzer as the reviewer for Piatek’s book (1998).

This is not to say that Heidegger’s or Levinas’ philosophy are obviously non-anthropocentric and can be read as environmentally oriented without any obstacles. Such interpretations are accompanied by many controversies.¹¹ Debate on this subject, however, is intense, inspiring, and definitely worth following. Unfortunately, Polish phenomenology seems to ignore it.

Conclusion

Eco-phenomenology offers a new paradigm of relations between human beings and the environment, which is supposed to overturn dominating, arrogantly anthropocentric approach to nature. Eco-phenomenology goes beyond simple

¹¹ See Löwith 1971; Jonas 1994; Tonner 2011.

division of ethics and metaphysics because argues that ethos should be grounded in the most fundamental localization of human being, which is his or her place on the metaphysical plane.

In Poland, even though the field of environmental philosophy is intensively growing, this movement does not have any phenomenological inspirations. I sought to show it might be due to the impact of Jozef Tischner's philosophy. He is undoubtedly one of the most significant contemporary Polish philosophers. He was one of the first to introduce Heidegger's and Levinas' philosophy to Polish philosophical audience and he has strongly influenced their reception in Poland. His interpretation of their phenomenological concepts, as well as his own philosophy of drama, which he drew upon them, presented human individuals not only as absolutely intrinsically valuable but also as superior to all other creatures in the world. Even though he aimed in the first place to enhance the status of human beings, which he believed to be undervalued in the contemporary world, it suggested largely anthropocentric worldview criticized by environmental philosophy in general, and eco-phenomenology in particular. This, I think, has hindered the adoption of eco-phenomenological perspective by Polish phenomenology, even though Roman Ingarden's concepts can have implications for environmental ethics. I believe it would be worth re-examining them through the prism of eco-phenomenology, as well as include this perspective in ongoing phenomenological research in Poland, expanding its horizons in metaphysics and ethics.

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VARIA

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Do Good Old Philosophical Values Work Today? Polish Students' Value Priorities in 2006 and 2017 – A Comparative Study

BACKGROUND. Values are concepts or beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors, that transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and are ordered by relative importance. Referring to Scheler's philosophical concept, the hierarchies of values among Polish students were compared between 2006 (Fanslau & Brycz, 2006) and 2017.

PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE. 603 (in total) adults participated in two studies. All of them were undergraduate students of various Universities from the Tri-City. They filled in the Scheler's Value Scale.

RESULTS. The results showed that the model hierarchy of values postulated by philosophers is not reflected in the minds of young (18–33 years old) Poles now and it was not reflected over a decade ago either. Moreover, significant differences between the levels of certain values were found.

CONCLUSIONS. It turned out that philosophical theories once accepted and adapted to psychology no longer have the same meaning as before. Value priorities change and they are ordered according to subjective validity.

Key words: values, hierarchy, young adults

Background

Personality, motivational and social psychology yield a large number of values definitions. However, there are five features that are common to most of these definitions: values are concepts or beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors, that

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transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and are ordered by relative importance (e.g., Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). Values measurement consists of ordering them from the least to the most important or separately estimating their validity as “principles that guide my life”. Values reflect preferences for what ideally ought to be. Both individuals and societies vary in the importance they place on different values (Fischer & Schwartz 2011). They are conveyed to society members directly, but also through laws, norms, organizational practices and the media (Daniel *et al.* 2014). In addition, there is a long-standing interest in how personal values change across the life span as a result of life adaptations (e.g., Erikson 1980). Large number of studies take into account sex or age differences in value priorities (e.g., Schwartz & Rubel 2005; Schwartz & Rubel-Lifschitz 2009; Fung *et al.* 2016). In this article however, we take a closer look at the hierarchy of values among Polish students, living temporarily or permanently in Pomeranian voivodeship and test, whether there are any differences between young people’s value priorities affirmed in 2006 and in 2017. We also check what place in the minds of young Poles occupy most abstract goals, namely: holy values (God, salvation, eternal life, nation, patriotism). The research adds to the existing literature in its focus on values of young people.

Different approaches to values

The author of the first concept of values, included in the psychology textbooks, was Gordon Allport. The Study of Values, as a way of measuring them, was first published in 1931. It was designed to measure six main values: theoretical (the dominant interest of the theoretical man is the discovery of truth), economic (the economic man is characteristically interested in what is useful), aesthetic (the aesthetic man sees his highest value in form and harmony), social (the highest value for this type is love of people), political (the political man is interested primarily in power), and religious (the highest value for the religious man may be called unity: he is mystical, and seeks to comprehend the cosmos as a whole, to relate himself to its embracing totality) (see Vernon, Allport 1931: 233–235). At the first version, the authors used the concept of values and interests interchangeably. They claimed that the SoV is intended to measure the relative importance of six universal interests as elements of personality. Rokeach’s proposition was also to include values within the framework of personality theory. Unlike the Allport concept, it was an analysis in terms of cognitive psychology. (see Ciecuch 2013).

Milton Rokeach (1973) described two types of values, terminal and instrumental, corresponding to idealized ends and means. He defined a value system as an hierarchical arrangement of values along a continuum of importance and

postulated two value systems, one terminal and one instrumental, each with a rank-order structure of its own. Terminal values refer to desirable end-states of existence – the goals that a person would like to achieve during their lifetime and may vary among different groups of people in different cultures (e.g. a world at peace, family security, freedom, equality, happiness, wisdom, pleasure). Instrumental values refer to preferable modes of behavior (e.g. ambitious, broadminded, clean, cheerful, logical, imaginative, polite, loving). These are preferable modes of behavior, or means of achieving the terminal values (Rokeach 1973).

According to Shalom Schwartz (1992) values form a circular motivational continuum in which adjacent values on the circle are compatible, have similar motivational meanings, and can be pursued simultaneously through the same behavior. In contrast, opposite values on the circle express conflicting motivations. He originally identified 10 motivationally distinct basic values that are recognized across societies: *power* (social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources), *achievement* (personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards), *hedonism* (pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself), *stimulation* (excitement, novelty, and challenge in life), *self-direction* (independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring), *universalism* (understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature), *benevolence* (preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact), *tradition* (respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self), *conformity* (restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms), *security* (safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self). They can be put across the value circle, which form two bipolar dimensions – the first dimension contrast self – transcendence values (universalism and benevolence) with self – enhancement values (power and achievement). The second dimension contrasts openness to change values (stimulation and self-direction) with conservation values (tradition, conformity and security). Hedonism is located between the openness to change and self – enhancement dimensions. Recently Schwartz *et al.* (2012) proposed distinguishing between 19 facets by partitioning some of the 10 values into more narrowly defined values (security was divided into security-personal and security-societal; benevolence was divided into benevolence-dependability and benevolence-caring; universalism was divided into universalism-tolerance, universalism-concern and universalism-nature; conformity was divided into conformity-rules and conformity-interpersonal; power was divided into power-resources and power-dominance and self-direction was divided into self-direction-action and self-direction-thought). Moreover, they introduced two new, narrowly defined values between some earlier values. *Face*

was defined as “security and power through maintaining one’s public image and avoiding humiliation” and was located between security and power, and *humility* was defined as “recognizing one’s insignificance in the larger scheme of things” and was placed between conformity and benevolence (Schwartz *et al.* 2012).

Max Scheler, a German philosopher, known for his work in phenomenology, ethics and philosophical anthropology postulated that values exist objectively and they are just as independent from the subject as material beings or logical and mathematical laws. Moreover, values are ideal, in contrast to material entities or mental beings, which are real. That is why they can only be grasped intuitively (see Tatkiewicz 1990). There is, according to Scheler, an objective ranking of values, a ranking of the “lower” to the “higher,” or better expressed, a ranking of the more superficial to the deeper. He claimed that the universal hierarchy of values embraces all aspects of human activity (Kuderowicz 1965). The ranking of value types from lowest to highest is as follows: pleasure, utility, vitality, spirituality, and holiness (Scheler 1975). Spiritual values divide into three groups: esthetical values (beauty), truth and moral values (see Scheler 1975; Tischner 1982; Brzozowski 1995). Scheler did not establish the order of spiritual values. According to Brzozowski (1995), esthetical values should be the lowest, because of their similarity to pleasure values (e.g. beauty usually ensure sensual pleasure). Truth values should be therefore subordinate to moral values. The values ranking proposed by Tischner (1982) is compatible to Scheler’s hierarchy – the lowest are hedonistic values, because they provide only temporary pleasures which can pose a potential threat to life and health. Life-giving (vital) values should be therefore more important. Spiritual values should, in turn, give meaning to life, a sense of happiness, and be something deeper and permanent than life-giving values. Tischner (1982) also claims that even spiritual values have to have their own substantiation – when a man sacrifices himself for the truth, justice or freedom, he has to refer to the holy values: God (if he is a believer), nation, history or homeland. Brzozowski (1995) also argues that if the universal hierarchy of values actually exists, then a person’s emotional, cognitive and social development should lead to its discovery.

In our comparative study the question we sought an answer for was whether Polish students differ in relation to their value priorities between 2006 and 2017.

The present research

In the study carried out in 2017 we repeated the value survey among students from 2006 (Fanslau & Brycz 2006). The aim of it was to compare student’s value priorities. To assess them we used the Scheler’s Value Scale (SVS). The SVS (D-50 version), constructed by Brzozowski (1995) consists of 50 values, put into six basic value categories: hedonistic, life-giving, esthetic, truth, moral, and holy.

The basic 6 categories consist of the following items:

1. hedonistic – 8 items: prosperous life, erotic love, possession, pleasure, joy of life, convenience, rest, life full of impressions (adventurous life);
2. life-giving – 6 items: resistance to fatigue, physical strength, fitness, body elasticity, resistance to cold (ability to bear the cold), resistance to hunger (ability to cope with hunger);
3. esthetic – 7 items: elegance, taste, harmony, order of things, proportionality of shapes, regularity of features, order;
4. truth – 8 items: intelligence, consistency, wisdom, objectivity, open mind, understanding, broad (mental) horizons, knowledge;
5. moral – 11 items: kindness, honor (reputation), love, peace, helping others, truthfulness, reliability, sincerity, honesty, kindness, benevolence;
6. holy – 10 items: God, country, nation, independence, homeland, state, patriotism, faith, salvation, eternal life.

Four factor subscales consist of the following items:

1. fitness and physical strength – 3 items: physical strength, fitness, body elasticity;
2. resistance – 3 items: resistance to fatigue, resistance to cold (ability to bear the cold), resistance to hunger (ability to cope with hunger);
3. lay sanctity (patriotic) – 6 items: country, nation, independence, homeland, state, patriotism;
4. religious sanctity – 4 items: God, faith, salvation, eternal life.

The items are ordered alphabetically on the test sheet. To complete the scale, all values have to be evaluated on the 101-point scale (from 0 to 100), where “0” means that the value is neutral, and “100” means that the value is the most important.

We decided to use this scale in our research for three reasons. First, it seems to fit in with the assessment of values in Polish society, where 88% of the total population declares affiliation to the Roman Catholic Church. Second, we wanted to see whether the emphasis on the conservative and religious values put on by the right – wing Law and Justice party which assumed full power in Poland in 2015 is shared by Polish students. The third reason was dictated by the ease of comparing two studies, where the same tools of research are used.

Method

Questions

1. Is there any difference in the importance attached to value priorities by students between 2006 and 2017?
2. What is the hierarchy of values among Polish students?

Participants

603 (in total) adults participated in two studies. All of them were undergraduate students of Gdańsk University, Gdańsk University of Technology, WSB University of Gdańsk, Gdynia Maritime University and Polish Naval Academy in Gdynia. In 2006 308 students (aged between 18 and 30, $M = 22.70$, $SD = 2.01$) took part in the study. In 2017 295 students (aged between 18 and 33, $M = 21.77$, $SD = 1.91$) participated in the follow up study. Participants were eligible if they were 18 or older, undergraduate and Polish. No reward was given for the participation in the study.

Procedure

Students worked in classrooms (groups of 15–20 people). All of them were assured about the scientific goal of our study and their anonymity. Afterwards, they filled in the Scheler's Value Scale (SVS). The reliability of the SVS was satisfactory: in 2006 Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.92$, in 2017: Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.87$. Nobody was unsure about their gender. All participants understood the task and filled in the SVS. There was no reason to exclude any of the subjects.

Variables

Independent variable: Time of values' measurement: 2006 vs. 2017

Dependent variable: Raw average score for all values: hedonistic, life-giving, esthetic, truth, moral, holy

Results

In order to answer the questions we conducted the analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA): 2 Time (2006 vs. 2017) 1 Group separately for each dependent measure.

In the study we wondered whether the importance of values among Polish students might change after 11 years. We found significant differences for the following values (main effects):

- **hedonistic**: $F(1, 601) = 26.59$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = 0.04$, with the higher importance of the value in 2006: $M = 74.24$, $SD = 0.82$ than in 2017: $M = 68.01$, $SD = 0.85$;
- **life-giving**: $F(1, 601) = 9.87$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = 0.02$, with the higher importance of the value in 2006: $M = 59.32$, $SD = 1.10$ than in 2017: $M = 54.28$, $SD = 1.13$;
- **esthetic**: $F(1, 601) = 3.71$, $p = .05$, $\eta^2 = 0.01$, again with the higher importance in 2006: $M = 54$, $SD = 1.04$ than in 2017: $M = 51.07$, $SD = 1.07$;
- **holy**: $F(1, 601) = 22.21$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = 0.04$ with higher importance in 2006: $M = 66.34$, $SD = 1.26$ than in 2017: $M = 57.61$, $SD = 1.29$.

However, no change was observed for two values. These values are:

- truth: $F(1, 601) = 2.93, p = .10$; 2006: $M = 77.38, SD = 0.8$ vs. 2017 $M = 75.71, SD = 0.78$, and
- moral: $F(1, 601) = 0.10, p = .75$; 2006: $M = 77.72, SD = 0.71$ vs. 2017 $M = 77.53, SD = 0.72$.

Figure 1 presents the change that occurred in values importance for Polish students between 2006 and 2017.




Figure 1. The Difference in Values Importance for Polish Students Between 2006 and 2017

Source: own elaboration.

Despite the fact that the significant change between 2006 and 2017 in the importance attached to most of the values was observed, the hierarchy of them remained unaffected (Table 1).

As shown in Table 1, students rated esthetic values as the lowest and moral values – as the highest. Interestingly, hedonistic values are consistently found in the higher values, while religious values are put within the lower values. A comparison of the exemplary hierarchy postulated by Max Scheler and the students' hierarchy can be found in Table 2.

Table 1. The Average Importance of Values in Ascending Order

Values	2006		2017		F(1.595)	p
	M	SD	M	SD		
Esthetic	54.00	1.04	51.07	1.07	3.73	.05
Life-giving	59.32	1.10	54.28	1.13	10.18	.001
Religious sanctity	66.14	1.81	56.64	1.86	13.40	<.001
Lay sanctity	66.50	1.38	58.27	1.41	17.39	<.001
Hedonistic	74.24	0.82	68.01	0.85	27.87	<.001
Truth	77.38	0.80	75.71	0.78	2.24	.14
Moral	77.72	0.85	77.53	0.72	0.04	.85

Source: own elaboration.

Table 2. Comparison of the Exemplary Hierarchy and the Students' Hierarchy

		Lower		Higher			
Scheler's exemplary hierarchy	Hedonistic	Life- giving	Esthetic	Truth	Moral	Lay sanctity	Religious sanctity
Students' hierarchy	Esthetic	Life- giving	Religious sanctity	Lay sanctity	Hedonistic	Truth	Moral

Source: own elaboration.

Discussion

In the study reported in this article the authors compared value priorities among Polish students between 2006 (Fanslau & Brycz 2006) and 2017. The results show that the weight attached to most values, that is hedonistic, life-giving, esthetic and holy (measured with Scheler's Value Scale) has decreased over time. This trend, however, doesn't apply to truth and moral values, which importance remains unchanged, and place those two at the highest level. Despite the fact that the significant change between 2006 and 2017 in the importance attached to most of the values was observed, the hierarchy itself remained unaffected. So if students are asked to rank values from the least to the most important, they put them in the following order: esthetic, life-giving, holy, hedonistic, truth and moral. This hierarchy, which seems to be typical for Polish students living in Pomeranian voivodeship, is far from the exemplary (model) hierarchy postulated by Scheler. Students put hedonistic values (prosperous life, erotic love, possession, pleasure, joy of life, convenience, rest, life full of impressions) much higher than holy values (God, country, nation, independence, homeland, state, patriotism, faith, salvation, eternal life). Why? Research proves (e.g. Fung *et al.* 2016) that subjective well-being is enhanced when individuals endorse values that are appropriate for their age and

fulfill their needs. Thus appreciating hedonistic values so much by young people is developmental (as well as beneficial) – they set and pursue age-related goals, one of which is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Additionally, the socio-emotional selectivity theory (Carstensen *et al.* 1999) posits that one of the ways in which individuals select goals is in accordance with their perceptions of future time – limited or open ended. For young people future time perspective is not limited, so a hedonistic approach to life is a goal which optimize the future. Moreover, it looks like that together with truth (intelligence, understanding, knowledge) and moral (kindness, honesty, benevolence), hedonistic values represent a genuine way to happiness for young Poles. This is consistent with the notion of positive psychology, where pleasure, positive relationships, and accomplishments along with engagement and meaning, constitute the authentic happiness pathways (Seligman 2011). In contrast to Scheler's concept, hedonistic values are no longer connected with something bad or threatening.

In turn, depreciation of holy values by students (which consist of religious as well as patriotic values) is in contrast to the slow but steady increase in religious involvement of Poles in general. This involvement is also related to the rise of conservative and xenophobic attitudes (Social Diagnosis 2015: 367–368). However, it should be remembered that 41,9% of young people up to 34 years of age do not participate in religious practices at all, and in cities with over 500 000 inhabitants this percentage rises to 54 (Social Diagnosis 2015: 284). Additionally, according to the Social Diagnosis (2015), only 10% of people living in the Pomeranian voivodeship (northern Poland) indicate God as one of the three cardinal values. Moreover, hedonistic approach to life generally excludes concentration on religion. Cherishing truth values may also limit trust in religion which calls for faith, not knowledge (Brzozowski 2007: 268).

Polish society in terms of interest and involvement in politics fall below the European average. Only 0.3% of people aged 16 or over are active in favor of a political party, and only 10% are active in favor of any organization (Social Diagnosis 2015). In the whole population, the participation in parliamentary, local or presidential elections does not exceed the 50% threshold. Recent research proves that, in general, if the elections had taken place in 2017, the elderly would have rather participate in the vote than younger respondents, as well as people with specific political views (rather the right-wing) and participating in religious practices (CBOS 2017: 9).

Seeking for an explanation for the value hierarchy professed by young people, it is also worth to compare it to the circular value model in Schwartz's theory. The attempt of integrating two approaches to values, that is the Schwartz's value theory and Scheler's value concept, was made by Ciecuch (2011). Using the multidimensional scaling method (MDS) he established that Schelerian values are

connected with corresponding values on the Schwartz's value circle. Life-giving (vital), hedonistic and esthetic values were located in the same area of the circle as hedonistic, achievement and power (the self-enhancement higher order values), with life-giving values closer to the conservation higher order values and esthetic values closer to openness to change. Moreover, Schelerian values of truth were situated in the same area of the circle as self-direction and stimulation values (the openness to change higher order values), and moral values fit into the sphere of benevolence and universalism values, creating with them the higher order values of self-transcendence. Finally, holy values (both religious and patriotic) were located in the same area as tradition, conformity and security, which belong to the conservation higher order values (Cieciuch 2011: 210). Having in mind that, according to Schwartz's theory, only adjacent values on the circle are compatible, while opposite values express conflicting motivations, the hierarchy of values embraced by young people is not at all surprising. They appreciate values from the spheres of openness to change (like: the open mind, understanding, knowledge, pleasure, joy of life – if the expressed hedonism is closer to the stimulation values) and self – transcendence (like: honesty, sincerity, kindness, benevolence) much more than values from the self – enhancement (like: elegance, taste, proportionality of shapes, physical strength, fitness) and conservation areas (like: patriotism, faith, salvation, eternal life).

The groups of students we focused on repeatedly admit that for them the real “sanctities” are love, truthfulness, reliability, sincerity, honesty, kindness, and benevolence. At the same time, it turns out that philosophical theories once accepted and adapted to psychology no longer have the same meaning as before – hedonism condemned by some philosophers is crucial for subjective well-being enhancement (which is consistent with the trend of positive psychology). Holy values, in turn, as philosophers perceived them, may be now associated with radicalism, political conservatism and religious prejudices, and therefore rejected by students.

Limitations of present research

The conclusions of the study presented here have limitations for at least two reasons. Firstly, the Schelers' Value Scale (SVS) is adapted only to Polish conditions, so it is not possible to use it for cross cultural research. Secondly, as the group of students was not a representative, national sample, conclusions on the hierarchy of values of young people cannot be generalized to the whole country.

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Wymiana barterowa jako strategia ubogich – między odwzajemnieniem a samowystarczalnością

Celem analizy jest próba interpretacji znaczeń nadawanych wymianie barterowej przez jej uczestników. Ramę interpretacyjną stanowią dwa konteksty teoretyczne: dyskurs odwzajemnienia i dyskurs samowystarczalności, w których ulokowałyśmy wypowiedzi badanych. Pierwszy z nich odsyła do strategii działania zakorzenionej w tradycjach i rytuałach gospodarki przedpieniężnej, drugi natomiast nawiązuje do klasycznej liberalnej wykładni człowieczeństwa, wypełniającego się w działaniach ukierunkowanych na pozyskiwanie niezależności od innych. Napięcia powstające między tymi strategiami wyjaśnia koncepcja szacunku Richarda Sennetta, zgodnie z którą jest on zyskiwany przez dawanie innym lub przez samorozwój. Analizowane interpretacje uczestników wymiany barterowej wskazują, że obydwie strategie są przez nich traktowane jako wzajemnie niesprzeczne sposoby wyjaśniania praktyk, w których biorą udział.

Słowa kluczowe: wymiana barterowa, bieda, odwzajemnienie, autonomia

Barter exchange as a strategy of the poor –
between reciprocity and self-sufficiency

The aim of the analysis is an attempt to interpret the meanings given to the barter exchange by its participants. The interpretative framework consists of two theoretical contexts: the discourse of reciprocity and the discourse of self-sufficiency in which we have placed the statements of the respondents. The former refers to the strategy rooted in tradition and rituals of barter economy, while the latter refers to the classical liberal interpretation of humanity fulfilled in actions aimed at gaining independence from others. The tensions between these strategies are explained by Richard Sennett's concept of respect where respect is earned by giving to others or through self-development. The analysed interpretations of

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barter exchange participants indicate that they treat both strategies as mutually consistent ways of explaining the practices in which they participate.

Key words: barter exchange, poverty, reciprocity, autonomy

Wprowadzenie

Przedmiotem naszej analizy są znaczenia nadawane wymianie barterowej, która we współczesnym, zdominowanym przez kapitalizm finansowy świecie stanowi jedną z głównych alternatywnych praktyk ekonomicznych dostępnych ludziom ubogim, którzy utracili dostęp do pieniądza. Znaczenia, o których mowa, poddamy interpretacji w dwóch konkurencyjnych kontekstach teoretycznych: dyskursu odwzajemnienia i dyskursu samowystarczalności. Teoretyczną ramę stanowi dla nich Sennettowska koncepcja szacunku, budowanego na strategii wzajemności lub niezależności. Egzemplifikację napięcia między tymi dyskursami stanowią dla nas znaczenia nadawane wymianie barterowej przez kobiety w niej uczestniczące².

Wymiana barterowa – powrót do gospodarowania bez pieniądza w świecie pieniądza

W kulturach pierwotnych podstawowym sposobem zbywania i nabywania dóbr oraz usług był barter, czyli wymiana przedmiotu za przedmiot/usługi za usługę. Towarzyszyły mu jednak niewygody, związane z trudnością określenia wartości wymienianych przedmiotów i usług czy też ze zrównoważeniem wartości wymienianych przedmiotów. System ten szybko został więc zastąpiony przez tzw. pośredników wymiany – dobra trwałe, podzielne i stosunkowo rzadko występujące (skóry, sól, zboże), które zostały potraktowane jako dobra konsumpcyjne, stanowiące pierwotną formę pieniądza. Stąd „pieniądz nie ma jednej ogólnie przyjętej definicji – zmieniały się one na przestrzeni lat z uwagi na rozwój wymiany handlowej, ewolucję sposobu funkcjonowania gospodarki, przyjęte doktryny ekonomiczne, a przede wszystkim z powodu dóbr, które pełniły funkcję pieniądza. Najpierw były to dobra naturalne i monety mające własną wartość, poprzez papier, aż do pieniądza w postaci zapisu elektronicznego” (Piotrowska 2014: 278).

² Wykorzystywane w tekście wypowiedzi pochodzą z szerszego materiału empirycznego, dotyczącego konstruowanych przez kobiety strategii radzenia sobie z biedą, zgromadzonego przez Elżbę Rozalię Żuchlińską na potrzeby pracy magisterskiej. Badania o charakterze jakościowym z wykorzystaniem wywiadu narracyjno-biograficznego zostały przeprowadzone w 2016 r. na celowo dobranej grupie dziesięciu kobiet, pochodzących z jednej z położonych pod Gdańskiem wsi.

Ten niezwykle użyteczny wynalazek od czasu swojego powstania pełni funkcje ekonomiczne (transakcyjną, obrachunkową, płatniczą, tezauryzacyjną) (Gruszczycki 2004: 70) i funkcje społeczne (behawioralną, motywacyjną, informacyjną, integrującą i dezintegrującą). Z perspektywy podjętej przez nas problematyki szczególnie interesująca jest funkcja dezintegrująca, która dotyczy jego wpływu na struktury społeczne, polegająca na rozwarstwianiu społeczności na posiadających i nieposiadających. Niespotykane dotąd w historii nasilenie tej funkcji pieniądza, z którym mamy obecnie do czynienia, jest związane z powstaniem współczesnego turbo kapitalizmu (Luttwak 2000) i jego finansowej odmiany, redukującej znaczenie produkcji na rzecz akumulacji zysków w postaci kapitału inwestycyjnego za pośrednictwem mechanizmów systemu finansowego. Znamionną cechą tej fazy rozwoju kapitalizmu są gwałtowne przeobrażenia struktury społecznej znaczone kolejnymi kryzysami finansowymi, po których pozostają ślady w postaci narastających nierówności dochodowych i coraz większych dysproporcji między bogatymi a biednymi. Bogaci są obecnie tak bogaci, że mają trudności ze skonsumentowaniem swoich zasobów, a biedni są tak biedni, że nie tylko doświadczają niedoborów i mają kłopoty z zaspokajaniem swoich potrzeb, ale mają też coraz mniejszy dostęp do pieniądza (Reichel 2007: 10–12).

Na tle tych kierunków przemian współczesnego kapitalizmu rodzą się idee i teorie problematyzujące rolę pieniądza, rozumianego dotychczas głównie jako neutralne i użyteczne narzędzie pośredniczące w wymianie dóbr i usług. W miarę kumulacji pieniądza w górnej warstwie hierarchii społecznej, coraz częściej jest on postrzegany również jako najważniejszy instrument stratyfikacji społecznej, naznaczania i wykluczania nieposiadających.

Równolegle, w świecie, w którym mamy do czynienia z niezwykle w historii nagromadzeniem pieniądza i równocześnie coraz trudniejszym do niego dostępem coraz większej liczby ludzi, powstają liczne alternatywne praktyki gospodarowania w warunkach deficytu pieniądza, a ludzie odkrywają, że pieniądź nie jest niezbędny do tego, by móc wymieniać się dobrami i usługami. Konieczność radzenia sobie z niedoborem pieniądza jest głównym impulsem dla rozwoju bezgotówkowych transakcji, czyli barteru (Reichel 2007: 31). Powstaje coraz więcej lokalnych walut, platform wymiany wirtualnej, której przykładami są LETS (Local Exchange Trading System) czy Banki Czasu (Reichel 2007: 13–55), składających się na tzw. alternatywną ekonomię.

Historia ekonomii alternatywnej sięga 1932 r., gdy swój urząd objął burmistrz małego miasteczka położonego w górach Tyrolu. Finanse miasta znajdowały się wówczas w głębokiej recesji, uniemożliwiającej bieżące funkcjonowanie miasta i jakiegokolwiek inwestycje w infrastrukturę. Burmistrz ów wydrukował zatem tzw. *freigeld* – „wolne pieniądze”, którymi wynagradzał urzędników miejskich i pokrywał koszty prac publicznych (Wewiór, Jurkiewicz 2013). Od tego czasu w wielu

miejscach świata (również w Polsce) drukowane są takie regionalne waluty uzupełniające i zastępujące pieniądź. Kolejnym krokiem w tworzeniu alternatywnego rynku stały się LETS-y i Banki Czasu, w których wymiana jest oparta na informacji. W przypadku LETS pierwszym krokiem do jego utworzenia jest zrzeczenie ludzi, sklepów i firm, które spisują swoje potrzeby i oferty. Na tej podstawie tworzy się wspólną bazę danych, która umożliwia kontakt i wymianę między członkami lokalnej lub nawet szerszej społeczności (Wewiór, Jurkiewicz 2013). Na podobnej zasadzie działają Banki Czasu, które gromadzą informacje o osobach bezgotówkowo oferujących innym swoje umiejętności. W ich przypadku jednostką rozliczeniową, niezależnie od rodzaju oferowanej usługi, jest zwykle godzina.

Popularność alternatywnej ekonomii pozostaje w bezpośrednim związku z sytuacją gospodarczą. Na przykład „w Wielkiej Brytanii w latach 1986–1991 działało zaledwie dziesięć systemów, jednak, gdy pod koniec 1992 r. dotknął ją kryzys, liczba LETS-ów zaczęła przyrastać w tempie geometrycznym. Podobny scenariusz obserwujemy w Nowej Zelandii, gdzie LETS-y (nazywane tu częściej Green Dollar Exchange lub Exchange and Barter Systems) rozwijały się na dużą skalę po 1987 r., gdy kraj zmagał się z wysokim bezrobociem, efektami krachu na giełdzie i światowej recesji” (Wewiór, Jurkiewicz 2013).

Pomimo tego, że w różnych regionach świata rozwinęły się różne praktyki barterowe, wkrótce okazało się, że nie wszystkie z nich są równie dostępne dla ludzi ubogich, co dla ludzi stosunkowo zamożnych. Niektóre z nich wymagają bowiem pewnej infrastruktury organizacyjnej czy przychylności władz lokalnych (pieniądz regionalny). Inne z kolei wymagają od uczestników pewnych warunków wstępnych w postaci komputera, szybkiego łącza i minimalnych kompetencji w zakresie ich obsługi (LETS) (Wewiór, Jurkiewicz 2013). Najbardziej dostępne dla ubogich są Banki Czasu, które stanowią odmianę barteru usługowego, polegającego na bezgotówkowej wymianie usług. Można je potraktować jako współczesną wersję dawnego wiejskiego odrobku, który jest praktycznie niewyczerpywalny, ponieważ na wsi zwykle nie brakuje zajęcia – „pracy do zrobienia”. Każdy zatem, niezależnie od zasobności swojego portfela, może coś dla kogoś zrobić (Szkudlarek 2005: 25–27).

Ekonomia alternatywna jest formą gospodarowania w świecie pieniądza ludzi, którzy są pozbawieni dostępu do niego. Pomimo wszelkich korzyści, które z niej wynikają, trzeba ją zatem traktować jako strategię ludzi wykluczonych ze względu na brak pieniądza z udziału w rynku zdominowanym przez pieniądź. Strategii tej, jak się okazuje, mogą być jednak przez jej użytkowników przydawane różne znaczenia: z jednej strony może być ona interpretowana jako zakorzeniona w dawnych czasach praktyka odwzajemnienia, z drugiej natomiast – jako liberalna co do swojego rodowodu praktyka uniezależniania się od innych. Pierwszej przypisujemy znaczenie dospołeczne, drugiej natomiast – odpsołeczne.

Odwzajemnienie jako społeczna strategia radzenia sobie z biedą

Dospołeczny sens praktyki odwzajemnienia daje się wywieść z Sennettowskiej teorii szacunku. Zgodnie z interpretacją tego autora, szacunek jest bowiem „fundamentalnym elementem doświadczania relacji społecznych, a także doświadczania siebie” (Sennett 2012: 57), zasadniczo jednak odmiennym od statusu, prestiżu czy też uznania. Status „określa położenie jednostki w hierarchii społecznej” (Sennett 2012: 61), prestiż „odsyła (...) do emocji, które status pobudza w innych ludziach” (Sennett 2012), a uznanie „oznacza respektowanie tych, którzy nie są nam równi” (John Rawls) (Sennett 2012: 62) lub „respektowanie poglądów jednostek, których interesy są sprzeczne z naszymi” (Jürgen Habermas) (Sennett 2012). Szacunek stanowi natomiast mentalną ramę, definiującą sposób rozumienia i konstruowania relacji międzyludzkich w kategoriach społecznych. Zdaniem Richarda Sennetta „społeczeństwo zbudowane jest na powszechnej zasadzie, wedle której traktując innych jak równych, umacniamy wzajemny szacunek” (2012: 9). Problem jednak tkwi w tym, że między ludźmi realnie występuje wiele nierówności o charakterze mniej lub bardziej arbitralnym. Powstaje zatem pytanie, czy wzajemny szacunek może dotyczyć także tych relacji, których uczestnicy ewidentnie nie są sobie równi. Odpowiedzi na to pytanie dostarcza analiza mechanizmów społecznego kształtowania ludzkich charakterów. Szacunek nie jest bowiem przynależny nikomu z natury rzeczy, lecz jest zdobywany na trzy sposoby: przez samorozwój, przez troskę o siebie i przez dawanie innym. Ostatni ze sposobów jest to „najbardziej bodaj uniwersalne, ponadczasowe i najgłębsze źródło szacunku” (Sennett 2012: 71), które jak żadna inna relacja dotyka uczuć innych ludzi, ponieważ u jego podstaw leży współczucie sprzyjające nawiązywaniu więzi społecznych. Wzajemność trzeba jednak odróżnić od zwykłego obdarowania kogoś, ponieważ dotyczy ona tych sytuacji, gdy nie tylko obdarowujemy, ale i jesteśmy obdarowywani. Zatem „jeśli nie prosimy o nic w zamian, to pokazujemy, że nie uznajemy wzajemności w relacji z obdarowywaną przez nas osobą” (Sennett 2012: 226). Równość powstaje w tym kontekście na bazie wzajemności obdarowania, a nierówność – na skutek nieodwzajemnienia darów (Sennett 2012: 227).

Dokonująca się podczas odwzajemnienia „wymiana kieruje ludzi na zewnątrz” (Sennett 2012: 233), kształtując głęboko osadzany w przemianie dokonującej się w nich samych stosunek do innych. Kwintesencją owej przemiany jest uczucie szacunku, wzmagające zdolność do kooperowania z innymi i wytwarzania sieci relacji opartych na odwzajemnieniu. Wymiana (transakcja barterowa) przynosi zatem konkretne korzyści społeczne, które dalece wykraczają poza korzyści ekonomiczne, ponieważ wzmacnia wzajemny szacunek i więzi między ludźmi – biednymi i niebiednymi, między którymi zachodzą kontakty w warunkach

równości obu stron, co nie byłoby możliwe w przypadku wykorzystania pieniądza jako pośrednika (lets.pl/korzysci.html). Relacje wzajemnościowe wytwarzają nieformalny kapitał społeczny, na bazie którego powstaje i rozwija się wspólnota (Reichel 2007: 58). Konstytutywne są dla niej akty wymiany, dokonywane między osobami, które pozostają ze sobą w bliskich relacjach. Otrzymanie czegoś od kogoś zobowiązuje do rewanżu. Udzielana pomoc postrzegana jest bowiem jako forma daru, który wymaga odwzajemnienia się, przy czym nie jest ważny jego ekwiwalentny charakter, ale sam fakt odwzajemnienia się przez osobę obdarowaną (Palska 2017: 183–184). Osoba obdarowana wie komu, kiedy i jak powinna się odwdziżyć, ponieważ odczuwa silny przymus odwzajemnienia się (Szkudlarek 2005: 24). Dzięki temu poczucie zależności, tworzące się w momencie otrzymywania daru, zmienia się w szacunek dla samego siebie mocowany w zdolności do odwzajemnienia. Dar, który może zostać odwzajemniony czyni bowiem z potrzebującego – darczyńcę (Kudlińska 2012: 8).

W zgromadzonym materiale empirycznym zostały odnotowane tropy, które wskazują na przydawanie przez respondentki wymianie barterowej, w której biorą udział, takich właśnie dospółecznych sensów. Są one opisywane przez respondentki za pośrednictwem przysłówków: wzajemnie, nawzajem; oraz zaimków typu: wszyscy, nas, my. Te środki językowe pozwalają respondentkom definiować wymianę barterową jako wymianę dóbr materialnych, u której podłoża tkwi i równocześnie która inicjuje wymianę dóbr niematerialnych (troski, życzliwości, współczucia, uwagi, zainteresowania), a te z kolei są podstawą zawiązywania się wspólnoty („pozwala mi na to, żeby z ludźmi się spotykać, bo wiadomo, że jak coś zrobisz dla kogoś, to zawsze można z nim pogadać trochę”). Cechą specyficzną tak szeroko rozumianej wymiany jest jej osadzanie na trzech filarach: współdziałania, współpracy i wzajemnej komunikacji, które w odpowiedniej konfiguracji tworzą specyficzny rodzaj tzw. relacji spiralnej (*spiral relationship*) (Olivier 2009: 153–179). Ten rodzaj relacji pozwala ludziom dostrzec to, że zależą od siebie wzajemnie nie tylko w sensie materialnym, ale przede wszystkim w sensie wzajemnej wymiany emocji, znaczeń, pomysłów, wyobrażeń, tworzących podzielane pole semantyczne (Olivier 2009). W tym kontekście wspólnota jest nie tylko odkrywana przez ludzi, ale przede wszystkim jest przez nich aktywnie tworzona/kreowana (Olivier 2009). Ludzie czują się jej częścią („bo czuję się taka z ludźmi, z sąsiadami połączona, a nie taka odcięta”), silniej się z nią utożsamiają, identyfikują z jej członkami, a w konsekwencji mocniej troszczą się o wspólnie wytwarzane dobro i o siebie nawzajem („trzeba pamiętać o innych, co im tam potrzeba, bo jak się nie zadba o innych, to obce się nie zatroszcza. Swojego człowiek też sam nie upilnuje”). Jest to artykułowane w używanych przez respondentki wyrażeniach: „pomagać”, „dawać”, „zrobić coś dla kogoś”, „nawzajem/wzajemnie”, które odsyłają do wytworzonej przez nie hierarchii wartości, w której troska o innych, uczciwość

wobec nich, lojalność i solidarność zajmują czołowe miejsca (Carole 1995: 354, 413). Na bazie podzielanych wartości, poza światem pieniądza, ludzie budują poczucie równości i szacunku dla samych siebie:

I właśnie takie nawzajem sobie dawnie tego a tamtego, albo że ktoś dla kogoś coś zrobi, to daje taką możliwość też tym, co pieniędzy brakuje, żeby nie czuli się gorsi, bo jak pieniądze między ludzi „wchodzą”, to wtedy są gorsi i lepsi, bo jedni mają pieniądze, a drudzy nie. A jak się wymieniamy, to każdy jest drugiemu równy, bo jeden drugiemu zawsze coś może dać, a jak nie dać, to coś pójść zrobić, a już szczególnie na wsi, bo jak coś z ogródka nie dasz, to możesz iść w tym ogrodzie coś pomóc zrobić. (Respondentka 9)

Ja też mogę komuś pomóc. To nie jest tylko tak, że tylko mi pomagają, ja też to robię. Miło jest tak poczuć się potrzebnym i docenionym. Może dlatego, że mi też ludzie dziękują za pomoc, to ja też to robię, bo wiem, jakie to ważne i miłe. Ja bardzo się cieszę, że mam wokół siebie ludzi, którzy mi pomagają, że ja też komuś mogę pomóc. (Respondentka 4)

Konstruowany w odniesieniu do współdziałania i wzajemnej wymiany szacunek, nawiązując do jego sennettowskiej interpretacji, tworzy dla respondentek podłoże splatania rozproszonych relacji społecznych we wspólnotę:

Tutaj na wsi to jest podstawa życia. Tutaj to jest takie naturalne. I to bez znaczenia, czy ktoś jest biedny, czy bogaty. Po prostu ludzie na wsi tak żyją. Jeden drugiemu pomoże, bo ludzie się znają, tak po prostu trzeba. Tak tu jest od zawsze. (Respondentka 2)

To jest to, co kocham tu na wsi, to, że ludzie są dla siebie, że sobie pomagają. Ja to po prostu za to kocham tą moją wieś. My sobie tu naprawdę potrafimy sami poradzić, bo wystarczy mieć dobrych sąsiadów i samemu też być dla nich dobrym, to naprawdę można sobie poradzić, bo dobrzy sąsiedzi to podstawa. W miastach to ludzie się ukrywają w czterech ścianach, nie to co tu, bo tu wszyscy wychodzą do ludzi (...), bo my sobie pomagamy, bośmy tak nauczeni i w ogóle to dla nas takie normalne jest, że sąsiad sąsiadowi pomaga, a jak sąsiad biedny albo w potrzebie, to mu się po prostu pomaga. (Respondentka 10)

Samowystarczalność jako odspołeczna strategia radzenia sobie z biedą

W tej części tekstu naszym zamysłem jest poszukiwanie w wypowiedziach respondentek tropów wskazujących na pracę dyskursu samowystarczalności jako umocowania dla neoliberalnej koncepcji wolności (niezależności) jednostkowej, któremu przypisałyśmy walor inicjowania odspołecznych strategii radzenia sobie z biedą.

Samowystarczalność (ekonomiczna) jest kategorią ujmowaną przez liberałów jako fundament ludzkiej niezależności od przymusu ze strony innych osób w sferze społecznej i politycznej, sprowadzaną przez nich do umiejętności pozyskania takiego zasobu własności, który pozwala jednostce podtrzymać swoje życie bez pomocy ze strony innych. Dla uzyskania dostępu do tak rozumianej niezależności konieczne są zdaniem liberałów odpowiednie okoliczności polityczne (prawnie zagwarantowana swoboda gospodarowania) i stosowne kompetencje jednostkowe (racjonalny umysł, zdolny trafnie oceniać relację cel–środek, dzięki której możliwe jest skuteczne działanie polegające na gromadzeniu własności). Kompetencje, o których mowa, zostały przypisane przez liberałów jedynie jednostce dojrzałej, która wydołała się ze stanu dzieciństwa i definiującej dla niego nieracjonalności i w związku z nią – zależności od innych. Zgodnie ze źródłową dla współczesnego neoliberalizmu klasyczną doktryną liberalną, umocowana w racjonalności niezależność od innych jest zatem konstytutywną cechą ludzkiej dojrzałości, znamię wyjścia człowieka z niepełnoletniości, dla której charakterystyczna jest wynikająca z nieracjonalności zależność od innych. W odróżnieniu od pełnoletniości, „niepełnoletniość to niezdolność człowieka do posługiwania się własnym rozumem bez obcego kierownictwa” (Kant 2000: 194), wiodąca do zależności od innych w każdej sferze życia.

Pełnoletniość opisana w kategoriach racjonalności stała się stanem niekoniernym, a jedynie możliwym, dlatego kategorię nieracjonalności można było zacząć wykorzystywać do charakteryzowania człowieka dorosłego, który z różnych względów sam uchyla się od korzystania ze swojego rozumu, w optyce zawinienia. Jak uważa Immanuel Kant, „zawinioną jest (...) niepełnoletniość wtedy, kiedy przyczyną jej jest nie brak rozumu, ale decyzji i odwagi posługiwania się nim bez obcego kierownictwa” (2000). Dla Kanta zatem o pełnoletności decyduje nie tylko fakt racjonalności, ale również wola korzystania z niej, stąd świadome podtrzymywanie ponad miarę własnej niepełnoletniości z człowieka dorosłego czyni istotę podobną dziecku.

Dzięki kantowskiej interpretacji zawinionej nieracjonalności, liberałowie uzyskali narzędzie, które wykorzystali do opisywania każdego przypadku ludzkiej nieskuteczności w sferze gospodarczej w kategoriach nieracjonalności będącej wynikiem niedostatecznego wysiłku, braku zaangażowania czy wprost lenistwa. Dzięki tej perspektywie interpretacyjnej usunęli z pola widzenia takie sytuacje, gdy jednostka ze względów strukturalnych nie ma szans odnoszenia sukcesów lub chociażby samego uczestniczenia w wolnym rynku. Zewnętrznym wobec jednostki warunkiem wystarczającym do powodzenia w tej sferze jest bowiem dla liberałów sam fakt istnienia swobody gospodarowania, dlatego każde niepowodzenie mogą opisywać jako zawinione.

Powiązanie swobody gospodarowania na wolnym rynku z wolnością jednostkową liberałowie argumentują tezą o tym, że wolny handel spowodował przełamanie społecznych barier i zniósł poddaństwo (Rand 2003: 237–238), ponieważ dostarczył bodźców do oddzielenia zdolności produkcyjnej od innych cech człowieka (Friedman 1993: 105–106). Dzięki temu ludzie mogą ze sobą współpracować w sferze ekonomicznej, niezależnie od dzielących ich światopoglądów, poglądów religijnych czy politycznych, gdyż motywuje ich do tej współpracy perspektywa wzajemnej korzyści.

Wzajemna korzyść, odnoszona podczas wymiany na wolnym rynku jest zatem, zdaniem liberałów, również podstawą nawiązywania więzi społecznych. „Człowiek (...) prawie ciągle potrzebuje pomocy swoich bliźnich i na próżno szukałby jej jedynie w ich życzliwości. Jest bardziej prawdopodobne, że nakłoni ich do pomocy, gdy potrafi przemówić do ich egoizmu i pokazać im, że jest dla nich samych korzystne, by zrobili to, czego od nich żąda” (Smith 1954: 21). Są to jednak więzi mocowane w egoizmie, w grze interesów, potrzeb i pragnień, które jednostki starają się zaspokoić przy pomocy innych jednostek po to, by finalnie uzyskać od nich całkowitą niezależność. W tym sensie uniezależnianie się od innych, dążenie do samowystarczalności ujmujemy jako odspołeczną strategię radzenia sobie z biedą, taką, która ze swej istoty nie sprzyja nawiązywaniu i podtrzymywaniu pozaekonomicznych relacji między ludźmi.

W analizowanych wypowiedziach kobiet uczestniczących w wymianie barterowej udało się nam zidentyfikować takie wypowiedzi, w których wykorzystując zaimki: ja, moje – nawiązują one do kwestii autonomii, niezależności od innych, samodzielności. Reguła wzajemności jest wówczas przez nie interpretowana jako społecznie ustanowiony sposób na zrewanżowanie się za doświadczane dobro, wyrównywanie rachunków czy spłacanie zaciągniętego długu (Caldini 2015: 36–37). W kontekście tych interpretacji relacje międzyludzkie nabierają dla nich charakteru instrumentalnego, rzeczowego i sformalizowanego. Ograniczają się bowiem do wymiany podporządkowanej zasadzie: „coś za coś”, „nie ma niczego za darmo”, „za wszystko trzeba zapłacić”, „przysługa za przysługę”. Wymiana dokonująca się w jej cieniu sprzyja strategiom odspołecznym, ponieważ rewanż uwalnia uczestników wymiany od wzajemnej relacji, od więzi, która się wytworzyła i którą zrywa zaspokojenie wierzyciela. Ludzie odwzajemniając dar odzyskują balans w relacjach z innymi i skutecznie pozbywają się ciężaru zaciągniętego długu. Szacunek dla samego siebie jest wówczas budowany na niezależności od innych, na braku zobowiązań wobec nich („ja im coś dam, to od nich za to coś dostanę, bo dla każdej najważniejsze to, żeby nic nikomu nie być winna”). Ten kontekst interpretowania wymiany barterowej osadza relacje międzyludzkie na osi my (biedni) – oni (niebiedni), w odniesieniu do której cały wysiłek badanych kobiet koncentruje się na przejściu ze sfery aktualnego „my” do sfery pożądanego „oni” („robienie czegoś dla kogoś daje

taką szansę, że chociaż przez chwilę biedny człowiek czuje się jak człowiek taki zwyczajny, taki normalny, a nie jak taki człowiek gorszej kategorii” (Appadurai 2009: 55–57)³. Skutecznie uniemożliwia to zakwestionowanie ukonstytuowanej opozycji w kierunku równości pozycji. Rewanżowanie się jest zatem traktowane jako sposób na uwolnienie się od zagrażającego piętna/stygmy (Heatherton *et al.* 2008: 25–27, 126–128, 226)⁴ niesamodzielnosci, uzależnienia od innych („to po to zaraz też coś dają, jak coś dostanę, żeby widzieli, że się po prostu wymieniamy, jak inni, a nie, że wiszę tylko na pomocy innych. Jak się odwdzięczę, to jest na czysto i mogę śmiało patrzeć innym w oczy; no i po to dają, żeby nie mówili, że sama nie dam rady i żeby nie czuć się gorszą od innych”).

W tym ujęciu kluczowa z punktu widzenia konstruowania szacunku dla samego siebie i pozyskiwania szacunku innych jest samodzielność i niezależność od innych:

Ja to zawsze tak mam, że jak najszybciej chcę się odwdzięczyć, bo inaczej to ciągle o tym myślę. Szczególnie jak widzę tą osobę, to jej tak prosto w twarz nie mogę spojrzeć, bo mi głupio. Bo ja potrzebuję najzwyczajniej w świecie potwierdzenia, że coś jestem warta, że jestem w stanie sobie poradzić sama, mimo że nie mam pieniędzy. Póki tylko brałam, to czułam się człowiekiem takim niepełnym, nie w stu procentach. Każdy chce być niezależny, a to tylko tak można. (Respondentka 2)

A to się zawsze jakoś udaje, bo to się coś samemu zbierze, jakoś człowiek sobie może poradzić, jak oczywiście chce, a ja chcę i robię, co mogę i co umiem, byle tylko nie musieć liczyć na innych i nie iść po prośbie. (Respondentka 6)

Dla mnie to najważniejsze, żeby sobie samej radzić, bo jak mogę się odwdzięczyć, to tak, jakbym wyrównała rachunki i nie miała długu. Wtedy wiem, że jeszcze jestem coś warta, bo sama sobie daję radę, bo nie mam długów. (Respondentka 4)

Jak coś od kogoś dostaję, a potem mu coś daję, ale to nie są pieniądze, to pozwala mi, żeby tak mocno nie odczuwać, że jestem... co tu dużo ukrywać... nie odczuwać wtedy, że jestem biedna i nie daję sobie sama rady. (Respondentka 3)

Konkluzje

Powracając do przyjętej na początku teoretycznej ramy naszego wywodu, warto przypomnieć, że w interpretacji Sennetta szacunek do samego siebie i innych

³ Konstruowanie relacji międzyludzkich na opozycji my–oni jest zdaniem Arjuna Appaduraia fundamentalne dla tworzenia, niezmiernie niebezpiecznej społecznie, polityki gniewu.

⁴ Piętno/stygma stanowi rodzaj społecznego konstruktu, który pozwala na przypisanie i oznakowanie odmiennosci, a następnie dewaluowanie osoby/osób będących jej nosicielami/reprezentantami. Piętno powoduje, że człowiek jest postrzegany i sam postrzega siebie jako istotę niepełną, niepełnowartościową, gorszą, co sprzyja jego odsuwaniu/odsuwaniu się zwykłych kontaktów społecznych.

może być konstruowany na podłożu dyskursu odwzajemnienia lub dyskursu samowystarczalności. Pierwsza strategia jest zakorzeniona w tradycjach i rytuałach gospodarki przedpieniężnej, druga natomiast nawiązuje do klasycznej liberalnej wykładni, zgodnie z którą człowiek „powinien się cieszyć uznaniem ze względu na swoją niezależność” (Sennett 2012: 112). W kontekście analizowanych wypowiedzi kobiet uczestniczących w wymianie barterowej obydwie strategie zdają się aktywne i kształtują ich myślenie o sobie i świecie. Co ciekawe, respondentki nie traktują ich jako wzajemnie sprzecznych czy też prowadzących do odmiennych konsekwencji społecznych, ale jako równoległe, prawomocne sposoby wyjaśniania praktyk, w których biorą udział. Tym samym, wbrew liberalnej wykładni tożsamości, przyjmują, że „ludzie dorośli mają prawo być zależni od innych” (Sennett 2012: 267), a równocześnie, pomimo pozytywnego waloryzowania tradycji wzajemnej wymiany, same pragną jednak uniezależnienia się od innych.

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