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25 YEARS AFTER THE COMMUNISM IN EUROPE: PHENOMENA, PROBLEMS AND TEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS

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Why Sociology of Transformations?

After the unprecedented constitutional, economic, and political transformations of the former communist countries, large differences between East and West Europe still exists in the results of sociological surveys and statistical records. At the same time, other tensions known from the history of Europe come back to the forefront of debates on European integration. The relative economic success of northern countries and failure of Southern Europe in confronting the recent economic crisis lead to questions of more profound cultural differences in dealing with economic issues.

The experience of state bankruptcy, lack of economic competitiveness, environmental pollution and other phenomena symptomatic of the falling of "real socialism" are part of the collective memory of Central-Eastern Europeans, who still remember the time before the transformation. This suggests the relative importance of the political and economic order as compared to purely cultural factors, and gives more weight to the question of what would be the right political and economic strategy for Europe as a whole. On the other hand, it may be understood as a question of the deeper drawbacks of socialism's cultural and anthropological presumptions.

The decreasing quality of European democracy raises a number of problems, such as the condition of political processes in individual member states, the prerequisites of moral universalism on the part of individual European "citizens" engaged in the political process, and the potential of openness and universalistic orientation of particular national and ethnic cultures making up the European home.

Since 1989, there have been several periods and strands of thought applied to Eastern and Central European societies. The period after 1989 was full of optimism and expectations, and mostly based on theories of transition towards market economy and democracy and catch-up approaches deriving from evolutionist and liberal theorizing of modernization and convergence theories.

In the late 2000s, illusions were gradually dissolving, and new realistic approaches to assessing reforms and transformations appeared, stimulating debates about the outcomes of social change. What did post-communist countries come up with? There were some critical views, 'unexpected' consequences discussed by sociologists using dependence theories (core and periphery of Europe), dependent market economies. Institutional sociologists suggested examining competitive

assets of institutions, as well as the variety of capitalisms which emerged in the region, to find out how differences and specific features of the transformations related to differences in context. The recent economic crisis has raised questions for the development of transforming societies in relation to their internal situations (the rise of social inequality and nationalism, the dropping level of institutional and personal trust, the maintenance of social cohesion and integrity), as well as their relations to Europe and the global world.

What are the *driving forces* of social transformations? What are the impacts of global forces? How do social transformations overlap with *cultural change*? Are they affected or constrained by such determinants as values, *habitus*? What are the consequences of certain social transformations with respect to social structures of society, emerging social inequalities, etc.? Do we overestimate or underestimate the inertia of precious institutional experience and culture? Is there a certain evolutionary logic to this process, etc.? Comparative studies are seen as the major source of data to address these issues and test the applicability and explanatory power of different approaches.

Micro-level analysis and interdisciplinary approaches take into account changes in individual lives, identities and solidarities, and focus on everyday life practices in the particular spheres of social life tied to certain local and historical contexts. This will definitely contribute to the understanding of actual social life in transforming societies.

Research Network (RN 36)
'Sociology of Transformation: East and West'

Understanding the need for better theories and research on the impact of social transformations, scholars from different countries formed a working group. The Research Stream 03 was first constituted in 2003, at the 6th ESA conference in Murcia as a platform for discussing the issues of social transformation in Eastern European countries and their integration into united Europe. At that time the RS03 was convened by Peeter Vihalemm (University of Tartu, Estonia) and Chris Rumford (Royal Holloway, University of London). During the 7th ESA conference in 2005 in Torun, the Research Stream titled its session "Enlargement of the EU – lessons from the past and prospects for the future".

At the 8th ESA conference in 2007 in Glasgow the RS was titled 'Enlargement of the EU' and convened by Peeter Vihalemm and Marju Lauristin (University of Tartu, Estonia).

At the 9th ESA conference in 2009 in Lisbon, the RS was titled 'East and West in Europe' and convened again by Peeter Vihalemm and Marju Lauristin.

In 2011, the Research Stream took further steps in Geneva under the title 'East and West in Europe: Two Decades of Transformations'. It was coordinated by Peeter Vihalemm and Elena Danilova (Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy

of Sciences, Moscow) and tasked with examining two decades of social change in Europe, beginning with the collapse of the wall between East and West. The collapse of the Communist system and enlargement of the EU and NATO during the last two decades have brought about fundamental changes in European social spaces as well as in social relations of old EU member states with new ones, applicant countries and their neighbors. Social transformations in Central and Eastern European countries drew great research interest, with multiple angles to consider. Fifty papers were submitted, on different sociological aspects of social transformation and European integration processes.

The initial objective of the stream was to unite efforts of sociologists throughout Europe, interested in the social transformation processes going on in Europe after the collapse of communist regimes, with a focus on the countries in Eastern and Central Europe including Post-Soviet countries.

The RN 36 has emerged from the integration of Research Stream (RS) activities and mutual efforts during a few last conferences of European Sociological Association. The RN title was accepted by a majority of members: "Sociology of transformations: East and West". The Research Network 36 positions itself as a space for scholars who are interested in the field of social transformations in European countries that have already joined EU or constitute its neighbors and partners in the broader sense. We want to bring together younger researchers and prominent scholars, so that they have a chance to share their thoughts and views and collaborate in the future. Comparative studies can be one of main foci of the collaboration.

The Research Network 36 brings together researchers from competing paradigms (Polanyi's 'great transformation' concept, modernization theory, path dependency theories (institutionalism, civilization theories, etc.), multiple modernities, etc.), and aims at linking sociological debate on the European transformations to the wider global processes.

The RN 36 attracts European scholars working with both macro-level and micro-level research. Its objective is to encourage interested parties to participate in the RN, develop research and enhance theoretical discussion on social transformations.

Among present activities of the RN 36 one can find:

1. Organising a number of sessions and a business meeting during ESA biennial conferences (the closest – in 2016 in Sibiu).
2. Managing an e-mail discussion list or establishing a web-based forum.
3. Organising a biennial mid-term conference or workshop in between ESA conferences.
4. Contributing to the ESA journal and special issues, and the ESA newsletter.
5. Developing and strengthening linkages with other RNs in the ESA and similar working groups in national sociological associations across Europe and elsewhere.

25 Years After the Communism: East and West of Europe in Search of Solidarity

All the questions mentioned above call for credible sociological explanations based on long-term empirical research in different countries. The heritage of the Solidarity Movement, which began in Poland 25 years ago, could be a good starting point for such a debate, so the last conference took place in Gdansk, the birthplace of 'Solidarity'.

For intellectuals of the period, the movement held out a hope of building a new kind of society in Central and Eastern Europe. One of those worth remembering is Fr. Józef Tischner, the author of *Ethics of Solidarity*, a small book proposing a new idea of (independent) society and citizenship. Studied today, it stimulates a reflexive evaluation of the present, provoking the questions of what hopes have been fulfilled and what fears have come true. The 1980–1981 period brought also a number of pioneering social studies of "action-research", with Touraine's *Solidarity. The Analysis of a Social Movement: Poland 1980–1981* as probably the best-known example.

A core conclusion for many academics after 20–25 years of transformation is that society cannot be founded only on economic and formal ties, but must build on social ones as well. *Solidarity* seems to be the best word to describe this 'forgotten' factor, which used to refer to what we know today as *social capital*, *mutual trust*, *community values*, or *civil society*.

The papers included in the volume were presented at the Conference 25 Years After Communism: East and West of Europe in Search of Solidarity which took place in Gdansk, in 16–18 October 2014. It was 2nd mid-term conference of RN 36.

In his article, *From the 'Solidarity' to precarious work. Transformation of the labour market in Poland 1989–2014*, Tadeusz Sznajderski shows the transition of the Polish economy from late communism, through early capitalism, to the precarious labour market.

Arkadiusz Góralczyk depicts Poland's role in the creation of self-government in Ukraine. He presents the conception and nature of and barriers to the decentralisation of power and citizen empowerment. He attempts to assess the situation and indicate the differences in the conditions of the development of this empowerment at the local level between Poland and Ukraine.

Adam Konopka's paper, *Political backlash in postcommunist Poland – the alliances between nationalist far right and working class 25 years after the decline of communism*, presents cases of alliances between nationalist organisations and local branches of the Solidarity Independent Trade Union in recent years. The explanation of those cases is based mainly on the historical-political perspective of David Ost's "Defeat of Solidarity" and the philosophical background of George Sorel's concept of revolutionary syndicalism.

Dominika V. Polańska and Grzegorz Piotrowski examine urban activism in their article, *Radical Urban Movements in Poland – the case of squatting*. Their

ambitious study looks at how urban social movements use transactional activism, networking between organized non-state actors and other groups in the politico-institutional sphere. The authors argue that the use of different repertoires of action, mediated and developed through negotiations among partners, facilitates new social movement activities. Their analysis, built on 50 semi-structured interviews, points to the importance of alliance formation and cooperation between different kinds of groups. The analysis focuses on the alliance built between the more radical form of urban movements – squatters – and the more moderate one – the tenants.

Arkadiusz Peisert raises a bit of a philosophical question about the character and the future of communal ties in his paper *The individualization process – constructive or destructive for communal ties? Deliberations on Norbert Elias's ideas*. His deliberation goes along the main ideas of Norbert Elias, presented in *The society of individuals*. Elias argued that the development of human communities is heading towards integration on human-wide level community. The question is, 'how do changes in the nature of communal ties in Central Europe during this process?'.

The last part of the volume turns to social theory. Jacek Tittenbrun's paper, *Concepts of capital in Piere Bourieu's theory*, shows that the Bourdieusian framework brought more harm than good. Paradoxically, whilst Bourdieu is commonly regarded as a culturalist, his approach is grounded in economism or economic imperialism. This squeezing of extra-economic phenomena into the economic straightjacket leads necessarily to the latter, i.e. the concept of capital, being overstretched. In turn, the notion of cultural capital suffers from crude physicalism and under-specification.

Arkadiusz Peisert
The Board of Research Network No 36 of European Sociological Associaton

Artykuły

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Tadeusz Sznajderski[1]

From "Solidarity" to precarious work. Transformation of the Labour Market in Poland 1989–2014

The article describes the changes in the Polish labour market within the last 25 years. The year 1989 closed the post-war period of the communist centrally-regulated labour market, which had been based on permanent obligatory employment for the leading working class. Neoliberalism and globalisation have created a flexible labour market in all Europe including Poland, resulting in developing a negative phenomenon of precarious work.

Key words: precarious work, labour market, precarious employment, employment in Poland, precariat

Introduction

Between 1980 and 1989 the "Solidarity" fought for decent working conditions in Poland. There is a historical paradox here: the workers who organised strikes against the communist regime and created the Solidarity Movement have, in the 25-year period of Poland's independence, lost the privileged socio-economic position they had before the strikes. The most visible example are shipyard workers who, in the first period of economic transition, constituted the largest unemployed group in Gdansk. The shipyard of Gdansk had 16 thousand workers in 1988, but by 2004 – only 2.4 thousand.

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Social and economic inequalities in Poland

The liberalised economic market, which was formed at the beginning of the nineties, proved to be unfriendly to many labour groups and created inequalities that have been increasing over the years (Sznajderski 2002: 31–38). Since the 1980s, we have observed, from the fuel crisis onwards, the slowdown in economic growth, lowering taxes (and even eliminating the tax rates for the rich), deregulating the market and making the labour market more flexible, which triggered rapid stratification of economic positions. The income gaps between the richest, the medium rich and the poorest are increasing. The reason is that, in capitalism, the return on equity is constantly higher than the growth rate of income and production. Thus capital (land, real property, assets) is growing faster than the total of production and income from work. An economic entity with a lot of capital will not be outdone in development by a producing and working entity. In other words, the rich will be getting richer than those who have less capital or who produce and work. It means that inequalities are growing.

Thus, in Poland, a new global class division has developed, similar to the one already existing in other parts of Europe. At the top, there is a small group of so-called "Croesus" – wealthy proprietors. In the middle, there is a salariat group, the former middle class, employed on the basis of employment agreements and covered by the Labour Code. In the lower position there is a precariat group, who have neither employment agreements nor high income. The rules of economic globalisation have proved to be true: the rich are becoming richer and the poor are getting poorer.

The conditions of precariat

According to Guy Standing, the precariat is a consequence of neoliberalism and globalisation. Moreover, the impact of globalisation on the Polish labour market has been growing, especially since the accession to the European Union. These adverse social and economic conditions have led to the widespread phenomenon of "precarious work" (Standing 2011: chapter 1).

The conditions which create precarious work are as follows:

1. Uncertainty of employment continuation (job insecurity, limited contracts, agency work).

There is a significant number of employment contracts that provide no job security. The report of the European Working Conditions Observatory described how, all over Europe, despite some rare exceptions, working conditions had worsened during the crisis (EWCO 2012: 36). Thus it seems clear that "Labour instability is central to global capitalism" (Standing 2014: 21). If one looks at such indicators

like job insecurity, involuntary temporary work or involuntary part-time work, it is obvious that fewer jobs rely on so-called "standard" or "typical" employment relationships. More jobs than before are covered by agency contracts, and there is growing job insecurity in most European countries.

2. Non-decent working conditions.
Jobs which are defined by maximum effort and minimum time offer neither real working relationships with colleagues nor the reflection on good practice while performing the tasks requested from the workers (Dommen 2003: 79–85).

3. Wages below subsistence level.
Compared to other European countries, the low wage sector in Poland is higher than the average percentage of low paid workers in the European Union, which is about 16%.

4. Long working time (uncontrolled and irregular hours, unpaid overtime, less free time).
People are asked to come and work for long and irregular hours or to stay longer at work with unpaid overtime. As they may not negotiate, they enjoy less free time and social life (Standing 2011: chapter 5). Shift work, as well as work at night or on Sundays, is growing for economic reasons. For example, TESCO supermarkets must remain open day and night.

5. Absence of trade unions and employee associations.
The types of enterprises offering unprotected jobs do not allow regular links between employees or the ability to associate in order to defend their rights and negotiate their conditions. Contracts in such economic sectors are not defined by agreements negotiated between employers and trade unions, and rely only on minimal legal standards, which are not always fully applied.

6. Work without any social security (covering housing, transport, health insurance, pension, unemployment pay and other social needs).
The quality of a workplace is connected with adequate access, convenient means of transport, adequate housing, provision of health insurance, an old age pension, or other insurances like unemployment benefits, and with covering other social needs. If a workplace does not meet the above requirements, it may be defined as bad and precarious (Sznajderski 2002: 34).

7. Lack of vocational training.
No progress in jobs is possible. Even after many years, the same job is still to be done with the same methods and space – or even less. Teaching better practical skills is not one of the duties of the employer.

8. No protection against dismissal.
Unwritten contracts or contracts for short-term jobs can be easily broken. The promise of longer employment is not included in the contract itself and legal rules preventing unjustified, abrupt dismissal do not apply.

9. Unclear status (workfare, training, internship, forced self-employment, absence of legal admission, absence of national documents).
The grey labour market is growing, where it is normal to have no written contract and no clear status. Work is done, jobs are paid – but on very different bases: some may be working on workfare, some in training or internship settings, some can even be apparently self-employed – but in reality, fully dependent on the mandating owner as a hidden employer.

Employed people in such positions include nationals as well as migrant workers (Standing 2011: chapter 4). For the latter, more status problems may arise from lacking legal admission papers or even lacking national documents.

10. Insufficient health and safety protection.
Inspection of working conditions by legal authorities is not frequent enough to demonstrate their unhealthy or unsafe character or to improve the requirements imposed by employers on their employees.

A typical employment

A full-time job, a living wage, the safety net of a social insurance system, care for health and safety in the workplace, and a guarantee of long-term prospects in a job – all these are becoming rare for more and more employees. The former standard working contract, which was perceived as "normal", is becoming today "un-normal" and unusual for most new jobs. Atypical employment, in the sense of part-time work, or temporary jobs, or contracts with no defined working time, is growing (Standing 2014: chapter 3).

Work is regulated in Europe, but due to globalisation, the deregulated informal sector is taking over and a grey labour market is developing (Addy 2003: 23). All these types of atypical work are related insofar they depart from the former „normal" employment relationship (full-time continuous work with one employer), but they are not to be considered precarious in all cases, since good legislation can secure acceptable forms of these contracts.

To declare a job as precarious, it is not sufficient for there to be only one of the ten indicators of an "atypical" working relationship; rather, it is the accumulation of more "un-normal" working conditions which makes work precarious (Standing 2011: 77).

The precariat has never been a part of the working class or the proletariat. According to Guy Standing (Standing 2011: 14), precarious workers are deprived of work protection methods characteristic of the industrial era:

a) labour market protection – possibility of gainful employment,
b) employment protection – employment and layoff regulations, protection against dismissal,
c) workplace protection, permanent job protection, fixed duties, promotion prospects,
d) safety at work – protection against accidents and diseases,
e) employee skills development prospects – access to training courses, potential to increase qualifications,
f) income protection – guarantee of adequate steady income, protected by mechanisms to block sudden decrease in income (indexation of wages, common social support),
g) guarantee of the right to join trade unions.

The precariat is defined by short-termism which may turn into permanent inability to look long-term, mainly because of the low probability of personal or professional development.

In addition, the Internet and the addiction to browsing information, Facebook, and other social media are working to "reprogram" the brain. Digital intellectual life impoverishes the imagination and the ability to think long-term. Digital information destroys the capacity for contemplation, reflection, philosophy, individuality.

In sociology, the present society is understood as being composed not of individual units, but rather of unified elements having superficial knowledge aimed at immediate short defence reactions against the environment that is presented to an individual by computers (Standing 2011: 28–34). Precarious workers, in particular, suffer from information overload; they are doomed to quick action, they have no conditions for reflection, and they act by short quick responses. They have no potential to go beyond the present moment, into the future and the past, to distinguish important issues from worthless information, the useful from the useless.

Precarious workers are characterised by 4 'A's: anger, anomie, anxiety, alienation (Standing 2011: 27–28). According to Emile Durkheim, anomie is the feeling of passivity born of desperation (Durkheim 1960, Book 3: 104–108). A continuous perspective of dull work with no career opportunities or professional promotion prospects further deepens this feeling. Precarious workers live in fear of chronic hazards connected with "balancing on the edge", where an accident results in a decrease on the social ladder by few rungs, and sometimes to the bottom. The fear is associated with a loss of what one already has, even if a precarious worker is convinced that their current condition is already unfair. People living in fear of losing their jobs become angry. Alienation results from a low professional status and the lack of career opportunities. Precarious workers lack self-esteem, because society does not respect their work (Standing 2011: 25).

The expansion of precariat in Europe

The number of precarious jobs is high in many countries. For example, in Poland the percentage of domestic workforce who are precarious workers amounts to 26.9%, in Spain 23.1%, in Portugal 21.4%, but in France it is only 16.0%, in Germany 13.3%, in Italy 13.2%, in Austria 9.2%, in Denmark 8.8%, and in the United Kingdom it is as low as 6.2% (OECD 2015, Temporary employment).

It is not affecting all European Union countries in the same way, but all over Europe the social-economic transformation has had an impact on employment and working conditions. Especially in Central-Eastern Europe, but also in economically stronger, European Union countries, unemployment is quite high. People with lower skills have a higher risk of becoming or remaining unemployed in this context. The unemployment rate in Poland amounts to 9.0%. This is much higher than in other European countries: 6.8% in the Netherlands, 6.1% in the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, 5.6% in Austria, 5% in Germany, and as low as 3.5% in Norway. Taking into account all the OECD countries, the average unemployment rate is 7.3% (OECD 2015, Unemployment rate).

But the situation not only has consequences for those out of work. It also creates insecurity and reduces workers' options. It forces them to accept bad working conditions against their will, because there is no alternative.

In most European Union countries, the transformation has also had an impact on wages (Duchrow 1995: 75–83), limiting the increase of salaries (Bourdieu 1988: 96–102). The fear of losing a job leads workers to accept low pay. High unemployment weakens the possibility of negotiating for better working conditions. In consequence, the situation for low-paid workers has worsened and the number of so called working poor has been growing even in economically stronger states (Dommen 2003: 39–41).

The Polish labour market suffers from several weaknesses and is undergoing demographic aging. The employment rate had increased significantly and stood at 67.3% in 2014. Long-term unemployment continues to rise. In 2013, 42% of the unemployed remained without a job for more than one year, up from around 30% in 2008–2009.

Labour market participation of older workers also remains low, although a gradual increase in the employment rate in the age group of 55–64 is visible, from 41.3% in 2013 to 43.3%.

Labour market segmentation persists in Poland. The incidence of temporary contracts is the highest in the European Union – 26.9% in 2014 versus 13.9% in the Union, while the transition rate from temporary to permanent employment is low (20%) and the wage penalty is the highest in the European Union, 36.8% in 2010. Moreover, 66.8% of temporary employees cannot find a permanent job (EC 2014).

Furthermore, the use of civil law contracts has increased over the recent years. This excessive use adds to weakening the quality of employment, especially for young workers. To protect the provision of social insurance for persons employed

under civil law contracts and to limit their excessive use, a new law has been introduced, which is in force as of 2016. The new law is to oblige employers to pay monthly social contributions for all order contracts (i.e. the most commonly used civil-law contracts) to at least the level of a minimum wage (at PLN 1750 in 2015).

While Polish economists attempt to improve the situation by small practical steps, the greatest global thinkers suggest more radical solutions. Thomas Piketty proposes a global progressive tax on individual wealth, which would provide an advantage of common interest over private interests, maintaining the functioning of competitiveness and market mechanisms. Guy Standing puts forward a different solution – a Tobin tax on financial speculations.

The precariat in Poland

The expansion of the precariat deepens social inequalities and stratifies society. This phenomenon is expressed by the Gini index. In 2014, the Gini index for Poland was 0.31, which was the same as the average of the indexes for all the OECD countries. It is worth emphasising that this index value expresses the significant stratification of Polish society. In comparison with the indexes for the wealthiest European countries: France – 0.30, Switzerland – 0.30, Germany – 0.29, the Netherlands – 0.29, Luxemburg – 0.27, Norway – 0.25, Denmark – 0.25, the one for Poland is extremely high. It should be noted that the value of the Polish index has increased in a very short period of merely twenty years, while in other countries this development process has covered the time of hundreds of years (OECD 2014, Income inequality).

On the one hand, a positive trend can be observed. The number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion was 25.8% of the total population in Poland in 2013, versus 30.5% in 2008. Children at risk of poverty or social exclusion constituted 29.8% of people under 17 years old in 2013, versus 32.9% in 2008.

On the other hand, Poland still faces serious challenges in terms of the overall adequacy and coverage of the social protection system. At the level of 18.1%, Poland's social protection spending in terms of GDP remains below the European Union average of 29.5% (EC 2014).

The recent statistics show that today there are more and more precarious working conditions (Standing 2011: chapter 3). The basic characteristic of precarious workers is their uncertainty within the system. Precarious workers do not know how they will be employed. When their current job is finished, they do not know if they can find another one. Precarious workers are employed under so-called junk contracts, getting only their wages, but no health insurance, paid leave, or retirement insurance contributions. Work which is not performed on the basis of a permanent employment agreement is not taken into account when the length of job experience is calculated or when a bank decides on granting a loan, and, in general, it does not provide the stability necessary to plan the worker's future life.

Young Poles usually live in uncertainty of their work and future, convinced of the impossibility of making plans for the upcoming years, and in anxiety about starting up a family or buying a flat.

While Polish politicians create state economic policy, they frequently do not focus on the interests of the general public, but support the wealthiest capital owners, the consequence of which is that the economic profits in Poland, as in other European countries, are taken mainly by the richest.

The employment situation is disastrous in Poland, especially for young people. Their average unemployment rate all over Europe is more than 20%, while in Poland it is 26.9%. This creates a generation of young people without hope and deepens the social gap both within Poland as well as between Poland and other European countries (Piketty 2013: 149).

Another important impact of the economic transformation and crisis is the mobility of workers in the European Union. It is a fact that more and more workers in Eastern Europe are forced to go abroad to look for a better job in another country (Standing 2011: chapter 4). Migrating people are often forced to work under bad working conditions and to accept lower wages compared with the local workforce, even if higher than in their country of origin (Addy 2003: 20–21).

This has a deep impact on family life: the number of children left alone back in the home country – the so-called "work orphans" – is growing. And, in the long run, the brain drain of skilled workers reduces the competitiveness of less developed countries.

Conclusion

To sum up, the economic gap within Europe is widening (Piketty 2004, 2013). Ultimately, over the period of 25 years, Polish society has covered the distance from the Solidarity expectations to this precarious reality.

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Arkadiusz Góralczyk[1]

The conception, nature and barriers in the decentralisation of power and citizen empowerment in Ukraine

This article considers the role of Poland in reforming the self-government in Ukraine. It describes proposals for reform, as well as barriers which occur or may occur while making an effort to decentralize power in this country. The author makes an attempt to identify differences between the situation in Ukraine and Poland during the process of reformation of the self-government.

Key words: decentralisation of power, self-government, citizen empowerment, formal and legal factors, factors of mentality, social capital, extent of socialisation of authority, representative democracy, deliberative democracy, direct democracy

Introduction

In 1991 Ukraine regained independence. The country is the direct successor of the Ukrainian Republic of Soviets. From that moment, as an independent country, Ukraine continues to face an uncertain future regarding the choice between two fundamental geopolitical orientations: pro-European and pro-Russian. There are upheavals and political tensions following in Ukraine, which exemplify this dilemma and divide Ukrainian society. Some of them ended with the changes of the particular geopolitical orientation. The first spectacular upheaval, called "the Orange Revolution", took place at the turn of 2004 and 2005. The direct reason was questioning the credibility of the election for the President pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovych. The second round of the presidential election was repeated. Viktor Yushchenko won and Yulia Tymoshenko became the Prime Minister. Hovewer, an alliance of two oppositional pro-European leaders soon ended with

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a conflict between them. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko began to accuse each other of cooperation with the pro-Russian forces and corruption. Successive political crises allowed Viktor Yanukovych to regain power, firstly as the Prime Minister, then as the President. In 2013 Euromaidan began, which ended with Yanukovych escaping to Russia. The direct reason for the conflict was the postponed signingof the Association Agreement with the European Union by President Yanukovych. As a result, power was seized by pro-Western forces. Petro Poroshenko became the President. Arseniy Yatsenyuk became the Prime Minister. In 2014, the Association Agreement was signed by the EU, but armed conflicts take place between supporters of the new power and pro-Russian separatists. Russia provides the silent military support and annexes Crimea.

This description Ukraine politics since 1991 proves a continued lack of political and social stability. It is not known, as it was highlighted above, what kind of political settlement will be reached in the future. The situation is complicated by the migration crisis in Europe.

Decentralisation of power as a condition of civil society

Despite the situation outlined above, the pro-European president and the government wish to conduct Ukraine to European community. However, to achieve this purpose, civil society institutions must function well. Decentralisation of power is fundamental for the development of that civil society, thereby enhancing the process of democratisation (Banat 2015: 34–41; Bar-Przybyła 2015: 42–58; Pac 2015: 48–58). The significance of this issue is the fact that, decentralization of power is the constitutional principle in the Polish political and administrative system, enshrined in the Poland's Constitution. Since the Polish solutions for local government are a good model or example for the Ukrainian solutions they are worth a brief description.

The Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law provides that "Ustrój terytorialny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej zapewnia decentralizację władzy publicznej" (The territorial system of the Republic of Poland provides decentralization of public power). Currently, the principle of decentralization of power is implemented in Poland through a three-tier administrative division – gmina (commune), powiat (district) and województwo (voivodeship). This division has been valid since 1999 and was introduced by the Law of 24 July 1998, which established a basic three tier division of administration. The different levels are independent. The function of the three-tier local self-government in Poland shows the legitimacy of decentralisation in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, which postulates that the higher level authorities implement only those tasks which can not be realized by the lower level authorities (Piasecki 2009: 154–174; Karnaś 2006: 140–142). Certainly, the practice of the three-tier local self-government in Poland has also shown some shortcomings and deficiencies. Over the last sixteen years,

some criticism has been raised about the functioning of self-government on the district level. First of all, critics questioned the existence and functioning of the self-government on the district level. The criticism referred to small, limited financial means of districts. Maintenance costs of the district administration do not justify, according to some critics, the existence of local self-government. Some of the tasks could successfully be taken over by the communal authority, and other parts by the self-government on the voivodeship level (Janik). Some suggested uniting districts, which would strengthen this level of government in terms of finance and competence. Despite the criticism, it seems that the Polish solutions regarding self-government can be an example for other countries, which are at the beginning of the road of democratic transformation. This applies to Ukraine, which, unfortunately, at the moment is afflicted by the conflict with Russia and internal conflict, dividing the country into pro-Russian and pro-European.

The present state, proposals for amendments and the main barriers of reform in Ukraine

It should be stressed that currently, Ukrainian locally elected councils operate at a few administrative levels: "oblasti" (equivalent of the Polish voivodeship), "regions" (equivalent of Polish districts) and "societies" (equivalent of communes). However, these grass-roots elected councils do not have their own executive apparatuses, which is one of several basic barriers of the development of self-government in Ukraine. Marcin Święcicki[2], a coordinator of a special expert group for local government reform in Ukraine, explains this by paying attention to the extreme fragmentation of local self-government units[3]. This fragmentation reduces executive power of these units. As Święcicki reports, Volodymyr Groysman, the Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine and the Minister of Regional Development in the government of Arseniy Yatsenyuk, came to Poland in March of this year. He asked then President of Poland, Bronislaw Komorowski, and the Polish government for help in carrying out the reform of local government (Święcicki). It is worth noting, along with Święcicki, that Groysman was previously very popular, elected repeatedly the mayor of Vinnitsa. During the last elections he reached 80% approval. Groysman agreed to become the minister of development, provided that he was able to implement the reform of decentralisation. According to Święcicki, the Deputy Prime Minister Groysman considers Polish administrative reform to be the most successful (Święcicki). Some other vital barriers of decentralisation of power in Ukraine were also indicated, including the financial constraints of the

[2] Marcin Święcicki – former mayor of Warsaw (1994–199), Member of Polish Parliament of Civic Platform party, the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations in the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

[3] At the level of councils, there are over 12.000, including sometimes even a few hundred residents. In Poland there are 2.500 communes. Source: (Święcicki).

authorities elected locally. As a matter of fact, they are dependent on higher-level authorities, and above all on the central authorities. Święcicki writes that… every year oblasti (regions) and regions (districts) must negotiate their budgets with the government in Kiev, and thus, local self-government units of the lowest level must negotiate with the regions (Święcicki). It is worth noting that this is the major component of the criticism of Polish districts. In addition to financial dependence, the Ukrainian local self-governments do not have the communal property. Another barrier is that general provisions are too vague and do not unambiguously delegate the competences for the particular levels of government (Święcicki). Pro-European Ukrainian government itself (in power since February 2014 and referred to as "Kamikaze Cabinet"), inherited a very unstable political situation with the background of military aggression from Russia, a high level of corruption in the public space, and the Soviet model of governance. One of the features of the system of centralisation of power includes finance and manual control of its transfer (Groysman 2015).

The current system of local government contradicts the mentioned principle of subsidiarity (subsidiarity), proper for the development of civil society but incompatible with Article. 4 par. 3 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government that reads as follows: "Generalnie odpowiedzialność za sprawy publiczne powinny ponosić przede wszystkim te organy władzy, które znajdują się najbliżej obywateli. Powierzając te funkcje innemu organowi władzy, należy uwzględnić zakres i charakter zadania oraz wymogi efektywności i gospodarności" (*European Charter of Local Self-government*). (In general, the responsibility for public affairs should be borne primarily by those authorities which are closest to the citizens. By assigning this task to another authority, one should take into account the extent and nature of the task and principles of effictiveness and economy).

Taking into account the abovementioned barriers, reforms should focus on the following spheres: 1) the financing of local self-government, 2) the creation of executive apparatus of local authority, 3) reasonable and precise division of duties, in accordance with the above cited principle of subsidiarity, which should also lead to a reasonable regional division (administrative) by reducing the excessive fragmentation of local self-government units. It is worth analysing both the assumptions of the reform of Polish experts and intentions of the Ukrainian government.

It should be emphasized that Polish experiences influence the proposed Polish solutions. Above all, these solutions should be based on the principle of subsidiarity invoked above, according to the European Charter of Local Self-Government. The deficiency in hierarchical connection between the different levels of local self-government, the precise separation of duties competences of those levels by:

a) Local Self-Government Acts indicating particular competences in general,
b) Competence Acts, which would determine in detail the competences of individual authorities (Święcicki).

A crucial issue is the review and analysis of laws regulating the actions and rights of authority, in order to clarify the responsibilities of the particular levels of gov-

ernment. The Ukrainian side introduced proposals for the division of competences to Polish experts. However, they require some clarification (year 2015), taking into account the Ukrainian peculiarity and respecting the legal separation of the competences of different levels of local self-government. Therefore, the said clarification should be made by Ukrainians themselves (Święcicki). For example, according to Święcicki, "(…) w pracach na reformą samorządową w Polsce dokonano przeglądu około stu ustaw branżowych i każdy artykuł, który mówi że władza coś wykonuje, wydaje decyzję, opinię lub odwołanie, przygotowuje program, deleguje uprawnienie, powołuje kogoś etc., każda taka czynność władzy jest ściśle przypisana gminie, powiatowi, województwu lub władzom państwowym". [(…) in the work on the reform of local self-government in Poland, there was a review performed of about a hundred trade laws and every article which says that the authority does something, makes a decision, opinion or revocation, prepares a program, delegates right, appoints somebody and so on, each act of authority is strictly assigned to the commune, district, voivodship or state authorities.] (Święcicki). On the other hand, the Deputy Prime Minister Groysman underlines that the following policy areas require reforming: housing and utilities infrastructure with particular emphasis on saving on energy, deregulation in the area of construction and space planning, and public services. A general reform of state services and actions is needed, including the introduction of e-administration, which is important in the Internet age (Groysman).

A great challenge will be to create transparent administrative procedures, which can also help in the fight against corruption. It can be assumed that, similarly to other post-Soviet countries, there exists a specific culture of "arranging"[4] based on informal cooperation networks, unclear corrupt business relationships and nepotism in public institutions.

The case for the discussion is also division of the existing administrative field apparatus subject to the central authority between the particular planned levels of local self-government. The problem to be solved is how much of this apparatus should be left for the central government. The proposal was even made, offering complete elimination of regional administration subordinate to the government. Generally, it is supposed that the only form of supervision under the local government by the central authority will be surveillance under the legality of local self-government actions. This solution works in Poland, where only at the level of voivodeships occurs on the one hand the province governor, as the head of the government administration in the voivodeship, and the representative of the Prime Minister. On the other hand, self-government operates in the form of Sejmik (regional council) of voivodeship as the legislature and the board of the voivodeship, headed by the Speaker, as the executive. In Ukraine, are proposals that central administration reached the level of regions (the equivalent of districts) (Święcicki).

[4] In fact this word does not fully refer what in this context mean polish word „załatwianie". It is untranslatable.

In the fight against these pathological phenomena free media, both professional and social, helps greatly. Unfortunately, the state of freedom of speech is seriously worrisome. A similar opinion was expressed in an interview for the American agency Associated Press with the OSCE representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatović (unknown, *OBWE*: *decyzja Kijowa*…). It should be pointed out that Ukraine is on the non-governmental organization Freedom House's list of countries in which Internet freedom is more restricted every year, as its showed by researches of non-governmental organisation Freedom Hause (unknown, *Ukraina znalazła się na liście*…). Undoubtedly, the main factor, apart from the whole mental and institutional legacy, inherited from the communist block, is the conflict with Russia. The organization Freedom House in its ranking classified Ukraine as a partly free country (unknown, *Ukraina znalazła się na liście*…).

Yet anotherissue of fundamental importance is financial independence, which Poland relatively acheived ("relatively" due to reservations regarding, in particular, financial possibilities of districts) for example tax CIT, PIT, commercial charges, property transfer tax, financial penalties (Święcicki). Other sources of income are subsidies (eg. education) and grants. All of these income instruments are to be introduced in Ukraine, as in Poland by introducing complicated algorithms and rules for obtaining funds from these sources. Because of this, the income of local self-governments will be predictable and relatively stable. It is conducive to stabilize the management of self-government unit, as it benefits the development and strengthening position in the administrative managerial system. Solutions relating to local government finances must guarantee the appropriate balance between the levels of local government.

Polish experts, including Professor Wojciech Misiąg, former deputy finance minister, counsel of the Supreme Chamber of Control, together with Ukrainian partners took appropriate analyses and simulations in this regard. The goal of the works is to achieve optimum distribution of finances, so that individual local governments at all levels were self-sufficient and fairly divided. As Święcicki writes "(…) It will require huge simulation, which is a big challenge for the whole team" (Święcicki).

Apart from guarantying the self-government funding it is important to provide appropriate communal facilities i.e. roads, accommodation, educational and medical service facilities. The Ukrainian government understands this. The crucial issue is the self-governments' fragmentation and the gromads in particular (12 thousand). It prevents the rational wealth distribution that would be directed to and then managed by the Ukrainian self-governments. The solution according to Święcicki is two readymade resolutions i.e. concerning voluntary basic entities combination and the other concerning their cooperation. Two hundred entities are proposed instead of today's forty-two. Number of oblasti (counties) is to remain more or less the same (Święcicki).

To sum up, the changes that the Ukrainian government plans to introduce include: government reform and authority decentralization (the government ought to serve its people) through self-government reform supported on three levels, corruption elimination, clear procedures in the public space and e-administration, and licence services deregulation (Groysman). Such profound changes including overall self-government reform cannot be introduced without change in the constitution. According to Marcin Święcicki the change is necessary. Therefore the Polish experts prompts based on Polish experience, constitution included. However, according to Święcicki, introduction of such strategy was impossible. In Poland 'every level is a communion of citizens' including community, county and voivodeship (Święcicki). The Ukrainian authorities state that oblasti is not to be defined, as a 'communion of citizens' and that should implicate a referendum. Why there is so much worry about the referendum at the level of oblasti? It is connected to the concerns of the Ukrainian constitutionalists and the people of Ukraine regarding national integrity. According to Święcicki the referendum exclusivity to oblasti only record does not seem to reassure and not voting for 'separation or own foreign polices' (Święcicki) Therefore work on constitutional oblasti definition records were proceeded to consider oblasti as a gromad community and not as community of citizens. Such approach should prevent referendum at any level in any case. The solution, however, shortens the citizen activity in Ukraine. It discards the instruments of direct democracy in oblasti. Another weakness of the reform is the necessity of the representative of each gromada community. And it results in the increase of the oblasti board members. And it results in the fact that each gromada would include at least one representative. In Poland, the 'voivodship sejmik counts 51 members in total and oblasti would count 150 members' (Święcicki).

The construction of the citizen institution at the local level, where effective, possessing its own real integrity self-government element seems indispensible requires constitutional changes. Good resolution projects, European Council positive assessment, political resolution support of western countries and technological and financial support from EU, USA, Canada and Japan at the same time are insufficient (Groysman). At present there is not sufficient 2/3 of the votes to change the Ukrainian constitution. The vice Prime Minister Vladymyr Groysman draws attention to the members forming the Ukrainian parliament (Wierchowa Rada) that it does not arise the hope to simple and fast changes in the legislation reforming self-government. The Prime Minister enlists the following threats connected to the self-government reform:

- The legislative changes concerning government decentralization delay and service deregulation by Wierchowa Rada;
- The reform lack of influence on the society and the targeted group. Disturbed view of the reforms in the eastern part of the country – through the prism of federalism;

- Fear and social lack of trustworthiness in reforms. Worries – 'will it be worse';
- Insufficient institutional ability to planning, managing, coordinating and monitoring all the reform processes (Groysman).

Considering the system transformation in the post communist countries, it is worth to state that mental factors play an important role[5]. The institutional and legal surroundings do not guarantee a successful self-government reform. Besides, the barriers mentioned above are the direct consequences of mentality. Mental change is a longer process than the state changes. Finishing both processes guaranties change.

Mental factors and social capital as a citizen empowerment

Properly operating self-government requires that people are real functioning citizens, in which they are not only aware of their laws respected by the government, but also participating actively for the 'common good'. Citizenship society influences political decisions on regular basis that are subjected to public control. It is said that developed democracy on the local level occurs when the local authorities are highly social. Sherry Arnstein suggested the following classification. They are as follows:

- non-participation in which 'the authorities does not share the power with a society, but direct them' and their actions bear manipulative and therapeutic features (authority as a "good, caring" father);
- tokenism, in which 'the authorities apparently listen to the society, but develop their own objectives' and inform the society about their decisions, sometimes counselling and seeking their support;
- citizen power (delegating power), in which 'society participate in power and has real impact on what happens' and so the actual power control takes place, power delegation and partnership in power and solving problems (Kazior, Jarzębska 2004: 8; Arnstein 1969: 216–224). Considering the points above, democratic criteria[6] suggested by Robert Dahl are not applicable to fully estimate citizenship empowerment awareness including the

[5] By mentality the author means believes, attitudes and group role models arising from values and the reality interpreted them.

[6] They are as follows:

a) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens;
b) Elected officals are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coerecion is comparetavly uncommon;
c) All mature citizens may participate in the elections;
d) Virtually all mature citizens may run for office;
e) Citizens have right to express themselves without danger of punishment on polital matters broadly defined;

local level, because they mainly focus on institutional and formal part of the citizenship policy and not real policies instead. To estimate citizenship empowerment (also at the local level) more useful proves to be authorities citizens model reflecting its real relationship and the influence of the latter on decision-making process or authorities settlements (Fig. 1).

In Poland in the public space appeared a phenomenon of citizen budget in the self-government where citizens decide how to spend part of the public money. Referendum as an instrument of direct democracy is used fairly rarely, in particular circumstances, and the public counselling announcement given by self-government in crucial matters, but not controversial that does not arouse excitement, do not often arouse interest. A good example of such action is discussing housing policy. In one of the mazowieckie county towns, a few people discussed housing policy with the mayor of the town. It is a good example of self-government citizen empowerment not fully understood in Poland that Ukraine wish to follow. Poland still experiences the ongoing system transformation, although it has already finished its state transformation (self-government state reform 17 years ago).

There is three-factor interaction: proper legal and formal tools, authorities and citizen attitude, which result, not only formally and legally, mostly from mental factors. It is worth to underline that substituting representative democracy with direct democracy seems utopian. It means to increase local society involvement 'on regular basis' and to increase real participation in the decision making process. And it results in the increase of the deliberative procedure participation and is directly decisive. Today in Poland the level of the voting involvement to representative offices is unsatisfactory and trust in politicians is relatively low. The trust is formed by social capital[7], which determines the formation and development of citizenship society. Professor Janusz Czapliński emphasises 'social capital constitutes the essence of the citizen society and definitely effectively developing society' (Czapiński, Panek 2009: 207). Democratic system or citizen society requires its members' activity at various levels of social encouragement – from active to passive attendance in voting for government offices or referendum participation through consulting decisions concerning public space or membership in a list of non-governmental organisations and involvement in social entrepreneurships or initiatives based on the bottom-up approach at the local self-govern level.

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f) Citizens have right to seek out alternative and independent sources of information from other citizens and these alternative sources are effectevely protected by law.

The citizens have right to form relatively independent associations or organisations, including independent political parties and interest groups, taken from: (Dahl 1995: 324–325).

[7] After: 1) Bourdieu: "social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition. In other words this is a sum of capitals and knowledge, which such net would moblize" (Frieske 2004: 28); 2) Putnam: "social capital refers to (…) social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them that increase social ability to proceed the coordinated actions" (Frieske 2004: 61).



Fig. Levels of democracy in the light of the citizens' power influence on government settlements

Source: Own elaboration.

Interestingly, the 2008 research detailing the social trustworthiness level in Ukraine shows that it was higher about three points (Poland 13, Ukraine 16) (Czapiński, Sułek 2011) then in Poland despite the higher democratic involvement at the local level. The test comes from the time before Euromajdan (despite of ongoing lack of stabilisation and political tensions). Basically conflict induces the inner tension (and so increases so called bonding capital at the cost of bridging capital – intergroup) but simultaneously antagonises social groups against each other. So it presents a vital difference between Poland and Ukraine comparing the 'starting' point in self-governments reform.

Conclusions

Ukraine is at the preparatory stage resulting in empowerment of representative organs at the local level. It is state transformation stage. Creating citizen society or citizen empowerment is a long-lasting process. It is not certain to say that it would be at the same pace as Poland if proposed state changes were pushed. Poland was situated in different geopolitical and inner condition after 1981, and after 1989 and 1990 then is Ukraine after 2016. The European Union was different when Poland joined it in 2004 and different is the current EU situation after so called migration crisis and separatism tendencies in Europe. Comparatively, in Poland no armed conflict has arisen, pro-Russian separatism tendencies did not occur, and in the eastern Ukraine in particular. Historical dependencies, were different too. Poland belonged to the eastern block but was not one of the Soviet Republics. Therefore Russian impact on Ukraine is and was higher at the worse economical condition at the same time. Central Ukrainian authorities conduct programs improving representative democracy at the local level by creating independent, efficient local authorities decentralising the decision making process and equipping it with proper organisational, financial and treasury instrument. Poland takes a counselling role. Our experiences serve as a formation government matrix. It is in Poland's interest for Ukraine to succeed. The arguments are clear and they do not need to be stated herein. The more democratic, stable and pro-European Ukraine, the safer Poland is geopolitically.

The next stage to increase citizen empowerment at the local level will require formation of deliberative and direct democracy. Poland already has both legal-organisational and financial instruments. Presently, despite the fundamental differences between Poland and Ukraine in temrs of self-government, following the Terry Arnstein categories it is crucial to emphasis that tokenism in varying degree is observable in both countries when speaking of society empowerment.

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Political backlash in postcommunist Poland – the alliances between nationalist far right and working class 25 years after the decline of communism

The article describes the alliances between nationalist organisations and local branches of the Solidarity trade union in recent years. I frame this discussion by using the historical-political perspective of David Ost's "Defeat of Solidarity" and George's Sorel philosophical concept of revolutionary syndicalism.

Key words: Solidarity, Far Right, nationalism, trade unionism

Introduction

In the last few years controversies have arisen around several regional leaders of Solidarity trade union. The trade unionist circles have become connected with various far-right organizations, which have become more active since 2011. The first documented case comes from Gorzów Wielkopolski, where the local branch, led by 1980s oppositionist Jarosław Porwich, cooperated on numerous occasions with Stalowcy, a group closely related to nationalist organization National Rebirth of Poland and known for their anti-semitic and racist rhetoric, as well as their violent behavior. The cooperation involved mutual marches and demonstrations (Rosołowski 2014: 18). The gorzowian region of Solidarity also transported Stalowcy to the largest far-right related demonstration in Poland – the Independence March in 2011, held on the Independence Day in Warsaw by nationalist groups All-Polish Youth and National-Radical Camp. In the past three years the march has ended in riots. The leader of Gorzów's Solidarity has defended the nationalists after the riots in 2011 and explained his support for them by naming

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them "patriotic youth" (Siałkowski 2011). Porwich also defended the far-right football fans after the march in 2013, when participants attacked two anarchist squats and a Russian embassy, burned an art installation "Rainbow" and caused about 120.000 zlotys losses (Rosołowski 2014: 18). Stalowcy also participated in one of the anti-government demonstrations held by Solidarity in May 2011, where the gorzowian branch of the union provided firecrackers which were later thrown towards the provincial office (Siałkowski 2011).

The second case of cooperation between a local branch of Solidarity and the far-right took place in Rzeszów. The local branch of the trade union attended a march in memory of Cursed Soldiers, which was held by the far-right football fan group devoted to Resovia Rzeszów. Also the members of nationwide nationalist organizations such as National-Radical Camp and National Rebirth of Poland participated in the event. The leader of rzeszowian Solidarity, Roman Jakim, said that he's sure that these young people do not entirely support nationalism (Kobiałka 2015).

There are also documented cases of cooperation between Solidarity's branches and the far-right in Częstochowa, Lublin or Ciechanów in activities such as mutual pickets and demonstrations. Also, the union leaders support the nationalists by lending a place for a meeting with nationalist party National Movement (Rosołowski 2014: 18). Some may wonder how an organization which played the most important role in the democratic transformation in Poland in 1989 could cooperate with authoritarian nationalist groups. In my article I will present the common philosophical and social ground of trade unionism and nationalist far-right movements through the historical-political perspective of David Ost's "Defeat of Solidarity" and George's Sorel philosophical concept of revolutionary syndicalism.

Far-right – the definitions

First of all, I would like to narrow the definition of the far-right to make clear in which cases it will be used throughout the article. Before identifying the main characteristics of the far-right, let's take a look at how political scientists define right-wing radicalism.

In Michael Minkenberg's definition every authoritarian, ultranationalist and antidemocratic political being fits the definition of the far-right. The right-wing extremism stands against the values of liberal democracy, including liberty, equality, individualism and universalism. Instead, it strongly supports ethnic, religious and cultural homogeneity, which should be guarded by an authoritarian government. The definition applies not only to the political parties, but also to other political structures, as well as subcultures, media or even specific social environments (Minkenberg 2006: 15–16). The far-right also accepts violence (both verbal and physical) as a political mean. It is usually directed against everyone who does not fit the set of norms constituted by the far-right ideology, including sexual,

ethnic, religious minorities, ideological enemies or criminals. The right-wing extremism is also strongly connected with anti-semitism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia and radical nationalism (Jakubowska 2002: 43).

The most frequently occurring reason for the establishment of far-right ideologies is the modernization of the economy and the socioeconomic consequences following the abandonment of traditional industries (Lipset 1995: 146). Right wing extremist movements have gained popularity during economic crises because the anti-establishment groups present an alternative to the ruling parties which cannot cope with the crisis and stand in opposition to the far-left, which in the mainstream discourse is very often associated with the former soviet regimes. Also the influx of immigrants from different cultures is feared by the far-right as a threat to both the labour market and the cultural identity of the hosting country, which leads to increase of the support for the extremists (Paxton 2005: 232).

The two ideologies generally described as the far-right are nationalism and fascism. Nationalism in the far-right meaning is often described as the 'negative' nationalism to distinguish it from the 'positive' nationalism or civic nationalism, which is specific to autonomous regions and usually does not include ethnocentrism, xenophobia chauvinism (Grott 2006: 8–9). The far-right negative nationalism is rather specific to nation-states and it also implies a strong connection to traditional cultural and religious norms, social cohesion and public order (Heywood 2007: 182). Right-wing nationalism also opposes the parliamentary democracy, instead supporting authoritarian regime, monarchy or strong presidential system (Bartyzel 2010: 34–35).

The fascists draw a lot of ideological elements from right-wing nationalism to their political agenda, but with the addition of racism and social darwinism (Pankowski 1998: 85). Fascism also advocates for a strong state authority and national purity, as well as negation of both capitalism and socialism. Similarly to nationalists, fascist groups attach importance to traditional values, strongly opposing cultural liberalism, feminism and LGBT rights (Giddens 2004: 273–274). Despite obvious associations with interwar fascists and nazis, modern neofascists usually dissociate themselves from their precursors, which helps them in finding new supporters (Muszyński 1980: 22). Some of the neofascist organizations also disavowed antisemitism considering it an obsolete idea and replacing it with hatred against the immigrants from Asia or Africa (Pankowski 1998: 78–79).

Far-right organizations in Poland

At the moment, there are a number of active extreme right-wing groups in Poland. The largest number of nationalists can be found in organizations such as National Movement, All-Polish Youth, National-Radical Camp or National Rebirth of Poland, as well as in informal groups like Autonomous Nationalists or numerous local initiatives.

The most famous nationalist organization, All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska), started in 1922 as an academic youth group of the first nationalist party in independent Poland, Popular-National Union (PNU). The main theorist of the current national movement, Roman Dmowski, did not insist on running a political struggle, but instead he suggested grass root activism for the good of the nation (Kotowski 2007: 21). Despite this, their campaign against newly elected president Gabriel Narutowicz in 1922 led to a murder of the head of state committed by the party's supporter Eligiusz Niewiadomski (Waszkiewicz 2008: 637). Moreover, since the beginning of PNU's existence, the national-democratic theorists have not hidden their anti-semitism. However, in the early 1920s anti-semitism was not explicitly racist; instead – the aversion against Jewish people was constructed as a political and economic issue (Ryba 2010: 108–110). The younger generation of nationalists from All-Polish Youth moved their ideology closer to the christian nationalism focused on introducing religious beliefs to internal politics, which met with a positive response from the priesthood of Catholic Church (Kawęcki 2010: 289–290). After the May 1926 coup d'etat the young nationalists parted ways with the national-democratic veterans due to their ineffectiveness and joined the Camp of Great Poland, a new organization created by Roman Dmowski, which was an emerging platform for organizing people with nationalist views (Meller, Tomaszewski 2009: 19). In the late 1920s the nationalist youth tightened their anti-semitic views, which were no longer only a matter of economy, but rather became a religious, cultural and even racial issue. The Camp of Great Poland expressed the desire to reduce the participation of Jews in social and political life, which included limitation of the number of Jewish students in Polish universities proportionate to their percentage in the general population. Jewish people became a scapegoat for nationalists; they blamed the Jews for every problem of the Polish society (Kornaś 2009: 31–32). This resulted in numerous acts of aggression towards the Jewish people and their property, including vandalism, boycotts or beatings (Rudnicki 1985: 149–150). The Camp also intensively planned a coup d'etat to overthrow Józef Piłsudski and his supporters, what led to a ban on the organization in 1933 and dispersion of its members into other minor groups (Wapiński 1980: 299).

The current incarnation of All-Polish Youth has existed since 1989, when Roman Giertych, grandson of one of the original All-Polish Youth members Jędrzej Giertych, reactivated the organization (Zdulski 2011: 41). After 1989 the activity of the organization has focused mainly on demonstrations against abortion, LGBT rights, pornography, ethnic minorities, foreign capital and anti-catholic cultural events (C. Maj, E. Maj 2007: 132). It also gained considerable popularity among nationalist skinheads in the 1990s. In 2000s All-Polish Youth became affiliated with the nationalist party League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin) as its youth wing. Members of this party have served in polish parliament during the IVth and Vth cadency and won ten seats in European Parliament in the 2004 elections. Although the leadership of the youth organization has attempted

to improve its image, a lot of their supporters continue to act violently and disrupt various demonstrations (Wojdyła 2005: 58–59).

In 2009 All-Polish Youth, along with National-Radical Camp, organized the first Independence March in Warsaw on Independence Day, November 11th. Though it was ineffective in the beginning, it has become the largest far-right demonstration, gathering tens of thousands of people with all kinds of right-wing ideologies – from centre-right conservatists and supporters of the largest conservative opposition party Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) to nationalists to neofascists. It also gained the interest of right wing football fans from the whole country. Since 2011 the demonstration has ended in riots with numerous injured people and severe damage in the city. On the Independence March in 2012, the leader of All-Polish Youth Robert Winnicki announced the foundation of a political party called National Movement (Ruch Narodowy), which includes his own organization along with National-Radical Camp and several minor groups (Jurczyszyn 2015: 154–155). After several electoral failures, a populist coalition Kukiz'15 introduced 10 National Movement's members into Sejm in 2015 parliamentary elections.

The second most significant and at the same time more radical polish far-right organization is the aforementioned National-Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny), which also has its roots in the interwar. It drew its name and ideological program from an organization founded in 1934 by young radical nationalists after the break-up of the Camp of Great Poland. The new organization tightened its anti-semitic, anti-democratic and anti-communist views, moving its agenda towards more totalitarian positions (Rudnicki 1985: 239). The National-Radical Camp was banned in the same year it was established. Shortly after the break-up, two new groups were formed in 1935: National-Radical Camp-ABC, which included mostly nationalist intellectuals, and National-Radical Movement Falanga, which was more violent and ideologically closer to fascism (Kawęcki 2012: 185).

At the beginning of World War II the members of ABC founded a military organization called the Lizard Union (Związek Jaszczurczy), which later merged with numerous members of the post-national-democratic National Military Organization (Narodowa Organizacja Wojskowa) and transformed into National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne) (Siemaszko 1982: 49). In spite of fighting the nazi and soviet invaders, the National Armed Forces continued the National Radical Camp's political struggle from the interward by attacking Polish communist partisans from the People's Army, as well as socialists, liberals, democrats and ethnic minorities (Siemaszko 1982: 96). In the years following the end of World War II some members of National Armed Forces, together with the remaining units of the National Military Organization and Home Army (Armia Krajowa) have continued guerilla struggle against the communist authorities. Many partisans were arrested and sentenced to death, as they were accused of fascist sympathies by the government of Polish People's Republic (Siemaszko 1982: 180–181). The anti-communist partisans, later called the Cursed Soldiers,

gained the status of heroes after the fall of the communist regime in Poland, which resulted in the establishment of the National Day of Remembrance of the Cursed Soldiers on 1st March.

The current incarnation of National-Radical Camp has existed since 1993, firstly only as a minor group. The organization has officially reactivated and gained notoriety in the last decade, when public opinion responded negatively to the Camp's commemoration of anti-semitic pogrom in Myślenice (Zdulski 2011: 54–55). As mentioned before, in last few years, the Camp, along with All-Polish Youth, has organized the Independence March and formed a political party called National Movement.

The third largest and at the same time oldest existing nationalist organization in Poland is National Rebirth of Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski). It was founded in 1981, but did not solidify its structure until the late 1980s. The group has attracted many far-right skinheads, who crashed concerts and political meetings and introduced right-wing extremism into sport stadiums (Wojdyła 2005: 45). In 1992 National Rebirth of Poland registered as a legal political party, but their rhetoric still remained hateful and aggressive (C. Maj, E. Maj 2007: 67). Like the two aforementioned organizations, the National Rebirth of Poland is strongly attached to traditional, non-ecumenical catholicism. Moreover, the organization has radical anti-semitic views, which very often take racist and xenophobic form (Stępień 2004: 303–304). The National Rebirth of Poland has also cooperated with nationalists from other countries through an international forum called International Third Way (C. Maj, E. Maj 2007: 50). In last few years the National Rebirth of Poland has lost some of its supporters due to the rising popularity of All-Polish Youth and National-Radical Camp, partially because of its extremist rhetoric and quasi-fascist aesthetic (Zdulski 2011: 57–58).

It is also worth mentioning the Autonomous Nationalists (AN) or similar unstructured nationalist and neofascist groups, which use aesthetic and tactical elements specific for left-wing and anarchist counter-culture, such as black blocs or graffitti, among with abandonment of the skinhead aesthetic or uniformed chic of other nationalist groups (Schlembach 2013: 295–296). The ideological profile is also different from traditional nationalist organizations. The Autonomous Nationalists, along with radical nationalism, anti-semitism and xenophobia, strongly emphasize their anti-capitalist views, which are mostly inspired by strasserism, the idea of Otto and Georg Strasser, a representative of the "left wing" of NSDAP in the 1930s who merged economic socialism with extreme nationalism (Schlembach 2013: 301). The AN's denial of market economy is limited only to the exploitation of native workers and usually explained with anti-communist, anti-semitic and anti-multicultural resentiments, which may look interesting for trade unionists with conservative views on social and cultural issues (Schlembach 2013: 307).

Solidarity and nationalist rhetoric

The Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity" was formed in the end of 1980 as a representative for the Polish employees and a product of the activity of various opposition organizations from the previous years. The formation as solidified with a season of strikes against the communist government's labour policy in various workplaces across the country (Krzemiński 2013: 77–79). On the day of its founding, the union had about a million of disciplined supporters ready to participate in nationwide strike actions (Ost 2014: 174). Although some of the groups who participated in the social movement have had a conservative right-wing profile, like the Conferadcy of Independent Poland (Ruch Polski Niepodległej) or the Movement of Young Poland (Ruch Młodej Polski), Solidarity in its first form has been considered left-wing by more contemporary political and social thinkers. Reasons for this designation usually include the union's support for social self-organization, social-democratic workers self-management, participatory democracy and commitment to universal social justice (Ost 2014: 30).

Most far-right groups opposed the ideas of the two most significant organizations at the core of Solidarity social movement – Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników) and the Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela). The first nationalist opposition group founded in 1977, Polish Committee of Defense of Life, Family and the Nation (Polski Komitet Obrony Życia i Rodziny, later known as Polish Self-Defense Committee – Komitet Samoobrony Polskiej) was in conflict with most of the other opposition organizations, accusing them of leftist and masonic influences (Tomasiewicz 2003: 58). Also another nationalist group called Independent Political Group (Niezależna Grupa Polityczna) did not accepted the activity of democratic opposition, what resulted in interfering the meetings of centrist organisations Workers Defence Committee and Movement for the Defense of Human and Civic Rights (Tomasiewicz 2003: 60).

The introduction of the Martial Law in December 1981 led to critique of the left-wing tendencies of Solidarity. Since the mid-1980's, many union activists and intellectuals have changed their agenda from social-democratic to more liberal and free-market oriented ideologies. The Solidarity's program in 1987, which boldly postulated the privatization of the Polish economy, was really close to the one proposed by the ruling party, which became more free-market oriented at the end of the decade. The abandonment of social postulates undermined Solidarity's position as a trade union (Ost 2014: 255–257). After the transformation in 1989, Solidarity as a social movement dispersed into numerous organizations with different political agendas, very often conflicted with each other. At that moment, the nationalist rhetoric became visible in the discourse of conservative post-Solidarity politicians.

After the fall of communism in Poland, the Polish economy faced many problems, which has resulted in major disappointment among the working masses.

The conservative part of post-Solidarity gathered around Lech Wałęsa and a political party called Centre Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum). The major purpose of this fraction was to end the policies of the liberal post-Solidarity government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki from the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna). At the same time the conservative politicians did not want to expose the disadvantages of free-market economy. In a short period of time they have started to organize their agenda using the figure of the "other" – the communists and the possibility of their return (Ost 2007: 155). Though conservative coalition has won in 1991 parliamentary elections, the condition of economy had not improved, so the communists as an "other" in right-wing discourse were replaced by atheists or non-catholics, who could be easily identified with post-Solidarity left and liberals. By that means the new elites have avoided a critique of the new economic system and turned the anger of the masses towards their political opponents (Ost 2007: 158–159). Inner conflicts and ineffectiveness of post-Solidarity politicians have caused their defeat in the elections in 1993, which were won by post-communist party Alliance of Democratic Left. However, even when the free-market economy has been run by former communists, the conservatives from Solidarity have not criticized the capitalist economy itself, but only the people who have run it. As a result, the conservative fraction of Solidarity's politicians and union leaders changed the ideological course of the organization – they decided to put aside the economic problems and struggle for workers' rights and focus more on political and cultural issues: anti-communism, support for the active presence of Roman Catholic Church on the political scene and anti-abortion laws (Ost 2007: 178–179). After 1993 even more radical tendencies have been shown by Solidarity's members – like in the xenophobic and anti-semitic fraction leaded by Zygmunt Wrzodak, later one of the founding members of nationalist party League of Polish Families (Ost 2007: 182).

In 1996 the conservative fraction of Solidarity under the aegis of its new leader Marian Krzaklewski formed a political coalition called Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność), which gathered most of the post-Solidarity political organizations into an electoral committee. The party has described itself as loyal to Christian, right-wing, and patriotic values, right-wing and patriotic and oppositional to communism. Although the coalition's economic program was strongly focused on increasing the privatization of the state-owned enterprises, the strong emphasis on anti-communism and christianity led to success in the 1997 elections by Solidarity Electoral Action (Ost 2007: 180–181). Four years under the rule of its coalition with the successors of the Democratic Union, the Union of Freedom (Unia Wolności) deepened the social-economic problems in Poland including increasing unemployment and contributing to collapses of many state-owned companies (Mażewski 2014: 316). The coalition dispersed into numerous different organizations, including the two most important centre-right parties today: liberal Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) and conservative Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). In the following elections in 2001 it

was defeated by the post-communist Alliance of Democratic Left, which was supported by about 34% of Solidarity's workers (Gardawski 2001: 81).

In the late 1990s, the extreme right-wing Solidarity union leaders gained much more attention from the working class. Wrzodak built a strong electorate by using radical catholic, anti-semitic, anti-liberal and xenophobic slogans. As a result, his party League of Polish Families entered the parliament in 2001 as a first party, which referred to the ideology of Polish nationalists from the interwar (C. Maj, E. Maj 2007: 242–243). The nationalist party has gathered the most conservative post-Solidarity politicians, as well as nationalists unrelated to the union. It has repeated its success in 2004 European Parliament elections and in Polish parliamentary elections in 2005 and entered a coalition with Law Justice and an agrarian populist party Self-Defence (Samoobrona) (Tomczak 2008: 859). Although the League of Polish Families did not last the whole cadency and lost in the anticipatory elections in 2007, the nationalist rhetoric and far-right sympathies remained among the trade union workers.

Revolutionary syndicalism – the ideological link between the trade unions and the history of radical nationalism and fascism

Some may wonder why the workers gathered in trade unions adopt far-right ideologies when their major objective is (or should be) the improvement of their working and living conditions. The explanation is found in the history of both trade unionism and fascism (or other historical nationalist movements). They are connected by the ideological tendency called 'revolutionary syndicalism'.

The idea of revolutionary syndicalism was a product of George Sorel's dissatisfaction with early 20th century anarchism. He has criticized traditional anarchists for being ineffective and focused only on the theory. Though he was not a theoretician nor a movement organizer, he did connect his ideas of an effective revolution with currently existing movements – he has appreciated the anarchists, who have became syndicalists by considering them as being able to separate from the theory, provide a real-life revolutionary action and pick violence as an instrument of revolution. The violence is – in Sorel's theory – the instrument of working class rebellion against the force used by ruling bourgeoisie and government to maintain the imposed social order. The heroic aspect of violence plays an important role in Sorel's theory, as he believed that the anarchists' accession in the syndicates is one of the most important historical events of his times (Laskowski 2007: 397–399).

In Sorel's theory, the general strike should be the main instrument of political struggle. He has considered the myth of a general strike as an ideological point of condensation for proletarian identity (Laclau, Mouffe 1985: 39–40). Despite it, the revolution in Sorel's vision is not based on the traditional definition of classes derived from their position in capitalist production, but on the subject's attitude towards the ruling elites. The general strike could also apply to any other social

structure. In *Reflections on violence* Sorel provided historical examples of cooperation beyond class divisions – peasants slaughtering each other for the legitimization of the authorities, as well as liberals supporting the 1905 proletarian revolution in Russia as a threat for tzarist government (Sorel 2014: 166).

However, the anti-economism of Sorel's ideological discourse created a visible void, which had been hitherto filled with a myth of class conflict between the working class and bourgeoisie. The abandonment of the economic character of a general strike had led some of Sorel's followers to search for another myth to fill the void, which led them to nationalism (Laclau, Mouffe 1985: 41). The first marriage of Sorelian theory and nationalism took place in 1909, when Sorel showed his support to french integral nationalists Action Francaise, naming them 'anti-parliamentary socialists' in the leading revolutionary syndicalist journal, "Divenire Sociale" (Asheri, Sznajder, Sternhell 1994: 79). In the following years Sorel's ideas gained popularity among revolutionary conservatists and nationalists, accompanied by mutual appreciation between the philosopher and his right-wing followers. Sorel was mostly impressed by the methods and radical character of those movements more than their actual beliefs – he acknowledged royalist Action Francaise, as the only real opposition movement in France before World War I, as well as Bolsheviks in tzarist Russia. Their common ground was primarily the rejection of liberal democracy under the bourgeoisie's rules (Asheri, Sznajder, Sternhell 1994: 81). Finally, the revolutionary syndicalist ideas became the foundation for the rise of fascism in interwar Italy, as it was the main ideological influence for Mussolini's thought and hence also his movement. These ideas united most of the anti-government revolutionary forces, including syndicalists, regardless of their class position (Asheri, Sznajder, Sternhell 1994: 195–196).

The history of Solidarity as a social movement shows a significant resemblance to the idea of general strike, with the communist party in the role of bourgeoise versus the revolutionary bloc including the trade unionists as the mythical heroes, as well as intellectuals, students, clergy, etc instead of economic classes.

Summary

The history is full of examples of trade unions' involvement in the formation of radical right movements. For decades, the economic and political crises have been a perfect background for the right-wing extremists to turn various social groups against the scapegoats of their ideologies. Moreover, the abandonment of the discourse of a class conflict leads more and more workers to identify themselves with different values, such as religion or nationality. Although some cooperation between european union workers and nationalist organizations are focused on economic causes [for example, Jobbik's (Hungarian radical nationalist party) support for trade unions' referendum on allowing men to retire after 40 years – see (*Radical Jobbik, socialist party support referendum initiative on men's retirement*, 2015)],

most of them are dictated by an opportunity of a political career in increasingly popular parties. Depending on the country, the reactions for such moves may vary. Trade union leaders and members in France, who have stood for elections from the anti-immigrant nationalist Front National's list, have been usually excluded from french unions CFDT, Force ouvrière, CGT, SUD and CFTC (Wieviorka 2013). But in Hungary for example, the union leader and Jobbik's member Lajos Rig defeated his rivals from the centre-right ruling party Fidesz and opposition Socialists in 2015 by-elections without losing the support of his union (Thorpe 2015). This may lead to the conclusion that positive approach of some trade unionist circles for involvement in nationalist politics occur more often in post-communist countries, where the leading trade unions have anti-communist backgrounds.

According to the trade unionist press, Solidarity's members collaborating with far-right organizations are only a minority in the union, which consists of more than 700.000 members. Yet still, a support given to the extremists from the historical and commonly respected organization seems dangerous and leads to legitimization of ideologies which promote violence, authoritarism and prejudice.

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Radical Urban Movements in Poland – the case of squatting

Radical social movements are more and more often the subject of academic inquiry, where their agenda, identity-building processes and repertoires of action are examined vis a vis the dominant discursive opportunity structures. The case study presented in this article is the squatting movement in Poland. We interpret this movement, its actions and in particular alliance-building strategies, through the perspective of radical flanks of broader urban social movements environment.

Key words: squatting, post-socialism, urban movements, Poland

Introduction

Recent academic discussions claim urban movements to be the type of social movements rooted in "collectivities with a communal base and/or with the local state as their target of action" (S. Fainstein, F. Fainstein 1985: 189). However, some researchers point to the fact that local authorities are not necessarily the target of action; the target may include private agents or action may be directed towards self-help initiatives (cf. Passotti 2013). Our intention is to show how alliances built between different groups and social movements result in the choice of targets and also politicization of movement claims. The definition of urban movements is often vague and opaque: "urban movements continue to mobilize around a great variety of issues – for instance, they struggle against urban redevelopment and gentrification; for environmental justice, including public transportation, waste management, pollution, and urban agriculture; for improved social services, community empowerment, and employment opportunities" (Passotti 2013: 3).

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Within the case studies of urban movements we chose for our study we expect to observe claims expanding beyond the issues of housing or controlled rents. Passotti summarizes the development of the research on urban movements: "much analysis on urban movements sets them in the context of macroeconomic shifts. In the latter part of the 20th century, capital reacted to deindustrialization by investing its surplus in cities with a strategy of «accumulation by dispossession» (Harvey 2008), in which poor residents in high-value areas were displaced to make place for profitable urban redevelopment" (Passotti 2013). The disposition is explicitly stated in Harvey's manifesto *The Right to the City*, in which he writes that one should demand "greater democratic control over the production and utilization of the surplus. Since the urban process is a major channel of surplus use, establishing democratic management over its urban deployment constitutes the right to the city" (Harvey 2008: 37).

One of the controversial points is the form of urban movements. Scholars see urban movements as taking a variety of forms, "from counter-cultural squatters to middle class-neighborhood associations and shanty town defense groups" (Castells 1983: 328). Our ambition is to show that urban social movements enrichen their repertoires of action by forming alliances and cooperating often through transactional activism that focuses on networking between organized non-state actors and other actors and groups in the politico-institutional sphere (cf. Petrova, Tarrow 2007).

Our analysis is built primarily on 40 semi-structured interviews, whereof 20 interviews were conducted in Warsaw in 2013 with squatters and tenants' movement activists and 20 interviews were conducted with grassroots activists (mostly squatters) in the years 2008–2013 in Poznań. Warsaw and Poznań have been chosen as they are the two Polish cities where the urban movement scene, and the squatting movement in particular, is very vibrant. The analysis focuses on the alliance built between the more radical forms of urban movements – squatters – and the more moderate ones – the tenants. The information collected in the interviews is complemented by publications released by and about the activists, official documents, newspapers and mass-media, social media, and with other information on the Internet [for more information about data collection see (Polanska, Piotrowski 2015)].

Squatting as a movement

Squatted social centers have been an integral part of alternative social movements (mostly autonomous, but also anarchist or radical environmentalist) for the last few decades. They have provided a place for the activists to meet up, organize themselves, and find shelter. They have formed mostly in urban areas and focused on urban issues, which is why squatting has been incorporated into the definition of urban movements (Castells 1983). For many activists, squatting has become

an end in itself: free spaces where ideals are introduced into everyday practice of consensus-based decision-making processes, environmental stability, autonomy, and so forth.

The term squatting originated in the 19th-century U.S. and described the taking-over of unused property by the Settlers (it also meant taking the land from Native American people), regulated in 1862 by the Homestead Act. For many decades, squatting was more focused on providing cheap (if not free) housing, just as it was for instance in the first post-war years in the United Kingdom. The second wave of squatting took place in the 1970s, when it became a political statement as well as an imminent part of the counterculture; this period provided the term's current meaning. Over the years, scholars have analyzed squatting from a number of perspectives such as: an example of middle class counter-culture (Clarke *et al*. 1976: 58); a manifestation of DIY[3] culture (McKay 1998); an "important facet of the decentralized yet worldwide struggle to redistribute economic resources according to a more egalitarian and efficient pattern" (Corr 1999: 3); a housing movement (Wates 1980); a post-modern, post-ideological, mass media-influenced movement (Adilkno 1994); an utopian struggle (Kallenberg 2001); a self-help movement (Katz, Mayer 1985); and progenitors to, and later a wing of, the "international Autonomen"[4] (Katsiaficas 1997).

An important distinction has to be made between squatting as a result of a necessity (provision of housing) and squatting as political statement. In this period of global recession and increased housing foreclosures, squatting has become far more prevalent in Western contexts (Peñalver 2009) and in some cases need-based and politically motivated squatting go hand in hand. According to Reeve, who specializes in housing research, "in the context of adverse housing circumstances, limited housing opportunity and frustrated expectations, squatters effectively remove themselves from and defy the norms of traditional channels of housing consumption and tenure power relations, bypassing the 'rules' of welfare provision" (Reeve 2005: 198). In effect, beleaguered citizens living in a welfare state that cannot provide them with adequate resources take action into their own hands.

This distinction between squatting resulting from housing needs and squatting as a political (or cultural) activity is reflected in the types of occupied locations. The first ones are house projects (living projects, social shelters etc.), the latter, after the Italian anti-hierarchical left Autonomia movement activists from the late 1960s and early 1970s, are usually called social centers. As Klein describes: "Social centres are abandoned buildings – warehouses, factories, military forts, schools –

[3] DIY – Do It Yourself – culture is linked to punk rock and hardcore scenes and the squatting movement. It is more than a fashion trend or aesthetic orientation, the 'true and pure' underground has to rely on DIY ethics in terms of organization, publishing, record labels and so forth. The DIY culture is most visible in squatted social centers and their activities, but its impact can be observed all over the scene.

[4] I.e. the autonomist anti-authoritarian left wing libertarian groops emerging in Germany and Italy since the early 1970s.

that have been occupied by squatters and transformed into cultural and political hubs, explicitly free from both the market, and from state control… Though it may be hard to tell at first, the social centres aren't ghettos, they are windows – not only into another way to live, disengaged from the state, but also into a new politics of engagement" (Klein 2001). This partially romanticized description of social centers emphasizes a few important features of venues like this. Firstly, squatted social centers are not occupied because of affordable housing shortage, at least not primarily. They are political statements, usually responding to local policies and, more indirectly, to national politics. Therefore, their emergence and existence should be analyzed through the perspective of the cities, not the states, however we acknowledge that often, state policies affect city governance that, in turn, condition and affect the emergence of squatting. Their confrontational attitude is at the core and brings the activists from squatted social centers closer to social movement activists. According to della Porta and Diani (1999: 15), such an attitude is one of the defining features of social movements as they engage in collective action focused on conflict, take part in political and/or cultural conflicts, and strive to promote or prevent social change.

The housing/activism division is also reflected in a long-running dispute between the activists themselves about the fundamental ideas behind squatting. This discussion can be reduced to two opposing tendencies: to open the squatted location as wide as possible (the social center model) or to create a space for its inhabitants and their activities, limiting interactions with the surrounding world by creating a private space within the squat. Social centers also differ in the degree of openness, with some stressing the openness to other groups and audience and some intentionally limiting the access for bystanders by requiring specific cultural capital or by creating strong links with specific subcultures. This division has far-reaching consequences including the types of activities performed in the squatted locations. In the case of a more exclusive space, the need to compromise the 'purity' of the movement is not as urgent as in more open and accessible organizational forms. The need to satisfy less radical (politically and esthetically) tastes and attitudes is less frequent.

The label 'radical movements' we use has been implicitly defined in opposition to the mainstream or moderate groups. Pizzorno (1978) suggested that instrumental movements establish a separation between means and ends, while countercultural movements scrutinize collective action as an end in itself. Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000) wrote that radical social movements differ from other (moderate ones) in terms of structure, ideology, tactics, methods of communication and understanding their success. Such movements emerge during or after particular cycles of protests or are the consequences of social dynamics that push groups into processes of radicalization (Stekelenburg, Klandermans 2010).

Guzman-Concha suggests that in order to define radical groups one should: "(1) establish historical and geographical parameters, against which similar instances of this type can be reasonably compared and (2) define the components

that constitute the concept" (Guzman-Concha 2015: 3). He later points that radical groups (a) pursue an agenda of drastic changes, in particular within the political and economic organization of society. In order to implement their agenda, they (b) use an unconventional repertoire of contention including civil disobedience. In addition, these groups (c) adopt countercultural identities that frame and justify unconventional objectives and methods, although this process of identity formation often comes together later with the development of the cases and campaigns.

Within social movements one can observe heterogeneity and ongoing internal negotiations (e.g. Melucci 1989, Peterson 1997), as well as an implicit, sometimes conflict-ridden, internal division of labor between different movement factions. While radical activists tend to be skeptical towards contacts with state representatives, moderate activists often see this as necessary for solving the problems at hand. Haines (1988, 2013) talks about 'radical flank effects' to describe how these different logics can both strengthen and counteract the overall goals of a movement. On the one hand, the more conflict-oriented strategies of the movement's 'radical flank' (e.g. direct actions) can create publicity and awareness of the issues at stake, making it possible for the movement's more 'reasonable' moderates to contact established political actors and influence the political agenda. On the other hand, there is a risk that the conflict-oriented actions of the radical flank may stigmatize and marginalize the movement as a whole, which will also affect its moderate flank.

Squatting in Poland

Squatting has not been studied to the same extent in Central and Eastern Europe as it has been in Western contexts, which is related to the phenomenon's delayed emergence in post-socialist settings. Squatting attempts, as an expression of counter culture, have been observed in the area in the first part of the 1990s, much later than their counterparts in the West. In the end of the 1990s, Corr (1999) predicted a rise of squatting actions in the post-socialist countries as a result of the growing inequalities, the decrease of affordable housing and opportunities for the improvement of living standards. Indeed, squatting spread to post-socialist cities and one of the few researchers studying squatting in Central and Eastern Europe, Piotrowski (2011a; 2014) argues that the squatting movement in the area encountered difficulties in finding broader support, due to the small size of left-wing movements and the phenomenon's novelty in the area. Poland stands out among other post-socialist countries with a deeply rooted squatting movement (Piotrowski 2011a, 2014; Polanska 2014; Polanska, Piotrowski 2015), with squatting initiatives represented in most Polish cities (Poznań, Warsaw, Wrocław, Opole, Gdynia, Lublin, Łódź, Gdańsk, Gliwice, Biała Podlaska, Częstochowa, Kraków, Grudziądz, Ruda Śląska, Białystok, and Sosnowiec) along with a rising number of tenants' associations fighting for tenants' rights all over the country (over 40 associations registered in the country) (Polanska 2015).

The very emergence of the squatting movement in Poland is described in Żuk's (2001) study of the new social movements in Poland in the 1990s. Żuk discusses the origins of squatting in the country and argues that it is a new phenomenon that holds some connections to the development of alternative culture in the country in the 1980s, but draws its inspiration mainly from Western examples. Squatting in Poland is also described as caused by the systemic changes in the 1990s and the rise of capitalism, along with socio-economic changes and the very existence of vacant buildings. Moreover, there are some studies indirectly describing the phenomenon of squatting in post-socialist context (for instance Piotrowski 2011b, 2014; Schwell 2005; Gagyi 2013).

Squatters' activism in Poland is ideologically rooted and squatting is seen as a goal in itself and, at times, could be described as a politicized lifestyle (Portwood-Stacer 2013). Because of squatters' preference for direct action and squatting's illegal dimension, such activism is often interpreted as 'uncivil' and has not found broad support in Poland, or in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (cf. Císař 2013). The tenants represent a more moderate social movement as they function within the politico-institutional system and are organized formally in associations (stowarzyszenia). Because tenants' demands contradict mainstream discourse of the market and private property, they are often viewed by the broader public as posing 'illegitimate' demands (Polanska 2015).

In order to understand the conditions of squatting and squatters' cooperation with tenant activists in Poland, one needs to consider the situation in the housing sphere, as it constitutes the conditions for such activism. According to official statistics, as many as 6.5 million Poles lived in substandard conditions in 2012, and there was a shortage of 1.5 million dwellings in the country by that time (NIK 2012). Many buildings and land, nationalized during communism, were until recent times under municipal management, however re-privatization claims by former owners, their heirs and the buyers of these claims (and the so called 'cleaners', used in situations when property needs to be 'cleaned' of tenants) started to re-shape the situation. Due to the lack of coherent legal regulations and lengthy procedures, lawyers or banks that employ lawyers skilled in property law, often buy these re-privatization claims, subsequently resulting in rent increases and eviction of the old tenants and subsequent gentrification. Sometimes the unclear ownership status of a building leads to it standing vacant for a long time. Squatters and tenants in Polish cities oppose these processes, given the housing shortage in the country. They also oppose the gentrification processes, related to the business of re-privatization claims, and the shrinkage of affordable housing stock.

Our analysis builds on the comparison of squatter and tenant activists from Warsaw and Poznań. Both cities are among the largest cities in Poland and with vibrant (for Polish standards) social movement scenes. In both of them, there is a rather long-standing and active squatting scene. What is different is their central/peripheral positioning: Warsaw, being the capital, is far more central for social movements than Poznań, along with their size (Warsaw has over 1.7 million

people, Poznań 0.7 million). Many of the groups we have studied so far (squatters, tenants and anarchists) were involved in urban conflicts and targeted local authorities in their campaigns. In Warsaw, the squatters, their activities and their cooperation with tenants' groups resulted in a Round Table on housing issues in 2012. Municipal housing and city housing policy have become politicized issues in the capital city. In Poznań, the squatters and the anarchists (being often an overlapping environment) have managed to radicalize and politicize the issues of public housing and commodification of public services, but in a somewhat different way, as we will show further on.

Cooperation between squatters and tenants

In the literature, tenants' activism is usually defined as self-help activity, where squatting or occupying a dwelling might be inevitable, but is not the very goal in itself, as it often is for squatters (Pruijt 2013). The development of the movements however has been inter-connected and is often mentioned in the literature on squatting in the West. For instance, Corr has described the development of a squatter organization closely related to homeless people and tenants' organizations in the US in the 1990s and concluded "squatters and rent strikers have often supported each other because both resist eviction and because many of their arguments, tactics, and movement trajectories have similarities" (Corr 1999: 9). In their study of the development of the tenant self-management movement in New York City in the 60s and 70s, Katz and Mayer (1985) illustrate how this movement is intertwined with squatters' tactics and repertoires of action. Nevertheless, the links between squatters and tenants are not exclusive to the North American context. In the case of squatter settlements in Latin America, the squatters took over the land informally and over time their activity was organized as tenants' communities (Castells 1983; Ward 2002). Also in Amsterdam, the history of squatting was interwoven with the history of tenants' committees fighting for affordable housing already in the 1930s (Owens 2009). Owens emphasizes, however, that the identities of tenants and squatters were separated as "tenants used squatting as a tactic, however, they did not think of themselves as squatters, let alone as a squatters' movement" (2009: 47). The clear division between the squatters and the tenants, and at the same time their interconnectedness throughout the history, generates some interesting questions on the relationship of these movements and the character of their cooperation.

In social movement literature, there are several studies covering the factors facilitating cooperation and alliance building (Polletta 2002; Lichterman 1995; Obach 2004; Rose 2000). For example, Van Dyke (2003) found that heightened levels of threat or opportunity, access to abundant resources, and high levels of identity alignment among the actors are significant factors to the probability of alliance building. This argument seems to be in accordance with the Political

Opportunity Structures (POS) approach (Tarrow 1998). In other words, social movement actors tend to build alliances and cooperate with others when they feel threatened, when they recognize an opportunity for reaching some of their goals, when the resources are plentiful and accessible, and when their identities are similar to the potential allies. These opportunities and threats appear from political structures, from the side of the authorities, and occasionally from other social movement actors involved in coalitions. Moreover, regarding the social movement context, "the openness or vulnerability of the political system and the fragmentation of the elites are key factors in the emergence of urban movements and shape targets and strategies" (Passotti 2013).

The durability and diversity of movements and alliance formation

A brief overview of the two cases shows an increase in the vibrancy of tenants' movements and squatters in recent years and alliances formed rather recently. The campaigns to defend the squats of Elba (Warsaw in 2012) and Rozbrat (Poznań in 2009) and the campaigns against the practices of the 'cleaners' of evicted houses in both cities resonated strongly within the public opinion on the local and national level (for a chronological review of squatting see Table). In the case of Warsaw, in particular, the cooperation between squatters and tenants and their sustained independence in that cooperation opened up a bargaining position vis-à-vis the authorities and allowed the movements to use an opening in the emerging POS.

Table. Squats (existing longer than one month) in Warsaw and Poznań since 1989

Warsaw	Poznań
1995–1996 Student Autonomist action at **Smyczkowa** Street (Warsaw University building) 1998–1998 **Twierdza** (fortress, more than a hundred-years-old fortification building) 2002–2002 **Czarna Żaba** (Black Frog, located in an old bakery on St. Wincenty Street) 2000–2011 **Fabryka** (Factory, opened in 2002 for social and cultural activities) 2002–2003 **Okopowa** Street, **Spokojna** Street (named after the location) 2003–2003 **Furmania** (cooperating with an animal welfare organization)	1994–today **Rozbrat** squat at Puławskiego street

Warsaw	Poznań
2004–2012 **Elba** (named after the location at Elbląska Street)	
2005–2005 **Spółdzielnia** (Cooperative, on Wiertnicza Street)	
2007–today **Wagenburg** (a trailer camp/eco-village on squatted land)	2007–2008 **Magadan** (punk squat)
2011–today **Syrena** (Mermaid, the symbol of Warsaw)	
2011–2013 **Czarna Śmierć** (Black Death, focus on black magic, skating and chess playing)	
2012–today **Przychodnia** (Clinic, located in a former medical clinic)	2013–2015 **Od:zysk** squat at the Old Town Square
	2013–today **Zemsta** (info-shop and activist run bookstore and café)
2014–today **ADA** (Aktywny Dom Alternatywny/ Active Alternative House, a legalized social center)	

Source: own sources basing on interviews and available movements' publications.

In Warsaw, the authorities tried to settle with the squatters by pushing them into more formalized initiatives resulting in the opening of a legalized social center, ADA, in 2014, which was preceded by the squatters establishing an association – Skłot-Pol – in order to have legal foundation for cooperation with the municipality. The alliance between squatters and tenants resulted in pressures imposed upon the authorities that heavily relied on mass media and Internet but also on demonstrations, campaigns, and other forms of direct action, such as eviction blockades or meeting interruptions. The diversity of the movement scene in both cities has varied and so has the openness towards alliance formation by the movements and ultimately their influence on formal politics. What is evident is that the influence of the movements in each city has varied in its degree on local formal politics. In Warsaw, one of the achievements was the arrangement of the Round Table (2012) and the creation of a platform for a dialogue between squatters, tenants, and the authorities (on the local, but also the national level) (2012–2013); in Poznań, the local authorities claimed the conflict between the tenants and the new house owners was of a private nature and downplayed the issue.



Picture 1. Przychodnia squat in Warsaw

Source: Dominika V. Polanska.

The alliances formed between squatters and tenants in both cities were not entirely free of friction and this was particularly evident in the Warsaw case. Here, the tenants' organizations were more independent from squatters' support, compared to the case of Poznań. In the interviews, we were told that some of the Warsaw squatters considered squatting as a purely cultural and social activity when the question of alliance with tenants came up and made their voices heard when tenants' rights were discussed. However, the difference of opinion was solved in the city by the opening of a new squat in 2011 that focused mainly on housing activism and where squatters interested in housing/tenants' activism could join in. Warsaw squatters saw this solution as a process of "profiling" and solving the tensions between different interests among squatters' activists in the city.

In the case of Poznań, the cooperation between squatters and tenants was initiated relatively later, in 2011 with the foundation of Wielkopolskie Stowarzyszenie Lokatorów, and by securing an important position of squatters in the founded tenants' association, and thus avoiding internal conflict. When understanding the role of personal networks in the alliance formation between squatters and tenant activists in both cities, it is evident that these networks of acquaintances were important at the very beginning of the contact between these environments. They also were, over time, broadened to more general trust, shared by both groups. This way, inter-

personal trust generated inter-organizational trust among the squatters and tenants in both cities, however earlier and for a longer period of time in the case of Warsaw.

From the perspective of resource mobilization theory, the tenants – usually older and with lower economic capital – have successfully cooperated with the mostly younger and helpful squatters. The latter used the conflicts revolving around tenants' rights to push forward their agenda and politicize the claims, but also possessed necessary skills in terms of campaign organization, media contacts, organization of demonstrations, and simple logistics. For the squatters, the cooperation has given them new tools in their conflict with the local authorities; it has provided them with more arguments for criticizing local housing and development policies and created an opening to politicize the housing issues in anti-capitalist terms. It also opened up squatters to new tactics, in particular concerning legal tools: for instance, in Poznań new, regulations about stalking were used against the 'cleaners'. Tenants have gained a new, radical, skilled and experienced ally, which could help win compensation for illegal evictions in courts (Rozbrat Raport 2014). Above all, tenants have gained a challenging partner that has broadened tenants' claims (from affordable housing, to a right to the city) and encouraged them towards a more demanding, confrontational and self-respecting attitude.

Picture 2. Rozbrat squat in Poznań

Source: Dominika V. Polanska.

The argument we would like to make is that the main differences in squatter-tenant cooperation in the two cities are affected by:

- the position and stability of squatters and squats in each city,
- the independence and influence of the tenants' organizations,
- tenants' organizations' diversity,
- the internal dynamics and divergence/convergence of interests and ideologies of the squatters.

In Poznań, since the squat Rozbrat was established in 1994, its stable political and cultural position has become indisputable within the city. Its position has heavily affected the interactions with other social actors and the authorities. We argue that ideological and identity alignment among the squatters and other social actors in the city shaped the need of interaction and openness towards new allies. In Warsaw, on the other hand, the diversity and dynamics in the activists' environment resulted in greater ideological and tactical flexibility in coalitions with other social movement actors. Therefore, we argue that the high degree of identity alignment and ideological consistency dampens formation of new alliances. Our cases show that the role of instability and differentiation of interests and identities among the activists facilitates the creation of alliances and willingness to cooperate. However, some degree of identity alignment must be kept as a common platform to build the alliances on.

Furthermore, in understanding what inspires and facilitates cooperation and alliances across and within social movements, researchers have highlighted the role of movement structure, ideology, and culture (Polletta 2002; Van Dyke 2003; Beamish, Luebbers 2009). In contrast to previous studies, we argue that our cases demonstrate that ideology and identity alignment generate stagnation in movements in regard to openness towards new allies and new potential modes of interactions with the authorities. Of course we are not opposing that alliances require some degree of identity alignment or ideological similarities between the allies. However, an overly high degree of identity alignment and ideological consistency discourages formation of new alliances.

We would, furthermore, like to argue that the formation of alliances and cooperation is not always grounded on rational decisions, as in many cases already existing social relations play a pivotal role in selecting partners and allies. Corrigall-Brown and Meyer (2010) argue that personal networks of friends and acquaintances enhance participation and collaboration. We believe that the trust produced through pre-existing inter-personal and inter-organizational relations and the need for investments on both parts in trust building can be (to a great extent) overridden by relying on already existing relations and networks. At the same time non-participation can be costly to the individual or the organization in terms of time spent on building trust and production of social capital required for the cooperation.

Picture 3. Former Od:zysk squat in Poznań

Source: Dominika V. Polanska.

Conclusion

The two cases described show an increase in the vibrancy of tenants' movements and squatting in recent years. The Polish media, often skeptical towards squatters and anarchists, has recently showed a large interest in the tenants' and the squatters' case and often showed affinity for the campaigns. We show that the success of the activists is mainly caused by alliances with each other and depends on the efficient use of the emerging political opportunity structures, in particular the openness of the political system to activities and claims made by squatters and tenants. The alliances formed result in pressure on the authorities (local and, in the case of Warsaw squatters, also national), and are heavily dependent on mass media and the Internet, but also on demonstrations, campaigns, and other forms of direct action, such as eviction blockades or meeting-interruptions.

Not to be ignored is the fact that the location (peripheral-central) and the size of the two cities compared might play a role in the complexity of the activist scene. Warsaw is a far bigger city than Poznań and has, as we argue here, a more dynamic, but also unstable squatting scene. In Poznań, the number of potential allies for the tenants' movement is limited. There is also one squatting and one anarchist environment (that despite internal tensions and discussions is rather homogeneous), while in Warsaw, the picture is far more complex and dynamic. Not only are some squats not explicitly anarchist but there are also other radical leftist groups present in the environment that form potential allies. In Poznań, activists from the anarchist environment are often the only groups with the know-how and experience in organizing protests and campaigns, but in Warsaw the already existing tenants' organizations have some experience in this regard.

Nevertheless, the pressure of the alliances formed resulted in uneven political outcomes in the two cities. We argue that the position and stability of the squatters in the cities, the independence and influence of tenants' organizations in each city, but also the internal dynamics and divergence/convergence of interests and ideologies of squatters and tenants play an important role for which direction their alliances take.

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The individualization process – constructive or destructive for communal ties? Deliberations on Norbert Elias's ideas[2]

In this article I consider whether the process of individualization inescapably disturbs communal ties. This is an especially important question when we consider social changes in Central Europe 25 years after the political transformation My deliberation follows the main ideas of Norbert Elias, presented in *The society of individuals*. He argued that the development of human communities is heading towards integration on human-wide level community. The question is, how do communal ties change during this process in Central Europe.

Key words: Norbert Elias, individualization process, civic community, civic participation, communal ties

Introduction

Elias describes the process of civilizing as the shifting of social control from community to individuals. This internal control, as Elias has shown, led the West to economic success and building democracy, thanks to great openness for people from abroad. Nonetheless, modern societies (like USA and old Europe) suffer from the erosion of communal life. One can ask, what happens to an individual, if that individual cannot be a permanent member of one established local (regional) community?

For the purpose of this article I will use the concept of community in a wide sense – as every social grouping, of which members are aware of being a part. The disquisition will be based on Norbert Elias's essay 'Changes in the We-I Balance',

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the last part of the book *The society of individuals* which, in my opinion, is Elias's most important book. It serves a role in his scientific testament. My considerations are linked with other Elias's writings as well.

Protestant ethic and beyond

Elias is primarily known as the author of *The civilizing process* (Elias 1982). In this book he describes his concept of the civilizing process as a way by which people struggle with their natural impulses. These natural impulses seem to be a limitation of rational planning and acting with other rational actors. Therefore, natural impulses had to be excluded from the planned activity of every individual. These impulses are sublimated into acts of art, products of culture, religious enthusiasm, economic activity, etc.

Economic activity as a consequence of human restraint, based on religious discipline, had been described by Max Weber in his widely known book, *Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism* (Weber 1996). As a result of the civilizing process, a specific ethos of capitalism has been developed in a few countries of Western Europe, in early Modernity. Recognition of this ethos would not be possible without the development a class of people who became to be perceived as trustworthy. Simultaneously with this new ethos, a new kind of community has arisen: merchants and other 'men of business', a community which has no territorial boundaries boards and no support by state power, but in mutual trust.

In both *The civilizing process* and *The court society* (Elias 1986), Elias described the growth of another kind of community – the court society. Although it seems to be another world completely, an outcome was similar to Weberian capitalist ethos – the ethos of the courtesy has grown up. Birth of this ethos was possible because of establishing a class of people who were ready to recognize it – the class of people of the court. In both cases – early merchants and 'people of the court' – each individual perceived others as competitors. On the other hand, they recognized the same rules in their relationships (different in these two worlds) and they found each other as members of the same community. They named themselves noblemen, gentlemen, honourable men, etc. It was visible when two merchants or courtiers met each other among masses of the lower classes or during a journey. An honourable man was always ready to help other man of this 'community', without expectation of any profit. So protestant ethic as same as the court society were not only factors of individualization, but also factors of establishing communities in wider, cross-regional or cross-local meaning.

Individualization as a social process

What is no less important, Elias describes also the development of the concept of 'individual'. The sociological concepts of 'individual' are for Elias a great misunderstanding. Generally, he consequently attends to abolish a theoretical opposition between 'individual' and 'society' (Elias 1991: 156). According to him, this opposition came from the relatively late usage of these concepts in language. This usage led sociologists in the wrong direction. They presumed that an explanation of the relationship between 'individual' and 'society' is the first task of sociology. Elias consequently protested against this presumption (Elias 1991; 1994: 167–170).

Also interesting for us is the development of the concept of 'individual' in language as such. Changing the usage of the concepts is, for sociologists, also a way of describing the social process (Elias 1991: 158). What Elias shows in his article, is the absence of concept of 'individual' during many centuries of European history. In ancient languages there was no equivalent to this concept (Elias 1991: 157). A separate human being was being characterized by his/her relation to the community: merchant, soldier, nobleman, etc. The Greek term *idiotes* shows a negative thought of someone who prefers to live in separation from the public affairs of his state. The Latin term *persona* was related to the masks of actors, through which they spoke their words. It also referred to somebody specific, important, characteristic, like Julius Cesar, Brutus, but not any theoretical, anonymous person (Elias 1991: 158). Also in the Middle Ages, there was no concept of separate individual. However, scholastic philosophy, with its logical concept of *individuum* gives a new ground for establishing the concept of individual in the next centuries (Elias 1991: 160). Times of the Renaissance gave separate human beings a possibility to gain an enormous social prestige and power, which, in opposition to the Middle Ages, was not a consequence of the place in traditional social network, but primarily – individual courage and genius (Elias 1991: 161). Nevertheless, Elias writes, that first distinction between individual and collective actions was visible among English Puritans in the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth century, the concept of 'individual' began its enormous career, because it was needed for the language of many theoretical ideas, as well as of political and social movements (Elias 1991: 162).

Undoubtely, the concept of 'individual' developed simultaneously with Modernity in Western societies. Modernity brought a rapid growth of possibilities to contact people from separate communities. Firstly, this became possible due to the development of trade and colonialism; secondly – because of technological innovations enabling people to contact others beyond the same place and time. European modern history is a history of individualization of separate human beings.

Individualizing process is nothing else but relocating social control from the community into the human being itself. This internal control acquired by human beings caused increasing development of rational calculation skills connected with one's own actions. The rationalising attitude of human beings must have

caused the state, feature and general norms and ties from Medieval times to cease to be treated without reflection and gave way to rational, consciously calculated behaviours. As a result, capitalism was born, as described in Max Weber's book *Protestant Ethics and the spirit of capitalism.* For similar reason, court society, as described by Elias (Elias 1983), developed. However, not everybody agrees that progressing individualisation of human beings was an inevitable process in Europe. Modern society has such a character only because new relations between people were imposed by the free trade and the division of labour (Durkheim 1997). For Durkheim all organic communities are not an anachronism but rather a preferred by human beings form of social ties, namely organic solidarity. Paradoxically, it was capitalism and free market of commodities and services, which has brought it to existence.

Nonetheless, Elias seems not to be fully aware of the fact that the process of individualization brought not only internal personal conflicts and social disintegration, but also enabled to build social structures of a higher level. Creation of individuals enabled a development of social competence to contact people from other cultures. Individual personality, in this sense, was possible because of individual reflexivity, which were developing since Renaissance. Elias did not take into consideration how this process is continued in modern society. The most adequate description of this process has been made by one of the Elias's followers – Anthony Giddens. His concept of reflexive identity gives us theoretical explanations, why individualisation could be linked with a tendency to development of social movements on the global scale (Giddens 1991). In short, reaching an ability to reflexive creation of self, takes us away from our relatives, neighbours, local community, and leads us to meet people, who are doing similar personal choices, who are creating a similar self-indentity-package. People, who have chosen similar values and ways of lives.

Community, or society of individuals?

We can define community after Ferdinand Tönnies. Community (*Gemeinschaft*) as such is based on emotional bonds, and a feeling of belonging. In contrast, association (*Gesellschaft*) is based on formalised bonds with fairly weak emotions, where these bonds are created due to contract stipulations (Tönnies 1988).

When we think about a community, what comes to our mind is the notion of local community in a specific place on earth. It is no news that auto-identity of an individual primarily as a representative of a specific local community (village, town, wide-family, tribe, etc.) loses its relevance nowadays. Elias presents this issue as a gradual change in the 'We-I' relation. According to him, at present, the 'We-I' relation is occurring on many layers. As Elias puts it, we can talk about 'plurality of interlocking integration planes characteristic of human society at its present stage of development' (Elias 1991: 202). One hundred years ago, the word 'We' meant

the inhabitants of the same village or town, while now 'We' is used referring to the whole city, region, country, or, as we have already observed, to the union of states. We come across such utterances where 'We' is used in relation to the whole Europe.

Elias puts a strong emphasis on state's role as an association which can replace the lower level of grouping – communities of any kinds. States, as he puts it, 'have emerged all over the world as the highest ranking survival units' (Elias 1991: 206).

Elias claims that identification of the inhabitants with their state as 'We' was possible due to the fact that all social classes could be represented in government (the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries) and also due to both world wars (Elias 1991: 208). He argues that 'nation states, one can say, are born in wars and for wars'. As a result of such historical circumstances, a state for a Central-European inhabitant is the main survival unit, safety support in conflicts with others and in case of natural disasters. The floods striking Poland and Czech Republic during the last 2 decades also show that the addressee of claims from aggrieved parties is the state rather than any local or regional authority.

Nevertheless, before the states were created, people formed into various local communities. Elias writes quite extensively about specific human predispositions in creating relation but I would like to focus on an observation that human being, before becoming an individual (to himself and to others) had to function as a part of a whole. Human being perceived himself only as belonging to some 'We'.

Robert Putnam, in his book *Making democracy work*, indicates that democracy works better in such a place where well-rooted, based on shaped historical ethos communities function (Putnam 1993). Francis Fukuyama reaches similar conclusions (Fukuyama 1995), as well as Alexis de Tocqueville (Tocqueville 1954). In his book *Bowling alone*, Putnam shows his deep disappointment towards the decline of American community life. In 1975, almost three-quarters of American association members attended their community meetings at least once a year, while in 1999 the number of attendants dropped to one-third (Putnam 2000: 56–57). Towards the end of the 20th century, the number of active members of various associations fell to the level present before World War II in United States.

In the late 1970s, the term 'civil society' arose, which originally was used to describe independent social movements in Central Europe. Nevertheless, after communism collapsed in these countries, 'civil society' did not develop in such a way as its activists had predicted. Today the idea of civil society, or similar, Amitai Etzioni's idea of active society, stay in the sphere of ideas rather than as a characteristics of a typical society in Central Europe (Etzioni 1968). Examples are visible in present researches. In 2015 in Poland 19.4% inhabitants took part in any public meeting in last year, but in that year we had 2 elections. People grew in this activity in years of elections, but generally this form of communal activity decreases at least since 2003 (Czapiński, Panek 2015: 346). According to *European Social Survey*, in 2014 only 13% among Poles generally believes that most of people are worth of trust (see also Czapiński, Panek 2015: 352). Inhabitants of Central-Easter Europe generally are still on the latest stages of this comparison (except of Estonia).

Active membership in communal bodies in Poland is also on low level. An experience of taking part in any representative body during the whole life has 6.1% polish inhabitants (Czapiński, Panek 2015: 341). According to other research, 5.3% inhabitants have candidated at least once (in the whole life) in any elections to local authority (Peisert, Matczak 2012: 111).

The family as the smallest community

Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński divided the world of ordinary Pole to a public sphere and a private sphere. In the public sphere he is passive, amoral and withdrawn, when in the private he is active, vital, morally oriented and opened, helpful (Wnuk-Lipiński 1995). This corresponds with a known, typical strong position of family ties in East-Central Europe, in relation to the external, formal ties. It is obvious that the strongest emotional bonds are created on the basic level of human relations. 'The strength of the family ties had much to do with the very extensive function of the family or, as the case may be, clan, as a survival unit' (Elias 1991: 203). However, the nature of these bonds undergoes significant changes with time. Increasing position of a separate individual in relation to communities of every kind is visible also here. Changes which have taken place in the modern society have created a situation where family ceased to be an act of accepting certain responsibilities for the whole life, and rather has become a form of 'voluntary, revocable union' (Elias 1991: 204). As a result, families transformed from stable human communities into changeable with time formation. The internal norms of a traditional family have lost their power of contemporary principles and have started to be formed by partners according to their liking. Treating family as something permanent, given once for a lifetime and unchangeable, is giving place to treating it as a certain element of life, very serious, but competing with work, education, social life, passions, peers, etc. Also relations with children and their upbringing become an object of deeper reflection – more and more extended upbringing models are being sought. Traditional patriarchal model where the head of the family (most often the father) was the only breadwinner is replaced with democratization of family life and individualising family members. Home life, where the whole family spends afternoons, evenings and weekends on housework or just enjoys free time together, is becoming marginalised. After work life, social life, and leisure time happen outside home, without family. In this process, the 'I' acquires a bigger role, as Elias arguments 'the only person with whom one must live one's whole life' (Elias 1991: 204). This process speeded up in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe during the social transformation after 1989, what I can show in the example of Poland.

As the family ties are weakening in Poland, there are fewer people living in families. During the period 1970–2002, the number of marriages with children decreased, while the number of marriages without children and single-parent

families increased (Jóźwiak 2006: 61–62). In 1970, marriages with children constituted 66.8% of families, while in 2002 it was just 56%. The amount of one-man households rose at that time from 16.1% to 24.8%. In the 1988–2002 period, the average amount of children in a household fell from 1.87% to 1.78%.

As the family ties are weakening and the norms of family life are worsening there appears a threat of forming pathological ties. To prevent this from happening the governments are trying to regulate family relations. Children rights are protected more and more as constitutional laws, and legislation of some European countries create strong protection of a child against a parent, including a possibility of child's resignation from being brought up in their own family.

Weakening of family ties in Poland caused by the growing migration process is partially compensated thanks to new technologies, what is shown by the Polish research agency 'Pentor' (see Czarnota, Rudak 2007). The Internet and universality of multimedia phones allow communication to spread beyond 'here and now' in a much broader sense than earlier.

A dusk of *gemeinschaft*'s?

Individualization in Elias theory does not mean that a human being today needs communities less than in earlier centuries. In fact, Elias sees every individual in the context of community, group and society in which it exist. For Elias, sociology could not be possible if we agreed, that in some moment in the future a description of the society could be reduced to separate individuals. 'Individuals always come in configurations and configurations of individuals are irreducible' writes Elias (Elias 1965: 170).

Elias writes "communities and neighbourhoods are a specific type of configuration" (Elias 1965: 171). This figurational theory presumes a historical character of every configuration. It means that traditional, local community of neighbours was accurate in some time and place, and it could also be removed by some other kind of community (in a wider sense) as more appropriate to basic conditions of live.

Communities in the 'Network Society'

Parallel to the decline of traditional communities and the crisis of modern civil society, the Internet role is growing. Various studies conducted in Poland (e.g. Batorski, Marody and Nowak 2006) indicate more or less stronger communities which, using the Internet, are sometimes becoming a platform of strong group identification. Is this a beginning of a 'new civil society'? The activity of people who do not know each other in real world but meet on the websites dedicated to local community life is increasing. This Internet service shows that online meetings can lead to discussion about local community problems. Anna Przybylska,

who described some projects of increasing civil activity, transparency and accessibility of local authorities in Finland, argues that internet enabled reasonable change in the quality of the life of citizens (Przybylska 2006: 263).

The concept of 'network society' proposed by Castells is very often perceived as description of the society in the Internet era. However the nature of ties in this network still remains unclear. On the one hand, people sharing ideas like human rights, animals' rights, can gather together and act more effectively than earlier. On the other hand, the Internet is full of traps and the trust to people met via Internet still decreases. Systems of protecting privacy are rapidly developing. Policy of *facebook* and other network administrators tend to help users to exclude people unknown in real life. One can say, that people mostly use the Internet rather to maintain social ties than they look for new contacts.

I share Elias's opinion that "the emotional tinge of «We-identity» grows noticeably fainter in relation to post-national forms of integration (…). The function of the highest plane of integration, humanity, as a focus of human we-identity may be growing. But it is probably not an exaggeration to say that most people mankind as a frame of reference foe we-identity is a blank area on their emotional maps" (Elias 1991: 203). Elias names this problem 'drag effect'. It means that throughout generations human communities got used to and felt loyal towards their lower level community. When lower level human communities become a part of another community due to impetuous social processes (e.g. transition from tribal integration into national integration) then they function in such a way (Elias refers to it as 'social habitus') as if the main point of reference was We-identity of lower level (in this case, a tribe). This is even more visible in case of international relations. Meanwhile, the world's history during the last several dozen years has introduced more and more examples where, as Elias puts it "nation state units have in reality already relinquished their function as guarantors of the physical security of their citizens, and thus as survival units, to supra-state units" (Elias 1991: 218).

Elias describes the transition of identification from lower level communities to higher level communities as a linear process. However, it seems to be a simplification. New technologies can revive local communities functioning (Kajdanek 2014). New communication technologies are used not only by these individuals whose objective is to broaden their contacts, but also by those who want to strengthen the ties inside their group. Good evidence of this thesis is given by Marta Olcoń-Kubicka (Olcoń-Kubicka 2006), who describes polish blogs. There is no reason to limit her outcomes to the Poles. According to her, bloggers form groups which in most cases can be considered as Tönniesian *Gemeinschaft*'s. Referring to a book of Maffesoli *La temps des tribes* she argues, that bloggers can be considered as members of postmodern tribes. Thanks to the internet, they form relationships covering trust, feelings and honesty. Olcoń-Kubicka assumes, that these individualized persons who make (in some extend) real communities, and, finally, can join the modern independence with emotional engagement and mutual trust (Olcoń-Kubicka 2006: 159). The Internet can also enable some people to form active groups of extremists

of every kinds who would be only interested in supporting their own communities to realize their own particular goals and to exclude others.

Conclusions

My criticism also targets Elias's exaggerated emphasis on identification with national state which might be caused by his own painful experiences (Elias 1978, 13–16). Such identification is characteristic for these countries which have had their own, native, modern absolute monarchy, like France, Sweden, and Prussia. The development process of this identification is described by Elias in his book. We can, however, distinguish quite a big group of European societies whose representatives identify with national state no more than these smaller communities. Going further, it seems that Polish society see the state as external oppressive force rather than main survival unit.

Traditional Polish culture is deeply connected with land and locality. In general, late-industrialized Polish society could be still considered as an unconnected aggregate of local communities (Gellner 2006: 10). Consequently, Polish culture contains numerous elements typical for agrarian cultures, present until today in many poor regions of the world (Scott 1976). Their typical moral values and the most important factors affects duration of their social networks. Another factor of the social structure is *amoral familism* (Banfiled 1958).

Nevertheless, it is difficult to find arguments which will reject Elias's hypothesis which states that the development of human communities is heading towards integration on human-wide level community. The idea of such community appeared in the Enlightenment as the world superpower organization or world government whose institutional remains we can observe in the form of UN. Many times, however, this idea was thwarted due to various crises (wars, totalitarian ideologies, etc.) but always was rebirthing again. This perspective – considering every social formation as a historical, never ending process rather than stable structure – was one of the main postulates of Elias.

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Concepts of capital in Pierre Bourdieu's theory

According to Bourdieu, there are various forms of capital. It is with this contribution that he is most commonly identified. Yet, the aim of this paper a is to show that the Bourdieusian framework brought about (or created) more harm than actual good. Paradoxically, whilst Bourdieu is commonly regarded as a culturalist, his approach is grounded in economism or economic imperialism[2]. This squeezing of the extra-economic phenomena into an economic straightjacket, leads necessarily to the latter, i.e. the concept of capital being over-stretched. In turn, the notion of cultural capital suffers from crude physicalism and under-specification.

Key words: Bourdieu, cultural capital, habitus, field, power, ownership, economism

Introduction

The hallmark of French theory is undoubtedly worthy of critical attention. To make this task feasible, the paper focuses not on the secondary literature, but on Bourdieu's work itself. Thus, the purpose is an analysis of the original source material, rather than to review the commentaries advanced by other scholars. What follows, is an examinartion of how the various conceptions of 'capital' stand up to analytical scrutiny. Furthermore, the outcome of this examination has even broader relevance as it demonstrates hoe Bourdieu is the most prolific exponent of an entire trend, much of which is currently in vogue in social science. It would be difficult to indicate a field of inquiry in which this or that unorthodox, extra-economic concept of capital has not been employed as a research tool.

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[2] Still, the present author is not alone in seeing that aspect to Bourdieu's approach; Sulkunen (1982: 108) describes as "«naive economism» applying a concept of capital (understood as a formal model of capitalist economy) by analogy to any area of social interaction".

The social world is accumulated history, and if it is not to be reduced to a discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibria between agents who are treated as interchangeable particles, one must reintroduce into it the notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its effects. Capital is accumulated labour (in its materialized form or its «incorporated», embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labour, i.e., the set of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which govern its functioning in a durable way, determining the chances of success for practices (Bourdieu 1986).

The passage cited above is in some way a strange animal, since it appears to be an orthodox exposition of historical materialism, yet on closer inspection, not quite. One cannot object to the French theorist's historical approach but, the most telling thing here is, that he does not follow through with it. It is namely inconsistent with viewing capital as an explanatory link that historicity. It is all the more odd that Bourdieu invokes the notion of private property, which is an essential precondition of capital's existence. How then can the presence of capital be accounted for in the whole span of human history without private property? On the other hand, the existence of private property relations is not a sufficient condition of capital, especially when we keep in mind we are talking about economic capital. Thus, even this short passage is not free of contradictions, a historicity that contrasts with the author's declarations, being but one example. The same criticism is also made by Shapiro (2009) who writes of Bourdieu that "his entire analytic corpus is a transhistorical one that is applied as equally to non-, pre-, or weakly capitalist societies as to capitalist ones. By refusing to considerhow the modernity of capitalist appropriation and reconfiguration of extramural formations fundamentally alter these preexisting spheres, Bourdieu grants himself the liberty for an evidentiary transitivity that moves from an anthropological study of the relatively «premodern» Kabyle of colonial Algeria to commentary on twentieth-century French society, shaped by its membership within the core of capitalist nation-states, as if the introduction of (imperialist) capitalism is irrelevant for customs of social stratification, lineage, and incorporation within adulthood".

We might give the French thinker the benefit of the doubt, and examine whether the other forms of capital suggest a solution to these problems.

Be that as it may, Bourdieu's programmatic proposition is astonishing: "the structure of the distribution of the different types and subtypes of capital at any given moment in time represents the immanent structure of the social world, i.e., the set of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which govern its functioning in a durable way, determining the chances of success for practices" (Bourdieu 1996).

This is an extreme form of reductionism and essentialism. Behind all appearances, there lies a deeper structure of the social world. If we were to base this on the above claim alone, the entire social order of life would be reducible to a variety

of capitals, and because of their diversity this particular series of capitals represent one and the same phenomenon, and so the social order of life is driven by the single logic of capital, or perhaps Capital. Ironically, given Bourdieu's left-wing convictions, this approach represents a praiseworthy nonpartisanship, or, if you will, perverseness.

It is also contradictory that Bourdieu's definition of capital is "accumulated, human labour" which can potentially produce different forms of profits (1986: 241). The first part of this particular definition draws upon the standard Marxian approach, and it is only in the second part of the definition that may subtly propose (or put forward) a different perspective, in that it uses the phrase of "different forms of profit".

Bourdieu further develops his aforementioned theorem stating that "It is in fact impossible to account for the structure and functioning of the social world unless one reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solely in the one form recognised by economic theory" (Bourdieu 1996).

This claim may present the reader with a clue that is forthcoming, but what really catches (or cementsm – this is more definite) their attention is another simplification, and this time it is related to what Bourdieu refers to as "economic theory", which supposedly entertains one unified concept of capital. This, needless to say, is far from the truth.

The misunderstanding of such an initial premise of the theory of various capitals does not bode well for the latter. Indeed, further claims put forth by the French sociologist are just as contradictory and convoluted as those already cited.

Economic theory has allowed itself to be foisted upon a definition of the economy of practices, which is the historical invention of capitalism, and thus, by reducing the universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange, which is objectively and subjectively oriented toward the maximization of profit, i.e., (economically) self-interested, it has implicitly defined other forms of exchange as noneconomic, and therefore as a result it has become disinterested.

In particular, it defines as disinterested those forms of exchange which ensure the transubstantiation in which the most material types of capital, such as those which are economic in the restricted sense, can present themselves in the immaterial form of cultural capital or social capital and vice versa (…).

In other words, the constitution of a science of mercantile relationships which, inasmuch as it takes for granted the very foundations of the order it claims to analyse – private property, profit, wage labour, etc. – is not even a science of the field of economic production, prevented the constitution of general science of the economy of practices, which would treat mercantile exchange as a particular case of exchange in all its forms (Bourdieu, Darbel 1966).

Having thus introduced two key capital terms, Bourdieu goes on to attack economics for, symptomatically, its economism:

> It is remarkable that the practices and assets thus salvaged from the 'icy water of egotistical calculation' (and from science) are the virtual monopoly of the dominant class – as if economism had been able to reduce everything to economics only because the reduction on which that discipline is based protects from sacrilegious reduction everything which needs to be protected. If economics deals only with practices that have narrowly economic interest as their principle and only with goods that are directly and immediately convertible into money (which makes them quantifiable), then the universe of bourgeois production and exchange becomes an exception and can see itself and present itself as a realm of disinterestedness. As everyone knows, priceless things have their price, and the extreme difficulty of converting certain practices and certain objects into money is only due to the fact that this conversion is refused in the very intention that produces them, which is nothing other than the denial (Verneinung) of the economy. A general science of the economy of practices, capable of reappropriating the totality of the practices which, although objectively economic, are not and cannot be socially recognised as economic, and which can be performed only at the cost of a whole labour of dissimulation or, more precisely, euphemization, must endeavor to grasp capital and profit in all their forms and to establish the laws whereby the different types of capital (or power, which amounts to the same thing) change into one another.
>
> (Bourdieu, Darbel 1966)

Field of economics

Bourdieu was even more of an anthropologist than a sociologist, which makes one wonder how he could overlook a well-known concept from his fellow anthropologist, and as expanded upon by many others, i.e. Karl Polanyi, who distinguished between substantive and formal understanding of economics. According to this distinction, only economics in the second sense restricts itself to the logical and historical bounds of the market economy, whereas the same discipline in its substantive guise goes beyond the logic of profit and monetary exchange[3]. This is not the only instance in which Bourdieu makes his task easier by constructing a straw man with whom, the fight becomes far simpler than with a real opponent. It follows that the real boundary between the economic and non-economic lies elsewhere than one as delineated by the French scholar, and, by extension, his charge of economism may or may be not true depending on which economics he is referring to[4]. Paradoxically, the aforementioned charge applies, however, to his own

[3] This gap is the more incomprehensible that in another context Bourdieu implicitly and partially at least refers to the above-mentioned distinction; he distinguishes between "archaic" economies, whose function is to limit and hide the callous brutality of economic interests, versus a capitalist economy, which allows room for "the clear, economic (i.e. economical) concepts of the undisguised self-interest economy" (Bourdieu 1977: 172).

[4] How important is this kind of specification is evidenced by, inter alia, the following claim by one of his numerous enthusiasts who contends that "it ispossible to convert one form of capital into another. This entails a conceptual break with the economism of Marx and the classical economists"

project, "a general science of the economy of practices, capable of reappropriating the totality of the practices which, although objectively economic, are not and cannot be socially recognised as economic" (Bourdieu, Darbel 1966). His initial move along this route is ostensibly a laughable stratagem, whereby he conveniently glosses over the fact that the economism he ostensibly rejects is made possible only by his own shameful practice of castrating the alternative, or considered by him as such, provides a convenient starting point for his own concept, whose justification, however, smacks of the very reductionism of which he is so fond of accusing his rivals. His analysis would not restrict itself to actions which can be capitalised in what Marx terms "callous cash payment" (Bourdieu 1977: 177), but must encompass also those actions as marked by an apparent disinterestedness, behind which people seek to camouflage the economic drives which lie behind their efforts to acquire capital. As noted above, for Bourdieu, all forms of capital can always be converted into economic capital, which is made possible by "a conceptual break with" the economics' practice of "artificially isolating an economical economy from a cultural economy" (Bourdieu 1990b: 113, Lash 1993).

Before tracking (analysing?) the above-mentioned "reappropriation", let us then draw the reader's attention to other contradictions and ambiguities present in the above-cited statement. Bourdieu states that economic theory "defines as disinterested those forms of exchange which ensure the transubstantiation whereby the most material types of capital – those which are economic in the restricted sense – can present themselves in the immaterial form of cultural capital or social capital and vice versa. Interest, in the restricted sense it is given in economic theory, cannot be produced without producing its negative counterpart, disinterestedness. The class of practices whose explicit purpose is to maximize monetary profit cannot be defined as such without producing the purposeless finality of cultural or artistic practices and their products; the world of bourgeois man, with his double-entry accounting, cannot be invented without producing the pure, perfect universe of the artist and the intellectual and the gratuitous activities of art-for-art's sake and pure theory" (Bourdieu 1996).

The Bourdesian understanding of the notion of ownership

Bourdieu is not the only theoretical "capitalist" to have used a flawed notion of property. It is remarkable that the theorist who wrote about private property can oppose it to the "gratuitous" reigning culture and pure science. In actual fact, what is treated by Bourdieu as non-economic and non-property, constitutes the very substance of economic ownership. The benefits inherent in the ownership

(Svendson). The aforementioned follower of his French idol explains that Bourdieu's alternative is to depart from such a substantialism and materialism by localising the economic forces behind all human actions, without necessarily seeing these as derived from naked self-interest, as the economists would have it (Bourdieu 1977: 17–8, Snook 1990: 169).

of the factors of economic activity are always, somewhat, to a lesser or larger extent, gratuitous[5].

One can see that having established the presence of such an erroneous discrepancy therefore pushes the theorist to the aforementioned reclaiming of the non-economic sphere of the social order of life (perhaps I am wrong to correct social life, if so please ignore it) by his own theory which, as he announced, would use economic concepts and yet would in itself not be economistic or economic "in the restricted sense".

There are iderntifying signature clues as to how this economic, and yet somehow at the same time, not economic theory, can be gauged from another startling definition by Bourdieu, only this time he equates capital with power. Of course, all hinges upon how the latter is understood, but even if Bourdieu implicitly adopts a broad notion of power, the political kind must figure prominently in any such definition, which means that, contrary to his aims, Bourdieu indulges in yet another form of reductionism, or, looking at this from another angle, imperialism.

Of course, the culprit of what is clearly a convoulted mess, would certainly reject such an accusation almost out of hand. Does not, after all, his conception of a variety of capitals respect their qualitative distinctiveness?

Depending on the field in which it functions, and at the cost of the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the forms of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the forms of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations ("connections"), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the forms of a title of nobility (Bourdieu 1996: 243).

The answer to the above, an ostensibly rhetoric question is, no. Take into account the analysis so far, that there is only one real substance of social reality, which is capital that can appear in a number of guises, and which does not, however, disturb this ultimate underlying unity.

Bourdieu, to be sure, did not maintain that between economic and cultural capital there are no differences at all. However, in his view they boil down to different modes of legitimation pertaining to the two respective dimensions of inequality. In the case of cultural capital, despite the fact that cultural capital is acquired in the home and the school via exposure to a given set of cultural practices, and therefore has a social origin, it is liable to be perceived as inborn "talent", and its holder "gifted", as a result of the fact that it is embodied in particular individu-

[5] As convincingly argued by the "rent theory of ownership" (Tittenbrun 2011; 2012), where the distinction between the concept of rent as conceived under socio-economic structuralism, as the author's theoretical framework has been dubbed, and the notion of economic rent known from conventional economic theory is also elucidated.

als. Moreover, because the school system transforms "inherited" cultural capital into "scholastic" cultural capital, the latter is predisposed to appear as an individual "achievement". For example, researchers have demonstrated that what they conventionally classify as middle-class parents typically talk more to infants and young children than do working-class or poor parents. As a result, middle-class children often have larger vocabularies when they enter school, and subsequently score more highly on standardized tests measuring verbal skills (Hart, Risley 1999; Lareau 2003). "Nevertheless, teachers, parents, and students themselves are likely to interpret the differences in test scores as a matter of natural talent or individual effort" (Lareau, Weininger 2003).

Pertinent as those observations are, they do not capture the unique features of the cultural, as distinct from the economic inequalities. As previously shown, one powerful set of class ideologies and rationalisations are at work to disguise the real socio-economic source of the disparities concerned, and among those, incidentally, the individualistic myths of self-made men are, and have long been salient in capitalism's economic life, notably in its stockholder, of the Anglo-Saxon variety.

An important source of all this confusion, and at the same time being a further misnomer which induitably hides behind the construct under consideration, is revealed in the following statement: "Cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu, Passeron 1977) includes culture-based factors and indicators of symbolic wealth that help define a person's class" (Wells 2008). What we have in mind is the term "symbolic wealth". Symbolic or not, wealth is closely related to property, as is, on its side, also the following statement "cultural «habits and dispositions» comprise a resource capable of generating «profits»; they are potentially subject to monopolization by individuals and groups; and, under appropriate conditions, they can be transmitted from one generation to the next" (Lareau, Weininger 2003).

And there lies the rub. It is arguable that social differentiation in the non-economic realm is grounded in non-economic property relations[6]. This suggests that the inclusion of class in the above-mentioned particular context, is ill-conceived, since although according to our approach, classes may be involved in certain non-economic property relations, it is economic ownership that determines their location in the structure of societal differentiation.

Cultural capital – a critical evaluation

The second point as suggested by the above-cited statement is that, in a sense, but quite different from the one conceived of by Bourdieu, is his pointing to the economic origin of his multiple concepts being correct, and namely, that his "capitals" refer to the various forms of property, only including non-economic property connections (as, inter alia, Weber's notion of social estate-commonly mistrans-

[6] Cf. (Tittenbrun 2011; 2012).

lated as "status group" – suggests). Educational qualifications are of course part and parcel of the ownership of labour power, and in connection with economic capital, Bourdieu himself mentions the concept of property rights. In addition, the terms such as "institutionalisation", "title", "rights" are suggestive of the legal view of property, which is untenable to the extent that there exists a yawning chasm between jurisprudence and dogmatic (as Weber referred to such formal disciplines) sciences in general, and and empirical sciences, including social science, on the other.

Even at this present stage of analysis we are in position to pin down the essential property of Bourdiu's theory of capitals, which is that his capital concepts do not bring anything new in the way of information on the social world, they merely replicate the content of other pre-existing concepts. The same applies to the Bourdesian extension of the cultural capital concept.

Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace or realisation of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.; and in the institutionalised state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee (Bourdieu 1996: 243).

In developing the notion under consideration, Bourdieu's starting point was his inquiry into the causes of the discrepancies in educational attainment shown by different social classes in France in the 1960s. For Bourdieu, the gap in access to economic capital had not been able to account for, adequately speaking, the educational disparities present there. Instead, the French sociologist proposed that, above and beyond economic factors, two other forms of capital – cultural capital and social capital – should be held o responsible for the reproduction of class privilege.

Cultural capital embodied

Within cultural capital Bourdieu (1986: 243) focuses on "physical capital" as consisting in "long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body" that carry with them particular social and cultural meanings that set parameters for individual action and serve to reproduce and legitimize structures of inequality. When class inequality is conceptualized in this way, the differences that establish the broadly defined categories of upper, middle, and lower class are more than just differences in access to material, cultural, and social resources. Instead, they are differences that are actually embodied. In other words, class inequality can find expression in embodied ways, such as physical appearance, pronunciation, stride, style, posture, Body language, diet, handwriting, and so on. For Bourdieu, then, the body itself is

a marker of social class, as particular embodied properties exist as a consequence of specific class practices. In Bourdieu's view, for the body to be recognized as a "marker" of class, some bodily properties must have attached to them more (or less) symbolic value than others. These different "valuations" attached to the size, shape, and appearance of the body mean that individuals possessing particular valued bodily traits are more able to "exchange" these physical properties for other valued resources. In this way, Bourdieu views the corporeal as a form of currency that results in the unequal accumulation of material resources and, by extension, an important contributor to class inequality (Perks 2012).

There are several problems with the conception laid out above. Firstly, it assumes a peculiar concept of the physical where both the body and mind are recognised at par as physical objects. This is all the more odd that Bourdieu points also to the symbolic nature of what he defines as cultural capital. To consider human consciousness as nothing more than as a set of energetic, at the end of the day material impulses of the brain is to indulge in a form of crude, naive materialism. This kind of vulgar materialism turns out to be infectious at that, as evidenced by the following statement by one of Bourdieu's followers: "the direct producers of the work in its materiality (artist, writer, etc.)" (Gracey 2002). Naturally, the fact that a painting, or a book appears in a material guise does by any means entail that the cultural objects in question are material, not ideal objects. For what matters in their case, the reason why a particular painting, or a poem are admired, is not their material form, but, conversely – ideal content. While indulging in this crude materialism or physicalism Bourdieu subscribes to the long tradition of French philosophy: consider, e.g., La Mettrie, this, needless to say constitute no justification for adopting this by no means just antiquarian doctrine – as it has been apparently galvanised by successes of neurology, and at an another plane, genetics in recent years. This assessment of the Bourdieusian notion, of course, calls into question its interpretation as one which "represents the social-structural change from materialism to postmaterialism"[7] (Kim, Kim 2008), which claim becomes less surprising given the same authors' subsumption of even environment into "the mental sphere rather than the physical one". Besides, the definition referring to dispositions, etc. overlaps, to a degree that it becomes indistinguishable from, another Bourdieu's notion of habitus[8]; after all, habitus is often defined as dispositions that are inculcated in the family but manifest themselves in different ways in

[7] This claim, false as it is, suggest that an important reason for popularity of Bourdieu's notion (which, as is argued in the book, is not supported by its analytical quality) may be paradoxically, considering Bourdieu's background – its appeal for anti-Marxists, who are always fishing for new arguments. The authors in question (Kim, Kim 2008) use the concept in question to seemingly refute what they consider the Marxist view on the relationship of base and superstructure: "cultural capital, a byproduct of superstructure to some extent, contributes to reproducing the production relation and also to determining or continuing the unequal structure in capitalist societies".

[8] The relevance of habitus as regards Bourdieu's forms of capital is, at least according to some of his keen followers, far broader inasmuch as financial, social, human and cultural capital "each are consistently related to, and clearly shaped by, each individual's habitus" (Salisbury *et al.*).

each individual (Snook 1990: 10). Moreover, there is yet another term overlapping the above-mentioned one. What Bourdieu (1986) terms "embodied cultural capital" is tightly linked to the dispositions of the habitus, and Bourdieu describes it as a "corporeal hexis", a "style of expression" (1986: 56), "a durable way of standing, speaking, walking" (1990b: 70).

Last but not least, the Bourdieusian conception is in fact a misconception in that, its terminology notwithstanding it does not refer to any social classes whatsoever, and the tripartite hierarchy it speaks of is typical of conceiving social differentiation in terms of stratification, which, although it often uses class terms, is a theoretical framework alternative to that of social class.

Cultural capital and socio-economic structuralism

Regarding specifically the central notion under consideration, it is our contention that a much better conceptualisation of the above-mentioned problematics is provided by our general theory of society, i.e. socio-economic structuralism. Within the said framework society at large is conceived of as a system of four structures. One of these is the ideational structure whose products are to be sought amongst Bourdieu's cultural goods.

To describe analytically given objects we do not need any "capital"; any – "culture". The latter concept is commonly taken for granted, but its raison d'etre in sociology is nothing but self-evident. Cultural anthropology and cultural studies another matter, and without it those disciplines would lose their subject, but in sociology, and in other social science disciplines, the concept does more harm than good, owing to its inclusiveness and fuzziness. Essentially, culture in an anthropological sense i.e. all human phenomena that are not purely results of human genetics, or the totality of patterns of human behaviour and its products borders on the concept of society, its usefulness, or, rather, harmfulness is thus equal to that of "capital" understood in an inclusive, Bourdesian sense. What is for the French scholar the prime example of cultural goods, e.e. tools and machines shall be regarded as such because they are indeed artifacts. In another context Bourdieu defines "cultural goods" as "paintings, monuments, machines, and any objects shaped by man" (Bourdieu 1996: 255).

What may be adequate for an anthropologist is, however, too general from the sociological point of view for which the former objects are to be considered as components of the economic structure of society, and lumping them together with the aformentioned monuments as being man-made is utterly useless from the standpoint of social theory.

The following account is of some interest as it shows his eagerness to enter the contest with human capital theory that claims an explanatory power in the same regard:

> The notion of cultural capital initially presented itself to me, in the course of research, as a theoretical hypothesis which made it possible to explain the unequal scholastic achievement of children originating from the different social classes by relating academic success, i.e., the specific profits which children from the different classes and class fractions can obtain in the academic market, to the distribution of cultural capital between the classes and class fractions.
>
> (Bourdieu 1996: 243)

This autobiographical confession is indeed useful in that it reveals the lengths to which Bourdieu will use linguistic tricks to justify his central idea. He first introduces the concept of profit with which, logically, the notion of capital as its underlying cause is associated. The trouble is, the premise of this reasoning is misplaced. Why should educational attainment be dubbed "profit"? One could use other terms such as advantages or benefits as well, in which case the connection with capital would be, however, not that apparent. The proof of the alleged relationship is accomplished through verbal manipulation only, that is, ironically, through the use of linguistic symbols, those exemplary cultural objects.

The French theorist draws on the jargon of the stock exchange whose agents espouse the policy of asset diversification, risk minimisation and gaining maximimisation, the effect of which is an array of false analogies: "the dominant fractions (…) tend to place ever greater emphasis on educational investment, within an overall strategy of asset diversification and of investments aimed at combining security with high yield" (Bourdieu 1996: 240).

As far as the aformentioned competition is concerned, Bourdieu is aware of whom he considers his chief rival, and launches an attack on human capital theory.

Scholastic investment as monetary investment

Their measurement of the yield from scholastic investment takes account only of monetary investments and profits, or those directly convertible into money, such as the costs of schooling and the cash equivalent of time devoted to study. They are unable to explain the different proportions of their resources which different agents or different social classes allocate to economic investment and cultural investment because they fail to take systematic account of the structure of the differential chances of profit which the various markets offer these agents or classes as a function of the volume and the composition of their assets (see esp. Becker 1964).

Furthermore, because they neglect to relate scholastic investment strategies to the whole set of educational strategies and to the system of reproduction strategies, they inevitably, by a necessary paradox, let slip the best hidden and socially most determinant educational investment, namely, the domestic transmission of cultural capital. Their studies of the relationship between academic ability and academic investment show that they are unaware that ability or talent is itself the product of an investment of time and cultural capital (Becker 1964: 63–66). Not

surprisingly, when endeavoring to evaluate the profits of scholastic investment, they can only consider the profitability of educational expenditure for society as a whole, the "social rate of return", or the "social gain of education as measured by its effects on national productivity" (Becker 1964: 121, 155). This typically functionalist definition of the functions of education ignores the contribution which the educational system makes to the reproduction of the social structure by sanctioning the hereditary transmission of cultural capital. From the very beginning, a definition of human capital, despite its humanistic connotations, does not move beyond economism and ignores, inter alia, the fact that the scholastic yield from educational action depends on the cultural capital previously invested by the family. Moreover, the economic and social yield of the educational qualification depends on the social capital, again inherited, which can be used to back it up (Bourdieu 1996: 244).

As in many other cases, what is striking by its absence in the above argument is a reference to ownership, and in particular, Bourdieu fails to perceive family as a unit based on common property from which definite consequences follow his theory of different capitals.

The same considerations apply thus, inter alia, to his deliberations on social capital where commensalism is such a phenomenon which is crying out for an interpretation in terms of common ownership: "Exchange transforms the things exchanged into signs of recognition and, through the mutual recognition and the recognition of group membership which it implies, reproduces the group. By the same token, it reaffirms the limits of the group, i.e., the limits beyond which the constitutive exchange – trade, commensality, or marriage – cannot take place" (Bourdieu 1996: 250).

As far as the above-mentioned critique of human capital theory is concerned, it is in point of fact not fair in that human capital theory is perfectly capable of capturing something other than the purely financial benefits of education. This does not alter the fact that the key criticism indicting the theory concerned with disregarding class relations is sound. The trouble is that this criticism by no means necessitates the use of such notions as cultural or social capital. Bourdieu takes this relationship for granted, and in doing so reveals his arrogance, if not his insolence. An eristic approach cannot substitute solid argument, and in fact, it only adds to the confusion in that it disallows the application of precise categories of property theory, thus replacing them with void categories of capitals which obscure the former, inter alia, making the differentiation of the private and personal impossible. Certain objects considered by the French sociologist as part of cultural capital may function as private property, e.g. marketable works of art. Others, however, constitute personal property in that the sole function is the satisfaction of the esthetic, and intellectual needs of their possessor. Bourdieu' comments on the next form of his cultural capital betray the same ignorance of ownership theory.

Embodied capital, external wealth converted into an integral part of the person, into a habitus, cannot be transmitted instantaneously (unlike money, prop-

erty rights, or even titles of nobility) by gift or bequest, purchase or exchange. It follows that the use or exploitation of cultural capital presents particular problems for the holders of economic or political capital, whether they be private patrons or, at the other extreme, entrepreneurs employing executives endowed with a specific cultural competence (not to mention the new state patrons). How can this capital, so closely linked to the person, be bought without buying the person and so losing the very effect of legitimation which presupposes the dissimulation of dependence (Bourdieu 1996: 245)?

Whilst for Bourdieu the aforementioned question poses a difficult problem, from the standpoint of socio-economic structuralism it is rather easy to answer. Owners of real, as distinct from cultural, social, political or whatever form of capital can rent the labour power of given to individuals without buying them in person, which, by the way, is impossible in the civilised world. Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital, though, this self-created puzzle, must remain without a solution. Bourdieu adds that "Cultural capital can be acquired, to a varying extent, depending on the period, the society, and the social class, in the absence of any deliberate inculcation, and therefore quite unconsciously. It always remains marked by its earliest conditions of acquisition which, through the more or less visible marks they leave (such as the pronunciations characteristic of a class or region) which is true enough, the only awkward question remaining: why language should be termed capital? Given the preponderatnt mass of social actions involves the use of language, it follows that, apart from the span whereby one learns his or her language, and obvious periods of sleep, etc. the whole social life is infused with capital. This is no small intellectual feat, but its benefits appear limited, not to say confusing" (Bourdieu 1996: 245).

Furthermore, Bourdieu's statements tend to aggravate this confusion, s linked in numerous ways to the person in his biological singularity, and is subject to a hereditary transmission, which is always heavily disguised, or even invisible, it defies the old, deep-rooted distinction the Greek jurists made between inherited properties (ta patroa) and acquired properties (epikteta), i.e., those which an individual adds to his heritage. It thus manages to combine the prestige of innate property with the merits of acquisition. And since the social conditions of its transmission and acquisition are more disguised than those of economic capital, it is predisposed to function as symbolic capital, i.e., to be unrecognised as capital, and recognised as legitimate competence, as an authority exerting an effect of (mis)recognition, e.g., in the matrimonial market and in all the markets in which economic capital is not fully recognised, whether in matters of culture, with the great art collections or great cultural foundations, or in social welfare, with the economy of generosity and the gift. Furthermore, the specifically symbolic logic of distinction additionally secures material and symbolic profits for the possessors of a large cultural capital: any given cultural competence (e.g., being able to read in a world of illiterates) derives a scarcity value from its position in the distribution of cultural capital and yields profits of distinction for its owner. In other

words, the share in profits which scarce cultural capital secures in class-divided societies is based, in the last analysis, on the fact that all agents do not have the economic and cultural means for prolonging their children's education beyond the minimum necessary for the reproduction of the labour-power least valorized at a given moment (Bourdieu 1996: 245).

Here Bourdieu claims innovation in the property theory, whereas his own conceptualisations have in fact the opposite effect, obscuring rather than contributing new useful distinctions. The above-quoted passage adds insult to injury, in that it reveals that the French scholar is perfectly aware and capable of using the concept of labour power whose relationship to ownership and capital, unlike other terms in his repertoire, remains conveniently obscure to him.

Going further, we are presented with the continuation of spurious analogies with economic relations: the capital, in the sense of the means of appropriating the product of accumulated labour in the objectified state which is held by a given agent, depends for its real efficacy on the form of the distribution of the means of appropriating the accumulated and objectively available resources; and the relationship of appropriation between an agent and the resources objectively available, and hence the profits they produce, is mediated by the relationship of (objective and/or subjective) competition between himself and the other possessors of capital competing for the same goods, in which scarcity – and through it social value – is generated (Bourdieu 1996: 246).

The use of such terms as "means of appropriation" is meant to legimitise the economic analogy (with the means of production), but in actual fact it has the exactl opposite effect since it highlights the divergence between the two. The reference to the notion of value in connection with cultural capital does not do the trick either. Bourdieu ignores the difference between reproducible goods to which both Ricardian and Marxian theory of value applies, and unique objects such as works of art whose price is determined by quite different mechanisms, and which cannot be couched in terms of accumulated labour.

Meanwhile, for Bourdieu, the economic theory of value applies, in that as in all others, such as his terminology, and within his field, each is being reigned in by a different type of capital: "The universal equivalent, the measure of all equivalences, is nothing other than labour-time (in the widest sense); and the conservation of social energy through all its conversions is verified if, in each case, one takes into account both the labour-time accumulated in the form of capital and the labour-time needed to transform it from one type into another" (Bourdieu 1996: 253).

The next pronouncement simply corrorobates previous considerations:

> The structure of the field, i.e., the unequal distribution of capital, is the source of the specific effects of capital, i.e., the appropriation of profits and the power to impose the laws of functioning of the field most favourable to capital and its reproduction. But the most powerful principle of the symbolic efficacy of cultural capital

> no doubt lies in the logic of its transmission. On the one hand, the process of appropriating objectified cultural capital and the time necessary for it to take place mainly depend on the cultural capital embodied in the whole family.
>
> (Bourdieu 1996: 246)

Structures versus fields

Considering that within Bourdieusian social theory the concept of structure as a building block of society is replaced by the notion of field, its cultural variety proves to be determined by what is translated into another language, with which the French theorist is barely familiar, i.e. property relations. The notion of non-economic property, however, should be applied to specific relations only[9], which are to be distinguished from economic (private or personal) property. By contrast, it is unknown what, if any, ownership implications pertain to "Manners (bearing, pronunciation, etc.) [which] may be included in social capital" (Bourdieu 1996: 255).

Contrary to what it seems, it appears to Bourdieu that[10] science is not magic in which putting a spell on an object can effect in its transsubstantiation and corresponding renaming. because in the real social order of life property is property is property, and capital is capital is capital, to borrow, with something of difference, Gertrude Stein's famous saying.

The cultural capital objectified in material objects and media, such as writings, paintings, monuments, instruments, etc., is transmissible in its materiality. A collection of paintings, for example, can be transmitted as well as economic capital (if not better, because the capital transfer is more disguised). But what is transmissible is legal ownership and not (or not necessarily) what constitutes the precondition for specific appropriation, namely, the possession of the means of "consuming" a painting or using a machine, which, being nothing other than embodied capital, are subject to the same laws of transmission (Bourdieu 1996: 247).

Again, the existence of "the same laws" governing the economic and cultural field, to use Bourdieu's own terms, is his wishful thinking. The French writer in fact goes a long way towards blurring the distinction between the two, which only compounds confusion. A case of transfer of a work of art or other "cultural object", or piece of "cultural capital" may mean very different things socio-economically. Selling a painting for profit is worlds apart from giving it as a gift to one's niece, and still different from bequeathing it to public museum/use. In Bourdieu's night all cats are, however, grey, as the Polish saying goes. And treating machines on

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[9] In the current state of the theory, there are around twenty such relations, which are listed in (Tittenbrun 2011; 2012).

[10] "But «glory» doesn't mean «a nice knock-down argument»", Alice objected. In this sense the French thinker is not unlike Lewis Carroll's legendary creation: "When I use a word", Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less".

a par with paintings as ostensible embodiments of cultural capital in both cases makes matters even worse. One may agree that industrial machinery is an example of the efficacy of aesthetics as objectified in industrial design, but it does not alter the elementary fact that a piece of machinery constitutes first and foremost constant capital (if, of course, it is used in the process of production), or the means of a specific type of quasi-work (when it is used in the household), in which case it represents no capital at all. For Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital, all of these cases boil down to the same thing.

His tendency toward Gleichschalten is glaringly manifest in such pronouncements as the following one: it is possession of cultural capital that makes it possible to derive greater profit not only from labour-time, by securing a higher yield from the same time, but also from spare time, and so to increase both economic and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1996: 240) where all the distinctions between quasi-work (which term is to underline both comon and distinct characteristics of activities bringing the means of livelihood, e.e. work, and those that, as domestic chores do[11] not) and work, between the respective parts of human personality, and between real capital and non-capital have been erased.

His cultural capital "exists as symbolically and materially active, effective capital only insofar as it is appropriated by agents and implemented and invested as a weapon and a stake in the struggles which go on in the fields of cultural production (the artistic field, the scientific field, etc.) and, beyond them, in the field of the social classes-struggles in which the agents wield strengths and obtain profits proportionate to their mastery of this objectified capital, and therefore to the extent of their embodied capital" (Bourdieu 1996: 247).

So far, so consistent, in the sense of similar unfair trickery being employed to substantiate the capital status of the construct under consideration. Unfortunately, contrary to the French sociologist's opinion, it is not sufficient to use the concept in question in connection with such terms as "profit", "appropriation", "investment", "production", and so on, as each of these purported relationships must be separately validated, which has not been done. It is precisely along similar lines that Bourdieu's argument goes further: cultural goods can be appropriated both materially-which presupposes economic capital-and symbolically-which presupposes cultural capital. It follows that the owner of the means of production must find a way of appropriating either the embodied capital which is the precondition of specific appropriation or the services of the holders of this capital. To possess the machines, he only needs economic capital; to appropriate them and use them in accordance with their specific purpose (defined by the cultural capital, of scientific or technical type, incorporated in them), he must have access to embodied cultural capital, either in person or by proxy. This is no doubt the basis of the ambiguous status of cadres (executives and engineers). If it is emphasized that they

[11] A woman cooking for her family does not work in this sense, but when preparing even the same dishes at a privately owned restaurant where she is employed on a part-time basis, this action transforms into work.

are not the possessors (in the strictly economic sense) of the means of production which they use, and that they derive profit from their own cultural capital only by selling the services and products which it makes possible, then they will be classified among the dominated groups; if it is emphasized that they draw their profits from the use of a particular form of capital, then they will be classified among the dominant groups. Everything suggests that as the cultural capital incorporated in the means of production increases (and with it the period of embodiment needed to acquire the means of appropriating it), so the collective strength of the holders of cultural capital would tend to increase – if the holders of the dominant type of capital (economic capital) were not able to set the holders of cultural capital in competition with one another. (They are, moreover, inclined to competition by the very conditions in which they are selected and trained, in particular by the logic of scholastic and recruitment competitions) (Bourdieu 1996: 246).

> It exists as symbolically and materially active, effective capital only insofar as it is appropriated by agents and implemented and invested as a weapon and a stake in the struggles which go on in the fields of cultural production (the artistic field, the scientific field, etc.) and, beyond them, in the field of the social classes-struggles in which the agents wield strengths and obtain profits proportionate to their mastery of this objectified capital, and therefore to the extent of their embodied capital.
>
> (Bourdieu 1996: 247)

There are a couple of problems with this argument. Firstly, it sounds warlike, each field beset with struggles, fighting, or what have you. But, as is customary in the case of the thinker being discussed, the point is greatly overdone. It is put in such a way that one does not know what, if any, difference there is between those cultural or other, as the case may be, activities that are not conflict, and those which can be considered in such terms. In a word, another case of the notion of "leaping". Secondly, Bourdieu touches upon the issue of class, but the outcome proves to be problematic. First, the logic of his argument would tend toward classifying managers, conceived of by as holders of cultural capital, as capitalists themselves. The French sociologist withdraws at the last moment, and leaves the matter in a state which is doubly unsatisfactory. If executives (which again is an inclusive notion encompassing not only corporate managers but also, e.g., government officials) "draw their profits from the use of a particular form of capital, then they will be classified among the dominant groups" which is contradicted by his another contention to the effect that if "they derive profit from their own cultural capital then they will be classified among the dominated groups". Apart from the adherence to the simplistic bipolar image of social differentiation, the above shows how difficult, if possible at all, is to determine the social location of groups connected with his newly invented cultural capital without the concept of ownership of the means of production which at the end of the day is invoked to that end. Another missing concept is one of labour power which of course is implicitly referred to in the theorist's account of the dominated as those who "derive

profit from their own cultural capital only by selling the services and products which it makes possible" (Bourdieu 1996: 247).

Social Capital

Owing primarily to space limitations, our discussion of this form of capital will focus on its characteristics relevant to Bourdieu's Broad theory of a range of capitals. Take, for example, the following claim:

> The reproduction of social capital presupposes an unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed. This work, which implies expenditure of time and energy and so, directly or indirectly, of economic capital, is not profitable or even conceivable unless one invests in it a specific competence (knowledge of genealogical relationships and of real connections and skill at using them, etc.) and an acquired disposition to acquire and maintain this competence, which are themselves integral parts of this capital.
> (Bourdieu 1996: 250)

The theorist who accuses others of economism describes as work [this is by any means an isolated formulation; in another place the reader is invited to consider "the profitability of this labour of accumulating and maintaining social capital" (Bourdieu 1996: 250)] everyday conversations with friends and other such similar activities, on the basis that they require some expenditure of time and energy, and/or material resources. For one thing, this amounts to an equally grave sin of physicalism, otherwise elicited above. And it is not an accidental slippage at all, as evidenced by other claims such as "in accordance with a principle which is the equivalent of the principle of the conservation of energy, profits in one area are necessarily paid for by costs in another" (Bourdieu 1996: 253), or "a general science of the economy of practices that does not artificially limit itself to those practices that are socially recognised as economic must endeavour to grasp capital, that 'energy of social physics'… in all of its different forms… I have shown that capital presents itself under three fundamental species (each with its own subtypes), namely, economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital" (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1992: 118–9).

Secondly, the aforementioned contention is bound, again, to dilute the concept of (economic) capital, in that everyday banal activities turn out to be either capital investments or capital deployments. Paying for a bus ticket in order to meet with a friend living in a distant quarter of the city, or dining out, has really nothing to do with capital or investment, and viewing them in such terms is economism writ large.

The capitalistic imperialism as espoused by the French thinker goes still further in that even the following ingredients of human personality are transformed by him into components of capital – "a specific competence (knowledge of genea-

logical relationships and of real connections and skill at using them, etc.) and an acquired disposition to acquire and maintain this competence, which are themselves integral parts of this capital".

And any such "proof" of the possibility of reducing a given social phenomenon to one or another form of capital is at the same time economism in that "economic capital is at the root of all the other types of capital and that these transformed, disguised forms of economic capital (…) produce their most specific effects only to the extent that they conceal (not least from their possessors) the fact that economic capital is at their root" (Bourdieu 1996: 251).

Bourdieu, to be sure, would loudly protest arguing that "the real logic of the functioning of capital, the conversions from one type to another, and the law of conservation which governs them, cannot be understood unless two opposing, but equally partial views are superseded: on the one hand, economism, which, on the grounds that every type of capital is reducible in the last analysis to economic capital, ignores what makes the specific efficacy of the other types of capital" (1996: 252), which however, is inconsistent with what he has to say even in the same sentence: "and on the other hand, semiologism (nowadays represented by structuralism, symbolic interactionism, or ethnomethodology), which reduces social exchanges to the phenomena of communication and ignores the brutal fact of **universal reducibility to economics**" (1996: 253; emphasis: J.T.).

After reading his ruminations on cultural capital, one may think it is the child whom he favours most, but certain claims regarding the blown-out of proportions of the importance of social capital may shake this conviction – "social capital (…) is the basis of the existence of the group (a family or a nation, of course, but also an association or a party)" (Bourdieu 1996: 251).

This is an astounding claim given the restricted (to interpersonal relationships) connotation of social capital. It is precisely the said narrow focus that accounts for the use of the phrase of sociability in the above Bourdesian deliberations on the form of "capital" in question, and the very definition of social capital: "The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition" (Bourdieu 1986: 248). It is only from a commonsense perspective that face-to-face relationships appear to be the most important, if not the sole form of social relations. In actual fact, each member of society, and in its globalised form, in an enhanced way, is entangled in a plethora of intermediate relations, most of which are, as opposed to the former, not registered by the human consciousness, but which nevertheless can powerfully affect human behaviour, health, etc.

Meanwhile, some justifications of the aformentioned importance of social capital given by its champion are perplexing:

> National liberation movements or nationalist ideologies cannot be accounted for solely by reference to strictly economic profits, i.e., anticipation of the profits which

> may be derived from redistribution of a proportion of wealth to the advantage of the nationals (nationalization) and the recovery of highly paid jobs. To these specifically economic anticipated profits, which would only explain the nationalism of the privileged classes, must be added the very real and very immediate profits derived from membership (social capital) which are proportionately greater for those who are lower down the social hierarchy ("poor whites") or, more precisely, more threatened by economic and social decline.
>
> (Bourdieu 1996: 255)

It is not our purpose here to argue over the so-called economic interpretation of national liberation movements and nationalism in general, barring drawing attention to Bourdieu's unfounded reduction of the said interpretation to a form of monocausalism.

Equally characteristic of Bourdieu, who despite the frequent use of the term "property" does not hold any consistent and sound theory of one, is his failure to see the socio-economic significance of nationalisation. If the move is skewed so that the overwhelming bulk of benefits therefrom are preempted by the privileged classes, then, and only then, his above-mentioned claim is correct. Otherwise, however, the labouring masses stand to gain much from such a measure.

In terms of analysis of Bourdieu's theory of capitals, the most striking aspect about the above-cited argument is purely the notional role played by his term of what social capital is. Social factors relevant to membership of nationalistic movements are one thing, but their conceptualisation in terms of social capital is quite another, and the former by no means entails the latter.

The goal of establishing social capital as a potent social force, is certainly not served particularly well by the contradictions present in this section of Bourdieu's theory. On the one hand he criticises, correctly enough, those who interpret generous or charitable conduct as 'calculated acts of class appeasement'. This naively Machiavellian view forgets that the most sincerely disinterested acts may be those best corresponding to objective interest.

It would be thoroughly erroneous to describe the choices of the habitus which lead an artist, writer, or researcher toward his natural place (a subject, style, manner, etc.) in tenns of rational strategy and cynical calculation (Bourdieu 1996: 240).

The trouble is, Bourdieu is not able to maintain the dialectic position outlined above, and fully in line with the way of thinking he himself rejects above, he states that "The network of relationships is the product of investment strategies (…) aimedat establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term (Bourdieu 1986: 248–249).

If the reader thinks the list of capitals utilised by the French theorist has been exhausted, they would be mistaken.

Bourdieu holds that "the state is the culmination and product of a slow process of accumulation and concentration of different species of capital: a capital of physical force, in the form of the military and the police (which is evoked by Weber's definition of the state as exercising the 'monopoly of legitimate physical violence');

economic capital (which is necessary, among other things, to provide the funding for the physical force); cultural or informational capital, accumulated in the form of statistics, for example, and also in the form of instruments of knowledge endowed with universal validity within the limits of its competence, such as weights, measures, maps or land registers; and, lastly, symbolic capital. In this way, it is able to exert a determining influence on the way the economic field functions (and also, though to a lesser extent, on the other fields). This is the case chiefly because the unification of the market of economic goods (and also of symbolic goods, the marriage market being one dimension of this) accompanied the construction of the state and the concentration of different species of capital it brought about. This means that the economic field is, more than any other, inhabited by the state, which contributes at every moment to its existence and persistence, and also to the structure of the relations of force that characterise it (Bourdieu 2005: 13).

It is difficult to imagine a text of similar length that would accumulate such a similar amount of mistakes/misconceptions. None of the factors attributed by Bourdieu to the state can be couched as a form of capital. Even financial resources held by the state cannot be characterised in those terms, because capital is intrinsically linked to private property, that by definition, is absent in the public sector. There is no reason for labelling, such as by the of capital physical force (whether in its state or other applications) either, and Bourdieu's reference to Weber in this connection is based on a complete misinterpreation. The same applies to his subsequent remarks. To invoke Weber as a patron of viewing the economy as an extension of the state is a blunder. Weber, on the contrary, insisted on distinguishing the economy and politics whose differentia specifica is the use of (legitimate) force or coercion, which, needless to say, had in his view nothing to do with capital that constituted a key economic concept in his overall framework. This does not imply (as it did not imply ie for Weber as well) any downplaying of economic interventions undertaken by the state. It stands to reason, though, that in order to examine how X affects Y, it is essential to establish that they are distinct from each other, and if they were of the same thing, one would view them to as something akin to Munchausen tales whose hero, and perhaps only him, could successfully pull themselves up by their own bootstraps.

It would be unfair to justify the above as a form of petty ethnocentrism, as commonly displayed by Bourdieu, because, yes, France has had a long tradition of a centralised and strong state, but this cannot justify Bourdiu's generalisation of these properties and of elevating them to the level of General theory.

In spite of conclusions

All in all, one can subscribe to the following summary, with a difference, and that the difference being the opposite, that where the commentator sees praise, in our judgment it is rather more a reason for criticism: "Bourdieu's expanded

concept of capital as a general framework for interdisciplinary research that seeks to dissolve what is largely anartificial distinction between economics and social science" (Svendsen 2001: 2). To be more specific, the overall objective outlined above is of course justified, what is objectionable is the set of means by which to achieve that end.

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Sprawozdania

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Monika Żak

Sprawozdanie z międzynarodowej konferencji pt. „Praca – Konsumpcja – Przedsiębiorczość. Świadomość ekonomiczna młodego pokolenia państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej"

Znalezienie odpowiedzi na pytanie o związki i zależności między funkcjonowaniem gospodarki i świadomością ekonomiczną stanowi istotne wyzwanie dla przedstawicieli wielu dziedzin nauki. Jest to o tyle trudne, że zazwyczaj te dwa pojęcia są formułowane i badane jako oddzielne elementy, które wszakże na siebie oddziałują. Kształtuje się opinie na temat jednostronnego wpływu gospodarki na świadomość ekonomiczną i świadomości ekonomicznej na gospodarkę. Przykładem takiego sposobu postrzegania tej problematyki są opinie Karola Marksa, który stwierdził, że to gospodarka determinuje świadomość społeczną, oraz Maxa Webera, który stał na stanowisku, że świadomość społeczna wpływa na funkcjonowanie i kształt gospodarki. Do dzisiaj nie można w sposób jednoznaczny odpowiedzieć na pytanie, która koncepcja jest słuszna lub bliższa rzeczywistości społecznej. Najbezpieczniej będzie zatem stwierdzić, że mamy do czynienia z wpływem obustronnym, tzn. gospodarka kształtuje świadomość społeczną, ale również sama świadomość jest determinantem gospodarki.

Świadomość ekonomiczną należy postrzegać jako element kultury ekonomicznej oraz różnych koncepcji człowieka, jak: *homo oeconomicus* czy *homo sociologicus*. Związki między świadomością społeczną i ekonomią są przedmiotem badań przede wszystkim socjologów, rzadziej ekonomistów. Wynika to oczywiście ze specyfiki tych dziedzin nauki. Świadomość ekonomiczna staje się obiektem badań i zainteresowań naukowych zazwyczaj w sytuacjach, w których próbuje się znaleźć wytłumaczenie zjawisk ekonomicznych, gospodarczych w uwarunkowaniach kulturowych danego kraju. Należy jednak pamiętać, że oba te pojęcia (gospodarka, świadomość ekonomiczna) funkcjonują stale i również stale na siebie oddziaływają.

Zakres tematyczny konferencji „Praca – Konsumpcja – Przedsiębiorczość. Świadomość ekonomiczna młodego pokolenia państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej" skoncentrował się wokół właśnie tych trzech głównych zagadnień: pracy, kon-

sumpcji i przedsiębiorczości – jako istotnych czynników kształtujących świadomość ekonomiczną. Konferencja, której organizatorem był Zakład Socjologii Ogólnej Instytutu Socjologii Uniwersytetu Śląskiego wraz z partnerami zagranicznymi (Palacky University in Olomouc – Czechy, Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra – Słowacja, a także Szent István University in Gödöllő – Węgry), odbyła się 4 listopada 2015 r. w Centrum Informacji Naukowej i Bibliotece Akademickiej w Katowicach. Konferencja była współfinansowana ze środków Międzynarodowego Funduszu Wyszehradzkiego (International Visegrad Fund). W spotkaniu wzięło udział prawie 40 uczestników i gości reprezentujących polskie, czeskie, słowackie i węgierskie środowisko naukowe.

Program konferencji zakładał obrady w dwóch sesjach plenarnych oraz w dwóch sekcjach tematycznych. Konferencję otworzyło uroczyste wystąpienie Przewodniczącej Komitetu Organizacyjnego prof. dr hab. Urszuli Swadźby, która powitała uczestników i gości spotkania. W imieniu władz Uniwersytetu Śląskiego zebranych gości przywitał Prorektor ds. Nauki i Współpracy z Gospodarką – prof. dr hab. Andrzej Kowalczyk. Władze Wydziału Nauk Społecznych reprezentowała Prodziekan ds. Kształcenia – dr hab. Małgorzata Suchacka, która życzyła zebranym owocnych obrad. Dyrektor Instytutu Socjologii, prof. zw. dr hab. Wojciech Świątkiewicz, podkreślał w swoim wystąpieniu znaczenie międzynarodowych konferencji jako areny wymiany doświadczeń i poglądów na różne istotne kwestie, m.in. właśnie na temat świadomości ekonomicznej w różnych krajach.

Część plenarną konferencji, której przewodniczyli dr hab. prof. nadzw. UE Wiesław Wątroba oraz dr hab. Piotr Wróblewski, otworzyła prof. dr hab. Urszula Swadźba z Uniwersytetu Śląskiego w Katowicach, która w swoim wystąpieniu pt. *Theoretical and methodological basis of the research: The economic awareness of the young generation of Visegrad countries* przekazała informacje dotyczące realizowanego przez jej zespół oraz czeskich, słowacki i węgierskich partnerów projektu badawczego w ramach Funduszu Wyszehradzkiego. Następnie partnerzy omawianego projektu zaprezentowali wstępne wyniki badań na temat świadomości ekonomicznej młodego pokolenia państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Doktor Viera Zozuľaková z Constantine The Philosopher University in Nitra w swoim wystąpieniu pt. *Economic understanding and young people (according to the type of study)* przedstawiła analizę wiedzy na temat procesów ekonomicznych słowackich studentów. Z kolei dr Jaroslav Šotola z Palacky University in Olomouc wygłosił referat pt. *Statements of the Czech students about wealth and income inequalities*, w którym wskazał na postawy czeskich studentów wobec zjawisk bogactwa i biedy w ich kraju. Następnie dr Mario Rodríguez Polo z tej samej uczelni przedstawił poglądy czeskich studentów na temat globalnej ekonomii i kryzysu ekonomicznego (*Awareness of the Czech students about the global economy and the current crisis*). Wyniki badań przeprowadzonych wśród studentów na Węgrzech zaprezentowali wspólnie assoc. prof. Anna Dunay oraz prof. dr Csaba Bálint Illés z Szent István University in Gödöllő w wystąpieniu pt.: *Entrepreneurial attitudes of university student – a Hungarian case study*. Następnie wyniki badań dotyczą-

cych postaw wobec konsumpcji polskich studentów zaprezentowała dr Monika Żak z Uniwersytetu Śląskiego (*I'm buying so I'm living? Consumption and lifestyles of Polish students*). Pierwszą część plenarną zamknęło wystąpienie dr. Rafała Cekiery z Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, który wskazał na znaczenie mobilności w planach zawodowych polskich studentów: *National and international mobility from the Polish students' career perspektives*. Tę część prezentacji zakończyła dyskusja na tematy poruszone w wystąpieniach.

Druga część wystąpień rozpoczęła się po przerwie kawowej, a przewodniczył jej prof. dr Csaba Bálint Illés oraz dr hab. prof. Politechniki Częstochowskiej Felicjan Bylok. Pierwszy referat w tej części wygłosił dr hab. prof. nadzw. UE Wiesław Wątroba z Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, który wskazał problem różnic między pokoleniami żyjącymi w drugiej połowie XX i na początku XXI w. w zakresie ich podejścia do pracy, relacji społecznych w środowisku pracy oraz różnic w etosie pracy (*Cross-Generational Work Attitudes*). Następnie prof. dr hab. Stanisław Swadźba z Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach w referacie pt. *The Economies of Visegrad Countries. Comparative Analysis* przedstawił kwestię gospodarki i ekonomii w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Z kolei dr Monika Szudy z Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach zwróciła uwagę na kwestie dotyczące funkcjonowania rynków w świetle uwarunkowań prawnych państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej – *State vs Market in the Economies of Visegrad Countries. Comparative Analysis*. Drugą część plenarną konferencji zamknęło wystąpienie dr. Zdenka Vavrečki z University of Ostrava, w którym przedstawił kwestię społecznych i ekonomicznych problemów, mających wpływ na życie młodego pokolenia w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Po referacie dr. Vavrečki nastąpiła dyskusja, która toczyła się wokół problematyki ekonomii i gospodarki krajów Grupy Wyszehradzkiej.

Kolejna część konferencji odbyła się równolegle w dwóch sekcjach tematycznych. W pierwszej części sekcji poświęconej pracy i przedsiębiorczości przewodnictwo objęły assoc. prof. Anna Dunay oraz dr Monika Żak. Obrady otworzyło wystąpienie pt. *Volunteering and its Influence on Volunteers' Working Life*, którego autorkami były dr Petra Šobáňová oraz dr Nicole Horáková Hirschlerová z University of Ostrava. Autorki poruszyły kwestię znaczenia wolontariatu dla przyszłych karier zawodowych wolontariuszy. Następnie dr hab. Joanna Wyleżałek oraz mgr Artur Puchta ze Szkoły Głównej Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego w Warszawie przedstawili zagadnienia związane z sytuacją absolwentów SGGW na współczesnym rynku pracy (*Absolwenci SGGW na rynku pracy – znaczenie wykształcenia w czasach neoliberalizmu*). W dalszej części dr Barbara Ober-Domagalska z Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego zaprezentowała referat, którego współautorem jest dr Łukasz Kutyło (UŁ) – *Wpływ przemian gospodarczych na akumulację kapitału normatywnego i jego użytkowanie. Rozważania nad stosunkiem młodych Polaków i Ukraińców do pracy*. Pierwszą część sesji zakończyło wystąpienie dr inż. Aleksandry Czarneckiej oraz dr inż. Anny Słocińskiej z Politechniki Częstochowskiej na temat postaw pokolenia Y wobec pracy (*Postawy pokolenia Y wobec pracy na*

przykładzie studentów pierwszego roku na kierunku Zarządzanie). Całość sesji zamknęła dyskusja.

W sekcji drugiej, której przewodniczyła dr Viera Zozuľaková oraz dr Rafał Cekiera, podjęto tematykę konsumpcji, kultury i życia społecznego. Obrady rozpoczął swoim wystąpieniem pt. *Kompetencje konsumenckie pokolenia Y w Polsce* dr hab. prof. PCz Felicjan Bylok. Następnie dr hab. prof. UŚ Adam Bartoszek przedstawił tezy swojego referatu, który koncentrował się wokół problematyki społeczeństwa prosumenckiego (*Prosument jako świadomy konsument energii – polskie uwarunkowania innowacyjnego rozwoju*). Kolejne wystąpienie, którego autorem była dr Alicja Łaska-Formejster z Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, dotyczyło wirtualnej aktywności beneficjentów służby zdrowia: *Wirtualna aktywność „młodych" pacjentów i konsumentów zdrowia. Wartości, postawy i charakter zachowań*. W swoim referacie pt. *Instytucjonalizacja przedsięwzięć ruchu wolnej kultury w państwach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* dr Sebastian Skolik z Politechniki Częstochowskiej poruszył ważne kwestie dotyczące aktualnej sytuacji wolnej kultury. Sesję zamknęło wystąpienie mgr. Piotra Czakona z Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, który zwrócił uwagę na znaczenie konsumpcji w życiu młodych katowiczan: *Młodzi w przestrzeni poprzemysłowej. Katowicka Strefa Kultury jako miejsce konsumpcji*. Po zakończeniu części właściwej przewodniczący sesji rozpoczęli dyskusję.

Ostatnią część konferencji, której przewodniczyli dr Jaroslav Šotola oraz dr hab. prof. UŚ Adam Bartoszek, otworzyło wystąpienie dr Ewy Giermanowskiej z Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego pt. *Funkcje i pewność emerytury z perspektywy młodego pokolenia Polaków*. Następnie dr Rafał Muster reprezentujący Uniwersytet Śląski przedstawił sytuację młodych ludzi na polskim rynku pracy: *Młodzież kończąca szkoły ponadgimnazjalne wobec wymagań pracodawców na współczesnym rynku pracy. Próba analizy socjologicznej*. Tematykę sytuacji absolwentów na polskim rynku pracy poruszył również dr Tomasz Herudziński ze Szkoły Głównej Gospodarstwa Wiejskiego, który wygłosił referat pt. *Orientacje społeczne absolwentów szkół wyższych wobec pracy – na przykładzie uczestników warszawskiego rynku pracy*. Problem godzenia pracy zawodowej z życiem osobistym podniosła w swoim wystąpieniu pt. *Elastyczny pracownik – uwarunkowania łączenia pracy z życiem osobistym* dr Elżbieta Robak z Politechniki Częstochowskiej. Spojrzenie na elastyczność pracy z punktu widzenia pracodawcy przestawił dr Łukasz Trembaczowski z Uniwersytetu Śląskiego: *Zatrudniam elastycznie. Opinie pracodawców o elastyczności zatrudnienia i organizacji pracy*. Sesję zamknęło wystąpienie dr Mai Skiby oraz dr Agnieszki Kwiatek z Politechniki Częstochowskiej, które zaprezentowały założenia swojego projektu badawczego: *Znaczenie wiedzy w kontekście przyszłej pracy zawodowej młodego pokolenia*. Po ostatnim wystąpieniu odbyły się dyskusja i podsumowanie konferencji. Przewodnicząca Komitetu Organizacyjnego – prof. dr hab. Urszula Swadźba – podziękowała zebranym gościom za udział w konferencji. Uczestnicy wyrazili chęć udziału w następnych spotkaniach, których tematyka dotyka ważnych aspektów życia społecznego.