Diplomacy and Arms, Opportunities and Obstacles in Episcopal Territorial Control in the Duchy of Krakow, 1279–1320

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The See of Krakow and the Decentralization of Secular Power in Piast Poland

Ducal Poland of the late thirteenth century was characterized by a forceful conflict between efforts to recreate a central authority, preferably in the form of a monarchy, and decentralizing tendencies springing from the natural proliferation of the ruling Piast dynasty and the formation of regional lordships. Increasing territorial divisions, reflected in further partitions of Poland’s historical provinces, presented a challenge to the Polish hierarchical church. Although the church retained an impressive level of integrity despite the particular interests of its secular patrons, each bishopric managed its affairs in response to specific political circumstances. These local conditions were dynamically altered when after decades of relative stability and orderly dynastic succession, the ducal throne

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in the metropolitan province of Krakow suddenly became vacant in the end of 1279. Church leaders faced an intensively precarious situation as claims to the principal Duchy of Krakow in the historic province of Little Poland now began to issue from various members of the Piast dynasty or even from abroad. The prelates were compelled to seek the most effective instruments of protection for their diocesan estates, judicial and fiscal privileges and the very authority of the see. Diplomacy, economic activities, like the reorganization of towns and colonization of the countryside, and even demonstrations of military potential and an alliance with a foreign monarchy were most obvious methods.

Lordship with castles and tangible military force emerged as a common paradigm of power relations and, thus, an indispensable facet of ecclesiastical authority in many parts of the Latin West before the rise of national monarchies. Yet, the case of the Duchy of Krakow offers a particularly intriguing example of initially promising but ultimately unsuccessful manipulations of ecclesiastical territorial structures and a military arm despite seemingly favorable political conditions such as instability of secular power, acceptance of extensive episcopal patronage, and the rise of church districts with extensive jurisdictional autonomy. The examination of political decisions and tactics made by the bishops of Krakow in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, as well as their immediate outcomes, leads to a better understanding of the scope of episcopal polities to enhance various areas of ecclesiastical dominion. It also illuminates the practical limitations of ecclesiastical authority, which was frequently incapable of securing stable and sovereign control over territory.

The importance of assertive protection of the bishopric rose along with the political crisis slowly developing after the death of Duke Bolesław V the Chaste (Grand Duke of Krakow 1243–1279),

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whose grandfather had been placed in power by rebellious Krakonian barons. Bolesław was the third and last Piast from the new lineage established by Kazimierz the Just in Krakow in 1166, and his death undermined the fragile dynastic stability in the region. The Duchy of Krakow could potentially provide the decisive impulse to advanced territorial integration of Polish provinces and a revival of monarchy that traditionally ensured reliable patronage for the bishops. The Piast dukes or foreign rulers who hailed from beyond Little Poland made such processes less predictable or certain. For local ecclesiastical leaders, a distinct lordship with armed force, exclusive fiscal prerogatives, and judicial power over tenants occupying a large compact territory could supplement traditional diplomatic and ideological means of preventing the political marginalization of the Krakonian see and its abuse by secular rulers.  

The bishopric demonstrated discernible interest in exercising jurisdiction in autonomous enclaves and expanding its military capacity. The presence of episcopal castellans, landowning vassals, and later even mercenary troops revealed the Krakonian bishops’ commitment to actively address crises in temporal affairs in their duchy at a time when public authority in the Duchy of Krakow fluctuated between the centrifugal forces of the secular baronage, who took advantage of the succession struggle for the throne of Krakow, and seemingly autocratic dukes who opposed the process through exercise of traditional military, fiscal, and judicial

prerogatives. The expansion of the episcopal lordship was, none-
theless, restricted to relatively small and dispersed regions and, 
by the early fourteenth century, eventually arrested by the secular 
rulers of Krakow who prevented the province from disintegrating 
into secular and ecclesiastical principalities. But during the tur-
bulent decades of the late thirteenth century, such a development 
was not inevitable. Political configurations were mutable, and only 
with many unpredictable steps and turns, the dukes’ determina-
tion to retain military superiority and the territorial integrity of 
their domain rendered the bishops’ lordship considerably limited 
and deprived of unquestioned sovereignty.

Competition for the Territory of a Widowed 
Duchess

The termination of Kazimierz the Just’s direct lineage with the 
death of his grandson Bolesław V the Chaste in 1279 opened a new 
period of unstable ducal rulership and jurisdictional adjustments 
that involved ecclesiastical possessions. Bishop Paul (in office 
1266–1292), who witnessed the accession of Duke Leszek the 
Black of Sieradz and Kujavia to Krakow, inherited the complicated 
issue of a district that had been transferred by Bolesław to his 
wife Kinga (Kunegund), who in turn granted a substantial part of 
it to a monastic community of St. Clare, formally under episcopal 
authority. The ensuing conflict between ecclesiastical and secular 
authorities over the resources and the population of the economi-
cally dynamic and strategically located Sącz district exemplifies the 
bishopric of Krakow’s practical inability to assert more control over 
compact territories despite advantageous circumstances in the late 
thirteenth century.

Located in the southern part of the Krakovian province, adja-
cent to the frontier with Hungary and near the crossroads from 
Ruthenia to Silesia and from Hungary through the Spiš region

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4 See M. Friedberg, Klientela świecka biskupa krakowskiego w w. XII–XIV. Ze stu-
diów nad organizacją społeczeństwa w Polsce średniowiecznej [Lay clients of the bishop 
of Krakow from the twelfth to the fourteenth Centuries: from studies on social organi-
zation in medieval Poland], Kraków 1938; and J. Maciejewski, Episkopat polski doby 
dzielnicyowej 1180–1320 [Polish episcopacy in the age of ducal Poland 1180–1320], 
to Krakow, the Sącz district had considerable strategic and economic value. In 1257, at the provincial assembly of Korczyn, Duke Bolesław the Chaste transferred the area to his pious wife, as compensation for her prematurely exhausted dowry. The grantee obtained full ducal authority in the region, with one important exception: Bolesław reserved for himself the responsibility to defend the Sącz castellany, that is the compact area centered at the castle and town of Sącz.⁵

The infamous discord between Bishop Paul of Krakow and Duke Leszek the Black in the 1280s pertained, among other issues, to the duke’s attempt to reclaim the entire Sącz area, which in practical terms had become a quasi-independent principality under his adoptive mother, the aforementioned Kinga.⁶ For Duke Leszek the Black, who in 1279 inherited Krakow largely by an earlier designation and adoption by Bolesław the Chaste, the territorial integrity of the Duchy of Krakow was essential to prove his ability to govern more than a loose conglomerate of duchies and generously distribute privileges.⁷ For the widow, receiving episcopal protection through formal submission to the bishopric’s jurisdiction was a promising strategy for shielding her possession against Leszek’s dominion.⁸

At first, avoidance of controversies was a preferred policy, as Bishop Paul demonstrated striking neutrality in cases pertaining to the status of the Sącz region. He is absent from the list of witnesses when on July 6, 1280, the widow transferred the town of Sącz and neighboring villages, commercial tolls and profits associated with them, to the newly created monastery of the Order of Saint Clare. An assembly at Sącz approved the foundation that the ruler and princess of Sącz (domina et princeps de Sandech)

⁵ KDM 2, no. 452, pp. 106–108.
⁷ B. Włodarski, “Polityczna rola biskupów krakowskich w XIII wieku”, Nasza Przeszłość 1962, t. 27, p. 51, has suggested that the designation would make Leszek less obligated to the Krakovian elites.
⁸ A. Semkowicz, “Walka o monarchię 1288–1294” [Struggle for monarchy, 1288–1294], KH 1891, t. 5, p. 763, suggested that Kinga’s foundation received support in the bishopric of Krakow to prevent the Duchess’ brother, the Hungarian King Bela IV, from claiming it after her death, as she remained childless. The diocese of Krakow had indeed experienced territorial disputes with the archbishopric of Esztergom after the 1230s.
had delivered to the Franciscan minister provincial Nicolas. The presence of the castellan of Krakow and a ducal seal attached to the charter confirmed Leszek’s tactful consent. It was reasonable to expect that Leszek, as a pious and responsible ruler, would not immediately attempt to repossess the territory, despite his long history of inimical attitudes to this specific group of nuns, who originally resided at Skała, already under the duke’s control. This armistice was possible because Kinga would no longer exercise exclusive jurisdiction in the alienated region, as a significant portion of her dominium now became a monastic district and was canonically under formal episcopal authority. As a result, negotiations to retain control over the entire Duchy of Krakow shifted focus from the duchess’ court to the episcopal see.

The transfer of a substantial part of Kinga’s realm to episcopal jurisdiction was a pragmatic political act allowing Bishop Paul to offer a reliable alliance to a female ruler who manifested her extraordinary piety through the patronage of a cloistered female branch of the mendicant movement. Although neither Bishop Paul nor the duke actively sought confrontation, conflict was unavoidable. On January 2, 1281, the Krakovian see formally stated that Kinga had endowed the monastery with estates which she legally owned and that in the event of the loss of her lordship in the three castellanies of Sącz, Biecz and Korczyn, ducal compensation would

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9 KDM 2, no. 487, pp. 145–147. The landed and human resources at the disposal of the monastery were extraordinary: the town of Sącz and approximately twenty-eight villages. For Pope Martin IV’s confirmation of the monastery’s possessions, see KDM 2, no. 496, pp. 153–154; BP, no. 837, p. 155.

10 B. Kowalska, “Biskup krakowski Paweł z Przemankowa a klasztor klarysek w Starym Sączu” [Krakovian bishop Paul of Przemankow and the cloister of the Order of St. Clare in Old Sącz], Zeszyty Historyczne 2009, t. 10, pp. 33–34. Paweł Żmudzki argues that encouraging the nuns of St Clare from Skała near Krakow to resettle in the Sącz domain made the conflict between the duchess and Duke Leszek particularly acute. Paul’s role in this particular conflict is, however, less apparent; see Studium podzielonego królestwa. Książę Leszek Czarny [Study of a divided kingdom: Duke Leszek the Black], Warszawa 2000, pp. 320–322.

11 Żmudzki defines Kinga’s “dominium” as “the state” (“państwo”) rather than territorial lordship and assumes that the character of that lordship was completely sovereign: “monarszy”/monarchical (312). Leszek’s consent may indicate a more ambiguous legal situation. The widow’s use of the titles “domina et princeps” in the foundation charter could have simply stressed her status as a ruling dowager, not the status of the Sącz territory, which she clearly termed “dominium”.

be required. From Leszek’s point of view, this situation led to an unacceptable transfer of power: a former duchess whose suitable ally was the bishop of the ducal capital city was in a position to practically alienate large territories to the church. This was not a mere division of local resources – it signaled open secession.

It was in the militarily capable and economically vibrant castellanies, including those in Kinga’s domain, that the problem of territorial control and the practical implementation of ducal prerogatives became acute. Although the very existence of a stronghold with a keep or tower carried a symbolic mark of lordship, the practical military value of castles in such districts was considerably varied across Piast Poland. The physical dimensions of the episcopal strongholds, their architecture and practical functions, and even the time of their origin are difficult to assess due to limited archeological field studies and the late medieval tendency to remodel many castles into more residential structures. One can hypothesize that in the course of forming autonomous episcopal districts, the dukes were willing to release to the church only castellanies of lesser strategic importance. By the thirteenth

12 KDM 2, no. 491, pp. 150–51.
15 It remains uncertain how the prerogatives of local castellans developed when the church began to acquire its own castellanies. For a distinction between older episcopal castellanies based on royal or ducal administrative structure and the later castellanies of seigneurial lords, see H. Łowmiański, Początki Polski. Polityczne i społeczne kształtowanie się narodu do początku wieku XIV [Poland’s beginnings: political and social formation of the nation to the beginning of the fourteenth century], t. 6, Warszawa 1985, pp. 352–398. More recently F. Dąbrowski, Studia nad administracją kasztelańską Polski XIII wieku [Studies on the castellan administration of 13th-century Poland], Warszawa 2007, pp. 61–86, has demonstrated the castellans’ duty to provide venues of military mobilization at the time of war, but also apparent limitations in the ability to construct fortifications and impose military duties on the local population without a special mandate from a ruling Piast.
century it was the new market economy that often determined their practical strength and status.

The organization of settlements at Golkowice and Gostwica according to German legal and administrative models shortly before the foundation of the monastery at Sącz revealed Kinga’s interest in buttressing her lordship with a market economy. The castellany of Biecz, which also was part of the duchess’s domain offered the possibility of creating a fairly large independent principality, secular or episcopal, depending on future relations between Kinga and Bishop Paul. The first significant opportunity to tie the security of the castellany with the see of Krakow came with the intervention of the papal legate Philip, who appointed Franciscans and the bishop himself to resolve the ensuing conflict over the castellanies of Sącz and Biecz claimed by Duke Leszek on the grounds of territorial integrity of ducal domain. The attempt to fortify Leszek’s recognition of the Biecz district as a domain legitimately ruled by the former duchess ended with partial success, as the duke suspended his claims. The agreement in 1280 in Czechow to postpone negotiations till a future council at Krakow suggested uncertainty in respect of Kinga’s right to the Biecz and Sącz territories. At this point the crisis prompted Bishop Paul to take the initiative. Paul demanded the same uniform privileged status for the entirety of the widow’s holdings, both religious and lay. Leszek’s reported hostility to building projects in the disputed districts appeared, therefore, unreasonable, unjust, and worthy of retribution. The harassment of the duchess’ lordship in the mentioned castellanies and the settlement of Korczyn (Chorczyn), where Leszek allegedly exploited its endowments, demanded solid compensation.

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17 KDM 2, no. 490, p. 149.

18 Ibidem, pp. 149–150; no. 491, pp. 150–151. The identification of the third castellany, Korczyn (Chorczyn), with Kinga’s realm has been debatable, particularly because Korczyn never obtained the status of an administrative district with its own castellan as a territorial representative of ducal authority. In Pawel
The crucial element of the episcopal statement related to the affair was a provision that allowed for the unconditional execution of the duchess’ future testament regarding her possessions if the duke had not delivered a requested payment. There is no evidence that Kinga ever considered the transfer of the disputed castellanes directly to the bishopric, although a generous grant of land to the see was a possibility. One must note that “under the advice of the venerable Father Lord Prandota, the Bishop of Krakow”, and with the consent of the provincial baronage, Bolesław’s grant from 1257 invested the duchess with complete liberty as to the future of the Sącz province, with the exception of transfer to foreign people, which would effect its separation from the “Polish nation” (a Polonica natione). In a confirmation charter, the duke made assurance that it would be lawful for his wife to “sell, exchange, donate, let the said land and in whatever way to alienate it...”. Bishop Prandota and his successors could become significant beneficiaries of such a testament. But the duke’s bold decision to arrest Paul for providing continuous support for Kinga and disgruntled barons, and his invasion of the duchess’ domain in 1283 prevented the uncontrollable development of an unfavorable situation. Violent action Żmudzki’s opinion, Korczyn was a personal ducal residence that had not been part of the administrative network of the duchy (pp. 316–317). M. Barański, Dominiun sądeckie. Od książęcego okręgu grodowego do majątku klasztoru klarysek sądeckich [The Sącz dominium: from a ducal town district to the estate of the Sącz Order of St. Clare], Warszawa 1986, pp. 103–104, questions the duchess’ ability to enforce her authority in the entire district of Korczyn due to the diversity of properties and multiplicity of jurisdictions within its borders.

19 KDM 2, no. 452, pp. 106–108: “... dictam terram liceat sibi uendere, commutare, donare, locare et quolibet modo a se alienare”.

20 An almost contemporary source records an anti-Leszek rebellion of the Sandomierz barons shortly before his arrest. “Rocznik Traski...”, p. 848. Długosz made an explicit connection between the two events. In his chronicle, the bishop committed treason by organizing the Lithuanians’ attacks on Leszek while other rebels tried to install Conrad II of Czersk, a Mazovian duke, in Krakow. Those were the direct reasons for his internment. KKK 1, no. 84, pp. 116–118; Długosz, lib. 7, pp. 176, 181–184. According to P. Wojciechowski, “Ugrupowania polityczne w ziemiach krakowskiej i sandomierskiej w latach 1280–1286” [Political factions in the provinces of Krakow and Sandomierz in the years 1280–1286], PH 1979, t. 70, pp. 59–60, 70, Paul’s conspiracy to use Lithuanians against his duke is improbable and the greatest appeal of the Mazovian duke to the Sandomierz nobility lay in Conrad’s ability to protect the Province of Sandomierz against the pagans, with whom he maintained good relations. In the text of the
shattered the possibility of acquiring episcopal territorial enclaves with seigniorial privileges, especially fiscal and legal jurisdiction.

Leszek temporarily allowed Kinga to preserve only those estates that constituted the original endowment of the monastery of the Order of Saint Clare in Sącz. Without a ducal charter of protection it was not certain for how long Leszek would restrain his power in the monastic villages and refrain from modifying the original land grants guaranteed by Bolesław the Chaste.21 The imprisoned Bishop Paul was unable to intervene, but Kinga’s appeal to the Holy See provided a chance of maintaining episcopal influence at least in the monastic foundation. In the bull issued by Pope Martin IV in 1283, the Holy See took the monastery under its protection, along with the Sącz district to the extent decided by Duke Bolesław in 1257. Kinga’s status as a principissa de Sandecz was also confirmed.22 Papal intervention saved the monastic foundation, but appeared practically insufficient to legitimize an autonomous political entity in thirteenth-century Poland.

By the end of the 1280s, the struggle for an episcopal protectorate in southern Little Poland had ended in failure. After the bull, neither the former duchess nor the bishop made claims to the disputed castellanies. Kinga merely retained her old title of the princess of Sącz; Paul never raised the issue of Leszek’s compensations for her territorial losses.23 As a result, the Biecz castellany quickly lost its affiliation with the monastery and became a ducal domain. In 1303 the bishopric, now headed by Jan Muskata (in office 1294–1320), received the castellany from Leszek’s successor, the Bohemian king Václav II (Duke of two agreements between Leszek and the bishop after Paul’s release the duke pledged to protect the church of Krakow and to compensate the bishop for his imprisonment. It was less certain that the agreement was Paul’s definite victory. See KKK 1, no. 85, pp. 116–118; no. 88, pp. 120–123. The lack of noticeable reaction in defense of the bishop indicates Paul’s isolation. E. Marecki, “Ugody księcia Leszka Czarnego z biskupem Pawłem z Przemankowa” [Settlements between Duke Leszek the Black and Bishop Paul of Przemankow], Studia Historyczne 1986, t. 29, pp. 266–267, doubts that the first agreement was ever formally honored by the duke and his barons. His major argument rests on the fact that there are no references to it in the second document.

21 KDM 1, no. 44, p. 52.
22 Ibidem, no. 102, pp. 121–122; BP, no. 837, p. 155.
Krakow, 1291–1305; King of Poland, 1300–1305) in exchange for Kamienica, the last large village remaining in episcopal hands in the Sącz region.\textsuperscript{24} This was a reward for Jan’s support for the Přemyslids, but the bishop seems to have encountered difficulties in retaining it and soon leased the castellany to the Benedictine monastery at Tyniec, who in turn lost it to the Hungarians.\textsuperscript{25}

Along with the arrest of the bishop, Duke Leszek the Black effectively immobilized the bishopric through confiscation of episcopal towns and strongholds, along with the revenues they generated. Leszek also appropriated all revenues that belonged to the bishop and the cathedral chapter.\textsuperscript{26} Only in 1284 did the duke create two miniature territorial lordships as a great gesture of public penance towards the abused bishop who in response no longer laid claims to any disputed districts or explicitly continued to support the ducal widow. As a temporary equivalent of compensation in silver for violating ecclesiastical liberties, the duke also offered the see of Krakow one town and one village equipped with the right to enforce justice, collect taxes and market fees, demand services and impose military duties.\textsuperscript{27} The minuscule size of these areas, centered at the settlements of Korczyn and Konary, rendered them irrelevant to the general political or military potential of ecclesiastical lordship. The new succession crisis after Leszek’s death in 1288 when Bishop Paul seems to have been penalized for opposing the victorious Duke Henry Probus of Silesia temporarily eliminated episcopal strongholds, even outside of the Sącz region, such as the castle at Sławków.\textsuperscript{28} A new chance to manifest lordship with some military arm arrived with the Bohemian monarchy.

\textsuperscript{24} KKK 1, no. 111, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{25} Długosz, lib. 9, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{26} KKK 1, no. 84, pp. 114–116; BP, no. 836, p. 155.
\textsuperscript{27} BP, no. 85, pp. 116–118.
\textsuperscript{28} J. Gawron, “Czarna legenda biskupa krakowskiego Pawła z Przemankowa” [The black legend of the Krakovian bishop Paul of Przemankow], Annales UMCS, Sectio F: Historia 2016, vol. 71, pp. 27–49, has discussed Paul’s involvement in various rebellions against Bolesław the Chaste, Leszek the Black, and Henry Probus, although his motivations were not always clear.
Bohemian Rulership and an Opportunity for Episcopal Territorial Control

By the early fourteenth century, the see was without an opportunity to construct episcopal districts through ecclesiastical patronage of particular regions, while the area under the Order of Saint Clare at Sącz became another instrument of Bohemian expansion in Little Poland. The negotiations that allowed the Přemyslids to occupy the Duchy of Krakow with the consent of the local elite were broad in scope. In 1291 the king of Bohemia, Václav II, confirmed the land grants of his secular predecessors in Krakow to all monasteries.²⁹ There were no provisions in his confirmation about the prerogatives of the current owner of the donated areas or about the claims of the bishopric of Krakow to monastic holdings. When on November 8, 1292, Václav agreed to specifically confirm the privileges of the monastery at Sącz, he legitimized Kinga’s foundation as a religious center, but did not address jurisdictional problems in its districts.³⁰ Gryfina, the widow of Duke Leszek the Black and Václav II’s paternal aunt, appropriated the territorial title “domina de Sanedecz”, exercised lordship over the domain outside of monastic estates, and headed the monastery, although she never took monastic vows.³¹ The absence of the titular form “ducissa Sanedecensis” on Václav II’s confirmation of the monastic property, despite the

²⁹ KKK 1, no. 94, pp. 130–131. In Maciej Maciejowski’s opinion, the general perception of Bohemian ruler as a reliable guarantor of stability and security in the bishopric affected the prelate’s decision to support Václav in Little Poland. M. Maciejowski, Orientacje polityczne biskupów metropolii gnieźnieńskiej 1283–1320 [Political orientation of the bishops of the Gniezno metropolitan province, 1283–1320], Kraków 2007, p. 172.

³⁰ KDM 2, no. 521, pp. 187–188.

³¹ Ibidem, no. 518, p. 182. Marek Barański argues that Gryfina’s grants of land to knights and her reorganization of villages according to German law were aimed at constructing a feudal clientele and a practically independent lordship where ducal authority was increasingly limited to only the highest judicial and military prerogatives (pp. 114–121). Gryfina’s alleged donation of the ducal realm to her nephew, as emphasized by a Bohemian tradition, had no legal bearing, even if it indeed took place, and pertained only to the Sacz district. See Cronica Przibiconis de Tradenina dicti Pulkaua, eds. J. Emler, J. Gebauer, Prague 1893 (Fontes Rerum Bohemicarum, vol. 5), p. 175. For brief discussions of the problem, see B. Włodarski, Polska i Czechy w drugiej połowie XIII i początkach XIV w. (1250–1306) [Poland and Bohemia in the second half of the 13th and the early 14th centuries (1250–1306)], Lwów 1931, p. 120.
earlier appearance of such a title in local charters,\textsuperscript{32} revealed the Přemyslid’s ostentatious rejection of the Sącz region’s extraterritorial status.\textsuperscript{33}

The Bohemian presence offered a new means of providing episcopal holdings in Little Poland with protection and military potential, especially when the Krakovian see received new bishops who at least nominally manifested interest in closer relations with Prague. In 1293 the former ducal chancellor, a canon at the cathedral of Krakow and a chief administrator of the Gniezno Archdiocese, Prokop (in office: 1292–1294), who had been elected to his episcopal office with some Přemyslid assistance, received first privileges.\textsuperscript{34} Václav concentrated on forging close relations with Krakovian monasteries and the bishopric without making his rule an object of negotiations with local ecclesiastical or secular leadership. His patronage of monastic communities began merely a year after the resignation of his father-in-law Przemysł II from the throne of Krakow.\textsuperscript{35} In 1293 Prokop received exemption from taxes from the two episcopal towns of Ilza and Tarczek – a significant step towards ensuring their autonomous status in the secular territory. On that occasion the foreign monarch mentioned the bishop’s “servicia utilita”.\textsuperscript{36}

Václav’s appreciation of Prokop’s assistance came to light again a year later, when the bishop was called to Prague to answer accusations about unspecified acts against Bohemian interests.\textsuperscript{37}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[32] KDM 2, no. 541, p. 208 (1303); \emph{Zbiór dokumentów małopolskich...,} cz. 1, nr 12, pp. 18–19.
\item[33] KDM 2, no. 521, pp. 187–88.
\item[34] Długosz mentions Václav’s pressure on the canons of the Krakow cathedral to elect Prokop – a view modified by T. Nowakowski, “Polityka biskupów krakowskich w końcu XIII wieku” [The politics of the bishops of Krakow to the end of the thirteenth century], \emph{Nasza Przeszłość} 1991, t. 75, pp. 11–12. In his opinion, the election was technically free, although welcomed by the Bohemian king.
\item[35] In 1292 Václav confirmed the original grants to the Order of Saint Clare in Sącz. KDM 2, no. 521, p. 314.
\item[36] KKK 1, no. 98, p. 134.
\item[37] Whom the bishop may have conspired with during Václav’s absence is still debated. Some have suggested that Prokop wanted to protect his diocese against Łokietek’s devastating invasions by opening negotiations with the aggressive Kujavian duke. K. Tymieniecki, “Odnowienie dawnego Królestwa Polskiego” [The renewal of the old kingdom of Poland], KH 1920, t. 34, pp. 41–42; and B. Włodarski, \emph{Polska i Czechy...,} pp. 60–61. The opposition of the Bohemian governors to the bishop’s attempts to collect the salt tithes and the issue of an episcopal town relo-\end{footnotes}
Having taken an oath of fealty, Prokop remained in episcopal office and Václav rewarded him with tithes from salt mines near Krakow, officially as compensation for destruction that occurred during a war against Duke Łokietek. Despite Prokop’s surprising resignation from the office soon after, the bishopric’s gravitation towards Prague continued.

Bishop Jan Muskata forged a close alliance with the powerful Bohemian monarchy, which had been encroaching on Polish duchies since the early 1290s. Cooperation offered the bishop opportunities to directly manage even large strongholds and knightly contingents. But the see of Krakow had embarked on a project that ultimately slipped out of its control. The dominant political agent was the Přemyslid king Václav, who in the course of rallying support in Poland only temporarily enhanced the power of his close Polish allies, including the bishop of Krakow.

Jan Muskata demonstrated impressive adaptability to a new political situation, becoming a loyal champion of the Přemyslids. Muskata’s patrician background and political connections to the Bohemian court opened new horizons for asserting political power outside the usual channels such as regency and leadership in baronial rebellions. When in 1295 Przemysł II of Great Poland petitioned the papal Curia for the royal crown, Muskata countered his efforts by bringing Silesian dukes and the bishop of Wrocław into the Bohemian camp. The bishop also attended the two coronations that made Václav the king of Bohemia and the king of Poland, the former in Prague in 1297 and the latter in Gniezno in 1300. For

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38 KKK 1, no. 97, pp. 133–134.
39 For a useful presentation of the bishop’s relations with the court at Prague, see T. Pietras, Krwawy wilk z pastorałem. Biskup krakowski Jan zwany Muskata [Bloody wolf with a crosier – the Krakow bishop Jan called Muskata], Warszawa 2001, pp. 43–87.
40 T. Jurek, "Przygotowanie do koronacji Przemysła II" [Preparations for the coronation of Przemysł II], in: Przemysł II. Odnowienie Królestwa Polskiego, ed. J. Krzyżaniakowa, Poznań 1997, pp. 178–179, argues that Václav’s charter allowing the fortification of three episcopal towns in 1295 was a reward to the bishop for his pro-Přemyslid diplomacy in Silesia. See also KKK 1, no. 101, pp. 137–138.
his service to the king, he was rewarded with the vice-chancery of Hungary and a castle on the Polish–Hungarian frontier.\textsuperscript{41}

Later sources that describe the trial of the bishop between 1306 and 1308 probably exaggerate the uncanonical character of Muskata’s elevation, although Muskata was undoubtedly Václav’s nominee.\textsuperscript{42} The king dispatched his \textit{starosta (capitaneus)}, Hynek of Dube, who at least allegedly, according to witnesses in the later trials against the bishop, demanded Muskata’s episcopal elevation.\textsuperscript{43} From the beginning it was obvious that the Přemyslid was not to remain in Krakow. Rather, he elevated Muskata to the new powerful office of \textit{starosta}, which allowed the bishop to practically exercise regency and represent all aspects of Václav’s authority in Little Poland. The bishopric was to become a fundamental tier of Bohemian rule.

The cooperation between Muskata and Václav theoretically provided the bishopric of Krakow with primary instruments of territorial protection, but the final practical results were disappointing. The king’s famous grant of the Pławiec castle in the Spiš region, made even before Václav obtained the Polish crown, may have been an initiation of episcopal territorial lordship.\textsuperscript{44} But the intention of the Bohemian king appears rather ambiguous. Muskata received the castle in 1301 in hereditary possession with the right to colonize its environs and give the settlers land under favorable tenure conditions. However, the coinciding royal grant of two border villages, Lubowla and Gniazda, to the Přemyslids’ German ally, Jordan de Gargow, and the postponement of the final transfer of the Pławiec castle to the bishop strongly suggest that the Přemyslid ruler preferred to diversify his support base by expending power through individual lordships.\textsuperscript{45} More practical benefits

\textsuperscript{41} KKK 1, no. 105, pp. 140–141.

\textsuperscript{42} For Muskata’s early relations with the Bohemian court and the controversy surrendering his elevation to the bishopric, see M. Maciejowski, \textit{Orientacje polityczne biskupów...}, pp. 180–89.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Analecta Vaticana 1202–1366}, ed. J. Ptaśnik, Kraków 1914 (\textit{Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana}, t. 3) [hereafter: AV], no. 121, p. 83; no. 133, pp. 93–94.


\textsuperscript{45} At the time Václav III, as Václav V, was only the king of Hungary. The Přemyslids’ successor to the Kingdom of Hungary, Charles Robert, built a castle at Lubowla to cement royal authority in the northern frontier of his Hungarian realm.
temporarily came to the bishopric from securing a small stronghold with seigniorial rights in the eastern part of the Sącz region, only as compensation for the affluent village of Kamienica near the controversial foundation of the Order of Saint Clare at Sącz.

The role of Bishop Muskata as an important advocate of the Přemyslids’ interests in Poland prompted Václav to resolve the issue by compensating the bishopric with the stronghold of Biecz and probably an adjacent town. The neighboring villages complemented the grant. Biecz was the economic and administrative center of a castellany that Duke Leszek the Black had tried to remove from the possession of Kinga’s monastery at Sącz. In 1303, the bishopric gained a region that had already failed to become an episcopal district of military and political significance. In later charters there is no sign of any effort to recover Kamienica for the Krakowian see. When a new ruler of the duchy, Kujavian Władysław Łokietek (Duke of Krakow: 1306–1320; King of Poland: 1320–1333) issued new privileges for Kamienica in September 1306, merely a month after Václav III’s death, the charter did not list any prerogatives of the episcopal authority, although Muskata witnessed the document.

If not for later events, one might assume that by investing the bishop with the Biecz castle in the Duchy of Krakow, Václav purposefully aided Muskata in the process of constructing episcopal territorial lordship. Václav II, the king of Bohemia and Poland after 1300, in fact appeared quite unhelpful in this matter. The stronghold of Biecz, an adjacent town, and neighboring villages fell under the see’s jurisdiction only as compensation for the populous and affluent settlement at Kamienica that Václav had confiscated during the prior episcopal vacancy. The limitations of episcopal liberty in compact territories also emerged after the Biecz area had been recovered by the Přemyslids from its temporary occupation by the Hungarians. Václav restricted the bishopric’s control of the town

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See T.E. Modelski, *Spory o południowe granice diecezji krakowskiej od strony Spisza (wiek XIII–XIV)* [Conflicts over the southern borders of the Krakovian diocese from the side of Spiš (13th–14th centuries)], Zakopane 1928, pp. 43, 49–50.


47 KDM 1, no. 136, pp. 165–166.
to the mere right of patronage in local churches.\textsuperscript{48} The bishop could not have been pleased with this constraint. The fifteenth-century chronicler Jan Długosz even notes that Muskata was ready to assist his adversary, Duke Władysław Łokietek, if the Piast duke allowed him to recover Biecz from the Bohemians.\textsuperscript{49}

The abovementioned limitations of episcopal territorial gains did not mean the absolute absence of benefits from Muskata’s alliance with the Přemyslid monarchy. The improvement of fortifications guarding episcopal strongholds and the construction of walls around major episcopal towns were tolerated by the Přemyslids as a means of amplifying a crucial alliance with the Bishopric of Krakow. On June 20, 1295, Václav granted the bishop the right to fortify the already legally privileged market towns of Kielce, Tarczek, Iłża, and Sławków, the latter two with strongholds later expanded into fairly large castles.\textsuperscript{50}

The Přemyslid monarch strengthened specific locations of strategic importance to pacify potential opposition to his rule in Poland; he did not intend to support the process of expanding territorial control by of the bishop of Krakow. There is little reason to believe that the term \textit{princeps} used by Václav for Muskata in a major charter, had a territorial rather than a honorific connotation, especially when the language stressing his close relations with the bishop needed to be more courteous than precise in technical terms.\textsuperscript{51} It should be remembered that Václav’s son, young Václav III, used the same title (\textit{venerabilis princeps noster}) in reference to the bishop of Krakow in 1301 in Buda, shortly after his

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{49} Długosz, lib. 9, p. 35.
\item \textsuperscript{50} KKK 1, no. 101, p. 137. For the castle at Sławków, see J. Pierzak, “Wyniki najnowszych badań nad zamkiem biskupów krakowskich w Sławkowie, woj. katowice” [Results of recent research on the castle of the Krakovian bishops in Sławków], \textit{Śląskie Prace Historyczne} 1994, t. 3, pp. 137–161. Information about the bishop’s direct involvement in building the strongholds in Pelczyska and Kurów can be found in the testimonies recorded during the ecclesiastical trials of Bishop Muskata. In his chronicle, Długosz also mentions Lelów as one of the first forts of the bishop that fell to Władysław. Długosz, lib. 9, pp. 15–16. The absence of those strongholds in Václav’s charter for Muskata was caused either by their earlier construction or their insignificant strategic importance. See AV, no. 121, pp. 83–84.
\item \textsuperscript{51} KKK 1, no. 101, p. 137; S. Gawlas, \textit{O kształt zjednoczonego Królestwa…}, p. 92, associates the title and the grants of castles with Václav’s acceptance of Muskata’s territorial lordship.
\end{itemize}
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Coronation as the king of Hungary. There, along with the chancellorship of the kingdom, Muskata was to receive the already mentioned frontier castle at Plawiec. Its practical contribution to the process of consolidating power by the bishop into one compact territory in Little Poland seems doubtful. The castle at Olsztyn, 65 miles to the northwest of Krakow, and the most unassailable castle held by Muskata, Lipowiec in Silesia, were plainly irrelevant to the areas under episcopal control in the Sącz region along the border with Hungary.

More characteristically, the absence of the actual transfer of the Plawiec stronghold to the bishop indicates the highly instrumental treatment of its Krakovian collaborator by the Přemyslid monarchy, which simply required frontier castles to be in the hands of faithful allies. The bishop was to be only one element of a complex structure of support developed by the Přemyslids in Poland. In this mosaic of lordships and interest groups, any given faction was prevented from concentrating excessive power, while the Přemyslids eventually intended to install a reliable governor directly representing their interests.

The office of the starosta (capitaneus), the governor of the king’s Polish territories, granted to Muskata by Václav in 1303, aimed at consolidating the Přemyslids’ power in Little Poland and centrally managing specific strategic locations dispersed across the province. As was the case in the allocation of military resources, the office of starosta was not designed to help the bishop construct a territorial enclave outside the Přemyslids’ control. After 1303, Muskata’s ecclesiastical prestige as a lord with seigniorial power

52 KKK 1, no. 105, pp. 140–141.
53 For Muskata’s appropriation of castles as a means of preparing ground for the creation of territorial lordship during the Přemyslids’ offensive in Polish duchies, see T. Pietras, *Krawy wilk z pastorałem...,* pp. 56–57.
had already been shattered by a prolonged conflict with the archbishop of Gniezno that resulted in the excommunication of the bishop, an interdict placed on the Krakovian diocese, and a trial.\textsuperscript{56} The office of the starosta that Muskata seems to have held shortly thereafter may have constituted an attempt by Václav to buttress the declining position of the bishop.\textsuperscript{57} Having built up his position as a main arm of Bohemian rule, the bishop was theoretically equipped with instruments of coercion to continue episcopal control over strategic locations even after the collapse of Bohemian authority in the Polish duchies. The prerogatives of the starosta allowed the bishop to hire mercenaries and organize military campaigns by the power vested with him by royal authority. This ability to exploit the local population for military purposes and raise armed forces, despite the absence of information how precisely it was accomplished, provided crucial means of protecting episcopal holdings or even expanding them. Because Muskata exercised temporal lordship, the despoliation of the cathedral chapter to pay his military expenses, his ordering of executions, as well as his tolerance of his soldiers’ robberies in the countryside – all of which appear to have shocked his contemporaries – were a logical result of his status as an ambitious and effective proprietor of seigniorial rights.

The Failure of Episcopal Lordship in the Collapsing Přemyslid Monarchy

It is possible to entertain the idea that Bohemian rule could have placed the Duchy of Krakow under the bishop’s paramount seigniorial authority, had not the rebellion of the Sandomierz barons, who had already manifested separatist tendencies when their position within the entire province of Little Poland declined, upset Přemyslid expansion in Poland. The great aristocratic families of Bogoria, Lis, and Starz quickly realized that Václav’s accession to the Krakow throne failed to redress the balance of power

\textsuperscript{56} The sources are imprecise about the cause of this early stage of the conflict between the two ecclesiastical leaders. The verdict that ended it merely orders Muskata to act obediently towards the archbishop. See AV, no. 121, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{57} There is no consensus as to when exactly Muskata may have held that office. See T. Nowakowski, “Polityka biskupów krakowskich...”, pp. 20–22.
between the two provinces of Little Poland.\textsuperscript{58} Václav, like the Piast duke Przemysł II of Great Poland five years earlier, chose to be crowned in Gniezno in Great Poland – an indication that the provincial baronage might never secure predominance in the Polish kingdom again. Władysław Łokietek of Kujavia took advantage of this political ferment and appealed to the alienated barons, especially those in the Province of Sandomierz.

In 1300 Václav was crowned as the king of Poland in Gniezno. His governors came to his Polish realm from Bohemia and the Silesian duchies.\textsuperscript{59} The revival of a Polish monarchy based in Krakow appeared remote, if not impossible, in the immediate future.\textsuperscript{60} With Władysław’s determination to cast out the Přemyslids, only the new prospect of a monarchy unequivocally centered in Little Poland and delegating power to local lords, provided a significant incentive to Krakovian nobles to abandon the Bohemian camp. The attitudes of the papacy were not less important. The Přemyslids’ appetite for Hungary, revealed in dynastic policies and military intervention, caused concern in the Curia.\textsuperscript{61} Pope Boniface VIII attempted to oppose Václav’s intervention in Hungary and openly rejected the Bohemian claim to the Polish crown.\textsuperscript{62} Václav’s death in 1305 and the murder of his son Václav III en route to Poland precipitated a major reconfiguration of the power structure in the Přemyslid realm. This dynastic catastrophe rendered the ambition

\textsuperscript{58} The Duchy of Sandomierz in Little Poland usually served as an endowment and benefice for the dukes of Krakow’s widows, occasionally united with Krakow and the rest of Little Poland. See A. Teterycz-Puzio, “Status dzielnicy krakowsko-sandomierskiej w XIII w.” [The status of the province of Krakow–Sandomierz in the thirteenth century], CPH 2006, t. 58, pp. 135–151.

\textsuperscript{59} Długosz, lib. 9, pp. 16–17, 23.

\textsuperscript{60} Tomasz Nowakowski has pointed out that the effort to incorporate the Krakovian secular elite into the Bohemian administration could not ultimately satisfy the barons as long as there were two separate governors for Little Poland and Great Poland, both foreigners. See T. Nowakowski, \textit{Małopolska elita władzy...}, pp. 52–56, 108.

\textsuperscript{61} Boniface VIII planned to grant Hungary as a papal fief to Charles Robert de Anjou and declared him the lawful king of Hungary on May 31, 1303. See \textit{Regesta pontificum romanorum, inde ab an post Christum. natum 1198 ad an 1304}, vol. 2, ed. A. Potthast, Graz1957, no. 25252, p. 2019.

\textsuperscript{62} BP, no. 964, p. 176. For the Apostolic See’s increasing interest in Polish affairs in the context of succession crises in Hungary, see W. Abraham, “Sprawa Muskaty” [The Muskata affair], \textit{Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności. Wydział Historyczno-Filozoficzny} 1894, t. 30, pp. 151–156.
of the bishop’s full control of a substantial and consolidated episcopal district once more unresolved.

The weakness of the territorial foundations of an autonomous episcopal authority was fully revealed during the campaign of Duke Władysław Łokietek to capture Krakow shortly after the withdrawal of Bohemian forces from the province in 1304. The duke quickly subjugated the main areas of episcopal influence, including Sandomierz, Wiślica, the nearby stronghold of Pełczyska, Lelów, and eventually even Tyniec, a strategic location at a short distance from Krakow, where Jan Muskata’s brother-in-law, Gerlach de Culpen, had pillaged the monastery and established a garrison in the town.63 The occupation of Tyniec by troops loyal to Muskata was not unreasonable due to the earlier failure of the Benedictines to guard Biecz against the bishop’s enemies.64 The bishop also transferred the ownership of the large castle of Lipowiec from the cathedral chapter to his relative Gerlach de Culpen, and fortified the collegiate church in Wiślica.65 Muskata was mustering the last available forces to retain a base from which he could launch a counter-offensive against the Kujavian duke. But while there is no evidence that the episcopal lordship was incapable of organizing an effective military campaign, Muskata’s conflict with the cathedral chapter presented a particularly acute problem when all resources were needed to resist the collapse of Václav’s kingship in Poland. Accusations against Muskata’s autocratic style of governing the see were one of the themes of the trials against the bishop in later years.66 It is possible that Muskata came to view his episcopal office as an impediment to effective lordship in the Duchy of Krakow. To render his power effective, Muskata was required to transform that power from strictly institutional to personal, and the practice of banal lordship seemed to have met this need.

The determination with which Muskata defended the bishopric’s possessions against Duke Władysław, then steadily encroaching on Krakow, resulted in only partial success. The grand privilege for the see of Krakow issued by the duke on September 2, 1306,

63 “Rocznik Traski...”, p. 853; Długosz, lib. 9, pp. 15–16, 34–35.
64 AV, no. 121, pp. 87–92. Judicial testimonies about the destruction of the monastic church can be found in the records of the judicial trial against the bishop in 1306–1308.
66 Ibidem, pp. 87–92.
approved a number of castellanies under the autonomous lordship of the bishop.\textsuperscript{67} The inclusion of the castellany of Biecz and Chęciny castle with eleven villages in the areas that would enjoy jurisdictional exemptions from ducal rights, and Władysław’s promises to return the stronghold at Pełczyska near the episcopal towns of Kielce and Wiślica, were positive steps towards reinstatement of the bishop’s economic and military power base.\textsuperscript{68} Yet, the lack of any records of episcopal activities in Biecz and Chęcin after the meeting of the bishop with the duke in 1306 leads one to doubt that Władysław had ever planned to fulfill the agreement.

When after a formal election Łokietek entered Krakow in September 1306,\textsuperscript{69} he realized that good relations with the former allies of Václav were essential for his rule in the duchy. Almost a decade earlier he had granted Muskata two privileges in the course of his unsuccessful struggle to win Krakow after Przemysł II’s death.\textsuperscript{70} In consequence, in the same year Łokietek captured Krakow he confirmed Václav’s grants, returned some strongholds, and offered legal and commercial privileges to the bishopric and the townspeople of Krakow.\textsuperscript{71} This period of amicable relations was nonetheless brief. Between 1307 and 1309 the fate of episcopal economic and military centers was ultimately determined during Duke Władysław’s aggressive campaign to subdue the entire Little Poland. In 1307, having appropriated tithes, Łokietek seized three episcopal towns and castles.\textsuperscript{72} When his relations with Muskata temporarily improved, the duke merely

\textsuperscript{67} The charter names four castellanies with centers at Kielce, Tarczek, Ilża and Biecz.

\textsuperscript{68} KKK 1, no. 114, pp. 147–149.

\textsuperscript{69} Election by the nobles of the duchy was an important legitimizing act that gave Łokietek an ideological advantage that the Přemyslids represented by the bishop had difficulty in countering. For the election, see Długosz, lib. 9, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{70} KKK 1, no. 102, p. 138; no. 103, pp. 138–139. The privileges of episcopal immunities and economic liberties pertain to the location of a new episcopal village.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Ibidem}, no. 114, pp. 147–149; KDMK, no. 4, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{72} KDM 2, no. 547, p. 331; “Rocznik Traski…”, p. 853. The imprisonment of the bishop by Duke Władysław Łokietek around 1306 has stimulated an interesting new theory. According to Tomasz Jurek, the humiliation of the bishop was dictated by his contacts with Duke Henry of Głogów who planned to invade Little Poland. Although the agreement arranged by Henry’s envoy pertained to exchange of tithes, a delay in the return of the envoy may point to Muskata’s conspiring against Łokietek; see T. Jurek, “Dziedzic Królestwa Polskiego. Książę głogowski
confirmed the privileges of Bolesław the Chaste and Leszek the Black. Those granted by Václav were not mentioned.\textsuperscript{73} On June 7, 1307, the duke issued a new charter for the bishopric. In the document he formally annulled all the privileges and grants received by the bishop from the Přemyslid monarchy.\textsuperscript{74} The special status of the fortification of church holdings, especially market towns, was now open to interpretation and depended solely on the good will of the new duke. The demand to deliver Lipowiec castle to Władysław Łokietek as a part of the peace agreement of July 2, 1309, was the final act that deprived the episcopal domain of its military backbone. The temporary acquisition of the bishopric’s prosperous town of Sławków by the duke as a guarantee of finalizing the Lipowiec transfer also put an end to the locus of the see’s economic significance.\textsuperscript{75} During a new political crisis caused by the outbreak of the Krakovian burghers’ rebellion against Władysław in 1311, townsmen in the larger settlements that formerly belonged to the Krakovian bishops, such as Sącz, Kamienica, and Lelow, remained loyal to the duke.\textsuperscript{76} Even the long-promised town of Biecz was either insecure or remained under ducal jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{77} Flight to Silesia in 1309 spared Muskata the personal implementation of the agreement

\textsuperscript{73} KKK 1, no. 116, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{75} AV, no. 124, pp. 97–99.
\textsuperscript{76} The Sącz Domain did not cease as a distinct lordship during Władysław’s struggle to control Krakow and in the revived kingdom of Poland. It served his wife Jadwiga as a power base to construct a network of support among the baronial elite of Little Poland, especially after her husband’s death in 1333. See A. Marzec, “Domina Terrae Sandecensis. Rola polityczna królowej Jadwigi Łokietkowej w kontekście jej związków z dostojnikami małopolskimi (1305–1339)” [“Domina terrae Sandecensis”. The political role of Queen Jadwiga, wife of Łokietek, in the context of her relations with the dignitaries of Little Poland], KH 2000, t. 107, pp. 3–23.
\textsuperscript{77} T. Pietras, Krwawy wilk z pastoralem..., p. 108, has pointed out that in 1308 during another ecclesiastical trial advanced against Muskata, the bishop was blamed for the loss of the town. However, the trial records should be interpreted with caution. The testimonies may have referred to a former state of affairs and Biecz had, in fact, been recovered for the bishopric, a matter that biased witnesses would have preferred to overlook. The town was certainly confiscated by Duke Władysław around the time of the rebellion of the Krakovian burghers in 1312. Długosz explicitly connected the two events. See Długosz, lib. 9, pp. 80–84.
and ultimate humiliation. Practically, it deprived the episcopal forces of leadership.

Conclusion

A combination of delicate diplomacy and an aggressive assertion of territorial rights was a sensible and seemingly promising policy of the bishopric of Krakow after the death of Bolesław the Chaste and in the face of renewed political instability in the province in the second half of the thirteenth century. The unusual status of the Sącz region offered the ecclesiastical authorities an opportunity to alter the power structure in terms of territory. The conflict between Bishop Paul and Duke Leszek the Black proved, however, that in a direct confrontation the bishopric could not match ducal power due to the usual absence of its own military force and its limited success in securing assistance from the provincial baronage. Secular rulers tolerated paramount episcopal control only on a local level, in select villages and towns. The bishop of Krakow held a few fortified settlements and castles, which were politically useful but insufficient to facilitate a successful large-scale rebellion and to secure liberty from the ducal court. At the end of the period discussed, there were only four episcopal strongholds of any significance and no host of military contingents directly bound to the episcopal authority through a system of land tenure. As a result, even the most ambitious ecclesiastical leader would present no major threat to either Piast or Přemyslid rule. The utilization of the traditional attributes of seigniorial power without consultations with the cathedral chapter in the early fourteenth century merely led to legal charges against the bishop.

The period of the Přemyslid presence in Poland demonstrated that a close alliance with a new secular government, despite its temporary positive assistance, was not the most reliable solution to overcome the bishop’s limitations in exercising full control over land and its tenants. Local lordships did not evolve into a principality. The process of consolidating power was first interrupted, and then completely shattered by the superior political and military strength of secular rulers. The prospect of constructing an episcopal territorial domain in provincial terms using
diplomacy and arms, opportunities and obstacles…

A tangible structure of coercion ended with Bishop Muskata, who, at the moment of defeat in the Duchy of Krakow, did not attempt to fall back on episcopal castles and reorganize military forces, but sought refuge beyond diocesan borders. It is worth noting that when a fifteenth-century bishop, Zbigniew Oleśnicki, was finally able to obtain a small principality, he did so through purchase, not through the organic growth of autonomous ecclesiastical estates or military struggle, and he became a prince at the time of a powerful and fully confident Polish monarchy.

In the larger context of medieval lordship and territorial rulership, the bishopric of Krakow did not achieve particular success despite seemingly favorable conditions provided by conflicts within the ruling ducal dynasty and a deteriorating central authority. Unlike their peers in the German realm, or even in the Polish provinces of Silesia and Kuyavia, the bishops of Krakow did not master sufficient resources or demonstrate any particular will to seek complete independence from secular authority as territorial princes. This may have merely reflected the Krakovian prelates’ conservatism and pragmatism in the implementation of the Gregorian ideas of ecclesiastical liberties. As in Bohemia, Hungary, or Kievan Rus’, the Church in Little Poland had experienced a dangerous level of insecurity under a weak and ineffective secular authority, even before the crown attempted to curb some ecclesiastical privileges. Thus, the bishops of Krakow rather than constructing their own lordships and further diminishing secular patronage and protection, tended to support strong native or even foreign rulers. This seems to have been a preferred method of securing broad ecclesiastical interests.

Episcopal territorial control in High Medieval Little Poland was therefore a result of political opportunism and practical necessity. Their peers in other Polish provinces more effectively built episcopal domains, although not on the same level of final success everywhere. Due to an extensive and complex web of political circumstances and economic changes, reorganization of towns, colonization, and the persisting traditional patrimonial rights of nobles, episcopal lordship rarely produced compact territories, where ducal authority practically disappeared. In few cases, like the episcopal principality of Nysa–Otmuchów, or the Castellany of Wolbórz, the transition from ecclesiastical property ownership and increasing legal and economic immunities from
secular authority to independent territorial lordships, with full traditional ducal rights pertaining to land and tenants exercised by individual prelates, advanced on a small and local scale.\textsuperscript{78} The political and ideological history of the bishopric of Krakow emphasizes the crucial importance of particular political circumstances and local conditions. The evolution of the Episcopal leadership in Little Poland was in accord with the pan-European tendencies to develop banal lordships and autonomous territorial jurisdictions, including regional legal and economic immunities from secular authority. The bishops of Krakow generally chose the safer and more predictable method to guard their interests: avoidance of an open confrontation with powerful laymen and, instead, cooperation with and support for a strong secular arm of the Church as envisioned by Pope Galesius in the fifth century. Experimentations with certain attributes of public power, like legal, economic, and military prerogatives in select districts administered by bishops, did not lead to the formation of an episcopal principality in Little Poland. But that could have been neither predicted nor was it predestined in the late thirteenth century. The case of the bishopric of Krakow exemplifies the diversity of political methods and their practical outcomes in the episcopal quest for leadership and political relevance in a decentralized ducal Poland with unstable secular rulership.
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Streszczenie

Dyplomacja i oręż, możliwości i przeszkody w biskupiej kontroli terytorialnej w Księstwie Krakowskim, 1279–1320

W Europie XIII w. rozwój biskupstwa krakowskiego odbywał się zgodnie z ogólną tendencją do tworzenia autonomicznych obszarów immunitetowych z prerogatywami władztwa terytorialnego. Jednak po okresie dłuższej dynastycznej stabilizacji zakończonej wraz ze śmiercią Bolesława Wstydliwego w 1279 r. biskupi krakowscy musieli się wykazać różnorodnością taktyki w celu utrzymania, a nawet rozszerzenia immunitetów prawnych w posiadłościach ziemskich. W przeciwieństwie jednak do wielu biskupstw w sąsiedniej Rzeszy Niemieckiej lub Czechach, a nawet w samej Polsce, pomimo z poziu korzystnych warunków wynikłych z osłabienia centralnej władzy świeckiej, prałaci krakowscy nie stworzyli suwerennej władzy książęcej. Piastowie i czescy Przemyslidzi wykazali znaczącą efektywność w zapobieganiu
stratom terytorialnym na rzecz Kościoła. Artykuł ten omawia strategie biskupów w rozszerzaniu władzy kościelnej i w wykorzystaniu pojawiających się możliwości wzmacniania jej terytorialnej kontroli w okręgach diecezjalnych. Różnorodność wysiłków, między innymi dyplomatyczne zabiegi biskupów, wykorzystanie prawa patronatu i prawa kanonicznego, ekonomiczne przedsięwzięcia kolonizacyjne, a nawet militarna aktywność okazały się ostatecznie niewystarczające. Zarówno Paweł z Przemankowa w otwartym konflikcie z księciem Leszkiem Czarnym, biskup Prokop w początkowo poprawnych relacjach z Waclawem czeskim, jak i Jan Muskata z pewnym potencjałem wojskowym i w bliskiej współpracy z czeską monarchią, nie byli w stanie osiągnąć znaczącej dominacji terytorialnej. Biskupstwo krakowskie na przełomie XIII i XIV w. ilustruje fundamentalny wpływ lokalnych uwarunkowań politycznych, przypadków i indywidualnych decyzji na rozwój kościelnego władztwa terytorialnego, a którego ostateczny wynik nie mógł być przesądzony w Polsce przed odnowieniem monarchii w 1320 r.