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THE FORM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S CONTEMPORARY AND FUTURE DEFENSE POLICY

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Abstract

Defence and Security Policy in Europe evolved, and thus it is a result of numerous actions and searches. Conflicts in Europe (in the Balkans) have forced the EU countries to change their thinking. The crisis after 2008 had a significant impact on the "inhibition" of defence policy activities.

A new global situation and threats (from Russia) exert some significant influence on the aspirations to conduct a common EU defence policy. For several years now, Poland has been pursuing a policy in this area that is not fully accepted by EU countries.

This paper is intended to show the need for a more harmonized EU defence policy, until its unification. Available research methods have been adopted, namely, historical, statistical, comparative and descriptive. The paper is interdisciplinary due to the multithreaded nature of the problem.

Keywords: defence policy, defence industry, globalization, armed conflicts, Poland's position in the EU, security policy

JEL classification: G, D,

Instead of an introduction

The European Union, after years of success in achieving and implementing successive stages of integration, has recently encountered plenty of barriers and problems. One of them is the challenges regarding the common defence policy. When Robert Schuman, a French statesman, made a declaration of peace to the peoples of Europe on 9 May 1950, he was primarily concerned with the security of those peoples and the eradication of war. It was a matter of safe cooperation between these nations, and afterward, he planned to build some economic and political ties.

Another "father" of European integration, Jean Monnet, already in 1945, expressed his conviction that prosperity is easier to achieve at the European level than at the national one. Therefore (in his opinion) the route to integration is long and inevitably leads through the economy (Michelle, 2007).

1. History and current situation

Hence, the history of the current European Union began with an attempt to create a common defence policy, a common army. This 'French' initiative was supported in Germany, the Benelux countries, Italy and several others, even in the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, it was the French Parliament that did not give its support and the whole idea was 'fell apart' for many decades. The "economic option" of integration remained, initially in one sector, the coal and steel, as a base for the defence industry.

However, the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1952, could not become a real system of security and defence for the countries that created it, because in the face of the threat from the Soviet Union, these countries had to seek real support from the USA, i.e. the North Atlantic Alliance, which included both parts of the Free West, during the Cold War: Western Europe and North America (Kuźniar, 2014).

It was not until the end of the Cold War that attempts to build an autonomous European defence policy could be made. In the 1970s and now, the biggest attempts are to create a defence alliance within NATO and the WEU (Western European Union). However, these attempts failed, which we experienced in the Balkan Peninsula during the armed conflicts. When diplomatic efforts floundered and the use of force proved necessary, the EU could not do so because it did not have its capabilities in this area. The only instrument of this kind has, therefore, remained the North Atlantic Alliance, being left in the hands of the Americans in terms of decisions and military capabilities. It should be recalled that the USA (after its experience in Somalia) has for a long time "resisted" the European persuasion of military engagement in the area of the former Yugoslavia. But when it decided, they did it without looking at the partners from Europe, when all over the West there was a "whining" that Europe had not passed the test. When it turned out that Europe "can only talk" and when it comes "to the specifics", it is only the USA that can take responsibility (Kuźniar, 2014). The United States had shown, also to Russia and the whole world that it is the only country that can be counted on when it comes to European security.

The European Union also demonstrated its helplessness concerning the US intervention strategy in Kosovo imposed by the Americans in 1999, when the US imposed the 'zero-loss rule' (means only air attacks), leading to the "caricature" of the humanitarian intervention (Kuźniar, 2014). One might think that this unpleasant experience had led to "awakening" and great determination towards independence and sufficiency on its continent. This was supported by the upcoming expansion of the EU to include 12 countries, as well as by the process of deepening integration (monetary union). The Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, as well as the subsequent Constitutional Treaty, show huge steps towards the introduction of common defence policy.

In building a common defence policy, the French were the most determined (faced not only with their "phobia" towards the USA, but also with the feeling that France was getting economically weaker, so there was a need for a different level of "showing leadership"). France quickly convinced the United Kingdom to its initiative and it was these countries that resigned (The beginning took place in 1947 when these 2 countries signed the so-called Treaty of Dunkirk) the declaration in Saint-Malo.

This declaration underlined that 'To play a comprehensive international role, the European Union must be equipped with an autonomous capacity to deal with crises, including the deployment and use of military force'. Once again, the need for not only strategic planning but also for building industrial and technological bases in the armaments sector was stressed. France and the United Kingdom can successfully provoke the remaining member states to undertake close cooperation in this branch of the industry! After all, there is nothing to stop

the idea to follow the development of a European air transport industry (AIRBUS) and to start building a military air sector. No one can compete with the US giant, Boeing, as only large-scale production can face the competition in the global world. The example of Airbus has shown that it is possible to cope with the competition.

The arrangements made by France and Britain in Saint-Malo were positively received in other EU countries, which was reflected in the introduction of a new term into the EU language at the Cologne Summit in June 1999: European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It was decided, but by the UN Charter, to establish appropriate bodies and structures in the area of so-called crisis operations. In 1999, the Helsinki Summit set up a political and military committee and a military staff. Javier Solana, EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Representative, was appointed responsible for the preparation.

However, to develop the credibility of the ESDP, there was a need to viably create military and decision-making capabilities! But this became more difficult than expected in Paris and London, as the position of the US (Clinton administration) had unfortunately shown great restraint towards the ESDP project.

Economically weak but militarily aggressive Russia easily divided the EU countries. It is interesting to note that former Soviet states such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia also expressed the "understanding" for Russian politics. This can now be seen in the activities in Syria.

An important step towards strengthening the defence and security policy was the adoption of the European Security Policy in December 2003, a document drafted mainly by J. Solana's office. It was like a confirmation that the EU is on the right path towards political and strategic autonomy and "reaching" the position of "superpower", a global actor (T. Blair), i.e. strengthening one of the three pillars of the world ranking of powers (after the USA and China). This was the result of "new thinking" in the European Union, aimed at the military aspect, so neglected between 1958 and 2001. It should be stressed, however, that this document was more of a concept than a rigorous piece of legislation. The fact that the document clarified the Union's overall military capability was a valuable element.

Unfortunately, there was a lack of consensus and mutual support within the Union on the part of the Member States. The aspiration expressed in this document was to create such a scenario: "The European Union and the United States can be a powerful force to the benefit of the good in the world, in a safer, fairer, more democratic world.

A weakness of this document was the lack of operational side, lack of tools. It must be stressed once more that it was strategically well thought and feasible. It was, however, an action due to impetus, based on the positive dynamics of development of the whole integration process in the EU.

On the one hand, the EU was expanding (in 2002 negotiations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were completed), and on the other hand, in the last phase of preparations, there was a "European constitution", which was associated with great hopes of reaching the federal constitution of Europe.

Not only the flag, emblem, and anthem, but also the common currency, the common army, the common foreign minister and the President of the European Union. These elements were supposed to create a new identity for the EU in the world, that the EU would not only remain a trading and economic power but would also become a serious political player in the global power system (alongside the USA and China). The question remains: if common money, common EU citizenship, why not a common army?

All these European positive intentions were interrupted by a series of events of different nature, but with a common denominator: the immaturity and unwillingness of the EU states (the strong ones) to play a role of a superpower. Various countries - superpowers - behaved differently, assessed the world situation differently and their unilateralism eventually

“buried” the project of the European Union as a global actor, and therefore made the security and defence policy unimportant.

The start came with the US war against Iraq, which divided the Union, despite the adoption of a joint UN Security Council resolution. The division into 'constructors' and 'deconstructors' of the European Union's common defence policy was, therefore, becoming increasingly clear.

Poland is an example of changeability: until mid-2007 it supported constructors, now it supports strangely, because leader Kaczyński is in favor of a common army, but is opposed to the creation of a federation! Meaning? - he does not understand what collective security means!

The recent actions of the government regarding the purchase of fighters in the USA prove that no one in this government understands what the EU's common defence policy should be based on.

Meanwhile, the Union is increasingly losing its self-confidence, being overwhelmed by political stagnation, exacerbated by the immigration crisis! Not without significance is also the adoption by B. Obama of a different approach (when compared to G. W. Bush, who would rather mock the EU's military plans), namely to encourage Europe to develop its defence forces. This was particularly important concerning the move of the USA to the Pacific area!

The interventions in North African countries during the so-called 'Arab Spring' were a failure of some EU countries, and the best example of stupidity was the military intervention in Libya and the overthrow of M. Gaddafi, which led to its collapse, and it now fosters the development of rebel and terrorist rule in numerous African and Middle Eastern countries.

Besides, a whole bunch of refugees is arriving in Europe via the "ruined" Libya. If this were a CSDP operation, it would have to be carried out per the mandate of the RB and all the resulting misfortunes could have been avoided, to the great detriment of the region and the EU.

However, the saddest moment of the CSDP (or rather its absence) occurred at the time of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Russia, which was supposed to guarantee the security of Ukraine's borders after the transfer of the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union to Russia.

This event in Europe, without precedence after the Second World War, was not treated as a security and defence problem in the EU! Yet it is also about the occupation and annexation of a part of the territory of a sovereign state by seemingly more responsible state power.

In addition, it concerns a country that desires to become a member of the EU, i.e. it is an indirect attack on the EU, on a potential member state, it is due to open pressure from Russia and under its influence the former president of Ukraine, V. Yanukovich, rejected the association agreement with the EU in November 2013, which was supposed to open a gateway for Ukraine to the EU and maybe later also to NATO!

In the face of such a clear situation, there has been an even deeper division within the Union than during the war in Iran. Unfortunately, only a few were responsible for the firm, hard response to Russia's aggressive policy, and a large number of countries, for economic and trade reasons, were actually on Russia's side (against sanctions and for maintaining "partnership" relations with Russia!)

A question arises as to why most EU capitals have not noticed that Russia's actions aimed at rebuilding the USSR's sphere of influence also undermine its security foundations and threaten peace in Europe. Is it the disappearance of the self-preservation instinct in the EU or even ignorance? After all, without this instinct, freedom, and security, there can be no common army, no common defence policy.

Also, there is the strong primacy of one's interests in the foreign policy of strong states such as France and Germany over the overall interest of the EU, and it is not conducive to common defence policy. Yet without a common foreign policy, there can be no common security and defence policy. The latter is the instrument of the former.

There are plenty of examples of this in life. After Russia's aggression towards Ukraine, it was not Brussels that spoke to Putin but Berlin and Paris! (Normandy Format.) Persons without any experience or clear position were elected as successors of C. Ashton. The EU avoids dealing with Ukraine or the Middle East, probably because it is afraid of Moscow. It finds a substitute: Africa because there is no Russian business there! The conclusion is as follows: the UE undertakes only safe military operations, far from its borders, and not in its defence!! This must be changed. Without a clear and common defence policy, the EU will become a "dwarf" in the political world; it will become dependent on the USA and defenseless in the face of aggressive and (militarily) powerful Russia.

The EU must mature to develop a course of action that will ensure its collective security. It may happen after some specific action of Russia, which will directly hit the borders of the EU (- better not)! Therefore, there is still a long way to go for the supporters of the Union as a strong, global partner.

Strong signals from the USA coming from the president's office are rather a sign of leaving Europe's security to Europeans. Donald Trump calls the case directly 'the American taxpayer will not pay for Europe's security. We spend around 5% of GDP on defence, the EU less than 2%. The Umbrella of the USA and thus of NATO over Europe is a thing of the past. The Americans believe that Europe spends more on social protection than the USA, at the expense of funds on armaments. This is proved by the table below.

Table 1: Armaments spending as a % of GDP in the USA and Europe

Country	GDP share	
	2005	2015
USA	4.3	5.1
France	2.3	2.2
Germany	1.4	1.7
Great Britain	2.3	2.5
Spain	2.0	2.1
The Netherlands	1.9	2.1
EU - average	1.9	1.7

Source: SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) various reports; Eurostat; the US and EU statistical yearbooks.

2. The institutional structure of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of Europe

The Institute for Security Studies of the European Union is an important institution, which has its seat in Paris, it operates as an agenda and plays an advisory and expert role. The Institute for Security Studies of the European Union has been established to support CFSP activities and, in particular, the European Security and Defence Policy. The Institute has a legal personality. It is completely independent, but it functions in close contact with the Council. The Institute deals with all kinds of analyses and research such as:

- Ad hoc surveys
- Organizing seminars
- Maintaining a network of exchanges with institutions and expert teams.

The results of studies and activities, excluding confidential and privileged information, are to be made available to the public. The Institute is placed under the political supervision of the Political and Security Committee. It has a Management Board composed of one representative of a Member State and one appointed by the Commission, who appoints a Director from among nationals of the Member States and their term of office is three years, renewable for a further two years. The Office of the Institute agrees on the work programmes and budget. "The special role of the Institute is since it constitutes the intellectual base for the activities undertaken in the field of security and defence of the EU.

1.1. European Security and Defence College

In November 2003, the Council of the European Union agreed on the organization's programme, aimed at cohesive training operations in the military and civil activities in the area of CSDP. In 2005, the Political and Security Committee legitimized the functioning of the European Security and Defence College, namely on 31 May. It also approved the establishment of the College Board, the Permanent Secretariat, and the Steering Committee. The European Security and Defence College is to serve as the most important training center to provide CSDP training. Courses at the strategic level are particularly important. Training provided by the ESDC comprises two types of training: initial training and higher-level training.

The objectives of the European Security and Defence College are as follows:

- Strengthening European security in the field of CSDP.
- Support for the development of effectiveness in understanding CFSP as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
- To provide European Union bodies with experts capable of working effectively on all CSDP issues.
- To provide Member State administrations with experts who have the necessary expertise and are familiar with the policies, procedures, and institutions of the European Union.
- Helping to spread professional contacts as well as contacts between training participants.

1.2. European Defence Agency

The European Defence Agency is composed of four directorates and it hires almost eighty employees. The Agency is subject to the authority of the General Affairs and External Relations Council and it reports to the Steering Committee. The Council sets the directions for the Agency and, at the same time, the Steering Committee is chaired by the High Representative for CFSP/Secretary-General. The European Commission also plays an important role in the functioning of the Agency. The European Defence Agency implements the activities and, where appropriate, is assisted by the Commission.

As Article 45 of the Treaty on European Union provides for, tasks of the European Defence Agency are to

- "contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;
- promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;
- propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;

- support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs;
- contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure”.

1.3. Political and Security Committee

Under Article 25 of the Treaty on European Union, the Political and Security Committee is to observe the international situation relating to the common foreign and security policy and to deliver opinions at the request of the Council or on its initiative. This is proved by the fact that the Political and Security Committee is competent to take appropriate action to manage any counter-measures in a crisis. In such a situation, it enjoys the privileges of the Council.

Moreover, at a time of crisis, the Political and Security Committee introduces "control and strategic direction" for the EU's military manoeuvres.

The Committee is a key element in the decision-making process in crises. It plays an important role in consultations with NATO as well as with third countries. Decisions made by the Political and Security Committee are made after consensus has been reached. The meetings are informal and held only in French and English.

The extent to which and the speed at which the European Union can cope with the crisis is largely determined by the decisions made by the Political and Security Committee. However, the Committee has a significant impact not only in times of crisis. It also plays an important role in the EU's ESDP policy-making process.

1.4. Military Committee of the European Union

The Military Committee of the European Union consists of Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, who are represented at its meetings by their military representatives. The Chiefs of Defence appear in person only in necessary situations.

The Military Committee of the European Union works within the Council of the European Union. The Chairman of the Committee himself is therefore appointed through the Council, upon an application and based on recommendations from the Committee. Under normal circumstances, the term of office of the Chairman is three years. The Chairman must demonstrate, at the time of appointment, the rank of four-star general, and preferably the Chief of Defence of any EU Member State. In case of absence, the Chairman may be replaced by a permanent Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee. However, this is only the case if such an office is set up and assigned.

The task of the EU Military Committee is to ensure support in military matters and to make suggestions to the Political and Security Committee. It makes recommendations and suggestions especially within the framework:

"The development of the overall concept of crisis management in its military aspects; the military aspects relating to the political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations and situations; the risk assessment of potential crises; the military dimension of a crisis situation and its implications, in particular during its subsequent management; for this purpose, it receives the output from the Situation Centre; the elaboration, the assessment and the review of capability objectives according to agreed procedures; the EU's military relationship with non-EU European NATO Members, the other candidates for accession to the EU, other States and other organisations, including NATO; the financial estimation for operations and exercises”.

He is also responsible for the management of the European Union Military Staff. In the event of a crisis, the Committee, at the initiative of the Political and Security Committee,

directs the preparation of the appropriate strategic military options by law, through the Director-General of the Military Staff of the European Union.

The Military Committee is also supported by military working groups, the Military Staff and, in special cases, by other organizational units.

The Military Committee, composed of permanent representatives, meets once a week and at the level of the Chiefs of Defence twice a year. The EU Military Committee is the highest and most important military body within the Council.

1.5. Military Staff of the European Union

The next body, which was created from the perspective of strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy, is the Military Staff of the European Union. It can be stated that the Military Staff is a source of expert knowledge on issues related to the European Union military. It is responsible for three core operational functions. They embrace:

- Early warnings
- Assessment of the situation
- Strategic planning

The Council decision specifies that the Military Staff is placed under the direction of the EU Military Committee and clearly defines the tasks. The Military Staff is responsible for, among other things:

- Supporting the High Representative and EU bodies with military expertise.
- Observing and analyzing probable crises. The analysis relies on multinational as well as national intelligence capabilities. It also cooperates with the Situation Centre
- Carrying out forward-looking military strategies. They are intended to enable the Member States to assess the military expenditure requirements
- Identification and mapping of European national and multinational forces that are prepared and deployed for European Union-led missions with the support and cooperation of NATO
- Supporting the development and preparation of countries and multinational forces available to the European Union through the Member States
- Organising and overseeing procedures with national and multinational HQs, including NATO HQs made available to the European Union, and ensuring, as far as possible, compatibility with NATO procedures
- Contributing to the military aspects of the fight against terrorism in the framework of the CSDP
- Contributing to the development of concepts, doctrines, plans, and procedures for the use of military assets and capabilities in carrying out natural or man-made disaster consequence management operations
- Formation of permanent relations with NATO
- Definition and estimation of costs of military operations and exercise
- Maintaining contacts and concluding agreements with relevant UN and other international organisations
- Responsibility for directing strategic contingency planning at the initiative of the High Representative
- Developing plans and procedures for the European Union Operations Centre
- Ensure the readiness of personnel and equipment to conduct operations

- Responsibility for the facilities and equipment, for the implementation of innovations and the replacement of facilities, as well as for the headquarters and premises of the European Union Operations Centre

In case of situations requiring crisis management, the Military Staff receives additional tasks: Meaning:

- “It requests and processes specific information from the intelligence organisations and other relevant information from all available sources.
- It supports the EUMC in its contributions to Initial Planning Guidance and Planning Directives of the Political and Security Committee (PSC).
- It identifies in coordination with national planning staff and, as appropriate, NATO, the forces that might participate in possible EU-led operations.
- It assists the operation commander in technical exchanges with third countries offering military contributions to an EU-led operation, and in the preparation of the force generation conference.
- Upon a request of DCPCC to DGEUMS, it assists with crisis-response planning at the strategic and operational level for civilian missions carried out under the responsibility of the DCPCC”.

In the case of direct operations, the Military Staff is given special tasks again. Therefore:

- “The EUMS, acting under the direction of the EUMC, continuously monitors all the military aspects of operations.
- It conducts strategic analysis in liaison with the designated operation commander to support the EUMC in its advisory role to the PSC in charge of the strategic direction.
- In the light of political and operational developments, it provides the EUMC with new options as a basis for EUMC's military advice to the PSC.
- It contributes to the key nucleus reinforced, and to further augmentation, as required, of the EU Ops Centre.
- It provides the permanent key nucleus of the EU Ops Centre
- t assists in coordinating civilian operations”.

In situations that require crisis management as well as in crisis management exercises, the Military Staff of the European Union is capable of creating teams that will have the task of planning and management. Where even more assistance is needed in this regard, the Military Staff of the European Union, through the Military Committee, has the right to request that personnel for temporary support be made available to the Member States.

3. Challenges and opportunities

The current global situation requires greater activation of the EU Member States in the area of defence. Defence in the broadest sense of the word. It should be stressed that the common defence policy depends directly on the structure and state of the arms industry. The concentration of the arms industry in the US and deconcentration in the EU is unacceptable. Economies of scale, the basis of the whole integration process for the EU is absent in the industry sector. The comparative advantage of the US is enormous. The USA is the largest arms exporter, but this is the economies of scale, most often 2 or 3 companies in a given industry (aviation, maritime, land).

Table 2: Share in global arms exports (%).

Country	2005	2012	2015
USA	33	30	29
France	6	7	6
Germany	7	6	6
Great Britain	7	5	7

Source: SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) various reports.

Meanwhile, there is a very high degree of fragmentation in the EU. For example, military planes are produced by 9 companies, floating equipment by more than 30, land weapons by more than 60! Unless there is a similar concentration as in the civil aviation industry, the EU will not be able to compete and will have to import arms from the US. It is a pity that Poland is already doing this.

The European Union fails to exploit the potential of the internal market in the area of arms production, although there are first attempts to do so, such as the Eurofighter, which is of interest to many European armies. Many EU countries buy aircraft in the USA without "feeling the business" for Europe. Airbus GMBH (military sector) is constantly inviting other European companies to cooperate to reduce costs and continuously modernize the industry. The European security policy is closely correlated with progress towards a federation of the European Union. There can be no common security policy without a common international representation and a common army. On the other hand, the Union will not be considered a global player unless it creates a military and defence power comparable to its commercial and industrial power. Given the current situation, this is possible, but will it be possible in 20 years? Despite the lack of agreement on the specific shape of the EU's defence policy, we have seen in recent years a resurgence of awareness of "the need to give real substance to the Union's obvious vocation to act as a global force, which cannot be done without having a real defence and security policy" (Kuźniar R. 2018).

In the face of Brexit and D. Tramp's foreign policy, as well as the pressure of external threats, this time it seems realistic to build a framework structure for defence policy.

The launch of the European Defence Fund in 2017 was a clear signal of a specific action. This is essential for the consolidation of the European defence industry (funding for Union defence programmes is to come from the Union budget). This should foster further integration of the defence industries in the EU and slowly lead to a simple fact! There are also economies of scale in this industry.

According to many experts, there is also scope for deeper integration in this area among fewer countries (Biscop S. 2017). This is particularly possible because of the withdrawal from the EU of the United Kingdom, which has a second army in the EU and also given the actions of countries such as Poland, which even disregard the EU's actions in favour of further federation.

In addition, there is the pressure from external threats (Russia), increased efforts to play a greater role in the Pacific (China), and increased efforts by the US to modernise and arm the military. It seems to be beneficial to the security of the Union that the United States spends more on armaments than in the past, but it is an apparent benefit.

The US has a global interest and the US army, the only imperial army in the world, does not intend to focus too much on Europe, or rather on the Pacific, in the face of the growing power of China. What is important is that many countries are very keen to participate in this project and there is a chance that this time it will work! (Kuźniar R.2018).

However, experts are wondering what the shape of this common army and defence strategy should be, because it is difficult to take US defence policy as a model, even in terms of the amount of expenditure (Biscop S. 2017, Kuźniar R. 2018, Bartels H.P., 2017).

Well, the "European Army" should have an outstandingly defensive character and not a global-aggressive one, which the US Army has. Why? Firstly, there is no political will for the Union to play out its imperial policy in the world (in the USA there is such a will, even for ordinary citizens), and secondly, the Union cannot afford to 'catch up' with a powerful American army at sea and in the air, because no one will agree to double the expenditure on arms. Moreover, as provided in the constitutional provisions, the US Navy is supposed to defend the interests of the US around the world, which is why this navy is the most powerful, with 11 super aircraft carriers at the forefront (there are only 5 more in active service in the world, with poor parameters!). As practice in recent years has shown, no one can compete with America in this area, because no one has such technical, industrial, logistical and financial facilities! And the aircraft carriers are a manifestation of power, enormous impact force and the ability to operate around the world, which everyone can only envy the USA!

We must remember that Russia has been "flexing its muscles" for years, but it is not reflected anything, because the only aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, due to defects and high costs of repair, was withdrawn, and another, unfinished, sold to China ("Liaoning").

If the cost of the last launched carrier USS Gerard Ford exceeds 11 billion US dollars, it is clear that the Americans are unrivalled here! No one has ever owned such a navy in the history of the world!

Just look at military spending in 2017 in the USA, Russia, and China:

Table 3: Military expenditure in 2018 in the world (in billion USD).

Country	2015	2018
USA	620	679
China	187	250
Saudi Arabia	56	68
India	54	66
France	61	63
Russia	72	61

Source: Own calculations based on national statistical yearbooks, adjusted by SIPR data (Stockholm International Institute for Peace Research).

That is alright, we (Europeans) like it because we can concentrate on our own continent's defence policy, without "circulating" around the world (the British are withdrawing from building more ships of this type, the French cannot afford it, Russia cannot do it).

The maritime and air corps of the EU are under preliminary discussion, which seems to be fully justified, as there is no need to centralise all defence at once, as for the time being, land forces may be in the hands of the Member States. This is, of course, to be done in parallel with the NATO presence.

4. What should Poland choose?

It seemed that after our country's accession to the EU, the answer was simple: Poland should be an active player in favour of the EU's Common Defence Policy. This was the case until 2015, but unfortunately, it is different now; the Polish government is blindly moving in a 'transatlantic' direction, completely disregarding discussions on this subject in Europe, and even favouring bilateral relations with the USA. This is, of course, beneficial for both Trump and Putin!

Meanwhile, it puts us in a very unfavourable position in terms of our strategic, political and economic security, because NATO and the USA provide us with military security (in

front of Russia) but are unable to provide security at a substrategic level. Russia has here open economic, social and political opportunities to destabilize our country (Kuźniar R.2018).

In this case, only an integrated and increasingly federal Union can provide us with security for future generations.

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