Academic Scientific JournalsThe assessment of selected standards of corporate governance in companies with State Treasury shareholding: Comparative Analysis
Keywords:
The State Treasury, Corporate governance, State Owned CompanyAbstract
State Treasury as a shareholder is on the one hand is a portfolio investor, which is seen as a factor weakening activity, and on the other hand is a long-term investor, which may increase the motivation to get involved in the affairs of companies. The advent of the Treasury in the shareholding of a company entails also consequences for its statutory bodies. The current Polish regulations govern the issues concerning the possibility of appointing their representatives to supervisory boards by the State Treasury and the level of remuneration of management board members. Due to these privileges the State Treasury may have a significant impact on the standards of corporate governance in the company.
The aim of this article is to evaluate selected standards of corporate governance in companies with State Treasury shareholding. I have examined which provisions, providing additional powers to the State Treasury and also limiting these powers, are found in the statutes of companies with State Treasury shareholding. These provisions were juxtaposed with the provisions concerning standards of corporate governance contained in the comparable sample of listed companies. The analysis was also to compare how in practice the State Treasury (in the case of companies with State Treasury shareholding) and a dominant shareholder (in the case of private listed companies) use powers resulting from their statutory documents.
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