How to Reduce State Expenditures with Single Resolution Mechanism

Authors

  • Michal Janovec Masaryk University

Keywords:

state aid, single resolution mechanism, bank recovery, taxpayers, bail in

Abstract

State aid is one of the wrong ways how to help any private entity when there is no other option, but in certain cases it is necessary from the larger point of view to do so. At least we were used to it especially in cases of big financial (or another) institutions, which are too big to fail, and it might be reasonable to “save” these entities to prevent bigger economic and social loss. For example, when bank fails, then many creditors lose their savings (although there is the deposit guarantee schemes), so they might stop using banking system, many people would lose their jobs (extra social expenses for state). This will all lead to reduce investing money for investors or consumers and that’s basically wrong for economy itself. On the other hand, state aid is highly negative for competition, because all those private entities without any need for state aid are disadvantaged. And finally, its taxpayer’s money, used for state aid and its big state expenditure for any country. The only way how to maintain good and healthy economic system without state aid is prevention. One of the preventions is Single resolution mechanism.

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References

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Legal Acts

Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15th May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/30/EU.

Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010 and (EU) No. 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council. Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (hereinafter the BRRD Directive’).

Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15th July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 (hereinafter the ‘SRM Regulation’).

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European commission, Deposit Guarantee Schemes, 2021. Available at: http://srb.europa.eu/, accessed: 22nd November 2021.

Services of European Commission Directorate, General Internal Market, Discussion paper on the debt write-down tool – bail-in (A working document), Brussels 2011.

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Coppola, F.: When bad banks fight each other. Forbes, 22.5.2015 [online]. 2015. Available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2015/05/22/when-bad-banks-fight-each-other/, accessed: 22nd November 2021.

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Published

28.10.2021

How to Cite

Janovec , M. . (2021). How to Reduce State Expenditures with Single Resolution Mechanism. Financial Law Review, (24(4), 177–193. Retrieved from https://czasopisma.bg.ug.edu.pl/index.php/flr/article/view/6534

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