Judicial Power and Democracy

Authors

  • Martin M. Shapiro University of California, Berkeley

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26881/gsp.2026.2.02

Keywords:

courts, judicial review, incrementalism, rights, balancing, proportionality

Abstract

The analysis asks how the courts endowed with the power of judicial review get away with it by building up popular credit through doing things people like and then can occasionally draw on that credit by doing something they don’t like. The Author attacks the problem of how they get away with it by constructing several building blocks of success (federalism – separation of powers – judicial independence – legal profession – constitutional rights). He argues that even though each successful review court is constructed of some of them but not necessarily all of them and not all of them necessarily of the same ones, successful review will always be built from and rooted in the judicial independence. The analysis opines that ultimately the judicial review will survive only if the court wielding that power acts with sufficient prudence or strategic sense not to offend the majoritarian rule too deeply. This is a question though of political skill and as such impossible to calibrate and calculate in advance.

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Published

2026-06-15

How to Cite

Shapiro, M. M. (2026). Judicial Power and Democracy. Gdańsk Legal Studies, (2(71)/2026), 21–35. https://doi.org/10.26881/gsp.2026.2.02