Doktryna konieczności jako uzasadnienie dla rozproszonej kontroli konstytucyjności ustaw w Polsce

Abstrakt

The Author of the article accepts the thesis on the monopoly of the Constitutional Tribunal in regard to deciding on the compliance of laws with the Constitution in the conditions of its proper functioning, however, he expresses the opinion that courts may exceptionally undermine legal provisions in a given case on the basis of the so-called doctrine of necessity. The doctrine of necessity seeks to preserve the fundamental values encoded in the Constitution in a situation of the blockage or obvious deligitimization of the Constitutional Tribunal. The Author is convinced that courts as part of the process of administering justice are obliged to secure the citizen’s right to a fair trial directly on the basis of the Constitution. According to the Author, if in the course of a lawsuit it is impossible to eliminate contradictions between constitutional and statutory norms by the interpretation consistent with the Constitution and at the same time it is not possible to obtain a judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal which does not raise unquestionable legal doubts, the court itself has the power to resolve the collision of norms.