Judicial “Independence” in Belarus: Theory and Practice
The aim of the article is to understand the reasons why the Belarusian judicial system is totally dependent and to show the legal mechanisms that were used by the executive to achieve this. The creation of a super-presidential form of government and authoritarian political regime gave the president of Belarus crucial influence on the judiciary through the processes of selecting, appointing and reappointing and dismissing judges, and determining their remuneration and social packages.
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