Truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. What are we looking for when seeking knowledge?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.26881/kg.2023.1.03

Keywords:

value of knowledge, truth, epistemic goods, Meno Problem, nonfactivism, social epistemology

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to argue that truth is the ultimate goal of knowledge. First, two intuitions are examined which, it is argued, are key in arguing for the inadequacy of truth as an end of cognition. Then, they are addressed by showing, on the one hand, that the problem of the value of knowledge cannot be reduced to its nature and, on the other hand, by arguing that it is possible to reconcile the sufficiency of truth as an end of knowledge with the value of justification in knowledge using the distinction between admirable and desirable goods. It is further shown that the perspective of social epistemology makes it possible to strengthen the role of justification while maintaining the strong thesis of the self-sufficient value of truth for knowledge. Finally, responses are offered to Kelp’s and Elgin’s recent counter-arguments concerning the end of inquiry and the value of falsehoods in knowledge, respectively.

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Published

2023-12-21

How to Cite

Jarczewski OP, D. (2023). Truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. What are we looking for when seeking knowledge?. Karto-Teka Gdańska, (1(12), 40–60. https://doi.org/10.26881/kg.2023.1.03

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