The Question of the Proper Formula of Contemporary Materialism

Abstract

Materialism, at every stage of its intellectual maturation, must decide whether it wants to be a strictly objectivist materialism without a knowing subject, or, conversely, a materialism that postulates the existence of the subject as a necessary position enabling the (self-)knowledge of matter. Materialism is forced to constantly navigate between the fatalism of negative affects liberated by a vision of the world dominated by the spirit of futility, and the euphoria of vitalism, which believes in matter in constant motion and indestructible development. The materialist must decide whether to be a "vulgar materialist" and a naive realist who accepts the world as it appears to us in perception, or whether to choose a transcendental and critical option that examines the conditions of knowledge rather than dogmatic knowledge about the state of matter. The question of materialism is therefore a question of how to avoid the temptation of being a dogmatic materialist. In this text, I address a key dilemma that divides contemporary materialists, who either choose a strictly realist option, believing in the existence of matter without a knowing subject (Quentin Meillassoux), or a vitalist or constructivist option, subjectivizing or vitalizing matter ab origine (Gilles Deleuze). I also attempt to establish the status of contemporary materialisms that go beyond constructivism and transcendentalism. This primarily concerns surrealist materialism (Meillassoux), Thomas Nail's kinetic materialism, and Karen Barad's agential realism. None of these options seem satisfactory because they absolutize certain properties of matter – contingency, entanglement, and motion. In opposition to these materialisms, I propose a procedure of deabsolutization. Deabsolutized materialism finds a place for the concept of construction in reality itself.